POLITICAL CHANGE
The Orient's chief handicap has been its vicious political tradition.
From earliest times the typical form of government in the East has been
despotism--the arbitrary rule of an absolute monarch, whose subjects are
slaves, holding their goods, their honours, their very lives, at his
will and pleasure. The sole consistent check upon Oriental despotism has
been religion. Some critics may add "custom"; but it amounts to the same
thing, for in the East custom always acquires a religious sanction. The
mantle of religion of course covers its ministers, the priests forming a
privileged caste. But, with these exceptions, Oriental despotism has
usually known no bounds; and the despot, so long as he respected
religion and the priesthood, has been able to act pretty much as he
chose. In the very dawn of history we see Pharaoh exhausting all Egypt
to gratify his whim for a colossal pyramid tomb, and throughout history
Oriental life has been cursed by this fatal political simplicity.
Now manifold human experience has conclusively proved that despotism is
a bad form of government in the long run. Of course there is the
legendary "benevolent despot"--the "father of his people," surrounded by
wise counsellors and abolishing evils by a nod or a stroke of the pen.
That is all very well in a fairy-tale. But in real life the "benevolent
despot" rarely happens and still more rarely succeeds himself. The
"father of his people" usually has a pompous son and a vicious grandson,
who bring the people to ruin. The melancholy trinity--David, Solomon,
Rehoboam--has reappeared with depressing regularity throughout history.
Furthermore, even the benevolent despot has his limitations. The trouble
with all despots, good or bad, is that their rule is entirely
_personal_. Everything, in the last analysis, depends on the despot's
personal will. Nothing is fixed or certain. The benevolent despot
himself may discard his benevolence overnight, and the fate of an empire
may be jeopardized by the monarch's infatuation for a woman or by an
upset in his digestion.
We Occidentals have, in fact, never known "despotism," in its Simon
Pure, Oriental sense; not even under the Roman Empire. Indeed, we can
hardly conceive what it means. When we speak of a benevolent despot we
usually think of the "enlightened autocrats" of eighteenth-century
Europe, such as Frederick the Great. But these monarchs were not
"despots" as Orientals understand it. Take Frederick, for example. He
was regarded as absolute. But his subjects were not slaves. Those proud
Prussian officers, starched bureaucrats, stiff-necked burghers, and
stubborn peasants each had his sense of personal dignity and legal
status. The unquestioning obedience which they gave Frederick was given
not merely because he was their king, but also because they knew that he
was the hardest-working man in Prussia and tireless in his devotion to
the state. If Frederick had suddenly changed into a lazy, depraved,
capricious tyrant, his "obedient" Prussians would have soon showed him
that there were limits to his power.
In the Orient it is quite otherwise. In the East "there lies upon the
eyes and foreheads of all men a law which is not found in the European
decalogue; and this law runs: 'Thou shalt honour and worship the man
whom God shall set above thee for thy King: if he cherish thee, thou
shalt love him; and if he plunder and oppress thee thou shalt still love
him, for thou art his slave and his chattel.'"[111] The Eastern monarch
may immure himself in his harem, casting the burdens of state upon the
shoulders of a grand vizier. This vizier has thenceforth limitless
power; the life of every subject is in his hands. Yet, any evening, at
the pout of a dancing-girl, the monarch may send from his harem to the
vizier's palace a negro "mute," armed with the bowstring. And when that
black mute arrives, the vizier, doffing his robe of office, and with
neither question nor remonstrance, will bare his neck to be strangled.
That is real despotism--the despotism that the East has known.
Such is the political tradition of the Orient. And it is surely obvious
that under such a tradition neither ordered government nor consistent
progress is possible. Eastern history is, in fact, largely a record of
sudden flowerings and equally sudden declines. A strong, able man cuts
his way to power in a period of confusion and decay. He must be strong
and able, or he would not win over other men of similar nature
struggling for the coveted prize. His energy and ability soon work
wonders. He knows the rough-and-ready way of getting things done. His
vigour and resolution supply the driving-power required to compel his
subordinates to act with reasonable efficiency, especially since
incompetence or dishonesty are punished with the terrible severity of
the Persian king who flayed an unjust satrap alive and made the skin
into the seat of the official chair on which the new satrap sat to
administer justice.
