ATTEMPTS AT PEACEABLE SETTLEMENT.
The Spanish name of greatest importance in the diplomatic contest
with England in 1790 is that of Count Floridablanca. He was of humble
origin. His ability as a diplomatist was established while ambassador
to the Papal Court, especially in the suppression of the Jesuit order.
“This result [says Tratchevsky] was due in great measure to the skill
and energy of the Spanish ambassador at Rome, Don José Moñino. As a
recompense, Charles III conferred on him the title Count Floridablanca,
and soon made him prime minister (1777).”[199] He retained this
position fifteen years. “His integrity and love of labor won for him
the entire confidence of Charles III, who found in him the industrious
and respectful servant whom he sought.[200] He was a great worker,
of clean morals, beneficent, but very proud.”[201] He was a devoted
servant of monarchy and an enthusiastic adherent to the principle of
aristocracy. But on account of his recent elevation to the rank of a
noble he did not enjoy the favor of the upper classes. Zinovief, the
Russian ambassador, wrote: “The nobles and the soldiery despise him,
and he, in turn, takes no pains to hide his aversion to them. No one
of the great nobles enjoys any considerable importance at Court or in
the confidence of the King. Floridablanca seems intentionally to push
everyone else aside that he alone may enjoy the Sovereign’s favor. Even
the King’s confessor, who, it seems, should have nothing to fear, has
to yield to him. … Everybody trembles before him.”[202]
This enviable position was enjoyed by the great minister until the
death of Charles III (1788). He was retained by Charles IV, but it was
not long before his position began to be undermined by court intrigues.
Baumgarten says:
The Queen sought occasions to cast reproaches upon him over a
multitude of trifles, and, according to the testimony of Sandoz,
this mighty man was more busily engaged in these bagatelles than
in the weighty affairs of state.[203] … The Queen found willing
accomplices among the Count’s associates in the cabinet. By 1790 his
power was greatly diminished, so that he entered the contest with
England considerably handicapped.[204]
The controversy between England and Spain did not seem so one-sided at
that time as it does when viewed in the light of the subsequent history
of the two countries. The thirty years’ reign of Charles III, which had
just closed, is the most glorious period of Spanish history, with the
single exception of her period of preeminence in the sixteenth century.
Desdevises du Dezert says: “In Charles III Spain had a real King, the
only one she had had since Philip II.”[205] Speaking of his position in
Europe, the same author says:
His foreign policy was wise. He rightly considered England as the
true enemy of Spain. He feared for the Indies; he beheld them
invaded by English merchants and adventurers, by English merchandise
and ideas. To protect the colonies he hurled upon them a new current
of Spanish emigration, and decreed liberty of commerce between the
Peninsula and America. He allied himself with France in order to
combat England; and, notwithstanding some reverses, the war was
closed to the advantage of Spain, which country in 1783 again took
her place as a great European power.[206]
When the conflict came, in 1790, although nearly two years of the reign
of Charles IV had passed, little was known of the weakness of the
King, the corrupting influence of the Queen, and the intrigues in the
ministry. Europe of the time saw in Spain a country rapidly forging
to the front, with a rejuvenated kingship, and a minister second
only to Pitt.[207] Led by this minister, Spain had less than a decade
before been largely instrumental in humiliating England; and since
then she had persistently refused to make any commercial concessions
to her vanquished antagonist. The same minister now dared to intervene
between the Czar and the Porte. He was also negotiating for an alliance
between Spain, France, Austria, and Russia.[208] If this quadruple
alliance should prove successful the outlook for England would be dark,
notwithstanding her triple alliance with Prussia and Holland.
Such, briefly, was the political condition of Spain, internally and
externally, when news arrived of the occurrences at Nootka Sound which
have been discussed in the foregoing chapters.
As stated above, it was at the very beginning of the year that the
intelligence was received which was soon to throw all Europe into a war
fever. On January 2, 1790, Valdez[209] sent to Floridablanca the second
installment of letters and documents concerning the occurrences at
Nootka. Three days earlier he had sent the first bundle.[210] These two
packages contained a complete account of the affair, with copies of all
the documents. Valdez asked for His Majesty’s pleasure concerning the
matter.
