THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
Two Days on the Alma--Retreat of the Russians--Raglan proposes
a Flank Movement--Korniloff scuttles his Ships--The Russian
Retreat--Korniloff and Todleben--The Flank March decided--The Armies
Intersect--Death of St. Arnaud--The Allies in Position--Menschikoff
reinforces Sebastopol--Todleben's Preparations--The Point of
Attack--French and English Opinions--The Opposing Batteries--The
Sea--Defences of Sebastopol--Doubts of the Admirals--Opening
of the Bombardment--The French Fire silenced--Success of the
British--Failure of the Fleets--The Bombardment renewed--Wild
Rumours at Home--Menschikoff determines to Raise the Siege--The
Attack on Balaclava--Lord Lucan's Warning--Liprandi's
Advance--Capture of the Redoubts--The 93rd--Lord Lucan's
Advance--Charge of the Heavy Brigade--A Pause in the Battle--Raglan,
Lucan, and Nolan--Charge of the Light Brigade--The Valley of
Death--The Goal--Colonel Shewell--The Retreat covered--The Loss--End
of the Battle.
The allied armies spent two days on the battle-field of the Alma. There
were the wounded to tend and carry on board ship--the wounded of each
army, for the Russians left hundreds on the ground--and the dead to bury.
All through the evening, nay, throughout the night, our soldiers were
groping about in search of comrades, and carrying water to assuage their
thirst, and at dawn officers and men streamed over the hills and into
the ravines on this errand of mercy. Surgeons were landed from the fleet
to aid the scanty medical staff, and sailors to bear away those whose
wounds had been dressed; but, looking to the resources of the fleet, one
is surprised that these labours should have occupied eight-and-forty
hours. Time was precious; it was always believed that the Allies must
fight at least one battle before they reached Sebastopol, yet the means
of moving swiftly, after it had been won, had not been prepared. So
while the Allies were engaged in tending their wounded, burying their
dead, replenishing their ammunition stores, reorganising the regiments
that had suffered the most, and even taking care of the Russian wounded,
the Russian army, retiring hurriedly and in alarm, had relinquished
successively the strong positions on the Katcha and the Belbek, had
abandoned all the open country north of Sebastopol, and, passing the
bridge of Inkermann, had entered the place itself.
During the halt of the armies there had arisen a grave doubt in the mind
of Lord Raglan. Even on the beach of Kamishli, pondering on the task
before him, he had come to question the practicableness of assailing
Sebastopol from the north, and feared that "a flank movement to the south
side would be necessary." Here, on the heights of the Alma, he seems
to have felt the pressure of doubt more strongly; for on the 21st of
September, probably at his suggestion, Sir John Burgoyne--who shared, if
he did not originate his doubts--drew up a formal memorandum, setting
forth all the advantages of a march round the head of the harbour to
Balaclava on the south coast. And when the short march to the Katcha
ended, a singular incident, reported at headquarters, gave the British
officers fresh arguments. On the 22nd, steamers of both fleets had looked
into Sebastopol harbour, and had reported that all the vessels of war were
still there. They were, however, so posted as to attract the attention
of naval men, who took particular note of a line of ships moored across
the entrance to the harbour, from north to south. The next day, when the
fleet came up from Cape Loukoul to the Katcha, the whole line of Russian
ships was observed to settle down in the water until only their tops were
visible. The enemy, at the suggestion of Admiral Korniloff, had thus
disposed of part of a fleet with which he could not keep the sea, and a
wise measure it proved to be. The news was sent at once to the headquarter
camps on the Katcha, and it probably gave Lord Raglan an additional
argument in favour of a march to the south side. The Allies halted on the
Katcha until late on the 24th, when they advanced to the Belbek.
Meanwhile the Russian army had quitted its position at an early hour.
There was considerable disorder in some parts of the field, where
battalions falling back came under the fire of the Allied guns; but there
were others untouched and unsubdued, and these, with the Hussars and
artillery, had made that show of covering the retreat. The Russians did
not halt. Night overtook them among the hills; still they plodded along.
They left behind them the steep banks of the Katcha, the steeper banks and
rougher ridges of the Belbek, and moving to the head of the harbour of
Sebastopol, crossed the bridge of Inkermann on the morning of the 21st,
and encamped to the south-west of the town. Some battalions were left on
the north side, destined to be the garrison of the largest work on the
plateau, called the Star Fort. There, we are told, all was confusion and
dismay; but this may be doubted. Two or three very firm men were at that
time in Sebastopol--the Admirals Korniloff and Nachimoff, and the German
engineer Todleben. This remarkable soldier had been sent to the Crimea
in the month of August, at a time when the Czar was just beginning to
believe in the probability of a descent. He arrived there at the end of
the month, a few days after the Malakoff, or White Tower, on the south
side had been completed. Prince Menschikoff requested the engineer to
report upon the defences, and it is recorded that the substance of his
report was that with two divisions of infantry, say 24,000 men, and field
artillery, he would undertake to be master of the town in three hours.
This was not a pleasant report, nor does it appear that much was done to
supply the deficiency of defence until the Allies were almost before the
place. On the 21st Prince Menschikoff held a council. It was then that the
sturdy admirals and the great engineer showed their metal. They resolved
to extemporise earthen defences on the south side, and sink a part of the
fleet across the mouth of the harbour--a task which they executed with
promptitude and skill. But Prince Menschikoff seems to have been uncertain
what part his army should play; and had the Allies appeared on the Belbek
on the evening of the 21st they would have found the extra defences not
begun, the army still under the influence of the staggering blow delivered
at the Alma, and its chief perplexed and vacillating. Even at the moment
when they crowned the heights of the Belbek, and could see from the
loftier elevations the white forts on the margin of the water, the works
on the northern side had only just received their garrisons, and were in a
most weak condition. This the Allies knew not, nor did they know that when
they were discussing the propriety of the flank march to the south, Prince
Menschikoff had just begun a flank march from the south, so as to gain the
main road leading to Russia. Had the Allies been quicker, they would have
caught the Russians in their moment of weakness and doubt, and Sebastopol
would have been theirs.
