FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT.
General Joffre had arranged for a conference at my Headquarters at St.
Quentin with Lanrezac and myself, to take place early on the 26th.
I had reached St. Quentin at about 8 a.m. on the 25th. There had been
little sleep during the night for any of us. In the earlier hours
continual reports came in regarding the dangerous position of the 1st
Corps. In addition to the unfortunate but inevitable delay in
commencing their march in the morning, the troops were further greatly
embarrassed and worried by the retirement of the French from the
Sambre, and their convergence on our own line of march.
The enemy's cavalry, supported by guns, Jaeger, and detachments of
Infantry carried on motor cars and lorries, closely pressed our
columns through the Foret de Mormal. The result of this was to make it
imperative that the 2nd Division should make a firm stand at
Landrecies and Maroilles before the 1st Corps could reach the line
assigned to it in the morning. A gap of some eight miles existed
between the right of the 2nd Corps at Le Cateau and the left of the
1st Corps at Landrecies.
The moment this news reached me I summoned Huguet, and through him
dispatched an urgent request to two French Reserve Divisions (which
formed part of the 5th French Army and were nearest to the British) to
move up and assist Haig.
They readily responded, and the effect of the diversion
enabled Haig to extricate his Corps from this most dangerous
situation, which he did with great skill and judgment, whilst
inflicting severe loss on the enemy.
Towards morning it was reported to me that the enemy had drawn off,
and at dawn the retreat was resumed by the whole of the 1st Corps as
ordered. The fighting of the 1st Corps through this night, combined
with its skilful and efficient withdrawal in the morning, was one of
the most brilliant episodes of the whole retreat.
No sooner was my mind made easier by this happy deliverance of the 1st
Corps when the trouble related in the last chapter commenced with the
2nd Corps.
It was not until 8 a.m. on the 26th that I knew the left wing of the
Army was actually committed to the fight. At this time I was anxiously
awaiting the arrival of Joffre and Lanrezac.
Staff Officers were sent to General Smith-Dorrien, carrying peremptory
orders to break off the action and to continue the retreat forthwith.
Shortly afterwards the French Commander-in-Chief arrived with his
Chief of Staff. He was followed by the Commander of the 5th French
Army, and we proceeded to discuss the situation.
I narrated the events of the previous two days, and pointed out the
isolated situation in which the British Army had been placed by the
very sudden change of plan and headlong retirement of the 5th French
Army on my right.
Lanrezac appeared to treat the whole affair as quite normal, and
merely incidental to the common exigencies of war. He offered no
explanation, and gave no reason for the very unexpected
moves he had made. The discussion was apparently distasteful to him,
for he remained only a short time at my Headquarters, and left before
any satisfactory understanding as to further plans and dispositions
had been arrived at.
Joffre remained with me some considerable time. I gathered that he was
by no means satisfied with the action and conduct of his subordinate
General. No very definite plans were then decided upon, the
understanding, as the French Commander-in-Chief left, being that the
retreat was to be continued as slowly and deliberately as possible,
until we found ourselves in a favourable position to make a firm stand
and take the offensive. The Commander-in-Chief urged me to maintain my
position in the line, which I told him I hoped, in spite of the heavy
losses which we had suffered, to be able to do.
Immediately Joffre left I set out for Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's
Headquarters, as I could get no satisfactory report from that General.
For the first few miles we were able to make fair progress, but as we
went on, the road got worse and worse, and sometimes we were
absolutely blocked for several minutes together.
The whole country-side was covered with refugees and their belongings,
whilst our own transport were endeavouring to make all the haste they
could to convey much needed food, ammunition and material to the
Divisions in front.
Several messages reached me on the road, and at last I got information
that Smith-Dorrien had broken off the action and that his columns were
once more on the march. He was only just in time, for subsequent
reports reached me during this motor journey of considerable Uhlan
patrols in the neighbourhood, and towards evening St. Quentin
itself was threatened by hostile cavalry, which, however, did not
succeed in entering the town.
On reaching Headquarters I found that more or less detailed reports
had arrived, which showed the shattered condition of the troops which
had fought at Le Cateau.
All idea of making any prolonged stand on the Somme south of St.
Quentin, which had during the day seriously entered my mind as a
possibility, was definitely abandoned.
The first necessity was to rally and collect the troops, which had
become mixed up and scattered by the trying experiences of the
previous days and nights. The great essential was to recover order,
restore confidence, and infuse fresh spirit with a clear aim in view.
To enable all this to be brought about we had first to look to the
cavalry. Orders were at once sent to Allenby to make such dispositions
as would effectually cover our rear and western flank. I told him he
was to enlist the co-operation of the French cavalry under Sordet. The
Corps Commanders were ordered to move towards the line La Fere--Noyon.
On the evening of the 26th, Headquarters were moved to Noyon, where I
arrived late at night to consider the possibilities of making a stand
behind the Oise.
On the 27th the orders issued for the efficient conduct of the retreat
began to take effect, and the cavalry kept the enemy well at bay.
Smith-Dorrien reported himself in the early hours of the morning, and
later Major Dawnay (2nd Life Guards)--the recollection of whose
splendid and invaluable services until he fell at the head
of his regiment will for ever remain with me--brought news of Haig's
progress, whilst Shea of the Indian cavalry--afterwards a renowned
leader of a Division at the front--told me of the valuable _role_
which was being so efficiently performed by the Cavalry.
