THE RETREAT FROM MONS.
At 5 a.m. on the 22nd I awoke, as I had lain down to sleep, in high
hopes. No evil foreboding of coming events had visited me in dreams;
but it was not many hours later that the disillusionment began. I
started by motor in the very early hours of a beautiful August morning
to visit General Lanrezac at his Headquarters in the neighbourhood of
Philippeville.
Soon after entering the area of the 5th French Army, I found my motor
stopped at successive cross roads by columns of infantry and artillery
moving _south_. After several such delays on my journey, and before I
had gone half the distance, I suddenly came up with Captain Spiers of
the 11th Hussars, who was the liaison officer at General Lanrezac's
Headquarters.
There is an atmosphere engendered by troops retiring, when they expect
to be advancing, which is unmistakable to anyone who has had much
experience of war. It matters not whether such a movement is the
result of a lost battle, an unsuccessful engagement, or is in the
nature of a "strategic manoeuvre to the rear." The fact that,
whatever the reason may be, it means giving up ground to the enemy,
affects the spirits of the troops and manifests itself in the
discontented, apprehensive expression which is seen on the faces of
the men, and the tired, slovenly, unwilling gait which invariably
characterises troops subjected to this ordeal.
This atmosphere surrounded me for some time before I met
Spiers and before he had spoken a word. My optimistic visions of the
night before had vanished, and what he told me did not tend to bring
them back. He reported that the Guard and 7th German Corps had since
daybreak advanced on the Sambre in the neighbourhood of Franiere, and
had attacked the 10th French Corps which was holding the river. The
advanced troops had driven the Germans back; but he added that
"offensive action was contrary to General Lanrezac's plans," and that
this had "annoyed him."
The 10th Corps had had to fall back with some loss, and were taking up
ground known as the "Fosse Position," on the south side of the Sambre.
Spiers thought that the 10th Corps had been knocked about a good deal.
He gave me various items of information gleaned from the Chief of
Intelligence of the French 5th Army. These reports went to show that
the German turning movement in Belgium was extending far towards the
west, the right being kept well forward as though a powerful
envelopment was designed. It was evident that the enemy was making
some progress in his attempts to bridge and cross the Sambre all along
the front of the 5th Army. There appeared to be some difficulty in
finding General Lanrezac, and therefore I decided to return at once to
my Headquarters at Le Cateau.
I found there that our own Intelligence had received information which
confirmed a good deal of what I had heard in the morning. They thought
that at least three German Corps were advancing upon us, the most
westerly having reached as far as Ath.
The hopes and anticipations with which I concluded the last chapter
underwent considerable modification from these experiences
and events; but the climax of the day's disappointment and
disillusionment was not reached till 11 p.m., when the Head of the
French Military Mission at my Headquarters, Colonel Huguet, brought a
French Staff Officer to me who had come direct from General Lanrezac.
This officer reported the fighting of which Spiers had already
informed me, and said that the French 10th Corps had suffered very
heavily. When thinking of our estimates of losses in those days, it
must be remembered that a dearly bought experience had not yet opened
our minds to the terrible toll which modern war exacts.
The position of the 5th French Army extended from Dinant on the Meuse
(just north of Fosse--Charleroi--Thuin back to Trelon) about five
Corps in all. Sordet's Cavalry Corps had reported that probably three
German Corps were advancing on Brussels.
The German line facing the Anglo-French Army was thought to be
"roughly" Soignies--Nivelles--Gembloux, and thence circling to the
north of the Sambre, round Namur. A strong column of German infantry
was advancing on Charleroi from Fleurus about 3 p.m. on the 21st.
There had been heavy fighting at Tamines, on the Sambre, in which
French troops had been worsted. General Lanrezac was anxious to know
if I would attack the flank of the German columns which were pressing
him back from the river.
In view of the most probable situation of the German Army, as it was
known to both of us, and the palpable intention of its Commander to
effect a great turning movement round my left flank, and having regard
to the actual numbers of which I was able to dispose, it is very
difficult to realise what was in Lanrezac's mind when he made such a
request to me.
As the left of the French 5th Army (Reserve Division of 18th
Corps) was drawn back as far as Trelon, and the centre and right of
that Army were in process of retiring, the forward position I now held
on the Conde Canal might quickly become very precarious.
I, therefore, informed Lanrezac in reply that such an operation as he
suggested was quite impracticable for me. I agreed to retain my
present position for 24 hours; but after that time I told him it would
be necessary for me to consider whether the weight against my front
and outer flank, combined with the retreat of the French 5th Army,
would not compel me to go back to the Maubeuge position.
