Renewal of the Attack
_Crossing the Soyang in Flood--Light Resistance at First--Supply
Problems Cause Delay--Resumption of Division Attack--The Mounting
Problem of CAS--First Helicopter Supply Operation of History--The Fight
for Hill 749--5th Marines Attack Hill 812--The Struggle for the “Rock”_
It was to a large extent a new 1st Marine Division on 27 August 1951.
Very few veterans of the Reservoir campaign were left, and even
the Marines of the hard fighting in April and May had been thinned
by casualties and rotation. Whatever the new arrivals lacked in
experience, however, they had made up as far as possible by intensive
and realistic training while the Division was in reserve.
The new Marine zone of action, in the Punchbowl area, was as bleak and
forbidding as any expanse of terrain in Korea. Dominating the Punchbowl
from the north and blocking any movement out of it was YOKE Ridge,
looking somewhat like an alligator on the map (See Map 17). Hill 930
represented the snout. Hill 1000 was the head, and the body extended
eastward through Hills 1026 and 924.
Two smaller hills, 702 and 602, spread off southeast and northeast
respectively to the Soyang River and its unnamed tributary from the
west. On either side of YOKE Ridge were numerous sharp and narrow
ridges. Some of the hills were wooded with enough scrub pine to afford
concealment for outposts and bunkers. Altogether, it was an area
eminently suited to defense.
The defenders were identified by Division G-2 as troops of the 6th
Regiment, 2d Division, II NKPA Corps. Apparently they did not lack
supporting weapons, for 3/7 positions on Hill 680 were hit by an
estimated 200 mortar and artillery rounds during daylight hours of the
30th.
[Illustration: MAP 17
AREA OF 1st MAR DIV
ACTIVITY SEPT 1951
FRONT LINES 30 AUG 51 ON KANSAS
OBJECTIVE LINE HAYS]
_Crossing the Soyang in Flood_
The 7th Marines and KMC Regiment, ordered to relieve U.S. and ROK
Army units on the KANSAS Line, started their march in a downpour on
27 August. The 5th Marines (less 1st Battalion) at Inje had orders to
follow the 7th up the narrow Soyang valley.
Typical of the wet weather difficulties were those experienced by 3/7.
Scheduled to depart early for the forward positions, the companies
struck tents. Trucks failed to arrive and they remained to eat the noon
meal, a gustatorial bonus of all food the galley crew could not carry
with them. Unfortunately, the trucks were delayed further and the men
shivered in the rain as they ate an evening meal of “C” rations.
When the vehicles finally arrived at 2100 the rain had reached
torrential proportions. Progress was so slow over muddy roads that
it took until 0330 on the 28th to reach the CP of the 7th Marines at
Sohwari (Map 18), just southeast of the junction of the Soyang and a
tributary from the east.
The bivouac area assigned to 3/7 for the night proved to be a foot deep
in water, and Lieutenant Colonel Kelly directed his men to catch what
sleep they could in the trucks while he and his staff attempted to
straighten out the snarled traffic situation.[271]
[271] Sources are 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug 51, 3–5; Col B. T.
Kelly’s contemporary “Notes on my Service in Korea, 14
Apr-13 Sep 1951” (hereafter Kelly, _Notes_).
It took the rest of the night for the 3/7 officers to walk the length
of the convoy, cutting out trucks with less essential cargo. With
only a small space available for a turn-around, the 3/7 vehicles were
ordered to back into it, unload their troops and equipment, and return
along a narrow road, which had been churned into a quagmire.
The battalion assembly area was on the other side of the rain-swollen
Soyang. How Company and the command group managed to cross over a
waist-deep ford, but the crossing was so perilous that DUKWs were
requested for the other two rifle companies. Lieutenant Colonel Louis
C. Griffin’s 2/7 also found the river crossing an operation requiring
DUKWs. By the afternoon of the 29th all elements of the two 7th Marine
battalions were on the west bank, occupying their assigned assembly
areas.
The relief proceeded slowly. Two KMC battalions on the left of the
7th Marines took over the zone formerly held by elements of the 2d
Infantry Division and the 8th ROK Division. The cosmopolitan character
of the Eighth Army was revealed when 2/KMC relieved the French
Battalion of the 2d Infantry Division. Linguistic chaos was averted
only by the best efforts of the exhausted interpreters.
By the 30th, the 1st and 3d KMC Battalions were behind the line of
departure on Hill 755, ready to attack in the morning. The 2d Battalion
assumed responsibility for the regimental zone on the KANSAS Line.
The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines had meanwhile completed the
relief of elements of the 8th ROK Division. On the other side of the
river Lieutenant Colonel James G. Kelly’s 1/7 had relieved units of the
ROK division on the hill mass a mile and a half north of Tonpyong (Map
17). These Marines were first to come under fire as the enemy sent over
a few mortar rounds after dark on the 29th.
Division OpnO 22-51 directed the two assault regiments, the 7th Marines
and KMCs, to attack at 0600 the following morning and seize their
assigned positions on Corps Objective YOKE, the ridgeline running from
Hill 930 on the west through Hills 1026 and 924 on the east (Map 17).
Objective 1, the hill mass 1½ miles northeast of Tonpyong, was already
occupied by 1/7.
The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was ordered to seize Objective 2,
generally that part of YOKE Ridge east of Hill 924. The KMC Regiment
was assigned Objective 3, consisting of Hills 924 and 1026.
Other 1st Marine Division units had the following missions on 31 August:
_5th Marines_--to patrol the Division zone along the KANSAS Line
and protect defensive installations;
_1st Marines_--to remain in the rear in the Hongchon area in X
Corps reserve;
_1st Tank Battalion_--to move up in readiness to support the
assault regiments;
_Division Reconnaissance Company_--to continue to patrol the
Punchbowl and mop up bypassed enemy.
Land mines were a constant menace to troop movements as the assault
regiments adjusted positions in preparation for the attack. As usual,
neglected “friendly” mines were encountered as well as those planted by
the enemy.[272]
[272] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based
on 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug and Sep 51; X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep
51; 2/7 and 3/7 _HD_, Aug and Sep 51; Kelly, _Notes_; Col
G. P. Groves, ltr of 8 Apr 58.
[Illustration: X CORPS ZONE OF ACTION
SEPTEMBER 51
FRONT LINES ON 20 SEPT 51 WERE GENERALLY ALONG HAYS LINE
MAP 18]
POW information and air reports indicated a southward movement of two
to three enemy regiments with artillery and supplies. Prisoners stated
that an attack was due on 1 September, leading to the G-2 conjecture
that the enemy’s Sixth Phase Offensive might be about to start.
