THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
Attitude of the German Powers--The Lines at Boulair--The Campaign
on the Danube--The Siege of Silistria--It is raised--Evacuation of
the Principalities--The British Fleet in the Black Sea--Arrival
of the Allied Armies--A Council of War--The Movement on
Varna--Unhealthiness of the Camp--An Attack on the Crimea
resolved on--Doubts of the Military Authorities--Despatch to Lord
Raglan--Lord Lyndhurst's Speech--Raglan's reluctant Assent--The
Expedition sails--Debarkation in the Crimea--Forays of the French
Troops--Composition of the Allied Armies--The Start--The first
Skirmish--St. Arnaud's Plan--Slowness of the British--Battle of the
Alma--Menschikotf's Position--The Disposal of his Troops--Final
Arrangements of the Allies--A British Blunder--Partial Failure of
the French--The British Advance--Evans's Division--Exploits of
Sir George Brown--Lord Raglan on the Hill--The Duke of Cambridge
hesitates--Attack of the Vladimirs--Crisis of the Battle--Final
Advance of the Allies--St. Arnaud declines to pursue.
Thus by a series of complex events, beginning in 1850 with the restless
interference of the French, met with corresponding readiness by Russia,
who, out of a political quarrel with the French Emperor, developed a large
and aggressive design against Turkish independence--a series of events
which culminated in 1854--the Czar found himself at war, not with Turkey
only, but with France and Britain. And what was the attitude of the German
Powers, whose arms and influence should have exercised so great a pressure
in this quarrel? The offence committed by Nicholas was an offence not only
against Turkey, but against Europe. By Europe, no doubt, it should have
been met and defeated, and the common disturber should have been punished,
if need were, by the common force. But, although Britain and France
were prompt in pledging themselves to meet force by force, the German
Powers would not pledge themselves to more than the meeting of force by
diplomacy. The concert was incomplete. Austria was more willing than
Prussia to adopt strong measures; but Austria did not do more than take up
a negative and neutral position during the winter and spring of 1853-4.
Yet she could not evade the danger which grew every day; and, therefore,
on the 9th of April, Austria--Prussia going with her so far--signed, in
common with the Western Powers, a protocol taking note of the existence
of war, and declaring that the summons addressed to Russia was "founded
on right;" that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was and
remained an essential condition of peace; that means should be found
of bringing that empire within the European system; and that the Four
Powers would not enter into any arrangement with Russia, or any other
Power, which did not accord with these principles, without previously
deliberating in common. So far there was union; but there was no union
in arms. Yet the very requirements of the protocol were those which, as
every fact had shown, Russia would not agree to without an application
of adequate force. A wide chasm separated the Western from the German
Powers--the gulf of war.
The Allies do not appear to have entered on the war with any very definite
notions. Britain and France formed an alliance together, and then allied
themselves with the Sultan. In defending the Sultan, they were to defend a
fundamental principle of European policy in the concrete, and they were to
take no advantage to themselves by the act. But their earlier notions were
limited even from the defensive point of view. They determined to secure
a line of retreat for their ships, and a base of operations from which,
in the event of the Turkish army being driven over the Balkan, they could
effectively defend Constantinople. At this time there was existent an
exaggerated dread of Russian power. The Czar was so strong, the Sultan so
weak, so men thought, that it was deemed possible the Russians might force
both the Danube and the Balkan by the rapid marches of an overwhelming
force, and thus confront the Sultan in his capital. To provide against
this, and also to cover their weakness, the Allies determined to land
their troops at Gallipoli at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Therefore, as
the allied troops began to arrive in March and April, they were employed
in throwing up entrenchments, known as the lines of Boulair, extending
from the Gulf of Saros to the Sea of Marmora. It was in the camps near
Gallipoli that the whole of the French and part of the British army were
organised for active service; but while they were assembling there,
the Turks were fighting so manfully on the Danube, and so effectually
thwarting Russia, that the lines became useless, and the Allies found it
needful to take post on the northern instead of the southern slopes of the
Balkans.
When it grew certain that war would ensue, the Emperor Nicholas reinforced
his army in the Principalities, and raised it to the strength of about
150,000 men, including an immense force of cavalry, and no fewer than 520
guns. Against this mass the Sultan could barely array a nominal force of
120,000 men, and a number of guns far inferior to that of his foe. The
bulk of the Russians were in Wallachia, posted in detachments from Kalafat
to Galatz. Their plan of operations was to concentrate a mass of troops
opposite Silistria, to hold in check the Turks at Kalafat, on one flank,
while on the other they invaded the Dobrudscha. It was then intended that
the main body should cross the Danube at Kalarasch, and joining the troops
coming up the river upon Silistria, invest and capture that fortress. This
done, they hoped to capture or mask Varna, and forcing Shumla, debouch
through the passes of the rugged Balkans upon the plains of Roumelia.
Marshal Prince Paskiewitch had been appointed to command the army, and
such is assumed to have been his plan of operations. But the plan was
essentially vicious. They could not fail to lose men in the pestiferous
Dobrudscha. So long as the Turks held Kalafat the Russians were never
secure on that flank. Then, assuming that they kept the Kalafat army at
bay, and even captured Silistria, it was in the highest degree improbable
that they could force Shumla, and impossible that they could take Varna,
so long as the allied fleets held the Black Sea. Nor were these the only
dangers incurred by the Czar. The plains of Wallachia lie between the
ridges of the Carpathians and the Danube. On their northern slopes Austria
was collecting a formidable army. Austria, though not resolved to fight,
was growing more menacing in her language and in her attitude. It was
true that she trammelled herself by a treaty with Prussia, laying down
the march of the Russians on the Balkans as a _casus belli_. But Russia
had no security that circumstances might not occur to produce a change in
Austrian councils, or that the very success of her preliminary movements
might not bring Austria to act. And if she acted, she would move across
the Russian line of communications, and the mere threat to do that would
almost ruin the Russian plan.
Nevertheless the first operations were successful, and on the 20th of
May Prince Paskiewitch crossed the Danube, and inspected the attack on
Silistria. He brought with him Prince Gortschakoff, who took the command
of the besieging force. It so happened that two Englishmen, Lieutenant
Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth, travelling for pleasure, had entered
Silistria, and had volunteered to aid in the defence. They took their
posts in the advanced works, and their presence and bearing produced such
an effect on the Turks that the latter never thought of yielding, but
fought with a steadfastness and devotion equal to any troops in the world.
