though its general trend is so similar that its doctrines need not be
discussed in detail. One important difference between the two movements
is that Pan-Arabism is much more religious and Pan-Islamic in character,
the Arabs regarding themselves as "The Chosen People" divinely
predestined to dominate the whole Islamic world. Pan-Arabism also lacks
Pan-Turanism's unity of direction. There have been two distinct
intellectual centres--Syria and Egypt. In fact, it is in Egypt that
Pan-Arab schemes have been most concretely elaborated, the Egyptian
programme looking toward a reunion of the Arab-speaking lands under the
Khedive--perhaps at first subject to British tutelage, though ultimately
throwing off British control by concerted Pan-Arab action. The late
Khedive Abbas Hilmi, deposed by the British in 1914, is supposed to have
encouraged this movement.[166]
The Great War undoubtedly stimulated Pan-Arabism, especially by its
creation of an independent Arab kingdom in the Hedjaz with claims on
Syria and Mesopotamia. However, the various Arab peoples are so
engrossed with local independence agitations looking toward the
elimination of British, French, and Italian control from specific
regions like Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Tripoli, that the larger
concept of Pan-Arabism, while undoubtedly an underlying factor, is not
to-day in the foreground of Arab nationalist programmes.
Furthermore, as I have already said, Pan-Arabism is interwoven with the
non-racial concepts of Pan-Islamism and "Pan-Islamic Nationalism." This
latter concept may seem a rather grotesque contradiction of terms. So it
may be to us Westerners. But it is not necessarily so to Eastern minds.
However eagerly the East may have seized upon our ideas of nationality
and patriotism, those ideas have entered minds already full of concepts
like Islamic solidarity and the brotherhood of all True Believers. The
result has been a subtle coloration of the new by the old, so that even
when Moslems use our exact words, "nationality," "race," etc., their
conception of what those words mean is distinctly different from ours.
These differences in fact extend to all political concepts. Take the
word "State," for example. The typical Mohammedan state is not, like
the typical Western state, a sharply defined unit, with fixed boundaries
and full sovereignty exercised everywhere within its frontiers. It is
more or less an amorphous mass, with a central nucleus, the seat of an
authority which shades off into ill-defined, anarchic independence. Of
course, in the past half-century, most Mohammedan states have tried to
remodel themselves on Western lines, but the traditional tendency is
typified by Afghanistan, where the tribes of the Indian north-west
frontier, though nominally Afghan, enjoy practical independence and have
frequently conducted private wars of their own against the British which
the Ameer has disavowed and for which the British have not held him
responsible.
Similarly with the term "Nationality." In Moslem eyes, a man need not
be born or formally naturalized to be a member of a certain Moslem
"Nationality." Every Moslem is more or less at home in every part of
Islam, so a man may just happen into a particular country and thereby
become at once, if he wishes, a national in good standing. For
example: "Egypt for the Egyptians" does not mean precisely what we
think. Let a Mohammedan of Algiers or Damascus settle in Cairo.
Nothing prevents him from acting, and being considered as, an
"Egyptian Nationalist" in the full sense of the term. This is because
Islam has always had a distinct idea of territorial as well as
spiritual unity. All predominantly Mohammedan lands are believed by
Moslems to constitute "Dar-ul-Islam,"[167] which is in a sense the
joint possession of all Moslems and which all Moslems are jointly
obligated to defend. That is the reason why alien encroachments on any
Moslem land are instantly resented by Moslems at the opposite end of
the Moslem world, who could have no possible material interest in the
matter.
We are now better able to understand how many Moslem thinkers, combining
the Western concept of nationality with the traditional idea of
Dar-ul-Islam, have evolved a new synthesis of the two, expressed by the
term "Pan-Islamic Nationalism." This trend of thought is well set forth
by an Indian Moslem, who writes: "In the West, the whole science of
government rests on the axiom that the essential divisions of humanity
are determined by considerations of race and geography; but for
Orientals these ideas are very far from being axioms. For them, humanity
divides according to religious beliefs. The unity is no longer the
nation or the State, but the 'Millah.'[168] Europeans see in this a
counterpart to their Middle Ages--a stage which Islam should pass
through on its way to modernity in the Western sense. How badly they
understand how religion looks to a Mohammedan! They forget that Islam is
not only a religion, but also a social organization, a form of culture,
and a nationality.... The principle of Islamic fraternity--of
Pan-Islamism, if you prefer the word--is analogous to patriotism, but
with this difference: this Islamic fraternity, though resulting in
identity of laws and customs, has not (like Western Nationality) been
brought about by community of race, country, or history, but has been
received, as we believe, directly from God."[169]
Pan-Islamic nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon and has not
been doctrinally worked out. Nevertheless it is visible throughout the
Moslem world and is gaining in strength, particularly in regions like
North Africa and India, where strong territorial patriotism has, for one
reason or another, not developed. As a French writer remarks:
"Mohammedan Nationalism is not an isolated or sporadic agitation. It is
a broad tide, which is flowing over the whole Islamic world of Asia,
India, and Africa. Nationalism is a new form of the Mohammedan faith,
which, far from being undermined by contact with European civilization,
seems to have discovered a surplus of religious fervour, and which, in
its desire for expansion and proselytism, tends to realize its unity by
rousing the fanaticism of the masses, by directing the political
tendencies of the élites, and by sowing everywhere the seeds of a
dangerous agitation."[170] Pan-Islamic nationalism may thus, in the
future, become a major factor which will have to be seriously reckoned
with.[171]
III
So ends our survey of nationalist movements in the Moslem world. Given
such a tangled complex of aspirations, enormously stimulated by
Armageddon, it was only natural that the close of the Great War should
have left the Orient a veritable welter of unrest. Obviously, anything
like a constructive settlement could have been effected only by the
exercise of true statesmanship of the highest order. Unfortunately, the
Versailles peace conference was devoid of true statesmanship, and the
resulting "settlement" not only failed to give peace to Europe but
disclosed an attitude toward the East inspired by the pre-war spirit of
predatory imperialism and cynical _Realpolitik_. Apparently oblivious of
the mighty psychological changes which the war had wrought, and of the
consequent changes of attitude and policy required, the victorious
Allies proceeded to treat the Orient as though Armageddon were a
skirmish and Asia the sleeping giant of a century ago.
In fact, disregarding both the general pronouncements of liberal
principles and the specific promises of self-determination for Near
Eastern peoples which they had made during the war, the Allies now
paraded a series of secret treaties (negotiated between themselves
during those same war-years when they had been so unctuously orating),
and these secret treaties clearly divided up the Ottoman Empire among
the victors, in absolute disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants. The
purposes of the Allies were further revealed by the way in which the
Versailles conference refused to receive the representatives of Persia
(theoretically still independent), but kept them cooling their heels in
Paris while British pressure at Teheran forced the Shah's government to
enter into an "agreement" that made Persia a virtual protectorate of the
British Empire. As for the Egyptians, who had always protested against
the protectorate proclaimed by England solely on its own initiative in
1914, the conference refused to pay any attention to their delegates,
and they were given to understand that the conference regarded the
British protectorate over Egypt as a _fait accompli_. The upshot was
that, as a result of the war, European domination over the Near and
Middle East was riveted rather than relaxed.