I should mention that earlier in the day, on my return to Headquarters
after my talk with Spiers, I had despatched the following message to
General Lanrezac:--
"I am waiting for the dispositions arranged for to be carried out,
especially the posting of French Cavalry Corps on my left. I am
prepared to fulfil the _role_ allotted to me when the 5th Army
advances to the attack.
"In the meantime, I hold an advanced defensive position extending from
Conde on the left, through Mons to Erquelinnes, where I connect with
two Reserve Divisions south of the Sambre. I am now much in advance of
the line held by the 5th Army and feel my position to be as forward as
circumstances will allow, particularly in view of the fact that I am
not properly prepared for offensive action till to-morrow morning, as
I have previously informed you.
"I do not understand from your wire that the 18th Corps has yet been
engaged, and they stand on my inner flank."
I left my Headquarters at 5 a.m. on Sunday the 23rd and went to
Sars-la-Bruyere (Headquarters of the 2nd Corps), and there I
met Haig, Smith-Dorrien, and Allenby.
The cavalry had, during the 22nd, drawn off towards my left flank
after heavy pressure by the enemy's advancing columns, leaving
detachments in front of my right to the east of Mons, which was not so
severely threatened. These detachments extended in a south-easterly
direction south of Bray and Binche, the latter place having been
occupied by the enemy. They were in touch with the 5th French Army.
Patrols and advanced squadrons had engaged similar bodies of the enemy
and had held their own well.
The 2nd Corps occupied the line of the Conde Canal, from that place
round the salient which the canal makes to the north of Mons, and
extended thence to the east of Obourg, whence that part of the line
was drawn back towards Villers-St. Ghislain.
The 5th Division was holding the line from Conde to Mariette, whilst
the 3rd Division continued the line thence round the salient to the
right of the line occupied by the 2nd Corps.
The 1st Corps was echeloned on the right and in rear of the 2nd.
I told the commanders of the doubts which had arisen in my mind during
the previous 24 hours, and impressed on them the necessity of being
prepared for any kind of move, either in advance or in retreat. I
discussed exhaustively the situation on our front.
Allenby's bold and searching reconnaissance had not led me to believe
that we were threatened by forces against which we could not make an
effective stand. The 2nd Corps had not yet been seriously engaged,
while the 1st was practically still in reserve.
Allenby's orders to concentrate towards the left flank when
pressed by the advance of the enemy's main columns had been
practically carried into effect. I entertained some anxiety as to the
salient which the canal makes north of Mons, and enjoined on
Smith-Dorrien particular watchfulness and care with regard to it.
They all assured me that a quiet night had been passed and that their
line was firmly taken up and held.
The air reconnaissance had started at daybreak, and I decided to await
aircraft reports from Henderson before making any decided plan.
I instructed Sir Archibald Murray, my Chief of Staff, to remain for
the present at General Smith-Dorrien's Headquarters at Sars-la-Bruyere,
and gave him full instructions as to arrangements which must be made
if a retreat became necessary. I then went on to Valenciennes. General
Drummond (Commanding the 19th Infantry Brigade) and the French
Commandant at Valenciennes met me at the station.
I inspected a part of the entrenchments which were under construction,
and the disposition of the Territorial troops (two divisions under
General d'Amade) which were detailed to hold them and to guard our
left flank. The 19th Brigade (2nd Batt. R. Welsh Fusiliers, 1st Batt.
Scottish Rifles, 1st Batt. Middlesex Regt., and 2nd Batt. Argyle and
Sutherland Highlanders) was just completing its detrainment, and I
placed Drummond under the orders of General Allenby commanding the
Cavalry Division.
During this day (August 23rd) reports continued to reach me of heavy
pressure on our outposts all along the line, but chiefly between Conde
and Mons.
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, it will be remembered, was now in command of
the 2nd Corps, having been sent out from England in succession to Sir
James Grierson on the latter's untimely death.
After my conference with the Corps Commanders on the morning of the
23rd, I left General Smith-Dorrien full of confidence in regard to his
position, but when I returned to my Headquarters in the afternoon,
reports came to hand that he was giving up the salient at Mons because
the outpost line at Obourg had been penetrated by the enemy, and that
he was also preparing to give up the whole of the line of the canal
before nightfall. He said that he anticipated a gap occurring in his
line between the 3rd and 5th Divisions in the neighbourhood of
Mariette, and he went so far as to make a request for help to the 1st
Corps.
