THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_.)
Effects of Balaclava--Attack on Mount Inkermann--Evans defeats
the Russians--Menschikoff is Reinforced--His Plan of Attack--The
Advance in the Fog--Soimonoff and Pauloff--Pennefather's
Mistake--Repulse of Soimonoff--The Guards to the Rescue--Arrival of
Lord Raglan--Bosquet's Help refused--The Guns ordered up--The Fight
at the Sandbag Battery--The Coldstreams--The Guards' Charge--Defeat
of Cathcart--Ammunition falls short--Arrival of the French--Charges
of the Zouaves--The Russians slowly retreat--Canrobert hesitates
to pursue--Loss of the Allies--Their Plight--The Baltic Fleet--Its
real Objects--Capture of Merchant Vessels and Destruction of
Stores--Sveaborg and Cronstadt reconnoitred--Bomarsund--Capture
of the Fortress--End of the Naval Campaign--Changed Position
of the Allies--Determination of the British Nation--Storm of
November 14th--Destruction of the Transports--Sufferings of the
Troops--Conduct of the War--Unpreparedness of the Army--The Duke of
Newcastle--Timidity of the Government--Enlistment of Boys--Autumn
Session--The Paper Warfare--Hostile Motions in Parliament--Lord John
Russell's Resignation--His factious Conduct--Palmerston forms a
Ministry--Resignation of the Peelites.
The lower range of heights in front of Balaclava, and the seven British
guns taken from the Turks, were the only material advantages gained by
the enemy on the 25th of October. Moral advantages, beyond those implied
in the capture of guns, he gained none. In order to strike a severe
blow, Liprandi should have carried Balaclava as well as the Turkish
redoubts; and had the British cavalry or the 93rd Regiment shown the
least hesitation, the slightest symptom of wavering, it is most probable
that the Russians would have instantly overrun the valley, and have swept
like a torrent through the gorge into the little port. The charges of the
cavalry and the steadfastness of the 93rd balked the Russian general. The
Russian horse and Russian infantry fell again under that moral ascendency
established at the Alma, and never lost. Therefore the moral advantages of
the combat of Balaclava were with the Allies.
Prince Menschikoff, who still commanded the Russian army, seems to have
had no clear, decisive views of the course he ought to adopt; for,
having alarmed the Allies at Balaclava, he now determined to rouse their
suspicions on the side of Inkermann. On the 26th, accordingly, the very
day after the capture of the Turkish redoubts, he directed a force of
5,000 or 6,000 men, and abundance of guns, to attack the 2nd Division.
These troops quitted the fortress by the Russian left of the Malakoff, and
ascended the right bank of the Careening ravine. Their skirmishers were
soon heard exchanging shots with the pickets of the 49th and 30th. These,
falling back to a good defensible post, kept the Russians at bay for some
time; so that the whole of the 2nd Division, under Sir De Lacy Evans,
had time to form. But numbers prevailed, and the pickets were driven in;
and the Russians soon showed a mass of columns on and about Shell Hill,
and presently eighteen or twenty guns were brought to the front on that
height. By this time the regiments of the 2nd Division were lying down
in line on the crest in front of their camp; and their twelve guns were
in action, while the skirmishers were busy on the slope between the two
hills. At first the Russians threw some spirit into their advance. Under
cover of their artillery on the hill they sent a heavy column down the
slope which, by its steadiness and weight, looked as if it intended to
sweep all before it. But a great calamity befell these brave men. The
fire of our artillery, concentrated on the Russian guns, was so quick,
precise, and severe, that the whole of the Russian batteries disappeared
over the brow. Then the British artillerymen, with ready energy, turned
their eighteen pieces full on the column of infantry which had so manfully
come forward towards our line. The effect of the fire was immediate. The
Russian infantry, thus deserted by their artillery, and exposed to the
shot from our guns and to the bullets of our skirmishers, turned to the
left and hurriedly sought the shelter of one of the many deep hollows.
While they were thus concealed, the second column was seen to rise above
the brow, and on them the guns poured their shot and shell. The officer
commanding, observing what had befallen the first column, immediately
withdrew his second over the ridge. All this time the Russian skirmishers
in the scrub which roughened the hill side kept up the conflict. Presently
the column which had fled into the ravine on the left emerged in broken
order, and was seen climbing the slopes to rejoin the main body in
rear of Shell Hill, and our artillery once more visited them with shot
and shell and quickened their pace; while our right skirmishers, under
Colonel Herbert, plied them with musketry. The 2nd Division, led by Major
Mauleverer and Major Champion, Major Eman, and Major Hume, were now let
loose upon the skirmishers in the space between the ridges; and they fell
on with so much vigour and effect, and with such eagerness, that General
Pennefather had great difficulty in arresting their fiery march. In an
hour the action was over, and the enemy in full retreat.
[Illustration: BALACLAVA.]
Signs of the presence of the enemy in great strength were now visible
almost daily. The two remaining infantry divisions of Dannenberg's corps
arrived at Batchiserai on the 28th of October. The 10th Division, under
General Soimonoff, entered Sebastopol on the 3rd of November, and on the
same day, the 11th, under General Pauloff, took up its quarters among the
hills about the ruins of Inkermann. The arrival of these troops had been
seen by the Allies, and the generals became convinced that, it might be
in a few hours, the enemy would make an attack upon some point or points.
Yet not a single change was made in the arrangements, except that the
British cavalry--the wreck of two splendid brigades--were marched up
to the plateau, and posted in the rear of the French lines upon Mount
Sapoune. The Allies, had, for all purposes, little more than 60,000 men.
Prince Menschikoff had under his orders, exclusive of the sailors, 70,000
infantry, 9,000 horse, 3,000 artillery, and 282 guns. What use should he
make of a force which exceeded that of the Allies by one-fourth?
According to the Russian accounts, Prince Menschikoff had been informed
that the Allies intended to open fire once more upon the place from all
their batteries, and, after a short and sharp bombardment, storm. His
information was correct. In order to anticipate the Allies, he determined
to assume the offensive himself, and, if possible, force them to raise
the siege. Two Grand-Dukes, sons of the Czar, were on their way to the
army, hoping to arrive in time to witness the total defeat of the arrogant
Western Powers. It was decided that there should be one real and two
false attacks--the real attack from Inkermann, the false attacks from the
Tchernaya valley upon Mount Sapoune, and from the Quarantine Bay upon the
left of the French siege works. Thus, to begin with, Prince Menschikoff
divided his disposable force into three parts, separated from each other
by such wide intervals that neither could aid the other. Thus, it will
be seen, Prince Menschikoff devised a very wide plan for the destruction
of the Allies. He hoped that the attacks from the town and from the
Tchernaya would entirely occupy the French; and that General Dannenberg
would be able to catch the British alone and unaware, and deliver the
fortress by passing over their bodies. Had Prince Gortschakoff attacked
the French with energy, this might have happened, for there were, counting
everything, only 22,343 British troops effective, and of these 16,308
were infantry, rank and file--that is, in technical language, bayonets.