But the strangest feature of this strange business remains to be told.
One might imagine that the Allied leaders would have realized that they
were playing a dangerous game, which could succeed only by close
team-work and quick action. As a matter of fact, the very reverse was
the case. After showing their hand, and thereby filling the East with
disillusionment, despair, and fury, the Allies proceeded to quarrel over
the spoils. Nearly two years passed before England, France, and Italy
were able to come to an even superficial agreement as to the partition
of the Ottoman Empire, and meanwhile they had been bickering and
intriguing against each other all over the Near East. This was sheer
madness. The destined victims were thereby informed that European
domination rested not only on disregard of the moral "imponderables" but
on diplomatic bankruptcy as well. The obvious reflection was that a
domination resting on such rotten foundations might well be overthrown.
That, at any rate, is the way multitudes of Orientals read the
situation, and their rebellious feelings were stimulated not merely by
consciousness of their own strength and Western disunion, but also by
the active encouragement of a new ally--Bolshevik Russia. Russian
Bolshevism had thrown down the gauntlet to Western civilization, and in
the desperate struggle which was now on, the Bolshevik leaders saw with
terrible glee the golden opportunities vouchsafed them in the East. The
details of Bolshevik activity in the Orient will be considered in the
chapter on Social Unrest. Suffice it to remember here that Bolshevik
propaganda is an important element in that profound ferment which
extends over the whole Near and Middle East; a ferment which has reduced
some regions to the verge of chaos and which threatens to increase
rather than diminish in the immediate future.
To relate all the details of contemporary Eastern unrest would fill a
book in itself. Let us here content ourselves with considering the chief
centres of this unrest, remembering always that it exists throughout the
Moslem world from French North Africa to Central Asia and the Dutch
Indies. The centres to be here surveyed will be Egypt, Persia, and the
Turkish and Arab regions of the former Ottoman Empire. A fifth main
centre of unrest--India--will be discussed in the next chapter.
The gathering storm first broke in Egypt. During the war Egypt, flooded
with British troops and subjected to the most stringent martial law, had
remained quiet, but it was the quiet of repression, not of passivity.
We have seen how, with the opening years of the twentieth century,
virtually all educated Egyptians had become more or less impregnated
with nationalist ideas, albeit a large proportion of them believed in
evolutionary rather than revolutionary methods. The chief hope of the
moderates had been the provisional character of English rule. So long as
England declared herself merely in "temporary occupation" of Egypt,
anything was possible. But the proclamation of the protectorate in 1914,
which declared Egypt part of the British Empire, entirely changed the
situation. Even the most moderate nationalists felt that the future was
definitely prejudged against them and that the door had been irrevocably
closed upon their ultimate aspirations. The result was that the
moderates were driven over to the extremists and were ready to join the
latter in violent action as soon as opportunity might offer.
The extreme nationalists had of course protested bitterly against the
protectorate from the first, and the close of the war saw a delegation
composed of both nationalist wings proceed to Paris to lay their claims
before the Versailles conference. Rebuffed by the conference, which
recognized the British protectorate over Egypt as part of the peace
settlement, the Egyptian delegation issued a formal protest warning of
trouble. This protest read:
"We have knocked at door after door, but have received no answer. In
spite of the definite pledges given by the statesmen at the head of the
nations which won the war, to the effect that their victory would mean
the triumph of Right over Might and the establishment of the principle
of self-determination for small nations, the British protectorate over
Egypt was written into the treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain
without the people of Egypt being consulted as to their political
status.
"This crime against our nation, a breach of good faith on the part of
the Powers who have declared that they are forming in the same Treaty a
Society of Nations, will not be consummated without a solemn warning
that the people of Egypt consider the decision taken at Paris null and
void.... If our voice is not heard, it will be only because the blood
already shed has not been enough to overthrow the old world-order and
give birth to a new world-order."[172]
Before these lines had appeared in type, trouble in Egypt had begun.
Simultaneously with the arrival of the Egyptian delegation at Paris, the
nationalists in Egypt laid their demands before the British authorities.
The nationalist programme demanded complete self-government for Egypt,
leaving England only a right of supervision over the public debt and the
Suez Canal. The nationalists' strength was shown by the fact that these
proposals were indorsed by the Egyptian cabinet recently appointed by
the Khedive at British suggestion. In fact, the Egyptian Premier,
Roushdi Pasha, asked to be allowed to go to London with some of his
colleagues for a hearing. This placed the British authorities in Egypt
in a distinctly trying position. However, they determined to stand firm,
and accordingly answered that England could not abandon its
responsibility for the continuance of order and good government in
Egypt, now a British protectorate and an integral part of the empire,
and that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the Egyptian
leaders to go to London and there advance immoderate demands which could
not possibly be entertained.
The English attitude was firm. The Egyptian attitude was no less firm.
The cabinet at once resigned, no new cabinet could be formed, and the
British High Commissioner, General Allenby, was forced to assume
unveiled control. Meanwhile the nationalists announced that they were
going to hold a plebiscite to determine the attitude of the Egyptian
people. Forbidden by the British authorities, the plebiscite was
nevertheless illegally held, and resulted, according to the
nationalists, in an overwhelming popular indorsement of their demands.
This defiant attitude determined the British on strong action.
Accordingly, in the spring of 1919, most of the nationalist leaders were
seized and deported to Malta.
Egypt's answer was an explosion. From one end of the country to the
other, Egypt flamed into rebellion. Everywhere it was the same story.
Railways and telegraph lines were systematically cut. Trains were
stalled and looted. Isolated British officers and soldiers were
murdered. In Cairo alone, thousands of houses were sacked by the mob.
Soon the danger was rendered more acute by the irruption out of the
desert of swarms of Bedouin Arabs bent on plunder. For a few days Egypt
trembled on the verge of anarchy, and the British Government admitted in
Parliament that all Egypt was in a state of insurrection.
The British authorities met the crisis with vigour and determination.
The number of British troops in Egypt was large, trusty black regiments
were hurried up from the Sudan, and the well-disciplined Egyptian native
police generally obeyed orders. After several weeks of sharp fighting
and heavy loss of life, Egypt was again gotten under control.
Order was restored, but the outlook was ominous in the extreme. Only the
presence of massed British and Sudanese troops enabled order to be
maintained. Even the application of stern martial law could not prevent
continuous nationalist demonstrations, sometimes ending in riots,
fighting, and heavy loss of life. The most serious aspect of the
situation was that not only were the upper classes solidly nationalist,
but they had behind them the hitherto passive fellah millions. The
war-years had borne hard on the fellaheen. Military exigencies had
compelled Britain to conscript fully a million of them for forced
labour in the Near East and even in Europe, while there had also been
wholesale requisitions of grain, fodder, and other supplies. These
things had caused profound discontent and had roused among the fellaheen
not merely passive dislike but active hatred of British rule.