After the failure of the seventh and last assault the Russians began to
mine. By sap and mine they had taken the place in 1829. They fell back
upon the old methods. Unable to storm over the low rampart, they sought
to blow it up from below. Here again the British officers frustrated
them, for they caused the Turks to cut a fresh entrenchment in rear of
the first; and, if need were, another behind that, and then another, but
always, whatever happened, to stand fast and fight with them. The Turks
did as they were bidden, and their coolness under fire, and indifference
to danger, provoked the warm admiration of the British officers whose
confidence was so liberally repaid. And thus the siege went on.
The investment was so imperfect that General Cannon, an Englishman in
the service of the Porte, contrived to pass between the Russian covering
armies, and enter the place, to the great joy of the besieged. In the
meantime the enemy had come so close that a Turk dared not speak above a
whisper without drawing upon himself a Russian bullet. It is to a remark
in too loud a tone that the death of Lieutenant Butler is attributed. He
was speaking to General Cannon, when a Russian bullet, passing obliquely
through the earthwork, gave him a wound, of which he died. Shortly
afterwards General Cannon, obeying, it is supposed, an order, withdrew
from the fortress with the troops he had brought, and carried Lieutenant
Nasmyth with him, but left behind another British officer, Lieutenant
Ballard. The middle of June had now arrived. The siege had lasted five
weeks. The Russian army had lost thousands of men from disease as well as
wounds, yet, except that their works were close to those of the Turks,
nothing had been gained. They resolved to abandon the enterprise. On the
22nd of June they opened a tremendous fire on the place from all their
batteries. When daylight dawned on the 23rd the Turks became aware that
the trenches were tenantless, and soon saw that the bulk of the army had
repassed the bridge, and had encamped about Kalarasch. The siege was at
an end. A fortnight later a chance reconnaissance, which brought Omar
Pasha across the Danube at Giurgevo, induced Gortschakoff to attack him
with another army. But the Turks, supported by British gunboats, beat off
the Russians at every point, and Gortschakoff in despair evacuated the
Principalities. The object of the campaign was won.
[Illustration: ZOUAVES LOOTING A VILLAGE IN THE CRIMEA. (_See p_. 40.)]
The causes which led to this failure of the Russian arms were, first, the
shining valour and noble resolution of the Turkish soldiers, and, next,
the arrival of the Allies at Varna, the operations of their fleets in the
Black Sea, and the new position taken up by Austria. For Austria, eager
for the evacuation of the Principalities, had, on the 14th of June, while
yet the issue of the siege of Silistria was uncertain, made a separate
treaty with the Porte, whereby the Emperor engaged "to exhaust all the
means of negotiation, and all other means, to obtain the evacuation of the
Principalities" by the foreign army which occupied them. In other words,
Austria undertook to occupy the Principalities herself--an engagement
which, if the Russians did not withdraw, rendered it incumbent on Austria
to use force for their expulsion. It is easy to see that, unless the Czar
was ready to incur the hazards of a war with Austria, in addition to a
war with the Allies, this pressure put upon him, coming at the back of a
defeat before Silistria, and the gathering strength of Britain and France
ashore and afloat, would compel him to yield up the material guarantee
which he had so recklessly seized. And it did so. But now we must glance
at the incidents which preceded it in the Black Sea, and on the shores of
the Bosphorus and the Hellespont.
On the Black Sea the combined fleet had ridden triumphant. In a cruise of
twenty days they met no foe, but picked up prizes in considerable numbers.
One incident had occurred which added to the wrath and mortification of
the Czar. The _Furious_ was sent to Odessa to bring away the British
Consul. As her boat, bearing a flag of truce, was returning to the
ship, she was fired upon; and no satisfactory explanation being given,
Admirals Dundas and Hamelin appeared off Odessa on the 21st of April with
a combined squadron and demanded redress. General Osten-Sacken having
refused to grant any redress, the admirals sent in a steam squadron the
next morning and bombarded the war-port, but tried to spare the town. In
twelve hours they had blown up a powder-magazine, destroyed, by shot and
shell, a goodly number of ships, and many buildings containing stores. The
loss of the Allies was three killed and twelve wounded. After inflicting
this chastisement for a breach of the usages of war, the squadron cruised
off Sebastopol, but met no enemy; and on the 5th of May Sir Edmund Lyons
with a squadron steamed away for the Circassian coast, where his presence
caused the Russians to abandon all their forts, except those of Anapa and
Sujak Kaleh, lying at the northern end of the coast, near the straits of
Kertch. The Circassians took immediate advantage of this, and confined
the garrisons of the two forts within the walls; while the Turks occupied
Redut Kaleh and Sukhum Kaleh, in Mingrelia and Abasia.
During the spring the troops of the Allies gradually assembled in
the dominions of the Sultan; and in the month of March, and for many
subsequent months, the blue waters of the Mediterranean were ploughed by
the fleet of transports, under steam and sail, all bound eastward; while
the straits which divide Europe from Asia were almost as crowded as the
Thames. The pressing question at the beginning of May was to organise
the military machine; to put it into fighting and marching order; to
provide more for its future than its present wants; to lay up stores of
provisions and depôts of ammunition; and, above all, to gather together
the means of setting the military machine in motion when it was completed.
This was no easy task. The French, by habit, were better prepared for
war than the British, but the former found it difficult to give legs to
their transport corps. As to the latter, they had been hurried into action
almost totally unprepared. They had neither a military train, nor even
the nucleus of such a corps; they had no effective medical staff; they
had an inexperienced and undermanned commissariat. They had magnificent
regiments, individually perfect; but they had no army. Everything had to
be done on the spot; and being done in a hurry, and by men not accustomed
to the work, it was imperfectly done. The British had not been a week
in Turkey before there was an outcry for transport. Lord Raglan had a
splendid collection of soldiers; but he could not have marched them fifty
miles.
Marshal St. Arnaud was, to judge from his letters, in a state of feverish
impatience for action; but, according to the statements of Kinglake, he
was also in a disturbed as well as ambitious frame of mind. It is said
that he tried first to obtain the command of the Turkish army, next to
effect an arrangement which would have given him a control over that
of Britain. These vagaries of a vain and ambitious man were frustrated
by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Lord Raglan, and they did not meet
with the approval of the Emperor. But events pressed. The Russians were
certain not to wait until the Allies had devised some plan. It became
imperative to see the facts a little more clearly than they could be seen
at Constantinople; and, in the middle of May, Lord Raglan and the marshal
went to Varna, to meet the Turkish general, and hear from Omar Pasha his
view of the situation, and his conception of its requirements. Omar Pasha
told them he had 45,000 in Shumla, and with these he could defend it. He
had 18,000 in Silistria; but these, he believed, could not hold the place
longer than six weeks, that is, to the end of June. He had about 20,000
at Kalafat. The rest of his forces were scattered in detachments. He
naturally suggested Varna as the point of concentration for the Allies.
