the month of November. He was all for action. "It is intolerable,"
he urged, "that Italy should be invaded and Rome threatened in this
fashion. And what are we waiting for? There is no third army that can
join us. Our men will lose all heart if we let them sit in their camp
while the enemy plunders our friends." All this is natural enough,
especially when we know that the Romans had very little idea, so far,
of what Hannibal really was. But Livy, doubtless, is right when he
adds that Sempronius had before his eyes the approaching election of
Consuls. On the 1st of January ensuing he would have to go out of
office, and yield up his command. If he was to gain the distinction of
a victory he must strike at once.
He was encouraged by success in an affair in which he had engaged
against the more prudent counsels of his colleague. He had strongly
urged the duty of defending the friendly Gauls, had overruled the
opposition of Scipio, and had actually carried off the honours of
victory in a considerable cavalry skirmish.
Hannibal's plan was sufficiently simple. He was well aware--for what
we should now call his "intelligence department" seems to have been
admirably managed[19]--of Sempronius's eagerness for battle. In
the country that lay between the two camps was a spot which seemed
admirably suited for an ambush; the bed of a stream, closed in on
either side by steep banks, and enclosing a considerable space of
level ground, thickly covered with bush. Here he put his brother
Mago with a picked force of 2,000 men, composed of equal numbers of
cavalry and infantry. "You have an enemy," he said in dismissing
them, "who is blind to these stratagems of war." How familiar the
words have been made by recent experiences of our own! These
arrangements made, Hannibal sent his Numidian cavalry at dawn the
next day with instructions to ride up to the Roman camp, to pour a
shower of missiles upon the sentries, and, if possible, to provoke an
engagement. Sempronius was, he knew, eager to fight. This insulting
demonstration would stir the temper of the men in such a way that
they would obey with enthusiasm a command to advance. The device was
completely successful. Sempronius led forth his men in hot haste after
the Numidians, who retreated in apparent disorder. The Romans, thus
hurriedly summoned, had not had a meal; their horses had not been fed;
and they suffered from cold as well as from hunger. It was a snowy day
in November, and the region, the marshy, low-lying ground between the
Alps and the Apennines, had an inclement climate. More than this, they
had to cross the river, whose waters, swollen by the autumn rains, and
now breast high, struck a piercing cold into their limbs. When they
emerged on the other side of the stream they could scarcely grasp their
weapons.
Hannibal's men were in very different case when they were led forth to
encounter the enemy, warmed by fires in their tents, and strengthened
by a leisurely meal. The order of battle was this. The slingers were
in front; on either wing the cavalry and the elephants; in the centre
the heavy-armed infantry. The total number is given by Polybius at
about forty thousand. Half of these were infantry, Spaniards, Africans,
and Gauls, these last representing the addition which Hannibal had
been able to make to the army of the Alps. The cavalry numbered more
than ten thousand. Here also Gauls appear as "Celtic allies." Of the
slingers there were eight thousand. The Roman force was almost exactly
equal, but differently made up. It had but four thousand cavalry, as
against ten thousand. Of the infantry, sixteen thousand were Romans,
and twenty thousand auxiliaries.
It was among the light-armed and the cavalry that the first signs of
disorder and weakness could be seen. They were specially depressed
by suffering and exhaustion. A light-armed soldier is nothing if he
has lost his mobility, and this is exactly what had happened to the
Romans. They could render little or no help to the heavy-armed, whose
flanks and front were alike exposed, without any kind of covering, to
hostile attack. The centre, nevertheless, offered a stout resistance
to the enemy. For a time they held their ground manfully, and in
one direction did more than hold it. A body of ten thousand men
broke through the Carthaginian line, and steadily made their way to
Placentia, where, of course, they were in safety. Of the rest of the
army few survived. Their line was first broken by the unexpected charge
of the ambushed force. This was actually in the rear of the Roman
infantry, and the attack which they made from behind on the legions,
occupied as they were with what was going on in front, was very
destructive.