Authoritative English experts on Egypt were seriously alarmed. Shortly
after the riots Sir William Willcocks, the noted engineer, said in a
public statement: "The keystone of the British occupation of Egypt was
the fact that the fellaheen were for it. The Sheikhs, Omdehs, governing
classes, and high religious heads might or might not be hostile, but
nothing counted for much while the millions of fellaheen were solid for
the occupation. The British have undoubtedly to-day lost the friendship
and confidence of the fellaheen." And Sir Valentine Chirol stated in the
London _Times_: "We are now admittedly face to face with the ominous
fact that for the first time since the British occupation large numbers
of the Egyptian fellaheen, who owe far more to us than does any other
class of Egyptians, have been worked up into a fever of bitter
discontent and hatred. Very few people at home, even in responsible
quarters, have, I think, the slightest conception of the very dangerous
degree of tension which has now been reached out here."
All foreign observers were impressed by the nationalist feeling which
united all creeds and classes. Regarding the monster demonstrations held
during the summer of 1919, an Italian publicist wrote: "For the first
time in history, the banners flown showed the Crescent interwoven with
the Cross. Until a short time ago the two elements were as distinct from
each other as each of them was from the Jews. To-day, precisely as has
happened in India among the Mussulmans and the Hindus, every trace of
religious division has departed. All Egyptians are enrolled under a
single banner. Every one behind his mask of silence is burning with the
same faith, and confident that his cause will ultimately triumph."[173]
And a Frenchwoman, a lifelong resident of Egypt, wrote: "We have seen
surprising things in this country, so often divided by party and
religious struggles: Coptic priests preaching in mosques, ulemas
preaching in Christian churches; Syrian, Maronite, or Mohammedan
students; women, whether of Turkish or Egyptian blood, united in the
same fervour, the same ardent desire to see break over their ancient
land the radiant dawn of independence. For those who, like myself, have
known the Egypt of Tewfik, the attitude of the women these last few
years is the most surprising transformation that has happened in the
valley of the Nile. One should have seen the nonchalant life, the almost
complete indifference to anything savouring of politics, to appreciate
the enormous steps taken in the last few months. For example: last
summer a procession of women demonstrators was surrounded by British
soldiers with fixed bayonets. One of the women, threatened by a soldier,
turned on him, baring her breast, and cried: 'Kill me, then, so that
there may be another Miss Cavell.'"[174]
Faced by this unprecedented nationalist fervour, Englishmen on the spot
were of two opinions. Some, like Sir William Willcocks and Sir Valentine
Chirol, stated that extensive concessions must be made.[175] Other
qualified observers asserted that concessions would be weakness and
would spell disaster. Said Sir M. McIlwraith: "Five years of a
Nationalist régime would lead to hopeless chaos and disorder.... If
Egypt is not to fall back into the morass of bankruptcy and anarchy from
which we rescued her in 1882, with the still greater horrors of
Bolshevism, of which there are already sinister indications,
superadded, Britain must not loosen her control."[176] In England the
Egyptian situation caused grave disquietude, and in the summer of 1919
the British Government announced the appointment of a commission of
inquiry headed by Lord Milner to investigate fully into Egyptian
affairs.
The appointment was a wise one. Lord Milner was one of the ablest
figures in British political life, a man of long experience with
imperial problems, including that of Egypt, and possessed of a
temperament equally remote from the doctrinaire liberal or the hidebound
conservative. In short, Lord Milner was a _realist_, in the true sense
of the word, as his action soon proved. Arriving in Egypt at the
beginning of 1920, Lord Milner and his colleagues found themselves
confronted with a most difficult situation. In Egypt the word had gone
forth to boycott the commission, and not merely nationalist politicians
but also religious leaders like the Grand Mufti refused even to discuss
matters unless the commissioners would first agree to Egyptian
independence. This looked like a deadlock. Nevertheless, by infinite
tact and patience, Lord Milner finally got into free and frank
discussion with Zagloul Pasha and the other responsible nationalist
leaders.
His efforts were undoubtedly helped by certain developments within Egypt
itself. In Egypt, as elsewhere in the East, there were appearing
symptoms not merely of political but also of social unrest. New types of
agitators were springing up, preaching to the populace the most extreme
revolutionary doctrines. These youthful agitators disquieted the regular
nationalist leaders, who felt themselves threatened both as party chiefs
and as men of social standing and property. The upshot was that, by the
autumn of 1920, Lord Milner and Zagloul Pasha had agreed upon the basis
of what looked like a genuine compromise. According to the intimations
then given out to the press, and later confirmed by the nature of Lord
Milner's official report, the lines of the tentative agreement ran as
follows: England was to withdraw her protectorate and was to declare
Egypt independent. This independence was qualified to about the same
extent that Cuba's is toward the United States. Egypt was to have
complete self-government, both the British garrison and British civilian
officials being withdrawn. Egypt was, however, to make a perpetual
treaty of alliance with Great Britain, was to agree not to make treaties
with other Powers save with Britain's consent, and was to grant Britain
a military and naval station for the protection of the Suez Canal and of
Egypt itself in case of sudden attack by foreign enemies. The vexed
question of the Sudan was left temporarily open.
These proposals bore the earmarks of genuinely constructive compromise.
Unfortunately, they were not at once acted upon.[177] Both in England
and in Egypt they roused strong opposition. In England adverse official
influences held up the commission's report till February, 1921. In Egypt
the extreme nationalists denounced Zagloul Pasha as a traitor, though
moderate opinion seemed substantially satisfied. The commission's
report, as finally published, declared that the grant of self-government
to Egypt could not be safely postponed; that the nationalist spirit
could not be extinguished; that an attempt to govern Egypt in the teeth
of a hostile people would be "a difficult and disgraceful task"; and
that it would be a great misfortune if the present opportunity for a
settlement were lost. However, the report was not indorsed by the
British Government in its entirety, and Lord Milner forthwith resigned.
As for Zagloul Pasha, he still maintains his position as nationalist
leader, but his authority has been gravely shaken. Such is the
situation of Egypt at this present writing: a situation frankly not so
encouraging as it was last year.
Meanwhile the storm which had begun in Egypt had long since spread to
other parts of the Near East. In fact, by the opening months of 1920,
the storm-centre had shifted to the Ottoman Empire. For this the Allies
themselves were largely to blame. Of course a constructive settlement of
these troubled regions would have been very difficult. Still, it might
not have proved impossible if Allied policy had been fair and
above-board. The close of the war found the various peoples of the
Ottoman Empire hopeful that the liberal war-aims professed by the Allied
spokesmen would be redeemed. The Arab elements were notably hopeful,
because they had been given a whole series of Allied promises (shortly
to be repudiated, as we shall presently see), while even the beaten
Turks were not entirely bereft of hope in the future. Besides the
general pronouncements of liberal treatment as formulated in the
"Fourteen Points" programme of President Wilson and indorsed by the
Allies, the Turks had pledges of a more specific character, notably by
Premier Lloyd George, who, on January 5, 1918, had said: "Nor are we
fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned
lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in
race." In other words, the Turks were given unequivocally to understand
that, while their rule over non-Turkish regions like the Arab provinces
must cease, the Turkish regions of the empire were not to pass under
alien rule, but were to form a Turkish national state. The Turks did not
know about a series of secret treaties between the Allies, begun in
1915, which partitioned practically the whole of Asia Minor between the
Allied Powers. These were to come out a little later. For the moment the
Turks might hope.
