Passy, July 10th, 1780.
Sir,
I received the letter your Excellency did me the honor of writing to
me, dated June 30th, together with the papers accompanying it,
containing the correspondence of Mr Adams.[6] I have taken some pains
to understand the subject, and obtain information of facts from
persons recently arrived, having received no letters myself that
explain it. I cannot say, that I yet perfectly understand it, but in
this I am clear, that if the operation directed by Congress in their
resolution of March the 18th occasions, from the necessity of the
case, some inequality of justice, that inconvenience ought to fall
wholly on the inhabitants of the States, who reap with it the
advantages obtained by the measure; and that the greatest care should
be taken that foreign merchants, particularly the French, who are our
creditors, do not suffer by it. This I am so confident the Congress
will do, that I do not think any representations of mine necessary to
persuade them to it.
I shall not fail, however, to lay the whole before them; and I beg
that the King may be assured that their sentiments, and those of the
Americans in general, with regard to the alliance, as far as I have
been able to learn them, not only from private letters but from
authentic public facts, differ widely from those that seem to be
expressed by Mr Adams in his letter to your Excellency, and are filled
with the strongest impressions of the friendship of France, of the
generous manner in which his Majesty was pleased to enter into an
equal treaty with us, and of the great obligations our country is
under for the important aids he has since afforded us.
I have the honor to be, &c.
B. FRANKLIN.
[6] This letter is printed in Franklin's Correspondence. Vol. III. p.
152.
* * * * *
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Paris, July 13th, 1780.
Sir,
By the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, his Majesty
and the United States agreed, in case of war, to join their councils
and efforts against the enterprises of the common enemy; to make it a
common cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices,
their councils, and their forces, according to the exigencies of
conjunctures; and each of the contracting parties, in the manner it
may judge most proper, is to make all the efforts in its power against
the common enemy.
I have cited these clauses from the treaty, not as foundations of any
demand that I have to make, because they are neither proper to support
any demand, nor have I authority to make any if they were, but as an
apology for the liberty I take of requesting your Excellency's
attention to a few observations upon the present conjuncture of
affairs.
It is certain, from the best intelligence from London, as well as from
the debates in Parliament, on the several motions which have been made
for a pacification, that the British Ministry are inflexibly
determined to pursue the war another campaign in America, to send more
troops and ships there, if they possibly can obtain them, and to put
to the hazard not only the national credit, but their maritime power,
and even their political existence, rather than give up their designs
of domination over America; and indeed this is not at all to be
wondered at, that the Ministers and the nation, who have so far lost
their justice, their humanity, and policy, as to deliberately form and
pursue the plan of changing the foundations of the laws and
governments of thirteen Colonies, and reducing them to slavery, and
who have pursued this object with such sanguinary fury for so many
years, should persist so as to bury themselves in the ruins of their
empire, rather than to fail of their purpose, when it is plain they
consider, and that not without reason, the same ruin in the
independence of America, and her connexion with France.
The conduct of Count de Guichen, on the 17th of April, and the 15th
and 19th of May, in the West Indies, does great honor to the national
bravery, as well as to their science in naval tactics, and shows that
there is no cause to fear that the enemy will obtain any advantage
there. Yet nothing has yet been done on either side that seems
decisive.
The advantages, which Spain has gained in West Florida, and
particularly of late at Mobile, and the probability that she will
succeed in gaining both the Floridas, show that the English are on the
losing hand in that quarter; but it is not the loss of both the
Floridas, nor of all the West India Islands, in my opinion, that will
induce them to make peace, and acknowledge the independence of America
in alliance with France. They will see every possession they have
beyond the island lopped off, one after another, before they will do
this.
I pretend not to know, to what part of America M. de Ternay and M. de
Rochambeau are destined, but to whatever part it is, whether Canada,
Nova Scotia, New York, Carolina, or Georgia, I have no hopes of
anything decisive from their operations, although they should be
instructed to co-operate with General Washington. If they should be
destined against Canada or Nova Scotia, they may succeed; but this
success will not be decisive. If they are intended against New York,
I have no hopes of their success. The naval force is not sufficient to
command the seas. Admiral Graves, added to the ships before at New
York, will be superior; and I shall venture to give my opinion, that
without a superiority of naval force, clear and indisputable, New York
will never be taken. It is so situated, so fortified, it is garrisoned
with troops so accustomed to war, and so embittered and inflamed by
cruel passions, carefully nursed up in their breasts by their King and
their Generals, and it is universally regarded by them a port of such
essential importance, that I confess I should despair of success
against it, with an army twice as numerous as that of the Generals
Washington and Rochambeau united, while the English are masters of the
seas, or even while they have there an equality of naval power.
