AMERICA’S RELATIONS TO THE CONTROVERSY.
Attention was called above to the repeated conferences between Pitt
and the South American agitator, Miranda. The fact was pointed out
that these conferences occurred at the critical periods of the
English-Spanish negotiations.[350] To repeat briefly: The first was on
February 14, just after the receipt of the first Spanish communication
on the Nootka affair, and before the British Court had formulated
its reply. Miranda had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the
advantage of England united with South America. At this conference
the plan was admitted to be beneficial. It was decided that it should
be put into execution in case of a war with Spain. In consequence of
Pitt’s request, Miranda presented, some three weeks later, a written
statement of the commercial and military resources of South America.
Again, on May 6, when the war excitement in London was at its highest,
the great minister and the South American had a conference on the same
subject. Pitt was on his way to a cabinet council and was taking with
him for consideration at the council the papers which Miranda had
presented. Grenville was present at the interview. The conversation was
on the prospect of war with Spain, and on the disposition of the people
of South America toward joining England in order to gain independence.
Various interviews took place at Pitt’s house while the Spanish
negotiations were in progress.[351]
At some time during the year Miranda’s plan was presented in the form
of a draft of a constitution for the Spanish-American colonies after
they should have gained their independence. The proposed new empire
was to include all of South America, except Brazil and Guiana, and the
portion of North America west of the Mississippi River and south of the
forty-fifth parallel. Cuba was to be included as the key to the Gulf of
Mexico. The government was to be modeled in a general way on that of
Great Britain. The executive power was to be lodged in an inca, under
the title of “emperor,” with hereditary succession. The upper chamber
was to be composed of members nominated for life by the inca. Further
details of the government were worked out.[352] Miranda reminded Pitt
that the latter had seemed pleased with his ideas and had asked him to
leave the draft for further perusal. Plans for carrying on the war were
discussed, and the most favorable point for attack in South America was
considered. Means were devised for enlisting the interest of Jesuits
in Italy who were natives of South America and had been exiled by the
King of Spain. Accounts of recent insurrections in Spanish America were
given to show how ready the people were for emancipation. Later, a
detailed plan of attack was presented, with maps to illustrate it. At
Pitt’s request a plan of the defenses of Havana was left with him.
This shows what extended plans the British Cabinet was considering.
It was to be expected that England would persist in her demands, for
if Spain would not yield there was much to expect from a war. Secret
agents at various places in America were collecting information
looking toward military operations to carry out these schemes. Besides
the overtures to the United States through Canada, to be discussed
presently, there were secret emissaries at Charleston and New York, and
information was being collected concerning New Orleans, the Floridas,
and the Mississippi country. The feasibility of marching troops from
New Orleans to Mexico was considered, and reports were made by men
who were familiar with the country. Some of the secret employees were
enthusiastic over the possibility of making a great English colony
out of the Floridas and the Mississippi Valley. Agents of the Creek
and Cherokee Indians were negotiating for a friendly connection with
England. The plan, as far as it had taken shape, seems to have been for
England to seize the heart of North America for herself and erect the
remainder of Spanish America into a client state.[353]
As mentioned above, the British Cabinet sent instructions on May 6 to
Lord Dorchester, the governor of Canada.[354] He had intended to visit
England during the summer, but was requested to remain and prepare for
the impending struggle. Besides strengthening his own dominions he was
to make friendly overtures to the United States.[355] In consequence
of these orders Lord Dorchester gave instructions on June 27 to Major
Beckwith, whom he had selected as the medium through which these
overtures should be made. Beckwith was given double instructions. The
one set was to guide his conversations in discussing public questions
in a general way. The other was secret and for his private guidance.