While the master lives, things may go well. But the master dies, and is
succeeded by his son. This son, even assuming that he has inherited much
of his father's ability, has had the worst possible upbringing. Raised
in the harem, surrounded by obsequious slaves and designing women,
neither his pride nor his passions have been effectively restrained, and
he grows up a pompous tyrant and probably precociously depraved. Such a
man will not be apt to look after things as his father did. And as soon
as the master's eye shifts, things begin to go to pieces. How can it be
otherwise? His father built up no governmental machine, functioning
almost automatically, as in the West. His officers worked from fear or
personal loyalty; not out of a patriotic sense of duty or impersonal
_esprit de corps_. Under the grandson, matters get even worse, power
slips from his incompetent hands and is parcelled out among many local
despots, of whom the strongest cuts his way to power, assuming that the
decadent state is not overrun by some foreign conqueror. In either
eventuality, the old cycle--David, Solomon, Rehoboam--is finished, and a
new cycle begins--with the same destined end.
That, in a nutshell, is the political history of the East. It has,
however, been modified or temporarily interrupted by the impact of more
liberal political influences, exerted sometimes from special Eastern
regions and sometimes from the West. Not all the Orient has been given
over to unrelieved despotism. Here and there have been peoples (mostly
mountain or pastoral peoples) who abhorred despotism. Such a people have
always been the Arabs. We have already seen how the Arabs, fired by
Islam, established a mighty caliphate which, in its early days, was a
theocratic democracy. Of course we have also seen how the older
tradition of despotism reasserted itself over most of the Moslem world,
how the democratic caliphate turned into a despotic sultanate, and how
the liberty-loving Arabs retired sullenly to their deserts. Political
liberalism, like religious liberalism, was crushed and almost forgotten.
Almost--not quite; for memories of the Meccan caliphate, like memories
of Motazelism, remained in the back of men's minds, ready to come forth
again with better days. After all, free Arabia still stood, with every
Arab tribesman armed to the teeth to see that it kept free. And then,
there was Islam. No court theologian could entirely explain away the
fact that Mohammed had said things like "All Believers are brothers" and
"All Moslems are free." No court chronicler could entirely expunge from
Moslem annals the story of Islam's early days, known as the
Wakti-Seadet, or "Age of Blessedness." Even in the darkest times
Moslems of liberal tendencies must have been greatly interested to read
that the first caliph, Abu Bekr, after his election by the people, said:
"Oh nation! you have chosen me, the most unworthy among you, for your
caliph. Support me as long as my actions are just. If otherwise,
admonish me, rouse me to a sense of my duty. Truth alone is desirable,
and lies are despicable.... As I am the guardian of the weak, obey me
only so long as I obey the Sheriat [Divine Law]. But if you see that I
deviate but in the minutest details from this law, you need obey me no
more."[112]
In fine, no subsequent distortions could entirely obliterate the fact
that primitive Islam was the supreme expression of a freedom-loving folk
whose religion must necessarily contain many liberal tendencies. Even
the sheriat, or canon law, is, as Professor Lybyer states,
"fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to absolutism."[113]
Vambéry well summarizes this matter when he writes: "It is not Islam and
its doctrines which have devastated the western portion of Asia and
brought about the present sad state of things; but it is the tyranny of
the Moslem princes, who have wilfully perverted the doctrines of the
Prophet, and sought and found maxims in the Koran as a basis for their
despotic rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of doubt in
matters of religion, and, efficaciously distorting and crushing all
liberal principles, they have prevented the dawn of a Moslem
Renaissance."[114]
In the opening chapter we saw how Oriental despotism reached its evil
maximum in the eighteenth century, and how the Mohammedan Revival was
not merely a puritan reformation of religion, but was also in part a
political protest against the vicious and contemptible tyrants who
misruled the Moslem world. This internal movement of political
liberalism was soon cross-cut by another political current coming in
from the West. Comparing the miserable decrepitude of the Moslem East
with Europe's prosperity and vigour, thinking Moslems were beginning to
recognize their shortcomings, and they could not avoid the conclusion
that their woes were in large part due to their wretched governments.
Indeed, a few even of the Moslem princes came to realize that there must
be some adoption of Western political methods if their countries were to
be saved from destruction. The most notable examples of this new type of
Oriental sovereign were Sultan Mahmud II of Turkey and Mehemet Ali of
Egypt, both of whom came to power about the beginning of the nineteenth
century.
