chargeable with negligence; they have let slip one or two occasions of
conciliating the friendship of that Court. At the time of her rupture
with the Porte, what part have they acted? They did not enter into the
negotiation; but, which they will perhaps have cause to repent, they
sent vessels to the Russians to teach them how they might obtain and
preserve that domination of the seas, to which they pretend at this
day. Such are the fruits of the prudence and wisdom of our Ministers.
They have lost America, the most beautiful half of the Empire, and
against the half that remains to us, they have excited all the powers
of Europe. I say decidedly, that they have lost America, because,
after what has passed in Holland and in Russia, one must be very short
sighted not to see, that in fine, and at present, the independence of
America is consummated. The maritime code confirms the rest. France
and the other maritime powers, whose interest it is, that America
should never return to the domination of England, will take care to
comprehend her in the code; but I forewarn the Administration, that
this code will soon be in force; that if they do not speedily make
arrangements with Holland, there will be soon held at the Hague a
Congress, to the effect to give the sanction of maritime Europe to the
law which establishes, that free ships shall make free goods."
I cannot say that his Lordship is perfectly fair in this speech, nor
that he has been much wiser than the Minister. The true cause why the
Minister suffered France to make the peace between Russia and the
Turk, and between Austria and Prussia, was the American war. While
they pursued that phantom, all their men, all their ships, and all
their money were necessary, and the whole not enough; so that they had
not the power to lend troops, ships, or guineas to the Emperor, the
King of Prussia, the Grand Seignior, nor the Empress of Russia. If
they had been wise, made peace with America, acknowledged her equal
station with the powers of the earth, and conciliated as much as they
then might have done, her affection and her commerce, they might have
preserved their importance in Europe at the peace of Teschen and the
other peace. But my Lord Shelburne should have remembered, that he was
at that time as much against acknowledging American independence, and
as much for prosecuting the war against America as the Ministers; so
that it does not appear, that his wisdom was so much greater than
theirs. I am glad, however, that his Lordship is convinced, and I hope
some time or other the Minister will be; but they have all called us
rebels, till they have turned their own heads. This word rebellion
makes Englishmen mad; they still continue to use it, and by this means
as well as many others, to nourish and cherish the most rancorous and
malignant passions in their own bosoms against us, and they will
continue to do so a long time to come.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Paris, June 12th, 1780.
Sir,
The following is given in the public papers; as a copy of the bill
proposed by Governor Pownal, on the 24th of May, for putting Great
Britain in a situation for making peace with America.
"In order to remove all doubts or disabilities, which may prevent,
obstruct, or delay the happy work of peace, may it please your
Majesty, that it may be declared and enacted, and it is hereby
declared and enacted, &c. &c.
"That his Majesty is empowered to make a convention or truce, or to
conclude a peace with the inhabitants of New Hampshire, Massachusetts
Bay, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the three Delaware Counties, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, in North America,
convened in Congress, or in any other Assembly or Assemblies, or with
any person or persons authorised to act for, and in behalf of the
same, in such form and manner as he, by virtue of the prerogative of
his Crown hath power to do in all other cases, and on such terms and
conditions, as in the course of events shall become convenient and
necessary for the honor and welfare of his Majesty and his people. And
in order thereto, be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that from
and after the passing of this act, it shall, and may be lawful, for
his Majesty to appoint such person or persons (subjects of Great
Britain) as his Majesty in his wisdom shall think fit, and fully to
authorise and empower the same to treat, consult, and agree with the
said Americans, or with any part of them, or with any person or
persons acting for and in their behalf to the said purpose of
convention, truce, or peace. And be it further enacted, that from and
after the passing of this act, it shall, and may be lawful, for his
Majesty to grant safe conduct to any such person or persons
whatsoever, as his Majesty shall see cause and judge proper to receive
on the ground of treaty for such convention, truce, or peace, in like
manner as he is by divers ancient statutes empowered to do in the
cases therein specified."