In the first he was instructed to say that the appearance of war with
Spain rendered it improbable that Dorchester would obtain his expected
leave of absence that season. He was to return hearty thanks for the
friendly approbation of Dorchester’s proposed trip through the United
States on his way to England. He was to express the hope that the
appearance of a war with Spain, or even its actual occurrence, would
not alter the friendly disposition of the United States toward Great
Britain. He was to mention the pretensions of Spain to absolute control
over navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, and
discuss the evil effect on the United States if such control should
be conceded. These things he might say freely and publicly. But his
secret instructions were to guide him in conversing with those whom he
might select as proper persons in whom to confide. From them he was to
learn the disposition of the Government and the people toward England
if the affair with Spain were not considered. Then he was to discover
what difference a war with that country might make. He was to ascertain
whether in case war should occur they would be likely to join Spain,
and also to find what might induce them to join Great Britain in such
an event. In discussing the Mississippi question he was to be cautious,
but might suggest that England would probably assist in obtaining its
navigation. Naval and military movements should be watched.[356]
Dorchester reported to the home office, on July 7, that Beckwith had
been hastily sent back to New York.[357] The latter did not have
to wait long to find the right man to converse with on the matter
contained in his secret instructions. On July 8, Hamilton, the
Secretary of the Treasury, made a memorandum giving the substance of a
communication from him. The major had spoken of the expected rupture
and had observed that all commercial nations must favor the views of
England.
It was therefore presumed, should a war take place, that the United
States would find it to their interest to take part with Great
Britain rather than with Spain.[358]
It seems that Hamilton communicated the matter to the President at
once, for in a letter reporting a later conversation with Beckwith he
says:
I have made the proper use of what you said to me at our last
Interview [July 8].[359]
Under date of July 12, Jefferson, the Secretary of State, prepared a
paper entitled, “Heads of a consideration on the conduct we are to
observe in the war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly
should the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas.”
As one would expect, Jefferson inclined toward Spain rather than
England. He brought out the danger to the United States if England
should get control of New Orleans and the neighboring territory. He
suggested the idea of joining Spain in guaranteeing the independence
of these countries instead of allowing Great Britain to take them. The
paper seems to have been prepared to serve as a guide in an approaching
interview with the Canadian agent, for he says, “As to England, say
to Beckwith,” etc.,[360] then gives the substance of what Hamilton
reported as having been said to that gentleman in an interview of July
22, at which Jefferson was present.
In this interview the fact was brought to light that Beckwith was not
an authorized British agent, but that he had been sent by Dorchester
with the knowledge of the British Cabinet. Owing to his unofficial
character nothing of importance passed, but he was told that the United
States was ready to answer when it should be presented in an official
form. Hamilton had said that, at the time, he--
would not mean either to raise or repress expectations. … Something
was said respecting the probable course of military operations in
case of a war between Britain and Spain, which Mr. Beckwith supposed
would be directed toward South America, alleging, however, that this
was mere conjecture on his part. I hinted cautiously our dislike of
any attempt on New Orleans.
Hamilton added in a note:
The views of the Government were to discard suspicion that any
engagements with Spain or intentions hostile to Great Britain
existed; to leave the ground in other respects vague and open, so as
that in case of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain the United
States ought to be in the best situation to turn it to account in
reference to the disputes between them and Great Britain on the one
hand and Spain on the other.[361]
Beckwith reported to Dorchester that Hamilton had said:
We are perfectly unconnected with Spain, have even some points
unadjusted with that Court, and are prepared to go into a
consideration of the subject.[362]
Scott, a member of the House of Representatives from western
Pennsylvania, told Beckwith that the prospect for a rupture made
most forcible impressions on all classes in the States. There was a
deep interest, he said, in the prospect of England’s possessing New
Orleans. The possible dismemberment of South America and the opening of
commerce with that continent was of interest, as well as the question
of navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific. He thought that
the moment was very favorable for England; and he saw no reason why the
United States should not assist her.[363] After news of the declaration
and counter declaration, signed at Madrid July 24, reached America,
Beckwith reported general dissatisfaction in the United States at the
prospect of pacification. Agricultural interests had expected that
the war would bring them high prices, and the shipping interests were
expecting a share in the English carrying trade and hoped for free
commerce with the Spanish West Indies. Friends of England thought that
she ought to take the opportunity for ruining the Spanish marine, which
they imagined to be an easy matter. British possession of New Orleans
was expected and desired, except by the Government which hoped to gain
from a neutral position when the settlement should come. At the same
time he reported another conversation with Hamilton. The Secretary had
said:
We consider ourselves at perfect liberty to act with respect to
Spain in any way most conducive to our interests, even to the going
to war with that power, if we shall think it advisable to join
you.[364]
These reports were doubtless colored by the desire of the Canadian
agent to send as favorable news as possible; but after allowing for
the exaggerations and the distortion of facts that would naturally be
expected, enough remains to show that the prospect of war was common
talk and that it was not altogether undesired. They also point to the
well-known fact that England had many friends in the United States and
some even in the highest official circles.
