of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out of the
depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to listen to
his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the gods were on
their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he recalled to their
memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes,--how the vast
hosts of Persia had been disgracefully repelled. The army had shown
themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy of such forefathers; and they
would for the future be yet bolder, knowing by that battle of what
stuff the Persians were made. As for Ariaeus and his troops, alike
traitors and cowards, their desertion was rather a gain than a loss. The
enemy were superior in horsemen: but men on horseback were after all
only men, half occupied in the fear of losing their seats--incapable of
prevailing against infantry firm on the ground,--and only better able to
run away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with provisions to
buy, they on their side were released from their covenant, and would
take provisions without buying. Then as to the rivers; those were indeed
difficult to be crossed, in the middle of their course; but the army
would march up to their sources, and could then pass them without
wetting the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of
retreat, and establish themselves permanently in the King's own country,
defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians.[43] "If (said
Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with
these tall, stately and beautiful Median and Persian women for our
companions--we shall be only too ready, like the Lotos-eaters,[44] to
forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and tell our
countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault, when there
are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who choose to come,
and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our baggage wagons and
tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity.
Above all things, let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to
the commanders, upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every
man promise to lend his hand to the commanders in punishing any
disobedient individuals; and let us thus show the enemy that we have ten
thousand persons like Klearchus, instead of that one whom they have so
perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man, however
obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward and state
it; for we have all but one object--the common safety."
It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that the speech
of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for when Cheirisophus put the
question, that the meeting should sanction his recommendations, and
finally elect the new generals proposed--every man held up his hand.
Xenophon then moved that the army should break up immediately, and march
to some well-stored villages, rather more than two miles distant; that
the march should be in a hollow square, with the baggage in the centre;
that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedaemonian, should lead the van; while
Kleanor, and the other senior officers, would command on each
flank,--and himself with Timasion, as the two youngest of the generals,
would lead the rear guard.
This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up;
proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another, every
man's superfluous baggage--and then to take their morning meal previous
to the march.
The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more than
one point of view. It exhibits that susceptibility to the influence of
persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature in the Grecian
character--a resurrection of the collective body out of the depth of
despair, under the exhortation of one who had no established ascendency,
nor anything to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical
power, and his community of interest with themselves. Next, it
manifests, still more strikingly, the superiority of Athenian training
as compared with that of other parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not
only been before in office as one of the generals, but was also a native
of Sparta, whose supremacy and name was at that moment all-powerful;
Kleanor had been before, not indeed a general, but a captain, or one in
the second rank of officers:--he was an elderly man--and he was an
Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the army consisted of
Arcadians and Achaeans.[45] Either of these two therefore, and various
others besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established
starting-point, for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited
army. But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military
experience:--he was not an officer at all, either in the first or second
grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus:--he was moreover a
native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among the great body of
Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians,[46] with whom her recent long
war had been carried on. Not only therefore he had no advantages
compared with others, but he was under positive disadvantages. He had
nothing to start with except his personal qualities and previous
training; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover, but
also the superior person for whom the others make way. In him are
exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not less by the
denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of her own
citizens,--spontaneous and forward impulse, as well in conception as in
execution--confidence under circumstances which made others
despair--persuasive discourse and publicity of discussion, made
subservient to practical business, so as at once to appeal to the
intelligence, and stimulate the active zeal, of the multitude. Such
peculiarities stood out more remarkably from being contrasted with the
opposite qualities in Spartans--mistrust in conception, slackness in
execution, secrecy in counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though
Spartans and Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other
Greeks stood nearer on this point to the former than to the latter.
If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately upon the
great Athenian catastrophe[47] before Syracuse, the inertia of Sparta
could not be stirred into vigorous action without the vehemence of the
Athenian Alkibiades--much more was it necessary, under the depressing
circumstances which now overclouded the unofficered Grecian army, that
an Athenian bosom should be found as the source of new life and
impulse. Nor would any one, probably, except an Athenian, either have
felt or obeyed the promptings to stand forward as a volunteer at that
moment, when there was every motive to decline responsibility, and no
special duty to impel him. But if by chance a Spartan or an Arcadian had
been found thus forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as
would enable him to work on the minds of others--of that flexibility,
resource, familiarity with the temper and movements of an assembled
crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and touching the opportune
chords, which Athenian democratical training imparted. Even Brasidas and
Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid merit, and equal or superior
to Xenophon in military resource, would not have combined with it that
political and rhetorical accomplishment which the position of the latter
demanded. Obvious as the wisdom of his propositions appears, each of
them is left to him not only to initiate, but to enforce: Cheirisophus
and Kleanor, after a few words of introduction, consign to him the duty
of working up the minds of the army to the proper pitch.
