might have peace if she would renounce her dominion over all the Greek
cities; failing this, she must prepare for war. To such a demand there
could be but one answer. Dionysius did not even wait for the inevitable
negative, but marched with the whole military strength of the
Island--never probably gathered in such strength or with such unanimity
before--against the stronghold of Motyé. The Carthaginians resisted
with an obstinacy which is characteristic of the Semitic race. One line
of defence after another was stoutly maintained. When the walls had to
be given up, the streets were barricaded. In this kind of fighting the
Greeks lost heavily. At last a stratagem which is not without parallel
in modern warfare proved effective. For some days in succession the
assailants ceased fighting at sunset, the signal for recall being
sounded on a trumpet. This came to be expected by the townspeople, who
began to relax their watchfulness. But Dionysius prepared a picked
force which was to make a night attack. This was done before the
Motyans were aware of what had happened, and the town was taken. A
massacre followed in which many were destroyed, though Dionysius did
his best to stop it. He was certainly not specially humane, but he did
not approve of the useless destruction of what, in the shape of slaves,
might be valuable property. It is to be noted that the Greeks respected
the lives of those who fled to the temples for protection. It shows
them to have been on a somewhat higher plane of feeling than were the
Carthaginians. The temples, it must be remembered, were those of Punic
gods.
Carthage had no intention of allowing these attacks to pass without
retaliation. A large force, amounting at the lowest estimate to 100,000
men, was levied in Africa and landed in Sicily, where it received an
accession of another 30,000. Himilco, who had commanded in the last
campaign, was made general-in-chief. He conceived a novel and bold plan
of campaign. He marched to north-eastern Sicily, a part of the Island
which up to that time had been exempt from attack. Messana was his
objective point, and Messana was almost helpless. It had walls, indeed,
but these were in repair so bad that they were useless for any real
defence. And then a considerable part of the army was with Dionysius
and the Syracusans. What was left boldly confronted the enemy in the
field. Himilco did not offer them battle, but embarking a considerable
force in the ships which moved along the coast as the enemy advanced,
made a direct attack on the town. He calculated that the ships
would outstrip the Messanian army, and he proved to be right. The
Carthaginians found the place almost deserted, and simply poured into
the town by the gaps in the walls. The forts he could not take. Some
of the inhabitants were slain in a hopeless attempt to hold the town;
some attempted the desperate expedient of swimming across the Strait
of Scylla and Charybdis, whose terrors were not so formidable as the
ferocity of the Carthaginians--out of two hundred swimmers fifty got
safe to the Italian side. Messana gained, Himilco marched on Syracuse,
intending to take Catana on his way. The army was to follow the line
of the seashore; the fleet was to keep on a level with it. At Ætna a
diversion had to be made. The volcano was in action, and the streams of
lava that flowed down the eastern slope compelled the army to make a
_détour_ to the west. Dionysius thought he saw his opportunity in this
division of the invading force. He put both his army and his fleet in
motion, and proceeded to meet the enemy. Only the fleets, however, came
into collision, and the result was a serious defeat of the Syracusans.
The admiral, Leptines by name, had been strictly enjoined to be
cautious; to keep his fleet in close order, and on no account to break
the line. This tactic did not suit him. He attacked the enemy with a
squadron of thirty quick-moving ships, at first with brilliant success.
Then what the more prudent Dionysius had feared came to pass. Leptines
could not hold his own against the overpowering numbers of the enemy.
After some hours of fighting he had to make his escape with what ships
were left to him. He had lost a hundred ships and, it was said, as many
as twenty thousand men.
Dionysius had watched the disaster from the shore without being able
to give any help to his comrades. The question what he was himself to
do became urgent, His bolder counsellors urged him to give battle to
Himilco. He was half disposed to follow their advice, but the risk
seemed too great. It would be to hazard everything on one throw of the
dice. He retreated on Syracuse, and took shelter within the walls.
