NATIONALISM
The spirit of nationality is one of the great dynamics of modern times.
In Europe, where it first attained self-conscious maturity, it radically
altered the face of things during the nineteenth century, so that that
century is often called the Age of Nationalities. But nationalism is not
merely a European phenomenon. It has spread to the remotest corners of
the earth, and is apparently still destined to effect momentous
transformations.
Given a phenomenon of so vital a character, the question at once arises:
What is nationalism? Curiously enough, this question has been endlessly
debated. Many theories have been advanced, seeking variously to identify
nationalism with language, culture, race, politics, geography,
economics, or religion. Now these, and even other, matters may be
factors predisposing or contributing to the formation of national
consciousness. But, in the last analysis, nationalism is something over
and above all its constituent elements, which it works into a new and
higher synthesis. There is really nothing recondite or mysterious about
nationalism, despite all the arguments that have raged concerning its
exact meaning. As a matter of fact, nationalism is _a state of mind_.
Nationalism is a _belief_, held by a fairly large number of individuals,
that they constitute a "Nationality"; it is a sense of _belonging
together_ as a "Nation." This "Nation," as visualized in the minds of
its believers, is a people or community associated together and
organized under one government, and dwelling together in a distinct
territory. When the nationalist ideal is realized, we have what is known
as a body-politic or "State." But we must not forget that this "State"
is the material manifestation of an ideal, which may have pre-existed
for generations as a mere pious aspiration with no tangible attributes
like state sovereignty or physical frontiers. Conversely, we must
remember that a state need not be a nation. Witness the defunct Hapsburg
Empire of Austria-Hungary, an assemblage of discordant nationalities
which flew to pieces under the shock of war.
The late war was a liberal education regarding nationalistic phenomena,
especially as applied to Europe, and most of the fallacies regarding
nationality were vividly disclosed. It is enough to cite Switzerland--a
country whose very existence flagrantly violates "tests" like language,
culture, religion, or geography, and where nevertheless a lively sense
of nationality emerged triumphant from the ordeal of Armageddon.
So familiar are these matters to the general public that only one point
need here be stressed: the difference between nationality and race.
Unfortunately the two terms have been used very loosely, if not
interchangeably, and are still much confused in current thinking. As a
matter of fact, they connote utterly different things. Nationality is a
psychological concept or state of mind. Race is a physiological fact,
which may be accurately determined by scientific tests such as
skull-measurement, hair-formation, and colour of eyes and skin. In other
words, race is what people anthropologically _really_ are; nationality
is what people politically _think_ they are.
Right here we encounter a most curious paradox. There can be no question
that, as between race and nationality, race is the more fundamental,
and, in the long run, the more important. A man's innate capacity is
obviously dependent upon his heredity, and no matter how stimulating may
be his environment, the potential limits of his reaction to that
environment are fixed at his birth. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
men pay scant attention to race, while nationalism stirs them to their
very souls. The main reason for this seems to be because it is only
about half a century since even savants realized the true nature and
importance of race. Even after an idea is scientifically established, it
takes a long time for it to be genuinely accepted by the public, and
only after it has been thus accepted will it form the basis of practical
conduct. Meanwhile the far older idea of nationality has permeated the
popular consciousness, and has thereby been able to produce tangible
effects. In fine, our political life is still dominated by nationalism
rather than race, and practical politics are thus conditioned, not by
what men really are, but by what they think they are.
The late war is a striking case in point. That war is very generally
regarded as having been one of "race." The idea certainly lent to the
struggle much of its bitterness and uncompromising fury. And yet, from
the genuine racial standpoint, it was nothing of the kind. Ethnologists
have proved conclusively that, apart from certain palæolithic survivals
and a few historically recent Asiatic intruders, Europe is inhabited by
only three stocks: (1) The blond, long-headed "Nordic" race, (2) the
medium-complexioned, round-headed "Alpine" race, (3) the _brunet_,
long-headed "Mediterranean" race. These races are so dispersed and
intermingled that every European nation is built of at least two of
these stocks, while most are compounded of all three. Strictly speaking,
therefore, the European War was not a race-war at all, but a domestic
struggle between closely knit blood-relatives.
Now all this was known to most well-educated Europeans long before 1914.
And yet it did not make the slightest difference. The reason is that, in
spite of everything, the vast majority of Europeans still believe that
they fit into an entirely different race-category. They think they
belong to the "Teutonic" race, the "Latin" race, the "Slav" race, or the
"Anglo-Saxon" race. The fact that these so-called "races" simply do not
exist but are really historical differentiations, based on language and
culture, which cut sublimely across genuine race-lines--all that is
quite beside the point. Your European may apprehend this intellectually,
but so long as it remains an intellectual novelty it will have no
appreciable effect upon his conduct. In his heart of hearts he will
still believe himself a Latin, a Teuton, an Anglo-Saxon, or a Slav. For
his blood-race he will not stir; for his thought-race he will die. For
the glory of the dolichocephalic "Nordic" or the brachycephalic "Alpine"
he will not prick his finger or wager a groat; for the triumph of the
"Teuton" or the "Slav" he will give his last farthing and shed his
heart's blood. In other words: Not what men really are, but what they
think they are.
At first it may seem strange that in contemporary Europe thought-race
should be all-powerful while blood-race is impotent. Yet there are very
good reasons. Not only has modern Europe's great dynamic been nationalism,
but also nationalism has seized upon the nascent racial concept and has
perverted it to its own ends. Until quite recent times "Nationality" was a
distinctly intensive concept, connoting approximate identity of culture,
language, and historic past. It was the logical product of a relatively
narrow European outlook. Indeed, it grew out of a still narrower outlook
which had contented itself with the regional, feudal, and dialectic
loyalties of the Middle Ages. But the first half of the nineteenth century
saw a still further widening of the European outlook to a continental or
even to a world horizon. At once the early concept of nationality ceased
to satisfy. Nationalism became extensive. It tended to embrace all those
of kindred speech, culture, and historic tradition, however distant such
persons might be. Obviously a new terminology was required. The keyword
was presently discovered--"Race." Hence we get that whole series of
_pseudo_ "race" phrases--"Pan-Germanism," "Pan-Slavism," "Pan-Angleism,"
"Pan-Latinism," and the rest. Of course these are not racial at all. They
merely signify nationalism brought up to date. But the European peoples,
with all the fervour of the nationalist faith that is in them, believe and
proclaim them to be racial. Hence, so far as practical politics are
concerned, they _are_ racial and will so continue while the nationalist
dynamic endures.
This new development of nationalism (the "racial" stage, as we may call
it) was at first confined to the older centres of European civilization,
but with the spread of Western ideas it presently appeared in the most
unexpected quarters. Its advent in the Balkans, for example, quickly
engendered those fanatical propagandas, "Pan-Hellenism," "Pan-Serbism,"
etc., which turned that unhappy region first into a bear-garden and
latterly into a witches' sabbath.
Meanwhile, by the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the first
phase of nationalism had patently passed into Asia. The "Young-Turk" and
"Young-Egyptian" movements, and the "Nationalist" stirrings in regions
so far remote from each other as Algeria, Persia, and India, were
unmistakable signs that Asia was gripped by the initial throes of
nationalist self-consciousness. Furthermore, with the opening years of
the twentieth century, numerous symptoms proclaimed the fact that in
Asia, as in the Balkans, the second or "racial" stage of nationalism had
begun. These years saw the definite emergence of far-flung "Pan-"
movements: "Pan-Turanism," "Pan-Arabism," and (most amazing of apparent
paradoxes) "Pan-Islamic Nationalism."