In a telegram, which I communicated to the troops, General Joffre very
handsomely acknowledged what he described as the "invaluable" services
rendered to the Allied cause by the British Army throughout the past
few days.
It was a sincere gratification to the Army to see the generous terms
in which the French Commander-in-Chief expressed his appreciation.
I spent the early hours of the 27th in personally reconnoitring the
country bordering the south bank of the Oise, in the neighbourhood of
Noyon.
The one idea which now possessed my mind was the possibility of making
a stand with the object of obtaining the necessary time for rest, and
to make good equipment and bring up reinforcements.
At first sight it appeared to me that the line of the Oise and its
tributary canalised waters offered such an opportunity.
The cursory examination of the ground which I was able to make on the
morning of the 27th satisfied me that it possessed decided
capabilities for a defence which was not intended to be prolonged, and
I thought, also, that the tortuous course of the river afforded some
alternative features, by availing ourselves of which a powerful
offensive might be commenced at the right time.
During the day I had another interview with Joffre, which
took place before I had time to estimate the actual fighting
capabilities of the 2nd Corps and the 4th Division.
I was not even then fully aware of the terrible extent to which we had
suffered at Le Cateau. That these losses were heavy I never doubted,
but I had no idea, until many hours later, that they were such as must
paralyse for several days any movement in the direction of taking the
offensive.
My early morning deliberations were very much in accord with the view
of the French Commander-in-Chief. The proposal Joffre then
communicated to me was that the Allied Armies should fall back on a
line, roughly, from Rheims on the east to Amiens on the west, which
would bring the British Forces into the zone of country south of the
Oise, whose course I had already reconnoitred. We discussed the
situation thoroughly, and Joffre was most sympathetic and
"understanding" in reference to our special position. He promised that
the 5th French Army should be directed to take energetic action to
relieve us from undue pressure by the enemy, and told me of his
projects for the formation of the 6th French Army on our left.
We parted without coming to any actual decision: for my part I could
give no promise until I knew exactly what I had to rely upon; whilst
energetic pursuit by the enemy might well prevent Joffre rendering me
that support on both flanks which the situation imperatively demanded.
As a matter of fact, no more was heard of this project, and the idea
of standing on the above-mentioned line was abandoned.
On the morning of the 28th, General Headquarters moved to
Compiegne, where we remained till the morning of the 31st.
It was during Friday the 28th that I fully realised the heavy losses
we had incurred. Since Sunday the 23rd this had reached, in officers
and men, the total of upwards of 15,000. The deficiency in armament
and equipment were equally serious. Roughly, some 80 guns and a large
proportion of our machine guns, besides innumerable articles of
necessary equipment and a large quantity of transport, had fallen into
the enemy's hands.
It became quite clear to me that no effective stand could be made
until we were able to improve our condition.
It was on this day that I received the assurance, the most welcome to
a commander in retreat, that the cavalry under Allenby's skilful
direction was effectively holding off the enemy's pursuit.
Gough with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at St. Quentin, and Chetwode with
the 5th at Cerizy, vigorously attacked the leading troops of the
German cavalry at both these places, and threw them back in confusion
and with heavy loss on to their main bodies.
On our left, d'Amade with the two French Reserve Divisions, and Sordet
with his Corps of cavalry, attacked the Germans in and around Peronne.
Allenby's Headquarters were then at Cressy (north-west of Noyon), and
Sordet called upon him for support in this enterprise.
Before arrangements could be made for such assistance the French were
driven back.
Although this attack failed to drive the Germans north, it was most
valuable and effective in checking the pursuit, and by their
vigorous action the troops of d'Amade and Sordet showed the stuff of
which the embryo 6th Army was being formed: that Army which a few days
later covered itself with imperishable glory on the Marne and Ourcq.
On our right there still appeared little encouragement to hope for an
early effective stand. The 5th French Army was in full retreat, the
Reserve Divisions, after fighting at Urvillers, were retiring on the
Oise, whilst the 18th Corps on their right was thrown back from
Itancourt to the Oise by a violent German attack.
I spent several hours of the 28th in going the round of the troops, as
it was possible to intercept various columns on the march or at their
temporary halts. I was able to get the men together on the roadside,
to thank them for the splendid work they had done, to tell them of the
gratitude of the French Commander-in-Chief, and the immense value of
the service they had rendered to the Allied cause. I charged them to
repeat all this to their comrades, and to spread it throughout the
units to which they belonged. There was neither time nor opportunity
for any formal inspection or set parade. The enemy was on our heels,
and there was little time to spare, but it touched me to the quick to
realise how, in the face of all the terrible demand made upon their
courage, strength and endurance, these glorious British soldiers
listened to the few words I was able to say to them with the spirit of
heroes and the confidence of children. It afforded me gratifying
evidence of the wonderful instinctive sympathy which has always
existed between the British soldier and his officer. These men had
seen how they had been _led_, they _knew_ the far greater
proportionate loss suffered by their officers, they _felt_ that they
trusted them and were ready to follow them anywhere. It is
this wonderful understanding between "leaders" and "led" which has
constituted the great strength and glory of the British Army
throughout all ages.