Of course none of these reforming princes had the slightest idea of
granting their subjects constitutional liberties or of transforming
themselves into limited monarchs. They intended to remain absolute, but
absolute more in the sense of the "enlightened autocrat" of Europe and
less in the sense of the purely Oriental despot. What they wanted were
true organs of government--army, civil service, judiciary, etc.--which
would function efficiently and semi-automatically as governmental
machinery, and not as mere amorphous masses of individuals who had to be
continuously prodded and punished by the sovereign in order to get
anything done.
Mahmud II, Mehemet Ali, and their princely colleagues persisted in their
new policies, but the outcome of these "reforms from above" was, on the
whole, disappointing. The monarchs might build barracks and bureaux on
European models and fill them with soldiers and bureaucrats in European
clothes, but they did not get European results. Most of these
"Western-type" officials knew almost nothing about the West, and were
therefore incapable of doing things in Western fashion. In fact, they
had small heart for the business. Devoid of any sort of enthusiasm for
ideas and institutions which they did not comprehend, they applied
themselves to the work of reform with secret ill-will and repugnance,
moved only by blind obedience to their sovereign's command. As time
passed, the military branches did gain some modern efficiency, but the
civil services made little progress, adopting many Western bureaucratic
vices but few or none of the virtues.
Meanwhile reformers of quite a different sort began to appear: men
demanding Western innovations like constitutions, parliaments, and other
phenomena of modern political life. Their numbers were constantly
recruited from the widening circles of men acquainted with Western ideas
through the books, pamphlets, and newspapers which were being
increasingly published, and through the education given by schools on
the Western model which were springing up. The third quarter of the
nineteenth century saw the formation of genuine political parties in
Turkey, and in 1876 the liberal groups actually wrung from a weak sultan
the grant of a parliament.
These early successes of Moslem political liberalism were, however,
followed by a period of reaction. The Moslem princes had become
increasingly alarmed at the growth of liberal agitation among their
subjects and were determined to maintain their despotic authority. The
new Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, promptly suppressed his parliament,
savagely persecuted the liberals, and restored the most uncompromising
despotism. In Persia the Shah repressed a nascent liberal movement with
equal severity, while in Egypt the spendthrift rule of Khedive Ismail
ended all native political life by provoking European intervention and
the imposition of British rule. Down to the Young-Turk revolution of
1908 there were few overt signs of liberal agitation in those Moslem
countries which still retained their independence. Nevertheless, the
agitation was there, working underground. Hundreds of youthful patriots
fled abroad, both to obtain an education and to conduct their liberal
propaganda, and from havens of refuge like Switzerland these
"Young-Turks," "Young-Persians," and others issued manifestoes and
published revolutionary literature which was smuggled into their
homelands and eagerly read by their oppressed brethren.[115]
As the years passed, the cry for liberty grew steadily in strength. A
young Turkish poet wrote at this time: "All that we admire in European
culture as the fruit of science and art is simply the outcome of
liberty. Everything derives its light from the bright star of liberty.
Without liberty a nation has no power, no prosperity; without liberty
there is no happiness; and without happiness, existence, true life,
eternal life, is impossible. Everlasting praise and glory to the shining
light of freedom!"[116] By the close of the nineteenth century
keen-sighted European observers noted the working of the liberal ferment
under the surface calm of absolutist repression. Thus, Arminius Vambéry,
revisiting Constantinople in 1896, was astounded by the liberal
evolution that had taken place since his first sojourn in Turkey forty
years before. Although Constantinople was subjected to the severest
phase of Hamidian despotism, Vambéry wrote, "The old attachment of
Turkey for the absolute régime is done for. We hear much in Europe of
the 'Young-Turk' Party; we hear even of a constitutional movement,
political emigrés, revolutionary pamphlets. But what we do not realize
is the ferment which exists in the different social classes, and which
gives us the conviction that the Turk is in progress and is no longer
clay in the hands of his despotic potter. In Turkey, therefore, it is
not a question of a Young-Turk Party, because every civilized Ottoman
belongs to this party."[117]
In this connection we should note the stirrings of unrest that were now
rapidly developing in the Eastern lands subject to European political
control. By the close of the nineteenth century only four considerable
Moslem states--Turkey, Persia, Morocco, and Afghanistan--retained
anything like independence from European domination. Since Afghanistan
and Morocco were so backward that they could hardly be reckoned as
civilized countries, it was only in Turkey and Persia that genuine
liberal movements against native despotism could arise. But in
European-ruled countries like India, Egypt, and Algeria, the cultural
level of the inhabitants was high enough to engender liberal political
aspirations as well as that mere dislike of foreign rule which may be
felt by savages as well as by civilized peoples.