In the case of the Arabs there were far brighter grounds for
nationalist hopes--and far darker depths of Allied duplicity. We have
already mentioned the Arab revolt of 1916, which, beginning in the
Hedjaz under the leadership of the Shereef of Mecca, presently spread
through all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and contributed so
largely to the collapse of Turkish resistance. This revolt was, however,
not a sudden, unpremeditated thing. It had been carefully planned, and
was due largely to Allied backing--and Allied promises. From the very
beginning of the war Arab nationalist malcontents had been in touch with
the British authorities in Egypt. They were warmly welcomed and
encouraged in their separatist schemes, because an Arab rebellion would
obviously be of invaluable assistance to the British in safeguarding
Egypt and the Suez Canal, to say nothing of an advance into Turkish
territory.
The Arabs, however, asked not merely material aid but also definite
promises that their rebellion should be rewarded by the formation of an
Arab state embracing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
Unfortunately for Arab nationalist aspirations, the British and French
Governments had their own ideas as to the future of Turkey's Arab
provinces. Both England and France had long possessed "spheres of
influence" in those regions. The English sphere was in southern
Mesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf. The French sphere was the
Lebanon, a mountainous district in northern Syria just inland from the
Mediterranean coast, where the population, known as Maronites, were
Roman Catholics, over whom France had long extended her diplomatic
protection. Of course both these districts were legally Turkish
territory. Also, both were small in area. But "spheres of influence" are
elastic things. Under favourable circumstances they are capable of
sudden expansion to an extraordinary degree. Such a circumstance was the
Great War. Accordingly the British and French Foreign Offices put their
heads together and on March 5, 1915, the two governments signed a
secret treaty by the terms of which France was given a "predominant
position" in Syria and Britain a predominant position in Mesopotamia. No
definite boundaries were then assigned, but the intent was to stake out
claims which would partition Turkey's Arab provinces between England and
France.
Naturally the existence of this secret treaty was an embarrassment to
the British officials in Egypt in their negotiations with the Arabs.
However, an Arab rebellion was too valuable an asset to be lost, and the
British negotiators finally evolved a formula which satisfied the Arab
leaders. On October 25, 1915, the Shereef of Mecca's representative at
Cairo was given a document by the Governor-General of Egypt, Sir Henry
McMahon, in which Great Britain undertook, conditional upon an Arab
revolt, to recognize the independence of the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire
except in southern Mesopotamia, where British interests required special
measures of administrative control, and also except areas where Great
Britain was "not free to act without detriment to the interests of
France." This last clause was of course a "joker." However, it achieved
its purpose. The Arabs, knowing nothing about the secret treaty,
supposed it referred merely to the restricted district of the Lebanon.
They went home jubilant, to prepare the revolt which broke out next
year.
The revolt began in November, 1916. It might not have begun at all had
the Arabs known what had happened the preceding May. In that month
England and France signed another secret treaty, the celebrated
Sykes-Picot Agreement. This agreement definitely partitioned Turkey's
Arab provinces along the lines suggested in the initial secret treaty of
the year before. By the Sykes-Picot Agreement most of Mesopotamia was to
be definitely British, while the Syrian coast from Tyre to Alexandretta
was to be definitely French, together with extensive Armenian and Asia
Minor regions to the northward. Palestine was to be "international,"
albeit its chief seaport, Haifa, was to be British, and the implication
was that Palestine fell within the English sphere. As to the great
hinterland lying between Mesopotamia and the Syrian coast, it was to be
"independent Arab under two spheres of influence," British and French;
the French sphere embracing all the rest of Syria from Aleppo to
Damascus, the English sphere embracing all the rest of Mesopotamia--the
region about Mosul. In other words, the independence promised the Arabs
by Sir Henry McMahon had vanished into thin air.
This little shift behind the scenes was of course not communicated to
the Arabs. On the contrary, the British did everything possible to
stimulate Arab nationalist hopes--this being the best way to extract
their fighting zeal against the Turks. The British Government sent the
Arabs a number of picked intelligence officers, notably a certain
Colonel Lawrence, an extraordinary young man who soon gained unbounded
influence over the Arab chiefs and became known as "The Soul of the
Arabian Revolution."[178] These men, chosen for their knowledge of, and
sympathy for, the Arabs, were not informed about the secret treaties, so
that their encouragement of Arab zeal might not be marred by any lack of
sincerity. Similarly, the British generals were prodigal of promises in
their proclamations.[179] The climax of this blessed comedy occurred at
the very close of the war, when the British and French Governments
issued the following joint declaration which was posted throughout the
Arab provinces: "The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in
waging in the East the war let loose upon the world by German ambition,
is to insure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples,
so long oppressed by Turks, and to establish national governments and
administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative
and free will of the people themselves."
This climax was, however, followed by a swift _dénouement_. The war was
over, the enemy was beaten, the comedy was ended, the curtain was rung
down, and on that curtain the Arabs read--the inner truth of things.
French troops appeared to occupy the Syrian coast, the secret treaties
came out, and the Arabs learned how they had been tricked. Black and
bitter was their wrath. Probably they would have exploded at once had it
not been for their cool-headed chiefs, especially Prince Feisal, the son
of the Shereef of Mecca, who had proved himself a real leader of men
during the war and who had now attained a position of unquestioned
authority. Feisal knew the Allies' military strength and realized how
hazardous war would be, especially at that time. Feeling the moral
strength of the Arab position, he besought his countrymen to let him
plead Arabia's cause before the impending peace conference, and he had
his way. During the year 1919 the Arab lands were quiet, though it was
the quiet of suspense.
Prince Feisal pleaded his case before the peace conference with
eloquence and dignity. But Feisal failed. The covenant of the League of
Nations might contain the benevolent statement that "certain communities
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of
development where their existence as independent nations can be
provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to
stand alone."[180] The Arabs knew what "mandatories" meant. Lloyd George
might utter felicitous phrases such as "Arab forces have redeemed the
pledges given to Great Britain, and we should redeem our pledges."[181]
The Arabs had read the secret treaties. "In vain is the net spread in
the sight of any bird." The game no longer worked. The Arabs knew that
they must rely on their own efforts, either in diplomacy or war.
