ENGLAND’S FIRST DEMAND GRANTED.
While England and Spain were preparing for war at home and calling
on their allies for support, their diplomatic representatives were
endeavoring to reach an understanding. As stated above, the British
Court had concluded to make no further effort to get satisfaction
through the Spanish ambassador at London, but had sent its own
ambassador, Fitzherbert, to treat directly with the Spanish Court. This
step was decided upon during the exciting days immediately following
the 1st of May. It was nearly the middle of June before Fitzherbert
reached Madrid. In the meantime the British chargé, Merry, had been
instructed to open the renewed negotiation by presenting to the Spanish
Court a memorial setting forth at length the English contention. Leeds
sent instructions for this on May 4.[291]
Having received this communication from Leeds, Merry obtained an
interview with Floridablanca May 16. The Spanish minister was milder
than usual, but still suspected that England meant to use the matter
as a ground for quarreling. In an endeavor to remove this suspicion,
Merry, read to the Count his own secret and confidential instructions.
Floridablanca observed that if England was really not attempting to
force a quarrel the business might be amicably settled. In the evening,
after the interview, Merry sent to the Spanish minister a copy of the
memorial.[292] In a brief note accompanying it, he expressed great
anxiety to quiet the alarm, and suggested dispatching to London at once
a courier with pacific assurances from Floridablanca, if the Count felt
like giving such.[293]
The British memorial declared that the last Spanish communication[294]
was unsatisfactory even as the transaction had been stated in the
former Spanish note.[295] No satisfaction had been offered for the
insult to the British flag, and the ground stated for releasing the
vessels was not justice, from the English standpoint, but ignorance
on the part of the English commanders and general regard for England
on the part of the Spanish officials. Neither could Great Britain
admit the Spanish claim to exclusive rights of sovereignty, commerce,
and navigation. Besides these reasons, additional information had
arrived[296] telling of more than one captured vessel. It also appeared
that the soil at Nootka had been purchased by a British subject and the
British flag hoisted thereon. Merry was--
to represent in the strongest manner to the Court of Spain that
His Majesty has every reason to expect from the justice and wisdom
of His Catholic Majesty not only the full and entire restitution
of all the said vessels, with their property and crews (or of as
many of them as shall, on fair examination of what can he alleged
on both sides, be found to have been British vessels, entitled as
such to His Majesty’s protection), but also an indemnification to
the individuals concerned in the said vessels for the losses which
they have sustained by their unjust detention and capture, and,
above all, an adequate reparation to His Majesty for an injury done
by an officer commanding His Catholic Majesty’s vessels of war to
British subjects trading under the protection of the British flag
in those parts of the world where the subjects of His Majesty have
an unquestionable right to a free and undisturbed enjoyment of the
benefits of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and also to the
possession of such establishments as they may form, with the consent
of the natives, in places unoccupied by other European nations.
Assurances were given of pacific wishes on the part of England, but a
speedy and explicit answer was demanded.[297]
In this memorial England renewed her demand for satisfaction for the
insult to her flag, and added a demand that Spain indemnify the owners
of the captured vessels. She also rejected absolutely the Spanish claim
to exclusive sovereignty by asserting England’s unquestionable right
to unoccupied portions of the coast in question. Incidentally it is
valuable as a declaration of Great Britain’s position on the question
of the rights of colonization.
Two days after receiving this memorial Floridablanca answered
Merry’s note which accompanied it. He gave the pacific assurances
that the British agent had asked, but in general terms. In keeping
with his peaceful professions he proposed a mutual and proportionate
disarmament. He asserted that His Catholic Majesty knew of the capture
of only one vessel; and it had been trading illicitly, at the time, in
a place occupied by the Spanish.[298]
On the following day Merry replied, expressing his satisfaction with
the pacific intentions of the Spanish Court. He said that he would
gladly dispatch one of the English messengers with the Count’s peaceful
assurances.[299] Fearing lest Floridablanca meant this informal note
as a reply to the British memorial of May 16, he gave the Spanish
minister to understand that he still expected a formal reply.[300]
The British messenger bearing the peaceful assurances left Madrid May
21[301] and arrived in London June 1. Since the reply contained nothing
indicating that Spain would grant the English demands, the armaments
were continued.[302] Another messenger from Merry arrived in London
ten days later with less pacific news. Floridablanca’s language to the
foreign ministers at Aranjuez showed that he still thought that England
was determined to break with Spain. He looked on the English King’s
message to Parliament as almost equivalent to a declaration of war.
