THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
Widening of the Question--The Fleets in Besika Bay--Lord Clarendon's
Despatch--The Czar and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe--Nesselrode's
"Last Effort"--Military Preparations--Blindness of the British
Cabinet--Nesselrode's Ultimatum rejected--Occupation of the
Principalities--Projects of Settlement--The Vienna Note--Its
Rejection by the Porte--Division of the Powers--Text of the
Note--Divisions in the British Cabinet--The Fleets in the
Bosphorus--The Conference at Olmütz--The Sultan's Grand
Council--Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's Last Effort--Patriotism
of the Turks--Omar Pasha's Victories--The Russian Fleet puts
forth--Lord Stratford de Redcliffe refuses Support to the Turks--The
Turkish Fleet Destroyed at Sinope--Indignation in England--The
French Suggestion--It is accepted by Lord Clarendon--Russia
demands Explanations--Diplomatic Relations suspended--The Letter
of Napoleon III.--The Western Powers arm--An Ultimatum to
Russia--It is unanswered--The Baltic Fleet--Publication of the
Correspondence--Declarations of War.
When Prince Menschikoff presented his ultimatum the Eastern Question
underwent a complete change. Up to that moment the quarrel had been
confined, first to Russia and France, next to Russia and the Porte; and
the struggle, although supported on one side by the advance of armies,
was still a diplomatic struggle. Prince Menschikoff's formal demand for
a protectorate, the violence of his language, and his imperious request
for an answer in a limited time, converted the question at once into a
European question of the first magnitude.
The earliest news that the Prince had presented an ultimatum to the Porte
created a profound impression in the Courts of Paris and London, and even
in the Courts of Berlin and Vienna, where Russia had so many friends.
The British Government heard of it with "extreme surprise and regret."
They had been wronged by the conduct of the Czar, and a strong revulsion
followed from confidence to mistrust. The Emperor had broken his word.
The intelligence of the last violence offered to the Porte by Prince
Menschikoff reached England on the 30th of May. The British Cabinet took
a decisive resolution. On the 31st of May a despatch went forth from the
Foreign Office, placing the fleet under Admiral Dundas at the "disposal"
of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to be ordered whithersoever he would,
but not to be allowed to enter the Dardanelles, except on the express
demand of the Sultan. Two days afterwards, by a direct order, Admiral
Dundas was instructed to proceed at once from Malta to the neighbourhood
of the Dardanelles; and three days later, the French Government learning
this, and being desirous of acting in concert, the Emperor sent orders
to his squadron to quit Salamis, and proceed to Besika Bay. It was not
possible--it was not, at that stage of the question, desirable--to do
more. The two fleets were placed within call of the Sultan, and the
treaty of 1841 was not broken or strained.
The temper of the British Government now underwent a great change.
Its trust in the Emperor Nicholas was gone. On the same day that Lord
Clarendon entrusted the fleet to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, he wrote a
despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour, recapitulating, with trenchant brevity,
those "most solemn assurances" which the Czar had given over and over
again. It is a long catalogue; there are no less than sixteen distinct
pledges that the question of the Holy Places, and that alone, required
to be resolved. Yet at this very time the Czar was urging on Prince
Menschikoff to extort from the Porte a treaty which would have laid
that independence at his feet. The "explicit, precise, and satisfactory
assurances" which came day by day from St. Petersburg were day by day
proved to be worthless at Constantinople. The assurances of the Czar,
and the language and acts of his Minister at the Porte were in flagrant
contradiction. This flagrant "discrepancy," as the British Secretary of
State mildly called it, he did not fail to set forth as the ground of a
demand for explanations; nor did he fail to remark that Prince Menschikoff
had been supported by a display of force, with what object he desired the
Russian Government to explain. At the same time Lord Clarendon distinctly
informed the Russian Government that England was determined to abide
by that policy which held the preservation of Turkish independence and
integrity to be essential to the peace of Europe. Sir Hamilton Seymour
had already confronted Count Nesselrode with his promises. Nothing can
exceed the cool effrontery with which the wily old Chancellor maintained
that he had concealed nothing. His language, he averred, had always
pointed to the exact reparation which Prince Menschikoff had demanded, and
against which the Turkish Ministry and the British Ambassador had raised
such "unaccountable" objections. Well might Sir Hamilton remark that "a
long-cherished object" had been "sought by a tortuous path." Indeed, few
finer specimens of treacherous diplomacy can be found than those which are
furnished by the authentic records of the correspondence between the Czar
and the British Government in the first five months of 1853.
The anger and violence of the Emperor Nicholas at his defeat were
augmented by the fact that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was the British
Envoy at the Porte. In spite of the evidence pouring in upon him from
day to day, the Czar would believe that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe,
overawing the Ministers, and coercing the Sultan, had alone been the
cause of the rejection of the treaty. The Czar writhed at the thought.
Count Nesselrode--and in reading his words we read, no doubt, the words
of Nicholas--imputes the failure of Menschikoff to the vehemence of, "the
Queen's Ambassador." Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was accused of displaying
an "incurable mistrust, a vehement activity." Russia was aware of the
efforts he employed with the Sultan and the Council, and how deaf he had
proved to the prayers of Reschid Pasha. No; the rupture had been brought
about by "passion," by "a blind obstinacy," by forcing the Porte "to
brave" Russia by "distrust as unfounded as it was offensive." In short,
the Czar believed, or affected to believe, that he had suffered a moral
defeat at the hands of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and that he would not
endure.
Lord Clarendon's catalogue of Count Nesselrode's worthless promises was
crossed on its way to St. Petersburg by a despatch from that Minister to
Baron Brunnow, quite as insolent as any Prince Menschikoff had addressed
to the Porte. In the most haughty style of the Russian Foreign Office
Britain was warned not to drive the Porte, by a policy of mistrust, to
the verge of an abyss in which the moderation of the Emperor had alone
prevented her from being swallowed up. This heated language, this avowal
that the Czar regarded himself as the destiny of Turkey, did not open
the eyes of Lord Aberdeen, did not enable him to see that the Czar was
resolved, cost what it would, to have his will obeyed. Nor did the
ultimatum addressed to Reschid Pasha, insolent and peremptory as it was,
reveal to Lord Aberdeen the true state of the case. Declaring that the
Czar had been always friendly and generous and moderate, and that by
opposing his intentions, by showing distrust without cause, by giving
refusals without excuse, a serious offence had been committed against "a
sincere ally and well-disposed neighbour," Count Nesselrode had the tact
to appeal, not only to the wisdom, but to the "patriotism" of the Turkish
Minister, and almost ordered him to surrender without delay, under penalty
of seeing a portion of the dominions of his master taken, and held as a
"material guarantee." Such was the character of the "last effort" made by
this moderate, this conciliatory, this generous potentate, this "sincere
ally and well-disposed neighbour," to extort from a weak Power the essence
of sovereignty over twelve millions of subjects.