I
Let us now trace the genesis and growth of nationalism in the Near and
Middle East, devoting the present chapter to nationalist developments in
the Moslem world with the exception of India. India requires special
treatment, because there nationalist activity has been mainly the work
of the non-Moslem Hindu element. Indian nationalism has followed a
course differing distinctly from that of Islam, and will therefore be
considered in the following chapter.
Before it received the Western impact of the nineteenth century, the
Islamic world was virtually devoid of self-conscious nationalism. There
were, to be sure, strong local and tribal loyalties. There was intense
dynastic sentiment like the Turks' devotion to their "Padishas," the
Ottoman sultans. There was also marked pride of race such as the Arabs'
conviction that they were the "Chosen People." Here, obviously, were
potential nationalist elements. But these elements were as yet dispersed
and unco-ordinated. They were not yet fused into the new synthesis of
self-conscious nationalism. The only Moslem people which could be said
to possess anything like true nationalist feeling were the Persians,
with their traditional devotion to their plateau-land of "Iran." The
various peoples of the Moslem world had thus, at most, a rudimentary,
inchoate nationalist consciousness: a dull, inert unitary spirit;
capable of development, perhaps, but as yet scarcely perceptible even to
outsiders and certainly unperceived by themselves.
Furthermore, Islam itself was in many respects hostile to nationalism.
Islam's insistence upon the brotherhood of all True Believers, and the
Islamic political ideal of the "Imâmât," or universal theocratic
democracy, naturally tended to inhibit the formation of sovereign,
mutually exclusive national units; just as the nascent nationalities of
Renaissance Europe conflicted with the mediæval ideals of universal
papacy and "Holy Roman Empire."
Given such an unfavourable environment, it is not strange to see Moslem
nationalist tendencies germinating obscurely and confusedly throughout
the first half of the nineteenth century. Not until the second half of
the century is there any clear conception of "Nationalism" in the
Western sense. There are distinct nationalist tendencies in the
teachings of Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani (who is philosophically the
connecting link between Pan-Islamism and Moslem nationalism), while the
Turkish reformers of the mid-nineteenth century were patently influenced
by nationalism as they were by other Western ideas. It was, in fact, in
Turkey that a true nationalist consciousness first appeared. Working
upon the Turks' traditional devotion to their dynasty and pride in
themselves as a ruling race lording it over many subject peoples both
Christian and Moslem, the Turkish nationalist movement made rapid
progress.
Precisely as in Europe, the nationalist movement in Turkey began with a
revival of historic memories and a purification of the language. Half a
century ago the Ottoman Turks knew almost nothing about their origins or
their history. The martial deeds of their ancestors and the stirring
annals of their empire were remembered only in a vague, legendary
fashion, the study of the national history being completely neglected.
Religious discussions and details of the life of Mohammed or the early
days of Islam interested men more than the spread of Ottoman power in
three continents. The nationalist pioneers taught their
fellow-countrymen their historic glories and awakened both pride of past
and confidence in the future.
Similarly with the Turkish language; the early nationalists found it
virtually cleft in twain. On the one hand was "official" Turkish--a
clumsy hotchpotch, overloaded with flowers of rhetoric and cryptic
expressions borrowed from Arabic and Persian. This extraordinary jargon,
couched in a bombastic style, was virtually unintelligible to the
masses. The masses, on the other hand, spoke "popular" Turkish--a
primitive, limited idiom, divided into many dialects and despised as
uncouth and boorish by "educated" persons. The nationalists changed all
this. Appreciating the simple, direct strength of the Turkish tongue,
nationalist enthusiasts trained in European principles of grammar and
philology proceeded to build up a real Turkish language in the Western
sense. So well did they succeed that in less than a generation they
produced a simplified, flexible Turkish which was used effectively by
both journalists and men of letters, was intelligible to all classes,
and became the unquestioned vehicle for thought and the canon of
style.[138]
Of course the chief stimulus to Turkish nationalism was Western
political pressure. The more men came to love their country and aspire
to its future, the more European assaults on Turkish territorial
integrity spurred them to defend their threatened independence. The
nationalist ideal was "Ottomanism"--the welding of a real "nation" in
which all citizens, whatever their origin or creed, should be
"Ottomans," speaking the Turkish language and inspired by Ottoman
patriotism. This, however, conflicted sharply with the rival (and prior)
nationalisms of the Christian peoples of the empire, to say nothing of
the new Arab nationalism which was taking shape at just this same time.
Turkish nationalism was also frowned on by Sultan Abdul Hamid. Abdul
Hamid had an instinctive aversion to all nationalist movements, both as
limitations to his personal absolutism and as conflicting with that
universal Pan-Islamic ideal on which he based his policy. Accordingly,
even those Turkish nationalists who proclaimed complete loyalty were
suspect, while those with liberal tendencies were persecuted and driven
into exile.
The revolution of 1908, however, brought nationalism to power. Whatever
their differences on other matters, the Young-Turks were all ardent
nationalists. In fact, the very ardour of their nationalism was a prime
cause of their subsequent misfortunes. With the rashness of fanatics the
Young-Turks tried to "Ottomanize" the whole empire at once. This enraged
all the other nationalities, alienated them from the revolution, and
gave the Christian Balkan states their opportunity to attack
disorganized Turkey in 1912.
The truth of the matter was that Turkish nationalism was evolving in a
direction which could only mean heightened antagonism between the
Turkish element on the one side and the non-Turkish elements, Christian
or Moslem, on the other. Turkish nationalism had, in fact, now reached
the second or "racial" stage. Passing the bounds of the limited, mainly
territorial, idea connoted by the term "Ottomanism," it had embraced the
far-flung and essentially racial concepts known as "Pan-Turkism" and
"Pan-Turanism." These wider developments we shall consider later on in
this chapter. Before so doing let us examine the beginnings of
nationalism's "first stage" in other portions of the Moslem world.
Shortly after the Ottoman Turks showed signs of a nationalistic
awakening, kindred symptoms began to appear among the Arabs. As in all
self-conscious nationalist movements, it was largely a protest _against_
some other group. In the case of the Arabs this protest was naturally
directed against their Turkish rulers. We have already seen how Desert
Arabia (the Nejd) had always maintained its freedom, and we have also
seen how those Arab lands like Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hedjaz which
fell under Turkish control nevertheless continued to feel an
ineradicable repugnance at seeing themselves, Islam's "Chosen People,"
beneath the yoke of a folk which, in Arab eyes, were mere upstart
barbarians. Despite a thousand years of Turkish domination the two races
never got on well together, their racial temperaments being too
incompatible for really cordial relations. The profound temperamental
incompatibility of Turk and Arab has been well summarized by a French
writer. Says Victor Bérard: "Such are the two languages and such the two
peoples: in the latitude of Rome and in the latitude of Algiers, the
Turk of Adrianople, like the Turk of Adalia, remains a man of the north
and of the extreme north; in all climates the Arab remains a man of the
south and of the extreme south. To the Arab's suppleness, mobility,
imagination, artistic feeling, democratic tendencies, and anarchic
individualism, the Turk opposes his slowness, gravity, sense of
discipline and regularity, innate militarism. The Turkish master has
always felt disdain for the 'artistic canaille,' whose pose,
gesticulations, and indiscipline, shock him profoundly. On their side,
the Arabs see in the Turk only a blockhead; in his placidity and
taciturnity only stupidity and ignorance; in his respect for law only
slavishness; and in his love of material well-being only gross
bestiality. Especially do the Arabs jeer at the Turk's artistic
incapacity: after having gone to school to the Chinese, Persians, Arabs,
and Greeks, the Turk remains, in Arab eyes, just a big booby of barrack
and barnyard."[139]
Add to this the fact that the Arabs regard the Turks as perverters of
the Islamic faith, and we need not be surprised to find that Turkey's
Arab subjects have ever displayed symptoms of rebellious unrest. We have
seen how the Wahabi movement was specifically directed against Turkish
control of the holy cities, and despite the Wahabi defeat, Arab
discontent lived on. About 1820 the German explorer Burckhardt wrote of
Arabia: "When Turkish power in the Hedjaz declines, the Arabs will
avenge themselves for their subjection."[140] And some twenty years
later the Shereef of Mecca remarked to a French traveller: "We, the
direct descendants of the Prophet, have to bow our heads before
miserable Pashas, most of them former Christian slaves come to power by
the most shameful courses."[141] Throughout the nineteenth century every
Turkish defeat in Europe was followed by a seditious outburst in its
Arab provinces.