Up to this time there was no decided threat in any strength on Conde,
Sir Horace, therefore, need not have feared an imminent turning
movement, and, as regards his front, he was nowhere threatened by
anything more than cavalry supported by small bodies of infantry.
At that time no directions for retreat had been issued from
Headquarters, although the Chief of the General Staff had been left at
Sars-la-Bruyere on purpose to give orders for such a movement if it
should become necessary.
The General's anxiety seems to have lessened later in the afternoon,
for at 5 p.m. a message from the 2nd Corps said that the commander was
"well satisfied with the situation."
The 3rd Division was now effecting a retirement south of the canal to
a line running west through Nouvelles, and this movement had the
inevitable result of bringing back the 5th Division and handing over
the bridges of the canal to the German cavalry.
Every report I was now receiving at Headquarters pointed to
the early necessity of a retirement of the British Forces in view of
the general strategic situation, and I did not, therefore, deem it
desirable to interfere with the 2nd Corps commander.
Reports of German activity on his front continued to be received from
the G.O.C. 2nd Corps. At 7.15 p.m. he asked for permission to retire
on Bavai; at 9.45 he was again reassured--a Divisional Headquarters
which had retired was now "moving forward again"; and at 10.20 p.m. he
reported, "casualties in no way excessive; all quiet now."
The line which the 2nd Corps had taken up for the night showed an
average retirement of three miles south of the canal. During the late
afternoon the advanced troops of the 1st Corps were engaged, but not
seriously threatened; they held their ground.
During the late afternoon and evening very disquieting reports had
arrived as to the situation on my right. These were confirmed later in
a telegram from French Headquarters, which arrived at half-past eleven
at night. It clearly showed that our present position was
strategically untenable; but this conclusion had been forced upon me
much earlier in the evening when I received a full appreciation of the
situation as it then appeared at French General Headquarters. General
Joffre also told me that his information led him to expect that I
might be attacked the next day by at least three German Corps and two
Cavalry Divisions.
Appreciating the situation from the point of view which all reports
now clearly established, my last hope of an offensive had to be
abandoned, and it became necessary to consider an immediate retreat
from our present forward position.
I selected the new line from Jerlain (south-east of
Valenciennes) eastwards to Maubeuge. This line had already been
reconnoitred. The Corps and Divisional Staff Officers who were called
into Headquarters to receive orders, especially those of the 2nd
Corps, thought our position was much more seriously threatened than it
really was and, in fact, one or two expressed doubts as to the
possibility of effecting a retirement in the presence of the enemy in
our immediate front. I did not share these views, and Colonel Vaughan
(Chief of the Staff of the Cavalry Division) was more inclined to
accept my estimate of the enemy's forces on or near the canal than the
others were. His opportunities of gauging the enemy's strength and
dispositions had been greatly enhanced by the fine reconnoitring work
done on the previous two or three days by the Cavalry Division.
However, I determined to effect the retreat, and orders were issued
accordingly.
The 1st Army Corps was to move up towards Givry and to take up a good
line to cover the retreat of the 2nd Corps towards Bavai, which was to
commence at daybreak. Our front and left flank was to be screened and
covered by the cavalry and the 19th Infantry Brigade.
At about 1 a.m. on the 24th, Spiers came in from the Headquarters of
the 5th French Army and told me that they were seriously checked all
along the line. The 3rd and 4th French Armies were retiring, and the
5th French Army, after its check on Saturday, was conforming to the
general movement.
The information previously referred to as arriving from French
Headquarters at 11.30 p.m. on the 23rd was as follows:--
1. Namur fell this day.
2. The 5th French Army had been attacked all along their front by the
3rd German Corps, the Guard, the 10th and 7th Corps, and was falling
back on the line Givet--Philippeville--Maubeuge.
3. Hastiere had been captured by the Germans on the 23rd.
4. The Meuse was falling rapidly and becoming fordable in many places,
hence the difficulty of defence.