England’s advices to all settlements abroad increased his conviction.
Her tone toward Spain he thought insufferable. He still desired peace,
but feared that Spain would be driven to the necessity of defending
herself. Not only had Floridablanca expressed himself thus to the
foreign ministers, but he had made an appeal for money, and the bankers
of Madrid had agreed to furnish some £4,000,000.[303]
Floridablanca’s formal reply to the British memorial reached London
June 15. Merry had received it from the Spanish Court on the 4th of
the same month.[304] It declared that His Catholic Majesty would claim
nothing but what he could base on treaty rights, on the consent of
nations, and on immemorial possession. The discussions with the new
ambassador would turn on these points. If Spanish subjects had gone
beyond these rights they would be punished, and the injured parties
would be indemnified. Spain did not mean to carry her claim to all of
the South Sea, but only to “the Indian continent, islands, and seas,
which by discovery, treaties, or immemorial possession have belonged
and do belong to her by the acknowledgment of all nations.” The Spanish
King denied that Spain’s not having settled any particular spot was
a proof that it did not belong to her. Were this admitted, the Count
argued, any nation might establish herself on the dominions of any
other nation wherever there was not an actual establishment. This, he
said, would be absurd to think of. Satisfaction and indemnification
should rest on the question of right, which was to be settled by the
negotiation.[305]
This review of the essential points of the two memorials shows that the
Courts were as far apart as ever. The conflicting colonial principles
were clearly stated, and each nation stubbornly persisted in its own
view. In his remarks on this communication Merry conceived that there
was little or no room left to expect that any change would occur in
the sentiments of the Spanish Court. He thought that the Spanish delay
had probably been occasioned by the fluctuating advices from France.
He could attribute the conduct of Spain to no other motive than a hope
that her being attacked by England might put France under the necessity
of engaging in the war.[306]
Fitzherbert conducted the English negotiations from this point. His
record as a diplomat was already established. He had negotiated the
treaty of peace with France and Spain in 1783. The next four years he
had been envoy extraordinary to Russia. After that he had been for some
time chief secretary to the lord-lieutenant of Ireland. He had also
been made a member of the privy council. He left London May 9[307] and
went to Paris, where he tarried for some time. His delay at this place
was due partly to sickness, partly to his being engaged in making some
representations to the French Court in connection with Fitzgerald,[308]
and partly to his awaiting written instructions from London to govern
him in his negotiations with Spain.[309] He reached Madrid June 9.[310]
The next day he wrote a note to Floridablanca, who, with the whole
Spanish Court, had gone to Aranjuez. This note announced his presence
and his intention of reaching Aranjuez the same evening. It also
inclosed his credentials signed by the English King.[311]
The following day he had an interview with Floridablanca. Two days
later, June 13, he received his formal introduction to the King and
Queen.[312]
In their interview of June 11 Fitzherbert and Floridablanca exchanged
views on the question in dispute. The former, conceiving that the
memorial given to Merry on June 4 must fall short of His Britannic
Majesty’s just expectations, urged the latter to give him a more
favorable communication. The latter insisted that the paper in question
contained the utmost that Spain ought to grant. He declared that
compliance with the British demand for satisfaction would invalidate
the Spanish claims to sovereignty, rendering further discussion
useless. Therefore the British demand and the Spanish claim, he
maintained, ought to be discussed at the same time. He asked that
Fitzherbert’s statements should be presented in writing. Consequently,
two days later the British ambassador sent a brief memorial presenting
the British demand in language which makes it seem plausible.
