of Sicily came to help the unhappy town. Messenger after messenger had
been sent to tell how pressing was the need, and to implore assistance,
but no assistance was given. Agrigentum and Gela had indeed their
forces ready to march, but they waited for Syracuse, and Syracuse was
culpably tardy in moving. Possibly, as had been suggested, its rulers
fancied that Hannibal would waste time as they had lately seen Nicias,
the Athenian commander, waste it before their walls. Anyhow, they
waited first till a petty quarrel with two of their Greek neighbours
was finished, and then till the very largest and best equipped force
that could be raised was ready to march. By this time the opportunity
was lost. With horror, not unmixed with a certain fear for its own
future, Syracuse heard that Selinus, a Dorian Greek city, like itself,
had fallen.
The fall of a city taken by storm has always been miserable in the
extreme. In whatever respects the world may have advanced and improved,
in this it remains much about the same. But the Carthaginians seem
to have used their victory with more than common barbarity. That the
prisoners should be slaughtered in cold blood was unhappily a common
incident. A Greek conqueror was more likely than not to treat fellow
Greeks in this way. But mutilation was a hideous barbarity, and in this
Hannibal permitted his soldiers to indulge. I mention the fact because
it helps us to realise how the world would have been put backward if
Carthage had triumphed over Greece. Selinus was again inhabited, but
it never recovered the terrible blow inflicted upon it by Hannibal.
To this day the prostrate columns of its temples, some of the most
magnificent ruins in the world, bear the marks of the crowbars which
the barbarous invaders used in overthrowing them.
The main purpose of Hannibal was still to be accomplished. It was
against Himera, the scene of his grandfather's defeat, that his
expedition was really aimed, and, Selinus destroyed, he marched against
the other city, which was on the north coast of the island, and about
fifty miles distant. His numbers were swollen by recruits from the
native Sicilian tribes, who had never reconciled themselves to the
presence of the Greek settlers, and now gladly seized the opportunity
of expelling them. Hannibal repeated at Himera the tactics which he
had employed with success at Selinus. He delivered his attack without
any delay, bringing his battering-rams to bear upon the walls, and
bringing up his movable towers. Nothing was accomplished on the first
day. The people of Himera had the help and, what was probably not less
effective, the encouragement of a Syracusan contingent of 4,000 men.
Repeated assaults of the besiegers were repulsed with great slaughter,
and the spirits of the defenders rose high. So great indeed was the
confidence which they felt in their superiority to the enemy that
they resolved to take the offensive. At dawn on the second day a body
of 10,000 men sallied forth from the town and fiercely attacked the
investing force. The Carthaginians were not prepared for any such
action. Their first line was easily broken. The Greeks pursued the
fugitives and inflicted upon them a heavy loss, killing, it is said
by one writer, as many as 20,000 men. As this number would allow an
average of two victims to each combatant, it may safely be rejected.
The 6,000 given by a more sober historian is probably much nearer,
though not under the number. But the easy success of the sally led to
disaster. Hannibal was watching the affair from some elevated ground in
the rear of the position, and he now moved forward. He found the Greeks
exhausted and breathless, and after a fierce struggle drove them back.
The main body reached the gates of Himera, though not without loss, but
3,000 men were isolated on the plain and perished to a man.
While the struggle was proceeding, a squadron of twenty-five ships of
war arrived from Syracuse. Unfortunately they brought with them some
alarming news. In passing the Carthaginian port of Motyé they had
observed signs of preparation in the fleet. The explanation suggested
and received was that the enemy were preparing to attack Syracuse. The
captain of the Syracusan contingent, Diodes by name, was profoundly
alarmed by this intelligence. The defence of Himera became a secondary
consideration in view of what he believed to be the instant danger of
Syracuse itself. He ordered the warships to return immediately. He even
insisted on taking back the troops under his own command. The Himeræans
remonstrated against this desertion, but remonstrated in vain. It could
hardly be denied that Diocles was acting in the interest, at least in
the immediate interest, of Syracuse. All that he would agree to, in
the way of compromise, was that the ships should transport as many of
the Himeræans as could be taken on board to Messana, which was about
150 miles distant (Syracuse was 100 miles further off), and that they
should return with all speed to take away the remainder. Those who were
left behind, or elected to remain, should do their best in the meantime
to hold the city. As for Diocles, he marched away in such haste that
he left the bodies of such of his own men as had fallen in the recent
conflict unburied--the most shameful confession that a Greek general
could make of weakness or defeat. The next day Hannibal renewed the
attack. The brave Himeræans still repulsed him. For the whole of that
day they were able to hold their own. If they could have maintained
their resistance for yet another twelve hours, all might have been
well, for the ships, which clearly could not have gone so far as
Messana, were seen to be returning. But their strength was exhausted.
