stone, covered with blood. He offered him his horse. They might both
escape. He was himself unwounded and could help his chief. "Do not
add," he went on, "to the other disasters of the day the death of a
Consul. There will be tears and mourning enough without that." Paullus
refused the offer. "Do not waste," he said, "in useless pity your own
opportunity of escape. Go and tell the Senate from me to make Rome as
strong as possible against the arrival of the victorious enemy. As
to me, let me die here in the midst of my slaughtered soldiers. I do
not wish again to be brought to trial or to prove my own innocence by
accusing my colleague." Here a crowd of fugitives, followed close by
the enemy, swept over them. Lentulus escaped, thanks to the swiftness
of his horse. The Consul, whom the pursuers did not recognise, was
slain.
[Illustration: The Overthrow at Cannæ.]
Paullus, it will have been seen, is represented as anticipating the
immediate advance of Hannibal against Rome. The question whether that
advance should have been made has, we might say, been discussed ever
since; Livy tells us that Hannibal was strongly urged by his own
lieutenants to take this step. Maharbal, who was one of the ablest
among them, declared that if he would but start at once he should be
feasting in the Capitol in four days' time; and when Hannibal refused
to follow his advice, added, "I see that the gods do not give all
things to one man. You know how to win a victory, but you do not know
how to use it."
It is impossible, of course, to speak with confidence on such a
subject. That Hannibal was thoroughly competent to judge of the
situation from a soldier's point of view must be conceded. Nor is it
difficult to see that, victorious as he had been, his available force
must have been greatly reduced. His loss in killed is said to have been
6,000. The proportion of wounded in ancient warfare was far smaller
than that which prevails under modern conditions. Still we must make
a considerable addition if we would reckon the total of the disabled.
He had about 55,000 on the morning of the battle, and could hardly
have been able to put more than 30,000 in the fighting line at its
close. He thought it better, under the circumstances, to wait for the
results of his victory on those who both within and without Italy were
watching the course of the war. These were not inconsiderable, but
they were not as decisive as might have been expected. And Hannibal
seems to have continued to hope for developments which never occurred.
Perhaps we may say that it would have been wise to have abandoned the
Italian campaign, if, six months after Cannæ, he still felt himself
unable to march on Rome. This is one of the questions upon which the
most sagacious of men and the ablest of generals may be mistaken. To
abandon Italy would have been to give up the dream of his life, and to
this Hannibal could not bring himself, even after it must have become
evident to his cooler judgment that Rome was not to be vanquished.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 21: He held important commands in subsequent years.]
[Footnote 22: Not to be identified with any other officer of the same
name, for, strangely enough, he is not mentioned on any other occasion.]
[Footnote 23: His silence is certainly remarkable because he was
certainly acquainted with Paullus' son, and was on terms of intimate
friendship with his grandson. (The younger Scipio was a son of the
Æmilius Paullus who conquered Macedonia, and was adopted by a son of
the elder Scipio.)]
VIII
THE SECRET MARCH
The result of the victory of Cannæ, stated broadly, was that the
southern half of Italy threw in its lot with Hannibal. The Samnites,
in former days the fiercest and most dangerous enemies of Rome; the
Campanians, a warlike race whose name has occurred more than once in
my story, and who possessed in Capua the second city of Italy; the
Greek region, far less populous and wealthy than it had once been,
but still formidable, and the aboriginal mountain tribes of Bruttium
declared against Rome. Northern Italy, however, remained faithful,
and even the disaffected territories were more or less held in check
by the colonies, Latin as well as Roman, for the Latins were firm in
their allegiance.[24] On the whole the effect of the disaster was not
so absolutely crushing as might have been expected. Hannibal's most
noteworthy gain during the remainder of the year was the accession
of Capua. Rome had the profound relief of feeling that the worst was
over, and that she still existed. This relief was expressed in a truly
characteristic way when the Senate voted thanks to Varro "because
he had not despaired of the Republic." To Varro, indeed, no thanks
were due; he had done nothing more than save his own life; what the
resolution really expressed was that Rome had survived what might well
have been an annihilating blow.