The fiery ultimatum went on its way to Constantinople. The force to back
it received fresh marching orders. Baron Manteuffel told Lord Bloomfield
that Prince Gortschakoff had been appointed to command the Russian army on
the frontier of Turkey; and that his horses and baggage had, on the 5th
of June, already reached headquarters. A strong force of gunboats went up
the Danube to Ismail to prepare a means of crossing the river, and the
merchants at Odessa were warned to wind up their affairs. The Turks also
were bent on making ready for the worst. The small squadron of Turkish
men-of-war took up a position in the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus.
A flying camp was established between the Black Sea and Kilia, and Omar
Pasha was ordered to Shumla. But Varna was defenceless, and the works at
the mouth of the Bosphorus were out of repair, and the guns worthless; and
except the resistance which the Anglo-French fleet might offer, there was
none which the navy and army of Nicholas could not overcome. The whole
disposable force of the Sultan consisted of 80,000 men, mainly militia. In
the face of the menacing preparation of Russia, the British Government did
nothing but form a camp for 10,000 men at Chobham!
For they did not believe in the outbreak of war. Lord Clarendon's
despatches breathed of nothing but peace. The British Government could
not shake off its old confidence in Nicholas, although he was in arms
at the threshold of Constantinople. The policy of England, it was said,
was "essentially pacific." No hostile feelings were entertained towards
Russia, but every allowance was made for the difficulty in which the
Emperor "had been placed"--by his own acts, in the main, the Foreign
Secretary should have said. The British Government seemed to regard the
threatened occupation of the Principalities as something inevitable, and
while they still hoped to bring about a peaceful settlement, they did
nothing and said nothing to prevent this further violation of right.
It was a matter of course that they should appeal to the German Powers,
telling them that France and Britain, in sending their fleets to Besika
Bay, and in approving of the stand made by the Porte, were actuated by the
sole desire to uphold Turkish independence, and begging them, especially
Austria, to exert their influence upon the Czar in favour of peace. It
is strange, indeed, that the British Ministers did not see the drift and
persistency of Russia; and that, from the temper of the Czar, war was so
probable that they could not do too much to place themselves in a position
to bear a part becoming Britain. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe saw more
distinctly. He told the Ministers that the master view of the Czar was
to obtain a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, as a
means of securing, if not hastening, its downfall; and he said rightly
that if Turkey were to be left to struggle single-handed, the sooner
the Porte were apprised of its helpless condition the better. But the
British Government had taken up the weak position of desiring, almost
resolving, to defend the Sultan, yet of neglecting to provide the means
lest that very act should precipitate war. And so, while they went on the
road to war, by thwarting the Emperor's designs over the Ottoman Empire,
they prevented themselves from making war with effect by abstaining from
preparation.
[Illustration: CONSTANTINOPLE.]
When the second Russian ultimatum arrived, the Turkish Government did not
hesitate a moment respecting the answer which it should receive--they
determined at once to reject it. But being now assured, by the coming
of the fleets, of the support of Britain and France, they betrayed no
anxiety in so doing, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had no difficulty
in obtaining the assent of the Sultan to the suggestion that he should
protest, but not declare war, and should, on the contrary, offer to open
fresh negotiations by sending an Ambassador to St. Petersburg. It was
not supposed that the Emperor would assent to this, but the offer was in
unison with the policy of the friendly Powers, and placed the aggressor
still further in the wrong. On the 16th of June, the date of the answer to
Count Nesselrode, when the step taken by the Porte was irrevocable, Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe waited on the Sultan. His ostensible object was
to present a letter from Queen Victoria announcing the birth of Prince
Leopold, and to offer her Majesty's condolence on the severe affliction
the Sultan had sustained in the loss of his mother, the Sultana Validé.
Having accomplished this, he gave the Sultan more substantial comfort, by
informing him with what friendly sentiments and "eventual intentions" the
powerful fleet of Admiral Dundas, then at anchor in Besika Bay, had been
placed at the Ambassador's disposal. At the same time, and in obedience
to his instructions, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe told the Sultan that
peace was the great object of British policy, and that the fleet would be
used only to protect the Sultan from foreign aggression. On the 17th of
June M. Balabine quitted Constantinople, carrying with him to Odessa the
answer to Count Nesselrode's ultimatum, and the whole of the archives and
correspondence of the Russian Legation. The answer was received in St.
Petersburg about the 25th of June. It had been anticipated by the Russian
Court, and orders were at once issued for the troops to cross the Pruth
and occupy the Principalities.
Between the 1st and 30th of July, while the Russians were settling down
in the Principalities and acting like proprietors, projects of settlement
grew and withered apace. The Four Powers were endeavouring to find out
what each thought and what each would do. The idea of a Conference at
Vienna occurred to several persons at once. Lord Clarendon started a
scheme, based on the project of a Convention between Russia and Turkey,
which he drew up. M. Drouyn de Lhuys framed a note to be signed by Turkey,
and accepted by Russia. There was Count Buol's project of a fusion of
Russian and Turkish ideas. Independently of all this, the representatives
of the Four Powers at Constantinople got up a scheme of their own, which
proved to be distasteful to everybody but the Turks. Peace projectors
abounded, while Russia steadily went on with her design, occupied
the Principalities in a military fashion, seized on the post-office,
intercepted the Sultan's tribute, sent gunboats up the Danube, and when
the Porte recalled the Hospodars, induced them to disobey the Sultan's
mandate, and forced him to dismiss them. Nor did Russia stop here. She
sent emissaries into Servia and Bulgaria; she scattered her manifesto
broadcast; she strove to raise a spirit of disaffection; and she replied
with haughtiness to the complaints of the Western Powers. In the dominions
of the Sultan a corresponding spirit arose. The Czar's manifesto had been
read in all his churches; the Ulemas answered by sermons calculated
to raise a spirit of counter-fanaticism. It was manifest that Turkish
ardour was not extinct. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe began to fear more
from the rashness than the timidity of the Divan. Military and naval
preparations went on briskly, and by the middle of August the Sultan had
the satisfaction of knowing that he could defend Shumla, the Balkan, and
the Bosphorus, if pressed by the Czar. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe did not
fail to lay before his Government the real issues at stake, nor did he
disguise his doubts of the possibility of coming to a settlement without
resort to war.