On the 19th of May, at a meeting of the wholesale merchants of Dublin,
and several merchants of the out-ports, convened by the committee of
merchants, the following resolutions were unanimously agreed to.
"_Resolved_, That this kingdom cannot possibly derive any material
advantages from a free trade with the British Islands in the West
Indies, without securing a market here for raw sugar; that being the
capital article here of the produce of those Islands, and the
principal return to be obtained for any manufactures of Ireland, which
may be exported to the British Colonies.
"_Resolved_, That a market here for our raw sugar, can only be secured
in a tolerable degree, by laying an additional duty on refined sugar,
of sixteen shillings and seven pence half penny per hundred weight,
being three times the additional duty to which the raw material is
intended to be subjected.
"_Resolved_, That we view with the utmost concern and astonishment, a
measure likely to be adopted, not only destructive of the sugar
refinery of this kingdom, but, consequently, frustrating the professed
benefits held out to Ireland on laying open to her the Colony trade.
"_Resolved_, That we verily believe this to be the insidious intention
of those in Great Britain who have suggested the measure.
"_Resolved_, That we cannot but hold in the utmost contempt and
detestation, every Irishman of whatever rank or station, who, from
private and selfish considerations, shall prove base enough to be
subservient to the insidious purpose of those, who aim at baffling and
defeating the commercial interests of this too long oppressed and
unkindly treated country.
"_Resolved_, That if we find the commercial interests of our country
deserted, where we have and ought to expect guardianship, whether from
ignorance of the subject, misrepresentations received and too easily
listened to, or any other cause, it will then be incumbent on us, as
the only remedy for self preservation, to enter along with our
fellow-citizens and countrymen, of whose general concurrence on such a
necessary occasion we entertain no doubt, into such an effectual
association against the importation and use of the manufactures of
this kingdom, as may secure to the industry of Irishmen, the benefits
at least of their own consumption.
"_Resolved_, That a committee be appointed to transmit copies of these
resolutions to the merchants of the principal trading towns in this
kingdom, and that the said committee do consist of Mr Hartley, &c.
"_Resolved_, That the committee be empowered to convene a general
meeting when they shall think fit."
On the 15th of May, Mr. Martin, in the House of Commons of Ireland,
after having laid open in great detail, the increase which had crept
in by degrees upon the civil establishment of Ireland, proposed that a
committee should be appointed, and especially instructed to examine
into this alarming augmentation, and to propose a plan of economy, by
means of which they might lighten the burden of the civil
establishment of Ireland of the useless weight, which overloaded it;
but he withdrew his motion on account of the shortness of the time and
the assurance that was given him, that this object should be one of
the first attended to next session.
On the 17th, the House in a committee of ways and means, resolved upon
a duty of five shillings and tenpence per hundred weight to be laid on
refined sugar, imported from England.
On the 18th, they were about to confirm the resolution, when an
opposition arose, and Mr Yelverton spoke with so much energy, that the
next day, the 19th, the House resolved upon a duty of twelve
shillings, to the great detriment of the refiners of sugar at London.
Mr Yelverton's oratory was neither more nor less, than that he would
head the people, the only argument which carries any decisive weight
in that House, and this very seldom fails.
Nothing which is now, or will soon be interesting to the commerce and
navigation of the United States, is improper for me to send to
Congress.