Stripped of its verbiage it declares that England desires a peaceable
settlement, but that there can be no further negotiation until Spain
shall have fulfilled three conditions: First, restored the vessels;
secondly, indemnified the injured parties; thirdly, given satisfaction
to the British sovereign for the insult offered to his flag. A
declaration that the Spanish King would grant these demands would be
accepted as ground for the negotiation.[313]
After this first exchange of views with the Spanish minister,
Fitzherbert reported his observations to the British Cabinet. He
thought that Spain was bent on war, and was refusing satisfaction in
hope of inducing England to make reprisals which would serve as a
pretext for demanding French aid. As to her motive, he thought that
she certainly could not hope to regain Gibraltar or her West Indian
possessions; and it could not be to counteract French revolutionary
infection, for everything was quiet in Spain. He believed the real
cause to be Floridablanca’s suspicion that England had designs on
the Spanish colonies. The Spanish minister seemed to count little on
French aid, but to expect substantial help from the United States. Some
advances had been made to that power, and Carmichael, the American
chargé, was much caressed at Court. The American agent thought that his
Government would not be favorable.[314] A few days later, Fitzherbert
expressed his confidence that no encouraging communication had been
received from America. On the contrary, there had recently been marked
symptoms of coldness.[315]
In answer to the British ambassador’s communication of June 13,
Floridablanca replied five days later that he could not consent to
the principles which it laid down. However, for the sake of peace,
he offered to make the declaration proposed, provided one of three
explanations be added: First, the question of insult and satisfaction
should be decided by the arbitration of a king of Europe, to be chosen
by England; or, second, no facts should be admitted in the subsequent
negotiation unless fully established by Great Britain; or, third, the
satisfaction should not prejudice the rights of Spain nor prevent her
from exacting equivalent satisfaction from Great Britain if it should
be found that she had a right to do so.[316] In spite of the evident
fairness of these proposals, they were not accepted. In reporting
them to the British Court, Fitzherbert suggested that he considered
them inadmissible. The English Cabinet seems to have agreed with him.
This makes it appear that England was afraid to submit her case to
the judgment of a third party, even though she had the privilege of
selecting the judge. Further, she seemed unwilling to confine the
negotiation to established facts, or to suffer the consequences in case
the negotiation should show her to have been in the wrong. It appears
that the English Court had decided to force from Spain once and for all
an acknowledgment of the British principle of colonization. Nothing
less would be accepted. It was this, and not simply justice, that she
demanded.
For some time after this the British ambassador received no
communication from the Spanish minister. This was partially accounted
for by accident. On the same day that Floridablanca had written the
document last studied an attempt was made to assassinate him. He was
stabbed by a fanatical Frenchman. The wound was not serious. In letters
of June 24 and 28 Fitzherbert reported that the Count still refused to
see him on the pretense of indisposition, though he was transacting
other business. The Spanish Court had assumed a more pacific attitude
and seemed sincerely desirous of an accommodation. The delay was
continued in hope that a reply would soon be received from London to
the Spanish memorial presented to Merry June 4.[317]
The pacific intentions of the Spanish Court were further shown by the
fact that orders had been given to the commanders of various ports to
treat British war ships, which were hovering in the neighborhood, as
they would be treated in a period of profound peace. Furthermore, in
an informal interview of July 1, Floridablanca said that he had been
busying himself on a plan for an ulterior arrangement which he thought
would entirely fulfill the views and objects of both parties.[318] At
a conference on July 10 the Count presented his plan. The essential
points were: First, Spain should retain exclusive possession of the
Northwest Coast up to and including Nootka; second, from Nootka to
the sixty-first degree the two Crowns should have common rights,
except that south of the fifty-sixth degree British influence should
not extend beyond a certain distance inland; third, Great Britain
should have the right of fishing in the South Sea and of landing and
erecting temporary buildings in unoccupied places, though no English
vessels should approach a Spanish settlement; and fourth, the mutual
rights should not be discussed and the mutual demands for satisfaction
should be waived, in which case Spain would pay the losses on ships
taken at Nootka. Fitzherbert declared the plan inadmissible, but said
that it might possibly be modified to make it acceptable.[319] This is
interesting as foreshadowing in some respects the final settlement.
About the middle of July Fitzherbert received the English reply to the
Spanish memorials of June 4 and June 18. Extended instructions were
given to guide him in his communication to the Spanish Court. These had
been sent from London July 5[320]. In obedience to his instructions,
the British ambassador presented to the Spanish minister on July 17 a
new memorial defining the British views on the point of satisfaction.