It was the morning of the 25th. The Allied camp spread out over the
plateau, within three miles and a half of the nearest defences of
Sebastopol. The question to be resolved was, Should they at once attack
the northern works, or should they file through the rough woods and
appear suddenly on the southern plateau? We have seen that Lord Raglan,
as early as the 15th or 16th, doubted the ability of the Allies to carry
the northern forts by a _coup de main_, and contemplated the other
alternative; and that, the day after the battle of the Alma, he had set
Sir John Burgoyne to draw up a memorandum, showing the advantages of the
latter course. It is probable that these arguments were first placed
before Marshal St. Arnaud at the bivouac on the Katcha; but the ultimate
decision was not taken until the morning of the 25th, at the bivouac on
the Belbek. After that St. Arnaud had declined to risk an assault. Early
on the 25th Lord Raglan went to the quarters of Marshal St. Arnaud, who
was now attacked by cholera, and too much broken to be able to take an
active part; and in his presence, and that of General Canrobert and
others, debated the project of Sir John Burgoyne. Certainly, all were not
agreed; but Canrobert was not made of that stuff which leads a general to
take upon himself the burden of a heavy responsibility, and he yielded
to the arguments of the English. It was therefore ordered that the flank
march should be undertaken forthwith; and for four-and-twenty hours the
Allied armies were at the mercy of their opponents. Had Menschikoff
possessed a spark of genius, he would have cut his enemies to pieces on
the 25th of September; but he was employed on a movement of his own, when
he ought to have been watching the enemy.
About noon the march began. The artillery--so little was apprehended from
the enemy--took the lead; then the English cavalry and infantry, then the
baggage, and, next, the French. The 4th British Division was left on the
heights "to maintain the communication with the Katcha," until the new
base had been secured. The march was most painful and harassing; but,
leaving the infantry to tear their way through the low forest by compass,
let us follow Lord Raglan. According to his wont, he rode on towards
the front, taking the narrow bridle-path. The guns had halted when he
came up, because they were entirely without support. Half a battalion of
skirmishers might have destroyed all the horses, and killed the gunners.
When Lord Raglan rode up, he sharply ordered them to resume their march,
and passed on to the front. Suddenly he came softly back. As he emerged
from the trees he saw a strange sight--a body of Russians, with a
baggage-train, were moving northward along the road. It was the rear guard
of Prince MenschikofF, on its way to join the army at Batchiserai. Lord
Raglan eagerly inquired for the cavalry, and the cavalry were not to be
found. Some time elapsed; the Russians, ignorant of the nearness of their
foes, continued to march quietly along. Lord Raglan grew impatient, and
sent officers in search of his light horse, while he placed his own escort
and a troop of horse artillery in readiness to act. After some time,
parts of two Hussar regiments were brought up, and the 2nd battalion of
the Rifle Brigade; but the Russians had now detected the presence of an
enemy on their left flank, and had begun to run. Then the guns opened,
and the horsemen and light infantry went at the enemy, who, abandoning
his waggons, fled hastily away. Neither Menschikoff nor Raglan had the
slightest notion of one another's intentions during this extraordinary
chapter of blunders.
Next day the British army took up a position in front of Balaclava; but
the French remained on the Tchernaya. Marshal St. Arnaud, who had been
carried from the Belbek in a carriage captured at the Alma, now became,
in the opinion of those around him, incapable of commanding the army any
longer. He was, indeed, at the point of death, and on the morning of the
26th he formally handed his command over to General Canrobert. In a day
or two he embarked in the _Bertholet_, but died at sea, midway between
Balaclava and the Bosphorus. Marshal St. Arnaud was not a soldier of the
stamp to which our forefathers were accustomed in the great wars against
Napoleon. He was gifted with a showy, yet still genuine courage; he was
impetuous and daring. His long and painful sickness, and the peculiarity
of his position, no doubt, ought to be taken into account when we judge
of his soldiership; but, having made allowance for these obstructions to
the display of military ability, we are bound to say that we do not find
in the marshal any faculties of a high order. His ambition, his vanity,
his assumption, are as conspicuous as his frankness, warmth of heart,
and readiness to yield under pressure, whether it came from Paris or the
British headquarters; but, on the whole, he was a flashy and insubstantial
man. His successor, General Canrobert, came of the same Algerian stock,
and he had at least as much ability as Marshal St. Arnaud, and one quality
the marshal had not--modesty.
The French army crossed the plain on the 28th, and encamped in front of
Balaclava. The day before Lord Raglan had sent the Light and 2nd Divisions
up to the slopes which overlook Sebastopol; on the 29th the French army
followed, and by the 1st of October all the infantry of the Allies, except
the 93rd, the Turks, and some Marines landed from the fleet, were on those
hills. Here, then, for many months, was to be the scene of their mighty
labours and cruel sufferings: these rugged heights, and ravine-riven
plains, and sheltered valleys, were to be the mute witnesses of the
most extraordinary siege of modern times, and one of the most remarkable
recorded in military annals.
[Illustration: PLAN OF SEBASTOPOL, SHOWING THE DEFENCE.]
The Russians had profited by the change in the plans of the Allies. Prince
Menschikoff had moved his army upon Batchiserai on the 24th and 25th, in
order to regain his communications with Perekop and the eastern part of
the Crimea, whence, as he knew, large reserves were approaching to succour
the cherished city of the Czar. He hoped to place himself in rear of the
Allied armies, which, he supposed, would attack the northern works of
Sebastopol, and preserve his position there until he was strong enough
to fight a battle for the relief of the place. When the attack of the
Allies on his rear-guard, and intelligence from Sebastopol of the capture
of Balaclava, revealed to him the change of plan, he was persuaded by
Korniloff's remonstrances to move at once from Batchiserai and take up
a position on the Katcha, whence, on the 1st of October, he marched his
army through the village of Belbek, and rested for the night on the left
bank of the stream. The next morning the army was moved up to the northern
works, and thence transported across the harbour to aid in throwing up the
defences; so that, two days after the Allies had planted their camps on
the southern plateau, 20,000 men of Prince Menschikoff's beaten army had
re-entered Sebastopol.