The port Vendres, situated in Roussillon, twenty leagues from
Barcelona and four from Roses, upon the coast of the Mediterranean,
having been a long time filled up and abandoned, the King has ordered
the reparation of it, and it is now in a condition to receive not only
merchant vessels of any size, but frigates, and will very soon be fit
for ships of the line. This port, the position of which forms the
centre of the coast of the Mediterranean, receives by its right all
that comes out of the Straits, and by its left what comes from the
Levant and the coast of Italy, at the passage of the Gulf of Lyon; and
it presents to all the commercial nations, not only a center of union,
the most advantageous for reciprocal commerce, but at the same time a
mart, and an asylum so much the more safe, as this port is sheltered
from all the winds by the mountains, which surround it, and as vessels
are there as quiet as in a canal, and as it is not yet known but to
those who within a year past have taken refuge in bad weather, and
have owed their safety to it, several having perished for want of
knowing it, they have given two points by which to know it, by
painting white the fort St Elme, and the tower of Massane, placed upon
the highest mountain of the Pyrenees, which are seen at the distance
of fifteen or twenty leagues at sea, and they have placed at the
entrance of the port a lighthouse, which throws its light more than
five leagues in the night. Roussillon, moreover, can furnish by itself
wines of the first quality, oils, iron, silks, and wools, almost as
beautiful as those of Spain, and many other productions.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Paris, June 16th 1780.
Sir,
I have lately obtained a sight of a number of pamphlets, published in
London, which are given out as written by Mr Galloway, but there are
many circumstances in them which convince me they are written in
concert by the refugees. I see many traces, which appear unequivocal,
of the hand of Governor Hutchinson in some of them. I have read them
with pleasure and surprise, because it seems to me, that if their
professed intention had been to convince America, that it is both her
interest and duty to support her sovereignty and her alliance, they
could not have taken a method so effectual.
"Such treaties" says he, (that is an offensive and defensive alliance
between France and America) "will naturally coincide with their
several views and interests, as soon as American Independence shall be
acknowledged by the powers of Europe. America will naturally wish,
while she is rising from her infant state into opulence and power, to
cover her dominions under the protection of France, and France will
find new resources of strength in American commerce, armies and naval
force.
"The recovery of America from the disasters and distresses of war will
be rapid and sudden. Very unlike an old country whose population is
full, and whose cultivation, commerce and strength, have arrived at
their height, the multiplication of her numbers, and the increase of
her power will surpass all expectation. If her sudden growth has
already exceeded the most sanguine ideas, it is certain, that the
increase of her strength, when supported and assisted by France, and
pushed forward by the powerful motives arising from her separate
interest, her own preservation, and the prospect of her own arising
glory and importance among nations, will far outrun any idea we have
had of her late population. Nor will it be the interest of America to
check the ambition of France, while confined to Europe. Her distance,
and the safety arising from it, will render her regardless of the fate
of nations on this side of the Atlantic, as soon as her own strength
shall be established. The prosperity or ruin of kingdoms, from whose
power she can have nothing to fear, and whose assistance she can
never want, will be matters of equal indifference. She can wish for no
other connexion with Europe than that of commerce, and this will be
better secured in the hands of an ally than in those with whom she
holds _no_ other connexion. (The word _no_ is an evident error in the
press.) So that it will be of little concern to her whether Great
Britain, Spain, Holland, Germany, or Russia, shall be ruled by one or
more monarchs. The new States are and will continue the allies of
France, our natural enemy, unless reduced, and although at this time
by far the greater part of the people wish and hope for an union with
this country, and are ready to unite with us in reducing the power of
their tyrants, in the moment the least encouragement shall be given
for that purpose, which the infatuated policy of every commander has
hitherto withheld, yet should they be disappointed in their hope, it
will compel them to unite with the enemies of this kingdom.
"The mode of carrying on the war, more cruel to friends than to foes,
added to the inhumanity and treachery of this country, in not exerting
its powers for their relief, will not fail to create permanent enmity
and resentment, and the obligations of gratitude to the nation, which
shall save them from our ravages, will stamp impressions never to be
effaced. Advantage will be taken of these dispositions by the policy
of France, to establish treaties of alliance and commerce with them,
which will be founded on two great principles, their own mutual
interest and the subduing the power of Great Britain; and if she
should be permitted to trade with them at all, it will only be to
share with other nations in the worthless remains, after their own and
the purposes of their allies are served."