On January 4, Anthony Merry, the English chargé d’affaires at Madrid
wrote to the Duke of Leeds, British secretary for foreign affairs,
giving a very confused account based on rumors. Word had just arrived
from Mexico, he said, that a small Spanish ship of war had captured an
English vessel in the port of Nootka. There were conflicting accounts
of the event. Some said “that the Viceroy of Mexico, having had notice
that the English were forming an establishment at the above-mentioned
place, ordered a ship there to take possession of it.” Others said that
the Spanish ship was there simply to reconnoiter the coast. There were
also conflicting accounts of what was done with Russian, Portuguese,
and American ships found in the same port, some stating that all were
allowed to go free except the English; others, that all were seized and
only the American released, Merry had not yet been able to learn the
name of the English vessel or her master. All accounts agreed that she
had come for the purpose of forming a settlement, that other vessels
were to follow, and that the captured ship had been manned with Spanish
seamen and sent to Mexico.[211]
This was the first account to reach London.[212] It is not strange that
mistaken notions were formed. Fired by hatred for the Spaniards, it was
natural that the English should consider the act much more atrocious
than it was. The indefiniteness and inconsistency of the accounts gave
room for full play of the imagination. The Spanish Court, which had
complete accounts, either did not study them carefully enough to get
at the whole truth, or intentionally kept the British Court in the
dark. No English account arrived for nearly four months. Such a period
of uncertainty and suspense prepared a fertile field in which the
exaggerated accounts then arriving produced a fruitful crop of error.
Three days after sending the above confused account Merry inclosed an
extract from a letter written in Mexico, which he had seen. This letter
seems to have been unofficial. Respecting the genesis and purpose of
the Spanish expedition it is true to the facts. It tells briefly of
the expedition of 1788 to investigate the Russian settlements, of the
discovery that the Russians intended to occupy Nootka, and of the
Viceroy’s prompt action to anticipate them. But respecting the events
at Nootka little is told except the seizure of an English vessel and
its arrival in Mexico as a prize.[213] On January 15 the British
chargé wrote of a conference with Floridablanca on the subject. “The
Count avoided explaining to him the particulars of the transaction,
or avowing clearly the seizure of the vessels; neither did he enter
upon the question of our right to trade or to form an establishment in
that part of the continent of America.” He said that he would direct
the Marquis del Campo, the Spanish ambassador at London, to impart the
circumstances to the Duke of Leeds.[214]
In virtue of this promise Floridablanca instructed Campo, January
20, regarding the communication which he was to make to Leeds. This
communication will be studied presently.[215] A week after sending
his harsh instructions the Count attempted to smooth matters over in
another conference with Merry. He wished to see the present harmony
between the two courts preserved and improved, and “hoped that no
event might happen which might cause Great Britain to deviate from her
present pacific system.”[216]
The first three letters from Merry had reached London before February
2. On that day the Duke of Leeds wrote cautioning him to be extremely
guarded in what he should say, until definite instructions could
be sent after Campo’s communication should have been received. He
declared that England undoubtedly had a complete “right to visit for
the purposes of trade, or to make a settlement in, the district in
question.”[217] When this positive declaration by the British Cabinet
at the very first is compared with the demand of the Spanish Court,
received a few days later, it is seen that a conflict was inevitable
unless one side should yield.
The expected communication from Campo was received by Leeds February
11. Since it was this note that started the diplomatic controversy, and
since it has not before been made public, it is worth while to quote it
in full. It is dated “Manchester Square, February 10, 1790,” and is as
follows:
MY LORD: Continuing the frequent expeditions which the King, my
master, has ordered to be made to the northern coasts of California,
the Viceroy of Mexico sent two ships, under the orders of Don
Estevan José Martinez, ensign of the navy, to make a permanent
settlement in the port of San Lorenzo, situated about the fiftieth
degree of latitude, and named by foreigners “Nootka,” or “Nioka,” of
which possession had formerly been taken. He arrived there the 24th
of last June. In giving his account to the Viceroy, M. Martinez said
that he found there an American frigate and sloop, which had sailed
from Boston to make a tour of the world. He also found a packet
boat and another vessel belonging to a Portuguese established at
Macao, whence they had sailed with a passport from the governor of
that port. He announced also that on the 2d of July there arrived
another packet boat from Macao. This was English, and came to take
possession of Nootka in the name of the British King. She carried a
sloop in pieces on board.
