It is hard to distinguish with the last degree of accuracy what laws are

fundamental, and what not. However, there is a distinction between them,

authorized by the writers on jurisprudence, and recognized in some of

our statutes. I admit the acts of King William and Queen Anne to be

fundamental, but they are not the only fundamental laws. The law called

_Magna Charta_, by which it is provided that "no man shall be disseised

of his liberties and free customs but by the judgment of his peers or

the laws of the land," (meaning clearly, for some proved crime tried and

adjudged,) I take to be _a fundamental law._ Now, although this Magna

Charta, or some of the statutes establishing it, provide that that law

shall be perpetual, and all statutes contrary to it shall be void, yet I

cannot go so far as to deny the authority of statutes made in defiance

of Magna Charta and all its principles. This, however, I will say,--that

it is a very venerable law, made by very wise and learned men, and that

the legislature, in their attempt to perpetuate it, even against the

authority of future Parliaments, have shown their judgment that it is

_fundamental_, on the same grounds and in the same manner that the act

of the fifth of Anne has considered and declared the establishment of

the Church of England to be fundamental. Magna Charta, which secured

these franchises to the subjects, regarded the rights of freeholders in

counties to be as much a fundamental part of the Constitution as the

establishment of the Church of England was thought either at that time,

or in the act of King William, or in the act of Queen Anne.

The churchmen who led in that transaction certainly took care of the

material interest of which they were the natural guardians. It is the

first article of Magna Charta, "that the Church of England shall be

free," &c, &c. But at that period, churchmen and barons and knights took

care of the franchises and free customs of the people, too. Those

franchises are part of the Constitution itself, and inseparable from it.

It would be a very strange thing, if there should not only exist

anomalies in our laws, a thing not easy to prevent, but that the

fundamental parts of the Constitution should be perpetually and

irreconcilably at variance with each other. I cannot persuade myself

that the lovers of our church are not as able to find effectual ways of

reconciling its safety with the franchises of the people as the

ecclesiastics of the thirteenth century were able to do; I cannot

conceive how anything worse can be said of the Protestant religion of

the Church of England than this,--that, wherever it is judged proper to

give it a legal establishment, it becomes necessary to deprive the body

of the people, if they adhere to their old opinions, of "their liberties

and of all their free customs," and to reduce them to a state of _civil_

servitude.

There is no man on earth, I believe, more willing than I am to lay it

down as a fundamental of the Constitution, that the Church of England

should be united and even identified with it; but, allowing this, I

cannot allow that all _laws of regulation_, made from time to time, in

support of that fundamental law, are of course equally fundamental and

equally unchangeable. This would be to confound all the branches of

legislation and of jurisprudence. The _crown_ and the personal safety of

the monarch are _fundamentals_ in our Constitution: yet I hope that no

man regrets that the rabble of statutes got together during the reign of

Henry the Eighth, by which treasons are multiplied with so prolific an

energy, have been all repealed in a body; although they were all, or

most of them, made in support of things truly fundamental in our

Constitution. So were several of the acts by which the crown exercised

its supremacy: such as the act of Elizabeth for making the _high

commission courts_, and the like; as well as things made treason in the

time of Charles the Second. None of this species of _secondary and

subsidiary laws_ have been held fundamental. They have yielded to

circumstances; particularly where they were thought, even in their

consequences, or obliquely, to affect other fundamentals. How much more,

certainly, ought they to give way, when, as in our case, they affect,

not here and there, in some particular point, or in their consequence,

but universally, collectively, and directly, the fundamental franchises

of a people equal to the whole inhabitants of several respectable

kingdoms and states: equal to the subjects of the kings of Sardinia or

of Denmark; equal to those of the United Netherlands; and more than are

to be found in all the states of Switzerland. This way of proscribing

men by whole nations, as it were, from all the benefits of the

Constitution to which they were born, I never can believe to be politic

or expedient, much less necessary for the existence of any state or

church in the world. Whenever I shall be convinced, which will be late

and reluctantly, that the safety of the Church is utterly inconsistent

with all the civil rights whatsoever of the far larger part of the

inhabitants of our country, I shall be extremely sorry for it; because I

shall think the Church to be truly in danger. It is putting things into

the position of an ugly alternative, into which I hope in God they never

will be put.