Down to the middle of the nineteenth century these seditious stirrings
remained sporadic, unco-ordinated outbursts of religious, regional, or
tribal feeling, with no genuinely "Nationalistic" programme of action or
ideal. But in the later sixties a real nationalist agitation appeared.
Its birthplace was Syria. That was what might have been expected, since
Syria was the part of Turkey's Arab dominions most open to Western
influences. This first Arab nationalist movement, however, did not
amount to much. Directed by a small group of noisy agitators devoid of
real ability, the Turkish Government suppressed it without much
difficulty.
The disastrous Russian war of 1877, however, blew the scattered embers
into a fresh flame. For several years Turkey's Arab provinces were in
full ferment. The nationalists spoke openly of throwing off the Turkish
yoke and welding the Arab lands into a loose-knit confederation headed
by a religious potentate, probably the Shereef of Mecca. This was
obviously an adaptation of Western nationalism to the traditional Arab
ideal of a theocratic democracy already realized in the Meccan caliphate
and the Wahabi government of the Nejd.
This second stirring of Arab nationalism was likewise of short duration.
Turkey was now ruled by Sultan Abdul Hamid, and Abdul Hamid's
Pan-Islamic policy looked toward good relations with his Arab subjects.
Accordingly, Arabs were welcomed at Constantinople, favours were heaped
upon Arab chiefs and notables, while efforts were made to promote the
contentment of the empire's Arab populations. At the same time the
construction of strategic railways in Syria and the Hedjaz gave the
Turkish Government a stronger grip over its Arab provinces than ever
before, and conversely rendered successful Arab revolts a far more
remote possibility. Furthermore, Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda
was specially directed toward awakening a sense of Moslem solidarity
between Arabs and Turks as against the Christian West. These efforts
achieved a measure of success. Certainly, every European aggression in
the Near East was an object-lesson to Turks and Arabs to forget, or at
least adjourn, their domestic quarrels in face of the common foe.
Despite the partial successes of Abdul Hamid's efforts, a considerable
section of his Arab subjects remained unreconciled, and toward the close
of the nineteenth century a fresh stirring of Arab nationalist
discontent made its appearance. Relentlessly persecuted by the Turkish
authorities, the Arab nationalist agitators, mostly Syrians, went into
exile. Gathering in near-by Egypt (now of course under British
governance) and in western Europe, these exiles organized a
revolutionary propaganda. Their formal organization dates from the year
1895, when the "Arabian National Committee" was created at Paris. For a
decade their propaganda went on obscurely, but evidently with effect,
for in 1905 the Arab provinces of Hedjaz and Yemen burst into armed
insurrection. This insurrection, despite the best efforts of the Turkish
Government, was never wholly suppressed, but dragged on year after year,
draining Turkey of troops and treasure, and contributing materially to
her Tripolitan and Balkan disasters in 1911-12.
The Arab revolt of 1905 focussed the world's attention upon "The Arab
Question," and the nationalist exiles made the most of their opportunity
by redoubling their propaganda, not only at home but in the West as
well. Europe was fully informed of "Young Arabia's" wrongs and
aspirations, notably by an extremely clever book by one of the
nationalist leaders, entitled _The Awakening of the Arab Nation_,[142]
which made a distinct sensation. The aims of the Arab nationalists are
clearly set forth in the manifesto of the Arabian National Committee,
addressed to the Great Powers and published early in 1906. Says this
manifesto: "A great pacific change is on the eve of occurring in Turkey.
The Arabs, whom the Turks tyrannized over only by keeping them divided
on insignificant questions of ritual and religion, have become conscious
of their national, historic, and racial homogeneity, and wish to detach
themselves from the worm-eaten Ottoman trunk in order to form themselves
into an independent state. This new Arab Empire will extend to its
natural frontiers, from the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates to the
Isthmus of Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Oman. It will
be governed by the constitutional and liberal monarchy of an Arabian
sultan. The present Vilayet of the Hedjaz, together with the territory
of Medina, will form an independent empire whose sovereign will be at
the same time the religious Khalif of all the Mohammedans. Thus, one
great difficulty, the separation of the civil and the religious powers
in Islam, will have been solved for the greater good of all."
To their fellow Arabs the committee issued the following proclamation:
"Dear Compatriots! All of us know how vile and despicable the glorious
and illustrious title of Arabian Citizen has become in the mouths of all
foreigners, especially Turks. All of us see to what depths of misery and
ignorance we have fallen under the tyranny of these barbarians sprung
from Central Asia. Our land, the richest and finest on earth, is to-day
an arid waste. When we were free, we conquered the world in a hundred
years; we spread everywhere sciences, arts, and letters; for centuries
we led world-civilization. But, since the spawn of Ertogrul[143] usurped
the caliphate of Islam, they have brutalized us so as to exploit us to
such a degree that we have become the poorest people on earth." The
proclamation then goes on to declare Arabia's independence.[144]
Of course "Young Arabia" did not then attain its independence. The
revolt was kept localized and Turkey maintained its hold over most of
its Arab dominions. Nevertheless, there was constant unrest. During the
remainder of Abdul Hamid's reign his Arab provinces were in a sort of
unstable equilibrium, torn between the forces of nationalist sedition on
the one hand and Pan-Islamic, anti-European feeling on the other.
The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 caused a new shift in the situation.
The Arab provinces, like the other parts of the empire, rejoiced in the
downfall of despotism and hoped great things for the future. In the
Turkish Parliament the Arab provinces were well represented, and their
deputies asked for a measure of federal autonomy. This the Young-Turks,
bent upon "Ottomanization," curtly refused. The result was profound
disillusionment in the Arab provinces and a revival of separatist
agitation. It is interesting to note that the new independence agitation
had a much more ambitious programme than that of a few years before. The
Arab nationalists of Turkey were by this time definitely linking up with
the nationalists of Egypt and French North Africa--Arabic-speaking lands
where the populations were at least partly Arab in blood. Arab
nationalism was beginning to speak aloud what it had previously
whispered--the programme of a great "Pan-Arab" empire stretching right
across North Africa and southern Asia from the Atlantic to the Indian
Oceans. Thus, Arab nationalism, like Turkish nationalism, was evolving
into the "second," or racial, stage.
