The New Warfare of Position
_Sectors of Major_ EUSAK _Units--Statement by General Van Fleet--Hill
854 Secured by 3/1--Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884--Helicopter
Operation_ BLACKBIRD--_“To Organize, Construct, and Defend”--Marine
Operations of November 1951--The Second Marine Christmas in Korea_
Two and a half weeks of hard fighting had taken place along the X Corps
front when General James A. Van Fleet paid a visit on 16 September
1951. The commanding general of EUSAK wished to inspect the operations
and determine the morale of the 1st Marine Division and 2d Infantry
Division, both of which had suffered heavy casualties. He found the
morale of these X Corps units good and had no adverse criticisms of
their operations. While on this tour of inspection, however, he issued
the following three directives to X Corps:
(1) That replacements would be integrated into units only when
the battalion or larger-sized unit to which they were assigned
was in reserve;
(2) that certain ‘choke points’ [General Van Fleet pointed
out the locations on the map] be interdicted to prevent enemy
reinforcements or withdrawals through these points;
(3) _that the Corps Commander firm up his line by 20 September
and to plan no further offensives after that date_, as it was
unprofitable to continue the bitter operation.[294]
[294] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 47. Other sources for this
chapter are comments and criticisms by the following
officers, all but one of whom are U.S. Marines. Ranks in
each instance are those held at the time of interview or
correspondence.
General J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.); General G. C. Thomas,
Lieutenant General J. T. Selden; Brigadier Generals V. H.
Krulak, S. S. Wade, R. G. Weede; Colonels G. P. Groves,
B. T. Hemphill, K. L. McCutcheon, J. H. Tinsley, F. B.
Nihart, G. D. Gayle, W. P. Mitchell, J. F. Stamm, F. P.
Hager, Jr.; Lieutenant Colonels H. W. Edwards, J. G.
Kelly; Major R. L. Autry.
[Illustration: EUSAK DISPOSITIONS
20 SEPTEMBER 1951
MAP 19]
Italics have been added to emphasize the importance of 20 September
1951 as the turning point when a warfare of position replaced a warfare
of movement throughout the remaining 22 months of the conflict in
Korea. There are few dates as important in the entire history of the
war.
General Van Fleet reiterated his instructions on the 18th in a
confirming directive to the effect that X Corps continue making limited
attacks “until 20 September, after which ... units were to firm up the
existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it.”[295]
[295] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 53.
_Sectors of Major_ EUSAK _Units_
At this turning point the Eighth Army had 14 divisions from four corps
committed along a 125-mile front across the peninsula. These units were
distributed (Map 19) as follows:
U.S. I CORPS
_ROK 1st Division_ holding the left anchor in the Munsan-ni area
and controlling the 5th KMC Battalion on the Kimpo Peninsula;
_British 1st Commonwealth Division_ across the river Imjin to the
northeast;
_U.S. 1st Cavalry Division_ (Greek and Thai Battalions attached)
still farther to the northeast in the Yonchon area;
_U.S. 3rd Infantry Division_ (Belgian Battalion and Philippine
20th BCT attached) having the responsibility for the vital
Chorwon area;
U.S. IX CORPS
_U.S. 25th Infantry Division_ (Turkish Brigade attached)
defending the area west of Kumhwa;
_ROK 2d Division_ holding a sector east of Kumhwa;
_U.S. 7th Infantry Division_ (Ethiopian Battalion attached) on
the right;
_ROK 6th Division_ with a narrow sector as far east as the Pukhan
River, the Corps boundary;
_U.S. 24th Infantry Division_ (Colombian Battalion attached) in
Corps reserve south of Hwachon;
U.S. X CORPS
_ROK 8th Division_ on the left flank;
_U.S. 2d Infantry Division_ (French and Netherlands Battalions
attached) in left-central portion of Corps front;
_ROK 5th Division_ occupying a narrow sector to the east;
_U.S. 1st Marine Division_ holding eastern portion of the Corps
sector;
ROK I CORPS
_ROK 11th Division_ responsible for left of the Corps front;
_ROK Capitol Division_ holding the line eastward to the Sea of
Japan;
_ROK 3d Division_ in reserve at Yangyang for a period of
training.[296]
[296] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Oct 31, 5–6 and Plate 1; 1stMarDiv _HD_,
Sep 51, 3.
Some rather complicated juggling of units took place on the X Corps
front, giving the effect of a game of musical chairs in the tactical
sphere. From 18 to 21 September the 1st Marine Division extended its
line eastward to relieve the 8th ROK Division on the extreme right of
the Corps area. That Division in turn relieved the 5th ROK Division
on the extreme left, whereupon the latter leapfrogged the 2d Infantry
Division to occupy a new sector on the left of the Marines.
_Statement by General Van Fleet_
“Theirs not to reason why” could never have been written about American
fighting men. From 1775 to the present day, they have always taken
a keen interest in the high-level strategic and tactical decisions
governing their operations. This applies with particular force to the
Marines, who have seldom had a voice in the shaping of operations above
the division level.
As if in direct reply to unspoken questions, the commanding general of
the Eighth Army made a statement on 30 September explaining the purpose
of his strategy. “My basic mission during the past four months,” he
said, “has been to destroy the enemy, so that the men of Eighth Army
will not be destroyed.... Each loaded enemy weapon was a definite
threat to the Eighth Army. It was imperative that we knock out as many
of those weapons as we could find....”
“In prodding the enemy in the deep belly of the peninsula,” continued
General Van Fleet, “we have taken many casualties.... It was mandatory
that we control the high ground features, so that we could look down
the throat of the enemy and thereby better perform our task of
destruction.... In seizing these hills we lost men, but in losing a
comparative few we saved other thousands.”
Estimated casualties, inflicted on the enemy by UN ground forces
alone from 25 May to 25 September, were announced as 188,237 by the
EUSAK commander. “As we open our autumn campaign,” he added, “the
enemy potential along the front line has been sharply reduced by our
hill-hopping tactics. The Communist forces in Korea are not liquidated
but they are badly crippled.”[297]
[297] _Ibid._, 29–30.
Even so, EUSAK G-2 summaries credited the enemy on 1 October 1951 with
more than 600,000 troops at the front, or in reserve and available
as immediate reinforcements. Six CCF armies and one NKPA corps were
capable of reinforcing the units on the MLR or participating in an
offensive. The enemy also had an estimated 7,000 men in guerrilla
forces behind the UN lines.[298]
[298] _Ibid._, 7–9 and Plate No. 4.
The maximum strength of UN forces in Korea during October was 607,300.
This total included 236,871 U.S. Army troops, 21,020 Fifth Air Force
personnel, 30,913 U.S. Marines (including 5,386 officers and men of the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing), 286,000 men in ROK units, and 32,172 Allied
troops.[299]
[299] _Ibid._, 5–6, and Plate No. 1.
Although it might appear that the opposing forces were about equal,
it must be remembered that well over one-fourth of the UN troops were
engaged in administrative or maintenance duties behind the front. Thus
the Communists had a numerical advantage of at least four to three on
the firing line. This was not at all unusual, since they had enjoyed a
preponderance in manpower from the beginning.
_Hill 854 Secured by 3/1_
In accordance with EUSAK instructions, X Corps OI-235 directed the 1st
Marine Division to organize and construct defensive positions after
relieving the 8th ROK Division on the right and taking over its sector.
On the Corps boundary, elements of the 11th ROK Division, I ROK Corps,
were to be relieved on Hill 884 (Map 20). This meant the addition of
some 9,000 yards to the Marine front, making a total of about 22,800
yards or more than 13 miles.
First Marine Division OpnO 27-51, issued on 18 September, relayed the
X Corps directions. It also called for such offensive action as might
be necessary to complete the securing of Hill 854, in the sector of
the 8th ROK Division, if not in friendly hands at the time of the
relief.[300]
[300] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 3.
That the enemy had put up a desperate fight to hold this position
is indicated by the EUSAK report for 15–16 September: “The ROK 8th
Division, employing all three regiments, attacked against heavy and
stubborn resistance to wrest Hill 854 from the three battalions of
North Koreans who held the position. The ROK 21st Regiment forced one
of these battalions to withdraw and occupied a part of the hill, but
at the close of the day were engaged in heavy hand-to-hand fighting to
retain the position.”[301]
[301] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 47.
On 20 September, after three weeks of continual combat, the major units
of the 1st Marine Division were disposed from left to right (Map 20) as
follows:
1st KMC Regiment (Colonel Kim Dae Shik, commanding; Colonel Walter N.
Flournoy, senior adviser) occupying the HAYS line on the left flank and
patrolling vigorously to the north;
5th Marines (Colonel Richard G. Weede) holding a wide sector in the
center, with Hill 812 as the principal terrain feature;
1st Marines (Colonel Thomas A. Wornham) in process of extending
eastward to the Corps boundary just beyond Hill 884;
7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John J. Wermuth) in Division reserve at
Wontong-ni.[302]
[302] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 3–4, 18–22.
Division OpnO 27-51 designated the 1st Marines to relieve the ROKs
on Hill 854 and complete the seizure of that terrain feature, if
necessary. As a preliminary, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines
(Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston) took over the front of the 1st
Marines on the HAYS line. This enabled 1/1 and 3/1 to enlarge the
Division sector by side-slipping to the east while Lieutenant Colonel
Franklin B. Nihart’s 2/1 went into immediate reserve just behind the
main line of resistance.[303]
[303] The balance of this section is based on the 1stMarDiv
_HD_, Sep 51, 18–24, and on 1/1 and 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51.
The 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John E.
Gorman) relieved two battalions of the 10th ROK Regiment in the Hill
854 area. No opposition from the enemy was encountered, but the
Marines suffered 11 casualties from mines as a consequence of incorrect
charts supplied by the ROKs.
[Illustration: 1st MARINE DIVISION ZONE OF ACTION SITUATION ON 20
SEPT 51
MAP 20]
By this time it had become an open question whether “friendly” mines
did more harm to friend or foe. Certain it was, at any rate, that the
prevailing system--or lack of system--resulted in Marine casualties
during nearly every offensive operation in zones where the action
shifted back and forth.
Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La Hue’s 3/1 relieved two battalions of
the 21st ROK Regiment. Although the ROKs had fought their way to the
summit of Hill 854, the ridgeline to the southwest remained in the
enemy’s hands. An attack by 3/1 was planned for 1530 on 20 September,
supported by artillery and an air strike. Delays in the arrival of the
planes caused a postponement until 1720. How Company jumped off and had
advanced 50 yards when a man was killed and another wounded by mines.
The attack was called off at dusk so that the ROKs could remove the
explosives they had planted.
Air support was requested for 0700 on the morning of the 21st, but it
was 1040 before four Air Force F-51s arrived for a strike directed by
an observation plane of VMO-6 and a forward air controller. At 1220,
following a 10-minute artillery preparation, How Company spearpointed
a battalion attack which met stiff resistance. Another air strike was
requested but did not materialize. The assault continued with mortar
and artillery support until 1745, when How Company reported the ridge
line secured.
Casualties of 3/1 for the two days were nine KIA and 55 WIA. Enemy
losses totaled 159 counted and 150 estimated KIA, 225 estimated WIA,
and 29 prisoners.[304]
[304] Sources for the action on Hill 854 are the 1/1 and 3/1
historical diaries for September 1951.
“A large number of mines and booby traps were discovered within the
battalion sector,” the 3/1 report for the 23d concluded, “most of these
being U.S. types which were placed by ROK troops, with only a few enemy
mines scattered in the central portion of the sector.”[305]
[305] 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51, 8.
_Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884_
Division OpnO 27-51, it may be recalled, had directed the Marines to
extend the X Corps boundary eastward by taking over the sector of the
11th Regiment, I ROK Corps. Even under ordinary circumstances this
would have meant an exhausting 15-hour march for the relieving troops
merely to climb Hill 884 (Map 20), The position was accessible only on
foot, and supplies had to be brought on the backs of cargadores.
Because of the isolation of this wildly mountainous area, a
reconnaissance was deemed essential. Major General Gerald C. Thomas,
commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, assigned that mission to
the Division Reconnaissance Company after deciding on a troop lift by
helicopter.
He was aware, of course, that no such operation had ever been
undertaken during the brief history of rotary-wing aircraft.
Large-scale helicopter troop lifts were still at the theoretical stage.
Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring, commanding officer of HMR-101,
had but 48 hours for preparation. He and his executive officer,
Lieutenant Colonel William P. Mitchell, worked out a tactical and
loading plan with the commanding officer of Recon Company, Major
Ephraim Kirby-Smith, and the acting Division Embarkation Officer, First
Lieutenant Richard C. Higgs.[306]
[306] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified, are
the following: DivReconCo _HD_, 1stShorePartyBn _HD_,
HMR-161 _HD_, Sep 51; Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of
Assault Helicopters,” 7–13; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 162–165.
An air reconnaissance of Hill 884 disclosed only two acceptable
locations for landing sites, both approximately 50 feet square with a
sheer drop on two sides. About 100 yards apart and some 300 feet below
the topographical crest, each could be cleared sufficiently for the
landing of a single aircraft.
Major Kirby-Smith decided on the order in which troops of his company
and attached units would be landed. The assignment and loading
tables were completed on 20 September in time for a rehearsal. All
participants were instructed as to their team numbers and embarkation
points.
H-Hour of Operation SUMMIT (Map 21) was set for 1000 on 21 September.
The plan called for a preliminary landing of a Recon Company rifle
squad to provide security. Next, a landing point team from the 1st
Shore Party Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Edwards) had the
mission of clearing the two sites. These two groups were to disembark
from hovering helicopters by means of knotted 30-foot ropes. Strong
winds at the 2,900-foot altitude made landing quite hazardous.
The execution was delayed half an hour by the ground fog so prevalent
at this time of year. As soon as the two landing sites were cleared
(about 40 minutes), word was transmitted by radio for the loading to
begin at Field X-83 (Map 21), about 14 miles southwest of Hill 884 by
the defiladed route of flight.
Control over the landings and takeoffs on the two Hill 884 sites was
exercised by a hovering helicopter. Aircraft landed at 30-second
intervals, each carrying five fully equipped men who disembarked in
average time of 20 seconds. Two radio nets maintained communications
between the landing sites and orbiting aircraft. Voice contact could
not be established between the landing point team and X-83, however,
and it became necessary for a helicopter to return within sight of the
field to restore communications for incoming aircraft.
A total of 224 men, including a heavy machine gun platoon from 2/7, was
lifted in flight time of 31.2 hours and over-all time of four hours. In
addition, 17,772 pounds of cargo were landed.
Operation SUMMIT ended with the laying of two telephone lines between
Recon Company on Hill 884 and the CP of the 1st Marines, about eight
miles to the rear. Fifteen minutes were required for dropping each
line. The ROKs, following their relief, proceeded on foot to their own
Corps area.
From a tactical viewpoint, the importance of Hill 884 lay in its
domination of enemy-held terrain. The difficulty of reaching the remote
position had been overcome by the helicopter, and Operation SUMMIT was
recorded in front page headlines by Stateside newspapers.
Congratulations poured in from all sides. Lieutenant General Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of FMFPac, complimented HMR-161 on
“a bright new chapter in the employment of helicopters by Marines.”
Major General Clovis E. Byers, commanding X Corps, praised the “organic
and attached units of the 1st Marine Division that participated in
the first relief of units on the battle position. Your imaginative
experiment with this kind of transport is certain to be of lasting
value to all the services.”[307]
[307] Messages of congratulation are quoted from HMR-161 _HD_,
Sep 51.
