the islands in the Ægean were concerned, practically ceased with the
victory of Mycalé. But the Greek cities in Asia Minor were not safe.
In the years 466-5 B.C. Cimon, son of Miltiades, the hero of Marathon,
conducted operations in South-Western Asia Minor, which had for their
object the expulsion of the Persians from certain Greek settlements in
that region. In 450 a formal convention was made which brought to an
end, it may be said, the first act of the drama. The great king bound
himself to leave the Asiatic Greeks free and untaxed, and not to send
troops within a certain distance of the coast; Athens, on the other
hand, agreed to leave Persia in undisturbed possession of Cyprus
(though this island had a large Greek population) and of Egypt.
The next period was one in which the relations of Persia and Greece
were largely determined by the exigencies of Greek politics. The two
great rivals for supremacy, Athens and Sparta, found Persian help,
especially in the shape of gold, very useful; and Persia, for her own
purposes, played off the two against each other. There is an amusing
scene in Aristophanes which illustrates this state of affairs. A
pretended Persian envoy is introduced to the Assembly. He wears a mask
which is made of one big eye, in token that he is the King's Eye, and
mutters some gibberish which his introducer interprets as a promise to
send some gold. The scene goes on:--
"Tell them about the gold; speak louder and more plainly."
The Eye spoke again: "Gapey Greeks, gold a fooly jest."
"That is plain enough," cried a man in the Assembly.
_Ambassador._ "Well, what do you make of it?"
_Citizen._ "Why, that it is a foolish jest for us Greeks to think that
we shall get any gold."
_Amb._ "You're quite wrong. He didn't say 'jest' but 'chest.' We are to
get _chests_ of gold."
_Cit._ (turning to the _Eye_). "Now listen to me; is the king going to
send us any gold?"
_Eye_ shakes his head.
_Cit._ "Are the ambassadors cheating us?"
_Eye_ nods.
_Cit._ "Well, anyhow the creature knows how to nod in the right way."
This humiliating state of things reached its worst in 387 B.C., when
what was called the Peace of Antalcidas was concluded between Persia
and Sparta. It is enough to quote one clause from the treaty, which, it
should be said, all the Greek States agreed to accept.
"King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia and the islands
of Clazomenæ and Cyprus should belong to him. He thinks it just also to
have all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, both small and great,
except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which are to belong to Athens as
they originally did. Should any parties refuse to accept this peace, I
will make war upon them, along with those of the same mind, by land as
well as by sea, with ships and with money."
It looked as if all that had been won at Marathon and Salamis had
been lost, and Persia had become the arbiter of the fate of Greece.
The Asiatic Greeks did lose what had been gained for them, for they
fell again under the power of Persia. But these evils worked, in a way,
their own cure. The States which had abused their power for selfish
purposes fell, one after another, into the background, and others,
which had not exhausted themselves in futile struggles for supremacy,
came to the front. One of the claims which these new representatives of
Greek feeling put forward was the resolve to exact vengeance--for this
was the common form which the idea took--for the wrongs which Persia
had done to Greece. At the same time there had been various revelations
of the real weakness of the gigantic Empire which stretched from the
Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. The Expedition of the Ten Thousand,
though it had failed of its immediate object of dethroning one prince
in favour of another, had shown the immense superiority of the Greek
race over its ancient enemy. Ten thousand men had marched into the very
heart of Persia without meeting with a check, and had made their way
back again under circumstances of almost incredible difficulty, without
suffering anything like disaster. Jason, tyrant of Pheræ in Thessaly
(_d._ 370 B.C.) was the first, as far as we know, to form a definite
scheme for the invasion of Persia. Thessaly I have had occasion but
once only to mention. This was in describing the battle of Platæa,
when some cavalry from this region did good service to the Persians.
It is strange to find in it the first advocate of what we may call
the anti-Persian Crusade. But Jason had not the means to carry out so
important a scheme. Anyhow, his career was cut short by assassination.
About a quarter of a century later we find the idea further developed.