It was in these circumstances that Count Buol exerted himself at Vienna
to frame a plan of conciliation. He took the draft of a note drawn up
by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and by the aid of the representatives of the
Four Powers at Vienna, and after frequent communication with London and
Paris, he constructed out of this draft a note which he hoped would prove
acceptable alike to Russia and Turkey. The design was to ascertain whether
the Czar would accept the note, and if he agreed to do so, to send it to
Constantinople, accompanied by urgent recommendations from the Four Powers
to the Porte advising its acceptance. In taking this course, Austria acted
as mediator at the request, or at least with the assent, of Russia; but
the Russian Ambassador at Vienna would not attend the Conference, and his
master was only represented there by a sort of friend. After great labour
the note was framed, and a copy sent to St. Petersburg. The Powers took
steps immediately to ascertain whether the Czar would accept the note, and
they found that, although it did not give him satisfaction, he was content
to accept it in a spirit of conciliation, as an arrangement devised by
a friendly Government; and he was willing to take it from the hands of
a Turkish Ambassador, provided it were not altered in any way. This was
the famous "Vienna Note" which attracted so much attention, and raised so
many hopes in the summer of 1853. But while Austria and the other Powers
had consulted Russia and learnt her views, they had forgotten Turkey,
for whose benefit the thing was supposed to be devised. They had not
ascertained whether Turkey would or could sign it, and, indeed, in framing
it, the Powers seemed more anxious to devise a form of words satisfactory
to the Czar than safe in the eyes of the Sultan. And so, when it reached
Constantinople, although backed by strong advices from all the Powers,
and not least by England, the Porte declined to sign it, except in an
amended form, which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe drew up, and to which the
representatives of the Four Powers at the Porte agreed. The note, indeed,
was found to confer rights on Russia almost as extensive as those she
claimed through Prince Menschikoff. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, although
he saw this, scrupulously executed the instructions of his Government,
and pressed the note on the Porte. But the Sultan, the Ministers, and the
Grand Council were firm. After much deliberation, the Grand Council, of
sixty members, comprising the most distinguished statesmen of the capital,
adopted a form of note embodying their views, but rather deferring to
the plan suggested at Vienna. "If the decision," wrote Lord Stratford
de Redcliffe, on the 20th of August, "does not completely represent the
feeling of this country, it only fails in being framed with too much
forbearance and moderation."
The news that the Porte would not sign the note, except in a modified
form, vexed both Austria and England. Count Buol was chagrined, Lord
Clarendon was angry. What the Four Powers most interested in preserving
Turkish independence regarded as securing that independence, was surely,
they said, a form of words which the Sultan might accept. They did not
object to the changes made in the note as unreasonable in themselves--M.
Drouyn de Lhuys, indeed, thought they were decided improvements--but they
objected to them as unnecessary. The Four Powers would have assented to
the interpretation put upon the note by the Porte, and Lord Clarendon had
no doubt that Russia would have agreed with the Four Powers. But the Porte
seemed to desire war, and had certainly made peace more difficult by the
course it had pursued. In short, the friends of the Sultan were very angry
with him for exercising his undoubted right, and looking sharply after his
own independence. But if the Powers were angry, the Czar was enraged. He
was beside himself when he thought on the fact that the Porte had refused
what he had accepted. He would not at first discuss the modifications
themselves. He would not think about them. What he objected to was, "any
alteration--to the principle of alteration, to the fact of the Porte
having done that which, out of regard to the wishes of the Allied Powers,
his Imperial Majesty had refrained from doing." Count Nesselrode expressed
his master's views with such asperity as polite diplomatists permit
themselves to indulge in. If the Turks, he said, had had "the faintest
perception of their own interests, they ought to have clutched at the
note with both hands. That which the Emperor received without change or
hesitation in the course of twenty-four hours, should unquestionably have
been received by the Turks with the same expedition." The Emperor again
saw in this defeat the hand of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and felt sure
that the Turks had not been "made sufficiently sensible" of the dangers
they incurred. The Emperor would concede no more. "Concession had reached
its term." Further, a memorandum of Count Nesselrode's to his master was
allowed to find its way into a Prussian paper, from which it appeared that
the Czar placed an entirely different interpretation on the note to its
authors'.
Nothing shows more clearly how far, although still professing identical
views, the German Powers were separated from England and France, than the
fact that Count Buol and Baron Manteuffel, after they were aware of the
interpretation put on it by Russia, moved by the emphatic language of
Count Nesselrode, did once more urge the Porte to sign the original note,
and thus to sign away its independence. Far from being in real concert in
August, they were less in concert with the Western Powers in the middle of
September. The only Power which acted straight through with Britain was
France, and the only divergence of policy apparent was this--the French
Government did not seem to think the pace of the alliance fast enough, and
were constantly urging the transmission of orders to the admirals to enter
the Dardanelles. The plea was that the anchorage at Besika was unsafe.
But this was seen to be absurd, and twice Lord Clarendon resisted the
appeals sent by Louis Napoleon with the view of forcing the fleets upon
the Sultan, and depriving Lord Stratford de Redcliffe of any discretion
in the matter. This occurred during the negotiations on the new aspect
imparted to affairs by the Russian acceptance and the Turkish rejection
of the note. The German Powers, knowing what was the interpretation put
upon the note by Russia, persisted in pressing it upon the Sultan. The
Western Powers, always more respectful to Turkey, would not take part
in this move: indeed, they could not do so. Count Nesselrode's comments
on the modified note, showing that the Emperor of Russia did desire to
seek new rights and extended power in Turkey, had proved to Britain and
France that the apprehensions of the Porte, so far from being groundless,
were justified by the Russian construction. Instead of asking the
Porte, as they were disposed to do before they were in possession of the
Russian views, to reconsider its decision, they now asked the Emperor
to reconsider his. Austria, on the contrary, declared that if the Porte
again disregarded her counsels, she should consider her efforts to effect
a reconciliation at an end: further, that if Britain and France would
not support her in this step, there would be an end to the conference at
Vienna. In this opinion Britain and France agreed, and the conference at
Vienna came to an end accordingly. The German Powers went one way, the
Western Powers another; both professed to be hastening towards the same
goal, but the German Powers went astray, whereas the Western Powers kept
in the straight path. The secret of this was the personal ascendency which
the Czar exercised over the German Courts, and which diverted them from
their true course on the Eastern Question.
