and the historian attributes some of the energy and determination with
which the battle was fought to the encouragement of their presence.
The junior of the two, M. Atilius Regulus, is one of the most romantic
heroes of Roman story, and it is impossible not to give a short account
of the rest of his career. It was by an accident, the death of the duly
elected Consul of the year very shortly after his coming into office,
that Regulus happened to share the command of the expedition to Africa.
But he had held the Consulship before, and had then so distinguished
himself--he had in fact the glory of completing the Roman conquest of
Italy--that he had obtained the honour of a triumph. After the victory
at Heraclea, he effected a successful landing on the African coast.
The departure of his colleague, who was summoned home, left him in sole
command. Aided by an insurrection of the native tribes, always ready
to revenge themselves on their oppressive masters, he reduced Carthage
to great straits. That haughty State even brought itself to ask for
peace. Regulus demanded such conditions--what they were we are not
told--that the Carthaginians unanimously resolved to bear any extremity
of suffering rather than submit to them.
And now there was a change of fortune. It came with dramatic
suddenness, and signally illustrated the aphorism which the moralists
of antiquity repeated with such frequency and emphasis, "pride goeth
before a fall." The Carthaginian recruiting agents, when they visited
Greece, found a man who was admirably suited for their purpose.
Xanthippus was one of those Spartan soldiers of fortune who in several
conspicuous instances affected the course of history. It was the
Spartan Gylippus who saved Syracuse when it was almost in the grasp of
Athens; and now it was another Spartan who at least prolonged for a
century the existence of Carthage. Xanthippus had, it would seem, taken
service in some subordinate capacity as an officer of mercenaries.
He was an acute observer, and saw that the resources of Carthage were
but ill employed. In the two arms of elephants and cavalry her army
was so superior to the Romans that defeat could not but be the result
of mismanagement. These opinions, freely expressed to his comrades,
came round before long to the ears of the authorities. Xanthippus was
summoned before them; he explained his views and pointed out some
changes in the management of the campaign which it would be necessary
to make. His hearers were greatly impressed by the force and clearness
of his statement, and gave him what was probably a provisional command
of the army. He had now the opportunity of showing his military
abilities. He began by manœuvring bodies of troops, and showed such
tactical skill as to excite the admiration of the men. They loudly
demanded to be led against the enemy, stipulating that the leader
should be Xanthippus. It is needless to describe the battle which
followed. The hundred elephants which Xanthippus put in part of his
line were used to good effect. They did not actually break the Roman
legions, but they inflicted a great deal of damage, and prepared the
way for the infantry behind them. In cavalry the Carthaginian army was
so much stronger than the Roman--four thousand, we are told, to five
hundred--that there was practically no conflict. In the end the army
of Regulus was nearly annihilated. Two thousand men made good their
retreat to the town of Aspis on the coast; five hundred, among whom was
the Consul himself, were taken prisoners; the rest, more than twelve
thousand in number, perished on the field of battle.
For five years Regulus remained in captivity. Then--so runs the
story--he was sent to Rome in company of some ambassadors who were to
propose a treaty of peace. It was expected of him that he should do
his best to recommend the proposal to his countrymen; his release was
to be the reward of his help. But Regulus had very different views of
the situation. He thought that peace, at least on any such terms as
Carthage was willing to accept, would not be for the interest of Rome,
and he determined to oppose. He asked permission to speak; his right
to deliver an opinion as a member of the Senate he considered himself
to have lost by having fallen into the hands of the enemy. Leave
granted, he delivered an oration in which he did his best to dissuade
his countrymen from making peace, and succeeded. But his success was
fatal, not only to his chances of liberty, but to his life. He was
taken back to Carthage, and there--so the story has it--put to death
by cruel tortures. The tale is told by many writers, but Polybius, who
is by far the best authority for events of the time, is absolutely
silent about it, and his silence, in view of the strong feeling in
favour of the Romans which is noticeable in him, is a very important
consideration. According to another story, which seems to have as
little or as much foundation, the Senate handed over to the widow of
Regulus two noble Carthaginian prisoners. The woman, in revenge for
her husband's death, treated them with such barbarity that, for very
shame, the Senate took them out of her hands. Perhaps we shall be
justified in regarding both legends as specimens of that wonderful crop
of inventions which springs up whenever the feelings of a nation are
greatly roused by the agitations of war.