A breach had been made in the walls, and the Spaniards, again showing
their superiority over Hannibal's other troops, forced their way
through it. A few of the Himeræans made their way to the ships; but the
great mass of the population was either slain or captured. Hannibal,
while giving up the spoil of the city without reserve to his soldiers,
did his best to stop the massacre. But there was no mercy in his
motives. The women and children were either distributed among the
conquerors or sold as slaves. The male captives of full age, 3,000 in
number, were taken to the precise spot where Hamilcar had been last
seen alive, cruelly mutilated and slain. We read of many barbarous
acts in Greek history, but of nothing so atrocious as this. If we can
see but little trace of humanity, as we understand it, in the Greek
character, the people had a sense of fitness, a restraining power of
taste, if not of conscience, that forbad such horrors.
The danger that threatened civilisation must have seemed great at the
time, though it was probably less than had been the case when the fate
of the world, so to speak, had been in suspense on the day of Salamis.
But the fears of Sicily, felt also, we may believe, in mainland
Greece, were suddenly relieved. Hannibal had accomplished his object.
He had exacted a never-to-be-forgotten vengeance for the death of his
grandfather, and he wanted no more. Half Sicily was now in the hands of
Carthage, and the Greek name was more humbled than it had been within
the memory of man. He disbanded his army, and returned, laden with the
spoils of war, to Carthage, where he was received with enthusiasm.
But the danger was only postponed. If Hannibal had been satisfied
with the results of his campaign, Carthage was not. Its old ambition
of dominating Sicily was revived, and for the next four years it made
costly and incessant preparations for another invasion of the eastern
or Greek portion of the island. Unfortunately the Sicilian Greeks spent
the time, not in consolidating their strength, but in intestine strife.
The most eminent citizen of Syracuse had made repeated attempts to
establish a despotism. He had met with failure and death, but he left
behind him a legacy of political hatred that might well have proved
fatal to the State.
In 407 the hostile intention of Carthage became known to the Sicilian
Greeks. They sent envoys to make a remonstrance, and to suggest a
treaty of peace. No answer was given, and the preparations went on with
unabated zeal.
In the following year the expedition sailed. Hannibal was again in
command, but he shared his power with a young kinsman, Himilco by name.
His force, on the most moderate computation, amounted to 120,000 men,
with a fleet of 120 ships of war. It was in Agrigentum, to which the
frontier of Greek Sicily had now been pushed back, that the storm was
first to fall.
Agrigentum was a splendid city, second only to Syracuse in population,
and not yielding even to it in magnificence and wealth. No city in the
island or even in mainland Greece, Athens only excepted, could boast
more stately temples and public buildings. Surrounded by a large and
fertile territory, it carried on a profitable trade with the African
coast. It could boast of one kind of wealth in which few Greek cities
could vie with it--a noble breed of horses, which were seen at least
as often in the front at the chariot-races of Olympia as the teams
sent from Syracuse or Argos. Only two years before the time of which
I am speaking an Agrigentine citizen had won the prize for four-horse
chariots, and on his return home had been escorted from the frontier by
three hundred private chariots each drawn by two white horses.
Agrigentum was built on a site naturally strong and had been skilfully
fortified. It occupied a group, or rather part of a group, of hills
which on all sides but one, the south-western, rose precipitously from
the plain, so precipitously indeed that attack was impossible. On
the north-east, crowning the height of the most lofty hill, was the
citadel, approachable by one narrow path only.
While the fortifications were strong and well cared for, they were also
adequately garrisoned. Besides a numerous force raised from her own
citizens Agrigentum had in her pay eight hundred Campanian mercenaries,
who three years before had served under Hannibal, and had thrown up
their engagement dissatisfied with their pay. She had also secured
the services of fifteen hundred other mercenaries who were under the
command of Dexippus, a Spartan soldier of fortune. The citizens were
confident in their ability to repel any attack that might be made on
them. When Hannibal proposed a treaty of alliance, which, however,
would permit Agrigentum to stand neutral in the approaching conflict,
it was promptly rejected.
For a while all went well with the defence. Hannibal assaulted the
town at the only point where an assault was possible, but accomplished
nothing. He even lost his siege train, for the Agrigentines made a
sally, captured, and burnt it. He then adopted the alternative plan of
constructing a mound which would put the assailants on a level with the
walls. The cemetery of Agrigentum was situated outside the walls in
the same quarter as that which was the scene of the attack. Indeed, it
was only here that there was any level space. Massive tombs of stone,
in which reposed the remains of distinguished or wealthy Agrigentines
of past days, abounded, and Hannibal, with the national carelessness
of all religions other than his own, determined to make use of these
materials for his siege work. His workmen had destroyed many of the
tombs, and were busy with the most splendid of them all, that of Theron
(tyrant of Agrigentum from 488 to 472) when a thunderbolt fell on the
spot. This was regarded by the Carthaginians as a manifest token of
the divine displeasure. The panic which followed largely increased the
fatalities from a disease which now appeared in the camp. Thousands
perished, Hannibal himself being one of the victims. It was not till
various expiations, one of them a human sacrifice, had been made that
Himilco, who now succeeded to the chief command, was able to resume the
operations of the siege.