_Light Resistance at First_
Priority of air support on 31 August was assigned to the two KMC
battalions. They jumped off in column against light to moderate
resistance, with Hill 924 as their first objective. Mine fields gave
the KMCs more trouble at first than scattered NKPA mortar and machine
gun fire. Forward movement and maneuver were restricted as 1/KMC
passed through 3/KMC at 1445 to continue the attack against stiffening
resistance.
On the right 3/7 also encountered light resistance in the morning which
increased as the assault troops neared the objective. The slopes of
Hill 702 proved to be heavily mined, and forward elements of 3/7 were
hit by a concentration of mortar and artillery fire.
East of the river, on the regimental right flank, where Objective 1 had
been occupied without a fight, 1/7 supported the attack of 3/7 with
mortar fire. Both 3/7 and the KMCs were within 1,000 yards of their
objectives late in the afternoon when a halt was called for the day.
Casualties had been light, thanks in large measure to excellent air and
artillery support.
When the attack was resumed on 1 September, 3/KMC moved through
positions of 3/7 to reach a ridgeline on the flank of the regimental
objective. While 3/KMC advanced from the northeast, 1/KMC closed in
from the southeast. Both battalions took heavy losses from enemy mines
and mortars as well as machine guns and automatic weapons fired from
hidden bunkers. The converging attack made slow but steady progress,
however, until one company of 3/KMC drove within 200 meters of the
top of Hill 924 at 1700. Even so, it took four more hours of hard
fighting to secure the objective. That evening 2/KMC was relieved of
its defensive responsibility along the KANSAS Line by 3d Battalion, 5th
Marines, enabling the KMC battalion to join in the attack.
Throughout the day 3/7 slugged it out in the vicinity of 702 with an
NKPA battalion. Four counterattacks were launched from Hill 602, the
northeastern fork of YOKE Ridge. More than 500 men were employed in
this effort, some of them penetrating briefly into 3/7 positions. Two
air strikes, called by patrols of 1/7 from across the river, helped to
break up the main NKPA attack, and the 11th Marines (Colonel Custis
Burton, Jr.), poured in a deadly concentration of artillery fire.
Lieutenant Colonel B. T. Kelly’s battalion continued to be engaged
until dusk.
The tenacity of the NKPA defense was demonstrated at the expense of
the KMCs when they were driven from the top of Hill 924 by a surprise
enemy counterattack at midnight. The Korean Marines came back strongly
at daybreak and a terrific fight ensued before the North Koreans were
in turn evicted shortly before noon. As a measure of the artillery
assistance rendered, Major Gordon R. Worthington’s 1st Battalion,
11th Marines, fired 1,682 rounds of 105 ammunition in support of the
KMC’s during the 24 hours ending at 1800 on 2 September. During the
same period Lieutenant Colonel William McReynold’s 3/11 fired 1,400
rounds in support of 3/7. The other battalions of the Marine artillery
regiment, reinforced by the 196th, 937th, and 780th Field Artillery
Battalions, USA, brought the number of rounds to a grand total of 8,400
for this 24-hour period.
After the securing of Hill 924, the 2d Battalion of the KMC Regiment
passed through the 1st and 3d Battalions to spearpoint the attack
west toward Hill 1026. In the zone of 3/7, an NKPA counterattack was
repulsed at 0700 on 2 September. Two hours later George Company,
supported by How Company with mortar and machine gun fire, moved out to
resume the attack on Hill 602. Lieutenant Colonel B. T. Kelly ordered
his battalion heavy machine guns set up in battery to deliver overhead
supporting fires.
In slightly less than two hours the Marines of 3/7 swept the crest
of Hill 602, securing Division Objective 2. Three company-size enemy
counterattacks were repulsed before the North Koreans withdrew to the
north at 1500.
The 2d KMC Battalion fought its way to a point within 800 yards of Hill
1026 before dusk. So aggressive and persistent was the NKPA defense
that several light enemy probing attacks were launched during the night
of 2–3 September, not only against forward Marine elements but also
against the 5th Marines units on the KANSAS Line, 5 miles to the rear.
The front was where you found it.
While 3/7 constructed emplacements and obstacles on Hill 602, the KMCs
continued their attack on the morning of 3 September toward Hill 1026.
With the extending of the 7th Marines zone to the left to decrease the
width of the KMC front, 2/7 was brought up from regimental reserve to
help cover a new sector that included Hill 924.
The attack led by 2/KMC collided with a large-scale enemy
counterattack. It was nip and tuck for 3½ hours before the North
Koreans broke, but, by midmorning, the KMCs were in possession of
Division Objective 3 and consolidating for defense. They were not a
moment too soon in these preparations, for the enemy counterattacked at
1230 and put up a hot fight for two hours before retiring.
This action completed the battle for Corps Objective YOKE. At 1800 on
3 September, the 1st Marine Division was in full possession of the
HAYS Line, dominating the entire northern rim of the Punchbowl (Map
18). Reports from the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and 5th ROK Division,
attacking in sectors to the west, indicated that the pressure exerted
by the Marines was assisting these units. Large gains had been made on
the west side of the Punchbowl against comparatively light resistance.
On 4 September, with all objectives consolidated, 1st Marine Division
units patrolled northward from defensive positions. Plans were being
formed for the second phase of the Division attack--the advance to
seize the next series of commanding ridgelines, 4,000 to 7,000 yards
forward of the present MLR.
The victory in the four-day battle had not been bought cheaply. A total
of 109 Marine KIA and 494 WIA (including KMCs) was reported. NKPA
casualties for the period were 656 counted KIA and 40 prisoners.
As evidence that the enemy had profited by the breathing spell during
the Kaesong truce talks, it was estimated that NKPA artillery fire in
the Punchbowl sector almost equalled the firepower provided by the
organic Marine artillery and the guns of attached U.S. Army units. NKPA
strength in mortars and machine guns also compared favorably with that
of Marines.