It may here be proper to describe in more detail the Vienna Note, on the
terms of which, and on its modification, and the circumstances attending
and following both, the preservation of peace depended. This note began by
setting forth the desire of the Sultan to re-establish friendly relations
between himself and the Czar; and then went on to state the terms of the
proposed compromise. A difference arose on the first practical clause. As
worded at Vienna, the note implied that immunities and privileges of the
Orthodox Church existed as something independent of the Sultan's will,
and declared that the Sultans had never refused to confirm them by solemn
acts. The Turks could not subscribe to this. It was not historically
true. It impeached the sovereign power of the Sultan. It implied that
the Czar was protector by right of the Greek Church. Accordingly, the
Porte, in modifying the note, took care to use words showing that these
immunities and privileges had been "granted spontaneously," and confirmed
spontaneously from time to time by the Sultans. This was the first
amendment. The second practical clause, the origin of which was referred
to the complaints of Prince Menschikoff, needed other corrections. The
Vienna Note made the Sultan say that he would remain faithful "to the
letter and spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative
to the protection of the Christian religion." Here was established an
active protectorate. Now the Treaty of Kainardji applied only to one
church in existence, and to one that was to be built, and gave Russia
no rights to protect the Christian religion. This clause in the note
would then have actually given an extension to that treaty. The Porte
demurred, and rightly, modifying the clause by undertaking to remain
faithful "to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by
that of Adrianople, relative to the protection by the Sublime Porte of the
Christian religion." No one who knows the meaning of words can fail to see
the practical distinction existing between the two forms of expression.
In the Vienna Note the Sultan was made to declare that he would cause the
Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to other Christian rites
by convention or special arrangement. The Porte substituted the words,
"granted or which might be granted to the other communities, Ottoman
subjects," for the last words of the note. This was also an important and
a needful change. Under various treaties Austria enjoyed large rights of
interference respecting the Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan. The
terms of the original note would have conferred similar rights on Russia.
"Such a concession," wrote Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the 20th of
August, "when practically claimed by Russia, would leave her nothing to
desire as to the means of exercising a powerful influence on all the
concerns of the Greek clergy, and interfering even on behalf of the Greek
laity, subjects of the Porte.... Confined to Austria, the privilege in
question may be exercised with little inconvenience to the Porte; but
in the hands of Russia, applicable to twelve millions of the Sultan's
tributary subjects, the same right becomes a natural object of suspicion
and well-founded apprehension." In fact the original Vienna Note was as
huge a diplomatic blunder as could possibly have been devised; Count
Nesselrode's comments confirmed the view taken of it by the astute Turks;
and combined with the temper displayed by Russia, convinced Britain and
France that they had been flagrantly in the wrong when they assented to
Count Buol's note and pressed its acceptance on the Porte.
There was, indeed, a peace party in the British Cabinet, prominent among
whom was Lord Aberdeen, who still urged that the discrepancies in the two
drafts were immaterial, and that the note in its original form might well
be pressed on the Porte. They were, however, overruled by the advocates of
a bolder policy, of whom Lord Palmerston was the most prominent, backed up
by Lord John Russell, who, dissatisfied with his subordinate position, was
in a discontented and captious frame of mind. In fact, the Cabinet became
disunited on more than one question. Lord John Russell was pledged to
introduce a Reform Bill, and Lord Palmerston, who disliked the re-opening
of the question particularly in a time of foreign complications, resigned.
He was induced to withdraw his resignation, but the breach thus made was
not easily healed.
[Illustration: OMAR PASHA.]
In the middle of September matters had come to a crisis. On the 22nd
news arrived at Paris, in the shape of a telegraphic despatch from M. de
la Cour, stating that the Porte was apprehensive of a "catastrophe," in
consequence of the excitement among the Turkish population. The lives and
properties of Europeans, and even the throne of the Sultan, were, in the
opinion of the Grand Vizier, in danger. M. de la Cour also reported that
he and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in order to afford protection to the
Europeans, had ordered up four steamers from Besika Bay. This was very
vague and indefinite news. It was alarming, because it was indefinite.
No account of the affair was sent by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and
the British Government, to whom the news was reported, were compelled
to rely upon the view of M. de la Cour. What should they do? The French
Government, always eager for a movement of the fleet, at once proposed
that in addition to the four steamers the whole of the united fleet
should be directed to proceed to Constantinople. Count Walewski was
instructed to request from Lord Clarendon an immediate decision, and was
further to state that the Emperor's Government regarded the advance of
the fleets as "indispensably necessary." The British Government agreed
"without hesitation" to a course which Lord Palmerston had been urging
for weeks, and orders went out at once from both capitals to Admiral
Dundas and Admiral Hamelin. This was undoubtedly a serious step, as by
the treaty of 1841 the Powers were prohibited from sending fleets within
the Bosphorus in time of peace. Had the Government waited for the usual
despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, they would have seen that the
danger reported by M. de la Cour disappeared very rapidly, and that Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe, in describing the circumstances, took a cooler
view of the dangers and did not even suggest the advance of the fleet. It
may be doubted whether the British Government did not act with as much
precipitation as M. de la Cour. For it cannot be denied that this fresh
move of the fleet--a move so decisive, so completely pledging the two
Powers to the defence of Turkey, and so irritating to Russia--lessened the
chances of peace, if any were remaining.
At this time there were two contemporaneous sets of incidents going on
which influenced largely the course of events. The scene of the one set
was Olmütz; that of the other, Constantinople. Throughout the summer the
Czar had not neglected to court the German Powers of all dimensions. At
some of the smaller Courts his influence was supreme. At the larger,
after the first shock occasioned by the discovery of Prince Menschikoff's
designs, he attempted to recover the ground lost, and did recover it in
a great degree. September afforded him an opportunity of exerting his
direct personal influence upon the Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia. The
Austrian Emperor, ambitious of military distinction, had assembled about
50,000 men in a camp at Olmütz, for purposes of field exercise on an
extensive scale. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia resolved
to be present on the occasion, not only to witness what they had seen
before--a fine military display--but to discuss the affairs of the East,
the Czar hoping to gain thereby. It was here that the Czar disclosed a new
plan of action. The Four Powers were to take upon themselves to transmit
to the Porte "a declaration founded upon assurances given by the Emperor
of Russia." Count Buol and Count Nesselrode drew up a draft of the note,
and sent it to the other Powers. This was a very notable document. The
Czar wished to make the Four Powers his sponsors at the Porte; and, in
fact, as Lord Cowley observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, convert the Four
Powers into the advocates of Russia. But it was open to more serious
objections. In the first place, its terms were ambiguous. In the second
place, its value, as far as it had any, was neutralised, if not quite
destroyed, by the famous interpretations placed by Count Nesselrode upon
the Vienna Note. The plan gave Russia the advantage of two documents,
contrary to each other, which she might use as she pleased. When the
project was submitted to the French Government the Emperor would not
decide what he would do. He thought it might be sent to the Porte; but he
could hardly recommend it, and he desired first to know the opinion of the
British Government. No one could be more careful than the Emperor Napoleon
not to commit himself to any course alone. The British Government decided
at once. They rejected the project, because in no circumstances would
they recommend the Porte to accept the Vienna Note; because it would be
useless, as the Turks would not accept it; because Count Nesselrode's
analysis of that note left no doubt that Russia intended through the note
to establish rights and influences she never before possessed in Turkey;
because "no settlement was possible by notes requiring explanations, and
accompanied by vague assurances." Thus this last Russian scheme fell
through, and Austria again, now siding with Russia, advised the Western
Powers to abandon Turkey. The fruit of the Czar's visit to the Emperor at
Olmütz was this further separation of Austria from the Western Powers.