Nobody was more enthusiastic than General Thomas. “Operation SUMMIT,
the first helicopter-borne landing of a combat unit in history, was an
outstanding success,” said his message. “To all who took part, well
done!”
[Illustration: HMR-161
OPERATIONS
1951
MAP 21]
_Helicopter Operation_ BLACKBIRD
It is not surprising, considering their training, that the Marines
found it a difficult transition from offensive to defensive operations
after 20 September. As evidence that patrols were conducted with
customary aggressiveness, Marine casualties (including the 1st KMC
Regiment) for the last 10 days of the month were 59 KIA, 1 MIA, and 331
WIA. Enemy losses for the same period were 505 counted KIA, and 237
prisoners.
1st Marine Division casualties of 2,416 (including 594 reported by the
KMCs) for September as a whole were the most severe suffered during
any month of the war so far with the exception of December 1950 and
June 1951. NKPA losses of the month were 2,799 counted KIA and 557
prisoners.[308]
[308] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 4, 31–32.
On the 23d the 1st Marines extended to the eastern boundary of X Corps
and relieved the Division Reconnaissance Company on Hill 884. That same
day the enemy was treated to a novelty when 100 well aimed 16-inch
projectiles, fired from a range of 40,000 yards, roared in like meteors
on his positions in the area of Hill 951 (Map 20). Naval gunfire from
the USS _New Jersey_ was being conducted by Marine spotters in forward
OPs, who reported good coverage for the 2,000-pound rounds. Ammunition
dumps and artillery pieces were destroyed while NKPA troops in the open
suffered heavy personnel casualties, according to observers.
Several more bombardments were contributed by the _New Jersey_ at
the request of 1/1 and 3/1 during the balance of the month. Marine
and attached Army artillery also gave excellent support with fire
so accurate as to break up enemy counterattacks before they could
be launched. Ammunition restrictions hampered the efforts of the
11th Marines (Colonel Custis Burton, Jr.) but the cannoneers never
failed to respond to an emergency. The 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly H. Evans) continued to show good
results with direct observed fire on enemy bunkers. Air support in
September, concluded the Division report, was “generally inadequate and
unsatisfactory.”[309]
[309] _Ibid._
By the last week of September the Division right (east) flank was well
protected, considering the rugged terrain. Not as much could be said
for the other flank, northwest of the Punchbowl, where the sector of
the Marines joined that of the 5th ROK Division. Since the Division
sector was divided by high, roadless mountains, there was no rapid
way of moving reserves other than by helicopter. In short, the 1st
Marine Division was hard pressed to man a 22,800-yard MLR while keeping
in reserve enough troops to help defend this sensitive area in an
emergency.
Plans were completed by General Thomas and the Division staff for the
rapid displacement of a company from 2/1, the reserve battalion of the
1st Marines, to meet any such threat. Since a surprise attack was most
likely to occur at night, it was decided that a helicopter lift of an
element of the Division reserve should be made in the darkness of 27
September after a detailed daytime rehearsal.[310]
[310] The remainder of this section is based upon the Type “C”
Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II,
1–9; HMR-161 and 1stShorePartyBn _HD_, Sep and Oct 51;
_Cavalry of the Sky_, 165–167.
In contrast to former Marine helicopters, which had no night-flying
aids, the HRS-1 was equipped with few attitude of flight instruments.
They were primitive compared to the sophisticated instrumentation of
fixed-wing planes, and Lieutenant Colonel Herring sent his pilots on
preliminary night indoctrination flights to memorize terrain features.
The route, five air miles in length, amounted to a round trip of 13
miles because of the detours necessary for purposes of concealment. The
aircraft were to take off from a dry river bed southeast of Hill 702
(Map 21) and land near the northwestern rim of the Punchbowl, where the
troops would march a mile to their final assembly area.
The infantry unit selected for Operation BLACKBIRD was Easy Company
of 2/1, commanded by Second Lieutenant William K. Rockey. Lieutenant
Colonel Nihart and Major Carl E. Walker, the battalion commander and
his executive officer, supervised the daylight rehearsal on the morning
of the 27th. Six helicopters lifted 200 men in the overall time of two
hours and 10 minutes to a landing site of 50 by 100 feet cleared by a
team of the 1st Shore Party Battalion. The troops were proceeding on
foot to their assembly area when an antipersonnel mine wounded a man.
Nihart called a halt immediately and investigation revealed that the
area was filled with mines. Plans were changed to abandon the march,
although the landing site remained the same.
Operation BLACKBIRD got under way at 1930 on 27 September. The night
was dark when the first HRS-1 took off with five combat-equipped men.
Three-minute intervals were required between aircraft operating on a
shuttle system, so as to avoid the danger of collisions. Different
altitudes were assigned to outgoing and incoming helicopters which
used running lights only two minutes before entering or leaving the
debarkation zone.
A total of 223 troops were landed in over-all time of two hours and
20 minutes instead of the nine hours a movement by foot would have
required. Nevertheless, some of the results were not reassuring.
Rotor wash blew out many of the flare pots lighting the embarkation
area, and the battery-powered beach lanterns on the landing site
proved inadequate. Pilots were temporarily blinded by the glare on
windshields; and artillery flashes bothered them while making their way
through three mountain passes. Fortunately, good radio communications
aided pilots who had trouble in locating the landing site in spite of
night rehearsals.
Operation BLACKBIRD remained the only night helicopter troop lift
during the war in Korea. “Present equipment,” said the Marine report,
“indicates that under present conditions in Korea these night lifts
should be limited to movements within friendly territory.”[311]
[311] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “The Employment of Assault
Helicopters,” Part II, 4.
“_To Organize, Construct and Defend_”
“The Division continued to organize, construct and defend positions
along a 13½-mile front; patrol forward of the MLR and screen rear
areas; and maintain one U.S. Marine regiment which could not be
committed without authority from X Corps in a reserve area 17 miles
behind the lines.”
The above quotation, from the opening paragraph of the report of the
1st Marine Division for October 1951, sums up in a nutshell the new
trend of operations since 20 September. It is significant that for
the first time in 1951 the Division Historical Diary departs from a
daily account of events and divides the month into two equal parts
for a chronicle of operations. Not enough had happened to justify a
day-by-day summary.
This does not mean that the Marines neglected any opportunity to do
the enemy hurt. It means only that the opportunities of defensive
warfare were limited as compared to the preceding six months of
offensive operations. That the Marines made the best of such
opportunities is shown by the fact that the ratio of enemy to friendly
casualties increased from the 4-to-1 of September to the 20-to-1 of
October, even though the totals of the former month were larger.[312]
[312] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 1–3.
As a result of his new defensive policies, the enemy often avoided
a fight. Day after day passed during the first two weeks of October
without far-ranging Marine patrols being able to make contact.
Line MINNESOTA, the new MLR (Map 20), ran roughly parallel to the
hays line but included advanced positions taken in the September
offensive. During the first 10 days of October the 2d Battalion of the
1st Marines continued to be the Division forward reserve in readiness
for a quick shift to any threatened point in the MLR, and the Division
Reconnaissance Company had the mission of maintaining daily contact
with the 11th ROK Division on the Marines’ right flank.
It might seem that the 7th Marines, 17 miles to the rear at Wontong-ni,
would be entirely becalmed. Yet this regiment saw as much action on
some days as any of the three regiments ranging forward of the MLR.
The explanation was that the rear area was infested with elusive North
Korean guerrillas who kept the 7th Marines patrols busy.
Early in October the question arose as to how quickly a reserve
battalion could be shifted from one point to another. By this time
a company-size helicopter lift had become commonplace, having been
successfully completed twice by HMR-161 since Operation SUMMIT. It
remained to be seen whether a battalion could be transported with
comparable celerity, and, on 9 October, Division issued an order
warning of 3/7’s move.
The 7th Marines was due to exchange places with the 5th Marines on
the 11th after relieving that regiment in the center of the Division
front. While 1/7 and 2/7 completed a conventional relief of their
opposite numbers, 3/7 was selected for a helicopter lift. Lieutenant
Colonel Edwards, the new commanding officer, had recently commanded the
Shore Party Battalion and helped to train its landing site and loading
point teams. He took part in the planning along with Colonel Krulak,
Lieutenant Colonels Herring and Mitchell, and the new commanding
officer of the Shore Party Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel George G.
Pafford.
Planning went on as if for an amphibious operation. Assignment and
loading tables were worked out, and each Marine of the six-man
embarkation teams had his designated place in the helicopter. On 10
October all officers and men of 3/7 attended a familiarization class at
which trial teams were loaded.
Operation BUMBLEBEE began at 1000 on the 11th. Field X-77 (Map 21)
had been selected as the loading zone because of its proximity to the
assembly area of the 7th Marines. The landing site was just behind the
5th Marines MLR, northeast of Hill 702. A flight path of 15 miles took
advantage of the concealment afforded by valleys and defiladed areas.
The two dispatchers in the loading zone were provided with a checkoff
flight list containing the names of every team of 3/7. In order to
avoid delays, replacements could be summoned from a casual pool to fill
understrength teams to plane capacity. Average time for loading was 20
seconds.
Ten to 12 minutes were required for the flight. As the helicopters
landed at intervals of a minute, a team could exit and allow the craft
to be airborne in an average time of 17 seconds. “Time was saved,”
according to one Marine report, “when the Shore Party personnel, after
opening the door, vigorously assisted the passengers by grasping their
arms and starting them away from the craft. The last man out checked to
see if any gear had been forgotten. Guides furnished by the battalion
directed the passengers toward their respective company assembly areas,
thus keeping the landing areas clear at all times.”[313]
[313] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,”
Part II, 5–9. Other sources for Operation BUMBLEBEE are
HMR-161 and 1st ShorePartyBn _HD_, Oct 51, and _Cavalry
of the Sky_, 167–170.
Twelve helicopters were employed in 156 flights. The flight time was
65.9 hours and over-all time five hours and 50 minutes. A total weight
of 229,920 pounds included 958 combat-equipped troops averaging 240
pounds.
[Illustration:
DD MC A 132540
_Helicopter In The Hills--A large Sikorsky helicopter hovers over
the mountainous terrain of Korea. This type of aircraft has been
extensively used for many types of transport missions._]
[Illustration: DD MC A 131324]
_Generals Confer--Above, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas (left) and
MajGen Field Harris discuss the situation in April, 1952. Below,
MajGen John T. Selden (right) briefs Army MajGen R. D. Palmer._
[Illustration: DD MC A 159084]
[Illustration: DD MC A 8410]
_On The Planning Level--Above, BrigGen Whaling, MajGen Thomas,
and BrigGen Puller enjoy a bit of humor, while, below, MajGen
Thomas, LtGen Shephard, and Col Wade pose for the photographer._
[Illustration: DD MC A 157916]
[Illustration: DD MC A 161585]
_Ready For Action--Above, a Marine 105mm howitzer battery
preparing to fire a mission. Below, exterior and interior views
of a heavy and light machine gun emplacement._
[Illustration: DD MC A 155525 DD MC A 169584]
[Illustration: DD MC A 6953 DD MC A 6754]
_Going Up--Above, left and right, Marines move into position on
one of the many Korean hills. Below, a section of the MLR in
March, 1952._
[Illustration: DD MC A 160250]
[Illustration: DD MC A 159304]
_The Lifeline--Above, a view of the MSR of the 1st Marine
Division during January, 1952. Below, during the rainy season it
is difficult to move supplies over the poor roads._
[Illustration: DD MC A 164552]
[Illustration: DD MC A 162316]
_Terrain Features--Above, a Marine helicopter flies behind
ice-covered slopes to avoid enemy fire. Below, an enemy
stronghold nicknamed “Luke The Gook’s Castle.”_
[Illustration: DD MC A 160572]
[Illustration: USN 439970 USN 441346]
_Panmunjom “Talkathon”--Above (left) Gen Nam Il starts for the
truce talks. Above (right) United Nations’ sentries. Below, the
Chinese and North Korean Communist negotiators._
[Illustration: USN 431929]
[Illustration: USN 432414]
_Watchful Waiting--Above, MajGen L. C. Cragie and VAdm C. T. Joy
talk to correspondents at Panmunjom. Below, Communist and UN
sentries walk posts around the peace talk site._
[Illustration: USN 935646 USN 435646]
[Illustration: DD MC A 163575 DD MC A 164145]
_Lifesaver--Above, bruised Marines show the armored vests that
saved their lives. Below, a .45 caliber bullet test-fired into
cotton contrasted with three removed from an armored vest._
[Illustration: DD MC A 46216]
[Illustration: DD MC A 168081]
_Torso Protection--Above, a Marine rifleman lies prone to exhibit
the protective torso armor. Below, a helicopter evacuates a
corpsman who was wounded while treating a buddy._
[Illustration: DD MC A 167282]
[Illustration: DD MC A 156301]
_Papa-sans and Pills--Above, a group of Korean patriarchs gaze
curiously at a Marine tank. Below, an Army nurse administers
medication to a grimacing Marine._
[Illustration: SC 358063]
[Illustration: DD MC A 159786]
_A Dog’s Life--Above, Marines line up with their pets all packed
and ready to go. Below, troops gather for the ever-welcome mail
call._
[Illustration: DD MC A 7468]
[Illustration: DD MC A 6843]
_At The Front--Above, Marines advance across a fog-filled valley
while supported by machine gun fire. Below, a group of Communist
prisoners wait for interrogation by trained experts._
[Illustration: DD MC A 157686]
[Illustration: DD MC A 408351]
_CCF Propaganda--Above, one of the thousands of
attractively-colored CCF Christmas cards dropped on the_ MLR _in
December, 1951. Below, a mortar observer crew in action._
[Illustration: DD MC A 6627]
[Illustration: DD MC A 162989]
_Life’s Little Problems--PFC Henry A. Friday pauses to rest in
a trench and reflect upon the progress of his own particular
efforts towards fighting the Communists._
These statistics of Operation BUMBLEBEE made it certain that Stateside
headlines would proclaim another Marine “first.” Only four days later
HMR-161 demonstrated its ability to carry out on short notice an
emergency resupply and evacuation operation in a combat zone. Help
was requested in the IX Corps sector to the west for a completely
surrounded ROK unit in need of ammunition and of casualty evacuation.
Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell led six HRS-1 aircraft which flew in 19,000
pounds of ammunition. Lieutenant Donald L. Hilian (MC), USN, surgeon of
HMR-161, landed to supervise the evacuation of 24 wounded ROKs, several
of whom would otherwise have died. Captains James T. Cotton and Albert
A. Black made four flights each into the beleaguered area, and all
Marine pilots of Operation WEDGE were congratulated in person by Major
General Claude F. Ferenbaugh, commanding general of IX Corps.[314]
[314] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 171.
Seven infantry battalions, with 2/1 in immediate reserve, manned the
MLR from 1 to 13 October--three KMC battalions on the left of the
Division sector; two 5th Marines battalions (relieved by the 7th
Marines on the 11th) in the center; and two 1st Marines battalions on
the right. Scout and sniper teams were employed throughout the period,
with contacts few and far between. More destruction was inflicted on
the enemy by observed artillery, tank, and mortar fire.[315]
[315] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise
specified, is based on the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 3–12.
A new emphasis was placed on psychological warfare during these
defensive operations. Eighty-seven NKPA soldiers surrendered from 1 to
13 October, but whether they responded to leaflets fired by the 11th
Marines could not be determined.
