The Truce Talks at Kaesong
_Communists Ask for Truce Talks--Patrol Bases on_ BADGER _Line--Red
Herrings at Kaesong--1st Marine Division in Reserve--Marine Helicopters
Take the Lead--Marine Body Armor Tested in Korea--MAG-12 Moves to
K-18--The Division Back in Action Again_
It is not likely that the date 25 June 1951 meant much to the Marines
on the KANSAS Line. In all probability few of them recalled that it was
the first anniversary of the Communist aggression which started the war
in Korea.
Since that surprise attack on a June Sunday morning in 1950, some
1,250,000 men had been killed, wounded or captured in battle--a million
of them from the Communist forces of Red China and the North Korean
People’s Republic. This was the estimate of J. Donald Kingsley, Korean
reconstruction agent general for the United States. He reckoned the
civilian victims of privation, violence, and disease at two million
dead. Another three million had been made homeless refugees.[239]
[239] This section is based on by Peter Kihss, “One Year in
Korea,” _United Nations World_, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1951,
21–23.
On 25 June 1951 the Communists held less territory by 2,100 square
miles than they occupied when they began their onslaught with an
overwhelming local superiority in arms and trained troops. Losses of
Communist equipment during the first year included 391 aircraft, 1,000
pieces of artillery, and many thousands of machine guns, automatic
rifles, and mortars. North Korea, formerly the industrial region of the
peninsula, lay in ruins. Cities, factories, and power plants had been
pounded into rubble.
In short, the thrifty conquest planned by the Koreans and their Soviet
masters had backfired. Not only had the Communist offensives of April
and May been stopped; the United Nations forces had rebounded to win
their greatest victory of the war’s first year. While X Corps was
advancing to the Punchbowl, other major Eighth Army units had also
gained ground. Perhaps the most crushing blow was dealt by I Corps in
its attack on the Iron Triangle. Units of two U.S. infantry divisions
fought their way through extensive mine fields into Chorwon and Kumhwa
on 8 June. By the end of the month, I Corps held defensive positions
about midway between the base and apex of the strategic triangle that
had been the enemy’s main assembly area for the troops and supplies of
his spring offensives.[240]
[240] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jun 51.
On the east-central front, units of IX Corps pushed within 10 miles of
Kumsong while I ROK Corps advanced along the east coast to Chodo-ri.
Thus the UN forces occupied the most favorable line they had held since
the great CCF offensive early in January. From the mouth of the Imjin
this line ran northeast to the middle of the Iron Triangle, eastward
across the mountains to the southern rim of the Punchbowl, then
northeast to the coast of Chodo-ri (Map 14).
_Communists Ask for Truce Talks_
The first anniversary of the Korean conflict was overshadowed two days
earlier by the news that the Communists had taken the initiative in
proposing truce talks. The suggestion was made in a New York radio
address of 23 June by a Soviet delegate to the United Nations--Jacob
Malik, Foreign Minister of the USSR. On the 25th the idea was
unofficially endorsed in a radio broadcast by the Chinese Communist
government. UN officials immediately indicated their willingness
to discuss preliminary terms. The outcome was an agreement that
representatives of both sides would meet on 7 July at Kaesong, then
located between the opposing lines in west Korea.
Why had the Communists been first to ask for a truce conference? Both
Generals Van Fleet and Almond believed that the answer might have
been traced to military necessity rather than any genuine desire for
peace. “I felt at that time that the Chinese Communists and the North
Korean armies were on the most wobbly legs that they had been on to
that date,” said General Almond when interviewed shortly after his
retirement in 1953. “They were punch drunk and ineffective, and I,
personally, thought at that time that it was the time to finish off the
effort.”[241]
[241] _U.S. News and World Report_, 13 Feb 53, 40–41.
Raymond Cartier, representing a Paris newspaper, probably spoke for
most of the correspondents at the front when he suspected that the
proposal for truce talks “was possibly just a crafty trick devised by
the Communists to gain time and build up again the badly mauled Chinese
armies.”[242]
[242] _UN World_, Vol. 5, No. 10, Oct 51, 10.
