EUROPE PREPARES FOR WAR.
Until the first week in May the negotiations regarding the Nootka Sound
dispute were conducted with the greatest secrecy in both countries. The
public, especially in England, did not so much as know that there was
any serious question pending between the two Crowns. There were general
rejoicings over the prospect of a long period of untroubled peace. The
consternation that ensued may be imagined when, on the morning of May
5, England awoke to the fact that in the darkness of the preceding
night sailors had been seized in every port and were being pressed into
the navy for immediate service. The excitement in London is reflected
by the following extracts from a diary. The writer was an ex-governor
of Canada, and was living in retirement at London. According to his
entry for May 5, a note just received informed him that “during last
night all the sailors on the Thames had been pressed, and that war was
on the point of being declared against Spain, which had seized five
of our ships near Cooks River; and the funds had fallen 3 per cent.”
This indicates that the financial pulse was decidedly unsteady. The
depression seems to have continued for at least ten days. At the end
of that time the same writer entered in his diary: “Opinions are still
divided as to whether there will be a war or not. The funds begin to
rise.” On this day he had invested $3,000 in bonds.[246]
On the day following the press a message from the King was read in
both Houses of Parliament. This explained why the Government had taken
such an extraordinary step. The King declared that two vessels whose
nationality had not been fully ascertained and two others known to
be British had been captured at Nootka Sound by an officer commanding
two Spanish ships of war. He told how the cargoes had been seized and
the officers sent as prisoners to a Spanish port. He related briefly
the correspondence with the Spanish Court, then told how that Court
had refused the satisfaction demanded and had asserted a claim “to
the exclusive rights of sovereignty, navigation, and commerce in the
territories, coasts, and seas in that part of the world.” His minister
at Madrid was to renew the demand for satisfaction. Having learned of
considerable armaments in Spain, he had judged it necessary to arm in
turn “in support of the honor of his Crown and the interests of his
people.” He appealed to the Commons for the necessary support. He hoped
that the affair might be terminated peaceably, and in such a manner as
to remove grounds for misunderstandings in the future.[247]
The next day, May 6, the matter was discussed in Parliament. Pitt
opened the debate in the lower House by moving an address of thanks
for the King’s message. He recited the facts briefly, asserted
England’s right to fisheries and commerce in the districts in question,
and showed that Spain’s extravagant claims would entirely exclude
England from that ocean, if they were allowed. The settlement of this
dispute would establish a precedent for all the future. The insult
to the British flag lay in two facts--first, the seizure had been
made in time of profound peace; secondly, goods had been confiscated
without condemnation.[248] Government hoped yet to settle the dispute
peaceably, but it was necessary to increase the armaments in order to
treat with Spain on an equal footing. The opposition led by Fox agreed
that the address should be voted and the armaments approved; but they
criticised the ministry for having so recently held out hopes for
continued peace when a matter of such importance was pending. This
reference was to statements made by Pitt in his budget speech of April
19. The minister answered that the facts were not all known at that
time; and besides, he had made no promise of the continuance of peace,
but had said that the existing prosperity was due to the happy interval
of peace and that if peace should continue prosperity would increase.
From the facts presented in the preceding chapter it is known that
the criticism was unjust. Until April 21 the ministry had had no
communication from Spain except the note of February 10. Only one
ship was known to have been captured, and that only through the
information furnished by the Spanish Court in that note. Merry had
reported rumors of Spanish naval preparations, but had at the same
time given quieting assurances. Shortly after the budget speech came
the Spanish memorial of April 20, distinctly avowing the seizures and
asserting the Spanish pretensions; then came exact information from
Merry of extensive Spanish armaments; and last and most important came
Meares with his exaggerated stories of Spanish cruelty and injustice,
revealing the true number of seizures and overrating the losses. It was
urged more properly that the English Government was unjust in demanding
the restoration of the ships and satisfaction for the insult before
discussing the respective rights. This, it was said, was begging the
question.
Notwithstanding these criticisms the address was carried unanimously.