Here Congress will see the extreme ignorance or deception of the
writer, in affirming, that the "far greater part of the people wish
and hope for a union with Great Britain, and are ready to unite in
reducing," &c. But notwithstanding the bad faith of the writer, we see
that such is the force of truth, that he cannot adduce an argument to
persuade the English to continue the war, without producing at the
same time a much stronger argument to persuade the Americans to adhere
to the last to their sovereignty and their alliances. Of this nature
are all his other arguments.
"With the Independence of America," says he, "we must give up our
fisheries on the Bank of Newfoundland, and in the American seas."
Supposing this to be true, which it is in part, but not in the whole,
if Great Britain loses her fisheries, does not America gain them? Are
they not an object then to America, as important and desirable as to
Great Britain? Has not America then at least as strong and pressing a
motive to fight for them as Great Britain? The question then is
reduced to another, which has the best prospect of contending for them
successfully? America, favored by all the world, or Great Britain
thwarted and opposed by all the world. And to whom did God and nature
give them? The English lay great stress upon the gifts of God and
nature, as they call the advantage of their insular situation, to
justify their injustice and hostilities against all the maritime
powers of the world. Why should the Americans hold the blessings of
Providence in a lower estimation, which they can enjoy, without doing
injury to any nation or individual whatsoever?
"With American independence, we must give up thirtyfive thousand
American seamen, and twentyeight thousand more bred and maintained in
those excellent nurseries the fisheries. Our valuable trade, carried
on from thence with the Roman Catholic States, will be in the hands of
America. These nurseries and this trade will ever remain the natural
right of the people who inhabit that country. A trade so profitable,
and a nursery of seamen so excellent and so necessary for the support
of her naval force, will never be given up, or even divided by America
with any power whatsoever."
If Great Britain loses sixtythree thousand seamen by our independence,
and I believe she will not lose much less, I mean in the course of a
few years, will not America gain them? Are sixtythree thousand seamen
a feebler bulwark for America than Great Britain? Are they weaker
instruments of wealth and strength, of power and glory, in the hands
of Americans, than in those of the English; at the command of Congress
than at the command of the King of England? Are they not then as
strong a temptation to us to continue the war, as to them? The
question then recurs again, which has the fairest prospect of success?
America, which grows stronger every year, or England, which grows
weaker?
"The British islands," he adds, "in the West Indies must fall of
course. The same power that can compel Great Britain to yield up
America, will compel her to give up the West Indies. They are
evidently the immediate objects of France."
The true political consequence from this is to stop short, make peace,
and save the British islands while you can; once taken, it will be
more difficult to get them back. The whole returns again to the
question, are you able to keep peace at home and in Ireland, and the
East Indies, to settle matters with the maritime powers, and go on
with the war long enough to beat France and Spain, make them renounce
the war, and after that reduce the United States of America to
submission? Will your soldiers, your seamen, and your revenues hold
out till this is done, and after it shall be done, be sufficient to
keep up a force sufficient to keep down France, Spain, and America?
"France," he subjoins, "expects from the independence of America, and
the acquisition of the West India Islands, the sovereignty of the
British seas, if not of Great Britain itself."
Is not this the strongest of all arguments for putting an end to the
war? Now you may make peace, and keep the West India Islands, and
secure the neutrality at least of America for the future; and in this
case you may at least maintain your own sovereignty, and the freedom
of the British seas. France at present claims no more than freedom on
any seas. If you make peace at present, you may have more of American
trade in future than France, and derive more support to your navy than
she will to her marine from that country, and consequently may
preserve your liberty upon all seas; but by pushing the war you will
weaken yourselves and strengthen France and Spain to such a degree,
that they will have in the end such a superiority as may endanger your
liberty. But if Great Britain is to lose the West India Islands, and
the sovereignty of the seas, by the independence of America, surely
France, Spain, or America, or all three together are to gain them. And
are not these advantages as tempting to these powers as to England,
and as urgent motives to pursue the war?