Himilco promptly followed. His army, said to have numbered 300,000, and
certainly large, was easily able to invest the city on the landward
side; his fleet filled the Great Harbour, though this had an area of
nearly four square miles. The Syracusan army did not dare to leave
the shelter of their walls; the fleet was glad to be protected by
the defences of the Inner Harbour, a refuge which had never yet been
entered by a foe. Never had the Greek race in Sicily been reduced to
straits so desperate. Only one city remained to it, and this closely
invested. Syracuse was like Jerusalem as Isaiah describes her in the
height of the Assyrian invasion, "a cottage in a vineyard, a lodge in a
garden of cucumbers."
Then the tide began to turn. The Syracusans obtained some successes
at sea. Some corn ships carrying supplies to the Carthaginian camp
were captured, and a squadron of men-of-war which attempted to recover
them defeated with a loss of more than half its number, including the
admiral's ship.
Then pestilence, an attack of bubonic plague if we are to judge from
the description given of it, broke out in the camp. It was aggravated
by religious terrors. Himilco had shown himself as careless about
sacred things as his predecessor in command. He had broken down
tombs to use their materials, and had plundered temples, one of them
of especial sanctity, the shrine of Persephone, Queen of Hell, and
her mother Demeter (the Ceres of Roman mythology). Thousands of men
perished--the historians, dealing, as usual, in enormous figures, say
one hundred and fifty thousand. The mortality was certainly great,
and Dionysius did not fail to use his opportunity. He delivered
simultaneous attacks by land and sea, and was successful in both. The
fleet was nearly destroyed. Many ships were captured; many more were
burnt. Part of the camp was taken. Dionysius took up his quarters at
the close of the day near the temple of Zeus, in which Himilco had had
his headquarters that very morning.
The Carthaginian general then opened secret negotiations with his
antagonist. To tell the story in a few words, he purchased the safety
of himself and the native Carthaginian officers in the army by a bribe
of three hundred talents. The money went into the private coffers
of Dionysius, and Himilco was allowed to escape with his countrymen,
though some of the forty ships filled with the fugitives were captured.
The Syracusan admiral, of course, knew nothing about the arrangement,
and Dionysius, while he contrived to postpone, could not absolutely
forbid pursuit. The mercenaries thus left to their fate had various
fortunes. Dionysius took some of them into his own service; the native
Sicilians contrived, for the most part, to escape unmolested to
their own homes. A considerable number surrendered, and were sold as
slaves. Himilco reached Carthage in safety, but could not endure the
humiliating position in which he found himself. He blocked up the doors
of his house, refused admittance to friends and kinsmen, even to his
own children, and died by voluntary starvation.
Whether Carthage would have made any attempt to recover what had been
lost, we cannot say. The events that followed made it impossible. Her
African subjects revolted from her; her allies deserted her. For a few
weeks she stood as much alone as Syracuse had stood a few weeks before.
But the combination against her was not one that could hold together
long. It soon began to fall to pieces, Carthage helping the process by
heavily bribing the leaders. But her power was crippled for a time, and
she had to be content with withdrawing her boundary line in Sicily to
its old place in the western portion of the Island.
It would be tedious to follow in detail the wars of the next few years.
War followed war; sometimes one party triumphed, sometimes another.
We have just seen Carthage reduced again to the narrow limits within
which she had been confined before 409. Then, twelve years afterwards
(383), Dionysius is compelled, after a disastrous defeat at Cronium, at
which he is said to have lost 14,000 men, to concede nearly half of the
Island. In 368 again--our knowledge of these campaigns is sadly broken
and confused--there is another change of fortune, a brilliant victory
of Dionysius, followed, however, by a reverse, which had the effect of
leaving things very much as they had been when the campaign began.
In 367 Dionysius died, after a reign of thirty-eight years. I am not
concerned now with his character as a domestic ruler. In this respect
his name is proverbial for a cruel tyranny, amply punished by the
torturing suspicions with which the life of the tyrant was harassed.
But it is impossible to deny his great merits as a soldier. He had
faults, but he certainly supported the Greek cause in Sicily against
the incessant attacks of a very powerful enemy. We shall see how much
his abilities were missed when his power passed into the hands of a
feebler successor.