_Supply Problems Cause Delay_
Logistical shortages made it necessary for the 1st Marine Division to
call a six-day halt and build up a new reserve of artillery and mortar
ammunition.
During the first phase of the Division attack, the main burden of
transport and supply had fallen upon three Marine units--the 1st
Ordnance Battalion (Major Harold C. Borth), the 1st Motor Transport
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Wertman), and the 7th
Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Carl J. Cagle). The
extraordinary expenditure of artillery shells for these four days posed
a resupply problem that was aggravated by an almost impassable supply
route. The three Marine battalions had to strain every resource to meet
minimal requirements.
Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) 60-B, a U.S. Army installation manned
by elements of the Marine 1st Ordnance Battalion, was located about
five miles behind the gun positions. From this dump it was 48 miles
to Hongchon, the source of supplies for ASP 60-B. A well maintained,
two-lane dirt road led from that base to Inje, but northward it
deteriorated into a narrow, twisting trail following the Soyang valley.
Recent rains, resulting in earth slides and mudholes, had reduced the
road to such a condition that the round trip between ASP 60-B and
Hongchon took 25 hours.[273]
[273] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 4, 7.
As an added complication, it was necessary to build up a 10-day reserve
of ammunition at ASP 60-B so that Division transport would be available
for lifting 2,000 rotated troops to Chunchon some time between 3 and
15 September. This meant that 50 to 60 Marine trucks must be employed
daily to haul ammunition, with the result of a drastic shortage of
motor transport for other purposes.
Only human transport was available for supplying Marines on the firing
line. X Corps started the month of September with 20,070 Korean Service
Corps, the successor to CTC, and civilian contract laborers--the
equivalent in numbers of a U.S. Army infantry division. Even so, 14
air drops were necessary during the month, only one of which went to a
Marine unit. This took place on 1 September, when 20 Air Force cargo
planes from Japan dropped ammunition and rations to the KMCs. A 90
percent recovery was reported.[274]
[274] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 41–42; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51,
5–6.
It generally took a full day in the 1st Marine Division zone during
the first week of September for a cargador to complete the trip from
a battalion supply point to the front lines and return. This made it
necessary to assign from 150 to 250 Korean laborers to each infantry
battalion. And as the Marines advanced farther into the rugged Korean
highlands, the logistic problem was increased.
_Resumption of Division Attack_
Enemy groups moving southward into the zone of the 1st Marine
Division during the six-day lull were sighted by air observation. POW
interrogations and other G-2 sources established that the 2d NKPA
Division, II Corps, had been relieved by the 1st NKPA Division, III
Corps. Accurate 76mm fire from well-hidden guns was received by the
Marines throughout the interlude, and patrols ran into brisk mortar
fire when they approached too near to enemy bunkers on Hill 673.
For the second time, during the night of 4–5 September, 5th Marines
units were assailed on the KANSAS Line, 5 miles to the rear of the
7th Marines troops similarly deployed along the HAYS Line. Yet a
large 7th Marines patrol ranged forward some 2,000 yards the next
day without enemy contacts. A like result was reported by a patrol
representing almost the entire strength of the Division Reconnaissance
Company (Major Robert L. Autry) after it scoured the area north of the
Punchbowl.[275]
[275] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based
on the following sources: EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 38–53;
X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51,
8–14; 7th Mar _HD_, Sep 51; 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns of 7th
Mar, _HD_s for Sep 51.
1st Marine Division OpnO 23-51, issued on the morning of 9 September,
called for the 7th Marines to jump off at 0300 on the 11th and attack
Objectives ABLE and BAKER--Hills 673 and 749 respectively--white
maintaining contact with the 8th ROK Division on the right. Other
Division units were given these missions:
_1st Marines_--to be released from X Corps reserve near Hongchon
to Division control; to be prepared to pass through the 7th
Marines, when that regiment secured its objectives, and
continue the attack to seize Objective CHARLIE, the ridgeline
leading northwest from Hill 1052.
_5th Marines_--to maintain one company on KANSAS line while
occupying positions in Division reserve along HAYS Line in rear
of 7th Marines.
_KMC Regiment_--to patrol aggressively on Division left to exert
pressure on enemy defenses south and southeast of Objective
CHARLIE.
_11th Marines_--to displace forward to support attack of the 7th
Marines.
_Division Reconnaissance Company_--to patrol northward in the
Soyang valley as far as Hwanggi to deny the enemy this area.
The area ahead of the 7th Marines was ideal for defense. From YOKE
Ridge the assault troops had to descend into a narrow valley formed
by a small tributary of the Soyang-gang, cross the stream, and climb
Kanmubong Ridge on the other side. This formidable piece of terrain
was dominated by three enemy positions, Hills 812, 980, and 1052 (Map
17). Thus the attack of the 7th Marines had as its primary purpose
the securing of initial objectives on Kanmubong Ridge that would give
access to the main NKPA defense line, some 4,000 yards to the north.
The 7th Marines was to seize the eastern tip (Objective ABLE) of this
commanding terrain feature and “run the ridge” to Hill 749, Objective
BAKER. While Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. Griffin’s 2/7 maintained its
patrolling activities on the left, tied in with the KMCs, Lieutenant
Colonel B. T. Kelly’s 3/7 in the center and Lieutenant Colonel J. G.
Kelly’s 1/7 on the right were to attack.
As an intermediate regimental objective on the way to Kanmubong Ridge,
the 680-meter hill directly north of B. T. Kelly’s position on Hill 602
was assigned to his battalion. He ordered How Company to move forward
under cover of darkness and be prepared to attack at dawn. Rain and
poor visibility delayed the attempt until surprise was lost, and after
a fierce fire fight How Company was stopped halfway up the southeast
spur.
In order to relieve the pressure, the battalion commander directed Item
Company to attack on the left up the southwest spur. This maneuver
enabled How Company to inch forward under heavy mortar and machine gun
fire to a point with 50 yards of the topographical crest. Item Company
became confused in the “fog of war” and finally wound up on How’s spur
at 1245.
Twice the two companies made a combined assault after artillery and
mortar preparation and air strikes with napalm, rocket, and strafing
fire. Both times the North Koreans swarmed out of their bunkers to
drive the Marines halfway back to the original jump off line. It was
anybody’s fight when the two battered companies dug in at dusk.