Early in October the 1st Marine Division was granted permission
by EUSAK to use Sokcho-ri (Map 19) as a port of embarkation and
debarkation instead of Pusan. The change proved satisfactory even
though troops had to be lightered from ship to shore. A 68-mile truck
movement through the I ROK Corps zone replaced the airlift of 200 miles
from Pusan to Chunchon, followed by a motor march of 70 miles. It was
estimated that the new routing would add from 8,000 to 10,000 man-days
a month to the combat potential of the Division.
An improvement in logistics resulted when the Division asked and
received permission from EUSAK to use field K-50 near Sokcho-ri for an
airhead instead of K-51 at Inje. Although the Marines were limited to
five or six sorties a day while sharing K-50 with I ROK Corps, they
were able to transfer many airhead activities to the new field.
The mission of the Division remained essentially unchanged from 14
to 31 October. Foot patrols ranged farther into enemy territory,
and tank-infantry raids in company strength, supported by air and
artillery, were launched at every opportunity.
Typical of these operations was the raid staged on 16 October by
elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, (Lieutenant Colonel James
G. Kelly) supported by tanks, air, artillery, and engineers. Captain
John R. McMahon’s Charlie Company was the principal unit involved. The
Marine column had as its objective an NKPA strong point overlooking the
village of Changhang (Map 2) on the east and the flats on both sides of
the Soyang-gang to the south and southwest. Captain McMahon’s mission
was “to reduce all fortifications and installations ...” [and] “...
to seize, occupy and hold ground until the area was thoroughly mined,
booby-trapped and infested with trip flares.”[316]
[316] This account of the raid is derived from the 1/7 _HD_,
Oct 51, and the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7.
A small-scale battle flared up for a few minutes as the enemy put up a
stiff resistance with artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire.
Superior Marine firepower soon prevailed, and at 1540 the attackers
reached their objective. During the next hour and 20 minutes enemy
installations were destroyed and the strong point rendered untenable by
mines and booby traps. The Marines withdrew at 1700 after sustaining
casualties of 3 KIA and 18 WIA. Enemy losses were 35 counted KIA.
The next day a reinforced KMC company, supported by tanks, air,
artillery, and engineers made a similar raid on enemy positions about
875 yards northwest of Hill 751 and 1,500 yards south of Hill 1052 (Map
20). Twenty-five NKPA bunkers were destroyed with losses to the enemy
of 15 counted KIA, 3 prisoners, and 5 captured machine guns.[317]
[317] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7–8.
On 21 October the front of the 1st Marine Division was reduced a mile
when elements of the 3d ROK Division relieved the 2d KMC Battalion on
the Marine left flank in accordance with instructions of X Corps. Six
infantry battalions now manned an MLR of 12¼ miles.
A strong enemy position, menacing the forward elements, had developed
to the north of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines’ sector. Three days
of reconnaissance and detailed preparation preceded the destructive
raid carried out on 30 October. Captain George E. Lawrence’s Charlie
Company, reinforced with heavy machine guns, was held up by NKPA
resistance in estimated company strength. The Marines fought their
way up a ridgeline, throwing white phosphorus grenades into enemy
bunkers. Pinned down momentarily by NKPA mortar and small-arms fire,
they reached a defiladed position and withdrew under cover of Marine
artillery, air, mortars, and heavy machine guns. At a cost of only one
WIA, the raiders inflicted 65 counted KIA casualties on the enemy and
destroyed an estimated 40 NKPA bunkers.[318]
[318] 1/1 _HD_, Oct 51, 16; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7.
All three Marine regiments on Line MINNESOTA were directed by General
Thomas to fight the enemy whenever possible with his own weapons in the
form of ruses and night ambushes. On 31 October the 3d Battalion of the
1st Marines feigned preparations for an attack even to the extent of a
brief artillery barrage. When the firing let up, the Marines sounded
an NKPA bugle call as a signal for enemy troops to rush out of bunkers
and man open trenches. Thus exposed, they became the victims of intense
Marine mortar and artillery fire which inflicted an estimated 47 KIA
and 48 WIA casualties.
During the last 2 weeks of October, 11 missions were fired by the
battleship USS _New Jersey_ and 41 missions by the heavy cruiser USS
_Toledo_. Appreciation was expressed in a message to the _Toledo_ by
General Thomas: “Your accurate and effective fire during period 24–29
October made an important contribution to operations of this division.
Many thanks and come again.”[319]
[319] CO 1stMarDiv msg to USS _Toledo_, 1232 30 Oct 51 in G-3
msgs, Oct 51.
Antiguerrilla raids behind the MLR were carried out by Marine ground
forces relying upon HMR-161 helicopters for transportation. In
Operation BUSHBEATER teams from 1/1 were landed on the Division’s east
flank to sweep westward toward the Soyang-gang on 22 October while
teams from Recon Company patrolled from the opposite direction.
Operations HOUSEBURNER I and II were planned to deprive guerrillas of
shelter during the coming winter. As the name implies, helicopter-borne
teams set Korean huts afire with flame throwers and incendiary
grenades.[320]
[320] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 172–173.
Enemy forces facing the Marines at various times in October were
believed to comprise the 2d Division, II NKPA Corps, the 1st and
15th Divisions of III Corps, and the 19th Division of VI Corps. NKPA
casualties during the month were announced by the 1st Marine Division
as 709 counted and 2,377 estimated KIA, 4,927 estimated WIA, and 571
prisoners. The Marines (including the 1st KMC Regiment) suffered losses
of 50 KIA, 2 MIA, and 323 WIA.[321]
[321] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 2.
_Marine Operations of November 1951_
On 1 November 1951 the front line strength of the opposing forces
was nearly equal--195,000 for the UN, and 208,000 for the enemy. In
reserves the Communists held their usual numerical advantage with nine
CCF armies totaling 235,000 men plus 138,600 in four NKPA corps. All
were readily available either as reinforcements or as assault troops
for a great offensive.[322]
[322] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 9.
Even though the Eighth Army was committed to a warfare of position,
General Van Fleet meant to keep the initiative. “If we had stagnated
on any one of our many positions since the tide turned in April,”
he said in a recorded statement of 3 November, “the hydra-headed
Communists--who seem to grow two soldiers for each one cut down--would
soon have been at our throats. With the enemy’s prolific capacity
posing an ever-present threat, we had no choice but to destroy the
menace before it matured.”[323]
[323] _Ibid._, 32.
Throughout November the 1st Marine Division continued to occupy the
eastern portion of the X Corps defense sector in east-central Korea.
From left to right the 1st KMC Regiment, 7th Marines, and 1st Marines
held the 12¼-mile MLR with two battalions each. The 5th Marines
remained in reserve until the 11th, when it relieved the 1st Marines.
That regiment went into the new reserve area at Mago-ri (Map 19).[324]
[324] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise
specified, is derived from the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Nov 51,
1–20.
Elements of the 1st, 15th, and 19th Divisions, III NKPA Corps, manned
the opposing lines. The Marines continued to organize artillery- and
air-supported tank-infantry-engineer task forces in company strength
for raids. Squad-size patrols were sent out nightly to ambush the
enemy, employing ruses whenever possible.
The howitzers of the 11th Marines and the 90mm rifles of the 1st
Tank Battalion were kept busy throughout the month. On 7–8 November,
for instance, Marine artillery fired 257 observed missions in 24
hours--including 34 on enemy artillery positions, 32 on mortar
positions, 25 on bunkers, 22 on machine gun positions, 4 in support
of friendly patrols, 3 on supply dumps, 2 on trucks, and 1 each on a
bridge, a CP, and a 57mm recoilless rifle position.
In spite of such daily pounding, aerial photographs proved that NKPA
defenses in depth had become more intricate and formidable in November
1951 than during any previous month.
On the 7th the 14th Replacement Draft added 2,756 officers and men
to the 1st Marine Division. Within a few hours 2,066 officers and
men of the 10th Rotation Draft were detached. And on the 27th the
11th Rotation Draft represented a further loss of 2,468 Marines whose
departure was hastened so that they could be home by Christmas.
A note of grim humor crept into proceedings on 9 November. Division
OpnO 50-51 directed that all supporting arms and weapons commemorate
the Marine Corps Birthday the next day by firing a TOT on Hill 1052,
the key enemy observation point overlooking the friendly sector.[325]
While the cruiser USS _Los Angeles_ contributed naval gunfire, the
Commanding General of 1st MAW, Major General Christian F. Schilt, led
an air strike of 83 Marine planes to blast this enemy strong point.
[325] The initials TOT stand for Time on Target--an artillery
order calling for all guns to time their firing so that
projectiles will hit the target simultaneously.
The performance was embellished on the 10th when Marine tanks, mortars,
and machine guns added their fire to the grand crescendo of exploding
shells and bombs. The Communists were also bombarded with 50,000
leaflets inviting them to the Marine birthday dinner that evening.
Twenty Korean Reds actually did surrender, though some doubt remained
whether they had responded to the invitation or the TOT. General Van
Fleet sent a message to all Marines in his command, congratulating them
on “a job well done” in Korea.[326]
[326] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 42.
On 11 November the 5th Marines carried out its relief of the 1st
Marines on Line MINNESOTA. This was the occasion for the largest
helicopter troop lift so far, involving the transportation of nearly
2,000 combat-equipped men.
Operation SWITCH began at 0635 on D-Day when three helicopters took off
from Field X-83 with Shore Party specialists to signal aircraft into
landing sites and supervise the unloading and reloading of troops.
Twelve helicopters were employed, each carrying five men and supplies
from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Kirt W.
Norton), and returning to Field X-83 with a like load from Lieutenant
Colonel Clifford E. Quilici’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.[327]
[327] HMR-161 _HD_, Nov 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 174.
Naval gunfire from the USS _New Jersey_ helped to keep the enemy quiet
during the relief. All told, 950 men were flown to Hill 884--soon to be
known unofficially as “Mount Helicopter”--and 952 lifted to Field X-83
in return flights. Total flight time was 95.6 hours and over-all time
10 hours. Once again the Marine Corps had made tactical history.
Ground forces operations throughout November seldom varied from the
familiar pattern of squad-size patrols nightly and an occasional
daytime raid by a company-size task force with the support of artillery
and air. Supporting arms kept enemy strongholds under almost constant
fire, and North Korean activity in the construction or improvement of
bunkers provided frequent targets of opportunity.
Contacts seemed to be avoided by enemy troops. On the night of 29
November, for instance, 11 Marine ambush patrols ranged from 1,500
to 2,500 yards ahead of the MLR with only a single contact before
returning at daybreak. One enemy KIA was inflicted and one prisoner
taken at a cost of four Marine WIA casualties.
Total Marine casualties (including the KMCs) during November were
34 KIA and 250 WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 408 counted and 1,728
estimated KIA, 2,235 estimated WIA, and 104 prisoners.
_The Second Marine Christmas in Korea_
Marine operations in December were shaped in advance by the resumption
of armistice negotiations. This time Panmunjom was agreed upon as a
conference site instead of Kaesong. Literally a wide place in the road,
the tiny hamlet was located just north of the 38th Parallel between
Munsan and Kaesong (Map 19). In the lack of houses, tents provided
shelter for the UN and Communist delegates who renewed their meetings
on 25 October 1951 for the first time since the Reds walked out at
Kaesong on 23 August.
Discussions during November were largely devoted to the question of
a cease fire based upon a line of demarcation. On the 23d it was
agreed to accept a line linking up the farthest points of repeated
contacts up to 2,000 yards forward of the United Nations MLR. Three
days later, representatives of both sides initialed maps to indicate
acceptances.[328]
[328] References to the Panmunjom decisions are based upon the
following sources: William H. Vatcher, Jr., _Panmunjom,
The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations_
(New York: F. Praeger, 1958), 72–94, 232–237; _Joy, How
Communists Negotiate_, 40–52.
The effect of the so-called cease fire on EUSAK operations was
immediate. General Van Fleet sent his corps commanders a letter of
instructions warning that active defensive operations were to continue
until a full armistice had been concluded. If such an event took place
within 30 days after 27 November 1951, the demarcation line would not
be altered. But if an agreement had not been reached by that time, the
line would be revised in accordance with actual changes.[329]
[329] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 58.
EUSAK instructions to corps commanders were relayed in a X Corps
message of 27 November to the 1st Marine Division:
_Part 1._ The conference at Panmunjom has fixed a military
demarcation line as a preliminary step to ending hostilities
within a 30-day period.
_Part II._ Every US, UN, and ROK soldier will be informed that
hostilities will continue until armistice agreement is signed.
_Part III._ While negotiations continue, X Corps will: (1)
Demonstrate its willingness to reach an agreement by reducing
operations to those which are essential to insure maintenance of
present positions. Counterattacks to regain key terrain lost to
enemy assault are authorized, but other clearly offensive actions
will be taken only by direction of this Headquarters; patrolling
only to that line beyond which contact has been repeatedly
established; limiting supporting fires, including air strikes,
to destruction of those targets which appear to constitute a
major threat, or to improve the enemy’s offensive capability.
(2) Prepare for offensive action by: Conserving ammunition;
maintaining combat effectiveness through intensified training;
preparation for and rehearsal of limited-objective attacks, to be
launched near the end of the 30-day period in order to improve
the MLR.
_Part IV._ Every effort will be made to prevent unnecessary
casualties.[330]
[330] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 15–16.
In view of these instructions, it is understandable that a lull set
in along the X Corps front in December 1951. Most of the cold weather
clothing had been issued during the preceding month, and work was
largely completed for the “winterizing” of bunkers. It remained only
to improve defensive installations as front line elements continued
to send out patrols to maintain pressure against the enemy. And since
the Communists were putting similar military policies into effect, both
sides kept in contact with relatively small units.[331]
[331] The source for the remainder of this section, unless
otherwise stated, is the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Dec 51, 1–17.
The enemy also busied himself with extending already formidable
defenses in depth. And though he did not seek a fight, he showed no
hesitation about accepting one.
From 5 to 20 Marine patrols went out nightly during December, some of
them manning night outposts called “duck blinds;”[332] occasional raids
continued with relatively few contacts. In the rear of the Division
area, helicopter patrols continued against guerrillas.
[332] LtCol Harry W. Edwards, memo to G-3 dtd 3 Feb 1959.
The 13 aircraft of HMR-161 had a busy month with 390 missions and 621
flights. Six thousand pounds of rations, 9,000 pounds of fuel oil in
drums, 15,000 pounds of fortification material, and 15,000 pounds of
cold weather clothing were among the supplies flown to the front.
Personnel to the number of 2,022 were lifted, and cargo to the amount
of 149,477 pounds.
The first breakthrough in truce negotiations, at Kaesong, occurred on
18 December, when lists of prisoners held by both sides were exchanged.
Prior to this exchange of lists the UN Command could only speculate on
the number carried as missing in action who were in reality held as
prisoners of war. The Communists had previously reported only a few
dozen names, and then only if it suited their propaganda purposes.
Radio Peking, in releasing names piecemeal, had broadcast recordings
made by UN prisoners under duress. Far Eastern monitors reported these
broadcasts were slanted to give the Communist viewpoint.
The 18 December list of 3,198 American POWs revealed only 61 Marines
including 2 Navy hospital corpsmen. (Information received from 18
Marines who gained their freedom in May 1951 was sketchy concerning
others held at the time and was never accredited as official or
authoritative.)[333] Interestingly enough when the Communist
negotiators saw the list given them by the UN representative they
became irate and tried to withdraw their list. The names of the Chinese
and Korean prisoners had been Anglicized and caused considerable
difficulty in retranslating the names into oriental characters.