With the memorial he inclosed drafts of a proposed Spanish declaration
and a British counter declaration which would be acceptable to
His Britannic Majesty as affording the satisfaction demanded. The
memorial declared that the Spanish communications did not contain
the satisfaction demanded, nor was a plausible ground established
for refusing the demands. To justify these demands it was urged that
there had been no established possession of nor proved sovereignty
over the Nootka region which could have justified the seizure of
British vessels. For such justification there must have been actual
possession and exercise of jurisdiction which had been recognized by
other nations. From the representations of the Spanish Court itself, it
appeared that the Spaniards had undertaken the occupation only a few
days before the seizure of the vessels in question. English subjects
had for many years previously frequented the place and had traded with
the natives without interruption. Hence it was impossible for Spain to
maintain her claim to exclusive jurisdiction. The simple restoration
of the vessels was not sufficient. No reparation had been made for the
insult to the British flag. “In consequence, His majesty finds it
necessary to demand anew in terms most direct and least equivocal the
satisfaction already demanded, and which can not longer be deferred
without consequences which His Majesty desires ardently to avoid.” As
soon as this demand should be met England would be ready to treat with
reference to rights of territorial possessions, commerce, navigation,
and fisheries in that part of the world.[321]
In his private instructions referred to above, Fitzherbert was told
that the giving of satisfaction must amount to an admission that Spain
was not in possession of an actual and known sovereignty at Nootka.
No discussion could take place on this point, it was declared, after
the satisfaction should be given. If Spain could prove her claim to
sovereignty, it must be done before the point of satisfaction should be
reached. If proved, it would remove the ground on which satisfaction
was demanded; but, it was added, no such proof could be adduced. Hence
satisfaction was insisted upon.[322] This was tantamount to saying that
the British Court would not be convinced, no matter what arguments the
Spanish Court might produce. Spain was just as confident that she did
possess sovereignty over Nootka as England was that Spain did not. The
Spanish Court had taken great care to collect evidence on this point.
A commission was sent to examine the archives of the Indies at Seville
for this purpose. Their report covered some 200 pages of manuscript.
It was a compilation of accounts of exploring expeditions, of royal
orders and decisions, of acts of the council of the Indies, and of
laws promulgated, all affecting that part of the world. Its purpose
was to show that Spain had always claimed and exercised the rights of
sovereignty over those regions and the right of excluding other nations
from her possessions in the South Sea.[323] The treaty of Utrecht was
repeatedly cited in the various memorials and letters as guaranteeing
Spain’s rights in the Indies as they had been in the time of Charles
II. The willingness of Spain to submit the matter to arbitration shows
that she had confidence in the justice of her cause. England’s refusal
to arbitrate indicates a lack of confidence.
On July 22 Floridablanca replied to Fitzherbert’s communication of
five days before. He added little to what he had said in documents
already studied. He repeated the grounds on which Spain rested her
claim--grounds that were absolutely good from the Spanish standpoint.
He showed again the unreasonableness and absurdity, from the same
standpoint, of the English demands, and their contravention of
treaties. He assumed, not without cause, a tone of injured innocence,
and concluded that it was not worth while to extend further his
reflections on points so clear nor in demonstration of the rights of
Spain, since enough had been said already. The Spanish King had no
intention, he declared, of being dragged into a war over an academic
dispute. He agreed to give, first, such satisfaction as one of the
Kings of Europe, chosen by England as arbitrator, should think proper;
or, secondly, to give whatever satisfaction should be reciprocally
agreed upon, it being understood that such satisfaction should not
prejudice the rights of Spain to Nootka. He appealed to the honor and
justice of all nations to recognize the generosity of His Catholic
Majesty’s heart, since to avoid dragging Europe into war he would
sacrifice his own well-founded opinion, even though prepared to enforce
it by his superior armament.[324] Having led, or rather forced, the
Spanish minister to yield this much, Fitzherbert continued to press him
until he agreed to the declaration and counter-declaration, almost word
for word, as they had been dictated by the British Cabinet. They were
signed July 24, and are as follows:[325]
DECLARATION.
His Britannic Majesty having complained of the capture of certain
vessels belonging to his subjects in the port of Nootka, situated
on the Northwest Coast of America, by an officer in the service
of His Catholic Majesty, the undersigned counselor and principal
secretary of state to His Majesty, being thereto duly authorized,
declares in the name and by the order of His Majesty, that he is
willing to give satisfaction to His Britannic Majesty for the injury
of which he has complained, fully persuaded that His said Britannic
Majesty would act in the same manner toward His Catholic Majesty
under similar circumstances; and His Majesty further engages to make
full restitution of all the British vessels which were captured at
Nootka, and to indemnify the parties interested in those vessels
for the losses which they may have sustained, as soon as the amount
thereof shall have been ascertained. It being understood that this
declaration is not to prejudice the ulterior discussion of any right
which His Catholic Majesty claims to form an exclusive establishment
at Nootka.