These liberal aspirations were of course stimulated by the movements
against native despotism in Turkey and Persia. Nevertheless, the two
sets of phenomena must be sharply distinguished from each other. The
Turkish and Persian agitations were essentially movements of liberal
reform. The Indian, Egyptian, Algerian, and kindred agitations were
essentially movements for independence, with no settled programme as to
how that independence should be used after it had been attained. These
latter movements are, in fact, "nationalist" rather than liberal in
character, and it is in the chapters devoted to nationalism that they
will be discussed. The point to be noted here is that they are really
coalitions, against the foreign ruler, of men holding very diverse
political ideas, embracing as these "nationalist" coalitions do not
merely genuine liberals but also self-seeking demagogues and even stark
reactionaries who would like to fasten upon their liberated countries
the yoke of the blackest despotism. Of course all the nationalist groups
use the familiar slogans "freedom" and "liberty"; nevertheless, what
many of them mean is merely freedom and liberty _from foreign
tutelage_--in other words, independence. We must always remember that
patriotism has no essential connection with liberalism. The Spanish
peasants, who shouted "liberty" as they rose against Napoleon's armies,
greeted their contemptible tyrant-king with delirious enthusiasm and
welcomed his glorification of absolutism with cries of "Long live
chains!"
The period of despotic reaction which had afflicted Turkey and Persia
since the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century came
dramatically to an end in the year 1908. Both countries exploded into
revolution, the Turks deposing the tyrant Abdul Hamid, the Persians
rising against their infamous ruler Muhammad Ali Shah, "perhaps the most
perverted, cowardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced the
throne of Persia in many generations."[118] These revolutions released
the pent-up liberal forces which had been slowly gathering strength
under the repression of the previous generation, and the upshot was that
Turkey and Persia alike blossomed out with constitutions, parliaments,
and all the other political machinery of the West.
How the new régimes would have worked in normal times it is profitless
to speculate, because, as a matter of fact, the times were abnormal to
the highest degree. Unfortunately for the Turks and Persians, they had
made their revolutions just when the world was entering that profound
_malaise_ which culminated in the Great War. Neither Turkey nor Persia
were allowed time to attempt the difficult process of political
transformation. Lynx-eyed Western chancelleries noted every blunder and,
in the inevitable weakness of transition, pounced upon them to their
undoing. The Great War merely completed a process of Western aggression
and intervention which had begun some years before.
This virtual absence of specific fact-data renders largely academic any
discussion of the much-debated question whether or not the peoples of
the Near and Middle East are capable of "self-government"; that is, of
establishing and maintaining ordered, constitutional political life.
Opinions on this point are at absolute variance. Personally, I have not
been able to make up my mind on the matter, so I shall content myself
with stating the various arguments without attempting to draw any
general conclusion. Before stating these contrasted view-points,
however, I would draw attention to the distinction which should be made
between the Mohammedan peoples and the non-Mohammedan Hindus of India.
Moslems everywhere possess the democratic political example of Arabia as
well as a religion which, as regards its own followers at least,
contains many liberal tendencies. The Hindus have nothing like this.
Their political tradition has been practically that of unrelieved
Oriental despotism, the only exceptions being a few primitive
self-governing communities in very early times, which never exerted any
widespread influence and quickly faded away. As for Brahminism, the
Hindu religion, it is perhaps the most illiberal cult which ever
afflicted mankind, dividing society as it does into an infinity of rigid
castes between which no real intercourse is possible; each caste
regarding all those of lesser rank as unclean, polluting creatures,
scarcely to be distinguished from animals. It is obvious that with such
handicaps the establishment of true self-government will be apt to be
more difficult for Hindus than for Mohammedans, and the reader should
keep this point in mind in the discussion which follows.
Considering first the attitude of those who do not believe the peoples
of the Near and Middle East capable of real self-government in the
Western sense either now or in the immediate future, we find this
thesis both ably and emphatically stated by Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer
believed that the ancient tradition of despotism was far too strong to
be overcome, at least in our time. "From the dawn of history," he
asserts, "Eastern politics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity.