But fortune still seemed to favour the Greek cause. The other Greek
cities had been actively employed in raising a relieving force. A
Syracusan army, made up by contingents from Gela and Camarina to 30,000
foot and 5,000 horse, reached the Agrigentine territory. Himilco
despatched a force of Spaniards and Italians to contest their further
advance. After a fierce fight the Carthaginian mercenaries were broken,
and compelled to retreat to their camp. Daphnæus of Syracuse, who was
in chief command, possibly recollecting the disastrous result of the
too vigorous pursuit of the enemy before Selinus, held back his men
when they would have followed up the victory. The officers in command
at Agrigentum were equally cautious. Their troops were eager to sally
out from the gates and fall upon the flying mercenaries as they
hurried past in disorder, but the generals absolutely refused their
permission, and the opportunity of completely destroying the enemy--so
at least the malcontents contended--was lost.
The allies now entered the town amidst general rejoicing. It was not
long, however, before a discordant note was heard. Loud complaints
were made of the supineness of the Agrigentine generals in allowing
the enemy to escape. Some went so far as to suggest that a treasonable
understanding existed between the Agrigentine generals and Himilco. A
public assembly was hurriedly convened, and the accused generals were
put upon their trials. The leader of the contingent from Camarina,
Menes by name, ranged himself with the accusers. What evidence was
brought against the generals we do not know. It is quite possible that
there was nothing worthy of the name, for a Southern mob was ready
then, as, indeed, it is now, to take its wildest guesses as truth.
Anyhow their defence, whatever it was, availed nothing. Four out of
the five were stoned to death, the fifth was allowed to escape in
consideration of his youth. At the same time the Spartan Dexippus was
severely censured.
This deplorable affair bears a curious resemblance to a well-known
incident in Athenian history, which indeed almost coincided with it
in time: the execution of the Athenian generals after the victory at
Arginusæ, on the charge of having neglected to do all that was possible
in saving the lives of the shipwrecked crews. It shows, as any one who
tells the story of Greece has many occasions of showing, the dark side
of free political life. For the time, however, no ill result seemed to
follow, as far as the war was concerned. The tide of fortune still ran
strongly against the invading army. Himilco had practically to raise
the siege of Agrigentum, and was besieged in his own camp. This was
too strongly fortified to be taken by assault, but it seemed in danger
of being reduced by famine. Daphnæus was strong enough to cut off the
supplies, and the Carthaginians were reduced to the greatest straits.
Some of the mercenaries mutinied, and were with difficulty pacified by
having handed over to them the plate which the wealthy Carthaginians
who held high command in the army had brought with them. Then by a bold
_coup_ Himilco effected a total change in the situation. Agrigentum
was mainly supplied from Syracuse, and towards the end of the year a
fleet of transports carrying stores was on its way under the escort of
some Syracusan ships-of-war. The Carthaginian fleet had been inactive
since the beginning of the campaign, and the Greek commanders seem
to have thought that it might safely be neglected. In this they were
soon undeceived. A squadron of forty ships-of-war issued unexpectedly
from Motyé, attacked the escorting ships, of which they destroyed
eight, driving the rest ashore, and succeeded in capturing the whole
of the convoy. The positions of the two armies were now reversed. The
Carthaginians were possessed of abundance of supplies; the Greeks were
threatened with famine. The mercenaries in the service of Dexippus
approached him with a complaint. He was unable to satisfy them, and
they marched away to Messana, alleging that the time for which they had
been engaged was expired. The alarm caused by this desertion was great,
and Dexippus took no pains to allay it. He had not forgotten the fate
of the Agrigentine generals or the censure passed upon himself. The
magistrates of Agrigentum instituted an inquiry into the condition and
amount of the supplies still remaining in the city, and found that very
little was left. They lost no time in deciding on a course of action.
Agrigentum must be evacuated, and that at once. That very night all
the population, except the sick and helpless, and a few patriots who
preferred dying in their native city to leaving it, hurriedly fled to
Gela, their rear being guarded by the Syracusan and Agrigentine troops.
They escaped with their lives and with such property as they were able
to carry off. Those that remained behind were slaughtered without
mercy, unless they preferred to put an end to their own lives. Some
had hoped to find safety in the temples, but the Carthaginians showed
no respect for the sacred places of the city, which they plundered and
destroyed as remorselessly as they did the secular.
But the tide of Carthaginian success had not yet reached its height.
Two more Greek cities, Gela and Camarina, had to be evacuated.