This simple recital will have convinced your excellency of the
necessity in which the Court of Madrid finds itself of asking
His Britannic Majesty to punish such undertakings in a manner to
restrain his subjects from continuing them on these lands which
have been occupied and frequented by the Spaniards for so many
years. I say this to your excellency as an established fact, and
as a further argument against those who attribute to Captain Cook
the discovery of the said port of San Lorenzo, I add that the same
Martinez in charge of the last expedition was there under commission
in August of 1774. This was almost four years before the appearance
of Cook. This same Martinez left in the hands of the Indians two
silver spoons, some shells, and some other articles which Cook
found. The Indians still keep them, and these facts, with the
testimony of the Indians, served M. Martinez to convince the English
captain.
The English prisoners have been liberated through the consideration
which the King has for His Britannic Majesty, and which he has
carefully enjoined upon his viceroys to govern their actions in
unforeseen events. His Majesty flatters himself that the Court of
St. James will certainly not fail to give the strictest orders to
prevent such attempts in the future, and, in general, everything
that could trouble the good harmony happily existing between the two
Crowns. Spain on her side engages to do the same with respect to her
subjects.
I have the honor to be, etc.,
THE MARQUIS DEL CAMPO.
His Excellency M. the DUKE OF LEEDS.[218]
One who has read the foregoing chapters will recognize many misleading
statements in this letter. The first sentence falsely gives the
impression, though it does not make the positive statement, that the
King of Spain had ordered the occupation of Nootka. Hence there was
some ground for suspecting that the Spanish Government had ordered
Martinez’s violent proceedings. Martinez arrived at Nootka almost two
months earlier than the date given in the note. June 21 was the date
of the formal act of possession. This error seems to have been due
to carelessness, since no motive is apparent, and the correct date
is given in the documents which Floridablanca had at hand. The note
does not mention the fact, clearly stated in the same documents, that
the first packet boat and the other vessel accompanying it from Macao
were really English, though nominally Portuguese; and the impression
is given that they were allowed to go absolutely free as were the
American vessels. No mention whatever is made of the _Princess Royal_
which was also sent as a prize to Mexico, though this is plainly
stated in the documents. Instead of telling that four English ships
were captured, the impression is given that there was only one. The
gravest misstatement is that the English prisoners had been liberated.
As pointed out above, this was probably inferred from the statement
in the second letter of Florez that he thought that they ought to be
liberated, but would leave his successor to do it--a very insufficient
ground for such a positive assertion. As a matter of fact, they were
not liberated for more than three months after Floridablanca wrote the
instructions which this note embodied.[219]
But the gravity of the note did not lie in its errors or
prevarications. The serious part of it was the demand that the English
King should punish his subjects for doing what Leeds had declared to
Merry only a few days before they had a perfect right to do, namely, to
trade and make settlements on the Northwest Coast. The further request
that the English Government should give strict orders to prevent such
enterprises in the future was virtually demanding that England should
forever refrain from exercising this right. Such demands could only be
acquiesced in when made upon a weak government by a strong one. English
pride could not brook them.
The narrative which was prepared in the foreign office and published by
the Government[220] says:
His Majesty’s ministers conceiving the circumstance of seizing a
British ship in time of peace to be an offense against the law of
nations and an insult to His Majesty, lost no time in taking the
only step in their powers.[221]
A fortnight after receiving the Spanish note Leeds replied in a tone
equally imperious. After reviewing the facts as given by Campo and
referring to the demands of the Spanish Court, he said:
As yet no precise information has been received relative to the
events mentioned in your excellency’s letter, but while awaiting
such I have His Majesty’s orders to inform your excellency that the
act of violence spoken of in your letter as having been committed
by M. Martinez, in seizing a British vessel under the circumstances
reported, makes it necessary henceforth to suspend all discussion of
the pretensions set forth in that letter until a just and adequate
satisfaction shall have been made for a proceeding so injurious to
Great Britain.