The consequence was that the immense lines they had to guard were thinly
manned, and so scarce were labourers that there were none to repair the
trenches in the night attack.
In November the sun rises earlier in the Crimea than it does in England.
The rays of the dawn shoot up behind the snows of the Caucasus about five
o'clock; hence this hour was selected for the movement of the Russian
troops on the 5th of the month. But although the upper air was growing
brighter, a thick white fog overspread the hills around Sebastopol, and
settled down in heavier masses in the valleys. Hidden within its folds
the Russian columns stole unobserved out of Sebastopol, and Pauloff began
to throw a bridge over the Tchernaya, close to its mouth. As soon as it
was completed, the infantry poured over and the guns followed. The fog
deadened the sound of the hundreds of wheels emerging from the east and
west, and the grey-coated infantry, in silence and obscurity, tramped
along. The pickets of the 2nd Division were in the hollow between their
camp and Shell Hill and on the old post road, and those of the Light
Division were in the Careening ravine and on both its banks. There was
not more than usual watchfulness, for the Russian secrets had been kept,
and no attack was expected that morning more than any other. General
Codrington had ridden out at dawn to visit the outposts, and was riding
back to camp when the report of a rifle struck on his ear, and he halted
and listened. A sputter of musketry followed, and seemed to come from the
Careening ravine; and soon after the same ominous sound, its natural,
sharp, angry note being muffled by the fog, was heard on the right. The
skirmishers of the two Russian columns had touched the line of British
pickets. Codrington galloped off to turn out the Light Division. The
battle of Inkermann had begun.
Soimonoff, moving out of the Russian lines, had quitted the plateau on
which stood the Malakoff, and instead of resting his left on the Careening
ravine, by some mistake, crossed; and thus carried his twenty-nine
battalions along the proper right bank of the ravine towards the heights,
where Pauloff's troops had begun to assemble. It was his advanced parties
who came in contact with the outposts of the Light Division, whom they
drove into and over the Careening ravine, and whom they followed. Pauloff
had not got all his force up the heights; but as soon as the British
pickets were thrust back, he had hastened to put his heavy guns in battery
on the highest ground, and his lighter guns on the slopes beneath them,
within twelve hundred yards of the camp of the 2nd Division. He at once
opened fire to cover an assault of infantry and thus it happened that
Evans's British regiments had no sooner formed than they were exposed to
an iron shower of shot, shell, and grape. Evans, who had been disabled by
an accident, was on board a ship at Balaclava, and Sir John Pennefather
commanded the division. Protected by the fire of fifty guns, Soimonoff
directed a strong column to cross the Careening ravine; while Pauloff
threw forward by the old post road the two rifle regiments of Borodino and
Taroutino; so that both flanks of the English position were about to be
assailed at once.
The British troops at this moment in the front line were those of the
2nd and Light Divisions. General Pennefather, instead of relying on his
artillery, rashly rushed to the support of the pickets, sending Adams's
Brigade to the right of the post road with three guns, and keeping his
own on the left of the road. Sir George Brown brought up the Light
Division. Codrington's gallant soldiers were arrayed on the left bank of
the Careening ravine, not far from the 68-pounder battery, and Buller
moved up into the space between the left of Pennefather and the right
of Codrington. The front was contracted; but narrow as it was, the
troops were so few that there were gaps between the four brigades. At
the first onset of the enemy, the other brigades were not present. Soon
after six an orderly rode into headquarters with the news that the right
flank was assailed in force; and, indeed, the sound of cannon, not only
at Inkermann, but from the fortress and from the Balaclava front, told
the Allies with emphasis that the enemy was upon them. Lord Raglan soon
convinced himself that the real attack was at Inkermann, and he determined
to ride thither after issuing such orders as seemed expedient. The Guards
had not even reached the front when the Russian columns began to surge up
against our thin, straggling line.
The British guns had come into action on the crest as fast as they
arrived, and were at once exposed to an unequal combat with the heavier
guns of the enemy. And now the dense fog was made more dense by the
volumes of smoke which, breaking out from the guns in clouds, unfolded
itself, and lay almost motionless close to the surface of the miry ground.
Through this thick atmosphere the opposing troops made their dubious
way, and thus it happened that our men, hastening up to the front,
came suddenly upon enemies, who seemed to spring out of the hill side.
Soimonoff, on reaching the scene of action, found himself trenching upon
the ground apportioned to the columns of Pauloff. The huge masses had
converged upon a comparatively narrow front, and the Russians complain
that they had not room to range their men for a powerful and simultaneous
onset. Soimonoff had taken the wrong road, and instead of effecting a
junction with Pauloff at the head of the Careening ravine on the site of
the 2nd Division camp, he had joined Pauloff on the east of the ravine,
and found that hollow way between him and the troops he had been directed
to overwhelm--the Light Division. An ambiguous order had caused this
mistake. To retrieve his error, while the Taroutino and Borodino regiments
were climbing the hills to attack the Sandbag Battery, Soimonoff plunged
into the ravine, and led his men to the charge. Thus he came full on the
front of Codrington's Brigade, deployed on the left bank. The heroes of
the 7th, 19th, and 23rd were not dismayed by the masses which loomed large
and portentous in the fog, but opened upon them such a heavy fire that the
Russians heaped together in the deep hollows, and descending the steep
sides, never reached the opposite bank, but fell into disorder, recoiled,
and receded from view. These early combats rudely disarranged the Russian
plans.
In the centre the regiments of the 2nd Division had come upon enemies as
soon as they had formed. These were the leading companies of the Borodino
battalions, and they were at once set upon by Pennefather's brigade,
and pushed back. On the extreme right, half-way down the spur, whose
crags drop on one side into the Tchernaya valley, and on the other into
the Quarry ravine, Pennefather had posted the 41st and 49th, with three
guns, under Captain Hamley. They had no sooner arrived than heavy Russian
columns were seen indistinctly moving down the opposite slope. The guns
opened on them, but the Russians turned their artillery to that side, and
our guns, though steadfastly served, were too weak to contend with the
heavy metal opposed to them. The columns went down into the hollow, and
soon reappeared, flocking up the British side of the hill. The Taroutino
regiment turned upon the Sandbag Battery, and part of the Borodino went
with them up the road to break against Pennefather's brigade. The Russians
came on without faltering. Our troops were outnumbered and outflanked;
our guns were in danger of being taken. The 41st and 49th, quitting the
Sandbag Battery, fell back, and the hill seemed in danger of being lost;
but at this moment the bearskins of the Guards were becoming visible. The
Duke of Cambridge, when he had turned out his brigade, moved it to the
right of Pennefather, and went to succour the hardly-pressed 41st and
49th. The Guards came steadily down the slope of the spur, and, passing to
the right and left of the guns, cheered and charged, checked the advance
of the enemy, and recovered the battery. Hitherto they had only used the
bayonet; they now brought their rifles into play, and smote the retreating
Russians with deadly precision. The regiment Taroutino was so broken that
it retired even into the Inkermann valley to re-form. The brigade was not
complete when the Guards charged into the battery; but the Coldstreams
came up at once, and the three regiments took ground, the Grenadiers on
the right, the Coldstreams in the centre, and the Fusiliers on the left of
the recovered work.