At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th I went out to my advanced Headquarters, which had
been established at Bavai, a small village which is strategically
important from the circumstance that it is the meeting place of roads from
every point of the compass. The orders issued through the night had been
carried out. The 1st Corps was on the line Nouvelles--Harmignies--Givry,
with Corps Headquarters at Bonnet. They were making an excellent stand to
cover the retirement of the 2nd Corps, which was being hard pressed,
particularly the 5th Division to the south-east of Conde. In fact, at 10
a.m. General Fergusson, Commanding the Division, found it necessary to
call very urgently upon General Allenby for help and support. The 19th
Infantry Brigade under Drummond had, it will be remembered, been placed at
the disposal of the commander of the Cavalry Division, who, calling this
Brigade up in immediate support of the 5th Division, directed Gough's 3rd
and De Lisle's 2nd Cavalry Brigades (3rd Cavalry Brigade: 4th Hussars, 5th
Lancers, and 16th Lancers; 2nd Cavalry Brigade: 4th Dragoon Guards, 9th
Lancers, and 18th Hussars) to threaten and harass the flanks of the
advancing German troops, whilst Bingham's 4th Cavalry Brigade remained in
observation towards the west.
The intervention of Allenby and Drummond, and the support they
rendered, was most effective in taking the severe pressure
of the enemy off the 5th Division and enabling it to continue its
retreat. About 11.30 a.m. the 2nd Corps Headquarters were retired from
Sars-la-Bruyere to Hon.
Soon after arriving at Bavai I visited the Headquarters of the 1st
Corps at Bonnet and observed the fighting above mentioned. Our troops
in this part of the line were very active and pushing. The 8th Brigade
under Davies (2nd Batt. Royal Scots, 2nd Batt. Royal Irish Regt., 4th
Batt. Middlesex Regt. and 1st Batt. Gordon Highlanders) was now at
Nouvelles, on the left; then came the rest of the 2nd Division, and
then the 1st Division under Lomax, on the right.
I went out from Haig's Headquarters to a high ridge, whence the ground
slopes down towards the north and north-east, along a gentle declivity
stretching almost to the canal which was some distance away. The
situation of the 1st Corps was excellent, and the artillery positions
were well chosen. From where we stood we could observe the effect of
our fire. It was very accurate, and shrapnel could be seen bursting
well over the enemy lines and holding his advance in complete check,
whilst the German fire was by no means so effective. The infantry were
defending their position a long way down the slope with great
determination and tenacity. The steadfast attitude and skilful retreat
of our right wing at Mons had much to do with the success of our
withdrawal, and the short time I spent with the 1st Corps that morning
inspired me with great confidence.
The subsequent retirement of the 1st Corps was carried out
successfully and with little loss, Haig's Headquarters being
established at Riez de l'Erelle at about 1 p.m.
After visiting some important points in the field over which
the 2nd Corps was fighting, I determined to seek out General Sordet,
Commanding the French Cavalry Corps, which was in cantonments
somewhere to the east of Maubeuge. I found Sordet's Headquarters at
Avesnes. The scene in the village was very typical of continental war
as it has been so often presented to us in pictures of the war of
1870.
The Commander of the French Cavalry Corps and his Staff, whom I met in
the central square, formed a striking group against a very suitable
background of gun parks and ammunition wagons. One looked in vain for
the fire-eating _beau sabreur_ of a Murat.
The man who had come back from that first desperate onslaught in
Belgium, and had so grandly supported and succoured our hard-pressed
Allies in their splendid defence, was a very quiet, undemonstrative,
spare little figure of at least 60 years of age. He appeared hard and
fit, and showed no sign of the tremendous strain he had already
undergone. On the contrary, he was smart and dapper, and looked like
the light-weight horseman he is. His clear-cut face and small, regular
features, denoted descent from the old _noblesse_, and he struck me in
his bright tunic as one who might be most fittingly imaged in a piece
of old Dresden china; but added to all this was the bearing of a
Cavalry Commander.
His manner was courteous in the extreme; but he showed inflexible
firmness and determination.
His Staff were of the pattern of French cavalry officers. I have seen
much of them for years past at manoeuvres, etc., and they combine
the best qualities of cavalry leaders with the utmost _camaraderie_
and good fellowship.
I interviewed the General at some length, pointing out what
I had been told by General Joffre and his Chief of Staff, namely, that
the Cavalry Corps had been directed to operate on my left or outer
flank. I informed him that in my opinion this was the point where his
presence was chiefly required, and where his action would be most
effective in checking the advance of the enemy. I told the General
that I should be very glad of his help in that locality as soon as
possible, because in my present forward position, and having regard to
the continued retirement of the 5th French Army, I should sorely need
all the assistance I could get to establish the Army under my command
in their new position.