In the first place it is indispensable that the vessel in question
shall be restored. To determine the details of the ultimate
satisfaction which may be found necessary more ample information
must be awaited concerning all the circumstances of the affair.[222]
This haughty tone surprised the Spanish ambassador. In his note to
Floridablanca inclosing Leeds’s answer, he said:
The reply which this ministry has finally given to my letter will
surprise your excellency as it has surprised me. I refrain from
comments on it. At first I thought of going to the Duke of Leeds to
express my astonishment, but after considering the matter carefully
I have concluded that I ought to refrain, fearing lest in the heat
of conversation something might be said which might exasperate.
Since it is a formal reply and in writing I could not have obtained
its withdrawal. Besides, anything which I may say in reply will be
better if it comes from there (Madrid), which is the source.[223]
This quotation is a postscript to a letter which had been written
after delivering the Spanish note to Leeds, but evidently before
receiving the answer. In the letter he had said that Leeds listened to
him calmly, but avoided any discussion of the matter. He had tarried
a little time and then withdrawn to write his account and urge anew
that orders be sent disavowing the seizure. He was not convinced that,
as might be suspected, the English expedition had been ordered by
the Court. He believed it to have been an enterprise of some remote
officials.[224]
It should be noticed in connection with this reply to the Spanish Court
that Pitt was at this very time listening to the schemes of Colonel
Miranda, the famous South American agitator. It is quite possible that
this had much to do with the imperious tone assumed by the British
Cabinet. As previously stated, the Spanish note was received February
11. On February 14 Miranda met Pitt, on the latter’s invitation. He
had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the advantage of England
in connection with South America, and that plan was considered at
this meeting. Miranda explained the new form of government to be
introduced and discussed the existing situation. The plan was admitted
to be beneficial, but was to be put into execution only in case of a
war with Spain. Pitt asked him to write down the substance of what he
had said, adding a statement of all the products of South America, the
exports and imports, and the population, and the military and naval
forces of both South America and Spain. Miranda did so with as much
accuracy and detail as possible, and submitted his statement to Pitt on
March 5.[225] In the meantime, on February 25, Leeds’s reply had been
delivered to Campo. It will be interesting to watch the progress of
these conferences between Pitt and Miranda and note the coincidence of
some of them with the critical periods of the Spanish negotiation.
* * * * *
While awaiting the reply from London, nothing out of the ordinary seems
to have occurred at the Spanish capital. When Leeds cautioned Merry to
be guarded in what he might say, he also asked the chargé for all the
information he could obtain concerning recent Spanish naval movements.
Merry’s replies indicated a pacific attitude, externally at least, on
the part of the Spanish Court. March 1 he wrote:
Count Floridablanca gave me no hint of his having any intention of
arming; and, notwithstanding the reports which have continued to
prevail here with regard to the naval preparations in the Spanish
ports, I can not, on the most diligent inquiry, find that any are
yet commenced, except for the equipping of 3 ships of the line, 6
frigates, and 3 sloops of war for the purpose of forming a fleet of
exercise. [On March 15 he wrote:] The King of Spain has given orders
to grant free license to Prince Edward to pass and repass from
Gibraltar to Spain, and to pay him the same honors as to an Infante
de Castilla.[226]
After the English reply reached Madrid, Merry’s reports were very
different. March 22 he wrote that Floridablanca was much dissatisfied
with the English reply, but still seemed anxious that peace should
be preserved. Merry thought that the Count’s ill humor was caused by
the fear lest Great Britain should use the matter as a ground for a
quarrel.[227]
On the same day that Merry wrote the last-mentioned letter an important
session of the supreme junta of state was being held. The question
considered was as to the reply that should be made to England. The
matter had been discussed in the preceding junta. At this meeting of
March 22 Valdez, the minister for marine, presented in writing his
version of the proper reply. Though it is not given, its import may
be divined from the report which accompanied it. He told of abundant
military preparations at the principal places in the Indies, of what
was needed to complete their equipment, and the orders that could be
given to insure their security. He also reported on the state of the
Spanish navy, telling of the ships at the three naval stations Cadiz,
Ferrol, and Carthagena. There were 45 ships of the line and 32 frigates
ready to be armed at once; and in addition 24 of the former and 7 of
the latter could be prepared in a short time. The chief of the council
for the Indies, Porlier, also presented his opinion in writing. Others
gave oral advice, and it was left to Floridablanca to formulate the
reply to the English Court. Valdez received royal orders to collect a
squadron at Cadiz to be ready for emergencies, and to take the steps
necessary to put Honduras, Trinidad, and Porto Rico in a state of
defense.[228]
On March 24 an order was sent to the Viceroy of New Spain to liberate
the English ship in case this had not already been done.[229] As stated
in the preceding chapter, the vessels had not been released at this
time, but were liberated before this order reached the Viceroy.