It might have been recalled at this time that the Communists had used
truce negotiations for military purposes during the Chinese Civil War.
In 1945 and 1946, when prospects for a Nationalist victory were bright,
the enemy took advantage of American peace efforts by agreeing on
several occasions to meet for truce conferences. And while prolonging
the talks by all manner of subterfuges, the Communists profited from
the breathing spells by regrouping their forces and planning new
offensives. Their final triumph, in fact, owed in no small measure to
interludes when the conference table served a military purpose.[243]
[243] U.S. State Department Publications 3573, Far East Series
30, pp. 352–363.
History repeated itself in June and July 1951 when events of the next
two years were shaped by the political decisions of a few summer weeks.
Indeed, Admiral C. Turner Joy believed that the war was actually
prolonged rather than shortened as a result of the negotiations.
“Military victory was not impossible nor even unusually difficult
of achievement,” wrote the Senior Delegate and Chief of the UN
Command delegation at the truce talks. “Elimination of the artificial
restraints imposed on United States forces, coupled with an effective
blockade on Red China, probably would have resulted in military victory
in less time than was expended on truce talks.”[244]
[244] Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN (Ret.), _How Communists
Negotiate_ (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 176, hereafter
Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_. One of Admiral Joy’s
last services to his country before his death in 1956
was the writing of this book. Other sources for this
section are William H. Vatcher, Jr., “Inside Story of
Our Mistakes in Korea,” _U.S. News and World Report_, 23
Jan 1953, 35–36; E. Weintal, “What Happened at Kaesong
and What is in Prospect,” _Newsweek_, 23 Jul 1951, 38;
Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
Mao Tse-tung’s forces had lost face by the failure of their long
heralded 5th Phase Offensive. They had been badly beaten during the UN
counteroffensive. Pretensions of high CCF morale could no longer be
maintained when troops were laying down their arms without a fight.
Nor could charges of low UN morale be supported when the fighting
spirit of the Eighth Army was being shown every day at the front.
In view of these circumstances, it would appear that the Communists had
poor cards to play against United Nations trumps at a truce conference.
But they played them so craftily, with such a sly sense of propaganda
values, that the victors of the May and June battles were soon made to
appear losers begging for a breathing spell.
To begin with, the Chinese knew that the mere public announcement of
the possibility of truce talks would have a tremendous appeal in the
United States, where the war was unpopular. Pressure would be brought
upon Washington to meet the enemy immediately for negotiations. And
while a cease fire remained even a remote prospect, American public
opinion would demand a slackening of offensive military operations with
their attendant casualties.
From the outset it was apparent that the United Nations Command was
no match for the Communists in low cunning. The UN suggested, for
instance, that the truce teams meet on the Danish hospital ship
_Jutlandia_. Here, surely, was neutral ground, since the Danes had no
combat forces in Korea. Moreover, the ship was to be anchored in Wonsan
harbor within range of CCF shore batteries.
The Reds won the first of many such concessions with their refusal.
They insisted that the talks be held at Kaesong, and the UN Command let
them have it their way. The reason for the Communist decision was soon
made evident. Kaesong was in the path of the advancing Eighth Army,
which meant that an important road center would be immune from attack.
And though the ancient Korean town was originally in no man’s land, the
Communists soon managed to include it within their lines.
All delegates were requested to display white flags on their
vehicles for identification. Communist photographers were on hand
to snap countless pictures of UN delegates which convinced Asia’s
illiterate millions at a glance that the beaten United Nations had
sent representatives to plead for terms. If any doubt remained, other
photographs showed the unarmed UN delegates being herded about Kaesong
by scowling Communist guards with burp guns.
No detail of the stage setting was too trivial to be overlooked.
Oriental custom prescribes that at the peace table the victors face
south and the losers face north. Needless to add, the UN delegates
were seated at Kaesong with a view to enhancing Communist prestige.[245]
[245] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 4–5.