During the fortnight that had elapsed since the battle of the Alma a
striking change had been made in the landward defences of Sebastopol. When
the Allies landed the defensive works were few and disconnected. On the
eastern face--that is, from the Careening Bay to the great ravine--there
were but three works, the centre of which was the Malakoff tower on its
commanding hillock. On the western face there was a long loop-holed
wall, running from the sea in front of Artillery Bay to a stone tower,
called the Central Bastion, opposite a cemetery, and a second work made
of earth, called the Flagstaff Bastion, crowning a hill at the southern
apex of the town, and on the western side of the great ravine. Not
more than fifty guns were mounted on these works at that time. In the
interval, the genius of Todleben had converted the place into a strongly
entrenched camp. The sailors and soldiers, the civilians, and even women,
were employed, without stint, in throwing up earthworks and in mounting
guns. Inspired by the energy of Korniloff, a tough Russian, directed
by the skill of Todleben, supplied by the vast resources of an arsenal
crammed with means and appliances of all kinds, the workers, in a few
days, surrounded the city with powerful defences. Batteries, connected
by entrenchments, arose on all sides; so that when the Allies sat down
before the place, and looked out over the waste towards the goal of
their efforts, instead of finding an open town, they found an entrenched
camp, which grew stronger under the gazer's eye. They had shrunk from
the northern works, because they were too strong; they marched up to the
southern works, and discovered that these were stronger. They had come
thither to take a town by a _coup de main_, and, in the opinion of Sir
George Cathcart, could have walked into the place on the 28th of September
without the loss of a soldier. They soon found that they were in front of
an entrenched position which no troops could assail and live. Therefore
the siege guns were landed with all practicable speed, and it was resolved
to raise batteries, not to breach the works, but to silence the fire of
the guns, and then to storm in on all sides.
But the more minutely the Allies looked into the ground they would have to
take up, and the works they would have to execute, the less likely did it
appear that they would readily reduce the place. The plateau occupied by
the British sloped down to the Russian works. It was broken into ridges
by five deep ravines, whose sides became more precipitous as they fell
towards the South Bay or Dockyard Creek. The left ravine was the largest
and the most profound. Towards its termination in the South Bay, the two
next ravines towards the right ran into it, leaving flat slopes between.
The second, on the right, was the larger and more important, and along its
bottom ran the Woronzoff road, whence it became known as the Woronzoff
ravine. Next, on the right, was a smaller ravine, called Karabelnaia,
because it led to that suburb; and the next, having its source near
Inkermann, ended in the Careening Bay. The Malakoff tower, with its
surrounding entrenchments, stood between the Careening and Karabelnaia
ravines. Then on the south-west of the Malakoff, but on the opposite bank
of the Karabelnaia, stood the now famous Redan, and the works known as
the Barrack batteries. In order to attack these, the engineers were forced
to trace their parallels on the flats between the ravines; but such was
the nature of the ground that the batteries raised to fire on the Redan
were obliged to be erected, not on the plateau which descended to it, but
on the opposite side of the Woronzoff ravine; while those intended to
batter the Malakoff were placed, not on the plateau which ran down to the
Malakoff, but on that which ran down to the Redan. Thus the two systems of
attack were separated by these deep gullies. They were called the right
and left attacks, and were the scenes of the principal labours and loss of
the British.
It was the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne and the engineers that the proper
point of attack was the Malakoff. On the ridge leading down to this work
was a remarkable mound, first called Gordon's Hill, but afterwards known
as the Mamelon. It afforded a good site for batteries directed against the
Malakoff, and as the hill on which this work was placed commanded the city
and the anchorage, Sir John wished to make this the principal point of
attack, and direct the main efforts of the besiegers to its mastery; while
the French held the enemy in check on their side, and a battery west of
the Woronzoff ravine--that is, our left attack--kept down the fire of the
Redan. But the French engineer, General Bizot, did not agree with Sir John
Burgoyne. In his opinion, the Flagstaff Battery, a bold salient work on
the west of the South Bay, was the key of the position. Sir John desired
to employ our 3rd Division against the Malakoff, but the French objected,
and it could not be done. Wherefore, the imperfect plan of attack which we
have indicated was resolved upon.
The landing of the siege train occupied eight days, and on the 16th of
October, 41 pieces of ordnance, including five 10-inch mortars, had been
mounted in batteries on the left attack, and 32 pieces of ordnance,
including five 10-inch mortars, had been mounted on the right attack. The
guns and mortars in these batteries were to direct a cross fire on the
Malakoff, the Redan, and the Barrack batteries, or to search the flank of
the Flagstaff on one side, and the men-of-war in the Careening creek on
the other. Thus in less than a week the British had put these 73 guns into
position; but in the meantime Todleben had shown such amazing industry and
skill, that he had brought no less than 107 guns to bear upon the British
attack alone, 82 of which were heavy siege guns, and 130 against the
French. The garrison was augmented daily; first by Menschikoff's army,
then by troops from Taman and Kertch, then by battalions from Odessa; so
that in a few days there were in Sebastopol no fewer than 23,000 soldiers,
and 12,000 sailors armed and drilled as soldiers; and about the heights of
Mackenzie's Farm and Inkermann, a corps of observation, numbering 25,000
men, giving a total of 60,000 men, a force equal to that of the Allies.
No place in the world could be more impregnable to an attack from the
sea. At the mouth of the roadstead there were three mighty forts. On a
low point of land, under the cliff on the northern side, rose the immense
work named Fort Constantine, showing 110 guns, in three casemated tiers,
with another tier on the roof. On the south shore, also low down, and
having a good command of the sea, first the Quarantine Fort, with its
sixty guns, and beyond that, Fort Alexander, with its ninety guns, defied
all assailants, so that in first line, an invading fleet would have to
encounter the fire of 260 guns, securely placed in solid works. Looking
from the sea, these three forts impressed the beholder with the strength
of the place. But these were not all. Beyond Alexander rose Fort Nicholas,
armed with 110 guns; and beyond this, Fort Paul, with its eighty-six guns,
standing at the mouth of the south bay. Altogether, there were no fewer
than 700 guns looking towards the sea from their secure casemates. Nor
should the small work, called the Wasp Battery, above Fort Constantine,
improvised on the spur of the moment, be overlooked. It deserved its name.
Such were the formidable defences which the allied fleets were to attack
in wooden ships, and which some sanguine persons expected them to reduce
to helplessness. No greater delusion could exist.