The measures taken by the Government were confirmed, the armament
was approved, and the support of the Commons was assured. After a
similar debate in the Lords on the same day the ministry was supported
with the same enthusiasm.[249] The entry in the diary of Gouverneur
Morris, who was then in London as the semiofficial agent of the United
States Government, tells of the animated debate in the Commons, of
the enthusiastic support accorded to the ministry, and of the avowed
determination to obtain from the Spanish Court an acknowledgment
that Spain is entitled to no part of America except such as she
occupies.[250] The assurance of the Commons was followed up on June
10 by a vote of credit for £1,000,000 “to enable His Majesty to act
as the exigency of affairs might require.”[251] Orders were at once
given for the equipment of a fleet to consist of 14 ships of the
line, besides smaller vessels. This was soon increased. The press was
prosecuted vigorously and with success in all ports.[252] Vancouver’s
work speaks of “the uncommon celerity and the unparalleled dispatch
which attended the equipment of one of the noblest fleets that Great
Britain ever saw.”[253] Public excitement was wrought to the highest
pitch. Pamphlets were issued in the form of addresses to the King,
setting forth the extravagance of the Spanish claim to exercise
control over the whole Pacific Ocean, and enlarging on the magnitude
and promise of the frustrated English enterprise. All the forces
of national pride, prejudice, and patriotism were united to arouse
hatred for the Spaniard. Indignant orators dwelt on memories of Papal
anathemas, the Holy Inquisition, and the Invincible Armada.[254]
At this juncture it is interesting to note again the relations between
Pitt and the South American agitator, Miranda. Attention was called
above to conferences between them shortly after the Spanish note of
February 10 was delivered to the British Court. Nothing seems to
have passed between them after that time until the second Spanish
note arrived. At 9 o’clock on the evening of May 6, the day of the
debate in Parliament just studied, Miranda again met Pitt on the
latter’s invitation. Grenville was present also. They had a long
conference “upon the subject of a war with Spain, in consequence of the
occurrences at Nootka Sound, the disposition of the people in South
America toward joining the English for their independency against the
Spaniards,” etc. Pitt thanked Miranda for the papers which he had sent,
and showed them to him. The minister was taking them to a meeting of
the Cabinet. New assurances were given of the execution of Miranda’s
plans in case of war. Various interviews took place between them
during the time that the great armament and the Spanish negotiations
were in progress.[255] The fact that Pitt was taking Miranda’s papers
to a cabinet meeting just at this time is unmistakable evidence that
his plans were being seriously considered.
There were attempts on the part of the opposition to censure the
ministry for their conduct of the Spanish business. On May 10, in
debating the motion for the vote of credit, Fox called for the date
of the first communication from Spain on the affair. This was not
revealed.[256] On the next day there was an attempt to learn whether
the proposed settlement at Nootka was “undertaken under the sanction
and authority of Government, or merely as an enterprise of private
persons.” The motion was defeated, but Pitt declared that licenses to
trade at Nootka Sound had been granted; and whether this particular
undertaking was or was not a public enterprise it was incumbent on
the honor of the country to demand satisfaction. He said that the
“Memorial” of Captain Meares would put the House in possession of
all that Government knew on the subject.[257] On May 12 there was
a spirited debate on a motion calling for the papers relative to
the dispute, but the demand was successfully resisted.[258] On the
following day a motion by the opposition, calling for information
regarding the appointment of ambassadors to Spain since the peace
of 1783, was not resisted by the ministry.[259] A week later the
information obtained was discussed. During the seven years there had
been a resident ambassador at Madrid only thirteen months, though there
had been four appointments and upward of £35,000 had been appropriated
for their support. It was explained that these conditions were mostly
due to Spanish delays and etiquette; that although an ambassador had
not been present yet a chargé had been there all the time, and British
interests had not suffered. The motion was for an address asking the
King to provide for the performance in the future of the duties of
ambassadors to foreign courts. It was defeated.[260] There was no
further Parliamentary activity of importance on the matter before the
session closed on June 10.[261]
While England was making these vigorous preparations at home she was
calling for support in every place from which she had a right to
expect aid. At the same time she was taking steps to put every portion
of her wide dominions in a state of defense. Ireland was called upon
to restrain shipments of provisions to Spain, and also to recruit
forces for the West Indies. The lord lieutenant agreed, with some
qualifications, to carry out both measures.[262] The commander at
Gibraltar was warned of his danger. The governor of that port, who was
visiting in England, was ordered to return to his post. A regiment of
foot was to embark immediately to reënforce the garrison.[263] Notices
were sent to the governors of Barbados, St. Vincent, the Leeward and
Bahama Islands, Dominica, Cape Breton, and Nova Scotia. They were
ordered to expedite works of defense, to report on their forces, and to
keep a watch on Spanish and French movements. Four regiments of foot
and two ships of war were ordered to the West Indies.[264] Three ships
of war, with reënforcements and provisions, were sent to India, with
instructions to prepare an expedition to seize Manila or the west coast
of America should orders come to that effect.[265] The governor of
Canada, about to return to England, was ordered to remain and prepare
the forces of Canada for any exigency that might arise. He was to
cultivate the friendship of the United States and to adopt every means
in his power for influencing the Americans in favor of Great Britain
and preventing their union with Spain.[266] These interesting Canadian
overtures will be fully discussed later. It was suggested to the King
that he use his Hanoverian troops to augment the garrison at Gibraltar.