General Sordet was very courteous and sympathetic. He expressed the
utmost desire to help me in every possible way. He added that he had
received no orders to move to the left flank and must, therefore,
await these instructions before he could march. He further told me
that after the arduous time he had experienced when supporting the
Belgian Army, his horses stood in the most urgent need of rest, and
that, in any case, it would be impossible for him to leave his present
position for at least 24 hours. He promised, however, to do all in his
power to help me, and, as my story will presently show, he kept his
word splendidly.
I then went back to Le Cateau to pick up any messages or news from
Joffre or Lanrezac. Here I was gladdened by the sight of the
detrainment of the advanced troops of the 4th Division (General Snow).
After a brief halt at Le Cateau, I started again for my advanced
Headquarters at Bavai. The experiences of that afternoon remain
indelibly impressed on my memory. Very shortly after leaving Le Cateau
I was met by streams of Belgian refugees, flying from Mons and its
neighbourhood. They were lying about the fields in all directions,
and blocking the roads with carts and vans in which they were trying
to carry off as much of their worldly goods as possible. The whole
country-side showed those concrete evidences of disturbance and alarm
which brought home to all our minds what this retreat meant and all
that it might come to mean.
After much delay from these causes I reached Bavai about 2.30 p.m.,
and it was with great difficulty that my motor could wind its way
through the mass of carts, horses, fugitives and military baggage
trains which literally covered almost every yard of space in the small
town. The temporary advanced Headquarters were established in the
market place, the appearance of which defies description. The babel of
voices, the crying of women and children, mingled with the roar of the
guns and the not far distant crack of rifles and machine guns, made a
deafening noise, amidst which it was most difficult to keep a clear
eye and tight grip on the rapidly changing course of events.
In a close room on the upper floor of the Mairie I found Murray, my
Chief of Staff, working hard, minus belt, coat and collar. The heat
was intense. The room was filled with Staff Officers bringing reports
or awaiting instructions. Some of the Headquarters Staff had not
closed their eyes for 48 hours, and were stretched out on forms or
huddled up in corners, wrapped in that deep slumber which only comes
to brains which, for the time being, are completely worn out.
If some of the armchair critics who so glibly talk of the easy time
which Staff Officers, compared with their regimental comrades, have in
war--if some of them could have watched that scene, they would be more
chary of forming such opinions and spreading such wrong
ideas.
Personally, I have always been far more a regimental than a Staff
Officer, and I have every reason to sympathise with the former, but
when I have witnessed scenes and gone through days such as I am now
very imperfectly describing, and when I know such days to be frequent
and long drawn out occurrences in war, it makes my blood boil to hear
and to read of the calumnies which are often heaped upon the head of
the unfortunate "Staff."
Murray did splendid work that day and set the best of examples. On my
arrival at Bavai he reported the situation fully and clearly to me.
The action of the cavalry and the 19th Brigade on the left had greatly
relieved the heavy pressure on the 5th Division, and the retirement
was proceeding fairly well.
Information had, however, reached me of the defeat and retreat of the
3rd French Army, and the continued falling back of Lanrezac. I judged
also, by the method and direction of the attack, that strenuous
attempts were being made to turn our left flank and press me back on
Maubeuge. The force opposed to me was growing in size, and I judged it
to be more than double my numbers. As subsequent information proved,
we were actually opposed by four corps and at least two cavalry
divisions.
Early in the afternoon it was clear to me that further definite
decisions must be taken. We could not stand on the line towards which
the troops were now retiring.
The fortress of Maubeuge lay close on my right rear. It was well
fortified and provisioned. It is impossible for anyone, who has not
been situated as I was, to realise the terrible temptation which such
a place offers to an army seeking shelter against overpowering odds.
For a short time on this fateful afternoon I debated within
myself whether or not I should yield to this temptation; but I did not
hesitate long, because there were two considerations which forced
themselves prominently upon my mind.
In the first place, I had an instinctive feeling that this was exactly
what the enemy was trying to make me do; and, in the second place, I
had the example of Bazaine and Metz in 1870 present in my mind, and
the words of Sir Edward Hamley's able comment upon the decision of the
French Marshal came upon me with overwhelming force. Hamley described
it as "The anxiety of the temporising mind which prefers postponement
of a crisis to vigorous enterprise." Of Bazaine he says, "In clinging
to Metz he acted like one who, when the ship is foundering, should lay
hold of the anchor."
I therefore abandoned all such ideas, and issued orders at about 3
p.m. directing the retreat some miles further back to the line Le
Cateau--Cambrai.