IV
THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH
The younger Dionysius was indeed wholly unequal to the position
into which he was thrust by the accident of birth. He was entirely
inexperienced in government, for his father had jealously excluded
him from all share in public affairs, and he had little capacity for
learning the art of rule when he found himself under the necessity of
practising it. Some ability he had, but it was not in the direction
of politics. In this direction he seems to have had few ideas beyond
securing his own safety and getting as much enjoyment as possible
out of the opportunities of power. The history of his reign may be
told in a very few words. He held the power inherited from his father
during a period of fourteen years. Then he was expelled from Syracuse,
but contrived to establish himself at Locri, with which city he was
connected through his mother. After the lapse of ten years he regained
possession of Syracuse. But his power was not secure, and he could not
spare any thought or energy for the general interests of the Island.
The other Sicilian cities were no better off. Carthage, of course,
made use of the opportunity thus given, and steadily increased her
power. The situation became so threatening in 344 that some Syracusan
exiles bethought them of invoking the aid of Corinth, their mother
city. Corinth acceded to their request, but rather by way of permission
than of giving active help. No expedition was sent by the State. But a
general was nominated and appointed at a public assembly; Corinthian
citizens were allowed to volunteer for service. Finally seven ships
were sent by the State, two being added to this number by Corcyra,
another Corinthian colony, and one by Leucadia, also Corinthian
in origin. But the greater part of the force that was raised were
mercenaries. Something must be said about the general, who was one of
the most remarkable figures in Greek history.
Timoleon was a noble citizen of Corinth who had saved the liberties of
his country by a terrible sacrifice. His elder brother Timophanes, an
able and unscrupulous soldier, had established himself as a despot by
help of a band of mercenaries who had been hired for the protection of
the city against the threatened danger of Athenian invasion. Timoleon
remonstrated with him, but in vain. Then he resolved to free his
country at any cost. He communicated his intention to two, one account
says three, friends. They went together and asked for an interview
with Timophanes. Timoleon addressed another appeal to his brother, and
was contemptuously repulsed. His companions then drew their swords,
for, thanks to their introducer, they had been permitted to enter the
tyrant's presence with arms, and put Timophanes to death. Timoleon
took no part in the deed, but stood apart, his face covered with his
mantle and weeping bitterly. The act met with enthusiastic approval
from the great majority of Corinthian citizens. Some who had looked
for some personal gain from the favour of the despot, and in their
hearts regretted his death, pretended to be shocked by the way in
which it had been brought about. To Timoleon himself the event was the
cause of the deepest and most permanent sorrow. He shut himself up in
his house, took no part in public affairs, and refused the visits of
his friends. The arrival of the Syracusan exiles delivered him from
this miserable existence. At the Assembly held for the appointment of
a general, name after name had been proposed in vain. The internal
dissensions of Syracuse were so notorious at Corinth that no one was
willing to undertake the thankless task of intervening in its affairs.
Unexpectedly some one in the Assembly--it was thought at the time by
a divine inspiration--proposed the name of Timoleon. It was received
with general acclamation, and Timoleon thankfully accepted the post. He
contrived to elude the Carthaginian squadron which was sent to watch
him, and reached Sicily. Some four years were spent in restoring order
and freedom in the Greek cities. For some reason with which we are not
acquainted, Carthage did not interfere with him whilst so engaged. War
is said to have been precipitated by a violation of the Carthaginian
territory. That it would certainly have broken out sooner or later may
safely be affirmed.
Carthage evidently made a great effort to bring the war to a successful
issue. She seems to have been aware that circumstances were unusually
favourable, for the Greek cities of Sicily had never before been in
so deplorable a condition of weakness. It was, indeed, a happy thing
for the cause of freedom that so exceptionally able a man as Timoleon
had the conduct of affairs. The army landed at Lilybæum, under the
command of Hasdrubal and Hamilcar, numbered 70,000. Of these, not less
than 10,000 were native Carthaginians. Carthage was always sparing of
the blood of her own citizens, preferring to buy even at lavish prices
the valour and skill which she needed. On this occasion she raised
an unprecedently large native force. They were equipped, too, in the
most costly fashion. Each soldier was clothed in complete armour, much
heavier and, therefore, more impenetrable than that usually worn. Each,
too, had an elaborately ornamented breastplate. A _corps d'élite_,
numbering 2,500, was the nucleus of the force. A fleet of two hundred
ships of war accompanied the army, whose needs were supplied by a vast
multitude of nearly a thousand transports. One important item in the
war material was a number of chariots. The personal effects of the
Carthaginian soldiers, many of whom belonged to the wealthiest families
in the city, splendid tents and rich goblets and other plate for the
table, were costly in the extreme.