This was not the only loss that Rome suffered during the latter part
of the war. She lost one fleet by a storm, and another by the folly
of its commander. This man was one of the Claudian family, a house
which showed more ability in politics than in war. He seems to have
fallen into the mistake of underrating the enemy, made an attack upon
them from which he was compelled to withdraw, and when he saw that the
day was lost, made his own escape with a discreditable precipitancy.
The battle was fought in and outside the harbour of Drepanum, a town
in the extreme west of the Island. Claudius was indicted on his
return to Rome, heavily fined, and thrown into prison. He is said to
have committed suicide. In later writers we find a story which has
something of the look of having been invented to point a moral. It
was represented to him on the morning of the battle by the keepers of
the sacred chickens, that the sacred birds, whose conduct was held to
foretell the future, would not eat. This was a most sinister sign. The
insolent soldier received the intimation with contempt. "If they won't
eat," he cried, "they shall at least drink!" and he gave orders that
they should be thrown into the sea. It is certainly, whether true or
not, a characteristic illustration of the arrogance of the Claudian
family. Such, too, is the other story which supplements it. Some years
afterwards a sister of the unlucky or impious general was greatly
incommoded by the crush of people coming out of the amphitheatre.
"I wish," she cried, "that my brother were alive again, and would
take another fleet to Sicily, and ease us of some of this superfluous
crowd." She was fined for her _incivility_, the use of language
unbecoming a citizen.
In B.C. 241 this long war at last came to an end. Both sides had
suffered fearfully both in men and means. The Romans lost 700 ships of
war and the Carthaginians about 200 less, for though they had not shown
themselves a match for their antagonists in fighting, they knew better
how to deal with bad conditions of weather. The Romans had a way of
going straight to their point, whatever obstacles were in their way.
Storm or no storm, they went on, and the result of their obstinacy was
often not a little disastrous.[17]
On the whole the balance of success was considerably in favour of
Rome, and the conditions of the peace showed a distinct gain. The most
important article was the total withdrawal of Carthage from Sicily.
For more than three centuries she had renewed her attempts to possess
herself of the Island. Now she was compelled to definitely renounce her
ambition. This renunciation marks an important stage in the history of
the world.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 17: We may compare the way in which they made their great
military roads. These went by the nearest way from point to point, not
engineered according to modern practice.]
IV
THE SONS OF LIGHTNING
The later years of the First Punic War had brought to the front a man
of extraordinary genius, Hamilcar, surnamed Barca.[18] As his son,
Hannibal, was born in this very same year, we may safely put his age
at twenty-five. Hamilcar kept the Romans in check, first at Ercté, a
stronghold in Sicily, and afterwards at Eryx in the same island, for
five years, and might have even changed the course of the war if he
could have been adequately supported from home. So greatly did his
military ability impress the Romans that when negotiations for peace
were commenced, he was permitted to march out of Eryx with all the
honours of war. During the next four years he rendered the greatest
service to his country, which had been brought to the very verge of
ruin by the revolt of the mercenaries. It was Hamilcar, in fact, who
saved Carthage from destruction. This done, he devoted the remainder
of his life to the working out of a great scheme which was to restore
his country to the commanding position from which she had been deposed
by the disasters of the First Punic War. Sicily had been lost; another
province, far larger, and possibly more valuable, might be found in
Spain. Carthage had had for several generations a large trade with
Spain, and probably possessed some trading ports or fortified factories
on the southern coast. Hannibal crossed over into Spain with a general
commission to do what he could for the interests of Carthage in that
country. We know next to nothing about the details of his action, but
it is clear that he was eminently successful. He practically conquered
a considerable part of Spain, and did it without any charge on the home
revenues, which, indeed, were largely augmented by the sums which he
sent home. After a prosperous career of nearly nine years he fell in
battle. This was 229 B.C., when he was little more than forty years of
age. His work was taken up by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal. Hasdrubal was,
by all accounts, more of a politician than a soldier. The interests
of Carthage, however, were furthered rather than hindered by this
difference of character. Hamilcar had impressed the Spanish tribes by
his military genius and resources. Hasdrubal conciliated them. His
wife was the daughter of a Spanish chief. Altogether he did much to
consolidate the Carthaginian power in the Peninsula. Not the least of
his services was his foundation of New Carthage, a place admirably
chosen for strength of position and convenience of access. After eight
years of rule he was assassinated by a slave whose master he had put to
death.
