Remarks on the policy of the late Dictator.--System of operations
adopted.--The army leaves Warsaw.--Statement of the existing
forces.--Of the forces proposed to be raised.--Unfortunate
consequences of the delay in the preparation of the forces.--Statement
of the force with which the war was actually commenced.
The dictatorship had exercised a most unpropitious influence upon our
affairs.[29] Every movement had been retarded, and the most invaluable
time was lost. Instead of offensive operations, the defensive was now
necessarily taken. We awaited the enemy on our native soil, and exposed
that soil to his insults and outrages. Even, however, at this point,
the patriots called on the government to take the offensive, but it was
too late. An immense Russian army was concentrated upon our frontiers,
and was ready to pass them. Our forces were not strong enough to
defend every point against the enemy's entrance. It was decided to
keep our troops concentrated, and presenting to him always a narrow
and recurvated front, to lead the enemy to the environs of Warsaw, and
to give him a decisive battle there. On about the 20th of January, the
prince Radzivil renewed the orders for the most rapid organization of
all the different corps, and directed those corps which were already
organized to hold themselves in readiness for marching. A division
of lancers which was in the environs of Siedlce, augmented by some
regiments of newly raised light cavalry, occupied, as a corps of
observation, all the country between Wlodawa and Ciechanowiec, and were
ordered to watch every movement of the enemy in that region. On about
the 25th of January, the troops began to leave Warsaw and the other
towns of the department, and to concentrate themselves upon a line
embracing the towns of Siedlce, Ostrolenka, and Lukow.[30]
STATEMENT OF THE EXISTING ARMY, AND OF THE NEW FORCES PROPOSED TO BE
LEVIED.
The whole Polish force under the Russian government, consisted, of
_Infantry_, nine regiments of two battalions each, 19,000 men, and
a battalion of sappers of 1,000 men, in all 20,000; _Cavalry_, nine
regiments of four squadrons each; in all, 7,200; _Artillery_, six
batteries of eight pieces each, and two batteries of light artillery,
also, of eight pieces each; in all, sixty-four pieces. According to
the plans of the Dictator, the infantry was to be augmented in the
following manner. To each of the existing regiments was to be added a
battalion of 1,000, making a total of 9,000 men. He then proposed to
form fifteen new regiments, thus increasing the number of regiments
of infantry to twenty-four. Each one of the new regiments was to be
composed of three battalions of 1,000 men each. The total of these new
regiments would then have been 45,000 men, and the grand total of the
new levy would be 54,000 men. This body of recruits was to be made up
from those of the exempts (their term of service[31] having expired)
who were yet under the age of forty, and from all others under that
age, and above that of sixteen.
Of this force, six thousand men was to be furnished by Warsaw, and an
equal number by each of the eight palatinates. Besides this force, the
enrollment of a national guard at Warsaw of 10,000 men was ordered;
and in forming this body, no exemption was admitted except from age or
bodily infirmity. Each of the eight palatinates was also to enroll a
national guard of a thousand men. Thus the whole national guard was to
consist of 18,000 men.
The cavalry was to be augmented as follows. From the whole
gend'armerie, it was proposed to form a regiment of carabiniers,
consisting of two squadrons of two hundred men each. To the nine
existing regiments of cavalry it was proposed to add, as a reserve,
four squadrons of two hundred each, making, in all, eight hundred. Ten
new regiments were to be formed, of four squadrons each; so that the
whole number of old and new cavalry would be twenty regiments. The
whole augmentation of this army would amount to 9,200. The raising of
this force, as in the case of the infantry, was to be equally divided
between Warsaw and each of the eight palatinates.
The artillery was to be augmented by four batteries, of eight pieces
each, making a total of thirty-two pieces.
RECAPITULATION.
Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery.
New forces, 54,000 9,200 32 pieces.
Existing forces, 19,000 7,200 64
------ ------ --
Total, 73,000 16,400 96
If we should add to this
number the regiments
formed by the land
proprietors at their own
expense, detachments of
volunteers, foreigners,
and detachments of
partizans, amounting
perhaps to 6,000 2,000
The total might be ------ ------ --
increased to 79,000 18,400 96
This force, although it would seem to be disproportionate to the
resources of the kingdom, it was certainly possible to have raised;
for the energy and spirit of the people were at the highest point, and
every one felt the importance of improving the favorable moment, which
the general state of Europe, and the weakness of Russia, presented.
If the reader will anticipate the course of events, and remember what
a struggle, against the Russian force of more than 200,000 men, was
sustained by the 40,000 only which we actually brought into the field,
he may conjecture what advantages might have been expected from twice
that number, which we should certainly have brought to the field, had
the energy of the government followed out its plans. But from the
incapacity of the Dictator for the energetic execution of his trust,
these forces were never raised, and it was soon seen that Chlopicki,
by assuming a duty to which he was unequal, gave the first blow to the
rising fortunes of his country. The Dictator, as we have seen, had not
even taken a step towards the organization of these forces, and one
would have thought that he had thrown out these plans merely to blind
the eyes of the nation, without having entertained the thought of
taking the field. Two months passed away, the inevitable moment of the
conflict arrived, and the nation was obliged to march to the fight with
half the force which, under an energetic administration, it would have
wielded. If we add to this unfortunate state of things, that, besides
the threatening forces of our gigantic enemy, Prussia and Austria,
at this late moment, and especially the former, had began to take an
attitude of hostility towards us, and thus all hope of sympathy from
her neighbors was lost to Poland, the perilous nature of the crisis
to which the delay of the dictatorial government had brought us, thus
unprepared, may be imagined. But Poland did not suffer herself to be
discouraged by all these unpropitious circumstances. Trusting to the
righteousness of her cause, she went forth to the contest, determined
to fall or to be free.