Merry had another conference with Floridablanca on March 27. He
reported to his Government that the Count had concluded from Leeds’s
reply that the British Court intended to use the matter as a ground
for quarreling. The Spanish minister lamented the fact and hoped that
the necessity for Spain’s coming to an understanding with other courts
might be avoided. He said that he would endeavor to soften his reply to
the British Court. Merry thought that in view of the condition of Spain
Floridablanca would not suffer the matter to come to extremities.[230]
At the next junta, which was March 29, the minister for marine
presented another report. This was dated March 28 and was embodied in
the minutes of the session of the following day. In it Valdez says
that in consequence of the reply which the junta of one week before
had agreed should be sent to the Court of London by Floridablanca, and
in compliance with the precautionary measures which the department of
marine was ordered to take in the Indies and in Spain, he had proceeded
promptly, with His Majesty’s approval, to execute the orders which
follow in the report. Vessels were to be armed at once in Ferrol,
Carthagena, and Cadiz, and, the real purpose being kept as secret as
possible, a sufficient number were to be collected at the last-named
port to form a respectable squadron for use in case later occurrences
should make it necessary. The vessels that needed it were to be
cleaned and repaired as rapidly as possible. Those out of port were to
be detained under arms at Cadiz when they returned. Provisions were
being collected. The officials of Havana, Santo Domingo, Porto Rico,
and Trinidad were ordered to strengthen their positions. At the same
session Floridablanca read the reply which Campo, the ambassador at
London, was to present to the English Ministry.[231] The contents of
this reply will be examined presently.
This glimpse into the inner workings of the Spanish Cabinet reveals
a warlike activity. But externally every possible effort was made to
maintain a peaceable demeanor. Floridablanca made especial efforts
to keep the British chargé in the dark and quiet any alarm which
the warlike rumors might arouse. According to the dispatches of the
Prussian ambassador, Sandoz, to his Government at Berlin, the Count--
confided to Merry in the greatest secrecy the intelligence that
French emissaries had scattered seditious pamphlets in Mexico and
Havana, and thereby had stirred up the greatest possible ferment,
which threatened an outbreak every moment. The King had concluded
that the most efficacious measures must be taken with the greatest
haste in order that these first dangerous agitations might be nipped
in the bud, and consequently he had decided to employ his whole
force against it if necessary. To make this seem more probable, he
indulged in a tirade against the French Revolution.[232]
In dispatches of April 5 and 6 Merry told of the alarm in Spain and
of the naval activity, but he still thought Floridablanca desirous of
avoiding war if possible. The fleet of exercise which he had mentioned
before was assembling at Carthagena.[233] April 12 he reported that
the fleet of exercise had been ordered to Cadiz. Other ships were
being armed in that port and the other two naval stations.[234] Three
days later he reported as being fitted for immediate service at Cadiz
14 ships of the line, 10 frigates, and 2 sloops. He told of three
treasure ships that had recently arrived from Spanish America with some
5,000,000 Spanish dollars on board.[235] On April 22 he wrote of still
larger armaments. Twenty ships of the line were reported ready for
service.[236]
Such was the tenor of the dispatches from Madrid arriving at London
when, on April 20, Campo presented the second formal note from the
Spanish Court on the Nootka Sound controversy. This embodied the reply
agreed upon in the sessions of the Spanish junta of March 22 and 29. It
is as follows:[237]
MY LORD: Having given an account to my Court of the reply which
your excellency was pleased to make on the 26th of last February
to my memoir on the detention in the port of Nootka of an English
packet boat named the _Prince of Wales_,[238] in consequence I have
received an order to inform the Ministry of His Britannic Majesty as
follows: In spite of the incontestable rights of Spain to exclusive
sovereignty, navigation, and commerce, founded on the most solemn
treaties, on the discovery of the Indies and the islands and the
continent of the South Sea, on ancient laws, and on immemorial
possession, which rights this Crown has continually exercised over
the territories, coasts, and seas above mentioned, including the
right always exercised of capturing transgressors--[in spite of all
this] the Viceroy of Mexico, as appears from the latest information,
has already liberated the above-mentioned English vessel and crew.