Across the valley to the east, J. G. Kelly’s 1/7 had no better fortune
in its attack on Hill 673. Heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire kept
the assault troops pinned down until they consolidated for the night.
With both attacking battalions in trouble, Colonel Nickerson ordered
2/7 to advance up the narrow valley separating them. His plan called
for the reserve battalion to move under cover of darkness around the
left flank of 1/7 and into a position behind the enemy before wheeling
to the northeast to trap the North Koreans defending Hill 673.
The maneuver succeeded brilliantly. Griffin’s troops were undetected as
they filed northward during the night, making every effort to maintain
silence. By daybreak on 12 September 2/7 had two platoons in position
behind the enemy to lead the attack.[276]
[276] LtCol E. G. Kurdziel interv, 13 Jun 58.
The assault exploded with complete surprise as 2/7 swept to the crest
of Hill 673 against confused and ineffectual opposition. Griffin’s
battalion and 1/7 had the enemy between them, but the jaws of the trap
could not close in time because of NKPA mine fields. Thus 1/7 continued
to be held up on the forward approaches to Hill 673 by NKPA mortar
and small-arms fire. Grenades were the most effective weapons as J.
G. Kelly’s men slugged their way to the summit at 1415 while 2/7 was
attacking Objective BAKER, Hill 749.
On the other side of the valley, 3/7 had seized its initial objective.
While How and Item Companies attacked up the southeast spur, where they
had been stopped the day before, George Company launched a surprise
assault up the southwest spur. This was the blow that broke the enemy’s
will to resist. George Company knocked out seven active enemy bunkers,
one by one, thus taking the pressure off the troops on the other spur.
At 1028 all three companies met on the summit.
The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, radioed that Objective BAKER had
been secured at 1710 after a hard fight, but this report proved to
be premature. Enough NKPA troops to give the Marines a good deal of
trouble were still holding the wooded slopes of Hill 749, and it would
take the attack of a fresh battalion to dislodge them. Along the
ridgeline from Hill 673 to Hill 749, an undetermined number of enemy
soldiers had been caught between 2/7 and 1/7, and events were to prove
that they would resist as long as a man remained alive.
Casualties of the 1st Marine Division on 11 and 12 September were 22
KIA and 245 WIA, nearly all of them being suffered by the assault
regiment. Enemy losses included 30 counted KIA and 22 prisoners.
_The Mounting Problem of CAS_
With the Division in reserve from 15 July until the latter part of
August, close air support (CAS) was not a vital problem; however,
upon return to the Punchbowl area the situation became serious. The
difficulties arose from the time lag between the request for air
support to the time the planes arrived over target. The 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing operating under the control of the Fifth Air Force was
busily employed on interdiction missions. On 30 August, a tactical air
observer, spotting what appeared to be a division of NKPA troops moving
toward the Marines, hurriedly flashed back a request for a multi-plane
strike. The enemy troops were beyond artillery range, but they were
bunched up--a good target for a concentrated air strike. It was more
than three hours later that four fighter bombers arrived on the scene;
by that time, the enemy formation had dispersed and the desired number
of casualties could not be inflicted.[277]
[277] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CinCPacFlt, 4 Oct 51, enclosure (1)
“Observations on Close Air Support for the 1st Marine
Division during 5–23 September 1951.”
The reason for this lack of timely air support was apparent. Most
of the UN air power was being funneled into Operation STRANGLE, the
interdiction operation designed to cut off the enemy’s vehicular and
rail traffic in the narrow waist of North Korea. With the emphasis on
air interdiction, close air support sorties were limited to only 96 per
day for the entire Eighth Army.[278] The 1st Marine Division received
only a proportionate share.
[278] _PacFlt interim Rpt_ No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; 1stMarDiv
_SAR_, Jun 51.
Marine close air support was needed because of the enemy’s determined
resistance to the Division’s attack. The Reds hurled frequent night
counterattacks and pounded the Marine positions with artillery and
mortars hidden in the precipitous Punchbowl area. At one time it was
estimated that the enemy was using 92 pieces of artillery. The Marines
had only 72 field pieces, but in one 24-hour period they expended more
than 11,000 rounds of artillery ammunition on a 6,000-yard frontage.
The enemy emplacements, hewn out of solid rock, were hard to knock out.
To support the hard-working infantrymen, Marine Aircraft Group 12
(MAG-12) had moved VMF-214 and VMF-312 from the Pusan area to K-18,
an airfield on the east coast at Kangnung. By moving closer to the
Division area, planes were able to extend their time over the target
area and render more effective support to the infantry. Also, Marine
Air Support Radar Team One (MASRT-1) was sent to Korea and established
positions to support the Division. Using its support radar the team
began to evaluate its capability of guiding unseen fighter-bombers at
night or under conditions of poor visibility.[279]
[279] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–18; Chap. 10,
10–12, Chap. 15, 15–20, 60–61; Gen G. C. Thomas interv,
21 Jan 59.
Even though the Corsairs at K-18 were less than 50 miles from the 1st
Marine Division, very few were available to the Marines. Operation
STRANGLE, in full swing, was not achieving the desired results. Since
sightings of enemy vehicles were increasing, more and more Marine and
Navy air sorties were channeled into interdiction. During 18 days of
rugged fighting from 3 to 21 September, forward air controllers made
182 tactical air requests. Fighter-bombers were provided on 127 of
these requests; however, in only 24 instances did the planes arrive
when needed. The average delay time in getting CAS in response to
requests during September was slightly less than two hours, but in 49
cases the planes were more than two hours late.[280] As a consequence,
General Thomas reported, many of the 1,621 casualties suffered by the
1st Marine Division during the hard fighting in September were due
to inadequate close air support. Furthermore, he said, the tactical
capabilities of his battalions were strongly restricted.
[280] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–14.
During the planning of attacks, infantry commanders almost always
desired and requested close air support. It was also desirable to have
planes on station overhead should an immediate CAS need arise, for the
lack of an air strike when needed could jeopardize success. However,
with restricted availability of CAS planes due to participation in
STRANGLE, many times desired air cover was not to be had. Attacks under
those circumstances were often costly.