Some of the propaganda schemes bordered on the ridiculous, “At the
first meeting of the delegates,” Admiral Joy related, “I seated myself
at the conference table and almost sank out of sight. The Communists
had provided a chair for me which was considerably shorter than a
standard chair. Across the table, the senior Communist delegate,
General Nam Il, protruded a good foot above my cagily diminished
stature. This had been accomplished by providing stumpy Nam Il with a
chair about four inches higher than usual. Chain-smoking Nam Il puffed
his cigarette in obvious satisfaction as he glowered down on me, an
obviously torpedoed admiral. This condition of affairs was promptly
rectified when I changed my foreshortened chair for a normal one, but
not before Communist photographers had exposed reels of film.”[246]
[246] _Ibid._
_Patrol Bases on_ BADGER _Line_
The war went on, of course, during the negotiations. But the tempo was
much reduced as the UN forces consolidated their gains, and the enemy
appeared to be breaking off contact at every opportunity. Generally
speaking, the Eighth Army had shifted from the offensive to the
defensive. In keeping with this trend, the 1st Marine Division occupied
the same positions for nearly three weeks after fighting its way to the
BROWN Line.
On 22 June all three infantry regiments were directed to establish
battalion-size patrol bases on the BADGER Line--1½ to 2½ miles forward
of their present positions. In the 1st Marines sector 3/7 was attached
to Colonel Brown and ordered to relieve 3/1 on the left flank of the
regiment. The purpose was to free 3/1 to move forward and establish a
patrol base on Hill 761, about 1,000 yards forward of the MLR.
While these arrangements were being carried out, General Almond called
at the 1st Marines CP. He expressed surprise that the establishment
of patrol bases was being contemplated by EUSAK when some of the
front-line units were still in contact with the enemy.[247]
[247] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jun 51, 55.
Execution of these orders was accordingly suspended. The following
day, however, Division again alerted the infantry regiments to be
prepared to occupy patrol bases on order. This was by direction of
Corps, which in turn had been directed by EUSAK.
The Marine regimental and battalion commanders were not happy about
this turn of affairs. The patrol base concept had been tried out early
in May, during the lull between the enemy’s two offensives, and found
wanting. In theory it was a good means of keeping contact with an
enemy who had pulled back out of mortar and light artillery range. In
practice the enemy had shown that he could bypass patrol bases at night
for probing attacks on the MLR. The bases themselves ran the constant
risk of being surrounded and overwhelmed. As a final objection, a
regiment was often deprived of its reserve battalion, which was the
logical choice for such duty.
In compliance with orders, 3/1 moved out on 26 June and established a
patrol base on Hill 761. This position received such a bombardment of
large caliber mortar fire that Colonel Brown pulled the battalion back
to the MLR the following day.[248]
[248] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0815 27 Jun 51.
General Thomas gave his opinion of the patrol base concept after his
retirement when he summed it up as “an invitation to disaster.”[249] He
could only carry out orders, however, when Corps directed early in July
that a patrol base be established on Taeu-san.
[249] Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 6 Feb 58. It is interesting
to note that there was no mention of the patrol base
concept in the then current _Field Service Regulations,
Operations, FM 100-5_, published by the Department of the
Army in August 1949.
This 4,000-foot peak, located some 2 miles north of the MLR, afforded
excellent observation eastward into the Punchbowl and westward into
the So-chon River Valley. The enemy, of course, was aware of these
advantages and had made Taeu-san a strongpoint of his MLR. This
was clearly indicated by the stiff resistance encountered by KMC
reconnaissance patrols.[250]
[250] Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this section
is based on 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jul 51, 7–11; Col C. W.
Harrison’s account, “KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8-11 July
1951;” Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 9 Apr 58.