He did this because he was convinced that nothing but ignorance
of the rights of Spain could have encouraged the individuals of
any nation to resort to those places with the idea of establishing
themselves or of carrying on commerce there. The Viceroy also had at
hand positive orders which had been given to him instructing him to
have all possible regard for the British nation and to avoid even
the least act that could disturb the good harmony and friendship
which happily subsists between the two Courts. For these reasons,
and in order to give a further proof of the King’s desire to
preserve and strengthen this friendship, His Majesty understands and
considers this affair as closed, without entering into disputes or
discussions over the indubitable rights of his Crown. His Catholic
Majesty flatters himself that the British King will order all of
his subjects to respect these rights, as I had the honor of setting
forth and recommending to your excellency formerly.
It is with the most respectful sentiments and the most constant
attachments that I have the honor, etc.,
THE MARQUIS DEL CAMPO.
His Excellency M. the DUKE OF LEEDS.[239]
The tone of this letter explains the feverish preparations for war
which the Spanish Court began as soon as the reply was decided upon.
It ignored the demand for satisfaction, the granting of which the
English reply of February 26 had made the indispensable condition
of further negotiation. It assumed that Spain was right and England
wrong. It distinctly avowed the seizure and made the release an act
of pure generosity. As justification, it asserted the most extensive
claims to exclusive dominion. It renewed the former demand that England
prevent her subjects from infringing upon that dominion. To support the
positive position taken, Spain was making extensive preparations for
war. If granting the first Spanish demand would have been incompatible
with British pride, yielding to the second would have been inconsistent
with British honor. Only one answer could have been expected from the
British Court.
Shortly after the presentation of the above Spanish memorial an event
occurred which greatly influenced the British Cabinet and made them
urge their demands more vigorously. This was the arrival of Meares.
He came just at the opportune moment. The blood of the English
ministers was already up. In the absence of any authentic account to
the contrary, they accepted the exaggerated statements of Meares. The
foreign office “Narrative” says:
From him a more full and probably a more authentic account of this
transaction was obtained than had already been in possession of
Government.[240]
His Majesty’s ministers, who till now had proceeded with that
caution which the uncertain nature of the intelligence they had
received rendered essentially necessary, no longer having room to
doubt of the insult offered to the British flag, and the injury
sustained by British subjects from the unwarrantable and unprovoked
hostility of the Spanish commander, lost no time in taking those
measures which were best calculated to vindicate the honor of His
Majesty and the British nation.[241]
This event with the arrival of the reports from Merry, mentioned above,
caused the British Government to turn its most serious attention to the
Nootka business.