The successor of Hasdrubal was the son of Hamilcar, a son who possessed
a military genius even greater than that of his father. Hannibal is
ranked by common consent among the greatest generals of the world.
If Rome could have been overthrown by any enemy, it would have been
by him, so brilliant was his strategy, so great his capacity for
leadership--nothing is more remarkable in his career than his power
of giving unity to the varied components of a mercenary army--and
so resolute his hostility to Rome. He himself narrated towards the
close of his life the incident which seems to have made this feeling
the dominant motive of his life. He was then in exile, and the guest
of Antiochus the Great, King of Syria. Some jealous courtiers had
suggested to Antiochus that Hannibal was not indisposed to come to
terms with Rome. He then told his story.
"When my father was about to go on his expedition to Spain, I was
nine years old. I was standing near the altar when he made the usual
sacrifice to Zeus. This successfully performed, he bade all the other
worshippers stand back, and calling me to him, asked me whether I
wished to go with him. I gave an eager assent, and begged him most
earnestly to take me. On this he took me by the right hand, led me
up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim, and swear
eternal enmity to Rome."
No vow was ever more faithfully performed.
Of Hannibal's early years we know but little. He was present at the
battle in which his father was killed, being then in his nineteenth
year. During the period of his brother-in-law's command he was
continuously employed on active service. Hasdrubal's ability, as
has been already said, was political rather than military, and the
operations in the field were largely conducted by the younger man, and
conducted with conspicuous success. His habit of victory and his great
personal qualities made him the favourite of the army. Livy gives us a
vivid picture of the man as he was in his youth.
"Bold in the extreme in incurring peril, he was perfectly cool in its
presence. No toil could weary his body or conquer his spirit. Heat
and cold he bore with equal patience. The cravings of nature, not the
pleasure of the palate, determined the measure of his food and drink.
His waking and sleeping hours had no relation to day and night. Such
time as business left him, he gave to repose, but it was not on a soft
couch or in stillness that he sought it. Many saw him, wrapped in his
military cloak, lying on the ground amidst the sentries and pickets.
His dress was not one whit superior to that of his comrades, but his
accoutrements and his horses were conspicuously splendid. Of all the
cavalry and the infantry, he was by far the first soldier, earliest to
join the battle and last to leave it."
The quarrel with Rome, undoubtedly provoked of set purpose by Hannibal,
began with his attack on Saguntum (now _Murviedro_, i.e., _Muri
Veteres_, "The Old Walls," in Valencia). This town was in alliance
with the Romans, who sent envoys to Hannibal bidding him desist from
the attack, and to Carthage, complaining of their general's action.
Hannibal refused to receive the embassy; at Carthage the answer given
was practically a refusal to interfere. Meanwhile Saguntum was left
without help. When it fell, after a siege of several months, the Romans
felt that war was inevitable, and made preparations for carrying it on
with vigour. They probably under-estimated the strength of the enemy.
The army voted, largely made up, it must be remembered, of recruits
enrolled for the purpose, amounted to about 70,000; and the fleet was
to number about 250 ships. Everything, however, was to be done in due
form. Another embassy was sent to Carthage, with instructions to put
the direct question, whether the government accepted the responsibility
for the destruction of Saguntum. There was, it is true, a peace-party
in Carthage, but it had been reduced to helplessness. The envoys could
obtain no satisfaction. Their spokesman, one of the great Fabian House,
on receiving a reply which could have no meaning but war, gathered up
his robe into a fold and cried, "We bring you peace and war; take which
you please." He was met with a fierce cry, "Give us which you will."