_First Helicopter Supply Operation of History_
The relief of the three battalions of the 7th Marines by their
corresponding numbers of Colonel Thomas A. Wornham’s 1st Marines took
place during the night of 12–13 September. By daybreak 3/1 and 1/1
had assumed responsibility for the zones of 3/7 and 1/7, which were
on their way to Division reserve at Wontong-ni at the junction of the
Inje and Kansong roads. In the center, however, 2/1 could not complete
the relief of 2/7. Not only was that battalion engaged most of the day
with the enemy, but the units were separated--one company south of Hill
749 being unable to join the other two companies on separate spurs
northwest of that height. All three were under persistent NKPA mortar
and 76mm fire.[281]
[281] Sources for this section are as follows: EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_,
Sep 51, 35–53; X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv
_HD_, Sep 51, 10–16; 1st Marines _HD_, Sep 51; 1/1, 2/1,
and 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51; Class “C” Rpt, _Employment of
Assault Helicopters_, 1–6; Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the
Sky_ (New York, 1954), 159–162, (hereafter _Cavalry of
the Sky_).
The attack of the 1st Marines, originally scheduled for 0500 on 13
September, had been changed to 0900 by Division orders. One reason
for the postponement was the serious shortage of ammunition and other
supplies after the urgent demands of the last two days. Another reason
was the inability of VMO-6 helicopters, lifting two wounded men at
most, to cope with the mounting casualty lists. Enemy interdiction
of roads added in several instances to the complications of a major
logistical problem, particularly in the zone of Lieutenant Colonel
Franklin B. Nihart’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.
The hour had struck for HMR-161, and the world’s first large-scale
helicopter supply operation in a combat zone would soon be under way.
It was not the development of a day. On the contrary, its roots went
all the way back to 1945, when the atomic bomb of Hiroshima rendered
obsolescent in 10 seconds a system of amphibious assault tactics that
had been 10 years in the making. Obviously, the concentrations of
transports, warships, and aircraft carriers that had made possible the
Saipan and Iwo Jima landings would be sitting ducks for an enemy armed
with atomic weapons.
The problem was left on the doorstep of the Marine Corps Schools, which
had reared the Fleet Marine Force from infancy to maturity during the
1930’s. A Special Board and Secretariat were appointed for studies.
They assigned two general missions to Marine Helicopter Experimental
Squadron 1 (HMX-1), organized late in 1947 before the first rotary-wing
aircraft had been delivered. These missions were:
(1) Develop techniques and tactics in connection with the
movement of assault troops by helicopter in amphibious operations;
(2) Evaluate a small helicopter as a replacement for the present
OY type aircraft to be used for gunfire spotting, observation,
and liaison missions in connection with amphibious operation.[282]
[282] CMC ltr to CO MCAS, Quantico, 3 Dec 47.
The second mission resulted in the small Sikorsky and Bell helicopters
of VMO-6 which landed in Korea with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade
in August 1950. Although it was originally believed that rotary wing
aircraft might replace the OYs, combat experience soon demonstrated
that the best results were obtained by retaining both types in fairly
equal numbers.
Landing exercises under simulated combat conditions were conducted
by HMX-1 in fulfillment of the first mission. At first the squadron
had only three-place helicopters. Later, when the usefulness of the
helicopter was fully realized, even the new 10-place “choppers” were
never available in sufficient numbers. The capacity designations of
these machines, however, were more ideal than real, for the helicopters
could lift only four to six men in addition to the pilot, copilot,
and crewman. Despite such drawbacks, HMX-1 developed tactical and
logistical techniques for helicopter landings to be made from widely
dispersed carriers against an enemy using atomic weapons.
Belated deliveries of aircraft delayed the commissioning of the world’s
first transport helicopter squadron, HMR-161, until 15 January 1951
at El Toro. Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring was designated the
commanding officer and Lieutenant Colonel William P. Mitchell the
executive officer.
Nearly three months passed before the first three transport
helicopters arrived. The squadron was gradually built up to a
strength of 43 officers and 244 enlisted men with a full complement
of 15 HRS-1 helicopters. These Sikorsky aircraft, designed to
Marine specifications, were simply an enlarged three-place HO3S in
configuration, with a similar main rotor and vertical tail rotor. About
62 feet long with maximum extension of rotor blades, the HRS-1 was
11½ feet wide with the blades folded. Following are some of the other
statistics:
Gross weight at sea level, 7,000 pounds; cruising speed, 60 knots;
payload at sea level, 1,420 pounds; troop-lifting capacity, four to
six men with full combat equipment or three to five casualties in
litters.[283] Capabilities varied, of course, according to such factors
as altitude, temperature, and pilot experience.
[283] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 157.
Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron 161 arrived in Korea on the last
day of August, and by the 10th of September it had moved up to the
front, sharing Airfield X-83 (see Map 18) with VMO-6.[284] The 11th
was devoted to reconnaissance flights in search of landing sites, and
on the 12th the transport squadron was ready for its first combat
mission. A new means of logistical and tactical support that was to
revolutionize operations and create front page headlines had arrived in
Korea.
[284] Auxiliary airstrips in Korea had an “X” designation and
fields in the “K” category were major installations.
Those in proximity to U.S. Army centers were designated
“A.”
Prior to the squadron’s arrival, the Division chief of staff, Colonel
Victor H. Krulak, had held numerous planning conferences with Division
staff officers, and preparations for the employment of HMR-161 had
made noteworthy progress. Then General Thomas ordered executed the
first operation of the squadron under combat conditions, and the major
logistical problem of moving supplies and evacuating casualties was
well on the way to being solved. At 1600 on 13 September 1951--a date
that would have historical significance--Operation WINDMILL I was set
in motion.
Lieutenant Colonel Herring had attended the final planning conference
at Division headquarters at 0830 on the 13th, and he was told that the
operation would involve a lift of one day’s supplies to 2/1 over a
distance of seven miles. The commanding officer of 2/1 was to select
suitable landing points and the commanding officer of 1st Shore Party
Battalion had the responsibility of providing support teams to operate
at the embarkation and landing points.[285]
[285] LtCol H. W. Edwards, interv of 20 Feb 61.