The pressure of the enemy on our left flank became greater towards
night. All reports and reconnaissances indicated a determined attempt
to outflank us and cut across our line of retreat, but Allenby's
cavalry was splendidly disposed and handled. The German columns were
kept at bay, and the troops bivouacked generally on a line somewhat
south of that towards which they had been ordered to retreat in the
morning. There was some confusion in the retirement of the 2nd Corps.
The 5th Division crossed the rear of the 3rd near Bavai, got to the
east of them and somewhat on the line of the retreat of the 1st Corps,
whose movement was thus hampered and delayed.
I got back to Headquarters at Le Cateau late in the evening,
where a budget of reports awaited me. The most important news was
contained in a telephone message received at 9.40 p.m. from Major
Clive of the Grenadier Guards, who was my liaison officer at French
Headquarters. This ran as follows:--
"The 4th Army, fighting against an enemy estimated at three Corps, has
fallen back to the line Virton--Spincourt. Three Reserve Divisions
made a counter-attack this afternoon from the south against the
enemy's left flank. The 3rd Army, fighting in difficult country, has
fallen back to better ground this side of the Meuse, about Mezieres
and Stenai. The enemy have been unable to cross the Meuse. The 3rd
Army is waiting for sufficient strength to make a counter-attack from
its right. The 1st Corps of the 5th Army found that the Germans had
crossed the Meuse behind them south of Dinant; they therefore fell
back to the neighbourhood of Givet and Philippeville."
Murray followed me to Headquarters about 3 a.m., and reported that all
orders had been carried out effectually and that the move was
proceeding satisfactorily. All the troops were very tired and had
suffered severely from the heat. Our losses in the fighting of the
last two days were considerable, but not excessive, having regard to
the nature of the operations.
In the early hours of the 25th the retreat was continued, again
covered skilfully by Allenby's cavalry.
During the night the 4th Division had nearly completed their
detrainment, and were taking up the position assigned to them towards
Cambrai. In the course of the morning of the 25th I visited Snow, who
commanded this Division, and went over the ground with him.
The only action of importance during the day occurred at
Solesmes, when the rearguard of the 3rd Division under McCracken was
heavily attacked. Allenby, with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade (4th Dragoon
Guards, 9th Lancers, and 18th Hussars), came to his assistance and
enabled him to continue his retreat. He did not, however, arrive at
his appointed destination till late in the evening, and then it was
with very tired men.
The reports received up till noon of the 25th showed that the French
were retiring all along the line, and there was no longer any doubt in
my mind as to the strength and intention of the enemy in our own
immediate front. Three Corps and a Cavalry Division were concentrating
against us, whilst a fourth Corps and another Cavalry Division were
trying to turn our western flank.
I had now to consider the position most carefully and again come to a
momentous decision. Was I to stand and fight on the line to which the
Army was now retiring (Le Cateau--Cambrai) or continue the retreat at
daybreak?
To hold the Le Cateau position in view of the heavy threat on my front
and western flank was a decision which could only be justified if I
were sure of the absolute determination of the French Commander to
hold on all along the line with the utmost tenacity; but our Allies
were already a day's march in rear of us, and every report indicated
continual retreat. At least one Army Corps and two Cavalry Divisions
of the enemy were engaged in an outflanking movement on my left, in
which they had already made some progress, and the only help I could
depend upon in that quarter was from two French Reserve Divisions
spread out on an enormous front towards Dunkirk, and very hastily and
indifferently entrenched. It was unlikely that they would be able to
oppose any effective resistance to the enemy's flank movement.
If this flank attack were successful, my communications with
Havre would be practically gone.
There had been neither time nor labour available to make the Le Cateau
position strong enough to withstand a serious onslaught by the
superior numbers which were advancing against my front, and the
British troops, which had been almost continuously marching and
fighting since Sunday morning, stood in much need of rest, which could
only be secured by placing some serious obstacle, such as a river
line, between my troops and the enemy.
After long and anxious deliberation, it seemed clear to me that every
consideration pointed to the necessity of resuming our march in
retreat at daybreak on the 26th, and orders to that effect were
accordingly issued.
I determined to direct the march on St. Quentin and Noyon. The troops
were to be held so concentrated as to enable me to take immediate
advantage of any change in the situation which might check the retreat
and offer favourable opportunities for taking the offensive. Failing
such developments, my idea was to concentrate behind the Somme or the
Oise. Behind such a barrier I should be able to rest the troops, fill
up casualties and deficiencies in material, and remain ready to act
effectively with the Allies in whatever direction circumstances might
dictate.