For another incident had occurred during those momentous five days. It
was about the time when the conferences at Olmütz began, and when, at
the urgent request of the French Government, Britain agreed to issue
orders for the fleets to enter the Dardanelles--that is, about the 23rd
of September--that the Porte learnt the refusal of Russia to accept the
modifications of the Vienna Note. The Sultan could bear the suspense no
longer. Notwithstanding the advice of the envoys of the Four Powers, he
summoned his Grand Council to meet on the 25th and 26th and determine
the question of peace or war. Hearing this, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe
made a last effort to prevent war. He begged Reschid Pasha to prevail on
the Council, whatever might be its decision, to allow time for one more
appeal to the Four Powers, on the basis of their concurring in the Porte's
interpretation of the Note. It was in vain. The Porte saw no safety
but in war. The Council met. One hundred and seventy-two distinguished
Turks obeyed the summons of the Sultan, and unanimously agreed, on
their first meeting, that the Vienna Note could be by no means accepted
without modifications; and at their second, they adopted a report to the
Sultan, recommending that Omar Pasha should be directed to summon Prince
Gortschakoff to quit the Principalities within fifteen days from the
receipt of the summons, that a refusal should be regarded as a declaration
of war, and that thereupon war should be declared. Within three days the
Sultan assented to the report, and the necessary instruments for executing
the measures resolved on were prepared by the 4th of October. A form of
summons was forwarded the next day to Omar Pasha, a manifesto to the
Empire was issued, and a formal appeal for aid was sent to the Western
Powers. Thus the irrevocable step was taken, and war was certain.
There was scant time for further negotiations. Nevertheless, although
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe regarded the chance of averting war as
hopeless, so desirous was he of preserving peace that he proposed another
mode of extricating all parties from their difficulties. It embraced
the alternative of a new note or arbitration. But although looked upon
favourably in England, the Austrian Government would not take it into
consideration. As the Cabinets of London and Paris, said Count Buol, had
not thought proper to support the Austrian plan--that is, the Czar's
astute scheme--the Austrian Government could not support Lord Stratford
de Redcliffe's plan, especially at a moment when the Porte was declaring
war against Russia. There was, for the time, an apparent breakdown in the
whole diplomatic machinery; but nevertheless the British Cabinet still
persevered in the work of framing notes, and Austria and Prussia did not
fail to give advice which could not be accepted, while Russia and Turkey
prepared for war.
At this period the conduct of the Turks made a favourable impression
on Europe. The manifesto of the Sultan was sensible and temperate, and
still left open a door to negotiations. A spirit of self-devotion,
unaccompanied by fanatical demonstrations, showed itself among the highest
functionaries of the State. The Ulemas offered a large sum of money, and
the Sultan, with reluctance, gave consent to the raising of a loan. The
Egyptian Viceroy prepared to send ships and troops; the Grand Vizier and
the leading Ministers gave many horses for the service of the artillery;
men were forthcoming, and troops were constantly on the march for the
Danube and the Georgian frontier. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, taking a
comprehensive view of the merits of the quarrel, and of the interests at
stake, justified the Turks in having recourse to arms. "Having," he wrote
on the 28th of September, "witnessed the whole course of pretension and
intimidation to which the Sultan and his Ministers have been subjected,
and the conciliatory though firm consistency with which so many vexatious
proceedings have been met, I may be allowed, while lamenting the necessity
for war, to admire the gallant and orderly spirit which has prevailed,
with slight exceptions, in all the proceedings of this Government." On the
9th of October the summons of Omar Pasha reached Prince Gortschakoff at
Bucharest; and on the 10th he answered that he was not empowered to treat
of peace or war, or the evacuation of the Principalities. This reply the
Porte considered as constituting a state of war. The Anglo-French fleet
was in the Dardanelles, and the admirals had instructions to defend the
territory of the Sultan, but their power to operate in the Black Sea was
limited. The Western Powers were as yet committed only to a policy of
resisting any aggression of Russia. The German Powers declared themselves
neutral, and Austria, deeply interested in the issue, assumed for herself
the character of mediator.
The first anxiety of the British Cabinet when they learnt that the Sultan
had determined on war, was to prevent the outbreak of actual hostilities.
But this was no easy task, though the Russians professed moderation. On
the 14th of October, Count Nesselrode, in these words, described the then
position of his country:--"War," he said, "has been declared against us
by Turkey; we shall, in all probability, issue no counter-declaration,
nor shall we make any attack upon Turkey; we shall remain with folded
arms, only resolved to repel any assault made upon us, whether in the
Principalities or on our Asiatic frontier, which we have been reinforcing;
so we shall remain during the winter, ready to receive any peaceful
overtures which, during that time, may be made to us by Turkey: that is
our position." On no account would he take the first step. That, Turkey
must do. But if Austria thought she could induce the Turks to take it,
and the Maritime Powers to accept an Austrian proposition, Austria might
proceed. Acting on this suggestion, and finding the British Cabinet eager
to negotiate once more, Count Buol renewed the lapsed conference at
Vienna. But while these industrious diplomatists were engaged in their
work, and had even prepared bases of negotiation which were formally
embodied in a protocol, to which the Porte agreed, events had occurred,
followed by acts on the part of the Western Powers, which helped to
frustrate their benevolent designs, and put an end, for a time, to their
abounding use of the pen. The Turks had won victories; the Russians had
exacted vengeance; the Western Powers had determined to occupy the Black
Sea.