I have said most of what occurs to me on the topics you touch upon,

relative to the religion of the king, and his coronation oath. I shall

conclude the observations which I wished to submit to you on this point

by assuring you that I think you the most remote that can be conceived

from the metaphysicians of our times, who are the most foolish of men,

and who, dealing in universals and essences, see no difference between

more and less,--and who of course would think that the reason of the law

which obliged the king to be a communicant of the Church of England

would be as valid to exclude a Catholic from being an exciseman, or to

deprive a man who has five hundred a year, under that description, from

voting on a par with a factitious Protestant Dissenting freeholder of

forty shillings.

Recollect, my dear friend, that it was a fundamental principle in the

French monarchy, whilst it stood, that the state should be Catholic; yet

the Edict of Nantes gave, not a full ecclesiastical, but a complete

civil _establishment_, with places of which only they were capable, to

the Calvinists of France,--and there were very few employments, indeed,

of which they were not capable. The world praised the Cardinal de

Richelieu, who took the first opportunity to strip them of their

fortified places and cautionary towns. The same world held and does hold

in execration (so far as that business is concerned) the memory of Louis

the Fourteenth, for the total repeal of that favorable edict; though the

talk of "fundamental laws, established religion, religion of the prince,

safety to the state," &c., &c., was then as largely held, and with as

bitter a revival of the animosities of the civil confusions during the

struggles between the parties, as now they can be in Ireland.

Perhaps there are persons who think that the same reason does not hold,

when the religious relation of the sovereign and subject is changed; but

they who have their shop full of false weights and measures, and who

imagine that the adding or taking away the name of Protestant or

Papist, Guelph or Ghibelline, alters all the principles of equity,

policy, and prudence, leave us no common data upon which we can reason.

I therefore pass by all this, which on you will make no impression, to

come to what seems to be a serious consideration in your mind: I mean

the dread you express of "reviewing, for the purpose of altering, the

_principles of the Revolution_." This is an interesting topic, on which

I will, as fully as your leisure and mine permits, lay before you the

ideas I have formed.

First, I cannot possibly confound in my mind all the things which were

done at the Revolution with the _principles_ of the Revolution. As in

most great changes, many things were done from the necessities of the

time, well or ill understood, from passion or from vengeance, which were

not only not perfectly agreeable to its principles, but in the most

direct contradiction to them. I shall not think that the _deprivation of

some millions of people of all the rights of citizens, and all interest

in the Constitution, in and to which they were born_, was a thing

conformable to the _declared principles_ of the Revolution. This I am

sure is true relatively to England (where the operation of these

_anti-principles_ comparatively were of little extent); and some of our

late laws, in repealing acts made immediately after the Revolution,

admit that some things then done were not done in the true spirit of the

Revolution. But the Revolution operated differently in England and

Ireland, in many, and these essential particulars. Supposing the

principles to have been altogether the same in both kingdoms, by the

application of those principles to very different objects the whole

spirit of the system was changed, not to say reversed. In England it

was the struggle of the _great body_ of the people for the establishment

of their liberties, against the efforts of a very _small faction_, who

would have oppressed them. In Ireland it was the establishment of the

power of the smaller number, at the expense of the civil liberties and

properties of the far greater part, and at the expense of the political

liberties of the whole. It was, to say the truth, not a revolution, but

a conquest: which is not to say a great deal in its favor. To insist on

everything done in Ireland at the Revolution would be to insist on the

severe and jealous policy of a conqueror, in the crude settlement of his

new acquisition, as _a permanent_ rule for its future government. This

no power, in no country that ever I heard of, has done or professed to

do,--except in Ireland; where it is done, and possibly by some people

will be professed. Time has, by degrees, in all other places and

periods, blended and coalited the conquered with the conquerors. So,

after some time, and after one of the most rigid conquests that we read

of in history, the Normans softened into the English. I wish you to turn

your recollection to the fine speech of Cerealis to the Gauls, made to

dissuade them from revolt. Speaking of the Romans,--"_Nos_ quamvis

toties lacessiti, jure victoriæ id solum vobis addidimus, quo pacem

tueremur: nam neque quies gentium sine armis, neque arma sine

stipendiis, neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queant. _Caetera in