Deferring discussion of this broader development, let us follow a trifle
further the course of the more restricted Arab nationalism within the
Turkish Empire. Despite the Pan-Islamic sentiment evoked by the
European aggressions of 1911-12, nationalist feeling was continually
aroused by the Ottomanizing measures of the Young-Turk government, and
the independence agitation was presently in full swing once more. In
1913 an Arabian nationalist congress convened in Paris and revolutionary
propaganda was inaugurated on an increased scale. When the Great War
broke out next year, Turkey's Arab provinces were seething with
seditious unrest.[145] The Turkish authorities took stern measures
against possible trouble, imprisoning and executing all prominent
nationalists upon whom they could lay their hands, while the
proclamation of the "Holy War" rallied a certain portion of Arab public
opinion to the Turkish side, especially since the conquest of Egypt was
a possibility. But as the war dragged on the forces of discontent once
more raised their heads. In 1916 the revolt of the Shereef of Mecca gave
the signal for the downfall of Turkish rule. This revolt, liberally
backed by England, gained the active or passive support of the Arab
elements throughout the Turkish Empire. Inspired by Allied promises of
national independence of a most alluring character, the Arabs fought
strenuously against the Turks and were a prime factor in the _débâcle_
of Ottoman military power in the autumn of 1918.[146]
Before discussing the momentous events which have occurred in the Arab
provinces of the former Ottoman Empire since 1918, let us consider
nationalist developments in the Arabized regions of North Africa lying
to the westward. Of these developments the most important is that of
Egypt. The mass of the Egyptian people is to-day, as in Pharaoh's time,
of the old "Nilotic" stock. A slow, self-contained peasant folk, the
Egyptian "fellaheen" have submitted passively to a long series of
conquerors, albeit this passivity has been occasionally broken by
outbursts of volcanic fury presently dying away into passivity once
more. Above the Nilotic masses stands a relatively small upper class
descended chiefly from Egypt's more recent Asiatic conquerors--Arabs,
Kurds, Circassians, Albanians, and Turks. In addition to this upper
class, which until the English occupation monopolized all political
power, there are large European "colonies" with "extraterritorial"
rights, while a further complication is added by the persistence of a
considerable native Christian element, the "Copts," who refused to turn
Mohammedan at the Arab conquest and who to-day number fully one-tenth of
the total population.
With such a medley of races, creeds, and cultures, and with so prolonged
a tradition of foreign domination, Egypt might seem a most unlikely
_milieu_ for the growth of nationalism. On the other hand, Egypt has
been more exposed to Western influences than any other part of the Near
East. Bonaparte's invasion at the close of the eighteenth century
profoundly affected Egyptian life, and though the French were soon
expelled, European influences continued to permeate the valley of the
Nile. Mehemet Ali, the able Albanian adventurer who made himself master
of Egypt after the downfall of French rule, realized the superiority of
European methods and fostered a process of Europeanization which,
however superficial, resulted in a wide dissemination of Western ideas.
Mehemet Ali's policy was continued by his successors. That magnificent
spendthrift Khedive Ismail, whose reckless contraction of European loans
was the primary cause of European intervention, prided himself on his
"Europeanism" and surrounded himself with Europeans.
Indeed, the first stirrings of Egyptian nationalism took the form of a
protest against the noxious, parasitical "Europeanism" of Khedive Ismail
and his courtiers. Sober-minded Egyptians became increasingly alarmed at
the way Ismail was mortgaging Egypt's independence by huge European
loans and sucking its life-blood by merciless taxation. Inspired
consciously or unconsciously by the Western concepts of "nation" and
"patriotism," these men desired to stay Ismail's destructive course and
to safeguard Egypt's future. In fact, their efforts were directed not
merely against the motley crew of European adventurers and
concessionaires who were luring the Khedive into fresh extravagances,
but also against the complaisant Turkish and Circassian pashas, and the
Armenian and Syrian usurers, who were the instruments of Ismail's will.
The nascent movement was thus basically a "patriotic" protest against
all those, both foreigners and native-born, who were endangering the
country. This showed clearly in the motto adopted by the agitators--the
hitherto unheard-of slogan: "Egypt for the Egyptians!"
Into this incipient ferment there was presently injected the dynamic
personality of Djemal-ed-Din. Nowhere else did this extraordinary man
exert so profound and lasting an influence as in Egypt. It is not too
much to say that he is the father of every shade of Egyptian
nationalism. He influenced not merely violent agitators like Arabi Pasha
but also conservative reformers like Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, who realized
Egypt's weakness and were content to labour patiently by evolutionary
methods for distant goals.
For the moment the apostles of violent action had the stage. In 1882 a
revolutionary agitation broke out headed by Arabi Pasha, an army
officer, who, significantly enough, was of fellah origin, the first man
of Nilotic stock to sway Egypt's destinies in modern times. Raising
their slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians," the revolutionists sought to
drive all "foreigners," both Europeans and Asiatics, from the country.
Their attempt was of course foredoomed to failure. A massacre of
Europeans in the port-city of Alexandria at once precipitated European
intervention. An English army crushed the revolutionists at the battle
of Tel-el-Kebir, and after this one battle, disorganized, bankrupt Egypt
submitted to British rule, personified by Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer.
The khedivial dynasty was, to be sure, retained, and the native forms of
government respected, but all real power centred in the hands of the
British "Financial Adviser," the representative of Britain's imperial
will.
For twenty-five years Lord Cromer ruled Egypt, and the record of this
able proconsul will place him for ever in the front rank of the world's
great administrators. His strong hand drew Egypt from hopeless
bankruptcy into abounding prosperity. Material well-being, however, did
not kill Egyptian nationalism. Scattered to the winds before the British
bayonet charges, the seeds of unrest slowly germinated beneath the
fertile Nilotic soil. Almost imperceptible at first under the numbing
shock of Tel-el-Kebir, nationalist sentiment grew steadily as the years
wore on, and by the closing decade of the nineteenth century it had
become distinctly perceptible to keen-sighted European observers.
Passing through Egypt in 1895, the well-known African explorer
Schweinfurth was struck with the psychological change which had occurred
since his earlier visits to the valley of the Nile. "A true national
self-consciousness is slowly beginning to awaken," he wrote. "The
Egyptians are still very far from being a true Nationality, but the
beginning has been made."[147]
With the opening years of the twentieth century what had previously been
visible only to discerning eyes burst into sudden and startling bloom.
This resurgent Egyptian nationalism had, to be sure, its moderate wing,
represented by conservative-minded men like Mohammed Abdou, Rector of El
Azhar University and respected friend of Lord Cromer, who sought to
teach his fellow-countrymen that the surest road to freedom was along
the path of enlightenment and progress. In the main, however, the
movement was an impatient and violent protest against British rule and
an intransigeant demand for immediate independence. Perhaps the most
significant point was that virtually all Egyptians were nationalists at
heart, conservatives as well as radicals declining to consider Egypt as
a permanent part of the British Empire. The nationalists had a sound
legal basis for this attitude, owing to the fact that British rule
rested upon insecure diplomatic foundations. England had intervened in
Egypt as a self-constituted "Mandatory" of European financial interests.
Its action had roused much opposition in Europe, particularly in France,
and to allay this opposition the British Government had repeatedly
announced that its occupation of Egypt was of a temporary nature. In
fact, Egyptian discontent was deliberately fanned by France right down
to the conclusion of the _Entente Cordiale_ in 1904. This French
sympathy for Egyptian aspirations was of capital importance in the
development of the nationalist movement. In Egypt, France's cultural
prestige was predominant. In Egyptian eyes a European education was
synonymous with a French education, so the rising generation inevitably
sat under French teachers, either in Egypt or in France, and these
French preceptors, being usually Anglophobes, rarely lost an opportunity
for instilling dislike of England and aversion to British rule.