As soon as the fifteen days of grace accorded by the Porte to Prince
Gortschakoff had expired, and while Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was
urging the Sultan to defer hostilities, Omar Pasha began the war. Drawing
together large forces at points so widely separated as Widin and Turtukai,
a place between Rustchuk and Silistria, he resolved to pass the Danube
in two columns, with the apparent design of marching on Bucharest, where
Prince Gortschakoff had his headquarters. On the 28th of October the Turks
threw a large body of men over the Danube at Widin, and occupied Kalafat,
which they at once entrenched and armed with heavy guns. This secured
them a passage over the river on the flank of Prince Gortschakoff's line
of occupation, and it diverted attention for a moment from operations at
Turtukai. It was here that the Turks obtained their first success in the
campaign, and startled Europe and enraged the Czar by beating his troops
at Oltenitza. During eleven days Omar Pasha held his ground. Diplomacy
forbade him to advance, and perhaps it was as veil for him that it did.
Prince Gortschakoff came down with the largest force he could collect;
but he did not venture to make an attack on the strong Turkish lines.
Rain, however, descended, and the Danube, and the island, and low left
bank became flooded and unhealthy; and Omar Pasha, without being molested,
withdrew his guns and his troops to Turtukai. At the same time a small
force which had crossed from Silistria, repassed the river; but Omar
Pasha knew too well the value of his entrenched camp at Kalafat to give
up that also. On the contrary, he reinforced the garrison, and left that
thorn sticking in the side of the Czar. He also held several islands in
the Danube, and jealously watched the enemy from the Dobrudscha; but his
main army he put into winter quarters. Both sides were suffering from
the sickness incident to all campaigns, and more especially to winter
campaigns, and it is probable that at this time fully one-tenth of the
troops on each side were non-effective. Nevertheless, in January, Omar
Pasha won a further advantage at Zetati. The effect of the operations of
the Turks on the Czar was immediate. He ordered the troops of Osten-Sacken
and Lüders to march towards the Principalities; but their divisions did
not arrive until the end of December.
Nor was his activity confined to the valley of the Danube. He determined
to show his strength in the Black Sea. The Turks had been active on the
Armenian frontier, and had greatly harassed the Russian outposts, but
without obtaining any marked success. Schamyl was also spurred forward by
the calamities which had befallen his old foe; and hence it was resolved
to increase the army in the Caucasus and in the Transcaucasian countries
to 180,000 men. The Czar seems to have believed that the Turks were
reinforcing their posts on the shores of Anatolia, and sending arms and
ammunition to the Circassian tribes. This he resolved to prevent. He was
anxious, also, to strike some blow at sea which should hurt the Turks;
and thus in November the Sebastopol fleet went forth to scour the Euxine.
The Turks were indeed imprudently eager to employ their fleet. Before
the allied squadrons had entered the Bosphorus, the Turkish Ministers
ordered four line-of-battle ships and ten frigates to enter the Black Sea.
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe becoming aware of this, set about preventing
it, and he caused the Porte to be informed that until the enterprise was
abandoned he would not order up the remainder of the allied squadron. He
would not, he said, be drawn into the wake of the Porte; and he caused
Reschid Pasha to be told that, if he wanted the support of the Allies,
he must be content to respect their opinions. The Turkish Ministers
appeared to comply with his earnest request, but in reality they left a
light squadron between the Bosphorus and Trebizond, and hence it happened
that, while the allied fleets were in Beikos Bay, ready at any moment to
move into the Black Sea, the Russians were able to fall upon the Turks at
Sinope.
The Russian squadron went out from Sebastopol about the middle of
November, steering for the Asiatic coast, and so disposed as to intercept
any Turkish ship proceeding from Constantinople to Trebizond or Batoum.
On the 20th they captured a Turkish war steamer, and one or more Turkish
merchant ships. The news of these captures reached Sinope, where a Turkish
squadron lay, and its commander for a moment indulged in the notion
that he would go out and fight the Russians. Better counsels, however,
prevailed, and he remained in port. On the 23rd the enemy's fleet, seven
sail of the line and two steamers, hove in sight ten miles from Sinope;
and the next day part of this squadron looked in at the Turks, but did
not attack. From the manner of their proceeding, it might be judged that
the admiral doubted whether he should attack, and that before doing so
he obtained some order from Prince Menschikoff at Odessa. Such was the
case. The British Consul at Samsoun, and the Turkish admiral, sent off
news of the presence of the hostile squadron to Constantinople, but it
did not reach the Porte in time to prevent the calamity which followed.
On the 29th Nachimoff had received his orders, and had rallied the
whole of his squadron. On the 30th, while the Porte and the ambassadors
were consulting, Admiral Nachimoff sailed into the port of Sinope, and
signalled the Ottoman squadron to surrender. The superiority of the
Russian force would have justified compliance, but the Turks answered
the summons by opening fire. Thereupon the Russians ranged up, and
firing shot and shell, not only into the ships but into the town, soon
set both on fire. The seven poor Turkish frigates and three corvettes,
whose heaviest guns were only twenty-six pounders, were no match for the
line-of-battle ships which poured in broadside after broadside of heavy
shot and Paixhan shells. Nearly 4,000 men had perished! One steamer
alone escaped and fled to Constantinople. Having completed the task of
devastation, and repaired damages, the Russian fleet sailed back to
Sebastopol.
[Illustration: THE RUSSIAN ATTACK ON SINOPE. (_See p._ 28.)]
It would be difficult now to make the reader feel what the people of
Britain felt when, a fortnight after it occurred, they received the news
of this disaster. They asked for what purpose fleets had been sent to
Constantinople if not for the purpose of protecting the Turks. They asked
why Ministers continued, and had continued, to rely upon the equivocal
language of the Czar, and they met with derision the assurance of the
Government that, after the Ottoman squadron had been crushed by a force
of ten times its strength, the allied fleets had entered the Black Sea.
The fact is that the public, in its eagerness to punish Russia, saw more
clearly than the Ministers. The prevailing sentiments in London and in
the embassies at Constantinople were indignation at the bad faith and
violence of Russia, and an almost morbid longing to preserve the peace.
It was the latter sentiment which made Lord Stratford de Redcliffe slow
to send the fleets into the Black Sea. He and his Government were afraid
that some conflict would break the finely spun web of peace negotiations
which they thought promised so fairly, and which, if they failed, would at
least put the Czar utterly in the wrong. Then the French admiral raised
objections and expressed doubts whether his instructions warranted him in
running the risk of an encounter; and the British Ambassador would not
send British ships alone into the Euxine, fearing it might produce a bad
political effect. More than this, supposing the assurance of the Czar that
he would not attack applied to the sea as well as the land, the case did
not seem urgent; and above all there appears to have been a real ignorance
of the fact that there was an exposed Turkish squadron in the Euxine. And,
after all, the fleets would have been ordered out, had not Admiral Hamelin
declined to employ his ships on the weak plea that he could dispose of
fewer than Admiral Dundas. These considerations only palliate, but do not
excuse, the conduct of the Allies in refraining from taking at an earlier
period a decided course.