[333] Maj J. Angus MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” MS
available in Historical Archives, G-3, HQMC.
Negotiations hit a snag at this point, and no other list was offered by
the Red officials until the first prisoner exchange (Operation LITTLE
SWITCH in April 1953). Notwithstanding the protracted and exasperating
tactics of the Reds at the truce table, the exchange of prisoner of war
lists presaged infinitely better treatment to the UN prisoners than had
been accorded them prior to that time. The so-called lenient treatment
policy by the Chinese, promulgated in July 1951, was initiated after
the exchange of lists.[334]
[334] Maj G. Fink, interview of 16 Dec 1960; Extract of Interim
Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division, cumulative
to 30 Jun 1953, 18.
The lists given by the Communists did not include several Marines
captured during the months of October, November, or December of 1951.
The families of these men were to sit in anguish waiting for these
names until April of 1953. These and other instances of perfidy and
treachery at the truce table by the Communist negotiators were to
become legion.[335]
[335] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 104–105; Maj J. A.
MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” _op. cit._
On 19 December the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Major William E. Baugh)
was relieved just behind the MLR by Lieutenant Colonel Norton’s 1/5
in helicopter Operation FAREWELL. It was the last flight in Korea for
Lieutenant Colonel Herring, who returned to Quantico as commanding
officer of Marine Helicopter Experimental Squadron (HMX)-1. His relief
as commander of HMR-1 was Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon, and Lieutenant
Colonel Mitchell remained as executive officer.[336]
[336] HMR-161 _HD_, Dec 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 175–176.
Two of the original 15 HRS-1 aircraft had been damaged
in accidents, but one was later restored to action with
parts cannibalized from the other.
The Marine helicopters of VMO-6 had also been setting records during
the last half of 1951 under four commanding officers, Major David W.
McFarland (5 April-5 October), Major Allan H. Ringblom (6 October-31
October), Major Edward R. Polgrean (1 November-25 November), and Major
Kenneth C. Smedley (26 November-31 January 1952). A total of 1,096
Marine wounded had been flown out during this period, many of whom
would otherwise have lost their lives.[337]
[337] VMO-6 _HD_, Jun-Dec 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 146,
180–181.
The supposed vulnerability of the helicopter was whittled down to a
myth by VMO-6 experience. Returning from a front line mission with
bullet holes was too commonplace for mention, yet the year 1951
passed without a single helicopter pilot being lost to enemy action,
even though several aircraft were shot down. The experience of these
12 months also proved anew the wisdom of combining rotary-wing and
fixed-wing aircraft in an observation squadron in fairly equal numbers.
When it came to reconnaissance and artillery spotting, the nimble
little OYs and OEs (both types are light observation planes) were much
better suited than the “choppers.”
As for close air support, increased Air Force emphasis on an
interdiction campaign beyond artillery ranges added to the limitations
imposed on Marine requests. Of the 22 strikes requested in December
1951, only five were approved.
From the 1st to the 10th, units of the Division along the MLR consisted
from left to right of the 1st KMC Regiment, 7th Marines, and 5th
Marines. The only major change took place on the 11th, when the 1st
Marines relieved the 7th and the latter went into Division reserve.
Enemy units were believed to be the 1st, 15th, and 19th (soon relieved
by the 47th) NKPA Divisions with an estimated strength of 25,750.
Permission was rarely granted by X Corps for Marine raids to cross
the EUSAK military limiting line known as Line DUCK, which generally
coincided with the line of demarcation. Christmas passed like any
other day except for the holiday feast. Nineteen patrols went out on
Christmas Eve, two of which had brief fire fights with enemy patrols
before returning at dawn. During the day 40 rounds of naval gunfire
from the heavy cruiser USS _St. Paul_ were credited with destroying
seven enemy bunkers.
More than a third of the Marines partaking of Christmas turkey were
comparative newcomers who had reached Korea since the warfare of
movement ended on 20 September. The 15th Replacement Draft brought 38
officers and 2,278 men early in December, and 127 officers and 1,805
men departed with the 12th Rotation Draft. No Marines who had arrived
prior to 1 January 1951 were left among the 1,495 officers and 23,040
men in Korea at the close of the year.
Heavy snow on 26 December impeded foot-patrol activity and increased
the danger of mines. Next day, when the 30-day cease-fire agreement
ended, it was announced at Panmunjom that the terms had been renewed
and that operational restrictions would be extended indefinitely.
Thus December came to an end on a note of troubled uncertainty. Not a
single large-scale combat had been reported, yet 24 Marines were killed
(including KMCs) and 139 wounded in patrol actions. That the enemy had
sometimes succeeded in the grim quest of both sides for prisoners is
shown by the unwonted entry of eight Marines missing in action. NKPA
losses for the month consisted of 246 counted KIA, and 56 prisoners.
The year 1951 passed into history at 2400 on 31 December as the 11th
Marines saluted 1952 by firing a “toast” at enemy strongholds. The
thud of the snow-muffled howitzers was also a fitting farewell to the
past year of a war that was not officially a war. Indications were
that it would doubtless be concluded by a peace that was not a peace,
judging from the attitude of the Communist delegates at Panmunjom.
And meanwhile the Marines and other Eighth Army troops would keep on
fighting in accordance with the terms of a cease fire was not a cease
fire.
CHAPTER XI
Winter Operations in East Korea
_Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve--Marine Raid in Company
Strength--Major General John T. Selden Assumes Command--Boot, Combat,
Rubber, Insulated--500 Armored Vests Flown to Korea--Helicopter
Operations_ MULETRAIN _and_ CHANGIE-CHANGIE_--The Fire Days of
Operation_ CLAM-UP
As the New Year began, the 1st Marine Division occupied practically
the same front it had held along Line MINNESOTA for the last three
months (Map 20) and would continue to hold for the next two and a half.
The major units were disposed from left to right on 1 January 1952 as
follows:
1st KMC Regiment (Colonel Kim Dong Ha commanding, LtCol Alfred H.
Marks, senior advisor);
1st Marines (Colonel Sidney S. Wade);
5th Marines (Colonel Frank P. Hager, Jr.);
11th Marines (Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill) in artillery support.
The 7th Marines (Colonel John J. Wermuth) was in reserve until 10
January, when it relieved the 5th Marines on line. That regiment then
went into reserve and could not be committed to action without the
approval of X Corps.[338]
[338] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, 1–2.
Tactical units not organic to the 1st Marine Division but attached at
this time were, in addition to the 1st KMC Regiment, the 1st Korean
Artillery Battalion, the 1st Platoon, 92d U.S. Army Searchlight
Company, and Battery C, 1st 4.5″ Rocket Battalion.
The new Korean artillery battalion consisted of two medium (155mm) and
two light (105mm) howitzer batteries. Major General Gerald C. Thomas,
commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, approved a plan for
placing this unit in the Punchbowl on 9 January to reinforce Lieutenant
Colonel Sherman W. Parry’s 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.
Enemy units opposing the 1st Marine Division up to 23 January 1952
were the 1st, 15th, and 47th NKPA Divisions with an estimated combined
strength of 25,750 men. On the 23d the 15th Division was relieved by
the 45th.
The enemy, according to the Division report, showed “greater caution
than he had in previous months, and friendly outposts and ambuscades
noted fewer contacts. His harassing mortar and artillery fires
increased in volume through the month. Meanwhile, extensive efforts to
improve his defenses continued with particular attention being given to
reverse slope installations.”[339]
[339] _Ibid._, 1, 6, 7.
_Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve_
The new year was but a few minutes old when the first Marine action
took place. Captain Charles W. McDonald’s Baker Company had been
directed by Lieutenant Colonel Kirt W. Norton, commanding the 1st
Battalion, 5th Marines, to send out an ambush patrol on New Year’s Eve.
A rifle squad, a light machine gun squad, an interpreter, and a
corpsman composed the little column wearing white camouflage clothing
which made the men all but invisible against a background of snow.
After getting into position, the patrol settled down for the usual
long wait. Darkness was the enemy’s element, and Marine ambushers ran
the risk of being ambushed themselves. This time, however, a six-man
North Korean patrol came within five yards before the Marines let the
enemy have it with machine gun and rifle fire which inflicted one KIA
and four estimated WIA casualties. Efforts to take a prisoner were
frustrated as the NKPA survivors melted away into the darkness. The
Baker Company patrol returned without casualties at 0400.[340]
[340] 1/5 _HD_, Dec 51, 31; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, 3.
Marine operations were still limited by the EUSAK “cease fire”
directive which went into effect for a month on 27 November 1951 in
accordance with a decision reached during the armistice negotiations
at Panmunjom. UN and Communist delegates agreed on a line of
demarcation, known to the Eighth Army as Line DUCK. It linked up points
of repeated EUSAK patrol contacts, not to exceed 2,000 yards beyond
the MLR. Operations past this line, running generally parallel with
Line MINNESOTA, could not be launched without permission from corps
commanders.
When the agreement expired on 27 December, it was renewed indefinitely.
Actually, it brought about few changes in the warfare of position which
had replaced a warfare of movement on 20 September 1951. Each Marine
infantry regiment on the MLR continued to send out several squad-size
patrols nightly for such purposes as ambush, reconnaissance, and taking
prisoners. Raids were employed for special missions where formidable
enemy resistance might be expected. These forces usually ranged from
a platoon to a company in strength, reinforced by supporting weapons.
Operations of this sort were planned with meticulous thoroughness and
carried out with minimal risks.
_Marine Raid in Company Strength_
The first company-size raid of the new year was conducted by units
of the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Spencer
H. Pratt) in the darkness of 1–2 January 1952. Captain James B. Ord,
Jr.’s How Company was alerted on 30 December to prepare for a night
raid with a mission of reconnaissance and capturing or destroying any
enemy that might be encountered. On the afternoon of the 30th, Ord made
a preliminary reconnaissance with Second Lieutenants Milo J. See and
John E. Watson, commanding the 2d and 3d Platoons respectively. That
evening the company commander held a briefing at his OP (observation
post) which was attended by the sergeants and squad leaders of the two
platoons selected for the raid.[341]
[341] Sources for this account of the raid, unless otherwise
specified, are Maj J. B. Ord, Jr., intervs of 3 Sep and
24 Oct 58; and Appendix VI, 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, a
five-page special action report of the operation.
This command group carried out a second reconnaissance forward of the
MLR on 31 December, proceeding until they ran into enemy sniper fire.
Captain Ord requested aerial reconnaissance and three missions were
flown by observation planes of Major Kenneth C. Smedley’s VMO-6.
Line DUCK and the assigned battalion sector limited the objective area.
On a basis of these restrictions as well as reconnaissance reports,
Ord recommended an operational area containing three objectives, each
of which represented a point where the enemy was not likely to be
encountered. These objectives were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Pratt
and formed the basis of the battalion order.
The task organization for the raid included two attached How Company
units, the machine gun platoon (-), and 60mm mortar section, commanded
by Second Lieutenants John D. Koutsandreas and James J. Hughes
respectively. Another infantry unit, the 1st Platoon of Item Company,
3/1 (Second Lieutenant William E. Harper), was also attached.
First Lieutenant Francis E. White, How Company executive officer,
remained at the OP with the tactical air-control party, which had an
observation plane on strip alert in case the raiders ran into artillery
or mortar fire. A forward air controller with radioman accompanied
the raiding party as well as artillery, 4.2″, and 81mm mortar forward
observers. An interpreter, the assistant battalion surgeon, and a
corpsman were included, and wiremen had the assignment of laying a line.
Hill 812 (Map 20) was the jumping-off place for the column of files in
ghostly white snow suits with hoods. Boots were dark in contrast but
the snow was deep enough to hide them. The drifts slowed up the wiremen
and an infantry fire team protected them at their work.
The first objective consisted of bunkers and suspected mortar positions
which had been reported by tactical air observers as recently occupied
by the enemy. They were empty when the raiding party reached them,
and the Marine column proceeded toward Objective 2, an ambush site
overlooking and commanding a crossing of the Soyang-gang.
The selected area for the support group was located nearby, and there
the machine gun section and riflemen took positions on a nose with the
wiremen, radiomen, and corpsman in the center. While these elements
peeled off, the raiding party continued toward the ambush site, where
it was planned to lie in wait two hours for the enemy. A suspected mine
field had to be crossed and Captain Ord directed his men to advance in
single file, stepping carefully in the footprints ahead. Twelve Marines
had passed safely when the 13th became the victim of a mine explosion.
The corpsman found broken bones but none of the usual torn flesh and
hemorrhaging, thanks to the new thermal boots issued during the winter
of 1951–1952.[342]
[342] Later in the chapter this innovation will be described.
The temperature was zero with a sharp wind blowing. Some of the Marines
had to shed clothing to keep the casualty warm during the forced
immobility, and the raiding party commander broke radio silence by
requesting permission of Captain Ord, in the support group area, to
pull back to that position and set up the ambush.
Permission was granted by Ord after radio consultation with the
battalion commander on the How Company OP. The raiding party remained
in ambush formation on Objective 2 for two hours without seeing or
hearing an enemy. By that time the condition of the mine casualty had
deteriorated to such an extent that Lieutenant Colonel Pratt gave
permission for a return to the MLR without proceeding to Objective 3.
He directed that the raiders split and take two routes in the hope of
capturing a prisoner, since a light enemy probing attack on the MLR
had just been reported by Item Company of 3/1. This proved to be a
fortunate decision, for two NKPA soldiers were seized. The main object
of the raid had thus been fulfilled, even though little action was seen
during the five-hour operation.
Raids of this sort may seem anticlimactic when compared to the fights
in the same area during the first three weeks of September. But the
Marines were showing adaptability in conforming to a warfare of
position that was contrary to all their offensive training. Careful
reconnaissance, detailed planning, and minimal risks--these were the
elements of defensive tactics in which large forces had to content
themselves with small gains.
_Major General John T. Selden Assumes Command_
On 11 January 1952 the 1st Marine Division had its second change of
command in Korea when Major General John T. Selden relieved General
Thomas. The new commanding general was born at Richmond, Virginia, and
educated there at McGuire’s University School. Before the United States
entered World War I, he tried to join the Canadian Army but was warned
that he would lose his American citizenship. In January 1915, at the
age of 21, he enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps and saw two
years of active duty on jungle patrols in Haiti. Commissioned as a
second lieutenant in 1918, he served in ocean convoys during World War
I.
Sea duty, China duty, and more Haiti duty occupied him during the
postwar years. The outbreak of World War II found him a Scouting Force
Marine Officer aboard the _Indianapolis_. After that he had three main
assignments: personnel and intelligence officer of I Marine Amphibious
Corps; commanding officer of the 5th Marines in the New Britain
operation; and chief of staff of the 1st Marine Division at Peleliu.
Brigadier General William J. Whaling remained on duty as Assistant
Division Commander. The new staff officers were Colonel Richard G.
Weede, Chief of Staff; Colonel Walter N. Flournoy, G-1; Lieutenant
Colonel James H. Tinsley, G-2; Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle, G-3;
and Colonel Custis Burton, Jr., G-4.
A change of FMFPac command had taken place on 1 January. Lieutenant
General Franklin H. Hart relieved General Shepherd, who became
Commandant of the Marine Corps as General Cates finished his four-year
term. General Hart paid his first visit to the 1st Marine Division late
in January.