He favored the measure, and took steps for carrying it out.[267]
Besides this aid from her dependencies, England also claimed the
support of her allies under the triple alliance of 1788. Since the war
promised to be almost wholly naval, the friendship of the Netherlands
with her fleet would be of great value. On May 4, the day before the
English preparations were made public, Leeds wrote to Lord Auckland,
the British ambassador at The Hague, asking him to communicate the
matter to the Dutch Government. His Britannic Majesty relied on the
justice of his cause, and had no doubt that the Dutch Republic would
approve, and, if it should become necessary, furnish him support under
the treaty.[268] In a private letter of the same date Leeds asked that
before demanding aid under the treaty Auckland ascertain whether the
Dutch Government would fit out a number of vessels and furnish them
to England at English expense.[269] In less than ten days an answer
had arrived, saying that Holland was ready to support England and that
any or all of the Dutch ships of the line might be put at the disposal
of Great Britain at British expense.[270] On May 15 Auckland sent a
statement of the terms on which these vessels would be furnished.[271]
Three days later Leeds replied that the terms were so favorable that
Auckland was authorized to accept them at once and promote with the
utmost expedition the equipment of 10 sail of the line.[272] Still
further assurances of Dutch friendship and generosity were given. On
May 31 the States General passed resolutions refusing to accept the
English subsidies, and taking upon themselves the entire expense.[273]
Everything being in readiness and the English Government having
requested the movement, the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Kinsbergen, left
the Texel on June 17 and joined the English fleet at Portsmouth three
weeks later.[274]
The third member of the triple alliance, Prussia, was at the same time
called upon for support. On May 20 Hertzberg, the Prussian minister,
handed an answer to Ewart, the British ambassador at Berlin. The
Prussian King approved the measures of England and pledged himself to
fulfill his engagements in case the contest with Spain should render
it necessary. Hertzberg suggested that it was impossible to suppose
that Spain would think of embarking on a war with such disadvantage
without having a motive other than that alleged. He said that there
were positive indications that an alliance was being negotiated between
Spain, Russia, and Austria to which Denmark was to be asked to accede.
These indications made it necessary for the three allies to be in
perfect accord. He referred to Prussia’s very grave discussions with
the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg and claimed English support in
case it should be needed in that business.[275] Thus the Nootka Sound
dispute was drawn into the general current of European politics and
was destined to have an indirect influence on the Polish and Turkish
questions. More will be said later regarding these matters.
* * * * *
While England was meeting with such decided success in her demands on
her allies, Spain was also looking for support outside her own borders.
Her chief reliance was on France. For nearly thirty years the two
countries had been intimately united under the family compact. This
was concluded in 1761, during the Seven Years’ war, when France was
fighting a losing battle. The farsighted Charles III, who had then
recently ascended the Spanish Throne, saw in a close union between the
Bourbon Monarchies a prospect for ultimate gain to his Kingdom in spite
of the fact that he could hope for little at the time. He hastened
nobly to the rescue and generously shared the defeats and losses of
France. When Louis XVI entered the contest in behalf of the American
colonies in their struggle against the mother country, Charles III,
true to the family compact, followed his ally into the war which ended
in the glorious peace of 1783. When in 1790 Spain was threatened by
war with England, she naturally turned to France, whom she had twice
assisted against this same foe. But the advances were made with
serious misgivings on account of the turbulence in France, which was
threatening to overturn the monarchy.