The radical nationalists were headed by a young man named Mustapha
Kamel. He was a very prince of agitators; ardent, magnetic,
enthusiastic, and possessed of a fiery eloquence which fairly swept away
both his hearers and his readers. An indefatigable propagandist, he
edited a whole chain of newspapers and periodicals, and as fast as one
organ was suppressed by the British authorities he started another. His
uncompromising nationalism may be gauged from the following examples
from his writings. Taking for his motto the phrase "The Egyptians for
Egypt; Egypt for the Egyptians," he wrote as early as 1896: "Egyptian
civilization cannot endure in the future unless it is founded by the
people itself; unless the fellah, the merchant, the teacher, the pupil,
in fine, every single Egyptian, knows that man has sacred, intangible
rights; that he is not created to be a tool, but to lead an intelligent
and worthy life; that love of country is the most beautiful sentiment
which can ennoble a soul; and that a nation without independence is a
nation without existence! It is by patriotism that backward peoples come
quickly to civilization, to greatness, and to power. It is patriotism
that forms the blood which courses in the veins of virile nations, and
it is patriotism that gives life to every living being."
The English, of course, were bitterly denounced. Here is a typical
editorial from his organ _El Lewa_: "We are the despoiled. The English
are the despoilers. We demand a sacred right. The English are the
usurpers of that right. This is why we are sure of success sooner or
later. When one is in the right, it is only a question of time."
Despite his ardent aspirations, Mustapha Kamel had a sense of realities,
and recognized that, for the moment at least, British power could not be
forcibly overthrown. He did not, therefore, attempt any open violence
which he knew would merely ruin himself and his followers. Early in 1908
he died, only thirty-four years of age. His mantle fell upon his leading
disciple, Mohammed Farid Bey. This man, who was not of equal calibre,
tried to make up for his deficiency in true eloquence by the violence of
his invective. The difference between the two leaders can be gauged by
the editorial columns of _El Lewa_. Here is an editorial of September,
1909: "This land was polluted by the English, putrefied with their
atrocities as they suppressed our beloved _dustour_ [constitution], tied
our tongues, burned our people alive and hanged our innocent relatives,
and perpetrated other horrors at which the heavens are about to tremble,
the earth to split, and the mountains to fall down. Let us take a new
step. Let our lives be cheap while we seek our independence. Death is
far better than life for you if you remain in your present condition."
Mohammed Farid's fanatical impatience of all opposition led him into
tactical blunders like alienating the native Christian Copts, whom
Mustapha Kamel had been careful to conciliate. The following diatribe
(which, by the way, reveals a grotesque jumble of Western and Eastern
ideas) is an answer to Coptic protests at the increasing violence of his
propaganda: "The Copts should be kicked to death. They still have faces
and bodies similar to those of demons and monkeys, which is a proof that
they hide poisonous spirits within their souls. The fact that they exist
in the world confirms Darwin's theory that human beings are generated
from monkeys. You sons of adulterous women! You descendants of the
bearers of trays! You tails of camels with your monkey faces! You bones
of bodies!"
In this more violent attitude the nationalists were encouraged by
several reasons. For one thing, Lord Cromer had laid down his
proconsulate in 1907 and had been succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst. The new
ruler represented the ideas of British Liberalism, now in power, which
wished to appease Egyptian unrest by conciliation instead of by Lord
Cromer's autocratic indifference. In the second place, the Young-Turk
revolution of 1908 gave an enormous impetus to the Egyptian cry for
constitutional self-government. Lastly, France's growing intimacy with
England dashed the nationalist's cherished hope that Britain would be
forced by outside pressure to redeem her diplomatic pledges and
evacuate the Nile valley, thus driving the nationalists to rely more on
their own exertions.
Given this nationalist temper, conciliatory attempt was foredoomed to
failure. For, however conciliatory Sir Eldon Gorst might be in details,
he could not promise the one thing which the nationalists supremely
desired--independence. This demand England refused even to consider.
Practically all Englishmen had become convinced that Egypt with the Suez
Canal was a vital link between the eastern and western halves of the
British Empire, and that permanent control of Egypt was thus an absolute
necessity. There was thus a fundamental deadlock between British
imperial and Egyptian national convictions. Accordingly, the British
Liberal policy of conciliation proved a fiasco. Even Sir Eldon Gorst
admitted in his official reports that concessions were simply regarded
as signs of weakness.
Before long seditious agitation and attendant violence grew to such
proportions that the British Government became convinced that only
strong measures would save the situation. Therefore, in 1911, Sir Eldon
Gorst was replaced by Lord Kitchener--a patent warning to the
nationalists that sedition would be given short shrift by the iron hand
which had crushed the Khalifa and his Dervish hordes at Omdurman.
Kitchener arrived in Egypt with the express mandate to restore order,
and this he did with thoroughness and exactitude. The Egyptians were
told plainly that England neither intended to evacuate the Nile valley
nor considered its inhabitants fit for self-government within any
discernible future. They were admonished to turn their thoughts from
politics, at which they were so bad, to agriculture, at which they were
so good. As for seditious propaganda, new legislation enabled Lord
Kitchener to deal with it in summary fashion. Practically all the
nationalist papers were suppressed, while the nationalist leaders were
imprisoned, interned, or exiled. In fact, the British Government did its
best to distract attention everywhere from Egypt, the British press
co-operating loyally by labelling the subject taboo. The upshot was that
Egypt became quieter than it had been for a generation.
However, it was only a surface calm. Driven underground, Egyptian unrest
even attained new virulence which alarmed close observers. In 1913 the
well-known English publicist Sidney Low, after a careful investigation
of the Egyptian situation, wrote: "We are not popular in Egypt. Feared
we may be by some; respected I doubt not by many others; but really
liked, I am sure, by very few."[148] Still more outspoken was an article
significantly entitled "The Darkness over Egypt," which appeared on the
eve of the Great War.[149] Its publication in a semi-scientific
periodical for specialists in Oriental problems rendered it worthy of
serious attention. "The long-continued absence of practically all
discussion or even mention of Egyptian internal affairs from the British
press," asserted this article, "is not indicative of a healthy
condition. In Egypt the superficial quiet is that of suppressed
discontent--of a sullen, hopeless mistrust toward the Government of the
Occupation. Certain recent happenings have strengthened in Egyptian
minds the conviction that the Government is making preparations for the
complete annexation of the country.... We are not concerned to question
how far the motives attributed to the Government are true. The essential
fact is that the Government of the Occupation has not yet succeeded in
endearing, or even recommending, itself to the Egyptian people, but is,
on the contrary, an object of suspicion, an occasion of enmity." The
article expresses grave doubt whether Lord Kitchener's repressive
measures have done more than drive discontent underground, and shows
"how strong is the Nationalist feeling in Egypt to-day in spite of the
determined attempts to stamp out all freedom of political opinion. As
might be expected, this wholesale muzzling of the press has not only
reduced the Mohammedan majority to a condition of internal ferment, but
has seriously alienated the hitherto loyal Copts. It may be that the
Government can discover no better means of recommending itself to the
confidence and good-will of the Egyptian people; it may be that only by
the instant repression of every outward sign of discontent can it feel
secure in its occupation; but if such be the case, it is an admission of
extreme weakness, or recognized insecurity of tenure." The article
concludes with the following warning as to the problem's wider
implications: "Egypt, though a subject of profound indifference to the
English voter, is being feverishly watched by the Indian Mohammedans,
and by the whole of our West and Central African subjects--themselves
strongly Moslem in sympathy, and at the present time jealously
suspicious of the political activities of Christian Imperialism."