It was at this time--about seven o'clock--that Lord Raglan arrived. The
fog had cleared somewhat, but the smoke of battle had taken its place.
He rode down the spur towards the Sandbag Battery just as the Guards had
recovered it; and he sought to penetrate the thick mist, and discern
the numbers and intentions of the foe. He could see but little through
the rifts in the smoke. He saw enough to make him feel the peril of his
position, and that of the whole army. Upon his tenacity hung the fate
of every soul on the plateau. Lord Raglan was a calm and steadfast man.
If danger rose high, his resolution rose higher; and knowing that his
soldiers were like himself, children of a proud and obstinate race, he
felt that he could do his duty, and hold fast to that narrow strip of
rugged ground, which formed, as it were, the gate into the lines drawn
about the southern defences of Sebastopol. He therefore resolved to stand
on the defensive, and dispute for the gate with the enemy until he won
or his troops were destroyed. The British soldiers actually before the
enemy at the end of this first heavy onset of Soimonoff and Pauloff did
not number more than 6,000 men. The 4th Division on the march would bring
the number up to 8,000, and beyond this he could not array a bayonet,
for the 3rd Division had to guard the trenches, and the Highland Brigade
was at Balaclava. Lord Raglan knew he could rely on aid from General
Bosquet. That officer at the first had offered several battalions to the
Duke of Cambridge and Sir George Brown, but these two, though ignorant of
the serious character of the attack, took upon themselves to refuse. Had
it not been for this proud unwillingness to accept French aid, or this
fear of responsibility, Bosquet would have been earlier in the field;
for Gortschakoff had so feebly acted on the side of Balaclava that the
quick Frenchman soon saw through his weak devices. As soon as he received
a request for troops from Lord Raglan he at once put three battalions in
motion. But he had two miles to march; the earth was soaked with a night's
rain, and part of the way lay through thick scrub. Some time, therefore,
was required to force the troops along. Two battalions were directed upon
the right rear of the 2nd Division, and the third was ordered to take post
near the Canrobert Redoubt at the extremity of the entrenchments on the
Sapoune ridge.
During the pause of the fight, while the artillery maintained the combat
and the infantry were merely keeping up a brisk skirmish in the bush,
Lord Raglan became sensible that his 9-pounders were over-matched by
the Russian guns, which, besides being many of them of heavier metal,
were nearly twice as numerous. Moreover, as fast as guns were disabled
the Russians supplied their places with fresh pieces from their immense
train of artillery. Lord Raglan soon remembered that there were in the
artillery park two 18-pounders, the same guns which had been used in the
Sandbag Battery to crush the Russian guns, mounted among the Inkermann
ruins. These he ordered to be brought up. Before they came into action the
infantry battle had been renewed. As Codrington's brigade of the Light
Division, fighting on the left bank of the Careening ravine, often within
it, and sometimes over it, protected effectually the left of Buller, and
as the occupation of the spur, on which was the Sandbag Battery, covered
the right flank of Pennefather, General Dannenberg saw that he could
not force the centre and break through on to the plateau until he had
cleared the Sandbag Battery spur. Between eight and nine he had rallied
two of Soimonoff's regiments, Tomsk and Kolyvan, and he counted on these,
supported by the Boutirsk regiment in reserve, to maintain the fight with
the left of Buller and the whole of Codrington. Then he sent forward the
infantry of the 11th Division--three regiments, each of four battalions,
Yakutsk, Okhotsk, and Selenginsk--with two rifle companies, to act as
skirmishers. They were ordered to carry the Sandbag Battery, clear the
whole of the slope, and sweep up the post road into the camp. Gallant
soldiers, and opposed to the British for the first time, they made their
way up to the battery with great spirit and unusual speed. It may be
remembered that the Guards occupied the battery, and the ground to the
right and left of it, and that Cathcart, with Torrens's brigade, was in
support on the right rear.
[Illustration: THE GUARDS RECOVERING THE SANDBAG BATTERY. (_See p._ 70.)]
Now began a contest about the battery which has been truly called sublime.
The Russians were nearly 6,000 strong, quite fresh, full of fight, and
very resolute. They came on in successive columns of regiments, making
loud and rude noises which our men called yells. The first to rush at the
battery were the Okhotsk men. As they came up the rifles of the Guards
told severely upon them, but did not arrest their course. A fierce combat
ensued, first heavy firing, then hand to hand fights, then a fearful
pressure of men on both flanks of the battery which it was hard to resist.
The heavy guns on Shell Hill took the British defenders almost in reverse,
yet they still clung to the ground. The regiment in the battery was the
Coldstreams. And now the enemy had swept round the flanks. For a moment
the Coldstreams fronted their foes on all sides, and kept them at bay on
the open rear of the battery. Then, with a cheer and a rush, they dashed
through, scattering their enemies right and left, and, bleeding, broken,
but unconquered, made their way up the slope to rejoin the British line.
But they had fourteen officers killed or wounded in that bloody Sandbag
Battery, and one or two, simply wounded, were murdered by the enraged
enemy. They had, however, slain many of the barbarous Okhotsk, and wounded
their colonel; and better than this, they had maintained their good name.
The fight at this time seemed going dead against the handful of British.
The other two regiments were coming on, Yakutsk up the post road, and
Selenginsk in reserve. On their right the rallied battalions of Soimonoff
were fighting with the British centre; while the fifty or sixty Russian
cannon on the heights never ceased hurling their iron shower into the
British lines. Unless the new attack were repelled at once, the Russians
would emerge from the ravines, and gaining the more open ground, deploy
their masses and sweep over the plateau. To prevent this, the Guards were
led once more to regain the Sandbag Battery. The three regiments formed a
line of no great length, but they went into the fight with their usual
decision. With a steady rush they came down upon their foes. The Russians
met them bayonet to bayonet. There was a brief conflict at close quarters.
Steel glistened in the air and muskets were brandished as clubs, and men
loaded and fired on the flanks, but still the Guards bored their way into
and through the mass, and passing over the slain, cheered as they stood
once more in the battery--now a charnel-house--and resumed their deadly
fire.
During this charge part of the Yakutsk regiment had halted on the post
road, and had turned to its left to aid its comrades. The Selenginsk men
had moved also to their left and had passed down the slope to outflank
the battery on the Inkermann side. The Russians were resolute to win.