Fabius shook out the fold with the words, "I give you war," and the
answer was, "We accept it."
I shall pass as quickly as possible over the early operations of the
war. Early in the spring of 218 B.C. Hannibal left his winter quarters
at New Carthage, crossed the Ebro, and fought his way from that river
to the foot of the Pyrenees. The Pyrenæan range itself presented no
great difficulties. At the Rhone he encountered formidable opposition,
but effected a crossing with great skill. In his march from the Rhone
to the Alps, and in his passage of the Alps themselves he suffered
little from hostile attacks. But the natural difficulties of the route
were great, and he was late. He appears to have left New Carthage at
the beginning of May. We may be sure that the start was made at the
earliest practicable moment, but the delay was to cost much. Could
he have moved a month earlier it would have been well. As it was he
did not reach the Alps till the beginning of October, when the snows
have already begun to fall on the higher ranges. The crossing was
effected in fifteen days, but the cost in men and beasts of burden was
tremendous. Hannibal had started from New Carthage with 90,000 foot
and 16,000 horse; he descended into the Lombard plains with 20,000
infantry and 6,000 horse. He had very little more than one-fourth of
his original numbers. He had not indeed lost the other three-fourths
by battle or by disease. Many had deserted, many had been sent home,
and the troops that remained were thoroughly trustworthy. But the
fact remains that an army of 26,000 was even ludicrously small to
be confronted with such an enemy as Rome. (It may be noted that the
infantry was made up of Africans and Spaniards. The higher posts in
the army were filled by Carthaginians, and some probably served in the
cavalry, but in the main the army consisted of mercenaries.)
* * * * *
It would be a pity to omit so picturesque an incident as Hannibal's
dream. Livy thus relates it: "He saw--so the story goes--a youth of
godlike shape, who said that he had been sent by Jupiter to conduct the
army of Hannibal into Italy; that he was therefore to follow, without
ever turning away his eyes. At first Hannibal followed, trembling,
looking neither round him nor behind; after a while, with the curiosity
natural to the human mind, as he thought what that on which he was
forbidden to look back might be, he could no longer restrain his eyes.
What he saw was a serpent of portentous size moving onward with fearful
destruction of bushes and trees; close behind the creature followed a
storm-cloud with crashing thunder. He asked what this portent meant,
and was told, 'It means the devastation of Italy.' He must go straight
on, and leave the fates in darkness."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 18: "Barca" is equivalent to the Hebrew _Barak_, and means
"lightning." We may compare the surname of _Boanerges_, "Sons of
Thunder," given by Christ to the sons of Zebedee. In 247 B.C. he was
appointed to the chief command of the forces of Carthage, being then "a
very young man," if we may so translate the term _adolescentulus_ which
Livy applies to him. This word, however, is very vague. It covers any
age from eighteen to upwards of thirty. Cicero, for instance, uses it
of Cæsar at the age of thirty-two.]
V
THE AVALANCHE FROM THE ALPS
A few days for rest and refreshment of the army were imperatively
needed, but only a very few could be spared. Hannibal could not hope
to face his antagonists without a large increase to his army, and this
increase he could only get for the moment from the Gauls, the people in
whose country he was, though later on reinforcements might be expected
from Carthage. The Gauls would be ready enough to join him, for they
were permanently hostile to Rome; but they would have to be satisfied
of his strength. A war had opportunely broken out between the Taurini
(Turin) and the Insubres (Milan). Hannibal took the part of the latter,
and stormed a stronghold of the Taurini. From that moment he could
practically command the services of as many Gauls as he wanted. But he
had now to meet the Romans for the first time in the field.
P. Cornelius Scipio, one of the Consuls of the year, had had the
province of Spain allotted to him. His intention had been to dispute
the passage of the Rhone, but Hannibal had moved with such rapidity
that Scipio found himself anticipated. The Carthaginians were already
across the river when Scipio reached its mouth, and had secured so
long a start that it was useless to follow him. But the news of the
Carthaginians arrival in Italy seemed to demand instant action. He
handed his army over to Cnaeus, his brother and second-in-command,
reserving for himself a few picked troops only, and sailed for Italy,
where he took over the division under the charge of the prætor Manlius.