Such being the state of Egyptian feeling in 1914, the outbreak of the
Great War was bound to produce intensified unrest. England's position in
Egypt was, in truth, very difficult. Although in fact England exercised
complete control, in law Egypt was still a dependency of the Ottoman
Empire, Britain merely exercising a temporary occupation. Now it soon
became evident that Turkey was going to join England's enemies, the
Teutonic empires, while it was equally evident that the Egyptians
sympathized with the Turks, even the Khedive Abbas Hilmi making no
secret of his pro-Turkish views. During the first months of the European
War, while Turkey was still nominally neutral, the Egyptian native
press, despite the British censorship, was full of veiled seditious
statements, while the unruly attitude of the Egyptian populace and the
stirrings among the Egyptian native regiments left no doubt as to how
the wind was blowing. England was seriously alarmed. Accordingly, when
Turkey entered the war in November, 1914, England took the decisive
plunge, deposed Abbas Hilmi, nominated his cousin Hussein Kamel
"Sultan," and declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire.
This stung the nationalists to fury. Anything like formal rebellion was
rendered impossible by the heavy masses of British and colonial troops
which had been poured into the country. Nevertheless, there was a good
deal of sporadic violence, suppressed only by a stern application of the
"State of Siege." A French observer thus vividly describes these
critical days: "The Jehadd is rousing the anti-Christian fanaticism
which always stirs in the soul of every good Moslem. Since the end of
October one could read in the eyes of the low-class Mohammedan natives
their hope--the massacre of the Christians. In the streets of Cairo they
stared insolently at the European passers-by. Some even danced for joy
on learning that the Sultan had declared the Holy War. Denounced to the
police for this, they were incontinently bastinadoed at the nearest
police-station. The same state of mind reigned at El Azhar, and I am
told that Europeans who visit the celebrated Mohammedan University have
their ears filled with the strongest epithets of the Arab
repertory--that best-furnished language in the world."[150]
The nationalist exiles vehemently expressed abroad what their fellows
could not say at home. Their leader, Mohammed Farid Bey, issued from
Geneva an official protest against "the new illegal régime proclaimed by
England the 18th of last December. England, which pretends to make war
on Germany to defend Belgium, ought not to trample underfoot the rights
of Egypt, nor consider the treaties relative thereto as 'scraps of
paper.'"[151] These exiles threw themselves vehemently into the arms of
Germany, as may be gauged from the following remarks of Abd-el-Malek
Hamsa, secretary of the nationalist party, in a German periodical:
"There is hardly an Egyptian who does not pray that England may be
beaten and her Empire fall in ruins. During the early days of the war,
while I was still in Egypt, I was a witness of this popular feeling. In
cities and villages, from sage to simple peasant, all are convinced in
the Kaiser's love for Islam and friendship for its caliph, and they are
hoping and praying for Germany's victory."[152]
Of course, in face of the overwhelming British garrison in Egypt, such
pronouncements were as idle as the wind. The hoped-for Turkish attacks
were beaten back from the Suez Canal, the "State of Siege" functioned
with stern efficiency, and Egypt, flooded with British troops, lapsed
into sullen silence, not to be broken until the end of the war.
Turning back at this point to consider nationalist developments in the
rest of North Africa, we do not, as in Egypt, find a well-marked
territorial patriotism. Anti-European hatred there is in plenty, but
such "patriotic" sentiments as exist belong rather to those more
diffused types of nationalist feeling known as "Pan-Arabism" and
"Pan-Islamic Nationalism," which we shall presently discuss.
The basic reason for this North African lack of national feeling, in its
restricted sense, is that nowhere outside of Egypt is there a land which
ever has been, or which shows distinct signs of becoming, a true
"nation." The mass of the populations inhabiting the vast band of
territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara desert are
"Berbers"--an ancient stock, racially European rather than Asiatic or
negroid, and closely akin to the "Latin" peoples across the
Mediterranean. The Berbers remind one of the Balkan Albanians: they are
extremely tenacious of their language and customs, and they have an
instinctive racial feeling; but they are inveterate particularists,
having always been split up into many tribes, sometimes combining into
partial confederations but never developing true national
patriotism.[153]
Alongside the Berbers we find everywhere a varying proportion of Arabs.
The Arabs have colonized North Africa ever since the Moslem conquest
twelve centuries ago. They converted the Berbers to Islam and Arab
culture, but they never made North Africa part of the Arab world as they
did Syria and Mesopotamia, and in somewhat lesser degree Egypt. The two
races have never really fused. Despite more than a thousand years of
Arab tutelage, the Berbers' manner of life remains distinct. They have
largely kept their language, and there has been comparatively little
intermarriage. Pure-blooded Arabs abound, often in large tribal groups,
but they are still, in a way, foreigners.[154]
With such elements of discord, North Africa's political life has always
been troubled. The most stable region has been Morocco, though even
there the sultan's authority has never really extended to the mountain
tribes. As for the so-called "Barbary States" (Algiers, Tunis, and
Tripoli), they were little more than port-cities along the coast, the
hinterland enjoying practically complete tribal independence. Over this
confused turmoil spread the tide of French conquest, beginning with
Algiers in 1830 and ending with Morocco to-day.[155] France brought
peace, order, and material prosperity, but here, as in other Eastern
lands, these very benefits of European tutelage created a new sort of
unity among the natives in their common dislike of the European
conqueror and their common aspiration toward independence. Accordingly,
the past generation has witnessed the appearance of "Young Algerian" and
"Young Tunisian" political groups, led by French-educated men who have
imbibed Western ideas of "self-government" and "liberty."[156] However,
as we have already remarked, their goal is not so much the erection of
distinct Algerian and Tunisian "Nations" as it is creation of a larger
North African, perhaps Pan-Islamic, unity. It must not be forgotten that
they are in close touch with the Sennussi and kindred influences which
we have already examined in the chapter on Pan-Islamism.
So much for "first-stage" nationalist developments in the Arab or
Arabized lands. There is, however, one more important centre of
nationalist sentiment in the Moslem world to be considered--Persia.
Persia is, in fact, the land where a genuine nationalist movement would
have been most logically expected, because the Persians have for ages
possessed a stronger feeling of "country" than any other Near Eastern
people.
In the nineteenth century Persia had sunk into such deep decrepitude
that its patent weakness excited the imperialistic appetites of Czarist
Russia and, in somewhat lesser degree, of England. Persia's decadence
and external perils were, however, appreciated by thinking Persians, and
a series of reformist agitations took place, beginning with the
religious movement of the Bab early in the nineteenth century and
culminating with the revolution of 1908.[157] That revolution was
largely precipitated by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 by which
England and Russia virtually partitioned Persia; the country being
divided into a Russian "sphere of influence" in the north and a British
"sphere of influence" in the south, with a "neutral zone" between. The
revolution was thus in great part a desperate attempt of the Persian
patriots to set their house in order and avert, at the eleventh hour,
the shadow of European domination which was creeping over the land. But
the revolution was not merely a protest against European aggression. It
was also aimed at the alien Khadjar dynasty which had so long misruled
Persia. These Khadjar sovereigns were of Turkoman origin. They had never
become really Persianized, as shown by the fact that the intimate court
language was Turki, not Persian. They occupied a position somewhat
analogous to that of the Manchus before the Chinese revolution. The
Persian revolution was thus basically an _Iranian_ patriotic outburst
against all alien influences, whether from East or West.