The next two years (215-214) passed without any event of great
importance. One serious danger, indeed, threatened Rome, but it passed
away. At Syracuse, Hiero, who had been a steady friend for nearly
fifty years, had been succeeded by his grandson, Hieronymus, a foolish
lad, who was under Carthaginian influence. In Macedonia Philip V.
made up his mind to give active help to Hannibal. But Hieronymus was
assassinated before he could do anything, and Philip, for reasons
which we do not know, let the opportunity pass. In 213 Tarentum fell
into the hands of Hannibal, though the citadel was held by a Roman
garrison. In 212 the Carthaginians won a great victory at Herdonia in
Apulia, wholly destroying a Roman army, and got possession of some
important towns in Southern Italy. They had also a great success in
Spain, where two Roman armies were defeated with the loss of their
commanders, Cnæus and Publius Scipio. On the other hand, Rome recovered
Syracuse, which was taken by Marcellus after a siege of nearly two
years' duration. Hard pressed as she was in other directions she thus
accomplished what Athens and Carthage, both at the height of their
power, had failed to do. And Capua was invested; nor could Hannibal,
victorious as he was in the field, relieve it. Much, it is evident,
turned on the fate of Capua. No Italian city would venture to take up
the Carthaginian cause if this important place could not be protected.
In 210, accordingly, Hannibal made a vigorous effort to relieve it. In
the hope of compelling the Consuls to raise the siege, he threatened
Rome itself, and advanced to within three miles of the city. He even
rode up with a body of cavalry to the walls. But he failed to achieve
his purpose. One of the Consuls led his army from before Capua to the
relief of the capital, but the other still pressed the siege. Hannibal
retreated, and though he turned upon the Consul, who was following him
somewhat carelessly, and defeated him with very heavy loss, he could
not relieve Capua. This city capitulated before the end of the year.
In 209 Hannibal won another great battle on the same spot, Herdonia,
where he had triumphed two years before. In the field, it will be seen,
he was always successful, but he could not be everywhere, nor could he
protect all his Italian allies. In this year the two important regions
of Samnium and Lucania gave in their submission to Rome, which had the
wisdom to grant them favourable terms. And Tarentum was lost, betrayed
to the Romans, as it had been betrayed a few years before to Hannibal.
The next year (208) was marked by the death of the consul Marcellus,
and by other Carthaginian successes. In 207 we came to another great
crisis of the war, the attempt of Hasdrubal to join his brother, ending
in the decisive battle of the Metaurus.
We last heard of Hasdrubal as defeating the two Scipios in 212. What
hindered him from following up this success by an immediate march into
Italy it is impossible to say. Livy's account of the transactions of
the next five years is wholly incredible, and Polybius' narrative is
lost. It is rash to pronounce a judgment where we know so little of
the facts. Still it is generally true that few commanders have the
same power of perspective which Hannibal seems to have possessed. It
is at least possible that Hasdrubal may have overrated the importance
of what he might be able to do in Spain, and have forgotten that the
war had really to be decided in Italy. It is a fact that he put off his
advance in Italy for four years, and that when he made it his general
prospects had not improved. A very able young commander, afterwards
known as Scipio Africanus, had appeared upon the scene, and had
achieved the great success of capturing New Carthage. This he followed
up in 209 by defeating Hasdrubal himself. This defeat, however, did not
prevent the Carthaginian general from carrying out his original plan.
Either in this year or in the next he crossed the Pyrenees. He spent a
considerable time in Gaul, where he was able to enlist a large number
of recruits, and, after an easy passage of the Alps, descended into
Italy early in the year 207. And here, again, we find him neglecting,
as far as we can see, the main issue, and wasting strength and time on
a quite subordinate matter. He besieged Placentia, a strongly fortified
colony, and so gave the Romans time to recover from the surprise of
his unexpectedly early arrival. By the time he had made up his mind to
raise the siege of Placentia, one of the Consuls, Livius by name, had
advanced to bar his way.