In all these roadside talks and confidences never did I hear one word
of complaint or breath of criticism. The spirit of discipline was as
palpably shown amongst these scattered groups of unkempt,
overstrained, tired soldiers, as on any "King's Birthday" Review ever
held on the Horse Guards Parade. Their one repeated question was:
"When shall we turn round and face them again?" And they would add:
"We can drive them to hell."
It was distressing, indeed, to look at some battalions, which I had
seen near Mons only some three or four days earlier in all their fresh
glory and strength, now brought down to a handful of men and two or
three officers; but the glorious spirit I saw animating the men gave
me the keenest pleasure, and inspired a confidence which was of the
utmost help.
On this day I inspected a large proportion of the transport of both
Army Corps, which I found in a much better condition than could have
been thought possible.
I did not reach my Headquarters at Compiegne until five. I found
Huguet waiting for me with a Staff Officer of the 7th French Army
Corps, which was to form part of the new 6th French Army. It was from
the talk I had with them that I learnt how Joffre was forming the new
6th Army.
Huguet informed me that a considerable force was being railed round from
Verdun to Amiens, and that the new Army would be commanded by General
Maunoury. I knew nothing then of the French Commander-in-Chief's ultimate
plans, and I doubt if at that moment he had been able to formulate any
decided line of action. At this particular time I think the unprepared
condition of Paris loomed largely in his mind, and that his original
intention with regard to the 6th Army was most probably to make further
provision for the protection of the capital.
Joffre had particularly asked me to undertake the Air reconnaissance
on the western flank of the Allied forces.
Our Intelligence Service had been admirably organised, and was working
most effectively under the able direction of Brigadier-General
Macdonogh. I cannot speak too highly of the skill and ability
displayed by this distinguished officer throughout the whole time
during which we served together. His service was invaluable; his
ingenuity and resource in obtaining and collecting information, his
indefatigable brain, and the unfailing versatility and insight with
which he sifted every statement and circumstance were beyond all
praise. He trained an excellent Staff who valued his leadership, for
he had an extraordinary power of getting the most and best work out of
everyone. His information as to the enemy's movements were remarkably
accurate, and placed me throughout in the best position to interpret
the enemy's probable intentions.
During my stay at Compiegne all appreciations of the situation pointed
to the immediate investment of Paris by the right wing of the German
Army as being the enemy's first objective.
It is fairly certain that the concentration of an important new Army
on the western flank of the British, to the north of Paris, was quite
unknown to the Germans, and did not enter into their calculations
until some days later.
We had also the best reason for believing that the German
Higher Command regarded the British Forces as shattered and almost
useless, at any rate so far as any effort which we could make for the
defence of Paris was concerned. In fact, believing the capital to be
practically at its mercy, the right wing of the German Army was
blindly marching into a veritable hornet's nest, in spite of the
backward condition of the Paris defence.
On the 29th a very brilliant and successful attack by the French 5th
Army at Guise heavily defeated three German Army Corps and threw them
back with severe loss. This had a great effect in assisting the
retreat, for it not only enabled the 5th Army to hold its own for some
time on the Oise, between Guise and La Fere, but it considerably
relieved hostile pressure on the British and on the French troops on
our left.
From Roye on the west, Montdidier, Noyon, La Fere, Guise, up to Hirson
on the east, the heads of the Allied columns were established, well
covered by their advanced cavalry.
Throughout this day reports often contradictory and conflicting
reached me. It was quite clear that our position on the Oise was being
dangerously threatened by superior forces, and I felt it to be
impossible to stand on that line even until we could make good some of
our heavy losses, and I could not hope to get anything up for several
days to come.
With great reluctance I ordered the retreat to be continued to the
line of the Aisne from Compiegne to Soissons, but in view of the knock
given to the enemy at Guise by the 5th French Army, and the desire
expressed by General Joffre that the Allied forces should hold their
ground as long as possible and only retire when necessary, I
directed commanders to carry out their marches with all deliberation,
and to take advantage of every opportunity to check the enemy's
advance.
It now became known to the Allied Command that the enemy had detached
a considerable force to his eastern frontier, where he was being
seriously threatened by the Russians. Joffre's natural desire to
profit by this, coupled with his fears for the safety of Paris, made
him very anxious to take the offensive at the earliest possible
moment. He came to see me on the afternoon of the 29th August at
Compiegne, and urged these views upon me. I remained firm in my
absolute conviction that the British forces could not effectively
fulfil their share in such action for some days, and that, so far as
we were concerned, a further retreat was inevitable. I assured the
French Commander-in-Chief that no serious gap should be made in his
line by any premature or hasty retirement, but I imperatively demanded
the necessary time to refit and obtain reinforcements.
I strongly represented to Joffre the advantage of drawing the German
armies on still further from their base, even although we had to move
south of the Marne. Indeed, the ideas which I afterwards expressed at
the British Embassy in Paris to M. Millerand, the French Minister of
War, in the presence of Lord Kitchener, were the same which I had in
my mind during this interview with Joffre, namely, that our stand
should be made on some line between the Marne and the Seine.
The French Army was still in full retreat. The 6th French Army on our
left was not yet formed, and the Commander-in-Chief had put no
definite plan of attack before me, with an assigned _role_ which he
desired me to fulfil. All he asked me to do was to remain in
the line and fill up the gap between the 5th and 6th Armies. This I
had every intention of doing.