The new FMFPac commander found the Marines occupying essentially the
same positions they had defended since late September. About two-thirds
of the 12¼-mile MLR on Line MINNESOTA (Map 20) was good defensive
ground. It had been strengthened by an elaborate system of trenches and
bunkers behind miles of barbed wire.[343]
[343] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are
the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan, Feb, and Mar 52, and _PacFlt
Interim Rpt_ No. 4, IX.
In the left-central portion of the Marine sector, the enemy held the
dominating terrain. This was particularly true of the rugged area just
west of Hill 812, where the opposing trenches were only 50 to 150 yards
apart. There a fire-raked landmark, known to the Marines as Luke the
Gook’s Castle, had been made into a strong point by the enemy. Its base
was a maze of trenches and bunkers, and the 20-foot granite knob could
have been taken only at an excessive cost in casualties. Although this
bastion was hit repeatedly by almost every type of supporting ordnance,
it was never completely destroyed nor denied to the enemy.
Operations of trench warfare had inevitably shaken down into a daily
routine of sniping by day and patrols or raids by night. Marine
artillery, mortars, and stationary tank fire, occasionally reinforced
by naval guns, played an increasingly important part in the coordinated
destruction of NKPA defenses. As a result the enemy was limited for the
most part to well camouflaged reverse slope positions.
Because of the 1st Marine Division’s defensive mission and the
constant rotation of the more experienced personnel back to the United
States, it was considered that men assigned to infantry elements, in
particular, needed additional training in small unit leadership and
offensive tactics. Consequently the regiments were rotated at monthly
intervals to the reserve area near Wontong-ni, where Camp Tripoli
had been established for training. An average of 84 NCOs a week
completed a 168-hour special course of instruction over a four-week
period. The program for the rank and file was so intensive, according
to one report, that “it was considered a relief by some Marines to
cease training and return to the relatively quiet life on the front
lines.”[344]
[344] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 4, IX, 9–11.
The truce talks at Panmunjom continued to influence operations at the
front. A demilitarized zone having been proposed in anticipation of
an armistice, preparations were begun by the 1st Marine Division to
develop the defenses along Line ICELAND, generally conforming to the
Line KANSAS of Marine fights early in September. It was to be used as
a new line of defense if the UN and Communist delegates reached an
agreement.
Perhaps because other offensive tactics were so curtailed,
psychological warfare had its heyday in the winter months of 1952.
Propaganda leaflets were dropped from planes or fired by 105mm
howitzers. At vantage points along the front, loud speakers bombarded
the Communists with surrender appeals in their own language. The
effects could not be evaluated with any degree of certainty, but it was
hoped that the enemy did not respond with the amused indifference shown
by the Marines toward Red propaganda.
_Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated_
The average low temperature for January 1952, was 11 degrees
Fahrenheit. This was mild weather as compared to the subzero readings
of the previous winter. Only 10 slight frostbite cases were reported
for the month in contrast to the 3,083 nonbattle casualties, nearly
all frostbite cases, incurred during the two weeks (27 November to 10
December 1950) of the Chosin Reservoir breakout.
The improvement in January 1952 could not be credited entirely to more
clement weather. It was due in greater measure to one of the most
noteworthy innovations of the Korean war--the insulated rubber combat
boot, which proved much superior to the shoe pac of the past winter.
U.S. Army experiments dated back to 1944. They were dropped three years
later after efforts to perfect a boot with sealed insulation failed
to meet the test of long marches. The Navy had more promising results
with the boot during the winter of 1948–1949 when Arctic clothing
tests were conducted at Point Barrow, Alaska. Army and Navy tests at
Mt. Washington, New Hampshire, the following winter were inconclusive.
Marine Corps tests were held during the first four months of 1951 at
the following places: MCEB, Quantico; Fort Churchill, Manitoba; Big
Delta, Alaska; Pickel Meadows, California; and the Naval Medical Field
Research Laboratory (NMFRL), Camp Lejeune.
“In addition to engineering tests,” states the Marine report, “the
insulated rubber boots have been worn by test subjects selected from
a variety of backgrounds; under conditions of activity varying from
strenuous marching for 20 miles to complete immobility; in ambient
temperatures from 58° to -42° F.; over terrain ranging from soft snow
[to] hard snow, ice, sand, rocky ground, mud, gravel, water, and iced
river banks; for periods of time corresponding to a normal working day
and more than 72 hours. As now constructed, the insulated rubber boot,
employing the vapor barrier principle, meets the requirements outlined
previously and is satisfactory for use by Marine Corps ground troops in
cold climate areas, supplanting the shoe-pac combination....”[345]
[345] LtCol G. W. Hardwick, “Summary of Marine Corps Experience
with IRB [Insulated Rubber Boot], Rpt of 8 May 1951.”
Other sources for the development of the boot, also found
in G-4 files, Headquarters Marine Corps, are as follows:
G. E. Folk, Abstract of Bowdoin College Rpt, Jun 1951,
“The Penetration of Water into the Human Foot;” G-4 Rpt,
“Resume of Activity re Insulated Rubber Boot,” 7 Feb
1952; G-4 Rpt, “Boot, Rubber, Insulated, Cold Weather,”
28 Nov 51; G-4 Rpt, “Fact Data Sheet, Boot, Insulated,
Rubber,” n.d.; MajGen J. T. Selden memo to CMC, 26 Apr 52.
The distinguishing feature of the “thermal boot,” as it came to be
popularly known, is an air space between the inner and outer layers
of wool pile insulation, both of which are completely sealed off by
latex from any contact with moisture. This air space, under pressure,
produces a vapor barrier such that heat cannot readily escape when it
is emitted from the foot. Thus the wearer of the boot supplies his
own warmth, which is retained as long as he is active, regardless of
prevailing temperatures. If, however, the walls of the air space are
punctured and the insulation becomes wet, the moisture collected within
the boot freezes at low temperatures if the wearer remains inactive. In
such cases, severe frostbite may result.
Some of the tests were spectacular. One subject poured water containing
pieces of ice into his boots and donned frozen socks before putting on
the footgear. After 10 minutes of walking, the ice in the boots had
turned to warm water, and there was no harmful effect on the man.
Another subject waded across a knee-deep creek at a temperature of
zero. Before he had marched a mile in the snow, his feet had warmed the
water in the boots, although his pants were frozen so stiff that he
could scarcely walk.
Seldom has a military innovation been tested so thoroughly and
scientifically in such a short time. Colonels Ion M. Bethel and John
F. Stamm of Marine Corps Headquarters took a leading part in the
development and procurement phases along with Lieutenant Colonel Gordon
A. Hardwick. Major Vernon D. Boyd and Captain David R. McGrew, Jr. were
active in the troop acceptance tests.
A good many “bugs” had to be eliminated before the boot met with
complete Marine approval. The manufacturer’s modifications were
effected with minimal delay.
It is perhaps needless to add that the thermal boot was not foolproof.
Protection continued in subzero weather for at least an hour after
the termination of activity, but it was inviting frostbite to remain
motionless much longer. Socks had to be changed every 12 hours, and
foot cleanliness and hygiene could not be neglected.
If a few such simple rules were observed, a man had virtually perfect
frostbite protection in the coldest weather. In fact, it was seriously
proposed that a Marine casualty of this sort should be charged with
misconduct if he acquired his frostbite while provided with thermal
boots and a change of socks.
In view of the tests and negotiations with the manufacturers, it was a
marvel of promptness when the first shipment of boots reached the 1st
Marine Division in August 1951, long before the advent of cold weather.
Distribution to the Division was completed by 15 November. Throughout
the winter the experience of all units concerned was reported to
Division headquarters. And in a memorandum of 26 August 1952 to the
Commandant, General Selden expressed his approval: “The boot, rubber,
insulated, is considered an excellent item of cold weather equipment.
It is far superior to the shoe pac.”
The acceptance by the rank and file went so far that the “Mickey Mouse
boot,” as it was sometimes dubbed, acquired a reputation for protecting
the wearer against antipersonnel mines. Some wounds apparently were
reduced in severity by this protection, but it could not be claimed
that the boot qualified as armor.
Production by the manufacturer kept pace with Division and Air Wing
requirements in Korea. By 14 December 1951 about 90,000 pairs of boots
and 2,000 patching kits had been received at San Francisco--more than
enough to take care of the 6,500 pairs needed monthly for resupply
under combat conditions.
The thermal boot was here to stay.
_500 Armored Vests Flown to Korea_
Marine body armor was just then about to meet its first large-scale
test in the field. It had cleared its preliminary hurdle during the
tests from 14 June to 13 October 1951 (see Chapter VIII) when a joint
Army-Navy Medical Commission endorsed 40 vests worn in action by troops
of the 5th Marines and two Army infantry regiments.
On 9 November, at Marine Corps Headquarters, Marine officers were
briefed on the successful results in Korea by the two Navy officers
who helped supervise the tests, Commander John S. Cowan (MC) USN, and
Lieutenant Commander Frederick J. Lewis (MSC) USN.
That same day the commanding general of FMFPac stated an
operational requirement for 500 armored vests to be sent to the 1st
Marine Division. And on 16 November the Commandant approved the
standardization and procurement of vests to be designed by the Naval
Medical Field Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune and air-shipped to
Korea not later than 31 January 1952.[346]
[346] Sources for this section, except when otherwise
specified, are the following: ACofS, G-4, Rpts of 2 Jan,
29 Feb, and 15 May 52 (in G-4 files, Headquarters Marine
Corps); Rpt of Test (Project 671) by MCEB, Quantico, Va.,
3 Jan 1952; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, ltr of 30 Jun 1954;
LtCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 1954.
So many problems remained to be solved that it was nip and tuck whether
Lieutenant Commander Lewis and his NMFRL colleagues would make the
deadline. On 11 December 1951 another body armor meeting was held
at Marine Corps Headquarters, attended by Marine representatives.
Lieutenant Commander Lewis and Mr. John F. Quinlan, reporting for the
NMFRL, explained that as a consequence of changes in design to speed up
manufacture, samples submitted to them weighed as much as 10 pounds.
Under no circumstances, said Lewis, would he approve a vest weighing
more than eight pounds, since its success depended so much on troop
acceptance. Despite the fact that only a few weeks remained before the
deadline, Lewis exhibited a vest that he and Quinlan had redesigned by
working around the clock until the armor came within the weight limit
without any sacrifice in protection. This vest was immediately put into
production as the M-1951.
A plastic fibre manufacturer agreed to supply 70,000 Doron plates, and
a Philadelphia sportswear company contracted to manufacture the first
500 vests, plus an additional 2,500 to be delivered by 30 March 1952.
The M-1951 was described in Marine reports as “a zippered, vest-type,
sleeveless jacket constructed of water-resistant nylon incorporating
two types of armor. One, a flexible pad of basket-weave nylon, covers
the upper chest and shoulder girdle; the other, overlapping curved
Doron plates, covers the lower chest, back and abdomen. These Doron
plates consist of several layers of fibre glass cloth, bonded or
laminated together with a resin.... Although the ballistic properties
of the flexible pads of basket-weave nylon and the Doron plates are
virtually the same, by using the rigid plates where flexibility is not
mandatory the problem of protrusion and the resultant wounds under the
armor is reduced.”[347]
[347] ACofS, G-4, “Instructional Information, Vest, Armored,
M-1951,” 5–6.
Marine wearers of the M-1951 were warned that it would not stop rifle
or machine gun bullets unless they had lost much of their velocity at
long ranges. The vest was protection against most grenade, mortar, and
artillery fragments, as well as .45 caliber pistol and burp gun slugs
of less than 1,000 feet per second initial muzzle velocity. Wearers did
not escape entirely unscathed, for the impact of the fragment or slug
left painful bruises.
It was a close squeak but the first 500 vests reached Korea with only
a few days to spare. Captain David R. McGrew, Jr. accompanied the
shipment as project officer with a mission of supervising and observing
the use made of the M-1951 in action. His first letter to Headquarters
Marine Corps, dated 4 February 1952, commented that “up to tonight we
have had nine men hit while wearing the vest. One was killed outright
as a 120mm mortar round landed right in his lap. However, the other
eight showed excellent results. All of the eight were wounded in
other places not covered by the vest--but they are all WIA instead of
KIA.”[348]
[348] Capt D. W. McGrew, Jr. to LtCol G. W. Hardwick, ltr of 4
Feb 52.
Captain McGrew cited the instance of a Pfc of the 2d Battalion, 7th
Marines, wounded by the explosion of an 82mm mortar shell only 15 feet
in front of him. He received several fragments in the face and his leg
was fractured. But there were some 45 holes in his vest, without any
penetrations. Fifteen of the fragments had been large enough to inflict
mortal chest or abdomen wounds.
The 500 vests were issued only to troops in particularly hazardous
situations, such as patrols to the enemy lines. Upon returning from a
patrol or raid, the wearers turned in their armor to be worn by other
Marines under fire.
“The reaction of the user to the vest,” reported McGrew, “is closely
related to the amount of enemy activity. In sectors of the OPLR and
MLR [outpost and main lines of resistance] where heavy incoming mortar
and artillery fire was received, there were no complaints regarding
the weight or restrictive features of the vest. In other sectors where
there was little or no enemy activity, approximately 15 percent of the
personnel complained that the vest was heavy and restricted movement to
some degree. Approximately 2 percent of the wearers in these sectors
thought the vest was not worth the trouble and would wear it only when
ordered to do so.”[349]
[349] ACofS, G-4, “Report of Field Test of Armored Vest,
M-1951,” 15 May 51.
The project officer believed that a “significant reduction” in KIA
casualties could be credited to the M-1951, but that WIA figures were
only slightly lessened. That was because so many wearers were wounded
who would have been killed save for the armor. Captain McGrew listed
the following case histories, confirmed by medical officers:
Men who would have been killed instead of wounded if they had
lacked armor protection--23:
Men who had potentially severe wounds reduced to superficial
wounds--29;
Men who had superficial wounds prevented altogether--31.
The project officer had no opportunity to compare the casualties of
vest wearers with those of an equal number of unprotected Marines
taking part in the same action. It was his conclusion, based on
observation, that “use of the vest by all personnel who are habitually
forward of battalion command posts may result in as much as a 30
percent reduction in battle casualties. Because many WIA cases are
the result of wounds of the extremities and/or multiple wounds, there
probably will not be a large reduction of casualties in this category.
It is believed that the largest reduction will occur in the KIA
category and that this reduction will be substantial.”[350]
[350] _Ibid._
The introduction of body armor was not heralded in the press by page
one headlines such as had announced the first transport helicopter
operations in Korea. Occasionally a photograph on page eight showed a
Marine grinning triumphantly while pointing to a hole in his armored
vest and holding aloft the jagged mortar fragment that might otherwise
have killed him. But it is safe to say that a majority of Stateside
newspaper readers and radio listeners in 1951 were unaware of the
Marine revival of armor adapted to 20th-century warfare.
Press correspondents in Korea did not appear to grasp the tactical
significance of an innovation which they regarded entirely as a
humanitarian achievement. From a strictly military viewpoint, however,
it was apparent that if the M-1951 could reduce casualties by 30
percent, as Captain McGrew estimated (and his estimate was later
regarded as conservative), it would mean that a like reduction had been
effected in the destructive potential of the enemy’s best antipersonnel
weapons. It was as if the Marines were able to slip behind the enemy’s
lines and silence 3 out of 10 of his howitzers, mortars, burp guns, and
grenades.
This was of particular importance in overcoming the numerical
superiority of the Communists. Not only did each American wound
casualty reduce the effectiveness of a unit, but four or more comrades
were often neutralized as stretcher bearers in Korean mountain terrain.