Feisal still counselled peace. He was probably influenced to this not
merely by the risks of armed resistance but also by the fact that the
Allies were now quarrelling among themselves. These quarrels of course
extended all over the Near East, but there was none more bitter than the
quarrel which had broken out between England and France over the
division of the Arab spoils. This dispute originated in French
dissatisfaction with the secret treaties. No sooner had the Sykes-Picot
Agreement been published than large and influential sections of French
opinion began shouting that they had been duped. For generations French
imperialists had had their eye on Syria,[182] and since the beginning of
the war the imperialist press had been conducting an ardent propaganda
for wholesale annexations in the Near East. "La Syrie intégrale!" "All
Syria!" was the cry. And this "all" included not merely the coast-strip
assigned France by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but also Palestine and the
vast Aleppo-Damascus hinterland right across to the rich oil-fields of
Mosul. To this entire region, often termed in French expansionist
circles "La France du Levant," the imperialists asserted that France had
"imprescriptible historic rights running back to the Crusades and even
to Charlemagne." Syria was a "second Alsace," which held out its arms to
France and would not be denied. It was also the indispensable fulcrum of
French world-policy. These imperialist aspirations had powerful backing
in French Government circles. For example, early in 1915, M. Leygues had
said in the Chamber of Deputies: "The axis of French policy is in the
Mediterranean. One of its poles is in the West, at Algiers, Tunis, and
Morocco. The other must lie in the East, with Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine."[183]
After such high hopes, the effect of the Sykes-Picot Agreement on French
imperialists can be imagined. Their anger turned naturally upon the
English, who were roundly denounced and blamed for everything that was
happening in the East, Arab nationalist aspirations being stigmatized as
nothing but British propaganda. Cried one French writer: "Some
psychiatrist ought to write a study of these British colonial officials,
implacable imperialists, megalomaniacs, who, night and day, work for
their country without even asking counsel from London, and whose
constant care is to annihilate in Syria, as they once annihilated in
Egypt, the supremacy of France."[184] In answer to such fulminations,
English writers scored French "greed" and "folly" which was compromising
England's prestige and threatening to set the whole East on fire.[185]
In fine, there was a very pretty row on between people who, less than a
year before, had been pledging their "sacred union" for all eternity.
The Arabs were certainly much edified, and the other Eastern peoples as
well.
Largely owing to these bickerings, Allied action in the Near East was
delayed through 1919. But by the spring of 1920 the Allies came to a
measure of agreement. The meeting of the Allied Premiers at San Remo
elaborated the terms of the treaty to be imposed on Turkey, dividing
Asia Minor into spheres of influence and exploitation, while the Arab
provinces were assigned England and France according to the terms of the
Sykes-Picot Agreement--properly camouflaged, of course, as "mandates" of
the League of Nations. England, France, and their satellite, Greece,
prepared for action. British reinforcements were sent to Mesopotamia and
Palestine; French reinforcements were sent to Syria; an
Anglo-Franco-Greek force prepared to occupy Constantinople, and Premier
Venizelos promised a Greek army for Asia Minor contingencies. The one
rift in the lute was Italy. Italy saw big trouble brewing and determined
not to be directly involved. Said Premier Nitti to an English journalist
after the San Remo conference: "You will have war in Asia Minor, and
Italy will not send a single soldier nor pay a single lira. You have
taken from the Turks their sacred city of Adrianople; you have placed
their capital city under foreign control; you have taken from them every
port and the larger part of their territory; and the five Turkish
delegates whom you will select will sign a treaty which will not have
the sanction of the Turkish people or the Turkish Parliament."
Premier Nitti was a true prophet. For months past the Turkish
nationalists, knowing what was in store for them, had been building up a
centre of resistance in the interior of Asia Minor. Of course the former
nationalist leaders such as Enver Pasha had long since fled to distant
havens like Transcaucasia or Bolshevik Russia, but new leaders appeared,
notably a young officer of marked military talent, Mustapha Kemal Pasha.
With great energy Mustapha Kemal built up a really creditable army, and
from his "capital," the city of Angora in the heart of Asia Minor, he
now defied the Allies, emphasizing his defiance by attacking the French
garrisons in Cilicia (a coast district in Asia Minor just north of
Syria), inflicting heavy losses.
The Arabs also were preparing for action. In March a "Pan-Syrian
Congress" met at Damascus, unanimously declared the independence of
Syria, and elected Feisal king. This announcement electrified all the
Arab provinces. In the French-occupied coastal zone riots broke out
against the French; in Palestine there were "pogroms" against the Jews,
whom the Arabs, both Moslem and Christian, hated for their "Zionist"
plans; while in Mesopotamia there were sporadic uprisings of tribesmen.
Faced by this ominous situation, the "mandatories" took military
counter-measures. The French took especially vigorous action. France now
had nearly 100,000 men in Syria and Cilicia, headed by General Gouraud,
a veteran of many colonial wars and a believer in "strong-arm" methods.
On July 15 Gouraud sent Feisal an ultimatum requiring complete
submission. Feisal, diplomatic to the last, actually accepted the
ultimatum, but Gouraud ignored this acceptance on a technicality and
struck for Damascus with 60,000 men. Feisal attempted no real
resistance, fighting only a rearguard action and withdrawing into the
desert. On July 25 the French entered Damascus, the Arab capital,
deposed Feisal, and set up thoroughgoing French rule. Opposition was
punished with the greatest severity. Damascus was mulcted of a
war-contribution of 10,000,000 francs, after the German fashion in
Belgium, many nationalist leaders were imprisoned or shot, while Gouraud
announced that the death of "one French subject or one Christian" would
be followed by wholesale "most terrible reprisals" by bombing
aeroplanes.[186]
Before this Napoleonic "thunder-stroke" Syria bent for the moment,
apparently terrorized. In Mesopotamia, however, the British were not so
fortunate. For some months trouble had patently been brewing, and in
March the British commander had expressed himself as "much struck with
the volcanic possibilities of the country." In July all Mesopotamia
flamed into insurrection, and though Britain had fully 100,000 troops in
the province, they were hard put to it to stem the rebellion.
Meanwhile, the Allies had occupied Constantinople, to force acceptance
of the draft treaty of peace. Naturally, there was no resistance,
Constantinople being entirely at the mercy of the Allied fleet. But the
silence of the vast throngs gathered to watch the incoming troops filled
some Allied observers with disquietude. A French journalist wrote: "The
silence of the multitude was more impressive than boisterous protests.
Their eyes glowed with sullen hatred. Scattered through this throng of
mute, prostrated, hopeless people circulated watchful and sinuous
emissaries, who were to carry word of this misfortune to the remotest
confines of Islam. In a few hours they would be in Anatolia. A couple of
days later the news would have spread to Konia, Angora, and Sivas. In a
brief space of time it would be heralded throughout the regions of
Bolshevist influence, extending to the Caucasus and beyond. In a few
weeks all these centres of agitation will be preparing their
counter-attack. Asia and Africa will again cement their union of faith.
Intelligent agents will record in the retentive minds of people who do
not read, the history of our blunders. These missionaries of
insurrection and fanaticism come from every race and class of society.