How well he performed this, may be seen by his speech to the army, which
bears in its general tenor a remarkable resemblance to that of
Perikles[48] addressed to the Athenian public in the second year of the
war,[49] at the moment when the miseries of the epidemic, combined with
those of invasion, had driven them almost to despair. It breathes a
strain of exaggerated confidence, and an undervaluing of real dangers,
highly suitable for the occasion, but which neither Perikles nor
Xenophon would have employed at any other moment. Throughout the whole
of his speech, and especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at
hand which interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that
skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience, and a given
situation, which characterized more or less every educated Athenian.
Other Greeks, Lacedaemonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery and in
concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could think,
speak, and act, with equal efficiency. It was this threefold
accomplishment which an aspiring youth was compelled to set before
himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens; and which the
Sophists[50] as well as the democratical institutions--both of them so
hardly depreciated by most critics--helped and encouraged him to
acquire. It was this threefold accomplishment, the exclusive possession
of which, in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Boeotian officers
and comrades of Proxenus, elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent
person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time when
it broke up,--as will be seen in the subsequent history.
I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,--that the
accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such
extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to his army,
were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to the Athenian
democracy and education--because Xenophon himself has throughout his
writings treated Athens not merely without the attachment of a citizen,
but with feelings more like the positive antipathy of an exile. His
sympathies are all in favor of the perpetual drill, the mechanical
obedience, the secret government proceedings, the narrow and prescribed
range of ideas, the silent and deferential demeanor, the methodical,
though tardy, action--of Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his
preference, certain it is, that the qualities whereby he was himself
enabled to contribute so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army,
and to his own reputation--were Athenian far more than Spartan.
While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of Xenophon,
were taking their morning meal before they commenced their march,
Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached to Cyrus, appeared
with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended friendship. But it was
soon found out that his purposes were treacherous, and that he came
merely to seduce individual soldiers to desertion--with a few of whom he
succeeded. Accordingly, the resolution was taken to admit no more
heralds or envoys.
Sec. 6. The Greeks cross the Zab.
Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army now
crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the other side,
having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and Cheirisophus
leading the van, with a select body of 300 heavy-armed foot-soldiers. As
no mention is made of a bridge, we are to presume that they forded the
river,--which furnishes a ford still commonly used, at a place between
thirty and forty miles from its junction with the Tigris. When they had
got a little way forward, Mithridates again appeared with a few hundred
cavalry and bowmen. He approached them like a friend; but as soon as he
was near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of
missiles. What surprises us most, is, that the Persians, with their very
numerous force, made no attempt to hinder them from crossing so very
considerable a river; for Xenophon estimates the Zab at 400 feet
broad,--and this seems below the statement of modern travellers, who
inform us that it contains not much less water than the Tigris; and
though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much narrower at any
fordable place. It is to be recollected that the Persians, habitually
marching in advance of the Greeks, must have reached the river first,
and were therefore in possession of the crossing, whether bridge or
ford. Though on the watch for every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernes
did not dare to resist the Greeks, even in the most advantageous
position, and ventured only upon sending Mithridates to harass the rear;
which he executed with considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of
the Greeks, few in number, were at the same time inferior to those of
the Persians; and when Xenophon employed his rear-guard, heavy-armed
foot-soldiers and light-armed foot-soldiers, to charge and repel them,
he not only could never overtake any one, but suffered much in getting
back to rejoin his own main body. Even when retiring, the Persian
horseman could discharge his arrow or cast his javelin[51] behind him
with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians exhibited afterwards still
more signally, and which the Persian horsemen of the present day
parallel with their carbines.[52] This was the first experience which
the Greeks had of marching under the harassing attack of cavalry. Even
the small detachment of Mithridates greatly delayed their progress; so
that they accomplished little more than two miles, reaching the villages
in the evening, with many wounded, and much discouragement.
"Thank Heaven" (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus
reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge
cavalry, whom yet he could not reach), "Thank Heaven, that our enemies
attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their great
numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing us any
serious harm." Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders organized
during the night and during the halt of the next day, a small body of
fifty cavalry; with 200 Rhodian[53] slingers, whose slings, furnished
with leaden bullets, both carried farther and struck harder than those
of the Persians hurling large stones. On the ensuing morning, they
started before daybreak, since there lay in their way a ravine
difficult to pass. They found the ravine undefended (according to the
usual stupidity of Persian proceedings), but when they had got nearly a
mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared in pursuit with a body of 4000
horsemen and darters. Confident from his achievement of the preceding
day, he had promised, with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks
into the hands of the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared.
As soon as he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,--and forthwith
the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the
Persians, sustained by the heavy-armed foot-soldiers in the rear. So
effective was the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay,
notwithstanding their superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded
their flight that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made.