I am bound to say that I had to make this decision in the face of
resistance from some of my subordinate commanders, who took a
depressed view as to the condition of their troops. When I discussed
the situation at a meeting of British commanders held at Compiegne,
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien expressed it as his opinion that the only
course open to us was to retire to our base, thoroughly refit,
re-embark and try to land at some favourable point on the coast-line.
I refused to listen to what was the equivalent of a counsel of
despair.
Our communications with Havre being now dangerously threatened, it
became necessary to effect a change of base and establish a fresh
line. St. Nazaire and Nantes were fixed upon, with Le Mans as advanced
base.
The morning of the 30th found our cavalry with two brigades to the
north-west of Compiegne, one to the north and one to the north-east.
The 5th, under Chetwode, covered the retirement of the 1st Corps. Our
line that night was through Nampiel on the west to Coucy-le-Chateau.
Huguet to-day communicated to me Joffre's new dispositions. He was
retiring the 5th French Army to the line of the Serre, their left on
La Fere; their right on the left of the 4th French Army towards
Rethel. The 6th French Army was to fall back to the line
Compiegne--Clermont. Sordet's Cavalry Corps was to be on the left of
the line.
Joffre sent an urgent request to me to destroy the bridges over the
Oise between Compiegne and La Fere.
Huguet once more pressed upon me Joffre's urgent desire that
I should remain and fill the gap between Compiegne and La Fere. In
reply I again repeated emphatically what I had previously stated,
namely, that I could be in no condition to stand and fight for several
days, and therefore I could not consent to fill any portion of a
"fighting" line. I was fully prepared to continue the retreat slowly
and deliberately, retaining my present position between the 5th and
6th Armies.
Now, as before, the view I took of my responsibilities, in accordance
with my interpretation of the "special instructions" given me, guided
my deliberations in these difficult days.
I could not forget that the 5th French Army had commenced to retreat
from the Sambre at least 24 hours before I had been given any official
intimation that Joffre's offensive plan had been abandoned. I knew
that it was alone due to the vast superiority of our cavalry over that
of the enemy, and to the splendid tenacity and the superior marching
and fighting powers of our troops, that we had been saved from
overwhelming disaster. My duty to my country demanded that I should
risk no recurrence of such a situation, and I determined that our
needs and the interests of our Empire must be duly weighed and
balanced in the councils of the Supreme Headquarters Staff.
I despatched a letter to Lord Kitchener on this day, in which the
following passage occurs:--
"I feel very seriously the absolute necessity for retaining in my
hands complete independence of action and power to retire towards my
base should circumstances render it necessary."
On this day Pulteney arrived, and the formation of the 3rd
Army Corps under his command was commenced forthwith. It was composed
of the 4th Division and the 19th Brigade, with some mounted troops
temporarily attached, pending the arrival of the 6th Division, which
had now been ordered to France.
On the morning of the 31st, Headquarters were moved to Dammartin.
After riding round to see whatever troops I could, we reached there
early in the afternoon. Huguet was waiting for me with more
information and messages from Joffre. The demand that we should stand
and fight was not only urgently repeated, but was actually backed by
imperative messages from the French President, and from Lord Kitchener
and the British Government, yet at this very moment Lanrezac was
actually throwing back the left flank of the 5th Army and widening the
gap between us. At the same time Lord Kitchener was assuring the Home
Government that our losses were comparatively small, and that all
deficiencies had been made good.
I retain the most profound belief that, had I yielded to these violent
solicitations, the whole Allied Army would have been thrown back in
disorder over the Marne, and Paris would have fallen an easy prey into
the hands of the Germans.
It is impossible to exaggerate the danger of the situation as it
existed. Neither on this day nor for several subsequent days did one
man, horse, gun, or machine gun reach me to make good deficiencies.
I refused. This brought Lord Kitchener to Paris, where I met him on
September 1st at the British Embassy. I went there with my Chief of
Staff at his urgent request, regarding him as a representative of His
Majesty's Government.
I deeply resented being called away from my Headquarters at
so critical a time. Two important actions were fought by considerable
detachments of the Army under my command during this day, over which
there was no one to exercise any co-ordinating control. Either might
have easily brought on a general engagement.
The interview had one important result. M. Millerand (the War
Minister) and M. Viviani (the Prime Minister) were present at the
Conference, and before them all I was able to give a clear exposition
of my views as to the future conduct of the Allied operations.
M. Millerand undertook to lay this document before General Joffre at
once. This great statesman and invaluable servant of his country
occupied the post of War Minister during most of the time I was in
France. His invariable kindness and courtesy, coupled with his skilful
and astute appreciation of the military situation throughout all its
difficult and varying periods, will always be gratefully remembered by
me.
The result of my proposals will be the better understood if I quote
General Joffre's reply to the War Minister, and a personal letter
which I received from the Commander-in-Chief on the same subject.
"Grand Quartier General des Armees de l'Est,
Au G.Q.G. le 2 septembre 1914.
"Le General Commandant-en-Chef a M. le Ministre de la Guerre.
"J'ai recu les propositions du Marechal French que vous avez voulu me
communiquer; elles tendent a organiser sur la Marne une ligne de
defense qui serait tenue par des effectifs suffisamment denses en
profondeur et particulierement renforces derriere le flanc gauche.