The real hour of trial had now come. The batteries of the Allies were
ready to open fire, and on the night of the 16th of October orders went
forth from both headquarters that the embrasures should be unmasked in the
obscurity of the dawn; that the troops in camp should be held in readiness
to fall in at a moment's notice ready to storm; that the fire of the land
batteries should open soon after six; and that the fleet, moving up,
should assail the great forts overlooking the sea. Both admirals, it is
understood, were opposed to this proceeding. They held the sound opinion
that the fleet could not effect anything against the forts. The safety of
the army, they said, depended on the safety of the fleet, and it would
be imprudent to risk the fleet in an encounter with forts so well placed
and so heavily armed. The mouth of the harbour was closed by the sunken
ships. A shoal, running out in front of Fort Constantine, prevented the
great men-of-war from placing themselves near enough to batter the walls
with effect. The sailing ships must be towed or propelled by steamers, and
would fight at a disadvantage. These arguments did not prevail. Admiral
Hamelin was under the absolute command of General Canrobert, and not at
liberty to disobey. Admiral Dundas was not under the absolute command of
Lord Raglan; but he could not well refrain from executing his wishes, or
look on while the French attacked. The allied generals were pressing in
their orders, as they held that an attack from the sea would operate as a
diversion, and favour the attack from the land. Therefore it was decided
that the ships should go in, take the risk, and do their utmost to damage
the enemy.
The first spectacle that arrested the eye when the first cloud of smoke
rolled away was the broken Malakoff. The 68-pounders, in Peel's battery,
more than 2,000 yards from the work, had dismounted the guns and ruined
the tower. Then it was seen that the French were inferior to their foes.
Their light brass guns and hastily constructed works were no match for
the heavier metal of the Russians. The batteries were beginning to
look deformed, their fire wanted the force and continuity of ours. The
Russians pounded them in front, and sent their heavy shot and shell into
their left flank; and, seeing the effect, redoubled their energy. Our
magazines were small, and the rapid firing soon exhausted the supply; but
the artillerymen drove down to the trenches, under a fierce cannonade;
and their daring was rewarded, for they met with few casualties. Then,
freshly supplied, the gunners went to work with renewed vigour. About
twenty minutes to nine there was an explosion, so loud that it struck
everyone with amazement, and caused a perceptible slackening of the fire.
A Russian shell had broken through the great magazine of the principal
French battery. In a moment all the guns were dismounted, 100 men were
killed and wounded, and the battery rendered absolutely useless. A shout
of triumph arose in the town, and its roar reached even the lines of the
besiegers. The French guns were now nearly silenced, so heavy had been the
storm directed upon them when it was found that they were giving way; and
between eleven and twelve, with one battery destroyed and two silenced,
General Canrobert gave orders to cease firing. Thus before noon the French
had retired from the contest altogether.
The British hardly relaxed a moment. Their batteries were mauled, but
their gunners never ceased to hurl forth their shot and shell. We had, by
this time, so reduced the fire from the Barrack batteries, on the Russian
right of the Redan, and from the earthwork round the Malakoff, that these
batteries were regarded as silenced. But, when the French ceased, the left
flank guns of the Flagstaff and Garden batteries, a little in its rear,
but facing our trenches, and the Redan, went on as furiously as ever. The
Russians fought their guns with a skill and persistence deserving the
greatest praise. They were now testing the worth of all their defences.
The costly casemated forts were replying to the allied ships; two steamers
and a line-of-battle ship in the harbour were exchanging shots with our
Lancaster guns and 68-pounders; while Todleben's extemporised batteries
were in full play. But the British fire was so good that, about three
o'clock, a shell found its way into the magazine of the Redan, and,
setting it on fire, caused an explosion which silenced that work for
half-an-hour. Then they got one or two guns to work, and with these they
kept up a fire all the rest of the day. But this earthwork suffered so
severely that its garrison was replaced three times between sunrise and
sunset. Along the whole line opposed to our batteries we had, by the
evening, established a complete superiority over the fire of the enemy;
and had the French been equally successful, it is probable that an assault
would have been hazarded. During the day we had demolished the Malakoff
tower, exploded its magazine, the magazine in the Redan, and a magazine
in the town; we had killed Admiral Korniloff, and killed or wounded 500
men, and dismounted thirty-five guns; and we had driven the line-of-battle
ships out of the creek, and damaged a steamer in the harbour. In return
our whole loss was 130 men killed and wounded, one Lancaster gun burst,
and seven guns disabled in consequence of injuries to wheels and carriages.
The operation of the fleets had been a glorious display of courage, and
that was all. The fleets were divided into three squadrons. The British
took the left, the Turks the centre, and the French the right. In order
to carry the great sailing ships into action, steamers were lashed to
the side next the offing, and one hour was occupied in turning the
_Britannia_, in order to place her in the proper position. The French were
drawn up in two lines, eight ships of the line with one Turkish ship, in
the first line, and eight, with a Turk, in the second. These were the
first, about 1,800, the second about 2,000 yards from the Quarantine
Fort and Forts Nicholas and Alexander on the south shore of the harbour.
The British fleet consisted of twenty-six ships of war, but some of the
steamers were used to carry the large sailing ships into position. They
had to contend with Fort Constantine and the batteries on the cliff,
notably the Wasp. A shoal running out from the spit on which the fort is
built prevented a nearer approach than 800 yards; but the _Agamemnon_
and _Sanspareil_, the first with only two feet of water under her keel,
did not hesitate to run within that distance of the 130 guns of Fort
Constantine. There was no wind, and the sea was smooth. About a quarter
past one the conflict began, and it did not cease until dark. And what was
the upshot? The forts looked "speckled." It is stated that the gunners
were driven from their guns more than once, and that some pieces were
dismounted; but the Russians again steadily resumed their fire, and fired
on to the end. The superiority of stone forts, and even earthworks, over
ships, remained as firmly established as ever. The fleets did not venture
again to attack the great forts at Sebastopol.
At dawn, on the 18th, the cannonade was resumed. This time it was a duel
between the British and the Russians, for the French had not recovered
from the destructive blows they received on the 17th. The Russian fire
was far heavier than on the preceding day. The batteries round the
Malakoff, the Redan, the Barrack, the Garden, and left face of the
Flagstaff batteries, were more vigorous than ever. But our fire did
not equal in intensity and weight the fire of the first day. Then, our
gunners were lavish of ammunition; now, they hoarded the slender store.
Each gun fired once in ten minutes. But the enemy, having behind them
the best stocked arsenal in the world, pitched in every kind of missile
without stint. Although they could not touch our magazines, again we blew
up one of theirs--this time in the Malakoff. The first day we fired as
fast as we could, in the hope of subduing their fire and storming in;
but on the second day all idea of instant storming had been given up. We
fired to continue the bombardment and enable the French to recover. One
ominous sign marked the 18th--the Russians made a reconnaissance from
the Tchernaya in the forenoon, upon the lines of Balaclava. Their heavy
masses appeared above Tchorgoun, and on the Fedoukine heights, but did not
approach nearer. It was the first instalment of the great bodies on the
road from Bessarabia. The superiority of the Russians was now established.