The Roman generals must have been aware that the main object of
Hasdrubal's descent into Italy was to effect a junction with his
brother. And now, by a lucky chance, they found out how this was
to be done. Hasdrubal sent a party of six horsemen charged with a
letter to his brother, in which he announced his arrival in Italy, and
suggested that they should meet in Umbria. These messengers traversed
nearly the whole of Italy in safety, only to fail at the last. When
they were some thirty or forty miles from Metapontum, where Hannibal
was encamped, they took the wrong road, and made for Tarentum. They
fell into the hands of a foraging party, and were brought before the
officer who was in local command. To him they confessed, under threats
of torture, that they carried despatches to Hannibal. The officer
sent them on to the Consul Nero, who was watching Hannibal. Nero at
once conceived a bold design. The junction of the two Carthaginian
armies must be prevented at any cost, and the best means of doing this
would be to strengthen the army of the north, and crush Hasdrubal
before he could unite his forces with his brother's. But there was no
time to be lost. Nero picked seven thousand men out of his army, the
very best troops that he had, and hurried northwards. No one knew of
his plan; even the authorities at Rome were hoodwinked. Nor did he
hamper himself with transport. He would be passing through a friendly
population, and he judged it sufficient to send messengers before him
with directions that ready-cooked provisions should be brought down for
the use of the army, with such horses as would suffice to carry what
was absolutely necessary. Everything turned out well. The soldiers made
forced marches of extraordinary length, and reached their journey's
end without mishap, entering the camp at night, as it was desirable to
keep their coming a secret. This, however, was not effectually done.
Hasdrubal had at least some suspicion of what had happened. Riding up
to the Roman camp, he observed some shields of unfamiliar pattern. Some
of the horses were leaner than those he had seen before, and there
were, as he thought, more of them. Another suspicious circumstance
was one for which he had been on the lookout. There were, it should
be explained, two Roman camps, one in charge of the Consul Livius,
the other commanded by the prætor Porcius. In the Consul's camp the
signal was sounded twice, indicating that both consuls were there.
On the other hand there was the perplexing circumstance that the
limits of the camps had not been extended. If a large reinforcement
had arrived, where could they have been put away? Above all, was
it possible that a general so consummately skilful as Hannibal had
allowed such a manœuvre to be made? Or was it possible that Hannibal
had been destroyed? The general result of these questionings was great
discouragement. He declined the battle which the Consuls, who had made
up their minds to fight without delay, offered him as soon as possible
after Nero's arrival, and in the course of the following night struck
his camp and moved away. It is not easy to say what was his object in
thus retreating, for a northward movement was a retreat, the Metaurus
river, which he wished to cross, being some miles to the north of his
camp. Possibly he wished to get to a region where the population would
be friendly. Anyhow, the movement ended in disaster. Two guides whom he
had pressed into his service contrived to disappear in the night-march,
and the ford of the Metaurus could not be discovered. The army
proceeded slowly up the right bank of the river. It was a fatiguing
march; many men fell out, and all were wearied and dispirited. Early
in the next day the Roman army came up, and Hasdrubal saw that he must
fight. He posted his elephants as usual in front of the centre, with
the Ligurians behind them. On the right were his Spanish troops,
veteran soldiers of his own, and of the very best quality. These were
under his personal command. The Gauls were on the left, but seem to
have taken but little part in the battle that followed. The Spaniards
acquitted themselves in a way worthy of their military reputation, and
maintained the struggle for some time on equal terms. The result of
the day was in a great measure decided by a bold movement of Nero. He
judged that he might safely neglect the Gauls, who were his special
antagonists, and wheeling rapidly from the left, fell upon the enemy
with crushing effect. The elephants behaved as usual. Formidable at
first, they threw the lines of the enemy into disorder; then becoming
unmanageable did not less damage to their friends. Livy says that more
were killed by their drivers than by the enemy. The battle was long and
fierce. So much is amply testified by the amount of the Roman loss. No
less than eight thousand men were slain, a very large proportion, it
is certain, of the number engaged. The Carthaginian army, of course,
suffered more. Probably few of the Spanish troops survived. Some of
the Ligurians escaped, and many of the Gauls. They were not far from