The two generals agreed to bring up their troops to Varna.
Owing to St. Arnaud's abrupt changes of plan, the movement on Varna,
begun on the 29th of May, was not completed until the 4th of July. The
camps were pitched in beautiful places. The white tents crowned a green
knoll, or extended along a sandy plateau, and looked out upon broad sweeps
of turf broken by groups of fine trees, and overlooking a shining lake
skirted by meadow lands, and backed by the rugged outlines of the Balkans.
But the peculiarity of the country was the absence of inhabitants. Except
those in the service of the commissariat, drivers of mule carts and
bullock drays, and now and then a wandering Bulgarian, none were to be
seen. Fear had driven them to desert their homes; and it was not one of
the least disadvantages attending the armies of the Allies that they had
to operate in a country practically deserted. The want of transport, felt
even at Scutari and Gallipoli, became a positive evil in Bulgaria. The
porter and ale sent out for the consumption of the troops could not be
carried inland for want of carts and horses; the water was bad, and the
men drank the red wine of the country, and, in consequence, fell victims
to disease. Diarrhœa, dysentery, cholera, made their appearance in the
camps, and the graveyards began to fill. Then the air was polluted with
horrid exhalations, and in addition the men pined for action. So that,
although the sites of the camps looked healthy, bad management, imperfect
food and drink, intemperance, a burning sun by day and chilling dews by
night, and _ennui_, soon reduced the physical and moral stamina of the
troops.
Though the object of the campaign had been gained when the Russians
recrossed the Pruth, the allied Powers, active agents in the war, had
resolved on a mode of reaching Russia. They had determined to carry the
war into the Crimea, and capture Sebastopol. This was no sudden resolve.
It grew naturally, and, one may say, inevitably out of the war itself.
The object of the war was, first, the defence of the Sultan's territory;
next, the placing of the territory in security. But there were other means
essential to complete success. For a quarter of a century all military
observers had seen the military importance of the Crimea. This peninsula,
united to the mainland only by the Isthmus of Perekop, and the sandy ledge
of Arabat, was the seat of enormous power. At its southern extremity,
within a few hours' sail of Constantinople, stood Sebastopol, upon an
inlet of the sea forming an excellent harbour. The Russian Government had
spent millions in constructing here a series of fortresses impregnable to
a maritime attack, and within the harbour and on the shores of a creek
running southward they had built vast docks, overlooked by extensive
barracks for sailors and soldiers. Long before the phrase was used in
Parliament or by statesmen, soldiers had come to regard Sebastopol as a
"standing menace" to the Turkish empire; and at the very outbreak of war,
the Duke of Newcastle, British War Minister, had directed the attention of
Lord Raglan to this point. But the military men, knowing how precarious
are operations based on the sea, were doubtful of success. Very little
trustworthy information respecting the obstacles in the way, and the
numerical strength of the Russian army in the Crimea, could be obtained.
Lord Raglan could get none. The French had none. The British Cabinet,
looking to all the circumstances, seeing that the allied fleets had
entire control of the Black Sea, and that any reinforcements sent to the
Crimea must march thither by Perekop, sure that Austrian battalions would
cover the road to Constantinople, pressed upon their ally the project of
an invasion of the Crimea. The nation went entirely with them in this.
Being responsible, they naturally hesitated longer than those who were
not responsible; but it is not true to say, as Mr. Kinglake says, either
that the _Times_ brought about the decision, or that the Government merely
obeyed the popular voice. Those who were responsible for the expedition
were the Cabinet, the Parliament, the people--in short, the British
nation. And the nation was right. For unless Sebastopol and the naval
power of Russia in the Euxine were destroyed, a treaty of peace would
have been a mere truce devoid of any sound security either to Turkey or
to Europe. It is really puerile to contend that Russia could determine
the war by relinquishing the Principalities. The wrongful act which led
her there was only a symbol, a manifestation of the existence of a state
of things injurious to Europe. When she retired, that state of things was
not changed; Russia was still the domineering Power, and still held in her
hands the means of disquieting, threatening, nay, of attacking Turkey. No
doubt the object of the war enlarged with its progress; but that, within
certain limits, is common to all wars. Having gone to the vast expense of
sending armies and fleets to Turkey, the Allies would have been culpable
had they neglected to obtain the amplest possible security for the
independence and integrity of Turkey.
Towards the end of June the British Cabinet were engaged in considering
the important project submitted by the Duke of Newcastle. After some
deliberation, all parties assented, and the terms of the despatch to Lord
Raglan were finally agreed to on the 28th. In this despatch Lord Raglan
was instructed "to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol, unless,"
so the terms ran, "with the information in your possession, but at present
unknown in this country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it could
not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success.... If, upon
mature reflection, you should consider that the united strength of the two
armies is insufficient for this undertaking, you are not to be precluded
from the exercise of the discretion originally vested in you, though her
Majesty's Government will learn with regret that an attack from which such
important consequences are anticipated must be any longer delayed." He was
further informed that, as no safe and honourable peace could be obtained
until the fortress was reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed, nothing
but "insuperable impediments" was to prevent an early decision. These are
what have been called the "stringent instructions" directing the invasion
of the Crimea. They were supported by the voice of the nation and its
Parliament. Before the Cabinet had taken its decision, before it was known
that the siege of Silistria had been raised, Lord Lyndhurst in his place,
on the 19th of June, declared that "in no event, except that of extreme
necessity, ought we to make peace without previously destroying the
Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and laying prostrate the fortifications by
which it is defended." And in answer, Lord Clarendon, with more reticence
of language, spoke to the same effect.