Educated and refined men disguise themselves as beggars and outcasts, in
order to spread the news apace and to prepare for bitter
vengeance."[187]
Events in Turkey now proceeded precisely as the Italian Premier Nitti
had foretold. The Allied masters of Constantinople compelled the Sultan
to appoint a "friendly" cabinet which solemnly denounced Mustapha Kemal
and his "rebels," and sent a hand-picked delegation to Sèvres, France,
where they dutifully "signed on the dotted line" the treaty that the
Allies had prepared. The Allies had thus "imposed their will"--on paper.
For every sensible man knew that the whole business was a roaring farce;
knew that the "friendly" government, from Sultan to meanest clerk, was
as nationalist as Mustapha Kemal himself; knew that the real Turkish
capital was not Constantinople but Angora, and that the Allies' power
was measured by the range of their guns. As for Mustapha Kemal, his
comment on the Sèvres Treaty was: "I will fight to the end of the
world."
The Allies were thus in a decidedly embarrassing situation, especially
since "The Allies" now meant only England and France. Italy was out of
the game. As Nitti had warned at San Remo, she would "not send a single
soldier nor pay a single lira." With 200,000 soldiers holding down the
Arabs, and plenty of trouble elsewhere, neither France nor Britain had
the troops to crush Mustapha Kemal--a job which the French staff
estimated would take 300,000 men. One weapon, however, they still
possessed--Greece. In return for large territorial concessions, Premier
Venizelos offered to bring the Turks to reason. His offer was accepted,
and 100,000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna. But the Greek campaign was
not a success. Even 100,000 men soon wore thin when spread out over the
vast Asia Minor plateau. Mustapha Kemal avoided decisive battle,
harassing the Greeks by guerilla warfare just as he was harassing the
French in Cilicia at the other end of the line. The Greeks "dug in," and
a deadlock ensued which threatened to continue indefinitely. This soon
caused a new complication. Venizelos might be willing to "carry on" as
the Allies' submandatory, but the Greek people were not. Kept virtually
on a war-footing since 1912, the Greeks kicked over the traces. In the
November elections they repudiated Venizelos by a vote of 990,000 to
10,000, and recalled King Constantine, who had been deposed by the
Allies three years before. This meant that Greece, like Italy, was out
of the game. To be sure, King Constantine presently started hostilities
with the Turks on his own account. This was, however, something very
different from Greece's attitude under the Venizelist régime. The
Allies' weapon had thus broken in their hands.
Meanwhile Mustapha Kemal was not merely consolidating his authority in
Asia Minor but was gaining allies of his own. In the first place, he was
establishing close relations with the Arabs. It may appear strange to
find such bitter foes become friends; nevertheless, Franco-British
policy had achieved even this seeming miracle. The reason was clearly
explained by no less a person than Lawrence ("The Soul of the Arab
Revolution"), who had returned to civil life and was thus free to speak
his mind on the Eastern situation, which he did in no uncertain fashion.
In one of several statements given to the British press, Lawrence said:
"The Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the war, not because the
Turkish Government was notably bad, but because they wanted
independence. They did not risk their lives in battle to change masters,
to become British subjects or French citizens, but to win a State of
their own." The matter was put even more pointedly by an Arab
nationalist leader in the columns of a French radical paper opposed to
the Syrian adventure. Said this leader: "Both the French and the English
should know once for all that the Arabs are joined by a common religion
with the Turks, and have been politically identified with them for
centuries, and therefore do not wish to separate themselves from their
fellow believers and brothers-in-arms merely to submit to the domination
of a European nation, no matter what form the latter's suzerainty may
assume.... It is no use for M. Millerand to say: 'We have never thought
of trespassing in any respect upon the independence of these people.' No
one is deceived by such statements as that. The armistice was signed in
accordance with the conditions proclaimed by Mr. Wilson, but as soon as
Germany and its allies were helpless, the promises of the armistice were
trodden underfoot, as well as the Fourteen Points. Such a violation of
the promises of complete independence, so prodigally made to the Arabs
on so many occasions, has resulted in re-uniting closer than ever the
Arabs and the Turks. It has taken but a few months to restore that
intimacy.... It is probable that France, by maintaining an army of
150,000 men in Syria, and by spending billions of francs, will be able
to subdue the Syrian Arabs. But that will not finish the task. The
interior of that country borders upon other lands inhabited by Arabs,
Kurds, and Turks, and by the immense desert. In starting a conflict with
4,000,000 Syrians, France will be making enemies of 15,000,000 Arabs in
the Levant, most of whom are armed tribes, without including the other
Mohammedan peoples, who are speedily acquiring solidarity and
organization under the blows that are being dealt them by the Entente.
If you believe I am exaggerating, all you have to do is to investigate
the facts yourself. But what good will it do to confirm the truth too
late, and after floods of blood have flowed?"[188]
In fact, signs of Turco-Arab co-operation became everywhere apparent. To
be sure, this co-operation was not openly avowed either by Mustapha
Kemal or by the deposed King Feisal who, fleeing to Italy, continued his
diplomatic manoeuvres. But Arabs fought beside Turks against the
French in Cilicia; Turks and Kurds joined the Syrian Arabs in their
continual local risings; while Kemal's hand was clearly apparent in the
rebellion against the British in Mesopotamia.
This Arab _entente_ was not the whole of Mustapha Kemal's foreign
policy. He was also reaching out north-eastward to the Tartars of
Transcaucasia and the Turkomans of Persian Azerbaidjan. The Caucasus was
by this time the scene of a highly complicated struggle between Moslem
Tartars and Turkomans, Christian Armenians and Georgians, and various
Russian factions, which was fast reducing that unhappy region to chaos.
Among the Tartar-Turkomans, long leavened by Pan-Turanian propaganda,
Mustapha Kemal found enthusiastic adherents; and his efforts were
supported by a third ally--Bolshevik Russia. Bolshevik policy, which, as
we have already stated, was seeking to stir up trouble against the
Western Powers throughout the East, had watched Kemal's rise with great
satisfaction. At first the Bolsheviki could do very little for the
Turkish nationalists because they were not in direct touch, but the
collapse of Wrangel's "White" army in November, 1920, and the consequent
overrunning of all south Russia by the Red armies, opened a direct line
from Moscow to Angora via the Caucasus, and henceforth Mustapha Kemal
was supplied with money, arms, and a few men.
Furthermore, Kemal and the Bolsheviki were starting trouble in Persia.
That country was in a most deplorable condition. During the war Persia,
despite her technical neutrality, had been a battle-ground between the
Anglo-Russians on the one hand and the Turco-Germans on the other.
Russia's collapse in 1917 had led to her military withdrawal from
Persia, and England, profiting by the situation, had made herself
supreme, legalizing her position by the famous "Agreement" "negotiated"
with the Shah's government in August, 1919.[189] This treaty, though
signed and sealed in due form, was bitterly resented by the Persian
people. Here was obviously another ripe field for Bolshevik propaganda.