We have already seen how this patriotic movement was crushed by the
forcible intervention of European imperialism.[158] By 1912 Russia and
England were in full control of the situation, the patriots were
proscribed and persecuted, and Persia sank into despairing silence. As a
British writer then remarked: "For such broken spirit and shattered
hopes, as for the 'anarchy' now existing in Persia, Russia and Great
Britain are directly responsible, and if there be a Reckoning, will one
day be held to account. It is idle to talk of any improvement in the
situation, when the only Government in Persia consists of a Cabinet
which does not command the confidence of the people, terrorized by
Russia, financially starved by both Russia and England, allowed only
miserable doles of money on usurious terms, and forbidden to employ
honest and efficient foreign experts like Mr. Shuster; when the King is
a boy, the Regent an absentee, the Parliament permanently suspended, and
the best, bravest, and most honest patriots either killed or driven
into exile, while the wolf-pack of financiers, concession-hunters and
land-grabbers presses ever harder on the exhausted victim, whose
struggles grow fainter and fainter. Little less than a miracle can now
save Persia."[159]
So ends our survey of the main "first-stage" nationalist movements in
the Moslem world. We should of course remember that a nationalist
movement was developing concurrently in India, albeit following an
eccentric orbit of its own. We should also remember that, in addition to
the main movements just discussed, there were minor nationalist
stirrings among other Moslem peoples such as the Russian Tartars, the
Chinese Mohammedans, and even the Javanese of the Dutch Indies. Lastly,
we should remember that these nationalist movements were more or less
interwoven with the non-national movement of Pan-Islamism, and with
those "second-stage," "racial" nationalist movements which we shall now
consider.
II
Earlier in this chapter we have already remarked that the opening years
of the twentieth century witnessed the appearance in Asia of
nationalism's second or racial stage, especially among the Turkish and
Arab peoples. This wider stage of nationalism has attained its highest
development among the Turks; where, indeed, it has gone through two
distinct phases, describable respectively by the terms "Pan-Turkism" and
"Pan-Turanism." We have described the primary phase of Turkish
nationalism in its restricted "Ottoman" sense down to the close of the
Balkan wars of 1912-13. It is at that time that the secondary or
"racial" aspects of Turkish nationalism first come prominently to the
fore.
By this time the Ottoman Turks had begun to realize that they did not
stand alone in the world; that they were, in fact, the westernmost
branch of a vast band of peoples extending right across eastern Europe
and Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Mediterranean to
the Arctic Ocean, to whom ethnologists have assigned the name of
"Uralo-Altaic race," but who are more generally termed "Turanians." This
group embraces the most widely scattered folk--the Ottoman Turks of
Constantinople and Anatolia, the Turkomans of Persia and Central Asia,
the Tartars of South Russia and Transcaucasia, the Magyars of Hungary,
the Finns of Finland and the Baltic provinces, the aboriginal tribes of
Siberia, and even the distant Mongols and Manchus. Diverse though they
are in culture, tradition, and even personal appearance, these people
nevertheless possess certain well-marked traits in common. Their
languages are all similar, while their physical and mental make-up
displays undoubted affinities. They are all noted for great physical
vitality combined with unusual toughness of nerve-fibre. Though somewhat
deficient in imagination and creative artistic sense, they are richly
endowed with patience, tenacity, and dogged energy. Above all, they have
usually displayed extraordinary military capacity, together with a no
less remarkable aptitude for the masterful handling of subject peoples.
The Turanians have certainly been the greatest conquerors that the world
has ever seen. Attila and his Huns, Arpad and his Magyars, Isperich and
his Bulgars, Alp Arslan and his Seljuks, Ertogrul and his Ottomans,
Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane with their "inflexible" Mongol hordes, Baber
in India, even Kubilai Khan and Nurhachu in far-off Cathay: the type is
ever the same. The hoof-print of the Turanian "man on horseback" is
stamped deep all over the palimpsest of history.
Glorious or sinister according to the point of view, Turan's is
certainly a stirring past. Of course one may query whether these diverse
peoples actually do form one genuine race. But, as we have already seen,
so far as practical politics go, that makes no difference. Possessed of
kindred tongues and temperaments, and dowered with such a wealth of
soul-stirring tradition, it would suffice for them to _think_ themselves
racially one to form a nationalist dynamic of truly appalling potency.
Until about a generation ago, to be sure, no signs of such a movement
were visible. Not only were distant stocks like Finns and Manchus quite
unaware of any common Turanian bond, but even obvious kindred like
Ottoman Turks and Central Asian Turkomans regarded one another with
indifference or contempt. Certainly the Ottoman Turks were almost as
devoid of racial as they were of national feeling. Arminius Vambéry
tells how, when he first visited Constantinople in 1856, "the word
_Turkluk_ (_i. e._, 'Turk') was considered an opprobrious synonym of
grossness and savagery, and when I used to call people's attention to
the racial importance of the Turkish stock (stretching from Adrianople
to the Pacific) they answered: 'But you are surely not classing us with
Kirghiz and with the gross nomads of Tartary.' ... With a few
exceptions, I found no one in Constantinople who was seriously
interested in the questions of Turkish nationality or language."[160]
It was, in fact, the labours of Western ethnologists like the Hungarian
Vambéry and the Frenchman Léon Cahun that first cleared away the mists
which enshrouded Turan. These labours disclosed the unexpected vastness
of the Turanian world. And this presently acquired a most unacademic
significance. The writings of Vambéry and his colleagues spread far and
wide through Turan and were there devoured by receptive minds already
stirring to the obscure promptings of a new time. The normality of the
Turanian movement is shown by its simultaneous appearance at such widely
sundered points as Turkish Constantinople and the Tartar centres along
the Russian Volga. Indeed, if anything, the leaven began its working on
the Volga sooner than on the Bosphorus. This Tartar revival, though
little known, is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in all
nationalist history. The Tartars, once masters of Russia, though long
since fallen from their high estate, have never vanished in the Slav
ocean. Although many of them have been for four centuries under Russian
rule, they have stubbornly maintained their religious, racial, and
cultural identity. Clustered thickly along the Volga, especially at
Kazan and Astrakhan, retaining much of the Crimea, and forming a
considerable minority in Transcaucasia, the Tartars remained distinct
"enclaves" in the Slav Empire, widely scattered but indomitable.
The first stirrings of nationalist self-consciousness among the Russian
Tartars appeared as far back as 1895, and from then on the movement grew
with astonishing rapidity. The removal of governmental restrictions at
the time of the Russian revolution of 1904 was followed by a regular
literary florescence. Streams of books and pamphlets, numerous
newspapers, and a solid periodical press, all attested the vigour and
fecundity of the Tartar revival. The high economic level of the Russian
Tartars assured the material sinews of war. The Tartar oil millionaires
of Baku here played a conspicuous rôle, freely opening their capacious
purses for the good of the cause. The Russian Tartars also showed
distinct political ability and soon gained the confidence of their
Turkoman cousins of Russian Central Asia, who were also stirring to the
breath of nationalism. The first Russian Duma contained a large
Mohammedan group so enterprising in spirit and so skilfully led that
Russian public opinion became genuinely uneasy and encouraged the
government to diminish Tartar influence in Russian parliamentary life by
summary curtailments of Mohammedan representation.[161]
Of course the Russian Mohammedans were careful to proclaim their
political loyalty to the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, many earnest
spirits revealed their secret aspirations by seeking a freer and more
fruitful field of labour in Turkish Stambul, where the Russian Tartars
played a prominent part in the Pan-Turk and Pan-Turanian movements
within the Ottoman Empire. In fact, it was a Volga Tartar, Yusuf Bey
Akchura Oglu, who was the real founder of the first Pan-Turanian society
at Constantinople, and his well-known book, _Three Political Systems_,
became the text on which most subsequent Pan-Turanian writings have been
based.[162]
Down to the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Pan-Turanism was somewhat
under a cloud at Stambul. Sultan Abdul Hamid, as already remarked, was a
Pan-Islamist and had a rooted aversion to all nationalist movements.