When the mischief was done they did not fail to adopt the most severe
measures. The French were the first to move. On the 15th of December M.
Drouyn de Lhuys wrote a despatch which reached Lord Clarendon the next
day. In this, after showing that Russia had given out that she would take
the offensive "in no quarter," and how her action had falsified that
assurance, he proposed that Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin should
declare to the Russian admirals, that every Russian ship met at sea by
the Allies should thenceforward be "invited" to return to Sebastopol,
and that every subsequent act of aggression should be repelled by force.
Lord Cowley was desired by the Emperor personally to urge this measure on
the Government, and convey to them a sense of his great disappointment
if the suggestion were not adopted. On the same day, and before he
received Lord Cowley's letter, Lord Clarendon wrote to Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe, informing him that the most effectual means should be taken
to guard against a disaster similar to that of Sinope. He had no doubt,
he said, that the combined fleets had entered the Black Sea. "Special
instructions," he wrote, "as to the manner in which they should act do not
appear to be necessary. We have undertaken to defend the territory of the
Sultan from aggression, and that engagement must be fulfilled." On the
24th of December Lord Clarendon informed Lord Cowley that her Majesty's
Government agreed to the French proposal. It was not until the 27th that
he sent the formal instructions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, directing
him to inform the Russian admiral of the determination arrived at by
France and Britain. It was not until the same day that Lord Clarendon
instructed Sir Hamilton Seymour to make known to Count Nesselrode the
nature of the orders sent to the East, orders issued with "no hostile
design against Russia," but rendered imperative by Russian acts. Russia
was not to mistake forbearance for indifference, nor calculate on any
want of firmness in the execution of a policy having for its object the
maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
Was it judicious at a moment when the last attempt to obtain peace by
negotiation was making progress, to send the fleet into the Black Sea,
and to send it with such orders? It may be said that this course was
injudicious. The Porte had agreed to terms of peace; the Conference
had signed these terms; they were sent by a special Minister to St.
Petersburg, and arrived on the very day on which the resolution of the
Western Powers was communicated to Count Nesselrode. How could the
Western Powers hope that these terms would be accepted at a time when
they had almost made war upon Russia? The demand for explanations was
made in London on the 23rd, and in Paris on the 24th of January, 1854.
Baron Brunnow placed in the hands of Lord Clarendon a despatch from
Count Nesselrode, in which the Chancellor vindicated the conduct of the
Russian fleet at Sinope, and declared that Russia could not look upon the
exclusion of her flag from the Black Sea in any other light than that of
a violence offered to her belligerent rights. He protested against the
notification, and refused to admit its legality. Baron Brunnow asked, in
writing, whether it was intended to establish a system of reciprocity
in the Black Sea--that is, whether Russian ships as well as Ottoman
ships were to be allowed to keep up communication with their respective
coasts? Lord Clarendon, in answer, while professing peaceful sentiments,
re-stated, in precise terms, the order given to clear the Black Sea of the
Russian flag. But while striving for peace, England would not shrink from
the duty imposed on her by Russia. In a letter written on the same day to
Sir Hamilton Seymour, Lord Clarendon branded the Czar as "the disturber
of the general peace," and traced to his unprovoked conduct all the
evil consequences that had already ensued. On the 4th of February Baron
Brunnow, firing a parting shot, announced his departure; and, on the 7th,
Sir Hamilton Seymour was directed to quit St. Petersburg. The same scenes
had been enacted in Paris. M. de Kisseleff departed, and M. de Castelbajac
was recalled. Whatever may have been the feelings of the French people,
the British nation openly expressed its joy that the season of suspense
was over.
At this time the Emperor of the French had taken a remarkable step on
his own account, and without consulting his allies. He wrote a letter
himself to the Emperor Nicholas, in the hope of averting the dangers
which menaced the peace of Europe. It was dated January 29th, five days
after M. de Kisseleff had demanded explanations, but before that envoy
had announced his determination to quit Paris. The Emperor Napoleon
began his letter, "Sire"--not "Sire, my brother," the usual form--for
Nicholas had never addressed him in the usual form. He ended it by styling
himself his Majesty's "good friend," and good friend was long a cant
name at St. Petersburg for the Emperor Napoleon. In this extraordinary
Imperial missive the French Emperor coolly recapitulated the history of
the Eastern Question, not from the beginning, but from the time of the
Menschikoff mission; and he told it in a manner showing, and intended to
show, that the Emperor Nicholas had by his acts caused the Maritime Powers
to adopt what Russia called a system of pressure; but what the Emperor
Napoleon said was a system "protecting, but passive." It was the Czar,
he said, who, by invading the Principalities, took the question out of
the domain of discussion into that of facts. Now, there must be a prompt
understanding or a decisive rupture. He offered the Czar peace or war. Let
him sign an armistice, and let all the belligerents' forces be withdrawn.
Then he politely told the Czar, in direct terms, that, as he desired, he
"should" send a plenipotentiary to negotiate with a plenipotentiary of the
Sultan, respecting a convention to be submitted to the Four Powers. The
letter drew from the Czar a haughty and brief reply.
The diplomatists still talked of peace, and gossipped over schemes of
accommodation; but the Governments of the West and North prepared for
inevitable war. The Western Powers entered upon an intimate alliance;
Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel Ardent were sent on a military mission to
Turkey, and in the middle of February it was notified to the Porte that
Britain and France would send a considerable force to Constantinople.
Greece, which showed a disposition, and more than a disposition, to take
sides actively with the Czar, was told, in so many words, to choose
between the goodwill of France and Britain, and the blockade of Athens.
Servia, where Russian agents invoked the spirit of disaffection, was
warned to be upon her good behaviour. Austria and Prussia were implored to
adopt a bolder policy, and unite with the Maritime Powers. From his vast
resources the French Emperor proceeded to select a choice army, taking by
preference the picked troops which had been seasoned in Algerian warfare;
and Britain, with smaller means, laid hands on whatever regiments were
nearest. The fleet was not forgotten, and seamen were rapidly raised to
man a squadron for service at the earliest moment in the Baltic. Britain,
in fact, grown rusty during a long peace, was ill-prepared for the work
she had undertaken. Neither her military nor her naval establishments
were up to the exigencies of war; while her administration was a painful
chaos of routine and contradiction. But her energy and goodwill were never
doubtful, and with a steadfast heart, but unready hand, she plunged into a
war with that Northern Empire which boasted of its destiny to control the
fortunes of the East of Europe by land and sea.