The fierce charge of the Guards had made them angry, and they desired
revenge. While these two bodies were moving upon the little redan, the
Okhotsk rallied, so that the Russians renewed the contest for the battery
with a larger force than ever. It so chanced that Sir George Cathcart,
thinking he could take the enemy in flank, of his own accord carried
Torrens's brigade down the slope to the right. Thus the hostile forces
were converging on the same point, Selenginsk intent on the same object
as Cathcart. But Selenginsk mustered 3,000 men and Cathcart 400, for part
of Torrens's brigade was on the flank of Pennefather. And now, while the
Guards once more withstood the shock of the Russian infantry in front,
the Selenginsk men suddenly discovered the little band that Cathcart had
led below them. They at once opened a crushing fire on our men. Instead
of flanking the Russians, Sir George found himself in danger of being cut
off and destroyed. His men, too, were short of ammunition. To extricate
himself from this position, Cathcart ordered the men to charge, but the
ground did not admit of that, and the men fell back. Torrens then rallied
the 68th, and prepared to try once more a charge up hill. Sir George
called out to him, "Nobly done, Torrens; nobly done!" But it availed
nothing. Torrens was shot down, and the men halted. Indeed, the movement
was hopeless. The fire of the Russians was so close that Sir George
Cathcart was shot dead, and Colonel Seymour, who rushed up to him, was
shot also. The men were led back through the greatest perils.
Simultaneously with the defeat of Cathcart, the Russians had rolled in
heavy masses on the Guards. It was only the fringe of the left of the
Selenginsk battalions which had slain and driven the men of the 4th
Division. The right of that regiment, the Okhotsk, and the left of the
Yakutsk, were pressing upon the Guards in numbers that were irresistible.
Our men fell sullenly back. At this crisis the Duke of Cambridge rode
along in front of the line of the Guards, and between them and the foe,
and urged his soldiers to stand firm and fire. "We have no ammunition,"
was the unanswerable reply; and without ammunition, but with a firm
countenance, and slowly, the Guards gave ground until they reached the
line of the 2nd Division. Had the enemy then come resolutely on, he might
have won the day, for the spur at length was his. He had now room to
deploy. He might ascend the post road, and the slope he had conquered,
and burst out upon the plain. We were in great straits, but the soldiers
were as stubborn as ever, and the officers as cheerful and daring. But
the loss had been terrible. The only cheering feature in the battle at
this time, apart from the pluck of the men, was the execution done by the
two 18-pounders which had been brought into action and were hammering
effectually the Russian guns on Shell Hill. Bosquet, too, was approaching,
and General Canrobert was at Lord Raglan's side. Fresh ammunition had
been served out to the men; and although they were in disorder, men of
different regiments being mixed together, yet fight they did, and in the
crisis of the engagement held fast.
The two French battalions, the 6th and 7th Light Infantry, which had been
sent forward by Bosquet at the request of Lord Raglan, were now brought
over the crest to support the right. It is said that when they came first
into the storm of shot and shell which fell upon the ridge they blenched,
as if amazed, halted, wavered and gave ground. But the hesitation of the
Frenchmen did not last long. Recovering their presence of mind, they went
over the ridge and into the battle, and, side by side with our men, and
sometimes mixed with them, stood as stoutly and charged as bravely as the
best. Behind them came other French battalions. Dannenberg was preparing
for a thundering attack along the whole line; but before he could assume
the offensive with decision he found himself assailed. The French were
about to win back the Sandbag Battery spur, which innumerable foes had
torn from the grasp of our exhausted men. The clarion of the Zouaves and
the drums of the Light Infantry were heard; 3,000 Frenchmen were about to
prolong the line to the right, and contend with the enemy for possession
of the ground, now strewn thickly with British and Russian dead.
Three French batteries had come up, and had taken their places in line
with ours; but still the worst enemies of the Russian gunners were our two
18-pounders, fired with steadiness and deadly precision. The Russians were
forming for an assault in force, when Bourbaki took them in flank by an
impetuous charge. The gallant Russians were surprised, and thrust right
and left. The British centre, still in front of their camp, had quite
enough to do to keep back the foes who were pressing up the road; and,
as the Russians had been smitten but not subdued, driven over the brow
but not defeated, they turned, extended, and enveloped the flanks of the
French in turn, so that those had to give ground. At this time D'Autemarre
came up with his brigade, a regiment of Zouaves, one of Algerians, and
one of the Line. These fresh troops brought the enemy to a stand, and as
Bosquet pushed them into the thick of the combat, they fought their way
down the spur beyond the Sandbag Battery. The charge of the Zouaves was a
magnificent spectacle; they swept the Russians from the hill. But on their
left the enemy held his ground. The French light infantry regiments of
Bourbaki, and the little groups of British soldiers, could scarcely keep
their place, under the fire of artillery and musketry from Shell Hill and
the post road. For a moment the Russians wrested a gun from the 6th French
Regiment, and its colours; but Colonel Camas roused his men, and by a
desperate charge, in which he fell, Camas recovered both colours and gun.
Bosquet was nearly captured; and the resistance of the Russians was so
fierce that the French had to fall back a pace, and re-form. The Chasseurs
d'Afrique had been brought up, and our light cavalry approached within
fire, but both were sent back and held in reserve.
But practically the battle was won. The Russian infantry only resisted
in order to cover the retreat of the heavy guns, which could no longer
bear up against the 18-pounders. According to the French accounts, the
Russian regiments made one more charge, in which they were repelled, but
it was only the effort of men determined to prevent a close pursuit.
General Dannenberg had still several untouched battalions, and these he
formed up to protect the retreat of the brave men who had so nobly borne
the brunt of this bloody battle. Two war-steamers at the head of the
harbour also began to throw huge shells into the allied position. As the
French followed the retreating enemy, he turned repeatedly and fired with
both cannon and musketry. The slowness and order of the Russian retreat
had, at its commencement, an air of majesty in its movement which drew
expressions of admiration from those who witnessed it. But as the fire
of their artillery slackened, the Russian masses nearest the Allies fell
into confusion and hurried away; followed at a distance by a crowd of
skirmishers in similar confusion, Guards and Zouaves, French Linesmen and
English Linesmen, all mingled together. The battle was at an end.
The Russians fell back as fast as they could. Part of their infantry
and artillery took the road to Sebastopol; the remainder crossed the
Tchernaya bridge. Lord Raglan, it is said, was anxious that the enemy
should be pursued as soon as the artillery left Shell Hill. He had not a
man to spare for this purpose himself, for our troops were worn out with
their tough, enduring struggle, and all the more so as officers and men
alike had gone into action fasting. But General Canrobert had Monet's
brigade of Prince Napoleon's division, which had been sent up from the
Siege Corps, and kept up to this time in reserve. Not a man had seen or
felt the enemy. But Canrobert hesitated to use them. He is said to have
asked that the Guards should go with them, if they went, for his troops
had great confidence in "_les Black Caps_." But to this Lord Raglan, of
course, could not consent, for the Guards were a mere handful. At length
Canrobert agreed to push forward two battalions of Zouaves and a battery
of 12-pounders, and these, with the two Commanders-in-chief, ascended
the heights abandoned by the Russians, and arrived in time to see that
the enemy had escaped beyond range. The guns opened fire and did some
mischief to the stragglers; but the main force had made good its retreat.