Do not let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple idea of
despotic rule will readily give way to the far more complex conception
of ordered liberty. The transformation, if it ever takes place at all,
will probably be the work, not of generations, but of centuries.... Our
primary duty, therefore, is, not to introduce a system which, under the
specious cloak of free institutions, will enable a small minority of
natives to misgovern their countrymen, but to establish one which will
enable the mass of the population to be governed according to the code
of Christian morality. A freely elected Egyptian parliament, supposing
such a thing to be possible, would not improbably legislate for the
protection of the slave-owner, if not the slave-dealer, and no assurance
can be felt that the electors of Rajputana, if they had their own way,
would not re-establish suttee. Good government has the merit of
presenting a more or less attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attain
anything approaching to the British ideal of self-government, they will
have to undergo very numerous transmigrations of political thought." And
Lord Cromer concludes pessimistically: "It will probably never be
possible to make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear."[119]
In similar vein, the veteran English publicist Doctor Dillon, writing
after the Turkish and Persian revolutions, had little hope in their
success, and ridiculed the current "faith in the sacramental virtue of
constitutional government." For, he continues: "No parchment yet
manufactured, and no constitution drafted by the sons of men, can do
away with the foundations of national character. Flashy phrases and
elegant declamations may persuade people that they have been transmuted;
but they alter no facts, and in Persia's case the facts point to utter
incapacity for self-government." Referring to the Persian revolution,
Doctor Dillon continues: "At bottom, only names of persons and things
have been altered; men may come and men may go, but anarchy goes on for
ever.... Financial support of the new government is impossible. For
foreign capitalists will not give money to be squandered by filibusters
and irresponsible agitators who, like bubbles in boiling water, appear
on the surface and disappear at once."[120]
A high French colonial official thus characterizes the Algerians and
other Moslem populations of French North Africa: "Our natives need to be
governed. They are big children, incapable of going alone. We should
guide them firmly, stand no nonsense from them, and crush intriguers and
agents of sedition. At the same time, we should protect them, direct
them paternally, and especially obtain influence over them by the
constant example of our moral superiority. Above all: no vain
humanitarian illusions, both in the interest of France and of the
natives themselves."[121]
Many observers, particularly colonial officials, have been disappointed
with the way Orientals have used experimental first steps in
self-government like Advisory Councils granted by the European rulers;
have used them, that is, to play politics and grasp for more power,
instead of devoting themselves to the duties assigned. As Lord Kitchener
said in his 1913 report on the state of Egypt: "Representative bodies
can only be safely developed when it is shown that they are capable of
performing adequately their present functions, and that there is good
hope that they could undertake still more important and arduous
responsibilities. If representative government, in its simplest form,
is found to be unworkable, there is little prospect of its becoming more
useful when its scope is extended. No government would be insane enough
to consider that, because an Advisory Council had proved itself unable
to carry out its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner, it
should therefore be given a larger measure of power and control."[122]
These nationalist agitations arise primarily among the native upper
classes and Western-educated élites, however successful they may be in
inflaming the ignorant masses, who are often quite contented with the
material benefits of enlightened European rule. This point is well
brought out by a leading American missionary in India, with a lifetime
of experience in that country, who wrote some years ago: "The common
people of India are, now, on the whole, more contented with their
government than they ever were before. It is the classes, rather, who
reveal the real spirit of discontent.... If the common people were let
alone by the agitators, there would not be a more loyal people on earth
than the people of India. But the educated classes are certainly
possessed of a new ambition, politically, and will no longer remain
satisfied with inferior places of responsibility and lower posts of
emolument.... These people have little or no sympathy with the kind of
government which is gradually being extended to them. Ultimately they do
not ask for representative institutions, which will give them a share in
the government of their own land. What they really seek is absolute
control. The Brahmin (only five per cent. of the community) believes that
he has been divinely appointed to rule the country and would withhold
the franchise from all others. The Sudra--the Bourgeois of India--would
no more think of giving the ballot to the fifty million Pariahs of the
land than he would give it to his dog. It is the British power that has
introduced, and now maintains, the equality of rights and privileges
for all the people of the land."[123]
The apprehension that India, if liberated from British control, might be
exploited by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy is shared not only by
Western observers but also by multitudes of low-caste Hindus, known
collectively as the "Depressed Classes". These people oppose the Indian
nationalist agitation for fear of losing their present protection under
the British "Raj." They believe that India still needs generations of
education and social reform before it is fit for "home rule," much less
independence, and they have organized into a powerful association the
"Namasudra," which is loyalist and anti-nationalist in character.