Only two days had been available for training and rehearsals, but not
a minute was wasted. All morning on the 13th the embarkation point
section separated the supplies into balanced loads of about 800 pounds
per helicopter. Loading commenced at 1520. Half an hour later, seven
aircraft were ready to depart while four others went ahead to carry the
landing point section to the previously reconnoitered site.
The route followed the valleys as much as possible, so that the
helicopters were in defilade most of the way. Smoke was laid down by
the 11th Marines for concealment.
The landing point section managed in 20 minutes to clear an area of
20 × 40 feet (later enlarged to 100 × 100 feet) and mark it with
fluorescent panels. At 1610 the first HRS-1 hovered with cargo nets
suspended from a hook released by manual control. A few minutes later
it took off with five walking wounded and two litter cases.
Each helicopter carried out as many casualties as possible, depending
on the amount of gasoline in the fuel tanks. Only 30 minutes passed
from the time one Marine was wounded and the time of his arrival at a
hospital clearing station 17 miles behind the firing line.
Radio provided communications between helicopters in flight, HMR-161
headquarters, 2/1 CP, and the Shore Party team at the landing site.
Fifteen aircraft were employed for one hour, three for two hours, and
one for two hours and 45 minutes--a total of 28 flights in over-all
time of 2½ hours. The helicopters landed at intervals of two minutes
and took off as soon as the landing point section could put the
casualties aboard. And though an altitude of 2,100 feet restricted
loads, 18,848 pounds of cargo had been lifted into the area and 74
casualties evacuated when the last “chopper” returned to X-83 at 1840.
To even the most pessimistic observer Operation WINDMILL I was a
complete success, so successful that a similar operation, WINDMILL II
was conducted on the 19th. Two days later the first helicopter lift of
combat troops was completed. A new era of military transport had dawned.
_The Fight for Hill 749_
Although 2/1 alone had 240 Korean cargadores attached, the 7½ tons of
helicopter-borne supplies, largely ammunition, were vitally needed
by the two assault battalions of the 1st Marines. After relieving
Fox Company of 2/7 south of Hill 749 at 1100 on the 13th, Lieutenant
Colonel Nihart’s 2/1 jumped off to the attack an hour later. Stiff
opposition was encountered from the beginning. The relief of the
remaining two companies of 2/7 was complicated by the fact that they
were some 400 yards from the position reported, on the reverse slope of
Hill 749. Throughout the day these Marines were heavily engaged with
the enemy.[286]
[286] Sources for this section are the same as for the previous
section except when otherwise noted.
On the left of 2/1, the 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La
Hue) could not make much progress toward its regimental objective, Hill
751, while the enemy was active on Hill 749. A second attack of 2/1
at 1500 drove to the summit of that height after fierce fighting with
small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. There was still much
fighting to be done before the entire objective would be secured since
many enemy bunkers hidden among the trees remained to be neutralized.
At 1600 a gap of about 300 yards separated 2/1 from the two 2/7
companies. So fierce was enemy resistance in this area that it took
until 2025 for Nihart’s men to complete the relief after fighting for
every foot of ground.
Air and artillery support had been excellent on the 13th despite the
fact that neither could be called by 2/1 in some instances because
of the danger of hitting elements of 2/7. Even so, 2/11 (Lieutenant
Colonel Dale H. Heely) and other artillery units fired 2,133 rounds
and Company C of the 1st Tank Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly
H. Evans) contributed 720 rounds of 90mm fire which knocked out six
enemy bunkers. The 4.2″ mortars had a busy day firing 261 HE and 28 WP
rounds, and Company C of the 1st Engineer Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
John V. Kelsey) supported the attack by clearing mine fields.
Mortar fire was received by the 1st Marines throughout the night,
and 3/1 repulsed a series of counterattacks by an estimated 300
enemy. Colonel Wornham’s regiment continued the attack at 0800 on 14
September. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions inched their way forward
against a heavy volume of well-aimed enemy mortar, artillery, and
automatic weapons fire.
NKPA resistance persisted on the wooded northern slope of Hill 749,
where hidden bunkers had to be knocked out, one by one. It took
constant slugging for 2/1 to advance 300 meters before dusk, enabling
3/1 to fight its way to the summit of Hill 751. Again the flat
trajectory fire of Company C tanks had been helpful as 400 rounds were
directed against NKPA bunkers, while the 11th Marines fired 3,029
rounds.
The 15th was a relatively quiet day as compared to the previous 48
hours. In preparation for an expected passage of lines, the action took
a slower tempo as units consolidated their positions. The principal
fight of the day was a continuation of the attack by 2/1 north of
Hill 749. Although the battalion commander had arranged for a heavy
artillery preparation, the attack, which jumped off at 1710, was
stopped at 1800 by a terrific pounding from NKPA mortars and artillery
coupled with a crossfire of machine guns from concealed bunkers. The
assault troops withdrew under effective covering fire by the 11th
Marines to positions occupied the previous night. Objective BAKER yet
remained to be secured.
The Marines could not help paying reluctant tribute to the skill as
well as obstinacy of the NKPA defense. Enemy bunkers were so stoutly
constructed that the North Koreans did not hesitate to direct well
aimed mortar fire on their own positions when the Marines closed in for
the final attack.
NKPA fields of fire were laid out for the utmost effect. Marines with
recent memories of college football referred to the enemy’s effective
use of terrain as the “North Korean T Formation.” On Hill 749, for
example, the main ridgeline leading to the summit was crossed by
another wooded ridgeline at right angles. Attackers fighting their way
up the leg of the “T” came under deadly crossfire from the head of the
imaginary letter--a transverse ridgeline bristling with mortars and
machine guns positioned in bunkers.
In accordance with Division OpnO 25-51, the 5th Marines (Colonel
Richard C. Weede) moved up to assembly areas on 15 September in
preparation for passing through 3/1 on the 16th to continue the attack.
The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines in turn would relieve 1/1 (Major Edgar
F. Carney, Jr.), so that it could pass through 2/1 and carry on the
assault to complete the securing of Hill 749.
The KMCs and Division Recon Company were to relieve the 5th Marines of
responsibility for the HAYS Line, while the 7th Marines remained in
reserve at Wontong-ni.