The attitude of France was not so precise. Concurring with the British
Cabinet in its views respecting the necessarily enlarged objects of the
war, the slow and cautious character of the Emperor led him to acquiesce
in the proposed invasion of the Crimea rather than urge it forward. His
general in Turkey was instructed to support the decision Lord Raglan
might come to, and not by any means to plead for the invasion; but if the
council of war decided in favour of the British project, then, of course,
Marshal St. Arnaud was to give his amplest co-operation. Practically,
therefore, the decision rested with Lord Raglan; for although Admiral
Dundas was not under his orders, yet it was not to be supposed that he
could or would stand out against the wishes of his Government. Lord Raglan
did not delay his decision. The despatch of the War Minister reached him
on the 16th of July; on the 18th he called a council of war; on the 19th
he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle that he accepted the task imposed upon
him; but accepted it, as he did not fail to express, "more in deference
to the views of the British Government, and to the known acquiescence of
the Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views," than in deference to his own
opinion: for he frankly stated that neither he nor the admiral had been
able to obtain any information upon which an opinion could be founded.
Indeed, there were not in the council any ready supporters of the project
except Admirals Lyons and Bruat. Dundas and Hamelin were both opposed
to it; but, as we have seen, St. Arnaud and his admirals were directed
to acquiesce. Dundas was not likely to do more than express an opinion;
and hence the council took its tone from Lord Raglan, and proceeded to
consider how and when the enterprise should be carried out. After two
months' delay caused partly by the sickness of the troops, partly by the
necessity for preparation, the allied troops sailed. They would never
have started had not Roberts, a master in the navy, devised means for the
transport of the cavalry and artillery, by buying up the boats of the
country and building rafts upon them. Yet this man was allowed to die
unhonoured and unpromoted.
The expedition reached the Crimea on the 13th of September, and the armies
lay four days in position off the points of debarkation. Each day there
was work enough to be done in completing the operation of landing. On
the 15th the wind blew heavily on shore, and sent a rough surf dashing
over the shingle and sand. But, later in the day, the wind went down a
little, and the British were enabled to put on shore more guns and the
greater part of the cavalry; and the French landed more guns and their 4th
division. Lord Raglan also went on shore, and established his headquarters
on a rising ground, and rode round the outposts. The men and officers
slept once more in the open air. They made beds of fern and lavender; but,
although the rain did not descend in steady streams, a heavy dew saturated
beds, and blankets, and kits. On the 16th the tents were landed, in the
hope that transport for them could be found in the country. It was not
found, and all the tents were taken on shipboard before the army marched.
And why could not transport be found? When the Allies first landed, the
country people, simple farmers and shepherds, quiet and inoffensive, came
into the camp; and brought fowls, and eggs, and sheep, and were glad to
sell them. They also were willing to let out their carts and bullocks.
According to the British system, these men were well treated and well
paid. Wellington, even in France, could always secure a well-supplied
market, and even transport, by treating the people civilly and paying them
well. So it would have been here. But the French acted on a different
system. It is allowed in all countries that stores belonging to the
Government of your enemy are good prize. You may, by the strict rules
of war, take private property if you need it. Yet, as a general rule,
it is prudent to respect private property; or, if you take it, to pay
for it. The French took both alike. On going his rounds on the evening
of the 16th Lord Raglan learnt that a body of Zouaves had entered and
plundered the village of Baigaili, within the British lines, and had even
abused the villagers, men and women. Of course a speedy end was put to
such brutalities. At the same time Captain de Moleyns, with a squadron
of Spahis, went out of the French camp, and returned driving before him
flocks of sheep and cattle, a few camels, a number of arabas, or country
carts, and a group of natives, the captives of his spearmen. The effect
of these predatory forays was to reduce to a minimum the supplies of
all kinds, animate and inanimate, to be derived from the country. While
these Zouaves and Spahis were ravaging the villages, it was remarked
that the Turks, who had landed on the 15th and 16th, "the much-abused
Turks, remained quietly in their well-ordered camp, living contentedly
on the slender rations supplied from their fleet." Nevertheless, the
Commissary-General, by aid of military force and money, ultimately managed
to get together about 350 country waggons, with bullocks and drivers, for
the supply of the British section of the invading army.
[Illustration:
SAVING THE COLOURS: THE GUARDS AT INKERMAN (1854).
FROM THE PAINTING BY ROBERT GIBB R.S.A.]
[Illustration: SKIRMISH ON THE BULGANÂK: MAUDE'S BATTERY COMING INTO
ACTION. (_See p._ 42.)]
The operation of landing occupied four entire days, and the fifth was
spent in terminating the preparations for the march. The 4th British
division, under Sir George Cathcart, except two battalions, arrived
and were put ashore. The French landed 26,500 men, 72 guns, and a few
Spahis. The Turks landed 7,000 men, all infantry, and no mention is made
of their field artillery. The British landed 26,800 men, including 2,100
artillerymen, 60 guns, and 1,100 horsemen. The total force was, therefore,
in round numbers, 61,000 men and 132 guns. The French force consisted of
four divisions, under Canrobert, Bosquet, Prince Napoleon, and Forey. The
Turks were under Selim Pasha.
The British army was composed as follows:--
LIGHT DIVISION, SIR GEORGE BROWN.--1st Brigade, 7th, 33rd, 23rd,
Brigadier Codrington; 2nd Brigade, 19th, 88th, 77th, Brigadier Buller; 2nd
Battalion Rifle Brigade.
1ST DIVISION, THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE.--1st Brigade, Grenadier,
Fusilier, and Coldstream Guards, Brigadier Bentinck; 2nd Brigade, 42nd,
93rd, 79th Highlanders, Brigadier Colin Campbell.
2ND DIVISION, SIR DE LACY EVANS.--1st Brigade, 41st, 47th, 49th,
Brigadier Adams; 2nd Brigade, 30th, 55th, 95th, Brigadier J. Pennefather.
3RD DIVISION, SIR R. ENGLAND.--1st Brigade, 4th, 50th, 38th,
Brigadier J. Campbell; 2nd Brigade, 1st, 44th, 28th, Brigadier Eyre.
4TH DIVISION, SIR G. CATHCART.--1st Brigade, 20th, 57th, Rifle
Brigade 1st Battalion, 50th, Brigadier Goldie (who, with 57th, had not
arrived); 2nd Brigade, 21st, 63rd, 46th, Brigadier Torrens.
CAVALRY, THE EARL OF LUCAN.--4th Light Dragoons, 8th and 11th
Hussars, 13th Light Dragoons, and 17th Lancers, Brigadier the Earl of
Cardigan.
ARTILLERY, Colonel Strangways. ENGINEERS, Brigadier
Tylden. Adjutant-General, Estcourt; Quartermaster-General, Airey;
Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan.