At a cabinet meeting held in the night of April 30 the following
recommendations to the King were agreed upon, and submitted by
Grenville to George III the next day:
Upon consideration of the information which has been received from
Mr. Meares of the detention and capture of several British vessels
at Nootka Sound, on the coast of America, and of the circumstances
of that transaction, as also of the papers which here have been
delivered by Monsieur del Campo relative thereto, Your Majesty’s
servants have agreed humbly to submit to Your Majesty their opinion
that Your Majesty’s minister at the Court of Madrid should be
instructed to present a memorial demanding an immediate and adequate
satisfaction for the outrages committed by Monsieur de Martinez; and
that it would be proper, in order to support that demand and to be
prepared for such events as may arise, that Your Majesty should give
orders for fitting out a squadron of ships of the line.[242]
In a note of May 1 the King asked whether a press would be necessary
for equipping the proposed squadron. The next day Grenville replied
that the Cabinet thought a press necessary and that it should take
place Tuesday night, May 4, between 12 and 3 o’clock, as that time
would create least observation. The same day that Grenville’s note was
written the King answered it requesting a privy council for the next
day, May 3, to consider the arrangements for the press. The council
was to be composed of the cabinet ministers, as the more secret
the business could be kept the more possibility there would be of
collecting some seamen in the first attempt.[243]
After these days of martial activity in the British Cabinet Leeds
replied to Campo’s letter of April 20. He informed the Marquis, May 5,
that the unsatisfactory answer which the latter had been instructed to
make to the English demand for satisfaction made it necessary for His
Majesty to direct his minister at Madrid to renew the representations.
Owing to this change in the seat of negotiations, Leeds said it was
impossible for him to enter into the particulars of Campo’s letter. He
concluded:
I can therefore at present only observe in general to your
excellency that although on cases properly stated it will be His
Majesty’s desire--which he has manifested in repeated instances--to
take any measures necessary for preventing his subjects’ interfering
with the just and acknowledged rights of Spain, he can never in any
shape accede to those claims of exclusive sovereignty, commerce,
and navigation to which your excellency’s representations appear
principally to refer; and particularly that His Majesty will
consider it his indispensable duty to protect his subjects in the
enjoyment of the right of carrying on their fisheries in the Pacific
Ocean.[244]
Each nation stood firmly on the ground originally taken. Each had
made its first demand apparently expecting immediate compliance.
When such was stubbornly refused each suspected that the other had
some ulterior end in view and was using the matter in hand only as
a pretext. The misunderstanding arose over the fact that neither
the Briton nor the Spaniard could understand the mental attitude of
the other regarding the matter in dispute. The Spanish mind had for
centuries been accustomed to think of the American continent as the
exclusive possession of Spain. The accident that had given a portion to
Portugal, when the Pope drew his arbitrary line between the dominions
of the two maritime nations, was accepted without question by the
abnormally religious mind of the Spaniard. That Spain had yielded the
bleak northern shore of the Atlantic was of little consequence, since
she retained the sunny southern portion, where, alone, the Spaniard
could feel at home. With the exception of Portugal’s comparatively
insignificant holding, Spain still possessed practically the whole of
both Americas south of the northern line of Florida and west of the
Mississippi River. That Russia had recently settled on the icebound
coast of the far-away northwest was hardly known and less to be
regretted. Being accustomed to think of America thus, the Spaniard
could not conceive that anyone else would dare to infringe on his
right. Little was known in Spain of the colonial development of England
and the new principles on which it was based, namely, that unoccupied
land anywhere on the globe was the legitimate possession of any nation
that would occupy and develop it, and that no other nation could resist
such occupation by the mere assertion of an ancient shadowy claim that
had never been made good by actual settlement. The Briton was too
accustomed to this view to believe that anyone would still advance in
good faith the antiquated notion that any real right could be conferred
by the gift of a Pope, who, he believed, had no more authority to make
such gifts than any other individual, or that a claim not made good by
occupying and developing would be seriously urged. It was impossible to
reach a harmonious agreement. One party would have to yield.
From this time onward negotiations were conducted at Madrid instead
of at London as hitherto. The British minister to the Court of
Spain, Alleyne Fitzherbert, had not yet gone to take charge of his
post. Affairs were in the hands of the chargé, Merry. Fitzherbert
was now dispatched to Madrid.[245] No communication of importance
passed between the two Courts until his arrival. In the meantime
each Government was putting forth its utmost efforts to raise its
naval force to the highest possible efficiency. During the same
time the diplomacy of each country was directed toward strengthening
its European position by calling on its allies for assurances of
support. The outcome of these efforts influenced, considerably, the
course of the main negotiation. Besides this influence much of the
interest and importance of the controversy lies in the effect of these
by-negotiations on France, the country chiefly involved in them. They
will be studied in the next chapter.