The comparative quiet of the 15th was shattered a minute after midnight
when the enemy launched a savage four-hour attack to drive 2/1 off Hill
749. The NKPA hurricane barrage that preceded the attempt, according
to the Division report, “reached an intensity that was estimated to
surpass that of any barrage yet encountered by the 1st Marine Division
in Korea.”[287]
[287] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 19–20.
The thinned companies of 2/1 took a frightful pounding from 76mm,
105mm, and 122mm artillery supplemented by 82mm and 120mm mortars.
Bugles and whistles were the signal for the onslaught. It was stopped
by weary Marines who demonstrated at NKPA expense that they, too, could
put up a resolute defensive fight.
Wave after wave of attackers dashed itself at the thinned Marine
platoons, only to shatter against a resistance that could be bent
but not broken. The fight was noteworthy for examples of individual
valor. When one of the forward Marine platoons was compelled to give
ground slowly, Corporal Joseph Vittori of Fox Company rushed through
the withdrawing troops to lead a successful local counterattack. As
the all-night fight continued, “he leaped from one foxhole to another,
covering each foxhole in turn as casualties continued to mount, manning
a machine gun when the gunner was struck down and making repeated trips
through the heaviest shell fire to replenish ammunition.”[288]
[288] Jane Blakeney, ed., _Heroes, U.S. Marine Corps,
1861–1955_ (Washington, 1957), Joseph Vittori Medal of
Honor Citation, 45.
Vittori was mortally wounded during the last few minutes of the
fight, thus becoming the second Marine of 2/1 within a 48-hour period
to win the Medal of Honor. His predecessor was Pfc Edward Gomez of
Easy Company. When an enemy grenade landed in the midst of his squad
on 14 September, he “unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice himself and,
diving into the ditch with the deadly missile, absorbed the shattering
violence of the explosion in his own body.”[289]
[289] _Ibid._, Pfc Edward Gomez citation, 38.
Not until 0400 on the 16th did the enemy waves of attack subside on
Hill 749. NKPA strength was estimated at a regiment. A combined assault
by an estimated 150 enemy on 3/1 positions to the west in the vicinity
of Hill 751 was repulsed shortly after midnight, as were three lesser
efforts during the early morning hours of the 16th.
When the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved out at 0830 to pass through
2/1 and continue the fight, it was the first day of command for
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gorman.[290] The passage of lines was slowed
by enemy mortar fire, and NKPA resistance stiffened as 1/1 attacked
along the ridgeline leading toward Hill 749. At 1800, after a hard
day’s fighting, Objective BAKER was occupied and defensive positions
were organized for the night.
[290] On 14 September, LtCol Horace E. Knapp, Jr., the previous
commanding officer of 1/1, was severely wounded while
reconnoitering forward positions. He was evacuated,
and the executive officer, Major Edgar F. Carney, Jr.,
commanded until LtCol John E. Gorman assumed command at
noon on the 16th.
Thus was the attack of the 1st Marines terminated. Around Hill 751, 3/1
remained in control. The regiment’s other two battalions, 1/1 and 2/1,
held a defensive line about 1,500 yards long on both sides of Hill 749.
Hill 749 had finally been secured. A number of mutually supporting
hidden enemy bunkers had been knocked out in a ruthless battle of
extermination, and veterans of the World War II Pacific conflict were
reminded of occasions when Japanese resistance flared up in similar
fashion after ground was thought to be secure.
Casualties of the 1st Marine Division during the four-day fight for
Hill 749, most of them suffered by the attacking regiment, were 90 KIA,
714 WIA, and 1 MIA. Enemy losses for the same period were 771 counted
KIA (although more than twice that number were estimated KIA) and 81
prisoners.
_5th Marines Attack Hill 812_
Division OpnO 25-51 assigned the 5th Marines the mission of passing
through 3/1 in the vicinity of Hill 751 and attacking to secure
Objective DOG, the bare, brown hill mass which loomed approximately
1,000 yards ahead. The last few hundred yards were certain to be long
ones, for the main east-west ridgeline leading to Hill 812 was crossed
by a north-south ridgeline--the leg and head of another “T” formation.
Again, as on Hill 749, the attackers had to fight their way through a
vicious crossfire.
Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff’s 2/5 on the right had the main
effort. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Donald R.
Kennedy) was to advance on Stiff’s left with the mission of supporting
his attack on Objective DOG, prepared to seize Hill 980 on order.
Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston’s 1/5 remained in regimental
reserve.[291]
[291] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified are
as follows: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 19–23; 5thMar _HD_,
Sep 51, 14–19; 1st, 2d, and 3dBn, 5th Mar, _HD_, Sep
51; LtCol Houston Stiff, interv of 25 Jun 58; Maj G. P.
Averill, “Final Objective,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, vol.
40, no. 8 (Aug 56), 10–16.
Fox Company spearheaded the 2/5 attack by moving initially up the low
ground between Hill 673 on the right hand and 680 on the left. Owing to
delays in completing the relief of 1st Marines elements, it was early
afternoon on 16 September before the assault got underway. Progress was
slow against heavy mortar and machine gun fire, and a halt came at 1700
for regrouping and evacuation of casualties.
Dog Company, in support on the ridge to the left, sighted troops
approaching the objective and requested that the positions of the
assault company be identified. In order to pinpoint the locations,
a white phosphorous grenade was used as a mark. It attracted the
attention of aircraft summoned by 3/5 against Hill 980 (Map 17), from
which fire had been received. The planes, assuming that another target
had been designated, attacked the forward platoons of Fox Company with
napalm and machine guns. By a miracle, recognition panels were put out
before a single casualty resulted, but the men found it a harrowing
experience.
Darkness fell before the attack could be resumed, and Fox Company
pulled back along the ridgeline to set up a perimeter defense and
evacuate the wounded. The night passed without enemy action. Bright
moonlight made for unusual visibility which discouraged enemy attacks
and permitted the Marine assault platoons more sleep than might
otherwise have been expected.
Regimental orders called for 2/5 to resume the attack at 0400 on the
17th, supported by the fires of 3/5, while 1/5 continued in reserve.
Fox Company of 2/5 had some difficulty in orienting itself after the
confusion of the night before and was delayed until 0700 in jumping
off. This proved to be a stroke of luck, for dawn gave the Marines a
good view of unsuspecting enemy troops eating breakfast and making
ready for the day’s fighting. Fox Company called artillery on them with
good effect.