The Russian Grand Dukes and Prince Menschikoff had the mortification to
witness the ruin of those splendid dreams in which they had indulged with
such confidence when their great army moved out at dawn. The battle of
Inkermann won for Lord Raglan the _bâton_ of a British Field Marshal,
which he deserved for his valour, though hardly for his strategy. The
losses of the Allies were very great. The British lost 2,816 men of all
ranks. Of these three generals and 43 officers were killed, and six
generals and 100 officers were wounded; 586 men were killed, and 2,078
were wounded. The French lost 1,800 men killed and wounded at Inkermann
and in front of their trenches. Their exact loss at Inkermann is not
stated, but is roughly put at 900 men. Among the wounded was Canrobert.
The Russian loss was some 12,000. Prince Menschikoff was slightly hurt.
The field of battle presented a more than usually horrible spectacle, for
the dead and wounded lay within a space about a mile and a half long and
half a mile deep, while about the Sandbag Battery the corpses were piled
in heaps.
No one alive on that bloody field, except Lord Raglan, had ever seen so
sad a spectacle. The Duke of Cambridge was so deeply affected by the loss
of the Guards alone that he fell sick, and shortly afterwards went home.
Sir De Lacy Evans, ill though he was, had come up from Balaclava in time
to see the crisis and the close of the fight; and he is said to have taken
the gloomiest views of the prospects of the Allies, and even to have
advised the abandonment of the whole enterprise. And, indeed, the Allies
were in a dreadful plight. They had won a victory, but at a cost which
forbade all further progress with the siege for some time.
But now we must quit the Black Sea and its shores for a space, and
narrate the proceedings of the fleet in the Baltic; and then proceed to
blend together the winter incidents in the Crimea and the astonishing
proceedings of the British Parliament and the British people.
The British nation is naturally and justly proud of its navy; but,
considering that they are a maritime people, they are--or were in
1854--singularly ignorant of the true functions of a fleet. When Queen
Victoria led the squadron under Sir Charles Napier out of Spithead, on the
11th of March, the popular impression was that the admiral, with eight
screw line-of-battle ships, four screw frigates, and three paddle-wheel
steamers, would be able, not only to keep the Russian fleet in harbour,
but demolish Cronstadt and Sweaborg, and this impression Ministers and
admiral did their best to strengthen by vainglorious speeches at a public
banquet.
The real fact is, that the Government prescribed to themselves very
limited and reasonable but highly useful objects. The Russian fleet in
the Gulf of Finland consisted of no less than twenty-seven sail of the
line, seventeen lesser men-of-war, frigates, and corvettes, and an unknown
number of gunboats--perhaps one hundred and fifty. These ships and boats
were well manned, and mounted upwards of 3,000 guns; but their situation
was peculiar. They were all in the Gulf of Finland, except a few gunboats;
and the Gulf of Finland was frozen. Supposing they could get out of the
Gulf of Finland, they would have been able to cruise in the Baltic, menace
both Copenhagen and Stockholm (if that were deemed expedient policy), and
send their lighter ships, and some of the heavier, through the Great Belt
or the Sound into the North Sea, to prey on the commerce of the Allies.
It was therefore of the last importance that this Russian fleet should be
prevented from leaving the Gulf of Finland. That was the primary object of
the occupation of the Baltic to be effected by Sir Charles Napier. If he
did this, and could do no more, much would be done.
It would be tedious and profitless to follow the British men-of-war in
their wanderings to and fro in these northern seas. As the Russians would
not come out and fight, all that could be done, even after the French
arrived, was to maintain a blockade of the ports, and inflict such damage
on the coasts of the enemy as the means at the disposal of the admirals
would permit. Before the French arrived Admiral Plumridge had reconnoitred
the Åland Islands, and had swept the Finnish coast of the Gulf of Bothnia,
taking within a month forty-six merchant ships, and destroying immense
quantities of pitch and tar and naval stores. He had visited the important
ports, and, by the aid of his boats, had done this damage between Abo and
Brahestad. The stores destroyed were public property, for private property
he respected.
In the meantime Sir Charles Napier went up the Gulf of Finland to look
at Sweaborg. On the 13th of June Admiral Parseval-Deschenes joined him
at Bomarsund, bringing twenty-eight ships, of which six were sailing
line-of-battle ships and only one a screw line-of-battle ship. The allied
fleet, exclusive of the ships doing duty as blockaders, now amounted
to forty-seven sail. The Russian fleet lay in two divisions, one at
Cronstadt, the other at Sweaborg; and although Sir Charles gave them
plenty of opportunities, neither of them would come out and fight him
together or singly. As there was so great a clamour in England for an
attack upon the fortresses, it is supposed that the Russians hoped the
admirals would attack one or the other, so that while they were suffering
from the fire of the forts, the Russian fleets might sail out, fall upon
and destroy them. The two admirals, however, were not to be so caught.
They went together, in the middle of June, to reconnoitre Cronstadt,
and, as was anticipated, found it out of their reach. The water was so
shallow and so commanded by forts that a direct attack would have been a
criminal folly, while the enemy had blocked up with sunken obstructions
the passage on the northern side by which, it was just possible, the
lighter ships might have got into the rear of the place. The fact is, that
without gunboats and light ships, and, above all, without an army, neither
Cronstadt nor Sweaborg could be attacked with success.
[Illustration: THE HOSPITAL AND CEMETERY AT SCUTARI, WITH CONSTANTINOPLE
IN THE DISTANCE.]
But there was one place within their power. At the southern end of the
Gulf of Bothnia, over against Stockholm, and within a few miles of the
Swedish coast, lie the Åland Islands. On one of these islands, the Czar,
at great cost, had built the fortress of Bomarsund. It was to Stockholm
what Sebastopol was to Constantinople--a "standing menace." Built on an
island, it lay within reach of the Allies, and they resolved to capture
and destroy it. But this could not be done without troops. So the French
Government agreed to supply 10,000 men; and they were embarked at Boulogne
in British ships, and commanded by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. The plan
of the Allies was to land the troops, and, taking the outworks, breach the
main fort from the rear. This was practicable, with the force in hand,
because our ships commanded the sea and no army could march to succour the
place.