They had more men, more guns, more supplies of all kinds. On the 19th
they fired more shots; they fired steadily, and they had increased their
number of guns. The artillery of the besieged was double that of the
besiegers. It was all artillery of great weight and great range. The
Russian general had men enough to serve all his guns, and to keep very
strong parties on guard. Each night he more than repaired the damage done
in the day. Todleben seemed to be sleepless. In short, the whole character
of the operation, so far as the Allies were concerned, had become changed,
not by their will, but by time and the will of the Russians. On the
morning of the 20th the British store of ammunition had been so reduced
that very few rounds per gun remained. They had fired 20,000 the first
day. Moreover, the enemy was evidently gathering in force in the valley
of the Tchernaya. Therefore the generals took counsel together, and
determined to await the arrival of reinforcements, both of men and means,
and then to recommence a fresh bombardment, with a greatly increased force
of artillery.
[Illustration: CHARGE OF THE HEAVY BRIGADE. (_See p._ 60.)]
The expedition to the Crimea was undertaken on the idea that Sebastopol
could be taken by a landing, a battle, a march, and a _coup de main_. The
Allies landed on the 14th. The news of the battle of the Alma reached
Paris and London on the 30th of September. On the 1st and 2nd of October
came a report that the place had been taken on the 25th. This report
was believed by most people, including the British Government, and it
was believed by them because they were cognisant of the real nature of
the plan. Those who felt and expressed doubts respecting the truth of
the story were indignantly silenced. The French Emperor shared in the
general delusion, and it was not until the 4th of October that it was
dispelled by the arrival of Lord Raglan's despatch of the 28th, stating
that he had only just reached Balaclava. In the midst of their labours
in the trenches, and when the grave fact, that Sebastopol could not be
taken without a regular siege, was becoming more apparent every hour,
this wild story reached the allied camp with the English journals, and
excited feelings of the warmest indignation. This incident is narrated to
show how great were the expectations of the people and the Governments,
and how little either knew of the real nature of the enterprise which
they had promoted and sanctioned. In England there was a passion to take
Sebastopol, and it cannot be doubted that the failure of the original
plan, while it intensified that passion, also made the people angry with
the heads of the army and the heads of the State.
The Czar Nicholas was also angry at the invasion of his dominions and
the defeat of his troops; and anger and prudence alike dictated the
reinforcement of Prince Menschikoff and the resumption of offensive
operations. Accordingly, he gave orders for the march of the 3rd and
4th Corps d'Armée to the Crimea, and by the end of October the Russians
outnumbered the Allies by two to one. Prince Menschikoff meanwhile was
meditating a counter-stroke, and devising plans to force the Allies to
raise the siege. Surveying their position, he deemed it assailable on
two points; from the Tchernaya, in front of Balaclava, and from the head
of the harbour on the British right flank opposite Inkermann. Perhaps
the feasibility of the latter operation was then only germinating in his
mind. He was seduced into another operation. The apparent weakness of the
British position about Balaclava made him impatient to attack it. From
the lofty ridge of Mackenzie, on the north, and from the heights to the
east, which on one side look towards the Baidar valley and the road to the
Crimean undercliff, and on the other into Kamara and the Balaclava plain,
he saw the weak-looking defences of the Allies in front and flank. The
little knolls crowned by the Turkish redoubts lay exposed in the plains,
nearly two miles from any support. They ran in a curved line north-west
from Kamara--No. 1, on a mound called Canrobert's Hill, being nearest to
Kamara; and No. 5 being almost under the ridge of Mount Sapoune. Between
them and Balaclava and Kadikoi, and on to the Col and the fortified ridge,
there was nothing except the Marines on the eastern Balaclava heights,
the 93rd in front of the gorge leading to the harbour, the sailors'
gun-battery above Kadikoi, and the camps of the British Cavalry Brigades,
north-west of that village. Could he not by a rapid and vigorous movement
sweep through these defences, expel the Turks, destroy the 93rd, seize
Balaclava, destroy the shipping, and cut off the British from their road
out to the sea? Having won Balaclava and the heights on both sides, could
he not next carry the Col, and so break into the rear of the allied camps,
and place them between his guns and bayonets and those of Sebastopol?
General Liprandi had arrived with the 12th Division and four regiments
of horse and 44 field-guns, and reinforcing these from his over-abundant
garrison, Menschikoff determined to attempt the enterprise.
Sir Colin Campbell, who commanded at Balaclava, feared an attack from
Kamara and on this side, and he had done all that was possible, with the
scanty means at his disposal, to provide against it. As he watched daily,
his keen eye detected the increasing symptoms of the coming storm, but
so weak was our force that we could do little, except place guns in the
Turkish redoubts, a measure which did not meet with general approval; and
in case of attack to rely for safety upon the arrival of troops from the
main body in time to give battle to the assailants. General Liprandi, as
early as the 23rd, had collected on the Tchernaya his own 12th Infantry
Division, and he was then reinforced by seven battalions and fourteen guns
from Sebastopol. This gave him a force of about 21,000 men, including
3,200 cavalry and 52 guns. The 24th was spent in reconnoitring the
position, and Sir Colin Campbell heard the same evening, from a spy, that
an attack in force would be made at dawn; information which Lord Lucan
sent by his own aide-de-camp to headquarters. But it does not appear that
any measures were taken in consequence. Perhaps no trust was placed in
the spy. Perhaps Lord Lucan did not enjoy that confidence at headquarters
which a really good cavalry commander would not have failed to inspire. In
any case it does not appear that special measures were taken to meet the
attack.
Long before dawn of the 25th of October the Russians stood to their arms.
The valley of the Tchernaya, the plain beyond, and the hill sides were
shrouded in a thick clammy mist. This was favourable to the assailants.
The plan of General Liprandi was to move in three separate columns upon
the redoubts occupied by the Turks. The Turks were alarmed. They opened
fire, but as the enemy's troops rolled on towards them they lost heart.