For a year the utmost confusion had prevailed in Paris and throughout
the country. The oppressions of the feudal régime, wasteful methods
of taxation, and financial mismanagement had combined to reduce the
Government to a state of bankruptcy. Finally, Louis XVI had yielded to
the universal clamor and called the States-General. In May, 1789, after
a recess of a hundred and seventy-five years, they had assembled at
Versailles. After a deadlock of nearly two months the privileged orders
had been compelled to yield to the demand of the third estate and meet
in a common body--the National Assembly. In the middle of July, the
Parisian mob had razed the Bastille, which they looked upon as the
symbol of arbitrary government. A little more than a fortnight later
the nobles in the National Assembly had bowed before the coming storm
and voluntarily laid down their feudal privileges. Rightly interpreting
these events as an acknowledgment of impotence on the part of the old
régime; the proletariat in the cities and the peasants in the country
had arisen everywhere, murdered the governmental officials, and burned
and pillaged the castles of the nobles. As a result of the frightful
events of the early days of October, the mob had carried the royal
family in triumph to Paris, and the National Assembly had followed
shortly after. Both were thenceforward virtually the prisoners of the
Parisian populace. The power of the Monarchy had ended. Under the spell
of Jacobin orators the Assembly was wasting its time in the fruitless
discussion of constitutional principles, and leaving the country to
ruin and anarchy. This was the condition of France in the summer of
1790.
As early as January 20, the day on which Floridablanca wrote his
instructions to Campo in London--which instructions the latter
embodied in his drastic note of February 10 to the British Court--the
Spanish minister had also written to Montmorin, the French minister
for foreign affairs. In this letter he made no mention of the Nootka
Sound episode nor of the haughty demands which he was making on England
the same day. But he expressed pity for France and her King, and
complained that in the existing circumstances that country was not in
a condition to unite with Spain as she should. He feared that their
enemies would take advantage of the embarrassing position.[276] Though
he said nothing about it, Floridablanca was evidently thinking of the
possible consequences of his harsh demand. After the warlike sessions
of the junta of state, mentioned in the previous chapter, and after
the second note to the British Court had been sent, Floridablanca made
indirect overtures to France for assurances of support. This was in a
letter of April 6 to Fernan Nuñez, the Spanish ambassador in Paris. He
suggested that in the absence of French support it would be necessary
for Spain to look to other powers. Russia he thought most likely to
furnish aid.[277] No formal demand was made in this communication,
but it seems that the Spanish ambassador made some advances to the
French Court. On May 11 Fernan Nuñez wrote of a conference which he had
had with Montmorin. The latter had promised to propose an armament.
Luzerne, the French minister for marine, had told of the number of
vessels available. Montmorin had suggested that in case of war the
allies should disembark 50,000 men in England and should revolutionize
Holland. The French minister had asked for information concerning the
origin and progress of the dispute with England.[278]
In the conversation just referred to Montmorin had told the Spanish
ambassador that the Constitutional party in France suspected Vauguyon,
the French ambassador at Madrid. They thought that he had induced
the Spanish Government to stir up the quarrel with England in order
to involve France as the ally of Spain. They suspected that this was
being done in the hope of strengthening the French royal power, and so
bringing about a counter revolution. This suspicion grew so strong that
Montmorin, as a concession to the radical element, recalled Vauguyon.
The Spanish King refused to grant him a letter of dismissal or to
recognize anyone as his successor.[279]
As Montmorin had promised the Spanish ambassador in the above-mentioned
conversation, the French Government immediately took steps toward an
armament. On May 14 a letter from Montmorin to the president of the
National Assembly informed that body that the King had given orders
for the armament of 14 ships of the line. Assurance was given that
it was only a precautionary measure in view of the English armament.
The King would do all that he could to promote a friendly adjustment
between the Courts of London and Madrid. He hoped that France would not
be involved in war. The English Court had made friendly declarations
and had stated that the only cause for armament was the dispute with
Spain.[280] It was not wise, however, to remain disarmed under such
circumstances. France ought to show to Europe that her constitution was
not an obstacle to the development of her forces.[281]
Montmorin’s message precipitated the famous discussion as to whether
the right to make peace and war should rest with the King or the
people. This discussion is probably better known than the Nootka Sound
dispute which occasioned it. The consideration of the message was made
the order of the day for May 15, the day following its presentation.
Biron, the first speaker, declared that the prosperity of France was
closely bound up with that of Spain. Spain had been a generous ally of
France in the past. The representatives of the people ought to respect
the obligations of the nation. “Let it not be said,” he declared, “that
the efforts of a free people are less than those of a despotism.” After
a brief enthusiastic speech he moved a decree approving the measures
taken by the King. Alexander Lameth declared, amid great applause, that
the first question to be considered was whether the sovereign nation
ought to concede to the King the right to make peace and war. There was
an attempt to postpone this question, but Barnave declared that when
it should be demonstrated that effects ought to precede their causes
then it would be proved that the question proposed by Lameth should be
considered last. Robespierre said that the time to judge of a right was
when they were deliberating on the exercise of it. Baron Menou said
that the right of making peace and war should be determined first,
then they ought to learn which nation was in the wrong. If Spain, she
ought to be persuaded to yield; if England, then France should arm not
merely 14 vessels, but all of the forces on land and sea, and compel
submission.