Timoleon could not raise more than 12,000 men. He had 3,000 Syracusan
citizens, an unknown number, possibly about 6,000, of volunteers from
other Greek cities, and a force of mercenaries. His cavalry numbered
one thousand. But he could not keep with him even the whole of these.
When he had nearly reached the border of the Carthaginian territory
there was a mutiny among the mercenaries. Their pay was considerably
in arrears, and one of their officers took advantage of this fact to
rouse them against the commander-in-chief. "He is taking you," he
said, "on a desperate errand. You will have to encounter an enemy who
can match every one of our soldiers with six of his own. And he does
not even pay you your wages." Never did the strong personality of
Timoleon show itself to more advantage. The mutineers got, in a way,
all they wanted. They were sent back to Syracuse with instructions to
the authorities at home that they were to be paid off at once, whatever
it might cost to raise the money.[11] This concession seemed to put a
premium on mutiny. Nevertheless, Timoleon by his personal influence
succeeded in checking the movement. The troops that were left, when the
discontented element was removed, followed him with unabated loyalty
and courage. Marching westward into the heart of the Carthaginian
territory, he reached the stream known as the Crimessus.[12] If he
had before to contend against the avarice of his soldiers, he had
now to deal with their fears. The army was encountered by some mules
carrying loads of parsley. The men were dismayed at what they took as
an unlucky omen, for parsley was commonly used for the garlands that
are placed on tombs. Timoleon was equal to the occasion. "With this,"
he cried, seizing a sprig of the herb, "we crown our conquerors in
the Isthmian Games at home. It is our symbol of victory," and he put a
chaplet on his own head and adorned his officers in the same way. The
Greek army had now reached the brow of the hill which forms the eastern
bank of the valley of the Crimessus. The whole country was covered
with a mist, but there came up from the valley beneath a confused
sound as of a great host in motion. Suddenly the mist lifted, and
Timoleon saw below him the great Carthaginian army. The war-chariots
had already crossed the river and were drawn up on the eastern shore;
the Carthaginian infantry, in their splendid armour, were in the very
act of the passage; pressing on their rear in a disorderly crowd was
a multitude of mercenaries and native African levies. Timoleon saw
his opportunity, and promptly seized it. He could never have so good
a chance of delivering a successful attack on the enemy as when they
were thus divided, some being actually in the river and some on the
further shore. After a brief exhortation to his men, he led them down
the steep slope to the river. The cavalry went first, and charged the
native Carthaginians, who were just struggling out of the river and
forming themselves in line on the bank. But for a time they charged
in vain. Indeed, they had to do their best to save themselves from
being broken up, for the chariots were driven furiously backwards and
forwards among them. They could hardly keep their own lines; on the
lines of the enemy they made no impression. Timoleon then changed his
plan. Recalling the cavalry, he sent it to operate on the flank of the
enemy, while he proceeded to lead his infantry to a front attack. He
took his shield from the attendant that carried it, and bade his men
follow him. "He shouted to the infantry to be of good cheer and follow
him," says Plutarch, "in a voice much louder than was his natural
wont." It may have been the excitement of the conflict that lent it
such a power, but the common belief at the time was "that something
divine was speaking through him." The work that they had to do required
no little enthusiasm of courage. The Carthaginians were stout soldiers
and splendidly armed. The spear availed little against them; the
Greeks had to get under their guard and assail them with the sword. At
this critical point of the battle something happened which convinced
Timoleon's soldiers that their leader had powers more than mortal
on his side. The mist that had cleared away from the valley, and
risen to the hilltop, now seemed to descend again in a furious storm.