The Allies resolved to land on the western shore of the bay and on the
northern shore of the island on the 8th of August. Day breaks early in
those high latitudes, and at two o'clock some French and British ships
opened fire on the woods to cover the landing, while others attacked the
battery and shelled Fort Tzee to occupy their attention. In a short time
the battery was abandoned, and the Allies were in possession of it. All
this time the troops had been pouring ashore, and by eight o'clock 10,000
men were marching through the woods, turning the enemy's works. They
encamped about two miles from Fort Tzee, on the north of a glen affording
plenty of water, while the fir groves furnished wood. The French battery
opened fire on Fort Tzee on the 13th; and while the shot from the heavy
guns and the shells from the mortars tore down the walls, the riflemen
lying among the rocks threw into the embrasures a fire so searching,
that the enemy's gunners found it difficult to load their pieces. In the
afternoon the Russians hung out a white flag. It is said they asked an
hour to bury their dead, and that the boon being granted, they used the
time to replenish their store of ammunition. The fire was renewed, and
later another flag of truce was displayed. This time General Baraguay
d'Hilliers refused to parley, because of the abuse of the previous
suspension of the cannonade. The next morning, the guns of the fort being
silent, the French riflemen dashed in and captured the work with fifty
prisoners. The British battery had been constructed under a heavy fire. It
was finished on the 14th, but not being wanted, its guns were turned upon
Fort Nottich on the 15th; and at six in the evening, one side of the tower
being demolished, the garrison surrendered. On the morning of the 16th
the main fort and the Presto tower alone held out. They had been under
the fire of the ships for some days, and now the great fort was entirely
commanded from the rear by the shore batteries. General Bodisco, having
no hope of succour, was without warrant for a bloody defence. So at noon
he hung out a white flag and surrendered. It was resolved to blow up all
the works--a resolution carried out very completely by the beginning of
September.
With this exploit the showy work of the naval campaign in the Baltic
ended. The blockade was maintained until the ice interposed an utterly
impassable barrier; Sweaborg was reconnoitred, and very antagonistic
schemes were propounded for its capture; some misunderstandings arose
between Admiral Napier and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James
Graham; but in the end the ice and the fierce tempests came, and arrested
the cruising of ships, although they could not stop the squabbling of men.
The British fleet was the first to enter and the last to leave the Baltic,
and the frigates did not reach home until November.
We have already stated that after the battle of Inkermann the British
general found himself compelled, with diminished forces, to maintain a
purely defensive attitude in the face of a weakened, but still numerous
and vigilant enemy. The character of the expedition had wholly changed. It
was intended to be a temporary operation, swift and complete. It became a
permanent invasion. Not only the enemy, but the winter had to be fronted.
The Czar counted on his generals, January and February, as well as on
Todleben and Gortschakoff. He trusted to rain, mud, and snow to weaken
the forces, and wear out the hardihood of the British, and exhaust the
spirit of the French. Like many others he cradled himself in delusions.
For, whatever may have been the effect of suspense on the French soldier,
the French Emperor could not afford to fail; and it so happened that the
British nation, with astonishing unanimity, had set its heart on the
destruction of Sebastopol; and rarely in history can you find an instance
of failure to accomplish a settled purpose really formed by the British
nation. In this present case they were severely tried; but, though they
were truculent, and angry, and irrational because Sebastopol had not been
taken in October; though they turned furiously upon the Government at home
and the general in the Crimea; yet not for one moment did they relent or
shrink from their fixed resolve; rather did they insist, with a vehemence
without parallel, on the full achievement of the main object, until the
phrase--"vigorous prosecution of the war," heard on every lip, became a
tedious but still vital commonplace.
The general and the troops who were working out their resolve in the
Crimea were tried more severely than they. With November had come, not
only a bloody battle, but a painful change in the climate. The soft,
calm, sunny days of October faded away. The Black Sea began to show the
appropriateness of the name it bore. Thick mists covered the surface of
its dark grey waters; heavy clouds overspread the clear blue sky. Rain
fell, sometimes in drenching showers, sometimes in thick, small drops; and
the earth absorbing the moisture, began to change into mud. Then, with a
fierceness gathered from a triumphant rush over the whole breadth of the
Black Sea, there came swooping upon the southern shores of the Crimea a
tempest memorable for its potency and destructiveness--the famous storm of
the 14th of November.
The wind came from the south. First came heavy squalls and pelting rain;
then the wind became more continuous and stronger, and the rain thicker,
beating on the earth with a hoarse sound, and forcing its way through
the canvas of the tents. It was early morning, and weary sleepers were
awakened by the uproar. In a few minutes nearly every tent on the plateau
was down. No fires could be lighted, no food cooked. All around was one
common desolation; for the hospital tents had shared the fate of the
others, and the sick lay exposed to all the violence of the tempest. The
wooden structures erected by the French for their sick went down before
the gale, and only a few planks remained. Generals, officers, soldiers,
sick and wounded, hale and well, were in a like predicament. And when the
wind fell a little--that is, became a little less violent--the air became
colder, and the rain became sleet and snow, men and horses perished from
exposure.
But the horrors of that day were most horrible off Balaclava. There
hundreds of lives were lost in a few hours. Outside the port, at
anchor in deep water, were twenty-two ships. Among them were the four
war-steamers _Retribution_, _Niger_, _Vulcan_, and _Vesuvius;_ four fine
steam transports, including the _Prince_, whose hold was filled with warm
clothing for the troops; ten sailing transports, and four freight ships.
Caught by the full violence of the storm, some were washed ashore, others,
including the _Prince_, went down.
This terrible tempest was the climax of our misfortunes. The battle
of Inkermann had proved that the army must winter on those desolate
hills; the effects of the storm made it manifest that the troops would
have to face the winter without adequate supplies. No fewer than 2,500
watch coats, 16,000 blankets, 3,700 rugs, 53,000 woollen frocks, 19,000
lamb's-wool drawers, 35,700 socks, 12,880 pairs of boots, 1,800 pairs
of shoes, and stores of drugs and other necessaries were lost in the
_Prince_. Fourteen of the wrecked transports were laden with forage and
provisions--namely, 359,714 pounds of biscuit, 74,880 pounds of salt meat,
157 head of cattle, 645 sheep, 8,000 gallons of rum, 73,986 pounds of
rice, 11,200 pounds of green coffee, 1,116,172 pounds of forage corn, and
800,000 pounds of pressed hay. With the _Resolute_ were engulfed several
million rounds of ball cartridge, and the reserve ammunition for the
artillery. Even these losses do not measure the extent of the calamity,
for many ships were injured so much that the army was for a long time
deficient in sea transport, and consequently in the means of repairing
the ravages inflicted by the storm on stores of all kinds. Although the
harbour of Balaclava was, after the 25th of October, in danger of being
seized by the enemy, there seems to have been no good reason why that risk
should not have been incurred, and the _Prince_ and the _Resolute_ allowed
to anchor inside. Lord Raglan, immediately after the battle of Inkermann,
had taken steps to obtain clothing and shelter, and ample supplies of
food. But in the interval the troops suffered greatly. For the remainder
of November it rained almost without cessation, and the plains became one
vast quagmire. So the road to the camps became a track of liquid mud; the
valley of Balaclava desolated and melancholy; the town as muddy as the
plains, and the tideless harbour a common sewer. For several weeks the
men were without proper clothing, fuel, or food, and the result was an
outbreak of cholera. In the camp hospitals men lay down to die upon the
bare ground; in the hospitals at Scutari, ignorance, dirt, and confusion
prevailed, besides a want of ambulance to carry the invalid soldier from
camp to port, and of accommodation on board ship.