The Greek soldiers of their own accord mutilated the dead bodies, in
order to strike terror into the enemy. At the end of the day's march,
they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa, the vast,
massive, and lofty brick walls of which (25 feet in thickness, 100 feet
high, seven miles in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near
this place was a stone pyramid, 100 feet in breadth, and 200 feet high;
the summit of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighboring
villages. Another day's march up the course of the Tigris brought the
army to a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the
modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have
formed the continuation of (or the substitute for) the once colossal
Nineveh[54] or Ninus, were completely deserted,--yet the country around
them was so well furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks
not only obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new
bows, and lead for bullets to be used by the slingers.
During the next day's march, in a course generally parallel with the
Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming up along with
some other grandees, and with a numerous army, enveloped the Greeks both
in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers, he did not
venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and
stones. He was however so well answered by the newly-trained archers and
slingers of the Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in
spite of the superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken
and effectively employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night in
a well-stocked village, they halted there the next day in order to stock
themselves with provisions, and then pursued their march for four
successive days along a level country, until on the fifth day they
reached hilly ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All
this march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch
that though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable
number of their men were wounded. Experience taught them, that it was
inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible, undivided,
hollow square; and they accordingly constituted six regiments of 100 men
each, subdivided into companies of 50, and smaller companies of 25, each
with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to move
separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in, as might
suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from impediments in
the road or menaces of the enemy. On reaching the hills, in sight of an
elevated citadel or palace, with several villages around it, the Greeks
anticipated some remission of the Persian attack. But after having
passed over one hill, they were proceeding to ascend the second, when
they found themselves assailed with unwonted vigor by the Persian
cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were seen flogging on the
men to the attack. This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light
troops were driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the
ranks of the heavy-armed foot-soldiers. After a march both slow and full
of suffering, they could only reach their night-quarters by sending a
detachment to get possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus
became afraid of a double attack.
The villages which they now reached were unusually rich in provisions;
magazines of flour, barley, and wine, having been collected there for
the Persian satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to
tend the numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most
competent persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day
they resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had
now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue in march under the
attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes appeared and began to
harass them, they halted at the first village, and when thus in station,
easily repelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian assailants
began to retire; for they were always in the habit of taking up their
night-post at a distance of near seven miles from the Grecian position;
being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in their camp, when their
horses were tied by the leg and without either saddle or bridle. As
soon as they had departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so
much advance during the night, that the Persians did not overtake them
either on the next day or the day after.
On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced march by
night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but in occupation of
a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging immediately the road
whereby the Greeks were to descend into the plain. When Cheirisophus
approached, he at once saw that descent was impracticable in the face of
an enemy thus posted. He therefore halted, sent for Xenophon from the
rear, and desired him to bring forward the light-armed foot-soldiers to
the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed the summons in person and
galloped his horse to the front, did not think it prudent to move the
light-armed foot-soldiers from the rear, because he saw Tissaphernes,
with another portion of the army, just coming up; so that the Grecian
army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by the enemy closing
upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground in front could not be
directly assailed. But Xenophon observed, that on the right of the
Grecian army, there was an accessible mountain summit yet higher, from
whence a descent might be made for a flank attack upon the Persian
position. Pointing out this summit to Cheirisophus, as affording the
only means of dislodging the troops in front, he urged that one of them
should immediately hasten with a detachment to take possession of it and
offered to Cheirisophus the choice either of going, or staying with the
army. "Choose for yourself," said Cheirisophus. "Well then (said
Xenophon), I will go; since I am the younger of the two." Accordingly,
at the head of a select detachment from the van and centre of the army,
he immediately commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this
highest summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also
detached troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and
the two detachments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling
with the utmost efforts to get before the other,--each being encouraged
by shouts and clamor from the two armies respectively.
As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them on and
reminding them that their chance of seeing their country and their
families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a
Sikyonian heavy-armed foot-soldier in the ranks, named Soteridas, said
to him--"You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on
horseback:--I am painfully struggling upon foot, with my shield to
carry." Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed
Soteridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his
place, and began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus
weighed down at once by the shield belonging to a heavy-armed
foot-soldier, and by the heavy cuirass[55] of a horseman (who carried no
shield), he nevertheless put forth all his strength to advance under
such double incumbrance, and to continue his incitement to the rest. But
the soldiers around him were so indignant at the proceeding of
Soteridas, that they reproached and even struck him, until they
compelled him to resume his shield as well as his place in the ranks.
Xenophon then remounted and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the
ground permitted; but was obliged again to dismount presently, in
consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic
efforts enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As
soon as the enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and
dispersed in all directions; leaving the forward march open to the main
Grecian army, which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted safely down into
the plain. Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the
summit. All found themselves in comfortable quarters, amidst several
well-stocked villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover
an additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted when on the
point of being transported across the river; where a considerable body
of horse was seen assembled on the opposite bank.