Its exponent is now the greatest rhetorician of the time, and the
champion whose services are invoked is Philip of Macedon. About 346
B.C. Isocrates addressed a letter to Philip, who had recently been
made president of the Amphictyonic Council, suggesting to him that he
should reconcile the Greek States to each other and with their help
wage war against Persia. The counsel was not offered, we may be sure,
without a previous assurance that it would be welcome to the prince to
whom it was given. Philip certainly cherished some such purpose. This
was the ultimate object which he set before himself in his struggle
for supremacy in Greece. He even went so far as to make definite
preparations for the enterprise. It may well be doubted whether he
had genius enough for so gigantic an enterprise. It was not put to
the test. His career also was cut short by the sword of the assassin.
He was slain in 336 B.C., in the forty-seventh year of his age. Able
as he was, he left a still abler successor the inheritance of his
preparations and his plans.
Alexander, who at his father's death was not quite twenty, had first to
consolidate his position. He began by crushing his barbarous neighbours
in the north; he then stamped out a rebellion in Greece. This done he
turned his attention to preparing his great plan. All was ready in less
than two years.
* * * * *
In April, 334, Alexander crossed the Hellespont into Asia. He had
about 35,000 men with him, one-seventh being cavalry. Marching slowly
eastwards, he came, a few weeks later (May 25th), on the Persian army,
which was encamped on the eastern bank of the Granicus, a small stream
which flows down from the Ida range into the Sea of Marmora. Of the
Persian strength differing accounts are given. The total probably
exceeded that of Alexander's army. The proportion of cavalry to
infantry was certainly much larger. The front line, indeed, which held
the bank of the river, consisted wholly of this arm. On the right were
the Medes and Bactrians, wearing the national dress, a round-topped
cap, gaily-coloured tunic, and scale armour. In the centre, similarly
accoutred, were the Paphlagonians and Hyrcanians; on the right was a
small body of Greek horse, and the Persian cavalry proper, largely
made up of men who claimed descent from the Seven Deliverers, the
little company of nobles who delivered Persia from the sway of the
false Smerdis.[13] Here Memnon, the Rhodian, the ablest counsellor of
King Darius, was in command. The infantry, both Asiatic and Greek, was
posted in reserve, on the rising ground which marked the limit of the
winter floods. The river was now flowing within its banks, but with a
full, strong stream.
Alexander, who was mounted on his famous charger Bucephalus, rode along
the line, addressing a few words of encouragement to each squadron
and company as he passed it, and finally placed himself at the head
of the right division of the army. As soon as the Persian leaders
perceived his intention, they began to reinforce their own left. The
fame of the king's personal prowess had not failed to reach them, and
they knew that the fiercest struggle would be where he might be in
immediate command. Alexander saw the movement and the opportunity which
it offered him. He would have his antagonists at a disadvantage if he
could catch them in the confusion of a change. Accordingly he ordered
the whole line to advance, the right division being thrown somewhat
forward. Here was a famous _corps d'élite_, a heavy cavalry regiment
that went under the name of the "Royal Companions." This was the first
to enter the river. A number of javelin-throwers and archers, on either
side, covered their advance; they were supported by some light horse
and a regiment of light infantry.