* * * * *
While Beckwith was holding these unofficial conferences with American
statesmen President Washington and his advisers were considering
what measures the Government should take in the event of hostilities
breaking out. Between the time of Beckwith’s first interview with
Hamilton and that of the more formal conference a fortnight later in
Jefferson’s presence the latter had written to Monroe concerning the
matter. He said that a war between England and Spain was probable.
Symptoms indicated a general design on Louisiana and the Floridas.
He spoke of the unpleasant position of the United States if England
should obtain them. Both England and Spain, he said, ought to know that
this country was in a condition for war.[365] Late in August President
Washington wrote concerning the matter to his chief advisers. He
thought that if Great Britain and Spain should come to arms New Orleans
and the Spanish posts on the Mississippi would be the first objective
point of the former. He asked what the answer to Lord Dorchester
should be in case he should request permission to march troops from
Detroit across the territory of the United States against the Spanish
posts, or in case it should be attempted without leave, which was most
probable.[366]
On the day after that on which the President’s letter was written
Jefferson answered it. He thought that the United States should keep
out of the war as long as possible. If Lord Dorchester should make the
expected demand, it should either be silently ignored, or, if granted,
the same privilege ought to be offered to Spain. If the march should
be attempted without permission, the United States should allow it,
but protest against it, holding off from actual hostilities as long as
possible.[367]
On the same day Chief Justice Jay answered the President’s question.
He considered, first, what the United States had a right to do from
the standpoint of international law, and, secondly, what was expedient
under the circumstances. Under the first head he concluded that,
except in cases of absolute necessity, or those in which it could be
shown that passage would be entirely innocent, the right of dominion
involved the right of excluding foreigners. Under the second head
he said that the probability of their being restrained by a refusal
ought to be considered. If they would probably proceed anyway, it
would be most prudent, he concluded, to consent. However, he added,
these remarks retain little force when applied to leading troops from
posts in the actual possession of England through territory under
English jurisdiction, though both the posts and the territory, of
right, belong to the United States. He admitted that it would militate
against the interests of the United States to have England occupy the
Spanish territories in question. The extent to which the principles of
the balance of power were applicable to the case in hand would merit
serious inquiry, he remarked, if the United States had only to consider
what might be right and just. But since the condition of the country
strongly recommended peace, and since it would be more prudent to allow
Great Britain to conquer and hold the Floridas than to engage in war to
prevent it, such inquiries would be premature.[368]
On the second day after the President wrote, Vice-President Adams gave
his opinion. He said that the interests of the United States pointed to
neutrality as long as practicable. To preserve neutrality every wrong
must be avoided. Granting to England the privilege in question would
be an offense against Spain. Therefore, if asked, the answer should
be a refusal. If the measure should be undertaken without leave there
were two methods of procedure--the one was war; the other, negotiation.
Nations, he said, are not obliged to declare war for every injury
or even hostility; but tacit acquiescence would be misinterpreted.
Negotiation, then, was the only alternative. The fact that there had
been no exchange of ministers with England made this difficult. A
remonstrance might be made in either of two ways. It might be handed
by the American representative at Paris, Madrid, or The Hague to the
British ambassador at the same place, or a special messenger might be
sent to London to demand an audience, make remonstrance, and then take
his leave shortly if a minister were not sent to the United States.[369]
Knox, the Secretary of War, sent his advice on the same day as the
Vice-President. He mentioned the danger to the United States if England
should get the Mississippi Valley. The true interests of the country
dictated neutrality. Spain, he said, would not enter the war unless
supported by France, and such support was not unexpected. If it should
be given, France would attempt to associate the United States with her
in the war. One of the parties might offer sufficient inducement to the
United States to enter the war, or they might be obliged to enter the
war on their own account to avert a greater evil.[370]
More than two weeks later Hamilton sent a long discussion of the
question from the standpoint of national right and from the standpoint
of expediency. He concluded that if Great Britain should ask the
privilege, it would be best for the United States to agree to it and
then explain the matter to Spain. If troops should be marched across
without consent having been asked, it would be a cause of war and would
have to be resented or a great national humiliation borne. Hostilities,
he thought, should be delayed as long as possible.[371]
While these precautionary measures were being considered by the
Government at New York, instructions were being sent to the American
diplomatic agents in Europe to guide them in case of a breach between
England and Spain. On August 11 Jefferson wrote instructions for Col.