STATEMENT OF THE FORCES WITH WHICH THE WAR WAS ACTUALLY COMMENCED.
A great exactitude in the computation of these forces would be
obviously impracticable, as the precise number of the detachments of
volunteers, occasionally joining the army, serving in a particular
locality only, and often perhaps for a limited period, cannot be
ascertained; but it will not be difficult to make a pretty near
approximation to the truth.
At the beginning of the campaign, the forces were divided into four
divisions of infantry, four of cavalry, and twelve batteries of
artillery, of eight pieces each.
The whole infantry consisted of:
The nine existing regiments, enlarged
by one battalion to each regiment,
making in all, 27,000
One battalion of sappers, 1,000
A tenth regiment, of two battalions,
called 'The Children of Warsaw,' 2,000
A battalion of volunteers, added to
the 4th regiment, 1,000
Different detachments of volunteers, as
the detachments of Michael Kuszel,
and the Kurpie or Foresters, &c., 1,600
------
Total of infantry, 32,600
The four divisions of infantry were nearly equal, consisting of from 7
to 8,000 men each. To each of these divisions a corps of 250 sappers
was attached. The divisions were commanded as follows; 1st division
by general Krukowiecki; 2d division, general Zymirski; 3d division,
general Skrzynecki; 4th division, general Szembek.
The cavalry consisted of the nine existing
regiments, 7,200
Four squadrons, added to these as a reserve, 800
Two squadrons of carabiniers, 400
Two regiments of krakus or light cavalry,
of Podlasia and Lublin, 1,600
Two regiments of Mazurs, 1,600
Six squadrons of Kaliszian cavalry, 1,200
Two squadrons of lancers of Zamoyski, 400
------
Total of cavalry, 13,200
This cavalry, which was composed of 66 squadrons, was divided into four
nearly equal bodies. They were commanded as follows. 1st division,
by general Uminski, consisting of 15 squadrons; 2d division, general
Stryinski, 15 squadrons; 3d division, general Lubinski, 15 squadrons;
4th division, making the reserve, under general Pac, 17 squadrons.
Besides those divisions, four squadrons were designated for the corps
of general Dwernicki.
The artillery was divided into 12 batteries of eight pieces each,
making in all 96 pieces.
The general statement of the forces with which the campaign was
commenced is then as follows:
_Infantry_, 32,600. _Cavalry_, 13,200. _Artillery_, 96 pieces.
This incredibly small number marched to the combat against a Russian
force of at least 200,000 men and 300 cannon. In fact, by the reports
of field marshal Diebitsch, found after his retreat, and the detailed
statements confidently made in the Berlin Gazette, the Russian forces
amounted to 300,000; but we reject one third on the supposition that
the regiments had not been entirely completed. If the very thought
of commencing a war with such disproportionate means, against so
overwhelming a force, should seem to the reader to be little better
than madness, he will appreciate the energy and courage with which it
was supported, when he learns that in _twenty days_, from the 10th of
February to the 2d of March, _thirteen_ sanguinary battles were fought
with the enemy, besides twice that number of small skirmishes, in
which, as we shall see, that enemy was uniformly defeated, and a full
third part of his forces annihilated.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 29: The dictatorship may be said to have been the first of
our misfortunes. The Dictator, acting in contradiction to the spirit
of the revolution, did not take advantage of that enthusiasm with
which the revolution commenced and by which prodigies might have been
achieved. But not only did he neglect to make use of that enthusiasm,
or to foster it, he even took measures which had a tendency to repress
it. The first fault with which he was reproached by the Patriotic Club,
was his having given permission to the Grand Duke to leave the kingdom
with his corps, taking with them their arms and accoutrements, which
were really Polish property. The retaining of the Grand Duke would have
been of the greatest importance to us. No historian could have blamed
such an act; for if the justice of our revolution be once acknowledged,
every energetic and decisive act which would favor its happy result
must also be justified in the view of history. The Russians indeed have
regarded our conduct on this point as an indication of weakness and
timidity rather than as an act of delicacy and magnanimity, in which
light Chlopicki intended that it should be considered. That same corps,
attached to the Grand Duke, consisting, as we have said, of 7,000 men
and 24 cannon, with the Grand Duke himself, did not regard it in this
light, for they fought against us in the very first battle. Another
fault of general Chlopicki was, not to have taken immediately the
offensive, passed the Bug, and entered the brother provinces which had
been incorporated with Russia. The Russian troops, especially those in
Lithuania, were not in a state to resist the first impetuosity of our
national forces. The Russian soldiers, as the reader probably knows,
are not, except in the large cities, concentrated in barracks, as in
other states of Europe, but are dispersed in quarters throughout the
country, in small bodies; so that sometimes a single regiment may
be spread to a circumference which may embrace eighty to a hundred
villages, with perhaps from ten to thirty soldiers only, in each. In
fact, the soldiers of a company may have often from six to twelve
miles march to reach the quarters of their captain. All this made the
concentration of these forces an affair of time and difficulty; and
one regiment after another could have been fallen upon, and their
whole forces annihilated in detail, and that without much effusion of
blood. Besides this, the Russian corps of Lithuania was composed, in
part, of our brethren enrolled in that province, and even commanded, in
part, by officers natives of that province. They would of course have
united themselves with us, and the revolution would have spread, with
the rapidity of lightning, to the very borders of the Dwina and the
Dnieper; and after this, not four millions alone, but sixteen millions
of Poles, would have been united in one cause. At a later period, all
this was no longer possible. Russia began to become alive to the danger
of the occurrence of such a state of things, and all the regiments with
Polish soldiers in their ranks were withdrawn into the interior, and
three hundred Polish officers in the Russian service were sent to take
commands in regiments posted in the regions about the Caucasus, in Asia.