If body armor could prevent 3 casualties out of 10, therefore, it
would be a significant addition to a unit’s numerical strength as well
as combat morale.
Any doubts about Marine troop acceptance of the M-1951 were laid to
rest by the approval of the 500 vests issued early in February 1952. An
additional 2,500 arrived early in March and on the 13th of that month
the Division ordered 25,000 more. The armored vest, like the thermal
boot, had needed only a thorough trial to become standard equipment.
_Helicopter Operations_ MULETRAIN _and_ CHANGIE-CHANGIE
The combat helicopter, oldest of the three Marine tactical innovations
in Korea, had already managed to make routine performances out of
operations that once claimed headlines. Battalion troop lifts were no
longer a novelty, and supplying a front-line company by air was taken
for granted. But nothing quite as ambitious as Operation MULETRAIN had
ever been attempted--the mission of completely supplying a battalion on
the MLR for a week with a daily average of four helicopters.
Hill 884 was again the objective. Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon’s HMR-161
was given the task of flying tentage, stoves, rations, and ammunition
from supply dumps to the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gorman.
It was the first opportunity for HMR-161 to try out improvements in
helicopter “flying crane” techniques credited to Major Charles E.
Cornwell. He had adapted the underslung nets, controlled manually
from the cabin, which did a better job than the pallet, or portable
platform, for many types of cargo.
An average altitude of 2,300 feet for the five landing places made it
necessary to reduce the payload to 850 pounds. Yet HMR-161 handled
the assignment during the first week of 1952 with about one-third of
its aircraft while the remainder went about routine chores. So well
did four helicopters keep ahead of schedule that sometimes they flew
in more cargo than could be immediately unloaded at the objectives.
Following are the statistics of the seven days:
Pounds lifted, 150,730; Hours of flight time, 91.7; Loads lifted,
219; Average of miles flown, 9.6
Three days later, Operation CHANGIE-CHANGIE began on 10 January 1952.
Like Operation BUMBLEBEE three months earlier, this was a battalion
relief lift. Yet it differed from its predecessors in that troops
were to be flown from Field X-83 to sites on the company instead of
battalion level, the former being only 200 yards behind the front
line.[351]
[351] Sources for the helicopter operations described in this
section are the following: HMR-161, _HD_, Jan and Feb 51;
_Cavalry of the Sky_, 176–175. Veterans of the Korean
conflict will recall that “changie-changie” meant “swap”
in the pidgin English serving as a conversational medium
between Americans and Orientals. Hence it was applicable
to a relief operation.
In December the loading zone and landing site duties formerly assigned
to a platoon of the 1st Shore Party Battalion, were taken over by the
1st Air Delivery Platoon, Service Command, FMFPac. First Lieutenant
William A. Reavis and 35 enlisted men had a mission “to prepare
and deliver supplies by air, whether by parachute, air freight,
or helicopter.” These specialists were in charge during Operation
CHANGIE-CHANGIE when the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel
Edward G. Kurdziel) relieved Lieutenant Colonel Norton’s 1st Battalion,
5th Marines. The operation was conducted smoothly by helicopters flying
in defilade throughout the approach, landing, and return phases.
Operation MOUSETRAP, from 14 to 17 January, was planned primarily as
a test of the ability of HMR-161 to launch an antiguerrilla attack on
short notice. Colonel McCutcheon and Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell were
alerted at 0100 in regard to a two-company lift scheduled for 1000
that same morning. With “only minor difficulties” they transported 500
Marines to a landing site cleared by the Air Delivery Platoon. Three
similar troop movements were completed by HMR-161 during the next three
days.
If ever a bronze plaque is awarded in commemoration of the first
history-making helicopter troop and supply lifts, it would be fitting
to install it on Hill 884. That bleak and roadless height had its fifth
large-scale operation on 24 February when Lieutenant Colonel Harold
C. Howard’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, relieved the 2d Battalion,
of that same regiment on “Mount Helicopter.” Operation ROTATE was
completed without incident as further evidence that battalion reliefs
by helicopter were now routine.
In spite of the demands made upon HMR-161 helicopters in cold weather
and mountainous terrain, it is noteworthy that no serious mechanical
defects had developed. This six-month record came to an end on 24
February 1952 when Captain John R. Irwin was returning from Seoul to
X-83. Warned by alarming vibrations, he landed to discover that the
broken remnants of the tail assembly had dropped behind him in the snow.
Four days later, while flying a load of logs for bunkers, Captain
Calvin G. Alston’s aircraft was so shaken by vibrations that he
suspected damage from enemy artillery fragments. He made a forced
landing in the snow only to discover another instance of a tail
assembly breakdown.
Colonel McCutcheon grounded all HMR-161 aircraft until the trouble
could be corrected. Not until 14 March, after 16 modified tail
assemblies had been flown to Korea did the Marine transport helicopter
squadron take to the air again.
_The Five Days of Operation_ CLAM-UP
Ground operations continued with little change during February and
the first two weeks of March. The only departure from the well-worn
tactical norm came on 10 February, when EUSAK put Operation CLAM-UP
into effect across the entire UN front.
The purpose was to feign a withdrawal and lure the enemy into sending
out patrols which would yield prisoners to Eighth Army units. A EUSAK
letter of instruction, dated 4 February 1952, asserted that “a policy
of aggressive patrolling has led the enemy to rely upon our patrols
for the maintenance of contact. This situation enables him to maintain
contact without subjecting his troops to the hazard of capture or
casualty.”[352]
[352] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based upon
the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 52, 1–12; and _PacFlt Interim
Rpt_ No. 4, 9–11 to 9–14.
All corps were directed to “... attempt to decoy the enemy into
dispatching patrols against our lines and ambush and capture such
patrols.”
First Marine Division orders called for an elaborate series of
deceptions. Immediately prior to CLAM-UP, on 9–10 February, the 11th
Marines fired 471 harrassing and interdiction missions, as if to
cover a large-scale withdrawal. Over 12,000 artillery rounds were
expended.[353] Then CLAM-UP commenced, and the three regiments on the
MLR--from left to right, the KMCs, 1st Marines, and 7th Marines--did
their part to hoodwink the enemy. Reserve battalions executed daylight
marches on foot to the rear and returned after dark by means of motor
lifts. The 5th Marines, in Division reserve at Camp Tripoli, executed
similar feigned withdrawals.
[353] 11thMar _HD_, Feb 52, 13; Col B. T. Hemphill comments, 20
Jan 59.
After the Marine cannoneers completed their supposed covering fires,
the front was plunged into an eerie silence. It did not take long,
of course, for the enemy’s curiosity to be aroused. NKPA patrols
reconnoitred the Marine lines on the night of 10–11 February without
being fired upon. The following night a patrol attempted to draw Marine
fire in the Hill 812 area by advertising its presence with loud talk.
The enemy’s fire was not returned until the patrol attacked a Marine
position with white phosphorous grenades. In sheer self-defense the
Marines retaliated, and the North Koreans made a hurried exit, leaving
behind 10 dead and 2 wounded men who became prisoners.
At first light on the 12th another enemy patrol tried to penetrate the
wire in front of a 1st Marines position and paid the penalty with nine
men killed and three wounded in a 15-minute fire fight.
On 13 February the Marines were pounded with the month’s heaviest
concentration of NKPA fire--344 artillery and 1,469 mortar rounds. Thus
did the enemy serve notice of his realization that Marine positions on
the MLR were being held in strength. NKPA patrol actions on the nights
of the 13th and 14th were launched at Marine trenches on Hills 812 and
854 at the estimated cost of heavy casualties.
When Operation CLAM-UP came to an end on 15 February, it had admittedly
fallen short of EUSAK expectations. Although NKPA patrol losses had
been considerable, they were offset by fewer casualties in rear areas
enjoying a five-day immunity from UN artillery fire. Worse yet, the
enemy was enabled during this period of grace to bring up ammunition
and other supplies without interference. As a final disillusionment, it
was reckoned that across the whole Eighth Army front the Communists had
lost fewer prisoners than during the preceding five-day period.
In the Marine combat zone a gain was recorded in enemy casualties.
General Selden congratulated the Division on “the fire discipline
practiced by MLR troops and by platoon and company commanders. As a
consequence of the fire discipline, the line companies were able to
kill 56 enemy and wound 54.” These totals, it was pointed out, were
larger than the losses normally inflicted on the enemy in a five-day
period.[354]
[354] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 52, 3.
On the other hand, five deserters from the mortar company of the 1st
Battalion, 91st Regiment, 45th NKPA Division revealed that advantage
had been taken of Operation CLAM-UP by detailing mortar personnel and
men from the rifle companies to carry ammunition. During the five-day
lull, according to the prisoners, 2,600 rounds were brought up for the
company’s nine mortars.[355]
[355] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ No. 486, Feb 52.
After the brief flurry of Operation CLAM-UP the front quickly settled
down to its old routine of patrols. An average of eight Marine night
ambush patrols and five daylight reconnaissance patrols forward of the
MLR was maintained. The results left much to be desired. Of the last
110 ambuscades and 75 reconnaissance patrols reported in February, only
1 of the former and 6 of the latter claimed contacts. All but one of
the contacts had negligible results.
The Marine fire attack did the enemy more damage. Artillery fired 679
observed missions during the month--211 on troops, 175 on bunkers, 121
on mortars, 96 on artillery, and 75 on such miscellaneous targets as
OPs, vehicles, machine guns, and supply points. This total was recorded
in spite of an ammunition shortage which would ultimately become the
subject of debate in Congress.
Even with supplies of ammunition limited by X Corps orders, Marine
artillery drove the enemy from untenable forward-slope positions to
underground fortifications on the reverse slope.
Naval gunfire was limited by the extreme range to the Division zone
of action.[356] Only large targets forward and to the right of center
could be taken under fire. Even so, the _Wisconsin_ and the _St.
Paul_ scored some devastating hits in February on enemy reverse slope
positions.
[356] The battleship _Wisconsin_ had a main battery of 16-inch
guns with a maximum range of about 23 miles. The heavy
cruiser _St. Paul_ had a main battery of 8-inch guns with
a maximum range of 16 miles.
On one occasion, the _Wisconsin_ erroneously calculated its deflection.
Two 16-inch rounds landed between the front line and the 3/7 mortar
positions before the fire could be stopped. Fortunately, no one was
injured. The _Wisconsin_ Marine officer happened to be visiting the
Division CP that day, and on hearing the news he came up to 3/7 and
collected a large shell fragment. He stated that he intended to mount
the jagged piece of steel in the ship’s CIC room as a reminder to
future gunners to make no errors in plot.
Observed direct fire by the 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank Battalion
(Major Walter E. Reynolds, Jr.) continued to be effective against NKPA
bunkers and gun emplacements. Utilizing the high ground along the MLR,
particularly on Hills 812 and 854, tanks sniped at the enemy both by
day and night.
This was made possible by the powerful lights of a platoon from the
92d U.S. Army Searchlight Company, attached to the 11th Marines. The
mountainous terrain in East Korea was not particularly suited to
“artificial moonlight”--the indirect illumination of a large area which
results from “bouncing” the rays of searchlights off low-lying clouds.
But direct illumination permitted aimed 90mm fire in the darkness and
had the further advantage of blinding the enemy to the tanks themselves
as well as to troop movements behind them. Not a single light was shot
out during the winter in spite of persistent NKPA attempts.
The lessons taught by battlefield illumination in Korea were to be
incorporated into two instructive bulletins after the war. “The enemy
does _not_ have any better night vision than we do,” asserted USMC
Landing Force Bulletin No. 6. “No racial or national group of people
has any inherent physical advantage over another as to capability for
seeing in darkness....[357] The apparent advantage which the enemy
sometimes displays in night operations is due only to a difference
in training. In the case of the Oriental soldier, or the Eskimo, for
example, training usually begins early in life, where he does not have
the convenience of artificial light to the degree we have, and has been
forced to make maximum use of his natural night vision in many of his
normal activities.
“U.S. Forces have conducted many successful night operations after
adequate training. Some units have reported that after intensive night
training, personnel have become so proficient that they sometimes
prefer night operations to daylight operations.”
[357] U.S. Marine Corps Landing Force Bulletin No. 6, “Night
Vision and Night Combat,” 5 Dec 53. See also Bulletin No.
18, “Battlefield Illumination,” 4 Jun 56.
In support of this conclusion, records for the winter of 1951–1952
reveal that the Marines held their own very well in the night combats
of no man’s land, where the outcome depended upon immediate decisions
based upon seeing in the dark.
Marine casualties for February, the last full month in East Korea, were
23 KIA, 102 WIA, and 1 MIA, including the KMC Regiment. Enemy losses
were reported as 174 counted and 381 estimated KIA, 606 estimated WIA,
and 63 prisoners.[358]
[358] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, App No. 5. Other sources for
this chapter are comments and criticism by the following
officers: (Ranks listed are those held at time of
interview or comment.) Gen G. C. Thomas; LtGen J. T.
Selden; BrigGen S. S. Wade; BrigGen C. R. Allen; Col J.
H. Tinsley; Col F. B. Nihart; Col J. F. Stamm; Col B. T.
Hemphill.
After a winter of positional warfare, the Marines could recall with
better understanding the tales their fathers had told them about
France in World War I. For history was staging one of its repetitions;
and, allowing for improvements in weapons, the trenches of Korea in
1951–1952 differed but slightly from the trenches of the Western Front
in 1917–1918.
CHAPTER XII
The Move to West Korea
_Truce Talks--Tactical Innovations--The Marines in Operation_
MIXMASTER--_Operations of Fifteen Months in Retrospect_
No chronicle of activities in Korea would be complete without a
discussion of the truce talks which began in the summer of 1951.
When the Communists proposed these meetings early in June, their
motives were transparent; they were hurt, staggering, and badly in
need of a breathing spell. Pretending a sudden interest in peace, the
hard-pressed enemy requested talks at Kaesong for the purposes of
recuperation.
The enemy would never admit the real damage he suffered. A typical
excuse for the smashing CCF defeat was given in a book by Wilford G.
Burchett, an Australian Communist who was a press correspondent behind
the Chinese lines.
“Immediately prior to the beginning of the talks,” he explained,
“the Korean-Chinese troops had withdrawn extensively along the East
Coast, hoping to entice the Americans as deep as possible into a trap
which would be sprung and would cut them off by an encircling move.
The Americans were seriously nibbling at the bait when the proposal
for cease-fire talks was made. The line was immediately frozen and
Korean-Chinese troops started to dig in.”[359]
[359] Wilford G. Burchett: _This Monstrous War_ (Melbourne,
1953): J. Waters, 121–122. Burchett was a Communist free
lance correspondent for left-wing newspapers. He wrote
several books and articles lauding the Communist cause in
the Korean War.
This beginning of static warfare was unquestionably the great turning
point of a war whose course from that time on was to be decided at
the conference table of Kaesong and later Panmunjom. Any doubts as to
the actual motives of the Communists might have been dispelled upon
reading in Burchett’s book this naive boast of the advantage taken of
the truce talks by the Reds:
Digging in is an understatement of the way the Korean-Chinese
troops literally burrowed into the mountains, constructed two
and three story dwellings underground, linked mountains and
hills by underground tunnels and carved deep communication
trenches linking flank with flank and front with rear. They raked
the insides out of mountains as you would rake ashes out of a
furnace. Each hill, mountain or ridge was connected with its
neighbors by deep, zig-zagged inter-communication trenches, at
least two yards below ground level and with yard-high antiblast
walls. In emergency, troops could be switched from hill-top
to hill-top with the enemy never knowing. Similar trenches
extended well to the rear, so that supplies could be brought
up and withdrawals if necessary made in comparative safety....