their own country, and the Romans were probably too much exhausted to
make an energetic pursuit. "Let some be left alive," said the Consul
Livius, when he was urged to follow the Gauls, "to carry home accounts
of the enemy's losses, and of our valour." These could hardly have
been his real reasons. But the total loss in killed and prisoners is
put at sixty thousand. Hasdrubal fell in the battle. As long as there
was any hope of victory he had done his best, reforming the line again
and again, encouraging the wearied, and putting fresh spirit into the
discouraged. When all was lost, he set spurs to his horse and charged
the enemy's line. Seven days afterwards his head was thrown among the
advanced guards of Hannibal's camp.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 24: A colony, I may remind my readers, was practically a
military outpost. It was inhabited by old soldiers to whom land had
been granted. There were two classes of colonies, Roman and Latin,
as there were two kinds of citizenship, Roman and Latin. Livy has an
interesting passage about the behaviour of the Latin colonies in the
year 209. There were thirty in all. Twelve of these declared themselves
to be unable to comply with the requisitions for men and money made
upon them. The other eighteen expressed themselves in an opposite
sense, as willing to do even more than was asked of them. Among these
we find Brundisium, Luceria, Venusium, Paestum, and Beneventum, all
important places in the region generally occupied by Hannibal. Livy
goes so far as to say that it was their support that was the salvation
of Rome. "After all these years they must not be forgotten or deprived
of the praise which they so well deserved."]
IX
HANNIBAL'S LAST BATTLE
What Hannibal proposed to himself by remaining in Italy after the
disastrously decisive day of the Metaurus it is not easy to say.
Perhaps he continued to hope against hope that the great anti-Roman
combination, for which he had been working for more than ten years,
might yet come into being. To us, who know what Rome became in after
days, it seems strange indeed that the kingdoms which she was destined
to crush one after another should not have joined with Carthage in
the attempt to destroy her. If Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt could
have combined while Hannibal had still a footing in Italy, she could
hardly have survived. But they were too jealous of each other, or too
short-sighted. Possibly they were unwilling to make Carthage, which
the Greeks had no reason to love, too powerful. And what was not done
after Cannæ would hardly be attempted after the Metaurus. Anyhow,
Hannibal remained in Italy for four years after Hasdrubal's death. He
now held only the extreme south of the Peninsula, and the limits of
the region which he occupied were slowly contracted by the loss of
town after town. Still he clung to his position; he could have gone at
any time; but he could not bear to give up the dominating hope of his
life, and he lingered on. At last, late in the year 203, in obedience
to an urgent summons from home, he embarked his army. No attempt was
made to hinder him. The Romans indeed were unfeignedly glad to see his
departure. They had lost three hundred thousand men during the fifteen
years of his stay. The huge dragon of his dream had indeed desolated
Italy. It is said that when he took his last look of the land where
he had met with such successes and such disappointments, he bitterly
reproached his countrymen for the grudging support which they had given
him. "It is not the Roman people, so often routed in the field, it is
Hanno"--the leader of the Peace party in Carthage--"that has vanquished
me." The charge can hardly have been true; but it is natural to one
who had finally to abandon one of the most splendid schemes that man
ever devised. Livy adds that Hannibal now bitterly regretted that he
had not led his troops against Rome immediately after the great victory
of Cannæ.
It is needless to dwell on the events that followed Hannibal's return
to Africa. We have not, indeed, the means of drawing out a quite clear
and consistent narrative of them. The romantic story in which Syphax,
Masinissa, and Sophonisba (daughter of Hasdrubal, son of Gisco) play
the chief parts, does not belong to my subject, and I pass on at once
to the battle of Zama.
Hannibal ranged his elephants, as usual, in front of his line.
Immediately behind them were the mercenaries, a mixed multitude, to
whom Polybius applies the famous verse in which Homer describes the
many-tongued battle-cry of the Trojans and their allies. Behind these
mercenaries were the native Carthaginians, brought once more into
the field by the extremity of their country, and in the rear of all,
as a reserve which in the last resort might restore the fortunes of
the day, the veterans whom Hannibal had brought with him from Italy.
Scipio departed in one particular from the usual rules of Roman
tactics. Usually the intervals in the front line were filled up in
the second, and the intervals in the second filled up in the third.