Accordingly, the Bolshevik government renounced all rights in Persia
acquired by the Czarist régime and proclaimed themselves the friends of
the Persian people against Western imperialism. Naturally the game
worked, and Persia soon became honeycombed with militant unrest. In the
early summer of 1920 a Bolshevist force actually crossed the Caspian Sea
and landed on the Persian shore. They did not penetrate far into the
country. They did not need to, for the country simply effervesced in a
way which made the British position increasingly untenable. For many
months a confused situation ensued. In fact, at this writing the
situation is still obscure. But there can be no doubt that Britain's
hold on Persia is gravely shaken, and she may soon be compelled to
evacuate the country, with the possible exception of the extreme south.
Turning back to the autumn of 1920: the position of England and France
in the Near East had become far from bright. Deserted by Italy and
Greece, defied by the Turks, harried by the Arabs, worried by the
Egyptians and Persians, and everywhere menaced by the subtle workings of
Bolshevism, the situation was not a happy one. The burden of empire was
proving heavy. In Mesopotamia alone the bill was already 100,000,000
sterling, with no relief in sight.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in both England and
France Near Eastern policies were subjected to a growing flood of
criticism. In England especially the tide ran very strong. The
Mesopotamian imbroglio was denounced as both a crime and a blunder. For
example, Colonel Lawrence stated: "We are to-day not far from disaster.
Our government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept 14,000
local conscripts in the ranks and killed yearly an average of 200 Arabs
in maintaining peace. We keep 90,000 men, with aeroplanes, armoured
cars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about 10,000 Arabs
in the rising this summer."[190] Influenced by such criticisms and by
the general trend of events, the British Government modified its
attitude, sending out Sir Percy Cox to negotiate with the Arabs. Sir
Percy Cox was a man of the Milner type, with a firm grip on realities
and an intimate experience with Eastern affairs. Authorized to discuss
large concessions, he met the nationalist leaders frankly and made a
good impression upon them. At this writing matters have not been
definitely settled, but it looks as though England was planning to limit
her direct control to the extreme south of Mesopotamia at the head of
the Persian Gulf--practically her old sphere of influence before 1914.
Meanwhile, in Syria, France has thus far succeeded in maintaining
relative order by strong-arm methods. But the situation is highly
unstable. All classes of the population have been alienated. Even the
Catholic Maronites, traditionally pro-French, have begun agitating.
General Gouraud promptly squelched the agitation by deporting the
leaders to Corsica; nevertheless, the fact remains that France's only
real friends in Syria are dissatisfied. Up to the present these things
have not changed France's attitude. A short time ago ex-Premier Leygues
remarked of Syria, "France will occupy all of it, and always"; while
still more recently General Gouraud stated: "France must remain in
Syria, both for political and economic reasons. The political
consequences of our abandonment of the country would be disastrous. Our
prestige and influence in the Levant and the Mediterranean would be
doomed. The economic interests of France also compel us to remain there.
When fully developed, Syria and Cilicia will have an economic value
fully equal to that of Egypt."
However, despite the French Government's firmness, there is an
increasing public criticism of the "Syrian adventure," not merely from
radical anti-imperialist quarters, but from unimpeachably conservative
circles as well. The editor of one of the most conservative French
political periodicals has stated: "Jealous of its autonomy, the Arab
people, liberated from the Ottoman yoke, do not desire a new foreign
domination. To say that Syria demands our protection is a lie. Syria
wishes to be entirely independent."[191] And recently Senator Victor
Bérard, one of France's recognized authorities on Eastern affairs made a
speech in the French Senate strongly criticising the Government's Syrian
policy from the very start and declaring that a "free Syria" was "a
question of both interest and honour."
Certainly, the French Government, still so unyielding toward the Arabs,
has reversed its attitude toward the Turks. Side-stepping the Sèvres
Treaty, it has lately agreed on provisional peace terms with the Turkish
nationalists, actually agreeing to evacuate Cilicia. In fact, both
France and England know that the Sèvres Treaty is unworkable, and that
Turkish possession of virtually the whole of Asia Minor will have to be
recognized.
In negotiating with Mustapha Kemal, France undoubtedly hopes to get him
to throw over the Arabs. But this is scarcely thinkable. The whole trend
of events betokens an increasing solidarity of the Near Eastern peoples
against Western political control. A most remarkable portent in this
direction is the Pan-Islamic conference held at Sivas early in 1921.
This conference, called to draw up a definite scheme for effective
Moslem co-operation the world over, was attended not merely by the high
orthodox Moslem dignitaries and political leaders, but also by heterodox
chiefs like the Shiah Emir of Kerbela, the Imam Yahya, and the Zaidite
Emir of Yemen--leaders of heretical sects between whom and the orthodox
Sunnis co-operation had previously been impossible. Most notable of all,
the press reports state that the conference was presided over by no
less a personage than El Sennussi. This may well be so, for we have
already seen how the Sennussi have always worked for a close union of
all Islam against Western domination.
Such is the situation in the Near East--a situation very grave and full
of trouble. The most hopeful portent is the apparent awakening of the
British Government to the growing perils of the hour, and its consequent
modifications of attitude. The labours of men like Lord Milner and Sir
Percy Cox, however hampered by purblind influences, can scarcely be
wholly barren of results. Such men are the diplomatic descendants of
Chatham and of Durham; the upholders of that great political tradition
which has steered the British Empire safely through crises that appeared
hopeless.
On the other hand, the darkest portent in the Near East is the continued
intransigeance of France. Steeped in its old traditions, French policy
apparently refuses to face realities. If an explosion comes, as come it
must unless France modifies her attitude; if, some dark day, thirty or
forty French battalions are caught in a simoom of Arab fury blowing out
of the desert and are annihilated in a new Adowa; the regretful verdict
of many versed in Eastern affairs can only be: "French policy has
deserved it."
Leaving the Near Eastern problem at this critical juncture to the
inscrutable solution of the future, let us now turn to the great
political problem of the Middle East--the nationalist movement in
India.
FOOTNOTES:
[138] For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, see
Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_; and his
_Western Culture in Eastern Lands_. Also the articles by Léon Cahun in
_Lavisse et Rambaud_, previously cited; and L. Rousseau, _L'Effort
Ottoman_ (Paris, 1907).
[139] Bérard, _Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances_, p. 16 (Paris,
1907).
[140] Cited by Bérard, p. 19.
[141] Cited by Bérard, p. 20.
[142] _Le Revéil de la Nation arabe_, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905).
[143] The semi-legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire.
[144] The texts of both the above documents can be most conveniently
found in E. Jung, _Les Puissances devant la Révolte arabe: La Crise
mondiale de Demain_, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906).
[145] A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War is
that of the Moslem publicist "X," "Les Courants politiques dans le Monde
arabe," _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1913. Also see G. W. Bury,
_Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen_ (London, 1915).
[146] For Arab affairs during the Great War, see E. Jung,
"L'Indépendance arabe et la Révolte actuelle," _La Revue_, 1 August,
1916; I. D. Levine, "Arabs versus Turks," _American Review of Reviews_,
November, 1916; A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien_ (Leipzig,
1918); G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_ (London, 1919); S. Mylrea, "The
Politico-Religious Situation in Arabia," _The Moslem World_, July, 1919;
L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution," _Asia_,
April, May, June, 1920.