When the people heard of the sufferings of their soldiers in the Crimea
and at Scutari they became indignant and unreasonable: they ascribed the
failure of the expedition and the distresses of the troops to the wrong
causes, and they demanded the recall of the general and the dismissal
of the Government. To understand how this came about, we must consider
how the Government conducted the war, and the means at hand wherewith to
conduct it.
For nearly forty years the British nation had not taken any part in a war
in Europe. The vast expense of the war against the first Napoleon, the
suffering it caused, the habits of despotic government which it induced,
the obstinate resistance of a great party to needful reforms, had all
served to inspire a dread of a standing army. The consequences were most
serious. The nation was in danger of having no army at all. At no period
subsequently to 1815 was Britain in a condition to go to war. The pith
of the army, the infantry, consisted of a number of very fine regiments,
kept down at the lowest numerical condition. The cavalry regiments were
good, but in numbers they were each barely equal to two good squadrons.
There were in England but a very few guns in fighting order. There was a
weak commissariat; there was no land transport corps or military train.
Such a thing as a camp of exercise was unknown until 1853. There were no
opportunities for handling large masses of all arms. The militia even was
suffered to fall into abeyance for many years. There were men in England
fully alive to the consequences of this neglect of the military machine;
but their voices were not heeded until the revolutions of 1848 and the
success of Louis Napoleon in 1851 roused the whole nation from its apathy.
An improved tone in public feeling, a better estimate of the real value
of a good army, and a real dread of danger from without, led to some
improvements. The militia force was revived. Lord Hardinge had the courage
to insist on the adoption of the Minié rifle, and Mr. Sidney Herbert
prevailed on his colleagues to establish a camp. The artillery was placed
in a state of great efficiency. But that man would, in 1852-3, have been
regarded as mad who proposed a military train, an ambulance corps, and an
effective military staff. These necessary parts of an army were not in
existence.
The army in 1853 consisted of little more than 102,000 men for the service
of the British Empire, exclusive of India. In 1854 Ministers proposed
and carried, in February, an augmentation of 10,000, bringing up the
total to 112,000. These men they had to obtain by enlistment, for the
militia then was young, and little more than a paper force. It was not
embodied, nor had the Government power to embody a single regiment; for
the militia had been raised to resist invasion only, so jealous were the
Commons; and Ministers, before they could call out a man, except for the
annual training, were obliged to obtain an Act of Parliament. Moreover,
just on the threshold of war, so rotten was the system of promotion
and retirement, that they were compelled to appoint a Royal Commission
to report on the best mode of enabling the Queen to avail herself of
the services of officers in the full vigour of life. Thus Europe was
astonished at the spectacle of a great Power remodelling its military
system, enlarging it, and strengthening it, on the brink of a conflict
with the vast and well-appointed armies of Russia. For it was soon found
that the Ministry of War must be separated from that of the Colonies; and
when this was done, no minute defining the powers and functions of the
new department was framed; so that the Duke of Newcastle, who left the
Colonies for the new War department, had to grope his way towards the
vital work he had undertaken to do. The duke was a man of some hardihood,
and great energy and industry; but he was new to the business, he had
not sufficient weight in the Cabinet; one at least of his colleagues
envied him the place he filled; and it may be surmised that with all his
good intentions, Lord Aberdeen's innate repugnance to war exercised,
unconsciously, a paralysing influence over the whole Cabinet. A more
vigorous and decided mind at the head of the executive would have begun
in 1853 to make those preparations which, made then, would have prevented
so much suffering in the winter of 1854. A man of greater weight at the
War Office would, even in 1854, have been able to impress his colleagues
with a sense of the magnitude of the impending conflict, and have obtained
their assent to the most vigorous exertions, made with a distinct
perception of all that was required to enable Britain to carry on her
share of the war in a manner consistent with the wishes of the people and
her character as a great Power.
The Government doubted--at least the Aberdeen section--if the House of
Commons would sanction the policy which they had pursued. There was one
man in the Cabinet who had what the first Napoleon called "popular fibre"
in his constitution, but he was in the Home Office. Lord Palmerston
understood the crisis better than any of his colleagues, and would,
in 1853, have taken means to back up his diplomacy. Lord Aberdeen was
afraid of appearing to threaten, or to do anything which might lay him
open to the factious charge of provoking hostilities. So timid were the
Government that, as we have said, they allowed 1853 to slip by without
obtaining power to embody the militia, except in the improbable event of
an invasion; and when Parliament met, they only asked for an addition to
the army of 10,000 men, because they thought the House of Commons should
sanction their policy before they brought the army, even on paper, up to a
reasonable strength. Such was the fruit of an unwholesome dread of war, a
lingering belief that peace was still probable, and a misapprehension of
the character of the Czar.
Yet, although at the opening of the Session it was manifest that the
Ministry had nothing to fear from the Opposition beyond the usual
criticism, and that, as a set-off against this, they had the cordial
support of the people, it was not until March that they asked for 15,000
more men, and not until May that they demanded an additional 15,000,
and obtained the ready assent to the embodiment of the militia, and
power to accept the offer of their services for the Mediterranean and
colonial garrisons. But this was too late, for it was found that only boys
enlisted; and although, in two months, so far as mere drill goes, you can
make a good infantry soldier, in two months a boy does not grow into a
man. The Duke of Newcastle drew off from the colonies every man he could
lay his hands on, and formed a reserve, which, in June, went to the East
under Sir George Cathcart. He then formed another reserve, by abstracting
more regiments from the colonies, and denuding the Mediterranean
fortresses of regular troops. This second reserve went to the Crimea after
the battle of Inkermann. Then the supplies of real soldiers were quite
exhausted. We had nothing to send but raw youths, unfit to sustain the
hardships of a winter campaign. We could only send gristle, instead of
bone and sinew. This was the consequence of not augmenting the army in
1853. Correctly speaking, it was a consequence of the neglect to maintain
an efficient and numerous army for many years.
[Illustration: THE LATE SIR W. H. RUSSELL, CORRESPONDENT OF THE "TIMES" IN
THE CRIMEA.]
The violence of national feeling was rising, thanks chiefly to the graphic
reports sent home by the correspondent of the _Times_, Mr. Russell, when
Ministers found it necessary to summon Parliament that they might obtain
power to raise a Foreign Legion, and power to accept the offers of militia
regiments to do garrison duty abroad--two measures due to suggestions
of the Prince Consort. The two Houses met on the 12th of December, and
sat until the 23rd. The whole policy of the war was discussed as well as
the state of the army in the Crimea; but although the Opposition, led by
Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli, tried to defeat both measures, they were
carried by considerable majorities. The speeches delivered during this
short Session served to herald the storm that was about to burst over the
Government in January.
The virulence of the paper war at home increased during the recess. Every
victim on the muddy and half-frozen plains of the Crimea sent home doleful
and indignant accounts of his sufferings. Many of these terrible stories
were pure inventions; but everything, without discrimination, was printed
and believed. Many were the pieces of foolish advice tendered to the
Government. But next to a genuine desire to relieve the suffering of the
soldiers, was a desire to punish somebody. The attacks in the newspapers
became more fierce when it was known or surmised that there were members
of the Cabinet who reeled under this storm of public censure; and it was
soon manifest that when Parliament again assembled the Ministers would be
driven from power.