On the present occasion the intervals were continuous, giving a free
passage from the front of the army to the rear. This was done with a
view to lessening the danger from the elephants. For the same reason
the space between the lines was made greater than usual. The more space
these animals were allowed in which they might move, the less likely,
Scipio thought, they would be to trample down the ranks of his men.
Lælius with the Roman cavalry occupied the left wing, with the native
Carthaginian horse opposed to him; Masinissa on the right had a body
of African horse fronting men of the same or kindred nationalities in
the service of Carthage. The elephants were of even less use and did
even more damage to their friends than usual. The stock of trained
animals had been long since exhausted, and the untaught creatures now
brought into the field were unmanageable. In this instance they turned
against the Carthaginian cavalry, and put them into such disorder that
Lælius won an easy victory over them. On the Roman right Masinissa, one
of the best cavalry officers that the world has ever seen, defeated
his antagonists. But in the centre the victory was less easily won.
The mercenaries were veteran soldiers skilled in all the arts of war,
and they more than held their own against the Roman infantry, largely
consisting of recruits. If they had been properly backed up by the
Carthaginians behind them, they might have changed the fortunes of the
day. But the citizen soldiers remained stolidly in their places. It was
only when they were themselves attacked--the mercenaries, we are told,
enraged at being thus deserted, turned against them--that they drew
their swords. The line of veterans, under Hannibal's personal command,
made a fierce and obstinate resistance. It was only when they were
charged on both flanks by the victorious cavalry that they gave way.
After this the rout was general. Twenty thousand men were left dead
on the field of battle, and as many more were taken prisoners. Of the
conquerors fifteen hundred fell. It was not a high price to pay for the
victory that, as Polybius puts it, "gave to Rome the sovereignty of the
world." Hannibal made his way to Adrumetum, and from thence to Carthage
with a body of six thousand troops.
The terms of peace were unexpectedly lenient. Carthage was to retain
its independence, and its African possessions. But it was to pay an
annual tribute of two hundred talents and an indemnity of ten thousand,
and it was to retain only ten ships of war. Hannibal was so strongly
impressed with the necessity of accepting these terms that he forcibly
pulled back into his seat a senator who had risen to speak against them.
A few lines may be given to the after history of this remarkable
man, the most formidable enemy that Rome ever had, equally great as
statesman and as general.
Not long after the conclusion of peace he left Carthage, avoiding by
his voluntary departure a demand that Rome was preparing to make for
his extradition. He was suspected, and probably with justice, of still
cherishing hostile designs. He took refuge with Antiochus, of Syria,
surnamed, but not for very convincing reasons, the Great. Antiochus
was flattered by his presence, but showed a ridiculous jealousy of his
genius. He would not employ him or even take his advice. A combination
against Rome among the Eastern powers was still possible, and Hannibal
strongly urged that it should be made, but he urged it in vain. In 192
he was indeed put in command of the Syrian fleet, largely consisting,
it may be presumed, of Phœnician ships. He was attacked by a superior
force from Rhodes, then the greatest naval power in the world, and was
defeated. Two years afterwards the great battle of Magnesia was fought.
Whether Hannibal was present we do not know, but he was certainly
not in command. Possibly an anecdote that is told of him belongs to
this time. King Antiochus showed him his army, splendid with gold and
silver. "Will not this be enough for the Romans?" asked the king.
"Yes, indeed," answered the veteran, "though they are the greediest
people upon earth." But it was of the value of their spoils, not of the
efficiency of their weapons, that he was thinking. The battle ended in
the total defeat of Antiochus and his splendid army. Two years later he
made peace with Rome, one of the conditions being that he should banish
from his dominions all the enemies of Rome. Hannibal had anticipated
the decree. He visited various places, and found at last what promised
to be a final refuge with Prusias, King of Bithynia. But Prusias
quarrelled with a neighbour, Eumenes, King of Pergamum, and Eumenes
was a friend of Rome. Rome sent to Prusias to demand the person of
his guest, and the veteran--he was now in his sixty-fifth year--took
poison. He carried the drug about with him in a ring, so the story
runs, to be used in such an emergency.
X
THE BLOTTING OUT OF CARTHAGE