In witness whereof I have signed this declaration and sealed it with
the seal of my arms at Madrid the 24th of July, 1790.
COUNT FLORIDABLANCA.
COUNTER DECLARATION.
His Catholic Majesty having declared that he was willing to give
satisfaction for the injury done to the King by the capture of
certain vessels belonging to his subjects in the Bay of Nootka; and
Count Floridablanca having signed, in the name and by the order of
His Catholic Majesty, a declaration to this effect, and by which
His said Majesty likewise engages to make full restitution of the
vessels so captured and to indemnify the parties interested in
those vessels for the losses which they shall have sustained, the
undersigned ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of His
Majesty to the Catholic King, being thereto duly and expressly
authorized, accepts the said declaration in the name of the King;
and declares that His Majesty will consider this declaration, with
the performance of the engagements contained therein, as a full
and entire satisfaction for the injury of which His Majesty has
complained.
The undersigned declares at the same time that it is to be
understood that neither the said declaration signed by Count
Floridablanca nor the acceptance thereof by the undersigned, in the
name of the King, is to preclude or prejudice, in any respect, the
rights which His Majesty may claim to any establishment which his
subjects may have formed, or may desire to form in the future, at
the said Bay of Nootka.
In witness whereof I have signed this counter declaration and sealed
it with the seal of my arms at Madrid the 24th of July, 1790.
ALLEYNE FITZHERBERT.
The only difference of any importance between the drafts prepared
by the British Cabinet and the documents as finally signed is the
insertion in the Spanish declaration of the clause “fully persuaded
that His said Britannic Majesty would act in the same manner toward
His Catholic Majesty under similar circumstances.”[326]
Fitzherbert wrote that on the first occasion of his paying his respects
to His Catholic Majesty after the declarations had been signed that
Monarch had deigned to converse freely concerning them, saying that
they had given him the sincerest pleasure, and that he considered
them “a happy earnest of the revival of that perfect harmony and good
understanding which it was his constant wish to maintain with the Crown
of Great Britain.” The ambassador reminded Leeds “that it is extremely
unusual for His Catholic Majesty to converse with foreign ministers
on any political topic, from which circumstance, joined to the known
sincerity of his character and the marked cordiality of air and manner
with which he accompanied this declaration, I can safely convey it to
your grace as the genuine expression of his feelings.”[327]
These declarations settled merely the question of satisfaction which
England had demanded as the indispensable preliminary to a discussion
of the respective rights of the two Crowns on the Northwest Coast,
and particularly at Nootka. This simply repaired the insult which
England felt that she had suffered at the hands of Spain. They were
now ready to begin negotiations on a friendly basis for the settlement
of the present difficulty and the arrangement of a modus vivendi for
the future. News of the declarations reached London August 5, and
Grenville immediately notified the King, congratulating him on the
event, “which, as far as it goes, appears highly satisfactory and seems
to offer the most favorable prospect for such an ultimate termination
of the business as may correspond with Your Majesty’s wishes.”[328] In
a letter of the next day, Leeds praised Fitzherbert for the latter’s
success.[329]
During the months of May, June, and July, while the negotiations that
have been studied in this chapter were in progress, both countries
continued their warlike preparations. Shortly after reaching Madrid
Fitzherbert reported a Spanish fleet of 30 sail of the line, though
poorly manned.[330] Baumgarten tells of the difficulty which the
Spanish Government experienced in getting sailors. He says that
they took refuge in the mountains to escape being pressed into the
navy.[331] On July 5 the British ambassador reported that the Spanish
fleet at Cadiz had been ordered to sea immediately, but he thought it
simply a show of vigor to inspire confidence.[332] Four days later he
received a note from Floridablanca explaining the movement. The King
of Spain, having learned that the English fleet had put to sea, gave
orders to his to move also, but to refrain from hostilities unless
attacked.[333] Two Spanish ships of war, with 1,000 soldiers, had been
sent to Porto Rico, since an attack was apprehended at that point.[334]
By the 20th of the same month Spain had 34 ships of the line and 16
smaller craft at sea.[335] At the end of June an English fleet of 25
vessels of the line had put to sea,[336] and had been joined early in
July by the Dutch fleet under Admiral Kinsbergen.[337]
During all this time the armaments had been carried on in spite
of repeated offers and requests from Spain to disarm mutually.