Many, also, were crushed by the elephants, which gave valuable help to
their side, not, however, without some counterbalancing mischief. The
animals, once wounded, became unmanageable, and were quite as likely
to damage their friends as their foes. This was, indeed, the last as
well as the first occasion on which Hannibal used them, for the cold
was so severe that all but one perished. We may sum up what is recorded
of the effectiveness of the elephant in ancient warfare by saying that
his first appearance was terrifying, that experience greatly lessened
the fear with which he was regarded, as the means of dealing with him
were soon learnt, and that he was always an incalculable and unreliable
force.
The season was now far advanced, considerably beyond the time when it
was usual to suspend military operations for the year. Hannibal retired
into winter quarters, though his cavalry never ceased to scour and
ravage the country. At Rome there was much alarm, shown, however, in a
resolute attempt to do all that was possible in the way of preparation
for the future.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 19: The Gallic auxiliaries in the Roman camp were his chief
sources of information.]
VI
THE DISASTER AT THE LAKE
The winter of 218-217 Hannibal spent in Cisalpine Gaul. Livy tells us
that his position here was uneasy, that the Gauls were dissatisfied
with the state of affairs, that they had expected the plunder of Italy,
but found themselves burdened by the presence of a powerful guest, and
that, in consequence, more than one plot was laid for the assassination
of Hannibal. Whatever truth there may be in this story, it is certain
that the Carthaginian general made good use of his time by recruiting
among the Gauls. As many as sixty thousand foot soldiers and four
thousand horsemen are said to have joined his standard. Early in the
spring of 217 he crossed the Apennines. The passage of this mountain
range was made without difficulty; it was when he reached the low-lying
country between the Arno and the Serchio that his troubles began.
His troops were decimated by sickness; multitudes of the baggage and
cavalry horses perished; he was himself attacked by ophthalmia in so
severe a form that he lost the sight of one eye. When he had extricated
himself and his army from the marshes, he marched on, plundering and
wasting the country as he went.
* * * * *
Of the two Consular armies one was at Ariminum (Rimini), nominally
watching an enemy who was now busy elsewhere, the other was at Arretium
(Arezzo). It was the latter that Hannibal designed to engage, his plans
being laid in such a way as to show that his political sagacity was
not less remarkable than his military genius. The Roman general was C.
Flaminius, a vehement advocate of plebeian rights. He had denounced
the incapacity of the Senate and of the patrician generals. He had
gained some distinction as a soldier, though, as a matter of fact,
his victories had been won by the valour of his troops, which had
triumphed in spite of their general's blunders. During his canvass for
the Consulship he had loudly proclaimed that, put at the head of the
army, he would speedily make an end of the invader. Now the time was
come for him to make good his boast. If he had been himself disposed
to hang back, though there is no reason for supposing that he doubted
of the result, he could not disappoint his friends and followers. The
camp was half filled, we are told, with adventurers who had thronged to
get a share in the Carthaginian plunder. Hannibal marched slowly past
the Romans, ravaging the country as he went, and Flaminius, infuriated
by the sight, immediately broke up his camp and pursued him. The omens
were, it was said, of the gloomiest kind. When the Consul mounted his
horse the animal stumbled and threw him; when the standard was to be
removed all the efforts of the officer whose business it was to take
charge of it was unable to stir it from the ground. Flaminius was
wholly unmoved by these occurrences, and followed Hannibal in hot
haste. The Carthaginian laid a trap for his antagonist, into which the
Roman fell with an almost ridiculous simplicity. The road southward led
past Lake Trasumennus. Here it was narrow, the mountains approaching
near to the water-side; a little further on there was an open space of
some extent; after this again the mountains closed in again and made a
narrow defile. These features are not visible to any one who approaches
the place from the north; and the Consul seems to have taken no pains
to acquaint himself with the road which he was following. Hannibal
barred the southern outlet with a strong force of his picked troops;
his cavalry he put in ambush at the point of entrance; the high ground
that bordered the road on the landward side he occupied with his
slingers and light-armed troops. Flaminius reached the lake at sunset
on the day of his breaking up his camp at Arretium, and bivouacked
there for the night. Next day, at early dawn, he moved forward, again
without reconnoitring, and reached the open space described before. A
heavy morning mist hung over the country, and the Romans saw nothing
but the road on which they were marching. Their first sight of the
enemy was when they reached the defile where Hannibal himself was in
position. Almost at the same moment the mist rolled away, and they saw
that the mountain-sides on either hand were alive with enemies, and
that their retreat was barred by the Carthaginian cavalry. At the same
moment they found themselves attacked, before, says the historian, they
could form their lines, or even draw their swords.