Nevertheless, Division G-3 was suddenly alerted on the morning of 7
July by the Marine Liaison Officer with X Corps to expect an order
directing the setting up of a patrol base on Taeu-san the following
day. The KMC Regiment, warned by telephone, had little time for
planning and organizing an attack. Since the KMCs could not be
relieved for responsibility for their sector, it was necessary to
form a composite battalion of the three companies that could most
conveniently be relieved. Unfortunately, they contained a large
proportion of recruits, and the battalion commander was a new arrival.
There were two avenues of approach. One was along an open, fairly
level, ridgeline that extended from the KMC positions. The other called
for a descent into the stream-bed generally paralleling the MLR and a
steep climb up a ridge leading directly north to Taeu-san.
Both routes of approach were used. One company advanced on the right
by way of the stream bed and two companies took to the ridgeline on
the left. The assault was to have been preceded by air strikes and an
artillery bombardment, but bad weather kept the aircraft grounded.
The attack jumped off at 1030 on 8 July. All three companies were
greeted by enemy mortar and machine gun fire that pinned down the
company on the right. The two companies on the left won a foothold on
Hill 1100, about a mile in front of Taeu-san. Here the advance ground
to a halt.
These KMCs dug in for the night and repulsed a series of
counterattacks. On the morning of the 9th the KMC regimental commander,
Colonel Kim Tai Shik, committed the entire 1st Battalion to the attack
on the right. It had no better success than the company of the day
before. Meanwhile, the two companies were driven off Hill 1100.
Colonel Gould P. Groves, senior liaison officer with the KMCs,
recommended that the remnants of the two companies be withdrawn. The
1st Battalion had managed to capture Hill 1001, but it was plain that
the KMC regiment could not come close to Taeu-san. On 12 July the 1st
Marine Division informed X Corps that the position held by the KMCs
just forward of Hill 1001 fulfilled the requirements of an advance
patrol base. As far as the Marines were concerned, the sad affair was
permitted to rest there.
As evidence of the valiant effort made by the KMCs, they suffered 222
casualties. A sequel to this story was written late in July after the
2d infantry Division relieved the Marines. X Corps again ordered the
capture of Taeu-san as a patrol base, and it required the commitment of
the major part of the division to accomplish the task.[251]
[251] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Jul 51, 13; 2dInfDiv _HD_, Jul 51,
13–19.
Although the fighting had not been severe for other units of the 1st
Marine Division during the first two weeks of July, the casualties
(including KMC losses) were 55 KIA, 360 WIA, and 22 MIA--a total of
437. Relief of the Marines was completed by the 2d Infantry Division
on 15 July, and by the 17th all units were on their way back to
assembly areas in X Corps rear.
It was the second time since the landing of the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade on 2 August 1950 that the Marines had been away from the firing
line for more than a few days.
_Red Herrings at Kaesong_
It is not changing the subject to switch to the truce talks. Kaesong
was actually a second UN front.
After the preliminaries had been settled--most of them to Communist
satisfaction--the UN delegation, headed by Admiral Joy, held a first
meeting on 10 July 1951 with his opposite number, NKPA Major General
Nam Il, and the Communist truce team. This was the first of the talks
that were to drag on for two dreary years.
Nam Il, a Korean native of Manchuria, born in 1911, had been educated
in Russia and had served with the Soviet army in World War II. His
career in Korea began when he arrived as a captain with Soviet
occupation troops in 1945. Rising to power rapidly, he took a prominent
part in the creation of a Soviet puppet state in North Korea.
An atmosphere of sullen hatred surrounded the UN delegates at Kaesong.
The CCF sentinel posted at the entrance to the conference room wore a
gaudy medal which he boasted had been awarded to him “for killing forty
Americans.” When Admiral Joy tried to send a report to General Ridgway,
the messenger was turned back by armed Communist guards. These are
samples of the indignities heaped upon the UN truce team. After several
UN delegates were threatened by guards with burp guns, Joy protested to
Nam Il, “demanding prompt elimination of such crudities.”