Parliament met on the 23rd of January, 1855, and Lord Ellenborough,
Mr. Roebuck, and Lord Lyndhurst at once put hostile notices of motion
on the paper. Mr. Roebuck proposed an inquiry, by a committee of the
House, into the condition of the army in the Crimea, and the conduct
of the departments whose duty it was to minister to the wants of that
army. Lord Ellenborough intended to ask for returns showing the number
of the force sent out, and the number of killed, wounded, and sick. Lord
Lyndhurst's notice of motion embodied a censure on the Government. These
were symptoms of the exasperated state of public feeling. More than this,
there was a statesman who flinched from sharing with his colleagues the
responsibilities of the moment. On the very day, the 25th, set apart
for the discussion of Mr. Roebuck's motion, it became known that Lord
John Russell had resigned. From that moment the fate of the Ministry was
decided. On the 26th Lord John stated why he had abandoned his colleagues.
His reasons were twofold:--First, he could not resist Mr. Roebuck's
motion for inquiry, because it was notorious that the condition of the
army in the Crimea was melancholy--nay, horrible and heart-rending; but
he failed to show how inquiry would better its condition. Next, in a
tone of complaint, he insinuated that he had long been dissatisfied with
the management of the War department, and that his suggested reforms had
not been adopted. It appeared that, although he had concurred in the
appointment of the Duke of Newcastle, he had, in November, that is, when
the tide seemed flowing against the Allies, thought that there should
be a strong Minister of War, and that Lord Palmerston should be that
Minister. To this Lord Aberdeen demurred. Lord John gave up his point
at the suggestion of Lord Palmerston, and dropped the subject. But when
Mr. Roebuck made his motion, he saw the danger it involved and ran away.
Lord Palmerston very properly said that the course taken by his noble
friend was not in correspondence with the usual practice of public men.
He ought to have given his colleagues the option of considering whether
they would accept his views or lose his services. Lord John had attended
in his place on the 23rd; he had walked from the House with a colleague,
giving no hint of his intention. At midnight he sent a note tendering
his resignation. The Government, he added, would not run away from Mr.
Roebuck's motion. "It would be disgraceful not to meet it standing in
the position which we now occupy--minus my noble friend." They did meet
it, and it was carried by 305 to 148. Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues
immediately resigned, and, as it was justly and shrewdly said, the Duke of
Newcastle was made the "Byng" of the day. The sole object of the motion
was to turn out the Ministry, and that object was accomplished. The public
demanded a victim, and, as usual, one was provided. In the meantime those
measures which remedied the evils in the Crimea were already in operation,
and the committee about to sit became a committee for the gratification
of curiosity, and for the raking together of materials to form a bill of
indictment against the Duke of Newcastle and the Aberdeen Government.
It was absolutely powerless to do a single act for the bettering of the
condition of the soldier, or the promoting of the success of our arms.
Lord John Russell's conduct on this occasion was a blot upon a very bright
escutcheon. He had all along been jealous of the Duke of Newcastle.
He had, and it was a right thing to do, forced on a division of the
Ministries of War and the Colonies, but he had done so without providing
a definite plan for the conduct of the new department. When the Cabinet
determined to separate the two secretaryships, he was annoyed that the
Duke of Newcastle selected the post of danger--the War department. He
had actually thought of occupying it himself, thus justifying the famous
remark of Sydney Smith, that Lord John would not hesitate to take the
command of a Channel fleet. When the duke was seated, with the full
consent of his colleagues, Lord John pursued him with foolish criticisms,
which were immediately disposed of as they deserved. When all seemed to
be going well, Lord John wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, "You have done
all that could be done, and I am sanguine of success." When calamity began
to fall upon the army, Lord John revived the old exploded criticisms, and
wished to substitute Lord Palmerston for the duke. But the whole Cabinet
dissented. Lord John retained his opinion, and intended to insist upon it;
but before Parliament met in December, he told Lord Aberdeen that, having
consulted his friends, he had changed his views, and no longer wished to
oust the duke from his office. From that time to the meeting of Parliament
in January he gave no sign. But public opinion was loud and fierce, and
Lord John could not bear its anger; and in the dead of the night, from
his domestic hearth, he wrote the hurried and brief announcement of his
intention to fly from a sinking ship.
There were some difficulties in forming a new Ministry. The Queen sent
for Lord Derby; he accepted her Majesty's commission to frame a Cabinet,
and he invited the co-operation of Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, and
Mr. Sidney Herbert--the very Ministers whom his party had just censured!
They declined; and as Lord Derby, much to the chagrin of Mr. Disraeli,
would not venture without them, he threw up his commission. Lord Lansdowne
declined the Premiership. As the contingent led into the Opposition ranks
by Lord John formed part of the majority, her Majesty then commanded him
to form a Cabinet. But in the circumstances he could get no one to back
him, and then her Majesty called in Lord Palmerston. But few days had
elapsed since he and others had fallen under a vote of censure. Yet he now
was able to construct a new Ministry out of old materials. Lord Aberdeen,
Lord John Russell, and the Duke of Newcastle, of course, could not well
form part of the new Cabinet. Lord Palmerston succeeded Lord Aberdeen;
Lord Panmure replaced the Duke of Newcastle; Earl Granville succeeded
Lord John as President of the Council; and Lord Canning obtained a seat
in the Cabinet. These were the only material changes. It was understood
that the policy of the new Cabinet should be the policy of the old one.
So that nothing was gained except the exclusion of two men by a vote of
the House, and the self-exclusion of a third. This Government, however,
lasted only a few days. Lord Palmerston declared that he was still
opposed to the Committee of Inquiry as unconstitutional and inefficient
for its purpose. The Government, he said, had already begun the needed
reforms--had remodelled the War department, established a transport board
at the Admiralty, and were about to send commissioners to the Crimea
and reorganise the medical department at home. But Mr. Roebuck insisted
on appointing his committee; and as Lord Palmerston was not willing to
run counter to the desire of the public, which found expression in Mr.
Roebuck's motion, and would no longer resist the appointment of the
committee, Mr. Sidney Herbert, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Cardwell, and Sir James
Graham resigned. So the committee was appointed, and Lord Palmerston
formed a fresh Ministry.
The new members were Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Chancellor of the
Exchequer; Lord John Russell, Colonial Secretary; Mr. Vernon Smith,
India Board; the Earl of Harrowby, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster;
while Sir Charles Wood, quitting the India Board, became First Lord of
the Admiralty, and Lord Carlisle went to Ireland in the room of Lord
St. Germans. The object of the original movers in this business had now
been accomplished: the Peelites had been driven out of the Government
altogether. So much of the home history of England it seemed needful
to introduce here. We must now return to the Crimea, and endeavour to
describe what really happened there, and show how far the popular outcry
was justified.