The result of this surprise was something like a panic. The march had
been conducted with so much carelessness and disorder that the legions
and even the maniples or companies were broken up. It was by the merest
chance that a soldier found himself in his proper place, or ranged with
his proper comrades. Some, it would seem, were actually without arms,
for these were being carried in waggons, and the waggons could not be
found when they were wanted. The mist, it must be remembered, though
it had cleared away from the higher ground, still lay thick upon the
lower ground, which was indeed very little raised above the level of
the lake. So it came to pass that, as Livy puts it, the ear was of more
service than the eye. The men rushed where they heard the groans of the
wounded, the clash of sword upon armour, the cry of victory or defeat.
The coward, flying in terror, found himself entangled in the mass of
combatants; the brave man, eager to take his part in the struggle,
might be irresistibly carried off by a crowd of fugitives.
After a while something of the habitual Roman courage reasserted
itself. Every one could see for himself that the army was hemmed in.
The mountains were on one side, the lake on the other; at either end of
the road the passage was barred by serried lines of the enemy. If there
was to be any deliverance it must come from their own strength and
valour. Panic was succeeded by the courage of despair. Nothing could
restore to the army its lost order, but it was at least determined to
sell its existence dearly. And here, at least, Flaminius did his duty
to the utmost. Incompetent as he was as a general, he was the bravest
of the brave. "It is not by prayers to heaven," he cried, "that you
will escape. Strength and courage, and these alone, will save you. The
less your fear, the smaller the danger." The men answered to their
leader's call. So fierce was the fight that the combatants were wholly
unconscious of an earthquake which, at the very hour when the battle
raged most fiercely, laid more than one city in ruins, changed the
courses of river, and brought down huge masses of earth and rock from
the mountains to the plains.
It was round the person of the Consul that the battle raged most
fiercely. He was a conspicuous figure in the scarlet cloak which marked
the officer in chief command, and in arms of unusual splendour. And as
long as he was in the front the legions held their own. For three hours
the issue seemed to be in suspense. But a general who exposes himself
as recklessly as the Consul felt constrained to do can hardly hope to
escape. And there were some in the hostile ranks who bore him a special
grudge. Five years before Flaminius had carried on a campaign against
the Insubrian Gauls,[20] and had treated them, it would seem, with
exceptional severity. An Insubrian trooper now recognised him. "This is
the man," he cried to his comrades, "who slaughtered our countrymen,
and laid waste our fields. I will offer him a sacrifice to the spirits
of the dead." So saying, he set spurs to his horse and charged through
the Roman line. The Consul's armour-bearer threw himself in the way,
and was struck down. The Consul himself fell mortally wounded. A fierce
struggle took place over his body, but the Roman veterans succeeded in
rescuing it. But to an army that is fighting at a disadvantage the fall
of its leader is often a disabling blow. So it was at Lake Trasumennus.
The Roman army no longer held its ground. Frantic attempts were made
to fly. Some tried to climb the mountain-side; others endeavoured
to escape by wading out into the lake. Very few succeeded in either
attempt. In the lake, especially, many perished. Those who attempted
to swim were drowned sooner or later; those who made their way back
to the shore were cut down by the enemy's horsemen, who rode out in
the shallow and were ready to receive them. Fifteen thousand in all
were slain; ten thousand contrived to escape. One body of six thousand,
possibly a complete legion, succeeded in forcing its way through the
defile occupied by Hannibal's troops. But its fate was only delayed for
a time. It was without provisions, and without guides. When, the next
day, Maharbal with the Carthaginian cavalry appeared, it surrendered.