The Namasudra view-point is well expressed by its leader, Doctor Nair.
"Democracy as a catchword," he says, "has already reached India and is
widely used. But the spirit of democracy still pauses east of Suez, and
will find it hard to secure a footing in a country where caste is
strongly intrenched.... I do not want to lay the charge of oppressing
the lower castes at the door of any particular caste. All the higher
castes take a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all the
non-Brahmin castes. The high-caste non-Brahmin oppresses all the castes
below him.... We want a real democracy and not an oligarchy, however
camouflaged by many high-sounding words. Moreover, if an oligarchy is
established now, it will be a perpetual oligarchy. We further say that
we should prefer a delayed democracy to an immediate oligarchy, having
more trust in a sympathetic British bureaucracy than in an unsympathetic
oligarchy of the so-called high castes who have been oppressing us in
the past and will do so again but for the British Government. Our
attitude is based, not on 'faith' alone, but on the instinct of
self-preservation."[124]
Many Mohammedans as well as Hindus feel that India is not ripe for
self-government, and that the relaxing of British authority now, or in
the immediate future, would be a grave disaster for India itself. The
Moslem loyalists reprobate the nationalist agitation for the reasons
expressed by one of their representative men, S. Khuda Bukhsh, who
remarks: "Rightly or wrongly, I have always kept aloof from modern
Indian politics, and I have always held that we should devote more
attention to social problems and intellectual advancement and less to
politics, which, in our present condition, is an unmixed evil. I am
firmly persuaded that we would consult our interest better by leaving
politics severely alone.... It is not a handful of men armed with the
learning and culture of the West, but it is the masses that must feel,
understand, and take an intelligent interest in their own affairs. The
infinitesimal educated minority do not constitute the population of
India. It is the masses, therefore, that must be trained, educated,
brought to the level of unassailable uprightness and devotion to their
country. This goal is yet far beyond measurable reach, but until we
attain it our hopes will be a chimera, and our efforts futile and
illusory. Even the educated minority have scarcely cast off the
swaddling-clothes of political infancy, or have risen above the
illusions of power and the ambitions of fortune. We have yet to learn
austerity of principle and rectitude of conduct. Nor can we hope to
raise the standard of private and public morality so long as we continue
to subordinate the interest of our community and country to our
own."[125]
Such pronouncements as these from considerable portions of the native
population give pause even to those liberal English students of Indian
affairs who are convinced of the theoretical desirability of Indian home
rule. As one of these, Edwyn Bevan, says: "When Indian Nationalists ask
for freedom, they mean autonomy; they want to get rid of the foreigner.
Our answer as given in the reforms is:[126] 'Yes, autonomy you shall
have, but on one condition--that you have democracy as well. We will
give up the control as soon as there is an Indian people which can
control its native rulers; we will not give up the control to an Indian
oligarchy.' This is the root of the disagreement between those who say
that India might have self-government immediately and those who say that
India can only become capable of self-government with time. For the
former, by 'self-government', mean autonomy, and it is perfectly true
that India might be made autonomous immediately. If the foreign control
were withdrawn to-day, some sort of indigenous government or group of
governments would, no doubt, after a period of confusion, come into
being in India. But it would not be democratic government; it would be
the despotic rule of the stronger or more cunning."[127]
The citations just quoted portray the standpoint of those critics, both
Western and Oriental, who maintain that the peoples of the Near and
Middle East are incapable of self-government in our sense, at least
to-day or in the immediate future. Let us now examine the views of those
who hold a more optimistic attitude. Some observers stress strongly
Islam's liberal tendencies as a foundation on which to erect political
structures in the modern sense. Vambéry says, "Islam is still the most
democratic religion in the world, a religion favouring both liberty and
equality. If there ever was a constitutional government, it was that of
the first Caliphs."[128] A close English student of the Near East
declares: "Tribal Arabia has the only true form of democratic government,
and the Arab tribesman goes armed to make sure that it continues
democratic--as many a would-be despot knows to his cost."[129]
Regarding the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Professor Lybyer remarks:
"Turkey was not so unprepared for parliamentary institutions as might at
first sight appear. There lay hidden some precedent, much preparation,
and a strong desire, for parliamentary government. Both the religious
and the secular institutions of Turkey involve precedents for a
parliament. Mohammed himself conferred with the wisest of his
companions. The Ulema[130] have taken counsel together up to the present
time. The Sacred Law (Sheriat) is fundamentally democratic and opposed
in essence to absolutism. The habit of regarding it as fundamental law
enables even the most ignorant of Mohammedans to grasp the idea of a
Constitution." He points out that the early sultans had their "Divan,"
or assemblage of high officials, meeting regularly to give the sultan
information and advice, while more recently there have been a Council of
State and a Council of Ministers. Also, there were the parliaments of
1877 and 1878. Abortive though these were and followed by Hamidian
absolutism, they were legal precedents, never forgotten. From all this
Professor Lybyer concludes: "The Turkish Parliament may therefore be
regarded, not as a complete innovation, but as an enlargement and
improvement of familiar institutions."[131]
Regarding Persia, the American W. Morgan Shuster, whom the Persian
Revolutionary Government called in to organize the country's finances,
and who was ousted in less than a year by Russo-British pressure,
expresses an optimistic regard for the political capacities of the
Persian people.