"Les emplacements actuels de la Ve Armee ne permettent pas de realiser
le programme trace par le Marechal French et d'assurer a l'Armee
Anglaise, en temps voulu, une aide efficace sur la droite.
"Par contre, l'appui de l'Armee du General Maunoury qui doit se porter
a la defense des fronts Nord-Est de Paris est toujours assure a
l'Armee Anglaise sur la gauche; celle-ci pourrait, dans ces
conditions, tenir sur la Marne pendant quelque temps, puis se retirer
sur la rive gauche de la Seine qu'elle tiendrait de Melun a Juvisy;
les forces Anglaises participeraient ainsi a la defense de la capitale
et leur presence serait pour les troupes du camp retranche un precieux
reconfort.
"Je dois ajouter que des instructions viennent d'etre donnees aux
Armees en vue de coordonner leurs mouvements, et qu'il pourrait etre
desavantageux de modifier ces instructions. Elles tendent a placer nos
troupes dans un dispositif leur permettant de prendre l'offensive dans
un delai assez rapproche. Le date de leur mouvement en avant sera
communique au Marechal French afin de permettre a l'Armee Anglaise de
participer a l'offensive generale."
* * * * *
"Grand Quartier General des Armees de l'Est,
Etat Major,
Au G.Q.G. le 2 septembre 1914.
"Le General Commandant-en-Chef a M. le Marechal French,
Commandant-en-Chef les Forces Anglaises.
"Monsieur le Marechal,
"J'ai l'honneur de vous addresser mes remerciements pour les
propositions que vous avez bien voulu soumettre au Gouvernement de la
Republique, relatives a la co-operation de l'Armee Anglaise et qui
m'ont ete communiquees.
"La situation actuelle de la 5e Armee ne permet pas a cette Armee
d'assurer a l'Armee Anglaise un appui suffisamment efficace sur la
droite.
"En raison des evenements qui se sont passes depuis deux heures, je ne
crois pas possible actuellement d'envisager une manoeuvre d'ensemble
sur la Marne avec la totalite de nos forces. Mais j'estime que la
co-operation de l'Armee Anglaise a la defense de Paris est la seule
qui puisse donner un resultat avantageux dans les conditions exposees
par la lettre ci-jointe que j'adresse a M. le Ministre de la Guerre et
dont j'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir la copie.
"Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Marechal, l'expression de ma haute
consideration et mes sentiments de cordiale camaraderie."
I replied as follows:--
"Mortcerf,
"September 3rd, 1914, 12 noon.
"To the Commandant-en-Chef from Field Marshal Sir John French,
Commander-in-Chief, British Forces.
"Dear General,
"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your very kind and
cordial letter of September 2nd (3332).
"I felt some considerable hesitation in putting forward my views as to
the general trend of the future operations, and I am much indebted to
you for the kind and friendly support which you have accorded to my
expression of opinion.
"I have now received your 'Instruction No. 4' and your 'Note pour les
Commandants d'Armee' of September 2nd, and I completely and clearly
understand your plans and the part you desire me to take in carrying
them out.
"You may rely on my most cordial co-operation in every respect.
"My troops have very much appreciated the kind consideration you have
shown them in sending so many decorations for distribution.
(Signed) "FRENCH."
I touch with some diffidence on less agreeable features of this
memorable discussion in Paris.
Lord Kitchener arrived on this occasion in the uniform of a Field
Marshal, and from the outset of his conversation assumed the air of a
Commander-in-Chief, and announced his intention of taking the field
and inspecting the troops.
On hearing this, the British Ambassador (Sir Francis, now Lord,
Bertie) at once emphatically objected, and drafted a telegram to the
Foreign Secretary stating clearly and unmistakably his views, and
demanding instructions. He gave this despatch to Lord Kitchener to
read. The latter then asked for my opinion, and I said my views on the
subject coincided entirely with those of the Ambassador.
After some discussion, the Secretary of State decided to abandon his
intention, and the telegram to Sir Edward Grey was not sent. In the
conversation which followed between us all, Lord Kitchener appeared to
take grave exception to certain views which I expressed as to the
expediency of leaving the direction of the operations in the field in
the hands of the military chiefs in command in the field.
He abruptly closed the discussion and requested me to
accompany him for a private interview in another room.
When we were alone he commenced by entering a strong objection to the
tone I assumed. Upon this I told him all that was in my mind. I said
that the command of the British Forces in France had been entrusted to
me by His Majesty's Government; that I alone was responsible to them
for whatever happened, and that on French soil my authority as regards
the British Army must be supreme until I was legally superseded by the
same authority which had put that responsibility upon me. I further
remarked that Lord Kitchener's presence in France in the character of
a soldier could have no other effect than to weaken and prejudice my
position in the eyes of the French and my own countrymen alike. I
reminded him of our service in the field together some 13 years
before, and told him that I valued highly his advice and assistance,
which I would gladly accept as such, but that I would not tolerate any
interference with my executive command and authority so long as His
Majesty's Government chose to retain me in my present position. I
think he began to realise my difficulties, and we finally came to an
amicable understanding.
Important telegrams and messages were then brought me, and I told Lord
Kitchener that it was impossible for me to absent myself any longer
from my Headquarters, whither I at once repaired with all possible
speed.