Hannibal's loss was fifteen hundred slain and a very considerable
number of wounded. Livy gives these figures on the authority of a
contemporary writer, Fabius Pictor.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 20: Near Mediolanum (_Milan_).]
VII
THE OVERTHROW AT CANNÆ
The disastrous defeat at Lake Trasumennus was followed by a change of
policy at Rome. Quintus Fabius, who was appointed dictator, was as
cautious as Flaminius had been rash. His plan was to watch the enemy,
to use all the opportunities which a knowledge of the country and the
friendly feeling of the population--for Italy remained firmly faithful
to Rome--put in his way. To a certain extent he was successful. While
he was in command Rome suffered no disasters. But he was, probably,
nothing more than an able soldier. He had nothing like the genius of
Hannibal, and when he might have struck a really effective blow at the
enemy, he allowed himself to be outwitted. And the Romans had not yet
thoroughly learnt their lesson. They wearied of the cautious strategy
of Fabius which avoided defeat but did not save Italy from fire and
sword. The first result of this revulsion of feeling was putting the
dictator's second-in-command--"Master of the Horse" was his official
title--on an equality with him. Minucius--for this was his name--was
an adventurous soldier of the Flaminius type. He had won some slight
successes when Fabius had been absent on official business in Rome, and
he now hoped to distinguish himself still more. He took charge of half
the army, and pitched a camp for himself. It was not long, however,
before he was outmanœuvred by the enemy, and reduced to extremities,
from which he was saved by the timely arrival of Fabius. But different
views of these events prevailed at Rome--and we must remember that we
have one side only of the case. It was affirmed that Minucius had been
purposely deserted, and that his reverse was due to the intrigues of
the aristocrats. Great popular excitement followed, and the result was
that when the Consuls of the new year were elected a violent partisan,
Terentius Varro by name, was put in office. Varro, though he could
scarcely have been as incompetent as we should suppose from Livy's
account,[21] had had no military experience. The aristocrats succeeded
in giving him as a colleague L. Æmilius Paullus, a soldier of some
reputation, but unfortunately much disliked by the commons.
Hannibal was now in Apulia, in Southern Italy, where he probably found
the population more sympathetic than in the north, the larger Greek
element being not yet reconciled to Roman rule. His headquarters were
at Cannæ, a town on the right or southern bank of the Aufidus. The
Roman army, which was under peremptory instructions from home to fight,
had probably followed the _Via Appia_ as far as Venusia, and had then
marched eastward. A garrison was probably left at Canusium, a strongly
fortified town, about six miles to the west of Cannæ. An hour's march
from Canusium must have brought them within sight of Hannibal. He
was encamped outside Cannæ, the country round him being level and so
well adapted for the operations of cavalry, an arm in which he was
particularly strong. A difference of opinion now developed itself
between the two Consuls. Æmilius Paullus was for drawing the enemy into
a country less suited to him; Varro, on the other hand, was impatient
to fight at once. He ordered an advance, which resulted in a partial
engagement, terminating, on the whole, not unfavourably to the Romans.
The final position taken up by the Consuls was this. Two-thirds of the
army was located on the north or left bank of the river, the remainder
was left on the south, being very nearly in touch with the Carthaginian
outposts. It must be remembered that the Aufidus, a shallow and rapid
stream, dwindled in summer to a very inconsiderable river which might
be forded anywhere without difficulty, at least in this part of its
course. The battle was fought on August 2nd, according to the Roman
calendar, but as this was very much in advance of the true time,
really in the middle of June, Paullus was for a policy of inactivity.
He believed that Hannibal would have to shift his ground for want of
supplies, and he hoped that he might find a favourable opportunity for
delivering an attack. His colleague, however, had a very different view
of the situation. Naturally rash and eager, he was irritated by the
aggressive movements of the enemy, who did all that was possible to
provoke him. The Roman troops, too, were eager to fight, and they soon
had their wish.