Surprise gave the attack an opening advantage and rapid progress was
made at first along the main ridgeline leading west to Hill 812. Then
Fox Company was stopped by the crossfire from the head of the “T.” Easy
Company passed through at 0830 to continue the assault, reinforced by a
platoon of Fox Company that had become Separated from its parent unit,
although it kept in touch by radio.
An air strike was called but did not materialize. After waiting for
it in vain, Easy Company drove toward the summit with the support of
artillery and mortars.
Two hours after passing through Fox Company, the attackers had advanced
only about a hundred yards against the NKPA crossfire. At 1100,
Lieutenant Colonel Stiff ordered an all-out drive for the objective,
following a preliminary barrage of everything that could be thrown
at the enemy--artillery, 75mm recoilless, rockets, and 81mm and 4.2″
mortars. As soon as the bombardment lifted, Easy Company was to drive
straight ahead along the ridgeline while the 2d Platoon of Fox Company
made a flank attack.
This maneuver turned the trick. The blow on the flank took the enemy
by surprise, and in just 36 minutes the assault troops were on the
summit after a hard fight at close quarters with automatic weapons and
grenades. Since regimental orders had specified “before nightfall,”
Objective DOG had been seized ahead of schedule.
With scarcely a pause, Easy Company continued along the ridgeline
leading west from Hill 812 toward Hill 980. Remarkably fast progress
was made against an enemy who appeared to be thrown off balance.
Permission was asked to seize Hill 980. The regimental commander
refused because of instructions from Division to the effect that this
position could not be defended while the enemy remained in possession
of Hill 1052, the key terrain feature. Easy Company was directed to
withdraw 600 yards toward Hill 812.
Late in the evening of 17 September, Colonel Weede directed his two
assault battalions to consolidate on the best ground in their present
locations and prepare to hold a defensive line.
When the brakes were put on the attack, 3/5 was strung out over a wide
area to the north of Hill 751. This battalion was not tied in with 2/5,
which occupied positions coordinated for the defense of Hill 812--Easy
Company to the west, on the ridgeline leading to 980; Dog and Weapons
Company to the south, protecting the left flank; and Fox Company to the
east.
Both Easy and Fox Companies were under fire from Hills 980 and 1052,
and daytime movement on 812 was restricted to the northern slope. Even
so, sniping shots from well aimed North Korean 76mm mountain guns
inflicted a number of casualties.
_The Struggle for the “Rock”_
An abrupt change in the enemy’s strategy became evident throughout
these September operations. Where he had previously contented himself
with an elastic defense, every position was now bitterly fought for and
held to the last man. When it was lost, counterattacks were launched in
efforts to regain it.
One of these attempts hit the western outpost of 2/5’s Easy Company at
0430 on 18 September, compelling the Marines to give ground. A second
counterattack at 0840 was repulsed. Enemy fire from Hills 980 and 1042
continued all day long, and Colonel Stiff’s battalion suffered most
of the 16 KIA and 98 WIA casualties reported by the Division for 18
September.
The night of 18–19 September passed in comparative quiet, but at
daylight the enemy on Hills 980 and 1052 was still looking down the
throats of the 2/5 Marines. None of the participants will ever forget
a landmark known simply as “the Rock”--a huge granite knob athwart the
ridgeline approximately 700 yards west of Hill 812. Only 12 feet high,
its location made it visible from afar. The Marines outposted the top
and eastern side, while the enemy held tenaciously to the western side.
Along the northern slope of the ridge leading west to the Rock were the
only positions affording protection to the dug-in forward elements of
the battalion.
The need for fortification materials such as sand bags, barbed wire,
and mines aggravated the already serious supply problems of 2/5.
A request for helicopter support was sent at 1100 on the 19th and
approved immediately by General Thomas. Loading commenced early the
same afternoon, and Operation WINDMILL II was launched. A total of
12,180 pounds were lifted by 10 HRS-1 aircraft in 16 flights during the
overall time of one hour.[292]
[292] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 162.
Again, on 19 September, 2/5 incurred most of the casualties reported
by the Division. During the day 1/5, after relieving the 1st and 2d
Battalions of the 1st Marines, moved up on the right of 2/5 to occupy a
defensive line stretching two miles east along the ridge almost to the
Soyang-gang.
NKPA action was confined to incessant long-range fire during the
daylight hours of the 19th, but at 0315 the following morning the
enemy made a desperate effort to retake Hill 812. After a brief but
intense mortar and artillery barrage, North Koreans in at least company
strength came pouring around the northern side of the Rock to attack
with grenades and burp guns at close range. The left platoon of Easy
Company counterattacked but was pushed back by superior numbers to
positions on the left flank of the hill.
The enemy immediately took possession of evacuated ground which enabled
him to fire into the front lines of Easy Company. At 0500 another
Marine counterattack began, with Easy Company making a frontal assault
and the 2d Platoon of Fox Company striking the enemy flank. It was
the same platoon that had delivered the flank attack resulting in the
capture of Hill 812. Again 2/Fox struck the decisive blow with grenades
and automatic weapons. The surprise was too much for enemy troops who
hastened back to their own side of the Rock, leaving 60 counted dead
behind.[293]
[293] 1st Marine Division losses of 33 killed and 235 wounded
during the three-day attack were incurred for the must
part by the 5th Marines in general and 2/5 in particular.
Enemy casualties of this period were reported as 972 KIA
(265 counted) and 113 prisoners.
This was the last action of a battle that had occupied all three Marine
regiments from 11 to 20 September inclusive while the KMC Regiment
patrolled aggressively on the Division left flank. Three of the four
Division objectives had been secured after savage fights, but Objective
CHARLIE (the ridgeline northwest of Hill 1052 in the KMC zone) had yet
to be attacked when Division OpnO 26-51 put an abrupt stop to offensive
movement.
Not only was the fight west of Hill 812 the last action of the 1st
Marine Division’s nine-day battle; it was the last action of mobility
for Marines in Korea. As time went on, it would become more and more
apparent that 20 September 1951 dated a turning point in the Korean
conflict. On that day the warfare of movement came to an end, and the
warfare of position began.