It is very difficult for any but soldiers to understand the real
bearing and significance of this Paris incident. If the confidence of
the troops in their commander is shaken in the least degree, or if his
influence, power and authority are prejudiced by any display of
distrust in his ability to conduct operations, however slight the
indications of such distrust may be, the effect reacts instantly
throughout the whole Army. This is more than ever true with troops
which, as at the moment in question, were being subjected to great and
severe demands upon their courage, endurance, and, above all, _faith
in their leaders_.
Then again there was the effect which might have been produced on the
French. Ministers and Generals were present and witnessed Lord
Kitchener's apparent assertion of his right to exercise the power and
authority of a Commander-in-Chief in the Field.
Fortunately, the incident terminated in a manner which led to no
regrettable publicity. Lord Kitchener realised his mistake and left
Paris that night.
I did not reach my Headquarters at Dammartin until about 7 in the
evening of September 1st. Two important rearguard actions had been
fought during the day, one at Nery--where Captain Bradbury was killed,
whilst "L" battery fought heroically against overwhelming odds--and
the other at Villers-Cotterets.
The proximity of the enemy, and the close presence of detachments of
hostile cavalry with guns, which had broken through our line, required
the retirement of my Headquarters to Lagny on the Marne. As it was
necessary to move with precaution, this place was not reached until 1
a.m. on the 2nd.
I have already reproduced the communications from General Joffre under
date September 2nd, in connection with the Paris interview on the 1st.
Although I did not receive these documents until late on the 2nd, they
indicated the ideas which occupied my own mind on that day, namely,
the defence of the Marne with a view to a subsequent offensive.
On this day I also received a letter from the Governor of
Paris which, with my reply, run as follows:--
"Gouvernement Militaire de Paris,
"Le Gouverneur,
"Paris, le 2 septembre 1914.
"Le General Gallieni, Gouverneur Militaire de Paris et
Commandant-en-Chef des Armees de Paris a Monsieur le Marechal French,
Commandant-en-Chef des Armees Anglaises.
"Monsieur le Marechal,
"J'ai appris ce matin, dans la tournee que j'ai faite dans nos regions
N.E. de Paris, que vous veniez d'arriver a Dammartin.
"Comme Gouverneur de Paris et Commandant-en-Chef des Armees de Paris,
je m'empresse de vous souhaiter le bienvenu et de vous dire combien je
suis heureux de savoir que les braves troupes anglaises qui se sont
conduites si vaillamment ces derniers jours, se trouvent a la
proximite de Paris. Vous pouvez compter sur le concours absolu que
nous devons a nos courageux compagnons d'arme.
"Personnellement, j'ajouterai que votre nom ne m'est pas inconnu,
etant moi-meme un colonial ayant fait de nombreuses campagnes, et
notamment m'etant trouve a Madagascar lorsque vous commandiez
l'expedition anglaise contre les Boers. Je suis donc sur d'avance que
je puis fermement compter sur l'entiere collaboration d'un chef tel
que vous.
"Vous savez que le General Commandant-en-Chef vient de faire placer
Paris dans la zone de ses operations. Je vous envoie donc les
dispositions que je viens de prendre, afin que vous soyiez bien
oriente a ce sujet, pour couvrir les fronts N. et E. de Paris qui
paraissent les plus exposes et d'autre part, pour attirer sur nous
les corps qui menacent le flanc gauche de notre armee.
"Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien me tenir au courant de
vos intentions et des dispositions que vous prendrez.
"Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Marechal, l'assurance de ma haute
consideration et de mes sentiments profondement devouees.
"GALLIENI."
"Mortcerf,
"September 3rd, 1914, 12 noon.
"My dear General,
"I have received your very kind letter (with enclosures) for which I
beg to offer you my most sincere thanks.
"A French officer attached to my Staff is now going into Paris, and
will explain the situation of the British Forces and their intentions
fully to you.
"You may rely upon my most cordial and energetic co-operation with the
French Forces on my right and left.
"I have duly received Gen. Joffre's 'Instruction No. 4' and his 'Notes
pour les Commandants d'Armee' of September 2nd, and I fully understand
the Commander-in-Chief's plans and intentions.
"May I say what a keen pleasure and satisfaction it is to me and the
Army under my command to be fighting side by side with the Grand Army
of France!
"Believe me, My dear General,
"Yours most sincerely,
(Signed) "FRENCH, Field Marshal,
"Commander-in-Chief, British Forces."
From these documents it will be seen that the safety of the
capital was the paramount thought in the minds of the French Generals.
On September 2nd, the 5th French Army on my right and the 6th on my
left were retiring on Chateau-Thierry and Paris respectively, whilst
our own troops reached the line of the Marne towards Lagny and Meaux.
The 4th Division was, however, delayed by a small rearguard action and
passed the night south of Dammartin.
I had spent the greater part of the day in carefully reconnoitring the
best defensive positions south of the Marne, and to these points the
British forces were directed to move on the following day, destroying
the bridges after they had passed.
By early morning of September 3rd, General Joffre's letter (quoted above)
had reached me, by which I judged that, whilst generally agreeing in my
views, the General did not think it advisable to attempt a deliberate
defence of the Marne. On this, the orders given to the British troops on
the night of the 2nd were modified, and they were directed to continue
their march to the line Montry--Crecy--Coulommiers.
Reinforcements of all kinds were ordered up to these points and were
well on their way, but the railways were badly blocked and there was
much delay.