Accordingly, the Pan-Turanians, while not actually persecuted, were
never in the Sultan's favour. With the advent of Young-Turk nationalism
to power, however, all was changed. The "Ottomanizing" leaders of the
new government listened eagerly to Pan-Turanian preaching, and most of
them became affiliated with the movement. It is interesting to note that
Russian Tartars continued to play a prominent part. The chief
Pan-Turanian propagandist was the able publicist Ahmed Bey Agayeff, a
Volga Tartar. His well-edited organ, _Turk Yurdu_ (_Turkish Home_),
penetrated to every corner of the Turko-Tartar world and exercised great
influence on the development of its public opinion.
Although leaders like Ahmed Bey Agayeff clearly visualized the entire
Turanian world from Finland to Manchuria as a potential whole, and were
thus full-fledged "Pan-Turanians," their practical efforts were at first
confined to the closely related Turko-Tartar segment; that is, to the
Ottomans of Turkey, the Tartars of Russia, and the Turkomans of central
Asia and Persia. Since all these peoples were also Mohammedans, it
follows that this propaganda had a religious as well as a racial
complexion, trending in many respects toward Pan-Islamism. Indeed, even
disregarding the religious factor, we may say that, though Pan-Turanian
in theory, the movement was at that time in practice little more than
"Pan-Turkism."
It was the Balkan wars of 1912-13 which really precipitated full-fledged
Pan-Turanism. Those wars not merely expelled the Turks from the Balkans
and turned their eyes increasingly toward Asia, but also roused such
hatred of the victorious Serbs in the breasts of Hungarians and
Bulgarians that both these peoples proclaimed their "Turanian" origins
and toyed with ideas of "Pan-Turanian" solidarity against the menace of
Serbo-Russian "Pan-Slavism."[163] The Pan-Turanian thinkers were
assuredly evolving a body of doctrine grandiose enough to satisfy the
most ambitious hopes. Emphasizing the great virility and nerve-force
everywhere patent in the Turanian stocks, these thinkers saw in Turan
the dominant race of the morrow. Zealous students of Western
evolutionism and ethnology, they were evolving their own special theory
of race grandeur and decadence. According to Pan-Turanian teaching, the
historic peoples of southern Asia--Arabs, Persians, and Hindus--are
hopelessly degenerate. As for the Europeans, they have recently passed
their apogee, and, exhausted by the consuming fires of modern
industrialism, are already entering upon their decline. It is the
Turanians, with their inherent virility and steady nerves unspoiled by
the wear and tear of Western civilization, who must be the great dynamic
of the future. Indeed, some Pan-Turanian thinkers go so far as to
proclaim that it is the sacred mission of their race to revitalize a
whole senescent, worn-out world by the saving infusion of regenerative
Turanian blood.[164]
Of course the Pan-Turanians recognized that anything like a realization
of their ambitious dreams was dependent upon the virtual destruction of
the Russian Empire. In fact, Russia, with its Tartars, Turkomans,
Kirghiz, Finns, and numerous kindred tribes, was in Pan-Turanian eyes
merely a Slav alluvium laid with varying thickness over a Turanian
subsoil. This turning of Russia into a vast "Turania irredenta" was
certainly an ambitious order. Nevertheless, the Pan-Turanians counted on
powerful Western backing. They realized that Germany and Austria-Hungary
were fast drifting toward war with Russia, and they felt that such a
cataclysm, however perilous, would also offer most glorious
possibilities.
These Pan-Turanian aspirations undoubtedly had a great deal to do with
driving Turkey into the Great War on the side of the Central Empires.
Certainly, Enver Pasha and most of the other leaders of the governing
group had long been more or less affiliated with the Pan-Turanian
movement. Of course the Turkish Government had more than one string to
its bow. It tried to drive Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism in double
harness, using the "Holy War" agitation for pious Moslems everywhere,
while it redoubled Pan-Turanian propaganda among the Turko-Tartar
peoples. A good statement of Pan-Turanian ambitions in the early years
of the war is that of the publicist Tekin Alp in his book, _The Turkish
and Pan-Turkish Ideal_, published in 1915. Says Tekin Alp: "With the
crushing of Russian despotism by the brave German, Austrian, and Turkish
armies, 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 Turanians will receive their
independence. With the 10,000,000 Ottoman Turks, this will form a nation
of 50,000,000, advancing toward a great civilization which may perhaps
be compared with that of Germany, in that it will have the strength and
energy to rise even higher. In some ways it will be superior to the
degenerate French and English civilizations."
With the collapse of Russia after the Bolshevik revolution at the end of
1917, Pan-Turanian hopes knew no bounds. So certain were they of triumph
that they began to flout even their German allies, thus revealing that
hatred of all Europeans which had always lurked at the back of their
minds. A German staff-officer thus describes the table-talk of Halil
Pasha, the Turkish commander of the Mesopotamian front and uncle of
Enver: "First of all, every tribe with a Turkish mother-tongue must be
forged into a single nation. The national principle was supreme; so it
was the design to conquer Turkestan, the cradle of Turkish power and
glory. That was the first task. From that base connections must be
established with the Yakutes of Siberia, who were considered, on account
of their linguistic kinship, the remotest outposts of the Turkish blood
to the eastward. The closely related Tartar tribes of the Caucasus must
naturally join this union. Armenians and Georgians, who form minority
nationalities in that territory, must either submit voluntarily or be
subjugated.... Such a great compact Turkish Empire, exercising hegemony
over all the Islamic world, would exert a powerful attraction upon
Afghanistan and Persia.... In December, 1917, when the Turkish front in
Mesopotamia threatened to yield, Halil Pasha said to me, half vexed, half
jokingly: 'Supposing we let the English have this cursed desert hole and
go to Turkestan, where I will erect a new empire for my little boy.' He
had named his youngest son after the great conqueror and destroyer,
Jenghiz Khan."[165]
As a matter of fact, the summer of 1918 saw Transcaucasia and northern
Persia overrun by Turkish armies headed for Central Asia. Then came the
German collapse in the West and the end of the war, apparently dooming
Turkey to destruction. For the moment the Pan-Turanians were stunned.
Nevertheless, their hopes were soon destined to revive, as we shall
presently see.
Before describing the course of events in the Near East since 1918,
which need to be treated as a unit, let us go back to consider the
earlier developments of the other "second-stage" nationalist movements
in the Moslem world. We have already seen how, concurrently with Turkish
nationalism, Arab nationalism was likewise evolving into the "racial"
stage, the ideal being a great "Pan-Arab" empire, embracing not merely
the ethnically Arab peninsula-homeland, Syria, and Mesopotamia, but also
the Arabized regions of Egypt, Tripoli, French North Africa, and the
Sudan.