II

Is it not equally true that the value of criticism as a guide to the

judgment or the taste, teaching us what to admire and what to condemn,

is less than its value as an intellectual pleasure and stimulus, its

power to awaken ideas? Judgment is good, but inspiration is better.

How rarely we make the judgments of the greatest critics our own! We

are pleased when they confirm our own, but is not our main interest

and profit in what the critic gives us out of himself? We do not, for

instance, care very much for Carlyle’s literary judgments, but for

Carlyle’s quality of mind, his flashes of poetic insight, his burden

of conscience, his power of portraiture, his heroic moral fibre, we

care a great deal. Arnold thought Carlyle’s criticism less sound

than Johnson’s,--more tainted with _engouement_, with passion and

appetite, as it probably is; but how much more incentive, how much more

quickening power, how much more of the stuff of which life is made, do

we get from Carlyle than from Johnson or from Arnold himself!

That the criticism is sound is not enough,--it must also warm and

stimulate the mind; and if it do this we shall not trouble ourselves

very much about its conclusions. Even M. Brunetière says that there are

masterpieces in the history of literature and art whose authors were

downright fools, as there are, on the other hand, mediocre works from

the hands of men of vast intelligence. Very many readers, I fancy, will

not rest in the main conclusions at which Tolstoi arrives in his recent

discussion of the question “What is art?” but who can fail to feel that

here is a large, sincere, helpful soul, whose conception of life and of

art is of great value? If we were to estimate Ruskin by the soundness

of his judgments alone, we should miss the most important part of him.

It is as a prophet of life as well as a critic of art that we value

him. Would he be a better critic were he less a prophet?

Or take a more purely critical mind, such as Matthew Arnold’s. Do we

care very much even for his literary judgments? Do we not care much

more for his qualities as a writer,--his lucidity, his centrality,

his style, his continuity of thought, his turns of expression, his

particular interpretation of literature and life? His opinions may be

sound, but this is not the secret of his power; it resides in something

more intimate and personal to himself. The late Principal Shairp was

probably as sound a critic as was Arnold, but his work is of much less

interest, because it does not contain the same vital expression of a

new and distinct type of mind. Arnold was a better critic of literature

than of life and history. There were other values than literary ones

that were not so clearly within his range. In 1870 he thought the

Germans would stand a poor chance in the war with France. How could

the German _Gemeinheit_, or commonness, stand up before the French

_esprit_? In our civil war, he expected the South to win. Did not the

South have distinction? But distinction counts for more in style than

in war. Arnold’s criticism has the great merit of being a clear and

forcible expression of a fine-bred, high-toned, particular type of

man, and that type a pure and noble one. There was no bungling, no

crudeness, no straining, no confusion, no snap judgment, and apparently

no bias. He was as steady as a clock. His ideas were continuous and

homogeneous; they run like living currents all through his works,

and give them unity and definitiveness. He is not to be effaced or

overthrown; he is only to be matched and appraised. His word is not

final, but it is fit and challenges your common sense. His contribution

flows into the current of English criticism like a clear stream into

a turbid one; it is not deep, but pellucid,--a tributary that improves

the quality of the whole. It gives us that refreshment and satisfaction

that we always get from the words of a man who speaks in his own right

and from ample grounds of personal conviction.

Positive judgments in literature or in art, or in any matters of taste,

are dangerous things. The crying want always is for new, fresh power to

break up the old verdicts and opinions, and set all afloat again. “We

must learn under the master how to destroy him.” The great critic gives

us courage to reverse his judgments. Dr. Johnson said that Dryden was

the writer who first taught us to determine the merit of composition

upon principle; but criticism has been just as much at variance with

itself since Dryden’s time as it was before. It is an art, and not a

science,--one of the forms of literary art, wherein, as in all other

forms of art, the man, and not the principle, is the chief factor.

Literary values, and other papers · 第 45 / 83 题