Arrived within a hundred yards, the Russian infantry made a rush over
the intervening space, and the first redoubt was won. The Turks fled,
some over the valley, some into the next redoubt; but some fought, for
the Russian general reports that 170 were slain in the work. The English
artilleryman in charge of the 12-pounders had spiked them. Moving swiftly
forward, bringing up his right and pushing his horsemen along on the
flank, Liprandi forced the Turks to flee from the next two redoubts; and
the Cossacks were soon over the slopes, dashing among the fugitives, and
spearing them as they ran. The Turks still fled. Panic ran along the whole
line. The last redoubt was abandoned, and the Russians occupied the whole
line of outposts, and bringing up their artillery, opened a heavy fire.
But General Liprandi, fearful of thrusting his men under the fire of
the heavy guns about Balaclava and Kadikoi, halted in full career, and
refrained from pressing an attack which, at one moment, seemed likely to
sweep like a tide through the whole valley.
Nevertheless, he resolved to continue his offensive movement, but with
his horsemen alone. When the Russians were first seen advancing through
the mist, Lord Lucan, who expected them, was in one of the redoubts. He
immediately rode off to join his division, and to send the unwelcome news
to Sir Colin Campbell and Lord Raglan. The cavalry were soon in the saddle
and in fighting order, the Heavy Brigade on the right, the Light on the
left. Sir Colin Campbell drew out the 93rd, under Colonel Ainslie, and
posted them on a rising ground in front of the gorge leading to the port.
He had no other force except Captain Barker's 9-pounder foot battery, with
which he covered his right. Some of the fugitive Turks were rallied by
Sir Colin, and placed on his right flank, but no dependence could be put
on them. The only staunch infantry on the plain were the 93rd, drawn up
in line along a little ridge--a mere streak of red compared with the dark
compact masses of the impending foe.
They came down with a gallop and a yell. The few Turks on the right of
the Highlanders fired a volley at once and ran, crying, "Ship, Johnny,
ship!" The Cossacks were elated, and they swung round their left flank as
if they would roll up "the thin, red streak, tipped with a line of steel."
But Sir Colin threw back his right flank company, and when the screaming
horsemen were within 600 yards, he threw in a volley. The guns on the
heights sent in heavy shots, yet the Cossacks were not to be deterred. In
a short space, instead of fleeing, the 93rd poured in another volley from
their rifles, a volley heard afar, as it rang out clear and compact, and
echoed among the hills. The Cossacks found that the men in red were not to
be scared away like Turks, although they stood alone far out in the plain,
and only two deep. So, when the great column was closing with our heavy
horse, the mere fire and steadfastness of the Highlanders drove the lesser
column back to the redoubts, while the guns of Barker's battery smote them
as they fled.
When the British cavalry fell back, Lord Lucan placed them near the two
most westerly redoubts. His object in doing this was twofold. He desired,
first, to give a clear and unobstructed range to Sir Colin Campbell's
guns; and secondly, to post the cavalry at a point whence, if the Russians
moved directly on Balaclava, he could take them in flank. For this reason
he made them front to the east. Now Lord Raglan did not approve of the
disposition of the cavalry, and, being Commander-in-Chief, he had the
audacity to direct a change of position. Lord Lucan was "discomfited." He
seems to have thought that Lord Raglan did wrong to interfere with him.
But he obeyed, and changed the front from east to north. Then Lord Raglan
appears to have thought that the infantry near Balaclava should not be
wholly without the support of the horse, and he directed Lord Lucan to
send eight squadrons of the Heavy Brigade towards Balaclava. He obeyed.
There was a long orchard running north and south, round which, on the
western side, the cavalry had to move. It so chanced that, coincidently
with this order from the English general, Liprandi had also given an
order. He had massed his cavalry behind the redoubts, and he now directed
them, with a force of Cossacks on the left flank, to push over the ridge
and pour the larger body into the cavalry camps that lay to the south-east
of the orchard, and the flanking Cossacks to attack the 93rd. As Lord
Lucan was riding along, he saw, through a break in the fruit-trees, the
head of the huge column of Russian cavalry, some glittering in blue and
silver uniforms, crown the ridge and descend the slope. He rode at speed,
and joined the Greys and Enniskillens, as they were rounding the south end
of the orchard. He wheeled them into line, almost in the cavalry camp, and
placing them under General Scarlett, he directed them to anticipate the
Russian charge. All this was visible to the men and officers who swarmed
on Mount Sapoune. They sat or stood, French and British, looking down with
breathless interest on the scene below. They saw the Russian horse, nearly
3,000 strong, sweep majestically over the rising ground, the front of
their broad and deep column protected by outstretched wings on each flank;
and they saw--at first in something like disorder, apparent not real--the
little squadrons of the Heavy Brigade, which altogether did not equal a
fifth of the force swooping down upon them. No British soldier could have
desired a fairer occasion for a display of valour and skill.
As the Russians rolled over the ridge, they instinctively fronted towards
the tiny squadrons which they saw entangled in their standing camp.
"They," wrote Mr. W. H. Russell, who witnessed the scene, "advanced
down the hill at a slow canter, which they changed to a trot, and at
last nearly halted. Their first line was nearly double the length
of ours, and it was at least three times as deep. Behind them was a
similar line equally strong and compact. They evidently despised their
insignificant-looking enemy, but their time was come. The trumpets rang
out through the valley, and the Greys and Enniskilleners went right at
the centre of the Russian cavalry. The space between them was only a
few hundred yards; it was scarce enough to let the horses 'gather way,'
nor had the men quite space enough for the play of their sword arms.
The Russian line brought forward each wing as our cavalry advanced, and
threatened to annihilate them as they passed on. Turning a little to
their left, so as to meet the Russian right, the Greys rushed on with a
cheer that thrilled every heart. The wild shout of the Enniskilleners
rose through the air at the same instant. As lightning flashes through a
cloud, the Greys and Enniskilleners pierced through the dark masses of
Russians. The shock was but for a moment. There was a clash of steel, and
a light play of sword blades in the air, and then the Greys and dragoons
disappeared in the midst of the shaken and quivering columns. In another
moment we saw them emerging with diminished numbers and in broken order,
charging against the second line." In less than five minutes, by the
vigorous attack in front, and a well-timed assault in flank, and the dash
upon the wings as they were closing in upon our first line less than 700
British swordsmen had beaten 3,000 Russian horse in compact and close
array into a disorderly crowd, and had driven them off so completely that
they did not draw rein until two miles from the scene of the combat and
well behind their own guns and between their own infantry. Fortunately,
General Scarlett, who had the conduct of this brilliant charge, kept his
men in hand, and brought them up before they came under the range of the
enemy's guns. Thus were exemplified before the eyes of our allies the
highest and the rarest qualities of cavalry--the swift, unhesitating
charge, and the faculty for stopping ere it is too late. But the British
general must have seen with regret, as the French officers saw with
astonishment, the inactivity of the Light Brigade. One word from their
leader, a few strides round the north of the orchard, and the brigade
might have buried itself deep in the Russian right rear, and have taken
hundreds of prisoners, if it had not half destroyed Liprandi's cavalry.