Most people in Europe have wondered at the inactivity of the American
army, for these two years past; but it is merely from want of
knowledge and attention. The true cause of it is, the English have
confined themselves to their strong holds in seaport towns, and have
been sheltered from all attacks and insults by the guns of their
men-of-war, and forever will be so, while they have the superiority at
sea. If our army had been three times as numerous as it was, it must
have remained inactive, without a fleet to co-operate with it; for an
attack upon New York without a fleet, would have been only sacrificing
the lives of thousands of brave men, without a possibility of
succeeding.
Had the English two years ago marched into the country from
Philadelphia, instead of retreating back with precipitation to New
York, Europe would have heard more of the exertions of the American
army, so much more, that in my serious opinion, you would have heard
of their total destruction. As it was, they were closely pursued,
attacked, and if not beaten, they had much the worst of the action,
for besides their loss in killed and wounded, and in those who
perished under the fatigue and heat of the day, not less than five
hundred deserted from them, and their desertions would have been
multiplied in every unsuccessful engagement within the country.
If in the last year the British army had marched out into the country,
instead of remaining under cover of their men-of-war, I am equally
clear, that they would have been ruined. The English, ever since the
alliance, have been fearfully apprehensive of an attack upon their
strong holds upon the coast by the French. This it was that induced
them to retreat from Philadelphia to New York, and this has kept them
almost wholly confined to that garrison the last year. I mention this,
merely to wipe off the imputations said to result from the inactivity
of our army, since the alliance, by showing the true cause of it, that
it proceeds not from any change of sentiments in the Americans, but
from the change of the mode of prosecuting the war on the part of our
enemies.
I am, however, clearly of opinion, and I know it to be the general
sense of America, that the English, both in North America and in the
West India Islands, have been for these two years past absolutely in
the power of their enemies; and that they are so now, and will
continue to be so, in such a degree, that nothing will be wanting but
attention to their situation, and a judicious application of the
forces of the allies to accomplish the entire reduction of their power
in America. In order to show this, let me beg your Excellency's
attention to a few remarks upon the situation of the English, and
upon the method of applying the force of the allies so as to reduce
them.
The English are in possession of Canada, a province vastly extensive,
and in which there is a great number of ports, at a great distance
from each other, necessary to be maintained among a people too, who
are by no means attached to them, but who would readily afford all the
assistance in their power to the united forces of France and the
United States, and who would join them in considerable numbers. In
this whole province, the English have not, comprehending the garrisons
of all their ports, more than four thousand men.
The English are in possession of Nova Scotia; they have in Halifax and
the other parts of the province, and at Penobscot, about three
thousand men. But the people of this province being descendants and
emigrants from New England, chiefly, are discontented with the British
government, and desirous of joining the United States. They are in
possession of New York Island, Staten Island, and Long Island, where
they have in all of regular British troops, ---- thousand men. The
militia, volunteers, &c. of whom they make such an ostentatious
display in the despatches of their Generals, and in the gazette of St
James, are of very little consideration; their numbers are much
exaggerated; it is force, fear, and policy, that enrol the greater
part of them; there are perhaps fifteen thousand inhabitants of the
city. These, together with the army and navy, are fed and supplied
with provisions, and stores, and fuel, and their cattle and horses
with forage, brought by sea from Quebec, Halifax, Ireland, and the
West Indies, except the small quantity, which they draw from Long
Island and Staten Island.
They are now in possession of Charleston, in South Carolina, and
Savannah, in Georgia. Their armies and navies in these places, as well
as the inhabitants, must be chiefly supplied by sea in the same
manner. They are still perhaps in possession of St Augustine, in East
Florida, and Pensacola, in the west. From these places, they have
drawn of late years great supplies of lumber and provisions for their
West India Islands. The number of troops in Georgia and Carolina may
amount to ---- thousands. They are in possession of Jamaica,
Barbadoes, Antigua, St Christophers, and St Lucia, and other islands.
These draw supplies of provisions and lumber, &c. from Quebec,
Halifax, Pensacola, and Augustine, that is from the Floridas. The
number of troops they have in each island, I am not able to ascertain;
but certainly they are not strong in any of them; and the climate in
the West Indies, and in Georgia and Carolina, is making a rapid
consumption of their men.
From this sketch, it will be easily seen, what a great number of posts
they have to sustain; how these are mutually connected with, and
dependent on each other, and that their existence in all of them
depends upon their superiority at sea, and that to carry on the
intercourse and communication between these various places, a vast
number of transports, provision vessels and merchant ships are
necessary. This is so much the fact, that the English nation has now
little navigation left, but what is employed in maintaining the
communication of these places with one another and with Europe. Here
then it is, that the English commerce and navy is vulnerable; and this
it is, which clearly points out to their enemies the only sure and
certain way of reducing their power in that quarter of the world; and
if it is reduced there, it is brought into a narrow compass
everywhere.