"I believe," he says, "that there has never been in the history of the
world an instance where a people changed suddenly from an absolute
monarchy to a constitutional or representative form of government and at
once succeeded in displaying a high standard of political wisdom and
knowledge of legislative procedure. Such a thing is inconceivable and
not to be expected by any reasonable person. The members of the first
Medjlis[132] were compelled to fight for their very existence from the
day that the Parliament was constituted.... They had no time for serious
legislative work, and but little hope that any measures which they might
enact would be put into effect.
"The second and last Medjlis, practically all of whose members I knew
personally, was doubtless incompetent if it were to be judged by the
standards of the British Parliament or the American Congress. It would
be strange indeed if an absolutely new and untried government in a land
filled with the decay of ages should, from the outset, be able to
conduct its business as well as governments with generations and even
centuries of experience behind them. We should make allowances for lack
of technical knowledge; for the important question, of course, is that
the Medjlis in the main represented the new and just ideals and
aspirations of the Persian people. Its members were men of more than
average education; some displayed remarkable talent, character, and
courage.... They responded enthusiastically to any patriotic suggestion
which was put before them. They themselves lacked any great knowledge of
governmental finances, but they realized the situation and were both
willing and anxious to put their full confidence in any foreign advisers
who showed themselves capable of resisting political intrigues and
bribery and working for the welfare of the Persian people.
"No Parliament can rightly be termed incompetent when it has the support
of an entire people, when it recognizes its own limitations, and when
its members are willing to undergo great sacrifices for their nation's
dignity and sovereign rights....
"As to the Persian people themselves, it is difficult to generalize. The
great mass of the population is composed of peasants and tribesmen, all
densely ignorant. On the other hand, many thousands have been educated
abroad, or have travelled after completing their education at home.
They, or at least certain elements among them which had had the support
of the masses, proved their capacity to assimilate Western civilization
and ideals. They changed despotism into democracy in the face of untold
obstacles. Opportunities were equalized to such a degree that any man of
ability could occupy the highest official posts. As a race they showed
during the past five years an unparalleled eagerness for education.
Hundreds of schools were established during the Constitutional régime. A
remarkable free press sprang up overnight, and fearless writers came
forward to denounce injustice and tyranny whether from within their
country or without. The Persians were anxious to adopt wholesale the
political, ethical, and business codes of the most modern and
progressive nations. They burned with that same spirit of Asiatic unrest
which pervades India, which produced the 'Young-Turk' movement, and
which has more recently manifested itself in the establishment of the
Chinese Republic."[133]
Mr. Shuster concludes: "Kipling has intimated that you cannot hustle the
East. This includes a warning and a reflection. Western men and Western
ideals _can_ hustle the East, provided the Orientals realize that they
are being carried along lines reasonably beneficial to themselves. As a
matter of fact, the moral appeal and the appeal of race-pride and
patriotism, are as strong in the East as in the West, though it does not
lie so near the surface, and naturally the Oriental displays no great
desire to be hustled when it is along lines beneficial only to the
Westerner."[134]
Indeed, many Western liberals believe that European rule, however
benevolent and efficient, will never prepare the Eastern peoples for
true self-government; and that the only way they will learn is by trying
it out themselves. This view-point is admirably stated by the well-known
British publicist Lionel Curtis. Speaking of India, Mr. Curtis says that
education and kindred benefits conferred by British rule will not, of
themselves, "avail to prepare Indians for the task of responsible
government. On the contrary, education will prove a danger and positive
mischief, unless accompanied by a definite instalment of political
responsibility. It is in the workshops of actual experience alone that
electorates will acquire the art of self-government, however highly
educated they may be.