The French preparations were completed by the morning of the 18th. They
had far less to land than the British. The weather was no real obstacle to
the landing of infantry, or even of stores; but it materially delayed the
debarkation of the horses; and independently of the artillery and baggage
animals, and chargers for the staff of all the divisions and brigades,
the British had to land 1,100 troop horses. In spite of his knowledge
of all these facts, Marshal St. Arnaud grew impatient of the delay. On
the following day the British were ready. The troops arose from their
damp beds at an early hour on the 19th, and paraded in marching order.
Much time was still spent in accommodating the baggage and stores of so
many thousands to the limited number of carts at the disposal of the
Commissariat. Everything not indispensable in a military point of view was
left behind. There was so much scattered on the beach, that Sir George
Cathcart had to part with his only brigadier, Torrens--for Goldie had not
arrived--and also part of his division; and Lord Lucan had to detach the
4th Light Dragoons from his weak brigade of cavalry to guard the beach,
and see all the stores, and tents, and baggage safely on shipboard. Time
wore on, the sun was high in the cloudless heavens before the word was
given to move. It was about nine o'clock. Marshal St. Arnaud, according to
the French writers, had then been two hours on the march.
The French were the first to cross the river Bulganâk. When our troops
came up, the French had halted in position and were at rest. But it was
our lot to fire the first gun. The divisions were crossing the river when
the Cossacks showed themselves on the slope which ascends from its bank.
The cavalry were ordered to look after them; and as they retired over the
ridge, Lord Cardigan followed. As he descended into the next valley, he
found himself face to face with a tolerably strong force of horsemen. The
skirmishers on each side began firing; but, as the Cossacks did not come
on, Lord Lucan ordered our squadrons to retire alternately. Suddenly the
enemy opened fire from horse artillery, and kept it up pretty smartly
upon the British, now halted, waiting for the guns. They had not to wait
long, for over the ridge came bounding Maude's troop of horse artillery.
Famous for rapidity, our gunners instantly came into action, and replied
to the enemy with such spirit and accuracy that the Russians quickly
ceased firing, and sheered off over the next ridge. By this time the
Rifles and part of the leading divisions had crowned the ridge in rear of
our cavalry; and our horsemen, with a loss of five wounded, and the guns
together with the infantry, returned to the position on the Bulganâk,
where they rested for the night. The Russians were a reconnoitring party,
strong in infantry, which kept out of sight. The cavalry present could
not have been less than 2,000. Some of them visited the French, but were
driven off by the artillery. So ended the first day's march. The Allies
bivouacked on the south bank of the Bulganâk; and, in order to guard
against a flank attack, the British divisions faced to the eastward, that
is, nearly at right angles to their line of march.
During the evening Marshal St. Arnaud visited Lord Raglan, whose
headquarters were in a posthouse on the Bulganâk. What passed at this
interview is painfully uncertain. It is said that the French marshal
brought with him a plan for attacking a position he had not seen; that
he proposed to turn both flanks; one division of his own army and the
Turks sweeping round the Russian left, and the whole of the British round
their right, while the remainder of the French fell upon and demolished
the centre. It is said also that Lord Raglan did not assent to or dissent
from this plan, yet that the French marshal left with an impression that
it was to be executed. How he came by the impression, one can never know;
but this one can know, that Lord Raglan ought not to have allowed Marshal
St. Arnaud to leave him with any doubts on his mind. He ought to have
distinctly explained that he could assent to no plan until he knew what
was to be attacked. He ought to have said in plain language--and he could
use plain language--that the plan of a battle must be determined by the
nature of the enemy's position, the number of troops by which it was held,
and the mode in which they were distributed. The allied commanders were
seven miles from the enemy. Neither had seen him, nor his position, nor
how he held his position. In these circumstances the proceeding of Marshal
St. Arnaud was absurd; and in plain, but polite language, he should have
been told so.
The dawn of the 20th of September was soft, balmy, and sunny. The troops
were afoot early, and soon under arms. Far away on the right the smoke
above the cliffs showed that the war-steamers were on the alert, and
prepared to work on that flank. Next to the sea, in execution of that
part of the marshal's plan not open to objection, General Bosquet, about
six o'clock, began to lead forth his division in two columns, followed by
four Turkish battalions. He moved on for an hour, and then halted, just
as the centre should have moved, to be followed by the British. But the
British were not ready. It is said they should have been in line about
seven. Whence arose the delay? Some of it must, no doubt, be set down
to the constitutional slowness of the British temperament; some to that
imperfect concert which is the bane of a divided command. The remainder
was caused, undoubtedly, by the fact that the British, in consequence of
the arrangements made overnight, had to effect a great change in their
array before they could begin to march. Then, that the two armies might be
in close proximity, so as to present an unbroken front, the whole had to
move obliquely to the right. These evolutions necessarily took up a great
deal of time.
Prince Menschikoff was the Commander-in-Chief of the naval and military
forces of the Czar in the Crimea. It seems that Nicholas did not believe
the Allies would venture upon the daring exploit of invading that
peninsula, or else that their rapidity of movement, slow as it seemed to
lookers-on, anticipated the arrival of his reinforcements; or he may have
thought that British and French armies and navies would not long act in
concert, and that some incident would bring about the abandonment of the
expedition. If so, he miscalculated the strength of will of those who held
in their hands the public forces of the Western Powers--the Emperor and
the British people. At all events, the Czar had comparatively few troops
in the Crimea--perhaps not altogether 50,000 men, including the sailors
and marines. These troops, in the early days of September, were partly
encamped at different places around and to the north of Sebastopol. By the
14th the lights of the fleet were visible from the heights of the Alma. He
might take up a position on the left flank of the line of march the Allies
would be compelled to follow, and thus force them to quit the sheltering
sea-coast in search of him; or he might take up the strongest position he
could find across the road they must follow, and thus try to impede their
march until reinforcements could reach him from Odessa. By adopting the
former plan he could have evaded an action or accepted one far from the
sea, for the Allies would not have dared to pass him, and thus he might
have played with them until reinforced. But he adopted the second plan,
believing that he had found a position which he could hold for several
weeks. That position was on the south bank of the Alma, fifteen miles from
Sebastopol; and on this point he directed the march of every disposable
bayonet, sabre, and gun. It was indeed a strong position. Facing the
north, the left seemed secured from attack by the steepness of the cliffs;
the centre afforded excellent ground for artillery on its terraces and
knolls, and the dips in the hills might be used to conceal the defenders;
on the right the Kourgané height overlooked all, and bending backwards,
offered protection to that flank. The lower slopes were quite open, and
fell down to the river with sufficient rapidity to try the fortitude of
an assailant, and yet not so abruptly as to deprive artillery of a full
command of the ascent, the river, and the plain beyond. There was one path
up the cliff practicable for infantry, and where the precipice ended there
were two up which guns could be got with great difficulty. Beyond this
troops of all arms could pass the stream and ascend the position. On a
point of the highest ground, to the west of the post road, and about two
miles from the sea, stood a tower, unfinished, for war had interrupted the
workmen, called the Telegraph station, as the peak became known as the
Telegraph Hill. The strength of the position lay in the wall of cliff,
the steep open downs to the east and west of the road to Sebastopol, and
in the river, with its high banks and enclosures. Its weakness lay in
its extent, compared with the number of troops at Prince Menschikoff's
disposal.