[147] Georg Schweinfurth, _Die Wiedergeburt Ägyptens im Lichte eines
aufgeklärten Islam_ (Berlin, 1895).
[148] Low, _Egypt in Transition_, p. 260 (London, 1914).
[149] _The Asiatic Review_, April, 1914.
[150] "L'Égypte et les Débuts du Protectorat," _Revue des Sciences
Politiques_, 15 June, 1915.
[151] Mohammed Farid Bey, "L'Égypte et la Guerre," _Revue Politique
Internationale_, May, 1915.
[152] Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, "Die ägyptische Frage," _Asien_, November,
1916.
[153] A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber, _Les Blancs
d'Afrique_ (Paris, 1910).
[154] For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix de
Saint-Aymour, _Arabes et Kabyles_ (Paris, 1891); A. Bel, _Coup d'Oeil
sur l'Islam en Berbérie_ (Paris, 1917).
[155] For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, "The European
Reconquest of North Africa," _American Historical Review_, July, 1912.
[156] For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A.
Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P.
Lapie, _Les Civilisations tunisiennes_ (Paris, 1898); P. Millet, "Les
Jeunes-Algériens," _Revue de Paris_, 1 November, 1913.
[157] A good analysis of the pre-revolutionary reformist movements is
found in "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," _Revue du Monde
musulman_, June, 1914. See also Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern
Lands_; General Sir T. E. Gordon, "The Reform Movement in Persia,"
_Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, 13 March, 1907.
[158] See W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York,
1912). Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne, _The
Revolution in Persia_ (London, 1910).
[159] E. G. Browne, "The Present Situation in Persia," _Contemporary
Review_, November, 1912.
[160] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp.
11-12.
[161] For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia,"
_The Moslem World_, January, 1911; Févret, "Les Tatars de Crimée,"
_Revue du Monde musulman_, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, "Les Musulmans
russes," _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1906; Fr. von Mackay, "Die
Erweckung Russlands asiatischen Völkerschaften," _Deutsche Rundschau_,
March, 1918; Arminius Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_; H.
Williams, "The Russian Mohammedans," _Russian Review_, February, 1914;
"X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme," _Revue du Monde musulman_,
March, 1913.
[162] For these activities, see article by "X," quoted above; also Ahmed
Emin, _The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press_ (New
York, 1914).
[163] For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see my
article "Pan-Turanism," _American Political Science Review_, February,
1917.
[164] See article by "X," quoted above; also his article "Les Courants
politiques dans la Turquie contemporaine," _Revue du Monde musulman_,
December, 1912.
[165] Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in the
_Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalist
activities and attitudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199--_A
Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. Compiled by the
Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff,
Admiralty_ (London, 1919); E. F. Benson, _Crescent and Iron Cross_
(London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka, _The Turks of Central Asia: An Inquiry
into the Pan-Turanian Problem_ (Oxford, 1918); H. Morgenthau,
_Ambassador Morgenthau's Story_ (New York, 1918); Dr. Harry Stürmer,
_Two War-Years in Constantinople_ (New York, 1917); A. Mandelstam, "The
Turkish Spirit," _New Europe_, April 22, 1920.
[166] For Pan-Arab developments, see A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von
Arabien_ (Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, "Turkey, England, and the
Present Crisis," _Asiatic Review_, October 1, 1914; A. Servier, _Le
Nationalisme musulman_; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauisch, "Das Machtgebiet
der arabischen Sprache," _Preussische Jahrbücher_, September, 1916.
[167] Literally "House of Islam." All non-Moslem lands are collectively
known as "Dar-ul-Harb" or "House of War."
[168] _I. e._, the organized group of followers of a particular
religion.
[169] Mohammed Ali, "Le Mouvement musulman dans l'Inde," _Revue
Politique Internationale_, January, 1914. He headed the so-called
"Khilafat Delegation" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 to
protest against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peace
treaties.
[170] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 181.
[171] For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali,
quoted above, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvième Siècle_
(Paris, 1888); same author, "Politique musulmane," _Revue du Monde
Musulman_, September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam,"
_Nineteenth Century and After_, July, 1919; G. Démorgny, _La Question
Persane_, pp. 23-31 (Paris, 1916); W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past
and Present," _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920.
[172] _Egyptian White Book_: Collection of Official Correspondence of
the Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919).
[173] G. Civimini, in the _Corriere della Sera_, December 30, 1919.
[174] Madame Jehan d'Ivray, "En Égypte," _Revue de Paris_, September 15,
1920. Madame d'Ivray cites other picturesque incidents of a like
character. See also Annexes to _Egyptian White Book_, previously quoted.
These Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied by
photographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops.
[175] Contained in the press statements previously mentioned.
[176] Sir M. McIlwraith, "Egyptian Nationalism," _Edinburgh Review_,
July, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "The Future in Egypt," _New
Europe_, November 6, 1919.
[177] For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol,
"Conflicting Policies in the East," _New Europe_, July 1, 1920.
[178] For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series of
articles by L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution,"
_Asia_, April, May, June, July, 1920.
[179] A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to the
Mesopotamian Arabs in March, 1917.
[180] Article xxii.
[181] From a speech delivered September 19, 1919.
[182] For examples of this pre-war imperialist propaganda, see G.
Poignant, "Les Intérêts français en Syrie," _Questions diplomatiques et
coloniales_, March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the author
cites Premier Poincaré's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies,
December 21, 1912: "I need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syria
particularly we have traditional interests and that we intend to make
them respected." See also J. Atalla, "Les Trois Solutions de la Question
syrienne," _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, October 16, 1913; L.
Le Fur, _Le Protectorat de la France sur les Catholiques d'Orient_
(Paris, 1914).
[183] Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article "Nos Droits en Syrie
et en Palestine," _Revue Hebdomadaire_, June 5, 1915. For other
examples of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article,
C. G. Bassim, _La Question du Liban_ (Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, "La
Syrie: Champ de Bataille politique," _La Revue Mondiale_, February 1-15,
1920; Comte Cressaty, _La Syrie française_ (Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, "La
France du Levant," _Revue Hebdomadaire_, March 1, 1919.
[184] Baudouin, _supra_. For other violent anti-British comment, see
Laudet, _supra_.
[185] For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, see
Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," _National Review_,
September, 1920; W. Urinowski, "The Arab Cause," _Balkan Review_,
September, 1920. Both of these writers were officers in the British
forces in the Arab area. See also strong articles by "Taira" in the
_Balkan Review_, August and October, 1920.
[186] For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted.
[187] B. G. Gaulis in _L'Opinion_, April 24, 1920.
[188] _Le Populaire_, February 16, 1920.
[189] For the details of these events, see my article on Persia in _The
Century_, January, 1920.
[190] Statement given to the press in August, 1920.
[191] Henri de Chambon, editor of _La Revue Parlementaire_. Quoted by
Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," _National Review_,
September, 1920.