In order to give their battered armies more time for recuperation, the
Communist delegates met every issue with delaying tactics. They proved
themselves to be masters of the ancient art of dragging a red herring
across the trail. Going back on their word did not embarrass them in
the least if they found it to their advantage to renege.[252]
[252] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived
from the following sources: Joy, _How Communists
Negotiate_, 6–10, 129, 140; Carl Berger, _The Korean
Knot_ (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 141–151;
Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
The truce negotiations were bound to have an immediate effect on
military operations. In the United States it seemed a pity to
newspaper readers that American young men should have to die in
battle at a time when headlines were hinting at the possibility of
peace. Mothers wrote to their congressmen, requesting a halt in Korean
operations.
General Van Fleet minced no words after his retirement when he
commented on the effect of the truce talks on strategy:
Instead of getting directives for offensive action, we found our
activities more and more proscribed as time went on. Even in the
matter of straightening out our lines for greater protection,
or capturing hills when the Reds were looking down our throats,
we were limited by orders from the Far East Command in Japan,
presumably acting on directives from Washington.[253]
[253] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), “The Truth About Korea,”
_Life_, 11 May 53, 133.
It was the opinion of Admiral Joy that more UN casualties were suffered
as a consequence of the truce talks than would have resulted from an
offensive taking full advantage of Red China’s military weaknesses in
June 1951.
“As soon as armistice discussions began,” he wrote, “United Nations
Command ground forces slackened their offensive preparations.
Instead, offensive pressure by all arms should have been increased to
the maximum during the armistice talks.... I feel certain that the
casualties the United Nations Command endured during the two long years
of negotiations far exceed any that might have been expected from an
offensive in the summer of 1951.”[254]
[254] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 166.
_1st Marine Division in Reserve_
Most of the 1st Marine Division units were in X Corps reserve during
the last two weeks of July 1951. The 5th Marines, however, remained
in “ready reserve” near Inje under the operational control of X
Corps. Toward the end of the month, the 3d Battalion of the 11th
Marines passed to the operational control of the 2d Infantry Division.
Meanwhile, the 7th Marines and Division Reconnaissance Company
displaced to the Yanggu area to aid in the construction of defensive
positions and undergo special training.
1st Marine Division Training Order 2-51, covering the period from 23
July to 20 August 1951, provided for a stiff daily schedule of general
and specialist military subjects. The objectives were “to maintain
each individual and unit of the command at a very high state of
proficiency, while emphasizing rest and rehabilitation of personnel
and repair and maintenance of equipment.... A minimum of 33% of all
technical training was to be conducted at night, stressing individual
and unit night discipline. Formal unit schools and on-the-job training
were utilized extensively.”[255]
[255] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jul 51, 18.
Most thoroughly covered among general military subjects were mechanical
training, capabilities, tactical employment, and firing of individual
and infantry crew-served weapons. Lectures and demonstrations were
combined to good effect with instruction in basic infantry tactics.
“The prescribed periods of physical conditioning,” the Division
report continued, “were supplemented by extensive organized athletic
programs outside of training hours, resulting in the maintenance of
a high degree of battle conditioning of all hands. Special military
subjects encompassed the whole range of activities necessary to the
accomplishment of any mission assigned the Division. Building from the
duties of the individual Marine, infantry, artillery, engineer, and
tank personnel progressed through small unit employment and tactics as
it applied to their respective specialities. Meanwhile such diverse
training as tank repair and watch repair was conducted in various
units.”[256]
[256] _Ibid._
Fortification came in for study after a tour of the KANSAS Line by
Major General Clovis E. Byers, who had relieved General Almond as X
Corps commander. He listed the weaknesses he found and directed that
“special attention [be] given to the thickness, strength and support
of bunker overheads, and to the proper revetting and draining of
excavations.”[257]
[257] CG X Corps, CITE X 21568.
The KMC Regiment received the most thorough training it had ever
known, considering that it had been in combat continually since its
organization. Each of the Division’s three other regiments sent four
training teams consisting of a lieutenant, an NCO, and an interpreter
to the KMCs on 22 July. The 12 teams had orders to remain until 20
August. Attached to various KMC companies, they acted as advisers for
the entire training period.