I must now turn to the discussion of important information which began
to reach us on the afternoon of the 3rd regarding the movements of the
enemy.
It appeared that a direct advance on Paris by the German right wing
was no longer intended. They were reported to be moving in large
columns south-east and east. A few regiments were said to be moving
east by train. Later on, further reports arrived that the country in
our front for several miles north of the Marne was clear of
the enemy. No less than four German Corps were said to be
concentrating on Chateau-Thierry and to the east along the Marne, and
it was reported that they had begun an attack on the 5th French Army.
The latest information told us that Chateau-Thierry was in the hands
of the enemy, and that the 5th French Army was retiring south to the
Seine.
The ideas underlying this concentration on their centre by the enemy
look as if it was based on a totally wrong appreciation of our
situation. The Germans were ignorant of the real strength which was
gathering north of Paris in the formation of the 6th French Army. They
regarded the British Army as practically crushed, and almost useless
as a fighting force.
Relying upon this, they had no hesitation in leaving what they thought
were the remnants of the Allied forces immediately north and east of
the Paris fortifications to be dealt with by such of their own forces
as were operating through Amiens and on their extreme right. The
German Higher Command then decided to strike with overwhelming force
at the Allied centre south of the Marne and to cut our Armies in two.
The first necessity for the enemy was a quick decision by a great
victory to be achieved at once. They were out-marching their supplies;
there was Russia to be crushed and their eastern frontier to be
secured; and, further, a prolonged campaign was what they desired to
avoid at all costs. The desperate attempt was no sooner fairly
launched than the fatal error of over-confidence and the folly of
under-rating one's enemy stared them in the face with all its
stupendous consequences, as west of the Ourcq the country was seen to
blaze along its whole length with the fire of the French
75's, whilst the British and 5th French Armies, now at bay, threw the
enemy back in confusion over the Marne.
With their usual arrogance and pomposity the Germans, ignoring the
fact that it was their own negligence which had led them into a most
dangerous situation, claim that General von Kluck showed unusual skill
in extricating the 1st German Army from the toils.
After considering the subject very carefully, and with a thorough
knowledge of the situation and the ground, I have formed the opinion
that von Kluck manifested considerable hesitation and want of energy.
The rear section of the British General Staff had been established
during this day at Melun, on the Seine. The leading section remained
with me at Mortcerf, which became my advanced Headquarters.
Information which arrived during the 4th confirmed all our
anticipations of the previous day, and, in the evening at Melun,
messages reached me from Joffre that he was formulating his new plan.
I had spent most of the day at advanced Headquarters, and had passed
some time with Haig near Coulommiers. It seemed likely, by the
direction of the German advance, that the 1st Corps might be attacked,
and Haig had retired his 2nd Division in line with the 1st and was
preparing for any eventuality. I conversed with him for a considerable
time on the state of his troops, about which he expressed some
anxiety. He said they stood in urgent need of rest and refitment, but
as usual he was full of fight and ready to meet any emergency.
Whilst I was with Haig, Smith-Dorrien arrived.
The British Army had, indeed, suffered severely, and had performed an
herculean task in reaching its present position in such
fighting form, and its moral had withstood the ordeal.
I think the Germans were probably justified in doubting our offensive
powers, but the thing they forgot was the nation from which we spring.
On my return to Melun on this night (September 4th) I found that
Murray had received a visit from General Gallieni, Governor of Paris,
who had communicated Joffre's plans for my consideration.
He wished the 6th French Army to recross the Marne between Lagny and
Meaux on Sunday the 6th, and then to take up a position facing east
towards the Ourcq. He asked me to fill up the space between the right
of the 6th Army (on the Marne) and the left of the 5th Army (near
Provins). He then intended the whole of the Allied Armies to advance
east, north-east, and north, and endeavour to crush the German Corps
operating between us.
General Franchet d'Esperey had now superseded Lanrezac in command of
the 5th Army. I had sent Wilson (Sub-Chief of the General Staff) to
him on the previous day, and to-night he returned and told me that
d'Esperey was making similar plans.
I must say a word here with regard to Henry Wilson. I have known him
for many years. He possesses a striking personality. In appearance
very tall and spare, his frame is surmounted by a face in which one
sees great intelligence and power, combined with a very kindly and
humorous expression. In looking at him it is impossible not to realise
the strength of will and character which he undoubtedly possesses. His
appearance does not belie him, he is all that he looks. Not one of his
many friends has had a more thorough experience of him than
I, both in "Sunshine and Shadow." However dark the surroundings,
however desperate the situation, however gloomy the prospect, his fine
humour, splendid courage and high spirit are always the same.
In those many weary, anxious days we passed together during my term of
command in France, I cherish a most grateful remembrance of his
unfailing and invaluable help, as well as of his sincere, loyal, and
wholehearted support. Of iron nerve and frame, nothing seemed to tire
him. Having passed through the Staff College early in life with high
honours, he was marked out for the most important Staff work; and
after filling many important minor positions with distinction he
became Commandant of the Staff College, where his great talents were
employed in reforming and much improving that institution. His _magnum
opus_ in peace time was done when he was Director of Military
Operations at the War Office during the four years preceding the War.
His countrymen have never realised, and probably may never know, the
vital importance and invaluable results of the work he did there, not
only in regard to the share he took in the preparation of the
Expeditionary Force, but also in establishing those happy relations
with the French Army which have proved of such help to Allied
operations throughout the War.