The policy and necessity of keeping always a superior fleet both in
the West India Islands and on the coast of the continent of North
America, is from all this very obvious. The English are so sensible of
this, that they dread it as the greatest evil that can befall them.
The appearance of the Count d'Estaing upon the coast of North America,
never failed to throw the English into the utmost terror and
consternation.
The appearance of a French fleet upon our coasts has repeatedly
compelled, and ever must compel, the English to call off from their
cruises all their frigates and other ships, and to assemble them at
New York, for their security and the defence of that place. These are
among the happy effects of such a measure, the communication of the
United States not only with each other but with the West Indies, with
France, and all other parts of Europe, with which they have any
concern, is immediately opened, and they are thereby easily furnished,
in all parts, with everything fitting and necessary to carry on the
war with the greatest vigor. His Majesty's fleets and armies will be
amply and much more cheaply supplied, and his subjects will reap, in
common with the inhabitants of the United States, the benefits of this
free commerce. It will give free sea-room to the few frigates
belonging to Congress and the several States to cruise for the
merchant ships, provision vessels, and transports of the enemy. It
gives opportunity also to the privateers to do the same. There are at
this day, notwithstanding the dreadful sacrifices made at Charleston
and Penobscot, sacrifices, the necessity of which would have been
entirely prevented by a few ships of the line, the Continental
frigates, the Confederacy, which is arrived at Philadelphia, the
Alliance which will soon be there, the Trumbull, the Deane, the
Bourbon, and also a ship of fiftysix guns which is nearly ready for
sea. The State of Massachusetts has two frigates and smaller vessels.
There are besides these, now in being, belonging to Newburyport,
Beverly, Salem, Marblehead, Portsmouth, Boston and Rhode Island, about
forty privateers. There are several belonging to Philadelphia.
If a French fleet should constantly remain upon that coast, the number
of these privateers would be doubled in a very few months. What havoc
then must these armed vessels make, especially if a few French
frigates should be also ordered to cruise for prizes among the
provision vessels, merchant ships, and transports, passing and
repassing to and from America and the West India Islands to Europe,
and to and from America and the West Indies, and to and from Quebec,
Nova Scotia, New York, Charleston, Savannah, and the Floridas. Such
depredations have several times been made by our cruisers alone, as to
reduce the English at New York to very great distress, and it would be
very easy in this way to reduce them to such misery as to oblige them
to surrender at discretion.
I therefore beg leave to submit it to your Excellency's consideration,
whether there is any possible way that a marine force can be employed
against the English, so much to the advantage of France and the
disadvantage of England, as in this way, and whether upon the
principles of French interest and policy alone, even without taking
into consideration that of the United States, a fleet ought not to be
constantly kept in North America. The advantages they will there have
in artists, supplies, accommodations, &c. above the English, are
obvious.
But the question will arise, where shall they winter? I answer, they
can winter with perfect security and advantage, either at Boston,
Rhode Island, Delaware, or Chesapeake Bays.
Another question will arise, whether they should all winter together
in one port, or be separated to several ports? I apprehend, however,
that it would be most prudent to leave it to the discretion of the
commander-in-chief of the squadron, to keep the squadron together, or
to detach parts of it, according to the exigencies of the service,
advising with Congress, or with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, from time
to time.
Two ships of the line, with three frigates, stationed at Boston, with
orders to cruise occasionally for the protection of French and
American trade, and the annoyance of the enemy, the same number at
Rhode Island with the same orders, the same number at Delaware river,
with similar orders, and a like number in Chesapeake bay, with like
orders, which would make eight ships of the line and twelve frigates,
I have a moral certainty would, in one year, reduce the power of the
English in North America, to absolute annihilation, without striking a
blow on land. These ships would make a diversion of an equal force of
the English, from the West India Islands, so that they would be in
that respect as usefully employed for his Majesty there as anywhere.
Eight ships of the line, and twelve frigates, stationed together at
Rhode Island, with orders to cruise for the same purposes, would do
the same thing.
Which plan would do best, I dare not undertake to say, but until
further informed and instructed by Congress I should think however
that the best plan would be to station the fleet for the winter,
either in Delaware or Chesapeake Bay; and as the war has lately turned
to the southward, I am inclined to think that Chesapeake Bay would be
the most proper.
But in all events, I beg leave to entreat in the most earnest manner,
that a powerful fleet may be ordered to winter somewhere in North
America. By this means I think there is a moral certainty, the English
will be ruined there, whereas if dependence is had upon the assault
and attack of their strong holds, without the most absolute command of
the sea, I fear it will end in disappointment and disgrace.