The retreat had been resumed at daybreak, and at 6 p.m. all the troops
of the 2nd Corps were on the Le Cateau line except McCracken's
Brigade, which, as before described, had been obliged to stand and
fight at Solesmes. The 1st Corps, however, was delayed in starting for
several hours, and was only able to reach the neighbourhood of
Landrecies; so that at the conclusion of the day's march a somewhat
dangerous gap existed between the 1st and 2nd Corps, which
caused me considerable anxiety in the small hours of the morning of
the 26th.
When darkness fell on the 25th, the enemy had sent forward advance
troops in motors and lorries through the Foret de Mormal in pursuit of
the 1st Corps. This culminated in a violent attack on Landrecies,
which, however, was splendidly driven off with heavy loss to the
enemy, chiefly by the 4th (Guards) Brigade under Brigadier-General
Scott-Kerr.
With reference to this action, the following is an extract from a
letter which I despatched to Lord Kitchener on August 27th:--
"The 4th Brigade were fighting in the early morning in the streets of
Landrecies. A German infantry column, about the strength of a brigade,
emerged from the wood north of the town and advanced south in the
closest order, filling up the narrow street.
"Two or three of our machine guns were brought to bear on this
magnificent target from the other end of the town. The head of the
column was checked and stopped, a frightful panic ensued, and it is
estimated that, in a very few minutes, no less than 800 to 900 dead
and wounded Germans were lying in the streets."
Sir Douglas Haig, although his troops were very tired and handicapped
also by heavy rearguard fighting, still proceeded to carry out the
instructions he had received, and the retirement of the 1st Corps was
continued in excellent order and with complete efficiency.
Things did not go so well with the 2nd Corps. General Allenby, who had
been most ably covering the retreat of the Army with his cavalry, had
already materially assisted the rearguard of the 3rd Division to
surmount their difficulties at Solesmes. McCracken's Brigade (7th)
(3rd Batt. Worcester Regt., 2nd Batt. S. Lancs Regt., 1st
Batt. Wilts Regt., and 2nd Batt. R. Irish Rifles) did not reach the Le
Cateau position until 10 or 11 p.m. on the 25th. His men were, of
course, nearly done up, and he had suffered severe losses.
Colonel Ansell, Commanding the 5th Dragoon Guards, one of the finest
cavalry leaders in the Army, who fell at the head of his regiment a
few days later, gave information to General Allenby at about 2 a.m.
regarding the nature of the German advance. This seemed of such great
importance that the latter at once sought out Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien
and warned him that, unless he was prepared to continue his march at
daybreak, he would most probably be pinned down to his position and
would be unable to get away. Sir Horace asked General Allenby what, in
his opinion, were the chances he had if he remained and held the
position, adding that he felt convinced his troops were so exhausted
as to preclude the possibility of removing them for some hours to
come. Allenby's reply was that he thought, unless the commander of the
2nd Corps made up his mind to move at daybreak, the enemy probably
would succeed in surrounding him.
Nevertheless, Sir Horace determined to fight. As to this decision, a
commander on the spot, and in close touch with his Divisions and
Brigades, is in the best position to judge of what his men can do.
I had, late on the evening of the 25th, before leaving for my
Headquarters at St. Quentin, visited several units of the 2nd Corps in
their bivouacs and, though tired indeed, they had not struck me as
being worn out troops.
By the break of day on the 26th the 5th Division on the right had
secured several hours' rest. The same may be said of the 8th
and 9th Brigades, which came next in the line. The 7th Brigade had
only just arrived at cantonments at 10 p.m. or 11 p.m. on the 25th,
after a heavy day's march and some severe fighting, but they could in
such an emergency have marched at dawn. The 4th Division on the left
of the 2nd Corps was comparatively fresh.
I visited in particular one Artillery Brigade, some of whose guns had
been saved from capture on the previous day by the cavalry. The
Brigade Commander broke down with emotion as he recounted to me the
glorious bravery displayed by Francis Grenfell and the 9th Lancers.
This Brigade fought magnificently for several hours next day on the Le
Cateau position.
All reconnaissance and intelligence reports received up to midnight on
the 25th concur in saying that Cambrai was then still in the
possession of the French, and that the position there was not yet
seriously threatened; further, that whilst there were clear signs of
the outflanking movement in progress, no considerable bodies of the
enemy had yet crossed the line Valenciennes--Douai, and that, after
their repulse at Solesmes by McCracken and Allenby, the enemy was not
in strength south of the line Valenciennes--Maubeuge.