It was the custom that when the two Consuls were with the army they
should exercise the command on alternate days. At early dawn on his
day of command Varro gave orders to the force encamped on the north
bank of the Aufidus to cross the stream. This done he drew out his
whole force in a long line fronting the south. He had in all about
80,000 infantry and 6,000 horse. The Roman cavalry he posted on the
right wing along the river bank; the right centre consisted of the
Roman foot, which was drawn up in deeper and closer formation than
usual; the left centre and the left wing were made up of the horse
and foot of the allies. The archers and light-armed generally were
in advance of the main line. Hannibal posted his Gallic and Spanish
cavalry on his left wing, _i.e._, opposite the Roman horse, and his
African horse on the right. Next the mounted troops on either side was
a body of African infantry, equipped with armour and weapons collected
from the spoils of Trebia and Trasumennus. The centre consisted of
Gauls and Spaniards. Livy speaks of the imposing effect of their
stature, for physically these Celtic warriors were greatly superior
to their Italian antagonists, and of their general appearance. The
Gauls were naked to the waist, the Spaniards clad in linen vests, of
dazzling whiteness, edged with purple. In numbers Hannibal was greatly
inferior, having only 40,000 infantry. For this disadvantage he was
partly compensated by the superiority of his cavalry, both in numbers
and efficiency. Of this arm he had no less than 10,000. Livy tells us,
though Polybius does not mention the circumstance, that a strong wind
from the S.E., locally known as the Volturnus, carrying with it clouds
of sand, blew into the faces of the Romans, and greatly incommoded them.
The battle began, as usual, with some indecisive skirmishing between
the light-armed troops on either side. The Gallic and Spanish cavalry,
on the contrary, soon achieved a very decided success. There was little
room for the display of tactics or even for a charge. The combatants
came to close quarters, and here the great personal strength of the
Celts gave them an advantage. They dismounted and dragged their
antagonists from their horses. A valiant resistance was made; it was
not till many had been slain in this fierce struggle that any sought
safety in flight.
The legionary infantry did not fail to assert its superiority in
discipline and effective equipment over the Gallic and Spanish foot
opposed to it. The latter fought with conspicuous courage, but
failed to bear up against the weight and the orderly advance of the
heavy-armed Romans. Had there been a cool-headed soldier in command
at this point the success of the legions might have been turned to
excellent advantage. Wanting capable leadership it ended in disaster.
The pursuit was carried far beyond the point at which, in view of the
fact that the cavalry had been driven off the field, prudence would
have stopped it. The legions, while they followed the flying Celts,
were themselves assailed on either flank by the African contingents,
made on this occasion more formidable by the fact that they had a
Roman equipment of armour and weapons. Already disordered by their
hasty advance, they were still further broken by this attack. But
though the line ceased to exist, many of the companies preserved their
formation, and, for a time, the conflict was carried on under fairly
equal conditions. A brilliant charge by the Carthaginian cavalry under
Hasdrubal[22] decided the day. He had led his Celtic host in the fierce
conflict with the Romans, had afterwards helped the Numidians to beat
the allies, and he now threw himself with his victorious squadrons
on the rear of the Roman legions. After this there was but little
more resistance offered, and the battle became a massacre. Rome never
suffered a more frightful loss than she did on the fatal day of Cannæ.
Of the 80,000 men whom she brought into the field only three or four
thousand escaped. The number of the slain is put by Polybius at 70,000;
Livy gives a much smaller figure (40,000), but Polybius is the most
trustworthy authority. Many prisoners were taken, some in the camps
which they had been left to guard, some at Cannæ, where they vainly
sought refuge. Only those who had the wisdom or good fortune to make
their way to Canusium found themselves in safety. Varro, with some
seventy troopers, escaped to Venusia. Æmilius Paullus died upon the
field. Livy tells a pathetic story of his end, which may well be true,
though Polybius does not mention it.[23] It runs thus:--