Here the Prince hoped to stop the march of the Allies, with the troops
he had, until the divisions from the army of the Danube came up and
drove them to their ships. To occupy the position he had 42 battalions,
16 squadrons of cavalry, 11 sotnias of Cossacks (1,100 lances), and 96
guns; that is, about 38,000 men of all arms. His infantry was 31,500,
and his cavalry 3,400 strong, including the Cossacks. The remainder were
artillerymen and sappers. In disposing of his forces, Prince Menschikoff
placed the bulk on the right and centre. To strengthen the position the
Prince had devised two fieldworks of the humblest kind. On the extreme
right, just below the brow of the great hill there, he had thrown up an
entrenchment, in the form of a flattened arrow-head; and on the lower
slope of the same hill, nearer to the centre, he had constructed another
fieldwork, the embrasures of which were formed by throwing up the earth
on each hand. This he armed with the twelve (some say fourteen) heavy
guns brought from Sebastopol. These two works were improperly called
redoubts. The regiments were formed in column, chequer-wise, on each flank
of the fieldworks, and were not all visible to the approaching army. The
right of the Russian line was commanded by General Kvetzinsky, the centre
by Prince Gortschakoff, the left by General Kiriakoff. It will be seen
that the bulk of the troops and artillery were in position to the east of
Telegraph Hill, that is, on the Russian right of the great road, while
only one-third of the troops and one-fifth of the guns were on or in front
of the Telegraph Hill, and towards the sea. Against this force and this
position marched, in round numbers, about 63,000 men and 128 guns.
The allied army now came slowly nearer to the Alma, visible in its whole
extent to the Russians. The fleet of war-steamers, eight French and one
British, went on ahead towards Cape Lookout and the mouth of the Alma. The
direction taken by the French brought General Bosquet opposite the village
of Almatamak, towards which one of his brigades wended its way, covered by
skirmishers in thick rows, while the other, with the Turks, under General
Bouat, made for the mouth of the Alma. Next on the left came the divisions
of Canrobert and Prince Napoleon, the latter almost in contact with the
right of our 2nd Division, and a little to the west of Bourliouk. In rear,
as a support, was General Forey. These three divisions of the French
army halted, while Bosquet continued to move on. Lord Raglan had had a
final conference with Marshal St. Arnaud. They had seen the enemy and
the enemy's position. The great accumulation of Russian troops on their
right and centre was manifest. It was plain that the French force was not
adequate to show a front to the whole Russian line, while the British
turned the right, and when the question was pointedly put to him, would he
turn the right or attack in front, Lord Raglan declined to undertake the
flank movement. It was arranged that the French should turn the Russian
left, covered by the fire of the ships, and that when this movement had
shaken the Russian line, the British should assail the right and centre.
The two commanders parted, and the whole line from right to left drew
nearer to the Alma. The steamers opened fire between twelve and one.
While Bosquet's first brigade was ousting the Russian skirmishers from the
river and the clefts in the hills leading upwards, the whole army moved
still nearer to the foe, and halted in readiness to close. The French
divisions remained in columns. They were not to advance until Bosquet's
diversion had made itself felt. The British divisions had deployed into
line, and had moved on until warned, about half-past one, that they had
come within range, when the men were ordered to lie down. It was about
half-past one. The 1st French division was crossing the river and swarming
up the steeps, when the Cossacks simultaneously fired the corn stacks
about Bourliouk. Instantly the waving sheets of flame leaped up, and a
stifling smoke rising on a lazy wind spread over the meadows. For a time
the centre of the Russian position was hidden from view, and the smoke
long continued to curl over the ground. This fiery village and dense
cloud of smoke proved a great inconvenience to Evans's division, in whose
front it was; for, pressed on one side by Prince Napoleon's division, on
the other by the Light, and deprived of a large space in front by the
conflagration, Sir De Lacy Evans was compelled to divide his brigades, and
encroach on the ground occupied by Sir George Brown, so that when they
were deployed, the left front of the 2nd overlapped the right of the Light
Division. This was a great fault. While the regiments lay prone under a
severe fire, the French were executing their share of the plan on the
right.
According to the plan agreed upon, the British were not to attack until
the French columns were firmly established on the heights. Bosquet's 1st
brigade, under D'Autemarre, had easily swept before them the handful of
light troops which alone were placed on the extreme flank of the Russian
line. Having gained the plateau with his infantry, he next brought in
succession two batteries of artillery, and posted them in front of the
brigade which had deployed, resting its left on the verge of the cliff.
Bouat and the Turks were so distant that they could lend no aid, and the
brigade and its guns were thus practically alone. At the same time the
Russian batteries, towards the centre of their position, cannonaded the
bulk of Prince Napoleon's division, which still lingered in the valley on
the left bank, unable to get on. For the want of guns seemed to paralyse
the advance of General Canrobert, and D'Aurelles' brigade of Forey's
division had passed round the right of Prince Napoleon, and had jammed
itself into a steep and narrow track on the left of Canrobert; so that
while Bosquet, although alone on the heights, made play with his batteries
and steadily gained ground, Canrobert and D'Aurelles, and the bulk of
Prince Napoleon's troops, were lying inactive, unable to strike for want
of artillery. For the rest, the Russian guns on the right and centre
continued to pour an incessant storm of shot and shell upon the British
soldiers lying exposed in line upon their faces, and our gunners, it is
said, did not fire because their shot, they found, fell short.
[Illustration: THE HIGHLANDERS AT THE ALMA. (_See p._ 49.)]