The van of the attacking force made its way across the stream in fair
order. The river-bed was rough, full of great stones brought down by
floods and with here and there a dangerously deep hole, but there was
no mud or treacherous sand. The first assault was checked. A line
of dismounted troopers stood in the water, wherever it was shallow
enough to allow it; on the bank itself was a mass of horsemen, two or
three files deep. The combatants below plied their swords; those on
the higher ground showered javelins on the advancing foe. Only a few
of these could struggle up the somewhat steep bank; of the few some
were slain, others thrust back upon the troops that followed them. The
attack seemed to have failed. But when the king himself took up the
attack the fortunes of the day were rapidly changed. For the first of
many times throughout his marvellous career the personal courage of
Alexander, his strength, his dexterity in arms, turned the tide of
battle. He was a matchless soldier as well as a matchless general, and
seemed to combine the old soldiership and the new, the personal prowess
of an Achilles and the tactical skill of an Epaminondas. He sprang
forward, rallying, as he advanced, his disheartened troops, struck
down adversary after adversary, and climbed the bank with astonishing
agility. The example of such a leader seemed to give the Companions an
irresistible strength. In a few minutes the bank of the Granicus was
won. But the battle was not yet over. The Persians had been beaten back
from their first line of defence; but they still held the level ground,
and till the whole of the Greek army had crossed the stream they had a
great superiority in numbers, enabling them to deliver charges which
the weight of men and horses might well have made irresistible. Again
Alexander was in the thick of the conflict. His pike had been broken in
the struggle for the bank. He asked his orderly for another. The man
showed him his own broken weapon. Then the king looked round to his
followers, holding high the splintered shaft. The appeal was answered
in an instant. It was a Corinthian, Demaratus by name, who answered
his call and supplied him with a fresh lance. It was not done a moment
too soon. The Persian cavalry charged in a heavy column, its leader,
Mithradates, son-in-law to King Darius, riding a long way in front
of his men. Alexander spurred his horse, charged at Mithradates with
levelled pike, struck him in the face, and hurled him dying to the
ground. Meanwhile another Persian noble had ridden up. He struck a
fierce blow at Alexander with his scymetar, but missing his aim in his
excitement, did nothing more than shear off the crest of the helmet.
Alexander replied with a thrust which broke through his breastplate and
inflicted a mortal wound. There was a third antagonist behind, but his
arm was severed by a sword-cut from a Macedonian officer just as he was
in the act of delivering a blow. The struggle, however, was continued
with unabated fury. It was not till almost every leader had fallen that
the Persian cavalry gave way.
Elsewhere in the field the victory was more easily won. The _élite_ of
the Persian army had been brought together to oppose Alexander, and
the remainder did not hold their ground with equal tenacity. When the
phalanx had made its way across the river, and reformed itself again on
the eastern bank, it encountered no opposition.
There still remained, however, a force to be dealt with which, had
it been properly handled, might have been found a serious difficulty
for the conquerors. The infantry, as has been said, was posted in
reserve, and of this force not less than a half, numbering as many
as ten thousand, consisted of Greek mercenaries. These had remained
in absolute inaction, idly watching the struggle on the level ground
below. They had no responsible leaders; no orders had been issued to
them. The Persian generals, confident in the strength of their special
arm, the cavalry, neglected to make any use of this invaluable force.
And yet they might have known what ten thousand Greeks, well led,
could do! Alexander came up and charged the unprotected flank of the
Greek force. "He had the defects of his virtues," and was too eager
in "drinking the delight of battle." His charger--not the famous
Bucephalus, which had fallen lame, but another horse--was killed under
him. The light infantry also delivered an attack, but the mercenaries
still held their ground. But when the phalanx came up, their strength
or their courage failed. The front ranks were crushed by the advance
of the ponderous machine, and the rest first wavered, then broke up in
hopeless confusion. Not less than half of their number were killed in
their places or in the attempt to escape. The rest were either admitted
to quarter, or contrived to make their way to some place of safety.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 13: Cambyses, in a fit of frantic jealousy--so the story
ran--had put his brother Smerdis to death. Cambyses died in Egypt.
The magi, Median soothsayers and priests, contrived that one of their
number should personate the murdered prince. After he had occupied the
Persian throne for a few months, seven nobles conspired against him
and slew him. One of the seven, Darius, became king; the others were
rewarded by perpetual immunity from taxes, for themselves and their
descendants, and other privileges.]
II
THE IRRESISTIBLE PHALANX
The eighteen months that followed the battle of the Granicus Alexander
spent in Asia Minor. A few strong places resisted him, but on the whole
he met with little opposition. On the other hand, he did not move very
quickly. At Gordium, in Phrygia, he gave his army a long rest, and
at Tarsus, in Cilicia, he was detained against his will by a severe
illness, contracted, it was said, by bathing in the ice-cold waters of
the Cydnus. Meanwhile Darius had been gathering together from all parts
of the Empire a vast army which would be sure, he thought, to crush
the invader. So confident did he feel that he did not attempt to check
Alexander's advance. He left the strong passes into Cilicia undefended.