Fearing no man, it was the very essence of his nature to speak his
mind openly on all occasions, and when the great Irish crisis in the
spring of 1914 was at its height, he sided openly with his native
Ulster. He accompanied me to France as Sub-Chief of the General Staff,
and when Murray's health broke down, in January 1915, I selected
Wilson as his successor; but, owing to his candid expression of
opinion in the Irish embroglio, he had many enemies, and his
appointment was vetoed. It was this bad luck alone which prevented his
valuable services then being used for his country's benefit in the
best direction, and in a position for which he was better qualified
than anyone else.
But to return to my story.
I somewhat feared the gap which existed between my right and
d'Esperey's left, although the cavalry under Allenby at Garatin were
on this flank. Because of this, and also because the Germans were
exercising some pressure on Haig on this night (September 4th), I
ordered the British Forces to retire a few miles further south.
This facilitated the movements of reinforcements, supplies and
material, which were coming up fast.
I have now brought the story down to September 5th, the last day of
the great German advance. The British forces had halted on the
previous night on a line facing nearly east and extending from
Villers-sur-Morin on the north to Fontenay on the south. The 5th
French Army lay east of my right flank on an east and west line
through Provins, facing north. The 6th Army was on my left, preparing
to recross the Marne between Lagny and Meaux.
I was at Melun early in the morning. Huguet had arrived in the night
with despatches and a Staff Officer from Joffre, with whom I held a
long conference.
It appeared that the 6th Army had already crossed the Marne, and would
be in position west of the Ourcq at 9 a.m. on the 6th, on which day
the French Commander-in-Chief proposed that the whole Allied Army
should advance to the attack.
Shortly afterwards General Maunoury, commanding the 6th French Army,
arrived, and we proceeded to discuss the situation fully. He described
in detail what he intended doing, which was almost exactly
as I have explained above. He thought that very few of the enemy still
remained north of Paris, his cavalry having reconnoitred for some
distance north and north-west. He expressed it as his intention to
attack most vigorously (_au fond_), and asked for my best support,
which I promised to give.
I despatched Murray at once to visit the Corps and Cavalry Commanders
and ascertain exactly the condition of their troops. He returned later
in the day with very favourable reports. All were in excellent spirits
and eager for the advance. They were having some much-needed rest;
whilst reinforcements both of men and material were beginning to
arrive.
Reports received during the day confirmed all we had previously heard.
The enemy's concentration against the centre of our line was complete.
They had crossed the Marne at several points, and their advanced
troops had been engaged during the past night and this day with our
cavalry and 1st Army Corps on our right, and along the entire front of
the 5th French Army.
Later in the day Joffre came to Melun, and I had a long conference
with him. We again went over all plans, and it was definitely arranged
that the attack was to commence all along the line next day, the 6th.
Joffre was full of enthusiasm, and very hopeful of success if we all
fulfilled our respective _roles_ and attacked _au fond_.
Thus ended the "Great Retreat."
* * * * *
In these pages I have avoided as far as possible any detailed account
of the many splendid engagements which have added new and
undying laurels to the battle rolls of all the distinguished regiments
which fought them.
I repeat that the main cause of the success, which prepared this vast
battle ground and opened the way for the decisive battle of the Marne,
is to be found in the able dispositions made by the leaders; the
magnificent example set by officers and non-commissioned officers; and
in the wonderful spirit, courage, and endurance which was displayed by
the rank and file of the Army.
My main object in writing this record is to explain as clearly as
possible to my countrymen the line of thought which was in my own
mind, the objects I set out to attain, and the reasons why I directed
the troops as I did and came to the decisions at which I arrived at
each successive phase of the operations.
In concluding this chapter I am anxious to lay particular stress on a
principle which seems to me of the utmost importance, namely, the
danger of undue interference by the Government at home with the
Commander of an Army in the field. Stanton's interference with
McClellan in the American Civil War should have been a sufficient
warning.
I have referred to the natural anxiety which was deeply felt by the
French President, Government, and Generals for the safety of Paris.
The utmost pressure was brought to bear upon me to alter my
dispositions so as to make a dangerous stand on lines and in places
which, in my judgment, would have exposed the British Army to the
greatest danger of annihilation.
The shattered condition of my troops was not realised, but perhaps in
view of the situation such pressure was natural and inevitable.
I had the power, in accordance with the instructions which I
had received before coming to France, to use my full discretion in
agreeing to or resisting such demands, and in all my happy experience
of them, never did I find my French comrades resentful of such
resistance when they realised the true reason for it.
But when, in spite of my earnest representation of the true condition
of affairs, the Secretary of State for War himself and the Government
with him, brought still greater pressure to bear, backed by the
authority they possessed, to enforce their views, I was placed in a
position of the utmost difficulty.
Lord Kitchener came to Paris with no other object than to insist upon
my arresting the retreat, although no sign of a halt appeared at any
part of the Allied line.
He was ignorant of the condition of the Army as I knew it, and was
mistaken in his assertion that reinforcements of men and material had
already reached me. The impression conveyed by his visit was that I
had greatly magnified the losses which had occurred, and exaggerated
the condition of the troops. It was difficult to resist such pressure.
Fortunately I was able to do so.