But fear of responsibility kept Lord Cardigan's lips closed. He had been
"placed there," and until he was ordered to move, there he must remain.
Few men have ever thrown away a more fortunate moment, and in battle such
moments fly never to return.
So far the conflict. The Russians had surprised a line of outposts, and
had taken seven guns, and now held the greater part of the line they
had surprised; but their cavalry had suffered a deep disgrace, and had
been driven in, and their general was compelled to form a strong line of
battle, not for offence, but defence. He placed seven battalions and eight
guns on the south and south-west slopes of the Fedoukine heights. In the
valley leading to the Tchernaya were the rallied horse, with their flanks
thrown forward, and guns in their front; and on the redoubt ridge, and
on both sides of it, and in three of the redoubts, was the remainder of
the infantry in column, as far as Kamara, supported by strong lines of
guns. He seemed to wait an opportunity, and was tempted again, by the weak
appearance of the defence of Balaclava, to try and debouch from Kamara;
but the steady fire of Barker and the Marines daunted him effectually.
Thus stood the aspect of the field between nine and ten o'clock, when the
action cooled down to a cannonade, and the Russians, who were proud of
their victory over the Turks seemed to entertain no desire whatever for a
further acquaintance with their other foes at close quarters.
[Illustration: GENERAL TODLEBEN.]
Lord Raglan, from his post of vantage, had watched the enemy's
disposition, and he thought he saw a chance of recapturing the redoubts.
He gave an order to Cathcart to that effect, but it was executed with
great slowness. He, therefore, no doubt again to the discomfiture of
Lord Lucan, directed him to move his cavalry, and take advantage of any
opportunity that might present itself to prevent the removal of the
guns. The infantry divisions had not yet entered the valley. The order
sent to Lord Lucan was not well constructed, but the sense was plain. It
ran thus:--"Cavalry to advance, and take any opportunity to recover the
heights. They will be supported by the infantry, which have been ordered.
Advance on two fronts." Lord Lucan, who resented interference with him,
put upon it the construction that he was to attack the guns at the eastern
end of the valley, and being out of humour, asked for no explanation. Soon
afterwards, feeling that Lord Lucan had not advanced far enough according
to his view, Lord Raglan directed Quarter-master-General Airey to send
the following instructions to Lord Lucan: "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry
to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the
enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany.
French cavalry is on your left. Immediate." These instructions were placed
in the hands of Captain Nolan, a far-famed cavalry officer, who believed
British horsemen, well led, could ride over anything. Nolan galloped
swiftly down the slope and over the plain, and drawing rein, presented the
paper to Lord Lucan. "After carefully reading this order," writes Lord
Lucan to Lord Raglan afterwards, "I hesitated, and urged the uselessness
of such an _attack_, and the dangers attending it. The aide-de-camp
[Nolan], in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's
orders, that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked [in a very
complaining tone] 'Where, and what to do?' [a sensible question], neither
enemy nor guns being in sight. He [Nolan] replied, in a most disrespectful
but significant manner, pointing to the farther end of the valley, 'There,
my lord, is your enemy; there are the guns!'" Here is a dramatic interlude
on a bare plain in the Crimea; Nolan's blunder had confirmed Lucan's
misconception.
After the fierce dialogue we have recorded, Lord Lucan rode over to the
Light Brigade. He found them dismounted, and orders were given to mount.
"Lord Lucan," says Lord Cardigan, in a sworn affidavit, "then came to our
front and ordered me to attack the Russians in the valley. I replied,
'Certainly, sir; but allow me to point out to you that the Russians have
a battery in our front, and batteries and riflemen on each flank.' Lord
Lucan said, 'I cannot help that; it is Lord Raglan's positive order that
the Light Brigade attacks immediately.'" Well might a thrill of horror run
through the spectators on the heights, when they saw the Light Cavalry
speed off to their glorious doom.
For at this moment the Russians presented a strong line of battle. The
Fedoukine hills were black with heavy masses of infantry, no fewer than
sixteen guns looked into the valley, and a body of foot Cossack riflemen
were extended as skirmishers on the lower slopes; all this force of
artillery and musketry being on the left flank of the valley down which
Lord Lucan was about to hurl the Light Brigade. Across the mouth of the
valley leading to the bridge over the Tchernaya and to Tchorgoun, with
both flanks thrown well forward, stood the cavalry defeated by the Heavy
Brigade, having in front, and parallel to the line of attack, a battery of
guns belonging to a Cossack regiment. On the right of the line of advance
two redoubts were occupied, and more than half the Russian infantry and a
body of lancers were in position. Riflemen were extended along both sides
of the valley. But, on our right flank, the artillery, except that in the
second redoubt, fronted towards Balaclava. It was through a valley thus
defended on the flanks, and thus barred at the end, that our Light Brigade
were ordered to ride. The feat they accomplished is, perhaps, unparalleled
in war.
Lord Cardigan had formed his ten squadrons in two lines, numbering from
the right, the 13th Light Dragoons, the 17th Lancers, and the 11th
Hussars; in the second, the 8th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons. Lord
Lucan did not approve of this arrangement, and, drawing the 11th Hussars
from the first line, he placed them in the left rear of the 17th Lancers.
Thus the brigade formed three lines. The whole did not amount to many more
than 600 men. Lord Cardigan took post in front of the centre of the first
line. He was conspicuous, for he wore the uniform of the 11th Hussars,
with its bright cherry-coloured trousers and gorgeous jacket, and he rode
a strong and beautiful chestnut horse, with white heels. The signal was
given, and--
"Into the valley of death
Rode the six hundred."