"There must, I urge, be a devolution of definite powers on electorates.
The officers of Government[135] must give every possible help and advice
to the new authorities, for which those authorities may ask. They must
act as their foster-mothers, not as stepmothers. But if the new
authorities are to learn the art of responsible government, they must be
free from control from above. Not otherwise will they learn to feel
themselves responsible to the electorate below. Nor will the electorates
themselves learn that the remedy for their sufferings rests in their own
hands. Suffering there will be, and it is only by suffering,
self-inflicted and perhaps long endured, that a people will learn the
faculty of self-help, and genuine electorates be brought into being....
"I am proud to think that England has conferred immeasurable good on
India by creating order and showing Indians what orderly government
means. But, this having been done, I do not believe the system can now
be continued as it is, without positive damage to the character of the
people. The burden of trusteeship must be transferred, piece by piece,
from the shoulders of Englishmen to those of Indians in some sort able
to bear it. Their strength and numbers must be developed. But that can
be done by the exercise of actual responsibility steadily increased as
they can bear it. It cannot be done by any system of school-teaching,
though such teaching is an essential concomitant of the process.
"The goal now set by the recent announcement of the Secretary of
State[136] will only be reached through trouble. Yet troublous as the
times before us may be, we have at last reached that stage of our work
in India which is truly consonant with our own traditions. The task is
one worthy of this epoch in our history, if only because it calls for
the effacement of ourselves."[137]
Mr. Curtis's concluding words foreshadow a process which is to-day
actually going on, not only in India but in other parts of the East as
well. The Great War has so strengthened Eastern nationalist aspirations
and has so weakened European power and prestige that a widespread
relaxing of Europe's hold over the Orient is taking place. This process
may make for good or for ill, but it is apparently inevitable; and a
generation (perhaps a decade) hence may see most of the Near and Middle
East autonomous or even independent. Whether the liberated peoples will
misuse their opportunities and fall into despotism or anarchy, or
whether they succeed in establishing orderly, progressive,
constitutional governments, remains to be seen. We have examined the
factors, pro and con. Let us leave the problem in the only way in which
to-day it can scientifically be left--on a note of interrogation.
FOOTNOTES:
[111] T. Morison, _Imperial Rule in India_, p. 43 (London, 1899).
[112] Quoted from Arminius Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_,
pp. 305-306 (London, 1906).
[113] A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," _Proceedings of the
American Political Science Association_, Vol. VII., p. 67 (1910).
[114] Vambéry, _op. cit._, p. 307.
[115] A good account of these liberal movements during the nineteenth
century is found in Vambéry, "Freiheitliche Bestrebungen im moslimischen
Asien," _Deutsche Rundschau_, October, 1893; a shorter summary
of Vambéry's views is found in his _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_,
especially chap. v. Also, see articles by Léon Cahun, previously noted,
in Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Générale_, Vols. XI. and XII.
[116] Vambéry, _supra_, p. 332.
[117] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 22
(Paris, 1898).
[118] W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, p. xxi (New York,
1912).
[119] Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, pp. 25-28.
[120] E. J. Dillon, "Persia not Ripe for Self-Government," _Contemporary
Review_, April, 1910.
[121] E. Mercier, _La Question indigène_, p. 220 (Paris, 1901).
[122] "Egypt," No. 1 (1914), p. 6.
[123] Rev. J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India," _Journal of
Race Development_, July, 1910.
[124] Dr. T. Madavan Nair, "Caste and Democracy," _Edinburgh Review_,
October, 1918.
[125] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 213-214 (London, 1912).
[126] _I. e._, the increase of self-government granted India by Britain
as a result of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.
[127] E. Bevan, "The Reforms in India," _The New Europe_, January 29,
1920.
[128] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p.
58.
[129] G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_, pp. 202-203 (London, 1919).
[130] The assembly of religious notables.
[131] A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," _Proceedings of the
American Political Science Association_, Vol. VII., pp. 66-67 (1910).
[132] The name of the Persian Parliament.
[133] Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, pp. 240-246.
[134] _Ibid._, p. 333.
[135] _I. e._, the British Government of India.
[136] _I. e._, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, previously noted.
[137] Lionel Curtis, _Letters to the People of India on Responsible
Government_, pp. 159-160 (London, 1918).