Everything was deep underground with many yards of rock and earth
between them and shells and bombs, atomic or otherwise. Back of
the front line positions, similar scooped-out mountain ridges
stretched all the way back to Pyongyang and further. It was
against these positions that Van Fleet began hurling his troops
in August, 1951.[360]
[360] _Ibid._ General Van Fleet did not “hurl” his troops
against anything. He began limited offensives for the
purpose of improving Eighth Army morale and maintaining
offensive spirit. See Gen James A. Van Fleet, ltr of 28
Feb 59.
The breathing spell provided by preliminary truce talk discussions gave
the Communists an opportunity they had not previously enjoyed. Not only
did they have time to prepare sturdy and effective entrenchments, but
they were able to bring up additional mortars and artillery to equal
those of the Allied forces. As a further advantage, while “free from
the compulsion of impending military disaster,”[361] they made use
of the interlude to reorganize and train NKPA divisions to a new and
increased level of effectiveness.
[361] C. Turner Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 28.
Communists are never embarrassed in the least to deny an agreement
already reached, and once having accomplished their intermediate goal,
the Red delegates broke off the Kaesong talks for a while. Once the
pressure on them was reduced, the enemy was in a position to try to
obtain the most favorable terms for armistice talks, even if it meant
prolonging the fighting.
The change in tactics soon became apparent. “Since the opening of the
Kaesong conference,” commented a FECom G-2 report, “the enemy has
deviated from his usual tactics of ‘flexible defense’ which he so
skilfully employed during the buildup period prior to all his past
offensives--to that of a more orthodox ‘fixed defense.’ Where the enemy
in the past has defended key terrain features with relatively small
groups to delay friendly forces, he has now changed over to tactics of
a fixed line of defense to be defended at all costs.”[362]
[362] FECom G-2 Intelligence Summary, 18 Sep 51.
“The most extended delay imposed upon the Korean Armistice Conference
by the Communists was in connection with the exchange of prisoners of
war,”[363] which subject will be discussed in Volume V of this series.
The United Nations contended that all prisoners should be “screened”
to determine whether they wished to return to their side of origin. No
prisoner was to be returned against his wishes. The Communists claimed
this treatment consisted of a reign of terror in which CCF prisoners
were held at gunpoint.
[363] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 53.
Some prisoners held in UN camps rioted and injuries and deaths
resulted. This provided the Communists with excellent propaganda on
which to denounce our principles of no forced repatriation.[364] In
the end, after a delay of more than 14 months of war, the Communists
finally did accept this principle, and an armistice was achieved.
[364] _Ibid._
The Communist delaying tactics were not entirely without benefits
to the Allied forces, for the major part of the 1st Marine Division
had the opportunity to go into reserve and engage in several weeks’
intensive training. While the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was busily
participating in the interdiction activities of Operation STRANGLE,
General Van Fleet and his ground commanders felt frustrated over their
orders to “sit tight” rather than attack and prevent further enemy
buildup.
An agreement to resume cease-fire talks, this time at Panmunjom, led to
a EUSAK order which committed the 1st Marine Division and other major
units to a defensive stand behind a fixed line of demarcation on 20
September 1951 (Map 19). Further negotiations resulted in a month’s
lull which was brought about by the fact that the delegates could
not agree on where the lines would remain if the fighting stopped.
The United States delegates pressed for a settlement within a 30-day
period. The Communists continued to stall. The United States then
consented to accept the present (then current) demarcation line if the
Communists agreed within the 30-day period.[365]
[365] Col J. C. Murray, Comments, Jan 59.
The significance of these dates was to become more and more plain as
the conflict dragged on into 1952 with both sides on the defensive,
limiting themselves to the raids and patrols of positional warfare
while the appointed representatives haggled for a truce. Although the
Marines did not realize it, the war had already turned into a contest
of watchful waiting and fierce local fights.
This line of demarcation left the Eighth Army holding a MLR across
one of the narrowest parts of the peninsula (Map 22). Just behind
the Communist MLR the peninsula bulged to the west. This meant that
the enemy had to devote much of his effort to mining the waters and
defense of many beaches against a surprise amphibious attack, and it
necessitated keeping in operation long and vulnerable supply lines.
It is probable that a UN breakthrough or successful amphibious
operation could have been mounted at this time,[366] for several high
ranking officers expressed such opinions. All the necessary ingredients
were available, yet the high level decision for such an operation was
not made.
[366] BGen V. H. Krulak, Comments, Jan 59.
_Tactical Innovations_
Until World War II, it had been a deserved reproach throughout the
brief history of our country that Americans were never prepared at the
outset of a war. A welcome departure from this tenet came in 1942 when
the Marine Corps and Navy introduced the new amphibious tactics they
had developed during the 1930s. Victory in the Pacific War was due in
large measure to the techniques, landing craft, and vehicles of the
Navy-Marine Corps ship-to-shore attack.
As a result, North Africa, Europe, and the Japanese-occupied islands of
the Pacific were opened to invasion without a single major reverse. In
contrast, Hitler’s _Wehrmacht_ lacked both the techniques and equipment
to launch a cross-channel attack on England in 1940, and Operation SEA
LION was of necessity abandoned by an army that dominated the rest of
Europe as a result of victories in land warfare.
Again, in Korea, the Marines demonstrated their foresightedness
by taking a prominent part in the development of such important
innovations as combat helicopters, body armor, and thermal
footwear.[367] By the first month in 1952 the combat helicopter had
proved to be of immeasurable assistance in modern warfare, in the
beginning of the Korean War the “chopper” was initially used for
command and liaison flights and reconnaissance missions. Evacuation of
casualties and rescue missions also became routine duties, and within
a short time the helicopter became the favorite “workhorse” for a
variety of tasks. In September of 1951 tactical troop movements began.
These operations made newspaper headlines everywhere.
[367] Previous chapters discuss the background and development
of these innovations.
Of greater tactical importance, at least in the opinion of the
front-line rifleman, was the physical protection provided him. The
armored vest and the new thermal boots were first tested by Marines
late in 1951 and soon came to be highly desired items of equipment.
The fighting men in Korea would not disagree with Benjamin Franklin’s
statement that “there never was a good war,” but modern inventions
certainly improved conditions by providing for the safety and comfort
of the fighting men. Marine transport helicopters and body armor were
of particular importance because they added to the human resources
of UN forces opposed by an enemy with a contempt for life, based on
seemingly endless reserves of manpower. UN commanders in their fight
against the Communist forces could not recklessly expend lives as did
the enemy; therefore, the Allies had need of tactical innovations and
life-saving devices in order to compensate for a lack of numbers.
_The Marines in Operation_ MIXMASTER
In the spring of 1952, when the UN and Communist forces were facing
each other from static positions and fighting local engagements,
Operation MIXMASTER took place. MIXMASTER was a complicated
rearrangement of UN divisions across the entire Korean front during
March, and involved the shuffling of about 200,000 men and their
equipment over distances from 25 to 180 miles. It was a severe test of
Eighth Army mobility.[368]
[368] Col B. T. Hemphill, Comments, 30 Jan 59.
General Van Fleet visited the 1st Marine Division CP on 12 March 1952,
and announced an important command decision. After six months of
defensive warfare in the same sector along Line MINNESOTA (20 September
1951 to 16 March 1952) the Division was to move across the peninsula to
West Korea.
[Illustration: EUSAK DISPOSITIONS
15 MARCH 1952
MAP 22]
The Marines had orders to relieve the 1st ROK Division and take
over a sector at the extreme left of the Eighth Army line under the
operational control of I Corps (Map 22). There they would have the
responsibility for blocking Korea’s historic invasion route to Seoul.
The reasons behind this EUSAK decision were summarized in the 1st
Marine Division report as follows:
(1) The abandonment of plans to carry out an amphibious
envelopment somewhere on the east coast;
(2) Concern over weaknesses in the Kimpo area defenses;
(3) The overall situation would not permit loss of ground on the
EUSAK left (South Korea) as this would endanger the capital at
Seoul; that if retraction of lines was necessary, territory could
better be sacrificed on the right (North Korea) where the country
was mountainous and had little economic or strategic value.[369]
[369] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 52, 1–2.
Up to this time the four corps of the Eighth Army had defended a
125-mile front across the peninsula (Map 22) with the following units
in line from left to right on 15 March 1952.
I CORPS--ROK 1st Division; British Commonwealth Division; U.S. 3d
Infantry Division (-); U.S. 45th Infantry Division (Oklahoma
National Guard); ROK 9th Division. In reserve were the ROK 8th
Division and RCT-65 of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division.
IX CORPS--U.S. 2d Infantry Division; ROK 2d Division; U.S. 40th
Infantry Division (California National Guard); ROK 3d Division.
In reserve were the U.S. 7th Infantry Division (-), RCT-17 of
that Division, and the ROK Capitol Division.
X CORPS--ROK 7th Division; U.S. 25th Infantry Division; U.S. 1st
Marine Division (including 1st KMC Regiment). In reserve was
the ROK 6th Division (-).
I ROK CORPS--ROK 5th Division (-). In reserve was the ROK 11th
Division (-).[370]
[370] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 52, 13–14.
Allowing for a few changes, these were the positions held by major
EUSAK units through the winter of 1951–1952.
The Marine move was launched by Division Operation Plan 2-52 and
provided that the 1st Marine Division would be relieved by the 8th ROK
Division as a preliminary to movement overland and by sea to the relief
of the 1st ROK Division and defense of Line JAMESTOWN in the I Corps
sector in the west. According to verbal orders later confirmed by EUSAK
OI 272, transportation by truck and ship was specified, and the move
was to be completed prior to 1 April.[371]
[371] Sources for this section are 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 52,
9–10; 1st MT Bn _HD_, Mar 52; 7th MT Bn _HD_, Mar 52.
Obviously such a transplacement--moving entire divisions great
distances from one sector of the MLR to another--necessitated careful
timing and close coordination, but the planners involved were equal to
the task. In referring to detailed plans by the Division G-3 Section
(Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle) and the G-4 Section (Colonel
Robert A. McGill), several unit commanders expressed the opinion that
“the move from east to west was a masterpiece of logistical efficiency
with no unnecessary paper work and no undue harrassment.”[372]
[372] Col T. A. Culhane, Jr., Comments, 4 Mar 59, and others.
In addition to transporting the Division, the arrival of replacements
and departure of personnel to be rotated to the United States were
smoothly coordinated into the over-all plan. The transport _General
W. H. Gordon_ anchored at Sokcho-ri on 16 March with 174 officers and
1,135 enlisted men of the 18th Replacement Draft. The newly arrived
Marines scarcely had time to drop their seabags before they joined the
motor march to West Korea. The _Gordon_ departed with 103 officers and
1,135 Marines homeward bound, and the 2d Logistical Command (Army)
received a 1st Marine Division request to route the 19th Replacement
Draft, due in April, to Inchon instead of Sokcho-ri.
At K-50, near Sokcho-ri on the east coast, air freight and passenger
service was discontinued and diverted to the new Division airhead,
K-16, at Seoul. The Division railhead was changed to Munsan-ni (Map 22).
The first Marine unit to depart for West Korea was the KMC Regiment
with its organic battalion of artillery. Since the artillery had
to be moved and repositioned all across the front with as little
interruption as possible in overall support available at any one time,
the 11th Marines CO planned to move his battalions directly into
their new firing positions. This was preceded by an initial detailed
reconnaissance.
Elements of the U.S. 25th Infantry sideslipped to the right and assumed
responsibility for the Marine sector on the 17th (Map 22), and the KMCs
and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines moved into their new positions on
18 March. The other artillery battalions followed at two-day intervals,
all battalions firing from their new positions by 24 March.
The movement of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion (less Company A),
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John T. O’Neill, was an unforgettable
experience. Embarking on LSTs manned by a skeleton Japanese crew, the
vessels headed for the Kimpo Peninsula. The weather was squally and
foggy throughout, and the ships were completely blacked out at night
with no facilities for emergency transmission of messages. There were
many navigational hazards, but in spite of this, and the lack of
adequate navigational equipment, the LSTs arrived at their destination
without incident.
Two days later, on 20 September, the 1st Tank Battalion and the
antitank companies of the three infantry regiments also took the sea
route to the new Division area in the west.
Division Operation Order 8-52, dated 18 March, directed the 1st Marines
to proceed by motor march from the Division reserve area at Camp
TRIPOLI to the new Division area east of Munsan-ni, and there to move
into front line positions. The 7th Marines, after being relieved on the
20th by elements of the 8th ROK Division, assembled at Camp TRIPOLI
and moved by truck to West Korea. Colonel Austin R. Brunelli, who had
replaced Colonel Custis Burton, Jr., as chief of staff, moved the
forward CP personnel and prepared the new Division command post.
After being relieved by the ROKs on the 23d, the 5th Marines departed
their east coast area. Two days later the regiment arrived in the
Munsan-ni area behind the 7th Marines and the remaining elements of the
artillery regiment.
The 5th Marines had originally been scheduled to occupy reserve
positions on the Kimpo Peninsula, but plans were changed en route. The
commanding general and his G-3 were appalled at the Division sector’s
width, and after General Selden had a chance to inspect the areas to
be defended and talk over the situation with the commanders of the 1st
and 7th Marines (Col Sidney S. Wade and Col Russell E. Honsowetz), he
decided that the 5th Marines should go into the line.[373]
[373] _Ibid._
A few hours after the 5th Marines convoy left the east coast on their
140-mile trans-Korea move, helicopters picked up the regimental and
battalion commanders from their respective vehicles in the convoy
and took them to the new Division CP. There they were assigned new
defensive sectors and immediately reconnoitered the ground while
awaiting the arrival of their units. By the time the regiment arrived,
all preparations were made for them to move into positions and relieve
a portion of the thinly stretched line of the 1st Marines.
It had been a busy week for the 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions,
commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Wertman and
Major Herbert E. Pierce. Two hundred Division trucks and a like number
of U.S. Army vehicles made up the long columns that shuttled back and
forth across the peninsula. The plan provided for moving an infantry
regiment every third day. For the drivers this meant a 140-mile trip,
a return trip the following day, and a one-day layover for maintenance
before commencing the new cycle. The artillery battalions, by order of
X Corps, were retained until the latest possible date.
The statistics of Operation MIXMASTER are impressive. It took 5,716
truck loads and 80 DUKW loads to move most of the Division personnel,
gear, and supplies. Sixty-three lowboys (flat-bed trailers) and 83
railroad cars were also utilized in addition to hundreds of jeeps and
jeep trailers. Three LSDs and 11 LSTs sailed from Sokcho-ri to Inchon
with the heaviest equipment.
During the previous winter a sizable number of prefabricated shelters
had been set up for supporting and headquarters units. Since timber,
logs, and salvage materials were in short supply, the 1st Marine
Division moved large quantities of these materials to the west coast
in order to live as comfortably as possible under static warfare
conditions.
The operations of the 1st Marine Division in defense of the western
sector of Line JAMESTOWN do not come within the scope of Volume IV. The
account of Marine activities in the new sector, under the operational
control of I Corps, will be discussed in the fifth and final volume of
this series.