communi sita sunt_: ipsi plerumque nostris exercitibus _praesidetis_:

ipsi has aliasque provincias _regitis: nil separatum clausumve_. Proinde

pacem et urbem, quam _victores victique eodem jure obtinemus_, amate,

colite." You will consider whether the arguments used by that Roman to

these Gauls would apply to the case in Ireland,--and whether you could

use so plausible a preamble to any severe warning you might think it

proper to hold out to those who should resort to sedition, instead of

supplication, to obtain any object that they may pursue with the

governing power.

For a much longer period than that which had sufficed to blend the

Romans with the nation to which of all others they were the most

adverse, the Protestants settled in Ireland considered themselves in no

other light than that of a sort of a colonial garrison, to keep the

natives in subjection to the other state of Great Britain. The whole

spirit of the Revolution in Ireland was that of not the mildest

conqueror. In truth, the spirit of those proceedings did not commence at

that era, nor was religion of any kind their primary object. What was

done was not in the spirit of a contest between two religious factions,

but between two adverse nations. The statutes of Kilkenny show that the

spirit of the Popery laws, and some even of their actual provisions, as

applied between Englishry and Irishry, had existed in that harassed

country before the words _Protestant_ and _Papist_ were heard of in the

world. If we read Baron Finglas, Spenser, and Sir John Davies, we cannot

miss the true genius and policy of the English government there before

the Revolution, as well as during the whole reign of Queen Elizabeth.

Sir John Davies boasts of the benefits received by the natives, by

extending to them the English law, and turning the whole kingdom into

shire ground. But the appearance of things alone was changed. The

original scheme was never deviated from for a single hour. Unheard-of

confiscations were made in the northern parts, upon grounds of plots and

conspiracies, never proved upon their supposed authors. The war of

chicane succeeded to the war of arms and of hostile statutes; and a

regular series of operations was carried on, particularly from

Chichester's time, in the ordinary courts of justice, and by special

commissions and inquisitions,--first under pretence of tenures, and then

of titles in the crown, for the purpose of the total extirpation of the

interest of the natives in their own soil,--until this species of subtle

ravage, being carried to the last excess of oppression and insolence

under Lord Strafford, it kindled the flames of that rebellion which

broke out in 1641. By the issue of that war, by the turn which the Earl

of Clarendon gave to things at the Restoration, and by the total

reduction of the kingdom of Ireland in 1691, the ruin of the native

Irish, and, in a great measure, too, of the first races of the English,

was completely accomplished. The new English interest was settled with

as solid a stability as anything in human affairs can look for. All the

penal laws of that unparalleled code of oppression, which were made

after the last event, were manifestly the effects of national hatred and

scorn towards a conquered people, whom the victors delighted to trample

upon and were not at all afraid to provoke. They were not the effect of

their fears, but of their security. They who carried on this system

looked to the irresistible force of Great Britain for their support in

their acts of power. They were quite certain that no complaints of the

natives would be heard on this side of the water with any other

sentiments than those of contempt and indignation. Their cries served

only to augment their torture. Machines which could answer their

purposes so well must be of an excellent contrivance. Indeed, in

England, the double name of the complainants, Irish and Papists, (it

would be hard to say which singly was the most odious,) shut up the

hearts of every one against them. Whilst that temper prevailed, (and it

prevailed in all its force to a time within our memory,) every measure

was pleasing and popular just in proportion as it tended to harass and

ruin a set of people who were looked upon as enemies to God and man,

and, indeed, as a race of bigoted savages who were a disgrace to human

nature itself.