The Dictator, who gave as a reason for not having taken the above
course, that the neighboring cabinets would have taken umbrage at
it as a violation of a foreign territory, can with difficulty be
conceived to have really felt that this would have been the case. Even
if such apprehensions were well founded, are diplomatic formalities
to be regarded, on an occasion like this? Should we, in such a cause,
forbear, from apprehensions of this kind, to press on to the delivery
of our brethren from the despotism under which they were suffering?
But, in fact, the true interests of those cabinets were to be found
in, what every sagacious observer of European history has pointed out
as the great safeguard of Europe, the establishment of the Polish
kingdom as a barrier against the threatening preponderance of our
barbarous enemy. It was indeed ridiculous to require of the Poles that
they should regard, as their only limits, the little kingdom into
which the violence and fraud of the combined sovereigns had contracted
them. The Poles, in entering those provinces, would have been still on
the soil of their ancient country; and, in fact, the revolution was
equally justifiable at Wilna, Kiow, and Smolensk, as at Warsaw. The
patriots, indeed, who began the latter, did not think of their own
sufferings alone, they bore in mind also the even greater sufferings
of their brethren who were more absolutely in the power of despotism.
It was indeed the great end of the patriots and of the nation, the
union of all the provinces of ancient Poland, which was abandoned by
the Dictator. Nothing else, in fact, but the forcing of the frontiers,
would have subdued the arrogance of the Emperor, and forced him to
listen to our claims. The unanimous voice of sixteen millions of Poles
could not have safely been despised. This compulsory amelioration of
our condition would have also spared Nicholas the remorse with which he
must reflect on the sacrifice of nearly 200,000 lives, and the death or
suffering to which he has condemned, and is still condemning, the best
spirits of Poland.]
[Footnote 30: I cannot forbear to dwell for a moment upon the occasion
of the departure of our troops from Warsaw and the other towns. It was
one of the fine and touching moments of our revolution. Every friend of
liberty would have desired to have brought together all the autocrats
of the world to witness the animation with which our national troops
went forth to engage in the combat for liberty. Perhaps they would
have been involuntarily struck with the conviction that this liberty
must be a blessing when men will sacrifice themselves so cheerfully
to achieve it. When the march was commenced, all the inhabitants of
the neighboring country left their homes to witness the departure,
and all the plains about Warsaw and the road sides between Warsaw and
Siedlce were covered with people. The soldiers, in marching through
the streets of the city, passed between lines of people composed of
senators, officers of the government, the clergy, children from the
schools, the members of the national guard, and in short an immense
assembly of both sexes, reaching even to two miles beyond Praga. All
the regiments passed in review before the general in chief, and each
regiment took the oath to defend their country to the last drop of
their blood. Exclamations such as these were constantly uttered: 'Dear
General, if you see us turn from before the enemy, point the artillery
against us, and annihilate our ranks.' The fourth regiment, the bravest
of the brave, knowing that our magazines were ill provided with powder,
refused at first to receive any cartridges; but on the remonstrance of
the chief, they agreed to take thirty each man, (half of the complement
for one battle,) saying that they would furnish themselves afterwards
from the Russians. They then entreated the commander in chief never to
send them against a smaller body of the enemy than a division, and to
use them wherever a decisive blow was required. 'Forget, dear general,'
said they, 'that we have no powder; but trust to our bayonets!'
It was truly affecting to witness the parting of the soldiers from
their friends and relatives,--fathers taking leave of children,
children of fathers, husbands of wives,--and to hear the cries of
sorrow mingled with animating shouts and patriotic hymns. These are
moments of which I am unequal to the description; but which every
freeman will form a conception of,--moments of the struggle between
domestic happiness and public duty; moments which show that the love
of country is the most powerful of all sentiments, and that men will
sacrifice every thing under its impulses.]
[Footnote 31: A service of ten years in the army, in person, or by
substitute, was required by law of every citizen.]