At this time Lord Raglan, himself riding up and down near the British
right, and watching the progress of the French, seems to have grown
impatient. We have no very clear account of his views and frame of mind;
but Mr. Kinglake's version, if it be true, leads to the direct inference
that Lord Raglan, who, it seems, had been frequently appealed to by the
French, could no longer bear to see his soldiers prostrate and inactive,
especially as there was an appearance of tardiness and inability to push
forward on the part of his ally. He therefore gave the order to assault
the front of the position; and Captain Nolan, a genuine soldier, swiftly
bore it to the combatants. First the 2nd Division and then the Light
started to their feet, and in a moment the red line, extending far to
the east, was gliding across the meadows which intervened between them
and the stream. As they descended the slope towards its banks, the guns
followed, and, drawing up on both sides of the great road, began to reply
to the fire of the enemy. All the time they moved under a heavy fire from
the Russian batteries, and the Russians were amazed that the islanders
should approach their dark columns and destructive artillery in a two-deep
line. The passage of some vineyards and enclosures disordered the troops,
and the beautiful symmetry of the first advance was soon broken far more
by these inert obstacles than by the bounding shot and bursting shells.
In spite of their disorder they reached the river, and plunging into its
shot-torn waters, scrambled through and gained the shelter of the opposite
bank. Here they halted and hung in clusters, no longer presenting the
fine parade spectacle visible to admiring eyes a short time before. The
bank was eight or nine feet high; and while it afforded shelter from the
artillery, it did not prevent daring Russian skirmishers from approaching
the edge, and firing down into the groups below. Here, under such fiery
leaders as were with them, the British troops could not long remain.
The parts of the Russian position they fronted were these. Evans's
division extended across the entrance to the ravine up which ran the
great road. This road passing the river by a wooden bridge, partially
destroyed by the enemy, climbed a low ridge between two higher ridges,
and on these higher ridges were two Russian batteries supported by six
battalions. It was not only their fire, but that of the left shoulder
of the field work on the slope of the Kourgané Hill, to which they were
exposed; for while the guns on each side of the road swept the front, the
heavier metal searched the left flank. The Light Division fronted the
steep sides of the Kourgané Hill itself, and had to bear the fire of the
big guns and of two batteries--that is, sixteen pieces posted on both
sides of the entrenchment,--to meet the musketry and bayonets of sixteen
battalions, and to stand prepared for the dense columns of cavalry which
showed themselves on their left. Before Evans was rough and broken ground;
before Sir George Brown, a bare hill-side. The troops were not allowed to
cling long to the protection of the bank. On the right Evans's colonels
got their men up to the mouths of the ravine; but there were only three
battalions to contend with six; and although they were aided somewhat by
the fire of the artillery massed on the east of Bourliouk, it required all
the fortitude of officers and men to stand fast. For the battalions had
been rent by the heavy artillery fire, and Evans himself had been wounded;
yet he kept his place in the midst, and held his men together as became a
veteran who had ridden in the thick of great battles thirty years before;
and now his weak force was opposed to heavy odds, and had to endure,
without flinching, shot, shell, and musketry.
On their left the four regiments of the Light Division, and the 95th, were
about to perform a most daring exploit. Nearly at the same moment Sir
George Brown, Brigadier Codrington, and Colonel Yea forced their horses
up the bank, and found themselves almost in the midst of the Russian
skirmishers. Their men, unformed as they were, crowded up, and presented
to the view of the Russian gunners an extended line, indeed, but in so
much disorder that the Russian generals, in their reports, described them
as a cloud of skirmishers. Once at the foot of the slope, they were face
to face, not only with the battery, but with two heavy columns, one on
the right, the other on the left of the rude fieldwork, whose weighty
guns had done so much mischief. There was no manœuvring, no order, no
neat soldiership. The advance of the Light Division was the steady rush
of a fierce crowd into and through the jaws of death; for though hundreds
strewed the hill-side, the survivors were not to be dismayed, but were
resolute to win. Such a sight, except at a deadly breach, in some bloody
siege, had rarely been seen in war. The line wavered and surged to and
fro, but it gained ground. And now it reaped the fruits of its daring. The
great battery fired one tremendous volley, and when the smoke grew thin,
it was seen that the enemy were carrying off the guns! The four regiments
had carried the battery, and forced the enemy to hurry away his guns by
sheer hardihood and will; and now came the question--could they keep their
prize, or would the Guards and Highlanders come up in time to relieve or
sustain them?
When Lord Raglan had given the order to advance, he rode off with his
staff along a pathway leading round the western side of Bourliouk, in
the track followed by Brigadier Adams, with the 41st and 49th Regiments
and Turner's battery. Probably the British commander wished to gain a
nearer view of the French operations, and also to get a glimpse of the
Russian line of battle unobscured by the smoke of Bourliouk. While he was
cantering across the meadows the Light and 2nd Divisions were working
up to the river under that heavy fire we have described. Approaching
its banks, he came under a sharp fire from the Russian guns on his left
front, the guns which faced Evans's troops, a fire which became heavier
as the whole staff plunged into the river at the ford, and two officers
were wounded. Lord Raglan had not been unobservant of the country which
rose before him. He saw a hill in the heart of the Russian position, but
unoccupied by the enemy, a hill whence he would see in profile the whole
of our own and of the Russian line opposed to it. The use to which it
could be put occurred to him immediately. Turning to one of his staff,
he was heard to say, "Ah, if they can enfilade us here, we can certainly
enfilade them from the rising ground beyond [pointing to the knoll]. Order
up Turner's battery." His presence on the hill undoubtedly scared the
Russians; at the same time his troops were out of his control.
[Illustration: LORD RAGLAN.]
Now the scene was about to change. The force possessed by the Allies was
about to be applied with irresistible vigour in all parts of the field.