_Operations of Fifteen Months in Retrospect_
During 1951 the Korean War became a most unpopular military venture
among Americans. As a consequence, letters and newspapers from home
caused a certain amount of anxiety among citizen-soldiers in Korea. To
counter any spirit of doubt which may have arisen, military leaders
issued frank and honest replies to inquiring politicians.
The _esprit de corps_ of Marines was high, and they were well aware
of their purpose in Korea. One noted author, on spending a couple of
days among front-line Marines during January of 1952, told a group of
officers at the Division CP that he “was impressed with the morale of
the Marines on the MLR.” He stated that he “had been prepared to find
that they didn’t know what they were fighting for or why they were
there.” However, he was encouraged to find that they knew exactly their
purpose in the Korean fighting.[374]
[374] Col F. B. Nihart, Comments regarding author James
Michener’s visit to 1stMarDiv, ltr of 23 Mar 59.
The period of nearly 15 months covered by Volume IV was at that time
the longest stretch of land warfare ever experienced by a major Marine
unit. Even during the numerous island-hopping campaigns of World War
II, the periods of combat were relatively brief for each.
Glancing back over the year 1951 with the benefit of hindsight,
it is evident that Marine “uncommon valor” during this period was
supplemented by such outstanding innovations as helicopter-borne
assaults and lightweight body armor, concepts brought to fruition by
the pressure of combat.
It is also apparent that Marine training, both for officers and
enlisted men, paid off handsomely under the demands of practically
every type of land warfare. The Division chalked up a commendable
record of service fighting on the east-central front. Since the UN
commander desired to have EUSAK’s only amphibious trained and equipped
division near a coast offering a suitable selection of landing
beaches, the Division was originally positioned in the east. Not since
the Inchon landing, however, had the Marines been employed in their
specialty, amphibious assault.
Subsequent to the unprecedented Chosin Reservoir campaign of late 1950
the Division reorganized and refitted in South Korea near Masan. Then
in January and February of 1951 came the prolonged guerrilla-hunting
campaign (Map 5) some 60 air miles north of Masan. Division operations
in this area covered more than 1,000 square miles.[375]
[375] Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 28 Jan 59.
The mountainous terrain offered cover and concealment for the
clandestine operations of far too many enemy groups. A solution to
this problem was found in “rice paddy patrols”--groups ranging from a
fire team to a squad in size which penetrated the mountain areas on
foot to flush out small enemy bands. In retrospect, had one squadron
of helicopters been available at that time, and its quick lift
capabilities utilized, the increased mobility and surveillance would
have made quite a difference in the conduct of the action.
Although land-based Marine air power had been under operational control
of the Fifth Air Force during the Chosin Reservoir fighting, a verbal
agreement allowed the 1st MAW commander to provide directly necessary
support to the 1st Marine Division. At the same time, carrier-based
Marine planes were flying on the west coast along with other Allied
planes harrassing enemy traffic.
During the guerrilla hunt VMO-6 planes provided air support to the 1st
Marine Division while Marine attack aircraft were busy elsewhere along
the Eighth Army front. Marine pilots, operating under JOC control, felt
frustrated because they were unable to provide the timely close air
support desired by the infantry. The Marine viewpoint held that too
many links in the Air Force system of control caused an excessive delay
in bringing air power over the target. This system continued for the
remainder of the year.
As an operation, the guerrilla hunt was merely a series of minor
engagements, but it accomplished its purpose of clearing out most of
the North Korean irregulars who had been a constant threat in the
Eighth Army’s rear. In addition, the numerous small patrols provided
excellent training for the newly arrived replacements.
The Eighth Army seemed to gain new vitality under General Ridgway.
On the 18th of February, when the general learned that the enemy was
withdrawing, he ordered a limited offensive. Operation KILLER began
three days later, and was followed by Operation RIPPER on 7 March. The
purpose of these operations was twofold: (1) General Ridgway wanted
to restore his army’s fighting spirit after its two defeats during
the 1950–1951 winter; and (2) he wished to keep the Chinese Reds off
balance while they prepared for another Communist offensive.
For the Marines these two operations were an experience with a strictly
limited offensive. The advance was “buttoned up” as major units paid
close attention to lateral contact. As the advance continued in March
and April, mud proved to be an adversary second only to a formidable
enemy using delaying tactics, and the Division as a whole had a
thorough workout in the logistics of the offensive under adverse
conditions.
In early April the Division, as part of the Eighth Army, crossed the
38th parallel and continued the attack to the north, the purpose being
to threaten the suspected enemy buildup for an offensive. EUSAK forces
rolled onward while the enemy, using his roving defensive tactics,
fought vigorously and withdrew.
The long-expected enemy counterblow fell on the night of 22 April and
resulted in the 1st Marine Division bearing the brunt of a 48-hour
attack (Map 10). This opening CCF assault in the IX Corps area of
east-central Korea was intended to throw the Eighth Army off balance as
a preliminary to aiming the main blow at I Corps in west Korea.
The CCF attack opened a hole in the MLR large enough for a major
breakthrough, and the Communists apparently expected to exploit
this success to the fullest. However, the Allied line pulled back,
consolidated, and held, as the Division’s reserve regiment was thrown
in to stem the tide. As the Marine flank was refused, the units on
the left found themselves facing to the west while stopping the enemy
thrust. Slowly, trading space for time, the Marines contained the enemy
attack while the entire Eighth Army line organized new positions.
The enemy effort ground to a halt in the east-central sector, and the
Chinese Reds were contravened in their attempt to take Seoul by May
Day. Surprise and impetus were lost on the western front when they
struck several days later, only to be stopped with frightful losses
after a few gains on regimental fronts. The Allied line now held firm.
The Division’s war of maneuver had worked well in halting this round
of the CCF offensive, but the Communists were far from finished. As 17
enemy divisions were still available to attack, the Marine division was
shifted to the east on 1 May in preparation for an expected battle.
On the 16th of May the Chinese offensive again opened, with the enemy
hitting more to the east than had been expected, and making a deep
but narrow penetration near the coast. The Marines moved eastward,
established blocking positions, and engaged fringe units of the drive.
This allowed the right flank Army division to move farther east and
brake the enemy’s rush.
The enemy was dangerously overextended when the UN counterstroke hit
him late in May. For a month the Eighth Army attacked and advanced, the
Marines slugging ahead day after day in the X Corps zone of action.
CCF casualties mounted high, and Marine veterans of only a few months
of Korean service saw scores of enemy corpses left behind on the
battlefield as the enemy withdrew northward.
This great UN counteroffensive netted prisoners all along the EUSAK
front as remnants of CCF platoons and even companies threw down
their arms. Marines captured their share. Upwards of 10,000 Chinese
surrendered to the Allies in a 10-day period--more prisoners than had
been taken up to this time.
As the Chinese withdrew northward they left determined NKPA troops
behind. The 1st Marine Division moved slowly forward, fighting for
every inch of ground. So fierce was the enemy’s resistance that at
times during June the division commander was forced to commit all four
regiments (the KMCs included) in the attack at the same time in order
to seize designated objectives. This was a modification of accepted
tactical doctrine, necessitated by the situation.
Throughout March, April, and part of May, Marine pilots continued to
provide close air support not only for the 1st Marine Division, but
also for other Allied units as directed by JOC. From the beginning
of Operation STRANGLE on 20 May this interdiction effort had first
priority, and close air support to all infantry units was secondary.
Difficulties in air-ground communication continued as radio frequencies
were heavily burdened with traffic. Although the 1st Marine Division
received a proportionate share of the few air support missions flown,
the frustrating time lag between requests for air support and the
arrival of planes on target continued into the next year.
Some planes were always available for front line support, although
rarely ever enough according to infantrymen’s opinion. When they had
the chance, 1st MAW pilots viciously attacked the fleeing enemy to
ease the way for advancing ground troops. During June the unrelenting
pressure of combined air-ground attacks sometimes caused large groups
of enemy to surrender. Marines also captured thousands of rounds of
enemy ammunition and other equipment.
By the last week in June the Marines had entrenched themselves along
the Division’s assigned portion of the MLR and “caught their breath”
after two months of hard fighting. In driving from the Hwachon
Reservoir area to the Punchbowl, they had employed practically every
weapon and tactic that could be used in an all-out offensive. The
Division then settled down to stable positions for a while, and some
units had the opportunity to go into reserve and train.
It was a recharged 1st Marine Division (the 5th and 11th Marines did
not go into reserve during this period) which moved back into the lines
at the end of August. The offensive which opened northeast of the
Punchbowl on the 30th and lasted with few and brief interludes until 20
September was the equal of the June fighting in sustained ferocity.
All four infantry regiments (including the KMCs) went up against
seemingly impregnable opposition.
The enemy’s “stubborn defense of strong positions and many well-placed
log and earth bunkers was similar to the tenacious tactics of the
Japanese in World War II,” according to a Navy report. “His artillery
and mortar fires were effective, his minefields continued to be
hazardous for many weeks, and his ability to dig in and fortify his
positions [was] always impressive.”[376]
[376] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, 15–25.
After the 20th of September the EUSAK commander ordered that no further
offensives be launched and that the MLR be stabilized. This was a
period of aggressive patrolling, local attacks for more advantageous
pieces of terrain, and watchful waiting to determine the outcome of
truce negotiations. In spite of Operation STRANGLE, enemy vehicular
movements increased at the end of the year, but 1st MAW pilots
continually attempted to provide more support for all the infantry
divisions.
The mission of the 1st Marine Division at this time was to organize,
construct, and defend its sector of the MLR, a front of more than 13
miles. Although there were heavy local skirmishes, during the latter
months of 1951 and the first 3 months of 1952, no great offensive
drives were launched. Essentially, the Marines were engaged in an
aggressive defense of their positions until they moved to West Korea.
While all Marines were hoping that the conflict would soon end, there
was no slackening of the customary vigilance. All hands remembered
General Ridgway’s words of the previous year, that it was “... a fight
for our own freedom, our own survival ...,”[377] and this was their
creed.
[377] See Ridgway’s Declaration of Faith, Chapter 1.
These lines would have made a fitting epitaph for Marines who gave
their lives in Korea. They had as worthy a cause as any fighting men of
our history, for it had become increasingly plain since World War II
that a stand must eventually be made against Communist encroachments.
By going halfway around the world to fight the enemy on his own
doorstep, Americans may well have spared themselves a more bloody and
costly future struggle nearer to their own homeland if not actually
on their own soil. The designs of Red China and Soviet Russia were
unmasked in Korea, and the people of the United States awakened to
their peril after neglecting the Nation’s defenses since 1945. To that
extent, therefore, the operations in Korea were a defeat for Communism.
APPENDIX A
Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
ADC--Assistant Division Commander
AdmO--Administrative Order
AD--Douglas “Skyraider” single engine attack plane
AF--Air Force
AH--Hospital Ship
AirDelPlat--Air Delivery Platoon
AirO--Air Officer
AirSptSec--Air Support Section
AmphTracBn--Amphibian Tractor Battalion
AmphTrkBn--Amphibian Truck Battalion
ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion
AT--Antitank
AutoMaintCo--Automotive Maintenance Company
AutoSupCo--Automotive Supply Company
BB--Battleship
BLT--Battalion Landing Team
Bn--Battalion
Btry--Battery
BuMed--Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
C-47--Douglas Transport used by Air Force (same as R4D)
CA--Heavy Cruiser
CCF--Chinese Communist Forces
CG--Commanding General
CIC--Counter Intelligence Corps, USA
CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East
CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CL--Light Cruiser
CO--Commanding Officer
Co--Company
ComFltAirWing--Commander Fleet Air Wing
ComNavFe--Commander Naval Forces Far East
ComPacFlt--Commander Pacific Fleet
ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One
ComSeventhFlt--Commander Seventh Fleet
ComUNBlockandCortFor--Commander United Nations Blockade and Escort
Force
CP--Command Post
CR--Command Report
C/S--Chief of Staff
CSG--Combat Service Group
CSUSA--Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
CTF--Commander Task Force
CTG--Commander Task Group
CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier
CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier
DD--Destroyer
DE--Destroyer Escort
Det--Detachment
DOW--Died of Wounds
EmbO--Embarkation Order/Officer
EngrBn--Engineer Battalion
EUSAK--Eighth U.S. Army in Korea
FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA)
FAC--Forward Air Controller
FAF--Fifth Air Force
FEAF--Far East Air Force
FECOM--Far East Command
F4U--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Fighter-Bomber
F4U-5N--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Night Fighter
F7F-3N--Grumman “Tigercat” Twin-Engine Night Fighter
FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FO--Forward Observer
FragOrder--Fragmentary Order
Fum&BathPlat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon
GHQ--General Headquarters
Gru--Group
H&SCo--Headquarters and Service Company
HD--Historical Diary
Hedron--Headquarters Squadron
HO3S--Sikorsky Helicopter
HqBn--Headquarters Battalion
HQMC--Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
InfDiv--Infantry Division (USA)
Interv--Interview
ISUM--Intelligence Summary
JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies
JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMS--Japanese Minesweeper
JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group
JTF--Joint Task Force
KIA--Killed in Action
KMC--Korean Marine Corps
Ln--Liaison
LSD--Landing Ship, Dock
LSM--Landing Ship, Medium
LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket
LST--Landing Ship, Tank
LSTH--Landing Ship, Tank-Casualty Evacuation
LSU--Landing Ship, Utility
Ltr--Letter
LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked
MAG--Marine Aircraft Group
MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing
MS--Manuscript
MedBn--Medical Battalion
MedAmbCo--Medical Ambulance Company (USA)
MIA--Missing in Action
MISD--Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA)
MLR--Main Line of Resistance, the main front line
Mosquito--North American AT-6 “Texan” Trainer;
Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and Target Spotting
MP--Military Police
MRO--Movement Report Office
Msg--Message
MSR--Main Supply Route
MSTS--Military Sea Transport Service
MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron
MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion
NavBchGru--Naval Beach Group
NavFE--Naval Forces Far East
NCO--Noncommissioned Officer
NK--North Korea(n)
NKPA--North Korean People’s Army
N.d.--Date not given
N.t.--Time not given
O--Officer; Order
OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA)
OI--Operation Instruction
OpnO--Operation Order
OpnPlan--Operation Plan
OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion
OY--Consolidated-Vultee Single-Engine Light Observation Plane
PhibGru--Amphibious Group
PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report
PLA--People’s Liberation Army
Plat--Platoon
POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
POR--Periodic Operation Report
POW--Prisoner of War
QMSubsistSupCo--Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company (USA)
R4D--Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine designation of
C-47)
R5D--Douglas Four-Engine Transport
RCT--Regimental Combat Team
Recon--Reconnaissance
Reinf--Reinforced
RktBn--Rocket Battalion
RM--Royal Marines
ROK--Republic of Korea
R&O File--Records and Orders File
ROKA--Republic of Korea Army
ROKN--Republic of Korea Navy
Rpt--Report
SAC--Supporting Arms Coordinator
SAR--Special Action Report
Sec--Section
SecDef--Secretary of Defense
ServBn--Service Battalion
SigBn--Signal Battalion
SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company
SitRpt--Situation Report
SP--Shore Party
SMC--Marine Supply Squadron
TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator;
Tactical Air Commander
TACP--Tactical Air Control Party
Tacron--Tactical Air Control Squadron
TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center
T-AP--Transport operated by MSTS
TBM--General Motors “Avenger” Single-Engine Torpedo Bomber.
Also used for Utility Purposes.
TE--Task Element
T/E--Table of Equipment
Tel--Telephone Message
TF--Task Force
TG--Task Group
TkBn--Tank Battalion