He did the same with the passes from Cilicia into Syria. He desired
nothing better than that the enemy should come to close quarters with
him. His original plan was to wait for the Macedonian army at a place
named Sochi, where there was a great expanse of level ground. Then he
began to fear that Alexander might after all escape him. He left Sochi,
and marched by one of the passes of Mons Amanus (Sáwur Dagh) to Issus,
where he would be in the rear of the enemy, and so be able to cut off
the retreat which he believed would be attempted. Alexander, who had
in the highest degree the faculty of guessing what his antagonist was
thinking, saw his advantage. At Issus, Darius could not make use of his
numbers, and so might be attacked with good hope of success. He made a
night march, recrossed into Cilicia, and fought at Issus the second of
his great battles.
Darius took up his position on the north bank of the River Pinarus
(_Deli Tschai_). The centre of his line of battle was composed of
90,000 heavy-armed infantry, drawn up in three bodies of 30,000 each.
One of these consisted of Greek mercenaries, and occupied the middle
place; on either side were the other two--Asiatics armed in Greek
fashion. His own place was behind the Greeks. It was in them that he
really trusted, though he had violently resented the suggestion when
it was made by another. Some weeks before, when reviewing the army
with which he was about to encounter Alexander, he had asked for the
opinion of Charidemus, an Athenian exile, who was in attendance on him.
Charidemus was bidden to speak his mind freely, and he was imprudent
enough to take the king at his word. The substance of his advice to the
king was not to trust Asiatics, but to spend his accumulated treasure
in hiring Greeks. Darius was deeply offended, and the great nobles
about him were furious with rage. Charidemus was put to death, but his
advice must have been followed. The cavalry was massed on the right
wing--that end of the line which was nearest to the sea, for there
alone was there any ground suitable for their action. On the left wing,
reaching far up the mountain-side, were twenty thousand light-armed
infantry, who were to throw themselves on the flank of the Macedonians
as soon as these should attempt to cross the river. Behind this line
of battle, numbering, it is probable, not less than 120,000 men, stood
a mixed multitude, swept together from all the provinces of the vast
Persian Empire. This mass of combatants, if combatants they can be
called, already unwieldy, received the addition of 50,000 troops,
who had been posted on the southern bank of the river to cover the
operation of forming the Persian line, and who were brought back when
the formation was completed. The ground had been over-crowded before,
and this addition to the numbers of the second line only made it more
hopelessly unmanageable.
Alexander put his light infantry on the extreme right of his line,
opposite, it will be remembered, to a similar force in the Persian
array. Here also was the cavalry regiment of the "Companions," and with
them some Thessalian horse. The main line was composed of the phalanx
in five divisions, the fifth, on the extreme left, being close to the
sea, which was little more than a mile and a half from the foot of
the mountains--so narrow was the space which Darius had chosen for a
battlefield. He could have done nothing better calculated to destroy
any advantage that might have been given by his vast superiority in
numbers. On the left were some squadrons of Greek cavalry, and bodies
of light-armed troops from Crete and Thrace.
On coming in sight of the enemy Alexander made some changes in the
disposition of his forces. The most important of these was to transfer
some light infantry, cavalry, and archers to act against the 20,000
Persians who had been so placed as to threaten his right flank. It was
a wise precaution, but, as a matter of fact, it was not needed. The
Persians made no move, and Alexander soon perceived that they might
be safely neglected. He left a few hundred cavalry to watch them, and
placed the rest of the force destined for this service in his main line.
A brief time was allowed for rest when the river was reached. It was
well, too, to wait for a possible forward movement on the part of the
Persians. The confidence that had prompted the march to Issus might
also prompt an attack. But the Persian line remained in its place, and
Alexander crossed the stream. He had with him his light infantry, not
slingers and archers, it should be explained, but regular soldiers,
with armour and weapons so modified as to enable them to move quickly,
the "Companions," and two divisions of the phalanx. The phalanx was
drawn up in companies each sixteen deep. All the soldiers were armed
with a pike (_sarissa_), which was twenty-one feet in length. The pikes
of the front rank projected fifteen feet, the other end being weighted
so that the weapon could be held without difficulty. The pikes of
the second rank projected twelve feet, of the third, nine, of the
fourth, six, of the fifth, three. The other ranks held their pikes in
a slanting direction over the shoulders of those who stood in front.