Practically Syracuse and Messana alone remained. If this success had
been attained in 480 the prospect of European civilisation would have
been dark indeed. Happily by this time Persia, Carthage's natural ally,
had ceased to be formidable.
It would demand too much time, and would take me too far from my proper
subject, if I were to relate in detail the history of the war. It can
hardly be doubted that there had been much mismanagement on the part
of the Syracusan generals. But all the mistakes which they made might
have been repaired without serious loss to the State and to the welfare
of the Greek race in Sicily, if it had not been for the unscrupulous
ambition of a Syracusan citizen. A short time before the Carthaginian
invasion there had been attempts on the part of one of the leaders
of the aristocracy of Syracuse to make himself an absolute ruler.
He perished in the enterprise, but his plan did not die with him. A
certain Dionysius, who had married the daughter of the deceased man,
now saw in the popular indignation against the incompetent generals
an opportunity of securing his own ends. He brought about their
condemnation, and procured his own election in their place. A crafty
manœuvre enabled him to surround himself with a bodyguard. In the
end he made himself master of the city. Ostensibly he was the chief
citizen of the republic. The coins of Syracuse still bore the figure
of the personified city, for Dionysius did not venture to put his
own likeness upon them. But practically he was absolute. So far the
success of the Carthaginian invasion had helped him. He would never
have risen to supreme power had it not been for the terrible disasters
which had overtaken Agrigentum, Camarina, and Gela, and had seemed to
make him a necessary person. But he felt, of course, that Syracuse must
not fall. Fortunately for his plans, he found that Himilco was not in
a position to carry the war further. The Carthaginian army, loosely
constituted of mercenaries gathered from many countries, had fallen
into a disorganised condition. The sickness that had worked such havoc
during the siege of Agrigentum had broken out again, and had claimed
thousands of victims. Without much difficulty an agreement was arrived
at. The Carthaginians were to keep all their former possessions and
their recent acquisitions. Only Gela and Camarina might be reoccupied
by their former inhabitants, on the condition of paying tribute.
And--for here was the important article of the treaty--_Syracuse was to
be subject to Dionysius_. Peace was concluded on these terms, and the
Carthaginian army returned home, carrying back with it, we are told,
the terrible disease which had wrought so much damage in Sicily.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 9: See p. 71.]
[Footnote 10: It may be as well to explain that our knowledge of
this period is derived chiefly from Diodorus Siculus, a writer of
the first century of our era. He was a native of Sicily, and while
writing something like an Universal History, gave special attention to
the affairs of his own country. He had before him, it would appear,
two writers of much earlier date, both of them Sicilians. These were
Ephorus, who was born about 404 B.C., and Timaeus, who was about half a
century later. Fragments only of their works survive, but practically
all that Diodorus tells us about Sicilian affairs comes from them. Some
details we get from Plutarch.]
III
DIONYSIUS THE TYRANT
We may feel pretty certain that neither of the two parties to the
treaty which brought the war of 407-6 to an end had any intention
of keeping it longer than it might suit his or their convenience.
Dionysius had skilfully used the war to raise himself to despotic
power; Carthage probably expected that once again, as so often
before, the internal quarrels of the Greek people might give her the
opportunity of some fresh aggrandisement. She had accomplished much
in a few years, though not without severe losses. But these losses,
after all, counted but for little. The blood of mercenaries was cheap.
As long as the city's sources of income were untouched, she could
reckon with certainty on gathering as many recruits from Africa, Spain,
Italy, and the shores of the western Mediterranean as she might choose
to pay for. She had therefore no small reason to believe that her
long-cherished scheme of subjugating Sicily might be accomplished at no
distant date.
Peace lasted for some eight years--years which Dionysius utilised to
consolidate his power at home, and to extend his dominions abroad. He
felt acutely the reproach levelled against him by his enemies that his
power rested on Carthaginian support, and was anxious to remove it. In
397 he felt himself strong enough to act, and taking the people into
his counsel, for he was careful to observe the forms of constitutional
government, proposed to commence hostilities. No declaration of war
was made, but the property of Carthaginian residents in Syracuse was
given up to plunder, and the trading vessels in the harbour were
seized as prizes. If Carthaginian wealth excited the cupidity of their
Greek neighbours, so their oppressive rule and brutal manners were
the objects of universal hatred. As soon as the news of what had been
done in Syracuse with the consent, and, indeed, at the suggestion of,
Dionysius spread through the Island, it was followed by a general
massacre of the Carthaginian inhabitants. In all the cities which the
late campaigns had left in a dependent or tributary condition there was
a rising of the population against their Carthaginian masters, and
a massacre followed not unlike that which was planned and partially
carried out amongst the Danes of East Anglia on St. Brice's Day, 1006,
A.D., or that which is known as the Sicilian Vespers in 1282. In a very
short time the region actually held by Carthage in the Island did not
extend beyond her strongholds on the western coast.