He marched as rapidly as possible to Placentia (Piacenza), where he
crossed the Po, and advanced up the left bank of the river till he
reached the Ticinus (_Ticino_), one of its tributaries. Over this
stream he threw a bridge, which he protected by building a fort.
Hannibal was encamped some ten miles to the westward, at a spot called
Ictumuli, and had sent out Maharbal in command of some Numidian cavalry
to ravage the country; sparing, however, all the territory belonging
to the Gallic tribes. Maharbal was recalled when the advance of the
Romans became known, and Hannibal moved out of his camp, in personal
command of his cavalry. Scipio did exactly the same. The battle that
ensued was therefore wholly a battle of cavalry. This put the Romans at
a great disadvantage. They were distinctly inferior in this arm, and
the nature of the country, an expanse of unincumbered plain, gave the
enemy every opportunity of making the best of the advantage. Scipio
had put some light-armed troops in the van. They seemed to have been
of the poorest quality, for they fled at the first impact of the two
armies. The regular cavalry of the Romans showed to better advantage.
They held their own for some time against their assailants, also a
force of regular cavalry. But they were at a great disadvantage. The
fugitives from the front had thrown their lines into disorder. These it
was impossible to keep firm when those panic-stricken creatures were
trying to find their way through them. Then there happened a great
misfortune. Scipio was so seriously wounded that he had to give up
the command. According to the most generally received account, he was
saved from capture by the valour of his son, then a lad of eighteen.
We shall hear of him again, for he became in later years the great
hero of the war, Scipio Africanus the elder. Some of the Roman cavalry
made a determined stand round their wounded chief and contrived to
carry him off the field. But the battle was lost. The defeat, however,
was not so complete that the Roman camp was in any danger. Hannibal,
who was still hampered by his scanty numbers, was content to rest on
the field of battle. That night the Romans hurriedly retreated to
Placentia, hoping to find their bridge unbroken. They had actually
reached their destination before Hannibal became aware of their
departure. He was in time enough, however, to capture some six hundred
stragglers whom he found lingering on the left bank of the Po. A great
raft had been constructed for the passage of the river, and they
were at work in loosing it. Hannibal came upon them while they were
so employed. He captured the men, but the raft, which it would have
been a great advantage to secure, floated down-stream. Two days were
spent in looking for a practicable ford. Before this could be found
the Roman army had recovered its order and confidence. It suffered,
however, a most damaging blow within the next few days. A body of
Gallic auxiliaries, two thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry,
deserted to Hannibal, cutting down the sentries at the camp gate. The
Carthaginian general gave them a hearty welcome, and held out to them
great promises of advancement and reward. For the present he sent them
to their homes. The best service, in his judgment, that they could do
was to spread abroad the report of his generosity and of the Roman
defeat.
Scipio now moved southward, falling back to a position near the river
Trebia, a tributary of the Po, which flows into it on its right or
southern bank. Here he fortified a camp, and sat down to await the
arrival of Sempronius, his colleague in the Consulship, who had been
recalled from his province (Sicily) to take part in the defence of
Italy. He was suffering greatly from his wound, and was unequal to the
active duties of command, which, however, he was unwilling to hand over
to a substitute. Probably it would have been unconstitutional to do
so, when the other Consul was within reach. Yet the prætor Manlius, in
whose charge the army had originally been, was probably in the camp.
Constitutional forms, as we shall see again and again, weakened the
military energies of Rome. Nothing could be imagined more absurd than
that the army should have been entrusted to generals, changed every
year, and elected by popular vote. To oppose such men to the unequalled
genius of Hannibal was to ensure defeat. The mere permanence of the
Carthaginian command gave him an immense advantage. But we must never
forget the other side of the case. Without these constitutional forms
neither Rome nor Greece (about which the historian has to say much the
same thing) could have been what they were. We must expect to find in a
nation as in a man the defects of its great qualities.