Alexander led the attack, as usual, in person. The Macedonians, moving
as quickly as the phalanx could go, fell upon the Asiatic heavy-armed,
who occupied the left division of the main Persian line. They were
mainly Carduchi, the Kurds of to-day, better hands, it would seem,
then as now, at plundering than at fighting. The Carduchi gave way,
not waiting for the Macedonians to come to close quarters with them.
Their flight endangered the safety of the king, or, rather, the king
himself believed that it was endangered. He bade his charioteer turn
the horses' heads and fly. As long as the ground allowed he kept to
the chariot; when it became too rough he sprang upon a horse, and fled
in such haste that he threw away his royal mantle, his bow, and his
shield. The mixed multitude that stood behind the main line of Persian
battle, as soon as they saw the king quit the field, fled, or, rather,
attempted to fly. But, so narrow was the space in which they had been
crowded together, they could scarcely move. A scene of frightful terror
and confusion followed. The fugitives struggled fiercely with each
other in the frantic attempt to escape. Had they shown as much energy
in resisting the enemy as in thrusting aside and trampling down their
friends, they might have changed the fortune of the day. In less than
half an hour from the time when Alexander crossed the Pinarus the left
wing of the Persian host was a hopeless mass of confusion.
[Illustration: The Battle of Issus.]
Yet the Persians had a still unbroken strength with which much might
have been done, if only there had been a leader to make use of it. The
Greeks in the centre stood their ground bravely. They even advanced,
charged the left divisions of the phalanx, which had not completed
the passage of the Pinarus, and inflicted some loss upon it, killing
as many as 150 of the front rank men, and the officer in command. But
by themselves they could not hope to hold the field. When Alexander,
wheeling round after his victorious assault on the Persian right,
attacked them in flank, they were forced to give way. But they retired
in good order, and the main body of them made good their escape. The
Persian cavalry, too, had shown themselves not altogether unworthy
of their ancient renown. They had actually crossed the Pinarus, and
charged the Thessalian horse, which had been transferred, it should
be said, by Alexander from the right to the left of his army. In the
combat that ensued they held their own. But their courage failed when
they became aware of the flight of Darius. When their king had given
up the struggle what was there for them to stay for? To him they were
bound, but they had no conception of a country to whose service it was
their duty to devote their lives. They fled, suffering greatly in the
pursuit.
The Macedonians lost 450 in killed, Alexander himself being slightly
wounded. The slaughter among the Persians cannot be estimated. It was
put down at more than 100,000. Ptolemy, afterwards King of Egypt, who
was one of Alexander's most trusted generals, declared that he found a
ravine so choked with dead bodies that he could use them as a bridge.
Ptolemy kept a diary of the war, which he afterwards embodied in a
regular narrative. Arrian, who wrote the story of Alexander's campaign
in the second century of our era, had this work before him.
III
THE ARMY OF THE HUNDRED PROVINCES
During the twenty months which followed the victory of Issus, Alexander
continued to make fresh conquests and to consolidate those already
made. He subdued Syria--a name which must be taken to include both
Phœnicia and Palestine. Here the two cities of Tyre and Gaza made an
obstinate resistance, the two detaining him for no less than nine
months. Egypt, which hated its intolerant Persian masters, gave itself
up without a struggle. Early in 331 he heard that Darius had collected
another huge army, with which to make another effort for his kingdom.
The king had lost the western half of his dominions, but the eastern
still remained to him, and from this he drew forces which exceeded in
number even the great host which he had put into the field at Issus.
The meeting-place was at Arbela, a place still known by the slightly
changed name of Erbil, and situated on the caravan-route between
Erzeroum and Bagdad; but the actual battlefield must be looked for some
twenty miles away in a level region known by the name of Gaugamela.