So that we come again to the old question, which is likely to hold it
out longest? The immense inexhaustible resources of France, Spain, and
America together, or the ruined, exhausted, or distracted kingdom of
Great Britain. The writer goes on. "France has long struggled to rival
us in our manufactures in vain; this will enable her to do it with
effect." If England were to make peace now, it is very doubtful
whether France would be able to rival her in manufactures, those I
mean which are most wanted in America, of wool and iron. But if she
continues the war, France will be very likely to rival her, to effect,
as it is certain she is taking measures for the purpose and the longer
the war continues, the more opportunity she will have of pursuing
those measures to effect.
"We receive," says he, "from the West India Islands, certain
commodities absolutely necessary to carry on our manufactures to any
advantage and extent, and which we can procure from no other country.
We must take the remains from France or America, after they have
supplied themselves and fulfilled their contracts with their allies,
at their own prices, and loaded with the expense of foreign
transportation, if we are permitted to trade for them at all." Is it
possible to demonstrate the necessity of making peace, now while we
may, more clearly? We may now preserve the West India Islands, but
continuing the war we lose them infallibly.
"But this is not all we shall lose with the West Indies," says the
writer. "We must add to our loss of seamen sustained by the
independence of America, at least twenty thousand more, who have been
bred and maintained in the trade from Great Britain to the West
Indies, and in the West India trade among themselves, and with other
parts, amounting in the whole to upwards of eighty thousand; a loss,
which cannot fail to affect the sensibility of every man who loves
this country, and knows that its safety can only be secured by its
navy."
Is not this full proof of the necessity of making peace? These seamen
may now be saved, with the islands whose commerce supports them. But
if we continue the war, will France and Spain be less zealous to
conquer your islands? Because, by this means they will certainly take
away from you, and divide among themselves, twenty thousand seamen.
Taking these islands from you, and annexing them to France and Spain,
will in fact increase the trade of France, Spain, the United Provinces
of the Low Countries, the United States of America, and Denmark; and
the twenty thousand seamen will be divided in some proportion among
all these powers. The Dutch and the Americans will have the carriage
of a good deal of this trade, in consequence of their dismemberment
from you, and annexion to France and Spain; do you expect to save
these things by continuing the war? Or that these powers will be less
zealous to continue it, by your holding out to them such temptations?
"Will not Great Britain lose much of her independence in the present
state of Europe," continues the writer, "while she is obliged to other
countries for her naval stores? In the time of Queen Anne, we paid at
Stockholm three pounds per barrel for pitch and tar, to the
extortionate Swede; and such was the small demand of those countries
for the manufactures of this, that the balance of trade was greatly in
their favor. The gold which we obtained in our other commerce, was
continually pouring into their laps. But we have reduced that balance,
by our importation of large quantities of those supplies from
America."
But what is there to hinder Great Britain from importing pitch, tar,
and turpentine from America, after her independence? She may be
obliged to give a somewhat higher price, because France, Spain,
Holland, and all other nations will import them too. But will this
higher price induce America to give up her independence? Will the
prospect which is opened to the other maritime powers of drawing these
supplies from America, in exchange for their productions, make them
less zealous to support American independence? Will the increase of
the demand upon the northern powers for these articles, in consequence
of the destruction of the British monopoly in America, make these
powers less inclined to American independency? The British monopoly
and British bounties, it was in fact, which reduced the price of these
articles in the northern markets. The ceasing of that monopoly and
those bounties, will rather raise the price in the Baltic, because
those States in America in which pitch and tar chiefly grow, have so
many articles of more profitable cultivation, that without bounties it
is not probable that trade will flourish to a degree, to reduce the
prices in the north of Europe. Should a war take place between us and
the northern powers, where are we to procure our naval stores?
inquires the pamphleteer.
I answer, make peace with America, and procure them from her. But if
you go to war with America and the Northern Powers at once, you will
get them nowhere. This writer appears to have had no suspicion of the
real intentions of the Northern Powers, when he wrote his book. What
he will say now after the confederation of all of them against Great
Britain, for I can call it no otherwise, I am at a loss to
conjecture.