However, as the English in Ireland began to be domiciliated, they began

also to recollect that they had a country. The _English interest_, at

first by faint and almost insensible degrees, but at length openly and

avowedly, became an _independent Irish interest_,--full as independent

as it could ever have been if it had continued in the persons of the

native Irish; and it was maintained with more skill and more consistency

than probably it would have been in theirs. With their views, the

_Anglo-Irish_ changed their maxims: it was necessary to demonstrate to

the whole people that there was something, at least, of a common

interest, combined with the independency, which was to become the object

of common exertions. The mildness of government produced the first

relaxation towards the Irish; the necessities, and, in part, too, the

temper that predominated at this great change, produced the second and

the most important of these relaxations. English government and Irish

legislature felt jointly the propriety of this measure. The Irish

Parliament and nation became independent.

The true revolution to you, that which most intrinsically and

substantially resembled the English Revolution of 1688, was the Irish

Revolution of 1782. The Irish Parliament of 1782 bore little resemblance

to that which sat in that kingdom after the period of the first of these

revolutions. It bore a much nearer resemblance to that which sat under

King James. The change of the Parliament in 1782 from the character of

the Parliament which, as a token of its indignation, had burned all the

journals indiscriminately of the former Parliament in the

Council-Chamber, was very visible. The address of King William's

Parliament, the Parliament which assembled after the Revolution, amongst

other causes of complaint (many of them sufficiently just) complains of

the repeal by their predecessors of Poynings's law,--no absolute idol

with the Parliament of 1782.

Great Britain, finding the Anglo-Irish highly animated with a spirit

which had indeed shown itself before, though with little energy and many

interruptions, and therefore suffered a multitude of uniform precedents

to be established against it, acted, in my opinion, with the greatest

temperance and wisdom. She saw that the disposition of the _leading

part_ of the nation would not permit them to act any longer the part of

a _garrison_. She saw that true policy did not require that they ever

should have appeared in that character; or if it had done so formerly,

the reasons had now ceased to operate. She saw that the Irish of her

race were resolved to build their Constitution and their politics upon

another bottom. With those things under her view, she instantly complied

with the whole of your demands, without any reservation whatsoever. She

surrendered that boundless superiority, for the preservation of which,

and the acquisition, she had supported the English colonies in Ireland

for so long a time, and at so vast an expense (according to the standard

of those ages) of her blood and treasure.

When we bring before us the matter which history affords for our

selection, it is not improper to examine the spirit of the several

precedents which are candidates for our choice. Might it not be as well

for your statesmen, on the other side of the water, to take an example

from this latter and surely more conciliatory revolution, as a pattern

for your conduct towards your own fellow-citizens, than from that of

1688, when a paramount sovereignty over both you and them was more

loftily claimed and more sternly exerted than at any former or at any

subsequent period? Great Britain in 1782 rose above the vulgar ideas of

policy, the ordinary jealousies of state, and all the sentiments of

national pride and national ambition. If she had been more disposed

(than, I thank God for it, she was) to listen to the suggestions of

passion than to the dictates of prudence, she might have urged the

principles, the maxims, the policy, the practice of the Revolution,

against the demands of the leading description in Ireland, with full as

much plausibility and full as good a grace as any amongst them can

possibly do against the supplications of so vast and extensive a

description of their own people.