David Humphreys, whom he was sending to Europe as a secret agent of
the United States. Humphreys was to go first to London, where he
should deliver instructions to Morris, the American informal agent at
that place. After delivering these he was to proceed by way of Lisbon
to Madrid, where he should deliver instructions to Carmichael, the
American chargé at the Spanish Court.[372]
Morris had been watching the progress of the dispute between England
and Spain and had been in close touch and sympathy with French
representatives.[373] The letter which Humphreys carried instructed
Morris to intimate to the British Court in case of war that the United
States could not be indifferent to the prospect of England’s acquiring
territory in the adjoining Spanish possessions. The American Government
would contemplate a change of neighbors with extreme uneasiness. Due
balance on their borders was not less desirable to Americans than the
balance of power in Europe was to Englishmen. Jefferson wrote: “We wish
to be neutral, and we will be so if they will execute the treaty fairly
and attempt no conquests adjoining us.” Other dominions of Spain, he
declared, left them room for conquests. “If war takes place, we would
really wish to be quieted on these two points, offering in return an
honorable neutrality. More than this they are not to expect.”
This was to be communicated only in the event of war having actually
taken place.[374] Without waiting for America to broach the subject,
the Duke of Leeds had sounded Morris on the American attitude toward
the extravagant claims of Spain. The latter answered carelessly without
giving any real information. He said that Spain was apprehensive of the
Americans and would sacrifice for their friendship. He intimated that
the navigation of the Mississippi might be offered.[375] A report was
current in London that Spain had actually made this concession to the
United States.[376]
Jefferson was planning to use French mediation to secure from Spain the
opening of the Mississippi. He instructed Short, the American chargé at
Paris, to make advances for this purpose through Lafayette if war had
begun or whenever it should begin. France, he said, would be drawn into
the war only as an ally, hence she might reasonably insist that Spain
should do all in her power to keep the United States from the ranks of
the enemy.[377]
In his instructions to Carmichael Jefferson suggested that, in case
of war, the people of Louisiana and Florida would favor England. He
also suggested that it would be best for both countries if Spain
would cede the Floridas and New Orleans to the United States in
return for a guaranty of the Spanish possessions on the west bank of
the Mississippi. These matters were being pressed warmly and firmly,
the Secretary said, under the idea that the war between Spain and
Great Britain would be begun before Carmichael could receive these
instructions, and such an opportunity must not be lost.[378] As stated
in the previous chapter, Fitzherbert believed that Spain had made
friendly overtures to the United States, but thought also that they
would not be cordially received. The Spanish representative at New York
presented a letter to President Washington on August 3 which doubtless
contained the overtures to which Fitzherbert referred.[379] Very late
in the negotiations Short thought that the Spanish ambassador at Paris
was about to offer through him a concession of territory to the United
States, but the conversation was interrupted before it reached the
vital point.[380]
Humphreys delivered Jefferson’s instructions to Carmichael late in the
year. Carmichael thought that America might have obtained all of her
wishes if the Secretary’s letters had arrived early in the summer. At
that time--
The critical state of affairs induced the Comte de Floridablanca
to throw out those general assertions that we should have no
reason to complain of the conduct of this Court with respect to
the Mississippi, which gave rise to the report its navigation
was opened. That minister had intimations from del Campo of the
conferences between Mr. Morris and the Duke of Leeds, which
occasioned him to say with warmth to Mr. Carmichael, “Now is the
time to make a treaty with England.” Fitzherbert availed himself of
these conferences to create apprehensions that the Americans would
aid his nation in case of war.[381]
The circumstances studied in this chapter show that plans were being
formed which, if they had been carried out, would have profoundly
altered the subsequent development of the United States. They show
also that the attitude of the United States was looked upon as of
considerable importance, and influenced to a certain extent the
counsels of both of the contending parties. Incidentally it is seen
that the controversy afforded an opportunity for expressions of the
attitude of the American Government toward encroachment of European
nations on American soil. In the above quotations from Jefferson’s
letters may be found a very good statement of the principles that later
became known as The Monroe Doctrine.