Mirabeau declared that it was unreasonable and irrelevant thus to elude
the question. The message, he continued, had nothing in common with a
declaration of war. Jurisdiction in times of danger ought always to be
in the King’s hands. The vessels were to be armed only because England
was arming. The armament was not dangerous, and to deny it would cause
commercial discontent. The only question, he said, was whether the
funds asked were necessary. He declared that they were, and called for
the immediate consideration of the message. He proposed to approve the
measures of the King and to order by the same decree that to-morrow
they take up the discussion of the constitutional question, Shall the
nation delegate to the King the exercise of the right of peace and war?
His proposition was adopted almost unanimously.[282]
Thus after some hesitation over the theoretical consequences the
armament was approved as enthusiastically as Spain could expect or
desire. The debate in the Assembly has no further importance for the
Nootka question. It would be of little interest and less value to
follow the metaphysical discussions of the constitutional question.
The final decision is of some interest. The debate occupied nearly
the whole of each morning session for six days. In the end Mirabeau
prevailed again. He had taken a middle ground. It was decreed that
the right of peace and war belonged to the nation; that war could be
declared only by a decree of the legislative body, but that this step
could be taken only on a formal proposal by the King, and must be
sanctioned by the King subsequently.[283]
A few days after the Assembly had approved the armament Montmorin
wrote to Floridablanca. He hoped that the armament would recall
England to a proper tone and that the difficulty might be settled
amicably. Referring to Floridablanca’s letter of January 20, in which
the latter had complained of the inability of France to support Spain
as she should, the French minister said that its statements were as
forceful as they were true. The Spanish Government could count on the
most sincere desire on the part of the French King to fulfill his
engagements with Spain, but the will of the Assembly could not be
depended on. If war should be decided upon, the difficulties would be
incalculable. Peace, then, he concluded, ought to be the end of all
their efforts.[284]
Subsequently, Luzerne, the minister for marine, made two reports on the
extent of the armament and the increased cost. On June 13 the Assembly
appropriated 3,000,000 livres to support it.[285] Up to the present
point the attitude of France appeared to be all that Spain could wish,
as far as could be judged from external appearances. But this armament
was distinctly French. There was no assurance that the fleet or any
part of it would be turned over to Spain if she should call for it
under the treaty. But this seems not yet to have been asked.
On June 4 Spain attempted to set herself right in the eyes of all
Europe by issuing a circular letter and sending it to all the Courts.
This recounted briefly the origin of the dispute and the course of the
negotiations, and attempted to show the unreasonableness of the English
demands and their inconsistency with her treaty obligations. It set
forth the Spanish claim in the most favorable light possible, basing it
on treaties and the consent of nations.[286]
The formal demand from Spain for French assistance was made June 16. On
that date the Spanish ambassador at Paris handed to Montmorin extracts
from all the correspondence between Spain and England up to date. He
inclosed with them an extended argument in support of the Spanish
case. After elaborating the arguments he demanded French assistance
under the family compact, and added that if it were not offered Spain
would have to seek alliances elsewhere in Europe.[287] Ten days later
Montmorin replied that the matter had been laid before the King, but
in view of the decree of the Assembly relative to peace and war the
Spanish demand would have to be submitted to that body. As soon as
it had been acted upon a positive response would be given.[288] This
reply had been delayed so long that the Spanish ambassador had become
impatient. On the preceding day he had written again to the French
minister demanding an early reply. Fitzherbert, the British ambassador,
had already arrived at Madrid, he said, and it was necessary for the
negotiation that Spain be assured of French supported.[289] To this
Montmorin answered that the King had not for a moment lost sight of the
importance of the matter. Louis XVI had written to Charles IV regarding
it.[290]
Notwithstanding the urgency of the Spanish ambassador and the
willingness of the French King and his foreign minister, the Spanish
demand was not laid before the Assembly for more than six weeks after
it was presented. During all this time Spain was kept in uncertainty
as to whether she would receive from France the aid which she had a
right to expect. Before the expiration of this time the diplomacy of
Floridablanca and Fitzherbert had taken an important turn, though the
dispute was still far from settled. The next chapter will follow the
course of the main negotiation through this preliminary settlement.