[Illustration: GATCHINA PALACE, ST. PETERSBURG.]
It was now the policy of Russia to watch the moves of the Western Powers.
She would not declare war, flattering herself she would thereby escape
the responsibility of that momentous decision. Accordingly she held her
peace. Before declaring war, the Western Powers had recourse to one more
step--a step which can be hardly termed peaceful, but one which placed
them in the right, and showed Russia in the wrong. They determined to
summon Russia to evacuate the Principalities within a given time, and they
spared no pains to induce Austria and Prussia to support the summons,
though, somewhat rashly, they did not await their reply. Eventually these
two Powers agreed to support the summons at St. Petersburg, but Prussia
expressly declined to undertake to enforce it if refused, and Austria,
after much shilly-shally, reserved her liberty of action. The summons
was entrusted to a special messenger, who was to pass through Vienna and
Berlin. This document declared, in effect, that unless Russia ordered
Prince Gortschakoff to retire from the Principalities at once, and to
complete the evacuation by the 30th of April, Britain and France would
consider her refusal equivalent to a declaration of war. The bearer was
told to wait at St. Petersburg six days for an answer, and no longer.
Captain Blackwood carried this stringent demand. He arrived at Vienna
just as fresh proposals for peace reached Count Buol from St. Petersburg,
the last effort to detach Austria. Captain Blackwood was detained a few
hours while the Conference at Vienna examined these proposals, and while
the ambassadors informed their Governments, by telegraph, of this new
incident, and requested instructions. These Russian proposals were found
to be as objectionable as ever. Except that Russia ceased to require
that a Turkish Minister should be sent to St. Petersburg, "it was that
same old story," of which even diplomatists had become thoroughly weary.
So the Conference, having duly examined the document, and having found
it utterly inadmissible, recorded the fact after the solemn fashions of
diplomacy; and messenger Blackwood, with his summons and its supporting
despatches, jumped into the train and started for the North. He arrived at
St. Petersburg on the morning of the 13th of March, and Consul Michele,
in charge of British interests, at once sent to the French consul and the
Austrian legate the packets brought for them. On the 14th Mr. Michele and
M. de Castillon waited on Count Nesselrode, who, however, declined to see
them together, and called for the British consul. The interview was short.
The summons was duly delivered, and the positive instructions to the
messenger to return in six days were made known. The Emperor was then in
Finland, whence he did not arrive until the 17th; and it was not until the
19th, the last day of grace, that Count Nesselrode requested Mr. Michele
to wait on him for an answer. "On entering the room," writes the consul,
"his Excellency's greeting was of the most friendly description. He said,
'I have taken his Majesty's commands with reference to Lord Clarendon's
note, and the Emperor does not think it becoming to make any reply to it.'"
[Illustration: PEERS AND COMMONERS PRESENTING THE PATRIOTIC ADDRESS TO THE
QUEEN ON THE EVE OF THE CRIMEAN WAR. (_See p._ 34.)]
The Western Powers having had no misgivings respecting the nature of the
reply their summons would receive, had accelerated their preparations for
war. Before the summons was in the hands of Count Nesselrode, the British
fleet intended for the Baltic had steamed out from Portsmouth, in the
presence of Queen Victoria. This took place on the 11th of March, when
her Majesty witnessed the departure of sixteen steamers, subsequently
augmented to forty-four ships, of which only six were sailers. The whole,
under the command of Sir Charles Napier, mounted 2,200 guns, and were
manned by 22,000 men. Three battalions of the Guards and several regiments
of the line had already embarked for Malta, and cavalry and infantry were
in course of rapid preparation. At the same time the French Government
began to collect troops at Toulon and Marseilles, and in Algeria. The
Commanders-in-Chief of both armies were appointed--Lord Raglan for
Britain, and Marshal St. Arnaud for France. The first had been the comrade
and friend of Lord Wellington, the second was a soldier of Algerian
growth, and Minister of War on the 2nd of December, 1851.
While the British courier was on his way from St. Petersburg with the
contemptuous message of Nicholas to the British Government, an incident
occurred, both of which helped to stimulate the indignation of England.
The _Journal of St. Petersburg_ thought fit to reply to some sharp
language about disturbers of the peace, used by Lord John Russell in
the House of Commons, by charging the British Government with having
stated what was not true when they said Russia had deceived Europe,
and, with incredible audacity, referring, for proof of its statement,
to the secret communications which took place between the Czar and the
Queen's Government in 1853. Lord Derby at once seized the occasion to
assail the Government and demand the production of the correspondence;
and Lord Aberdeen remarked that since Russia had shown no reluctance to
disclose its character, her Majesty's Government had none, and the whole
should come out. And come out accordingly it did, producing effects quite
different from those expected by Russia. Instead of blowing the Ministers
out of their offices and branding them with discredit, the mine, sprung
by the Czar himself, spent its force upon him, and the very means he took
to support the British peace party not only recruited the war party, but
filled all men with a righteous anger.
Thus the flames kindled by the pride of the Czar and the ambition of his
Western rival, grew fiercer, and began to burn with astonishing power and
intensity. Nothing was wanting to war but the formal declaration; and
this was not wanting long. Captain Blackwood had landed with the Czar's
negative defiance. On the 27th of March the Queen sent down a royal
message to Parliament, stating that all the endeavours of her Government
to preserve the peace had failed, and that she relied on the zeal of her
Parliament to support her in protecting the dominions of the Sultan from
Russian encroachments. On the 28th war was declared, and on the 31st
both Houses agreed to an Address, recording the aggressions of Russia,
and expressing a firm determination to resist them. On the 3rd of April
a very large body of peers of all parties, and three hundred members of
the House of Commons, headed by the Speaker, presented the Addresses in
answer to the royal message, to her Majesty at Buckingham Palace, who,
seated on her throne, with Prince Albert on the one hand, and the Prince
of Wales on the other, received these genuine representatives of the
spirit and determination of her whole people. On the day that war was
declared the British fleet anchored in the bay of Kiel. On the 11th of
April the Czar published his declaration of war, in which he again, in a
strain of religious exaltation, declared that Russia took up arms for no
worldly interests, but for "the Christian faith, for the defence of her
co-religionists oppressed by implacable enemies." "It is for the Faith and
for Christendom that we combat! God with us--who against us?"