A good deal, too, if the spirit of domination and exclusion had

prevailed in England, might have been excepted against some of the means

then employed in Ireland, whilst her claims were in agitation. They

were at least as much out of ordinary course as those which are now

objected against admitting your people to any of the benefits of an

English Constitution. Most certainly, neither with you nor here was any

one ignorant of what was at that time said, written, and done. But on

all sides we separated the means from the end: and we separated the

cause of the moderate and rational from the ill-intentioned and

seditious, which on such occasions are so frequently apt to march

together. At that time, on your part, you were not afraid to review what

was done at the Revolution of 1688, and what had been continued during

the subsequent flourishing period of the British empire. The change then

made was a great and fundamental alteration. In the execution, it was an

operose business on both sides of the water. It required the repeal of

several laws, the modification of many, and a new course to be given to

an infinite number of legislative, judicial, and official practices and

usages in both kingdoms. This did not frighten any of us. You are now

asked to give, in some moderate measure, to your fellow-citizens, what

Great Britain gave to you without any measure at all. Yet,

notwithstanding all the difficulties at the time, and the apprehensions

which some very well-meaning people entertained, through the admirable

temper in which this revolution (or restoration in the nature of a

revolution) was conducted in both kingdoms, it has hitherto produced no

inconvenience to either; and I trust, with the continuance of the same

temper, that it never will. I think that this small, inconsiderable

change, (relative to an exclusive statute not made at the Revolution,)

for restoring the people to the benefits from which the green soreness

of a civil war had not excluded them, will be productive of no sort of

mischief whatsoever. Compare what was done in 1782 with what is wished

in 1792; consider the spirit of what has been done at the several

periods of reformation; and weigh maturely whether it be exactly true

that conciliatory concessions are of good policy only in discussions

between nations, but that among descriptions in the same nation they

must always be irrational and dangerous. What have you suffered in your

peace, your prosperity, or, in what ought ever to be dear to a nation,

your glory, by the last act by which you took the property of that

people under the protection of the _laws_? What reasons have you to

dread the consequences of admitting the people possessing that property

to some share in the protection of the _Constitution_?

I do not mean to trouble you with anything to remove the objections, I

will not call them arguments, against this measure, taken from a

ferocious hatred to all that numerous description of Christians. It

would be to pay a poor compliment to your understanding or your heart.

Neither _your_ religion nor _your_ politics consist "in odd, perverse

antipathies." You are not resolved to persevere in proscribing from the

Constitution so many millions of your countrymen, because, in

contradiction to experience and to common sense, you think proper to

imagine that their principles are subversive of common human society. To

that I shall only say, that whoever has a temper which can be gratified

by indulging himself in these good-natured fancies ought to do a great

deal more. For an exclusion from the privileges of British subjects is

not a cure for so terrible a distemper of the human mind as they are

pleased to suppose in their countrymen. I rather conceive a

participation in those privileges to be itself a remedy for some mental

disorders.

As little shall I detain you with matters that can as little obtain

admission into a mind like yours: such as the fear, or pretence of fear,

that, in spite of your own power and the trifling power of Great

Britain, you may be conquered by the Pope; or that this commodious

bugbear (who is of infinitely more use to those who pretend to fear than

to those who love him) will absolve his Majesty's subjects from their

allegiance, and send over the Cardinal of York to rule you as his

viceroy; or that, by the plenitude of his power, he will take that

fierce tyrant, the king of the French, out of his jail, and arm that

nation (which on all occasions treats his Holiness so very politely)

with his bulls and pardons, to invade poor old Ireland, to reduce you to

Popery and slavery, and to force the free-born, naked feet of your

people into the wooden shoes of that arbitrary monarch. I do not believe

that discourses of this kind are held, or that anything like them will

be held, by any who walk about without a keeper. Yet I confess, that, on

occasions of this nature, I am the most afraid of the weakest

reasonings, because they discover the strongest passions. These things

will never be brought out in definite propositions. They would not

prevent pity towards any persons; they would only cause it for those who

were capable of talking in such a strain. But I know, and am sure, that

such ideas as no man will distinctly produce to another, or hardly

venture to bring in any plain shape to his own mind, he will utter in

obscure, ill-explained doubts, jealousies, surmises, fears, and

apprehensions, and that in such a fog they will appear to have a good

deal of size, and will make an impression, when, if they were clearly

brought forth and defined, they would meet with nothing but scorn and

derision.

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