There is the more urgent reasons for laying these considerations
before your Excellency, because there is a portion of the people in
America who wish to return to the domination of Great Britain, many of
whom are artful and sensible men. They take notice of every
circumstance of the conduct of France, and represent it in such a
light as they think will throw a prejudice against the alliance into
the minds of the people. They represent the affair of Rhode Island and
of Savannah, and of some other things, as proofs that the Court of
France do not mean to give any effectual aid to America, but only to
play off her strength against that of Britain, and thus exhaust both.
The refugees in England concur with them in these representations, and
the Ministry and the members of Parliament in their public speeches
represent the same thing.
Even Mr Hartley, who is more for peace than any man in that kingdom,
in a printed letter to the inhabitants of the county of York, says,
"It is our duty to unravel by negotiation, the combination of powers
now acting against us;" and he says further, in express words, that
"It is apparent to all the world, that France might long ago have put
an end to that part of the war, which has been most distressing to
America, if they had chosen so to do." He must mean here the war of
their frigates and privateers upon our trade. "Let the whole system of
France be considered," says he, "from the beginning down to the late
retreat from Savannah, and I think it is impossible to put any other
construction upon it but this, viz. that it has always been the
deliberate intention and object of France, for purposes of their own,
to encourage the continuation of the war in America, in hopes of
exhausting the strength and resources of this country, and of
depressing the rising power of America." This is not only the language
of Mr Hartley, but the general language of newspapers and pamphlets,
and, I am well informed, of conversation in England. These are very
industriously sent to America, through various channels, which cannot
be stopped by laws, art, or power.
The body of the people have great confidence in the sincerity of
France; but if these contrary opinions should be suffered to gain
ground, as they most assuredly will if something is not done to
prevent it, when all the world sees and declares as they do, that it
is the best policy of France, if she considered her own interest alone
in the conduct of the war, to keep a superior naval force upon the
coast of the continent of North America, I leave your Excellency to
judge what a melancholy effect it will have upon our affairs. There is
no event, in my opinion, which would have so direct a tendency to give
force and extent to opinions so dangerous to both nations, as the
calling off from the continent your naval force, during the winter,
and not keeping a superiority there through the year. I scruple not to
give it as my opinion, that it will disunite, weaken, and distress us
more than we should have been, disunited, weakened, or distressed, if
the alliance had never been made.
The United States of America are a great and powerful people, whatever
European statesmen may think of them. If we take into our estimate the
numbers and the characters of her people, the extent, variety, and
fertility of her soil, her commerce, and her skill, and materials for
shipbuilding, and her seamen, excepting France, Spain, England,
Germany, and Russia, there is not a state in Europe so powerful.
Breaking off such a nation as this from the English so suddenly, and
uniting it so closely with France, is one of the most extraordinary
events that ever happened among mankind. The prejudices of nations in
favor of themselves, and against all other nations, which spring from
self-love, and are often nurtured by policy for unworthy purposes, and
which have been ever certainly cultivated by the English with the
utmost care in the minds of the Americans, as well as of the people of
every other part of their dominions, certainly deserve the attention
of the wisest statesmen, and as they are not to be eradicated in a
moment, they require to be managed with some delicacy.
It is too often said in France, where the prejudice against the
English has not been fostered into so much rancor, because France
never had so much to fear from England, as England has from France,
"That the Americans and the English are the same thing," not to make
it appear, that there are some remnants of prejudices against the
Americans among the French, and it must be confessed there are some in
America against France. It is really astonishing, however, that there
are so few, and it is the interest and duty of both to lessen them as
fast as possible, and to avoid with the nicest care, every colorable
cause of reviving any part of them.
I beg your Excellency to excuse this trouble, because the state of
things in North America has really become alarming, and this merely
for the want of a few French men-of-war upon that coast.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Paris, July 14th, 1780.
Sir,
The advices from the Hague of the 9th of this month are, that the talk
had been of a Congress to be held in that place; but as her Majesty,
the Empress of Russia, had given to understand, that she desired that
the conferences should be held at Petersburg, the States-General have
consequently named, upon the proposition of his Serene Highness, the
Prince Stadtholder, the Baron de Waassenaar Starrenburg, and the Baron
Van Heckeren de Brantzenburg, Deputies to the Assembly of their High
Mightinesses, on the part of the Provinces of Holland, West Friesland,
and Utrecht, Ministers Plenipotentiaries to go to Petersburg, to the
end to assist there at the conferences, which are to be held for the
protection of the commerce of neutrals.
And that the Chevalier Llano, now Minister Plenipotentiary of his
Catholic Majesty to their High Mightinesses, had arrived at that
residence.