This estimate of the situation was confirmed by a German wireless
message, intercepted towards the evening of the 26th, which stated
that the outflanking German Corps was only at that time "moving
towards" Cambrai, and that the remaining Corps, which were engaged in
the frontal attack, were only then "moving on" towards Cattenieres,
Walincourt and Le Cateau respectively.
The 1st Corps had, as we know, experienced a much harder day's march
on the 25th, and was attacked at Landrecies and its neighbourhood
before it could get any rest at all. Sir Douglas correctly appreciated
the strength of the enemy on his immediate front and gauged the
situation, namely, the German design to impose on us the idea that he
was in great strength, and to pin our troops to the ground whilst his
flanking movement became effective.
For this purpose the enemy had hurried forward a large force of
Artillery, composed of guns and howitzers of all calibres, escorted
and protected by four Cavalry Divisions and a limited number of jaeger
battalions.
These troops were pushed forward against the 2nd Corps at Le Cateau as
they had been against the 1st Corps at Landrecies, and with a
precisely similar purpose.
The superb gallantry of the troops, and the skilful leading by
Divisional and Brigade and Battalion Commanders, helped very
materially by the support given by Allenby and, as I afterwards
learned, by Sordet and d'Amade, saved the 2nd Corps, which otherwise
would assuredly have been pinned to their ground and then surrounded.
The cavalry might have made good their retreat, but three out of five
Divisions of the British Army with the 7th Brigade must have been
lost.
The enemy, flushed by this primary victory, would have pressed in on
the flanks of the 1st Corps, cut off their retreat, and, continuing
his combined front and flank attack, would have almost certainly
pushed the whole Allied Army off their line of retreat, and a
stupendous repetition of Sedan might well have resulted.
The magnificent fight put up by these glorious troops saved disaster;
but the actual result was a total loss of at least 14,000 officers and
men, about 80 guns, numbers of machine guns, as well as quantities of
ammunition, war material and baggage, whilst the enemy gained time to
close up his infantry columns marching down from the north-east, at
the cost of losses not greater than, if as great, as our own, but
which were, in view of the immense superiority he possessed in numbers
and fighting power, infinitely less important to him.
The effect upon the British Army was to render the subsequent conduct
of the retreat more difficult and arduous.
The hope of making a stand behind the Somme or the Oise, or any other
favourable position north of the Marne, had now to be abandoned owing
to the shattered condition of the Army, and the far-reaching effect of
our losses at the Battle of Le Cateau was felt seriously even
throughout the subsequent Battle of the Marne and during the early
operations on the Aisne. It was not possible to replace our lost guns
and machine guns until nearly the end of September.
In my dispatch, written in September, 1914, I refer eulogistically to
the Battle of Le Cateau. I had been, together with my staff, directing
the movements of the British Army day and night up to the time of the
Battle of the Marne--in the course of which battle I received an
urgent demand from the Government that a dispatch should be forwarded.
It was completed, of necessity, very hurriedly, and before there had
been time or opportunity to give thorough study to the reports
immediately preceding and covering the period of that battle, by which
alone the full details could be disclosed.
It was, indeed, impossible, until much later on, to appreciate in all
its details the actual situation on the morning of August 26th.
At the time the dispatch was written, indeed, I was entirely
ignorant of the material support which was rendered throughout the day
by Generals Sordet and d'Amade, and I accepted without question the
estimate made by the commander of the 2nd Corps as to the nature of
the threat against him and the position of the German forces opposed
to him.
It is very difficult for the uninitiated to realise the concentration
which the direction of an Army carrying out a vigorous offensive like
that of the Marne, demands from the brain of the Commander-in-Chief,
if he is to make the best use of the forces under his command.
In the surroundings and under the conditions of a great battle, the
preparation of material for and the compilation of any dispatch is a
matter of great difficulty. It is very easy to say: "Why not employ
others?" I have always held that it is only the General who conducts
an operation of any magnitude who can, or should, sum up and describe
it. No one else can know what was passing in his mind, or how his
judgment was directed and formed by the swiftly moving procession of
events.
Nor can _exact_ information become available for weeks or months,
sometimes, indeed, even for years, after the conclusion of a
particular series of operations.
In more than one of the accounts of the retreat from Mons, it is
alleged that some tacit consent at least was given at Headquarters at
St. Quentin to the decision arrived at by the commander of the 2nd
Corps. I owe it to the able and devoted officers of my Staff to say
that there is not a semblance of truth in this statement.