The brigade went over the shoulder of the hill at a trot. At once they
came under the fire of the guns on the Fedoukine heights. The brave Nolan
was in the van. He had not gone far when a piece of shell struck him,
ripping open his chest. On went the brigade. In the race of death they
had to run the course was more than a mile long. The guns on their left,
the battery in front, served by Cossacks--who only sponged out after
every sixth round, so that their fire might be rapid--the guns from the
redoubt on their right, sent shot, and shell, and grape into the brilliant
and swiftly gliding lines, the thunder of whose trampling hoofs was
heard afar. The ranks were broken. The valley was strewn with heroes. The
mere sight of this steadfast band swooping down upon them, made upon the
Russians an impression so terrible that they instinctively drew back.
"Their fierce attack," wrote Liprandi, "forced General Rijoff to retire
by the road that leads to Tchorgoun." The infantry on the left went back
nearer to Kamara, and ran into squares. "The enemy's attack," continued
Liprandi, "was most pertinacious. He charged our cavalry in spite of the
grape fired with great precision from six guns of the light battery, No.
7, in spite of the fire of the skirmishers of the regiment 'Odessa' [on
the Russian left], and of a company of riflemen on the right wing, and
even unheeding the guns of General Yabrokritski," on the slopes of the
Fedoukine heights. Ignoring all this mass of destructive machinery, the
Light Brigade swept on. The steadfast artillerymen fired their last round
as the first line, rent and torn, closed upon the muzzles and, with a
fierce cheer, dashed in. The gunners were caught before they could retire,
and only those escaped who crept under the guns and waggons. Some Cossacks
charged to save their guns. Lord Cardigan had encounters with several, but
escaped with a lance thrust through his sleeve, and then he "rode away
apparently unhurt." After the first line came Colonel Douglas, with the
11th, and then the 4th and 8th. In a short space, the first line, which
had charged home so impetuously, was now broken into groups, and began to
straggle back; but, some of them meeting the 11th, faced about once more
and went on. All the regiments had passed the battery. Some of the men
were even galloping right into the Russian cavalry, who had fallen back
towards Tchorgoun.
[Illustration: THE CHARGE OF THE LIGHT BRIGADE AT BALACLAVA.
BY R. CATON WOODVILLE
(BY PERMISSION, FROM THE ENGRAVING PUBLISHED BY MESSRS H. GRAVES &
CO., LTD., PALL MALL, S.W.)]
The British horse were thus for a moment far within the enemy's position.
The Russians were almost stunned by the hardihood of the charge. But
General Liprandi, who was watching the fight, gathered up a body of
Lancers on his own left, and poured them into the space in front of the
battery, between our troopers and their line of retreat. Fortunately,
Colonel Shewell, of the 8th Hussars, had kept his regiment well in hand
throughout. He had come on at a steady, deliberate pace, on the right
of the 3rd line, but not so fast as the 4th. He had charged through the
battery, and had shown front to the Russians beyond; but, like a good
officer, he still kept his men in hand. His skill was rewarded. Across
the rear came the Russian Lancer regiment, and some of our men and some
officers thought for a moment it was the 17th, and proposed to form
upon it. They were soon undeceived. Colonel Shewell did not hesitate. He
wheeled about his squadrons just as Major Mayou, who had brought back a
knot of the 17th from their charge towards Tchorgoun, joined him; and,
leading the way, Shewell carried his men clear through the Russians, and
thus removed the worst danger from the path of the little groups and
single men, some wounded, some with wounded horses, some without horses,
who were struggling back over the corpse-strewn valley, still under that
terrible cross-fire.
Lord Lucan had brought up the Heavy Brigade to the crest of the ridge
to protect the retreat, and they came under fire and lost men, and his
lordship himself was slightly wounded. The Chasseurs d'Afrique had made
a most daring and skilful charge on a battery on the Fedoukine heights,
and had silenced its fire, with great loss to themselves. This was an
admirable feat, deserving all the praise it received. While the Heavy
Brigade was under fire, Lord Cardigan rode up and began to complain. At
this time the remnants of his brigade were still in the Russian position,
or just passing from it; for he had passed Lord Lucan, who was in advance
of _his_ brigade, before the returning heroes of the Light Cavalry were
within Lord Lucan's sight. So deponeth Lord Lucan and his statement was
amply confirmed. From which, taken in connection with Lord Cardigan's
sworn statements, we learn that Lord Cardigan rode well into the battery,
and fought with the Cossacks, but that he never had the brigade well in
hand, and though alive, was not in the midst of his men at the moment when
they required a guide and leader to extricate them from the heart of the
Russian position.
Far from the guns of the enemy, the remnant of that valorous band
re-formed. Lord Cardigan rode up to the front, and said, "Men, this is
a great blunder; but it is no fault of mine." And the men cheered and
replied, "Never mind, my lord, we are ready to go back again." And this
was the charge of the Light Brigade, such a grievous waste of life, yet so
sublime, and of such sterling quality, that its fame has rung through all
lands, and its influence still permeates all armies. Out of the 670 who
rode into the valley, there were left only 195 mounted men. The brigade
had lost 12 officers killed and 11 wounded; 147 men killed and 110 wounded
or missing; and 325 horses killed in the charge. All this devotion and
daring had been shown, all this havoc wrought, within the short period of
twenty minutes! Well might Lord Raglan say to Lord Lucan, "Why, you have
lost the Light Brigade!" Let us be just. The responsibility, whatever it
may be, for ordering that dreadful charge must be divided between three
men. The whole blame should not fall on Lord Lucan. General Airey and
Captain Nolan must share it with him.
The charge of the Light Brigade virtually terminated the battle. The
Guards, indeed, the 4th Division, and a French division did advance
farther eastward, and this, with the fire of the British guns, forced the
Russians successively out of all the redoubts, and compelled Liprandi
to take up a contracted position on the high ground between Kamara and
Tchorgoun. Lord Raglan and General Canrobert debated the propriety of a
further attack; but decided that it would be undesirable to waste life in
the attempt, as, if regained, the heights could not be reoccupied. So the
battle ended about one o'clock with a cannonade. At dusk the French troops
and the British infantry divisions, save the Highland Brigade, which
remained to reinforce the garrison of Balaclava, returned to the plateau.
The Russians admit a loss of 550 men in their cavalry alone, but admit
also that this was a hasty report. There is no other. The whole British
loss in cavalry was 37 officers and 353 men killed, wounded, and missing.