Besides the sound and sight of the thunder and the lightning--and
there were but few spirits in that day hardy enough to despise these
terrors--there was a blinding storm of rain and hail driven fiercely by
a tempestuous wind into the faces of the Carthaginians. To the Greeks,
who had it behind them, it caused little inconvenience. And then the
river began to rise. The Carthaginians began to stagger under the
weight of their heavy armour and saturated clothing, and when once a
man had fallen there was no hope of his rising again. It was not long
before the four hundred picked soldiers who formed the front ranks
were cut down. These champions gone, the rest broke up and attempted
to flee. This was almost impossible. Many were slain in the attempt;
many others were drowned; and there were thousands of prisoners. Never
before had such a blow fallen on Carthage. She lost, not as usual, the
mercenaries whom it was easy to replace as long as her wealth held out,
but her noblest sons. On the other hand, the Greeks, besides winning a
very complete victory, gathered a spoil more magnificent than the most
experienced campaigner had ever seen.
[Illustration: Timoleon holding the Ford of the Crimessus.]
Timoleon had not yet finished his work. He had still to put down the
despots whose thrones were propped up by the power of Carthage, and
Carthage was not inclined to give up her position in Sicily. In the
course of the next year, however, the despots were all destroyed,
and Carthage was glad to conclude a peace. By this she bound herself
to keep to the western side of the Halycus (_Platani_) and not to
interfere with the internal affairs of the Greek cities.
It is needless to continue in detail the story of the conflict between
Greece and Carthage. The result was practically fixed by the victory
of Timoleon at the Crimessus. Carthage did not indeed altogether
abandon her ambition. She still coveted Sicily, still hoped, it may
be, to acquire it, and came, once at least, as near to attaining to
this end as she had ever done before. In 309 B.C. Syracuse had again
lost the freedom which Timoleon had given back to her, and had fallen
under the domination of one of the ablest and most unscrupulous in the
long list of Sicilian tyrants, Agathocles. This man provoked a war
with Carthage, but found himself unequal to his antagonist, and after
a series of defeats was shut up in Syracuse. This city was, as it
had been eighty-odd years before, the only place in the Island which
the Greeks could call their own. Then Agathocles conceived a daring
scheme. He would transfer the war to Africa, and attack Carthage at
home, where, as he shrewdly perceived, her weakest points were to be
found. An invader could always reckon upon the sympathy and support
of the subject races, which suffered from the exacting rule of the
Carthaginian government. Agathocles carried out his plan, and for a
time achieved a brilliant success. He afterwards met with reverses, but
his main object, the rescue of Sicily, was fully achieved.
Agathocles died in 289 B.C. Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, famous for the
victories which he won over Rome, was the next to take up the part of
the leader of the Sicilian Greeks in their long struggle with Carthage.
He accomplished little. In fact he spent two years only in the Island.
The most memorable incident of his stay was that Carthage offered him
alliance on most advantageous terms, and that he refused it unless she
would agree to evacuate the Island. This was an honourable action,
for the offer would have given him a most important advantage in the
renewed attack upon Rome which he was planning. But the Sicilian Greeks
showed little gratitude for his self-denial; in fact, they became so
hostile that he had no alternative left him but to leave the Island.
"How fair a wrestling-ring," he is reported to have said as he took his
last look of Sicily, "are we leaving to Rome and Carthage!" With this
departure of Pyrrhus, Greece, we may say, disappears from the scene,
and Rome takes her part. Pyrrhus left Sicily in 276, and Rome came for
the first time into collision with Carthage twelve years afterwards in
what is called the First Punic War. These wars will be the subject of
my Fourth Book.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 11: It is difficult not to feel a certain satisfaction at
knowing that the mutineers came to a bad end. They had a disreputable
record, for they had taken the pay of the Phocians, knowing that it
had been provided out of the sacred treasures of the temple at Delphi.
On receiving their arrears they sailed to Southern Italy, where
they attempted to form a settlement, were entrapped by the native
inhabitants, and perished to a man.]
[Footnote 12: It is uncertain where this stream is to be located.
Some geographers (Sir E. Bunbury among them, in the "Dictionary of
Classical Geography") suppose it to be a little river that flows into
the sea near Castellamare; by others it is identified with one that has
its mouth on the south coast of the island, a few miles to the east
of Selinus. This is the view taken by the author of the map recently
published by Mr. John Murray, where the name is given to one of the
upper tributaries of the Hypsas, now known as the Belici.]
_BOOK III_
GREECE AND PERSIA. THE ATTACK
I. THE FIGHT ON THE RIVER