But before this force fell with all its weight upon the enemy, he was
destined to snatch a momentary success. For the four regiments of the
Light Division which had so hardily stormed the breastwork had remained
unsupported! Either because he was too diffident of his own ability, or
because he did not really see that it was time to strike, and strike
hard, the Duke of Cambridge hesitated. General Evans, seeing that the
Light Division was outstripping the supports, sent Colonel Steele to
urge an immediate advance. General Airey himself rode up and explained
how needful it was that the 1st should be within striking distance
of the Light Division. At one moment some officer, whose name is not
mentioned, said, "The brigade of Guards will be destroyed; ought it not
to fall back?" When Sir Colin Campbell, says Mr. Kinglake, "heard this
saying, his blood rose so high that the answer he gave--impassioned and
far-resounding--was of a quality to govern events! 'It is better, sir,
that every man of her Majesty's Guards should be dead upon the field,
than that they should turn their backs upon the enemy!'" Doubts and
questionings ceased. The division went forward, but not soon enough to
prevent a disaster. The four regiments holding the Russian breastwork
were now in the presence of a powerful force of infantry. For the four
battalions of the Vladimir Regiment, marshalled by Prince Gortschakoff,
were descending upon the work and had already begun to open fire. The
British soldiers lying under the parapet, and looking over, were able to
throw a storm of shot into the mighty mass, which, solid and close, came
down the hill. Soon its front ranks began to fire, and officers and men
began to fall. This was a most trying moment for General Evans, waging an
unequal fight, and for Colonel Yea, with his shattered battalion waging a
more unequal fight. General Codrington sent down an aide-de-camp to urge
the advance of the Scots Fusiliers, the central battalion, and soon the
whole brigade rushed up on to the slope. The Grenadiers on the right,
under Colonel Hood, formed up in regular order before they moved. The
Coldstreams did the same. But, urged by Codrington's message, the Scots
Fusiliers sprang forward and began to ascend the hill with eager steps. It
was too late. The Vladimirs had persisted in moving on, regardless of the
fire from our straggling line; and suddenly, none knows exactly why, the
British soldiers rose, and quitting the shelter of the entrenchment, began
to descend the hill. The fire of the Russians redoubled; the disordered
masses of red-coated men, who hate retreating, halted in clusters, more
or less dense, and flung back a dropping shower of bullets. This could
not go on long. Presently the pace became brisker, and the men getting
massed in heavier groups, and hurrying down the hill, came full upon the
Scots Fusiliers, broke the order of the regiment, and compelled what
should have been a support to withdraw with them. But the Grenadiers and
Coldstreams, separated for a time by a wide interval, went on; and farther
on their left came the Highlanders, with what fortune we shall presently
see. For now of the battery ordered up to the knoll by Lord Raglan, two
guns had arrived. The men had not reached the spot, and Colonel Dickson
and other officers loaded, laid, and fired the guns. The effect, it is
said, was instantaneous. The guns were trained to bear upon the batteries
which checked the advance of Evans's men; and it so happened that at the
same time the British artillery of the 2nd, Light, and 3rd Divisions came
powerfully into action against the batteries on the road; so that assailed
at once in front and flank, and uncertain what new strength the flank fire
might gain, the Russian commander limbered up all his guns, and withdrew
them to a higher and distant ridge. Then Sir De Lacy Evans pushed forward
his three battalions, and these, bringing up their right shoulders, came
up to the relief of the 7th just as the Grenadier Guards were approaching
on the other flank. The 7th, which had so nobly stood its ground, and
suffered very great loss, now, by order of Sir George Brown, allowed the
Grenadiers to pass them. The spectacle along the whole line was at this
moment magnificent. For the masses of the French on the Telegraph Hill
were now rapidly coming into action. Bosquet's artillery had shaken the
huge column with which Kiriakoff had threatened the troops of Canrobert.
Bouat and Lourmel showed themselves on the hills towards the sea, ever
gaining on the Russian left rear. Canrobert had got his guns up, and
his lines and columns were moving on to assault the Russians gathered
round the Telegraph. Lord Raglan's presence and Turner's artillery must
have deeply alarmed Prince Gortschakoff and General Kvetzinski for the
safety of their line of retreat. Evans's forward movement, the fire of
thirty guns, many of them over the river, combined with the proud march
of the Grenadiers and Coldstreams and the Highland Brigade--all these
co-operating causes contributed to the catastrophe. It was the crisis
of the battle. In vain the battalions of Suzdal endeavoured to succour
their comrades of Kazan and Vladimir, standing stiffly behind and about
the breastwork. The Highlanders, coming up in succession from the right,
smote each column in flank as it passed its front, while every moment the
rigid line of red coats and black bearskins and busy rifles crept closer
and closer and fired with deadlier effect. The discomfited Light Division
also partially reformed, and the Scots Fusiliers were rapidly filling up
the interval between the Grenadiers and Coldstreams. Active artillery
officers had brought their guns into action nearly on the site occupied
by the Russian batteries which so long vexed the 2nd Division. At length
the Russian battalions, unable to bear any longer the pressure brought
upon them, yielded, when, with a loud shout, the Guards brought down their
bayonets, and came steadily on. In a brief space the breastwork was again
carried; the Highlanders, most skilfully led, disposed of the Russian
reserves; and as Lord Raglan, who had quitted his knoll, came riding up,
he found the field his own and the enemy in retreat.
[Illustration: ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF THE ALMA: THE MISSION OF MERCY.
(_See p._ 50.)]
By this time, also, the Russian left was getting away from the French.
When the Guards were half way up the hill, and the 2nd Division was
crowning the ridges in its front, Canrobert advanced, and bringing his
guns into play, swept up the bare hill; and after some severe fighting
with the Russian troops, disposed so as to cover the retreat, captured the
Telegraph Station. Prince Napoleon and Marshal St. Arnaud now appeared on
the plateau, and the horse artillery, hurrying to the front, cannonaded
the retreating enemy. The 41st and 49th British Regiments had also moved
up into that part of the field which lies between the great road and the
Telegraph Hill, and thus formed the extreme right of the British line. So
that the whole allied front, from the peak of the Telegraph Station to the
eastern slopes of the Kourgané Hill, crowned the Russian position. The
Russians fell back in pretty good order, although they were pounded in
retreat by the artillery of the Allies, which had hurried up to the front.
Lord Cardigan brought his cavalry over the Alma, and rode in upon the
stragglers who formed the rear, but could effect little, as the Russians
halted on the next ridge, and for a short time showed a bold front. Then
they went about, and, unpursued, disappeared from view.
Lord Raglan had desired an immediate pursuit, such a pursuit as would
have brought the French upon the flank of the yielding columns, while the
British, with horse, foot, and artillery, burst in upon their rear. He
had two divisions which had not fired a shot; he had more than a thousand
lances and sabres; he was ready to go on. But although the French had
suffered comparatively little loss, whether it were that his illness
clouded his mind, or that he feared to compromise his army, or that he did
not relish a request to pursue coming from the English commander, Marshal
St. Arnaud declined to move any men from the field. So the victorious
soldiers took up their quarters on the line of hills, and began to
gather up the wounded. The battle, which reflects little credit on the
commanders-in-chief, had been won by the leaders of divisions. It was not
decisive, and it did not bring about the attainment of the great end of
the invasion--the immediate capture of Sebastopol.