As early as May 18, on receipt of the British memorial presented
two days before, Floridablanca had proposed to Merry mutual and
proportionate disarmament.[338] This was repeated in the Spanish
memorial of June 4.[339] The British Cabinet rejected the proposition.
In his instructions of July 5 Leeds cautioned Fitzherbert to be
particularly careful not to give the smallest encouragement to this
idea. His Majesty could not consent to discontinue preparations
until he should have secured freedom of commerce, navigation, and
fisheries in the districts in question.[340] After the declaration
and counter declaration had been signed, Floridablanca proposed
limiting the operations of the fleets to prevent the possibility of an
encounter.[341] On August 10 Campo, the Spanish ambassador in London,
repeated the proposals for disarming.[342] In reply, four days later,
Leeds gave assurance of England’s desire for peace, but declared that
Great Britain refused to disarm until the matter in question should
be settled for the future.[343] On the same day that Leeds gave this
decided answer to Campo in London, Floridablanca, in Madrid, had again
proposed to Fitzherbert a mutual disarmament. On September 10, Leeds
sent a formal reply, repeating what he had said to Campo on August
14.[344]
Far from yielding to the Spanish proposals, Great Britain was
continuing her preparations and calling on her allies to do the same.
On the day that Leeds rejected Campo’s proposition to disarm, he
instructed Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague, to ask that
Dutch preparations should not be relaxed. The national honor had been
satisfied, but the question of peace or war had not been settled. It
was requested that the Dutch fleet be ordered home for supplies and
reënforcements.[345] August 19 this request was granted, and England
was reassured of the support of Holland.[346] Baumgarten says that
early in September the English and Spanish fleets were both hovering
off Cape Finisterre, and were dangerously near to each other.[347]
In his instructions to Auckland of August 14, referred to above, Leeds
had suggested that with a slight additional expense the Dutch and
English fleets could be used to give weight to the representations
already made by England for bringing about a pacification in the north
and east of Europe. The Dutch Government assented that the general
state of Europe, as well as the Spanish negotiations, warranted a
continuance of their armament.
The relation between the Nootka Sound negotiations and the questions
uppermost in eastern and northern Europe is more than incidental. In
a dispatch of June 14 Theremin, the Prussian chargé at Madrid, wrote
his Government that in case of a breach between England and Spain the
latter would certainly join Russia and Austria.[348] The situation of
the powers was such that this would have been perfectly natural. Russia
and Austria were waging a common war against the Porte. The former
was also engaged in war with Sweden, and the latter had just been
deprived of her control in the Netherlands by the Belgian revolution.
England and the Netherlands were trying to quiet the storm and induce
all parties to make peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum.
Prussia, the third member of the triple alliance, was not in harmony
with the other two in this matter. On the contrary, she was attempting
to increase the confusion in the hope of gaining something in the
turmoil. She was attempting to force Galicia from Austria that she
might restore it to Poland and receive as compensation Dantzig and
Thorn. She was fostering the Belgian revolution so that in the end she
might be able to return the Flemish provinces to Austria to compensate
that power for the loss of Galicia. She had actually made a treaty
with the Porte looking to this end, and had won the partial support of
Poland. If Prussia had succeeded in dragging the other two members of
the triple alliance with her into war and Spain had at the same time
broken with England on the Nootka question, it would inevitably have
thrown Spain into the arms of the imperial courts. The opponents, then,
would have been Prussia, England, the Netherlands, and Turkey, with
probably Poland and Sweden, against Russia, Austria, and Spain, with
possibly Denmark. France had for a time been thought of as a fourth
member of the proposed alliance between Spain and the imperial courts,
but the disturbances in that country had, for the present, made her
almost a negligible quantity.
The conference at Reichenbach, which closed in August, affected
materially the state of Europe. The pacific efforts of England and the
Dutch Republic had already succeeded in curbing somewhat the warlike
passions of Prussia, and at this conference won a further triumph for
the peace principle by inducing Leopold of Austria to make peace with
Turkey. But Russia still persisted for a time in her war with the
Porte, and the English-Spanish dispute over Nootka Sound was almost as
far from settlement as ever.[349]