Another organization of Koreans that had won its way to favorable
recognition was the newly formed Civil Transport Corps (CTC). The use
of indigenous labor for logistical purposes dated back to March 1951,
when the Eighth Army’s advance was slowed up by supply problems caused
by muddy roads. Plans were made to equip and train a special corps to
assist in the logistical support of combat troops in areas inaccessible
to normal motor transportation.[258]
[258] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, 1080110.
The project began on 29 March with 720 South Koreans--all from the
Korean National Guard--being assigned to I Corps. Plans were developed
for a Civil Transport Corps of 82 companies, each containing 240 men.
The CTC was to be supervised by a staff of eight U.S. Army officers and
four enlisted men under the operational control of the Transportation
Section, EUSAK.
The ROK Army had the added responsibility for logistical support, of
hospitalization and medical services other than emergency treatment in
forward areas. Support for the CTC from UN units was to be provided
in a manner similar to that in effect for the ROK forces.[259] No
difficulty was found in filling the CTC ranks, for the pay meant food
and clothing to a Korean and his family.
[259] _Ibid._
The Marines were always astonished at the heavy loads the Korean
cargadores could carry uphill on their “A-frames,” which looked like
sturdy easels with a pair of arm-and-shoulder carrying straps. Humble
and patient, these burden bearers were the only means of supply in
remote combat areas.
_Marine Helicopters Take the Lead_
The truce talks continued to be front-page news in August. Some of
the more impulsive newspaper and radio commentators hinted at the
possibility of a cease fire before the end of summer. As for the Marine
command and staff, they were not so optimistic, judging from this
sentence in a report:
“All Division units were notified on 14 August that requisitions had
been sent to EUSAK for cold weather clothing and equipment.”
The training period afforded an opportunity to glance back over the
first year of fighting in Korea and evaluate the results. There could
be no doubt that the war’s foremost tactical innovation so far was
the combat helicopter. The Marine Corps had taken the lead in its
development when VMO-6, made up of OYs and Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopters
in roughly equal numbers, got into action with the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter. Brigadier General Edward A.
Craig had the historical distinction, insofar as is known, of being
the first commanding general to see the advantages of a “chopper” as a
command vehicle.
Evacuation of casualties was the principal job of the rotary-wing
aircraft, and 1,926 wounded Marines were flown out during the first
year. No less than 701 of these mercy flights took place during the
three months from 1 April to 30 June 1951, covering the period of the
two CCF 5th Phase offensives and the UN counterstroke. By that time
the Bell HTL-4, with its built-in litters on both sides sheltered by
plexiglas hoods, had taken over most of the evacuation missions from
the HO3S-1.
The zeal of the pilots contributed substantially to the successful
results. Captain Dwain L. Redalen gave a demonstration of the VMO-6
spirit at the height of the first CCF offensive in the spring of 1951.
During the 13½ hours from 0600 to 1930 on 23 April, he was in the air
constantly except for intervals of loading or unloading casualties.
Logging a total of 9.6 flight hours, he evacuated 18 wounded men under
enemy fire that left bullet holes in the plexiglas of his HTL-4.[260]
[260] VMO-6 Daily Flight Log, 23Apr51.
Practically all the helicopter techniques put into effect by VMO-6
had originally been developed by the Marine experimental squadron,
HMX-1, organized late in 1947 at Quantico. Despite the enthusiasm for
rotary-wing aircraft then prevailing, HMX-1 decided that an observation
squadron should combine OYs with helicopters. The wisdom of this
conclusion was proved in Korea, where the test of combat showed that
both types were needed. The OYs were the superiors at reconnaissance
and artillery spot missions, while the helicopters excelled at
transportation and liaison and evacuation flights.
VMO-6 as a whole was the only Marine organization linking the ground
and air commands. An administrative unit of the 1st MAW, the squadron
was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division.[261]
[261] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived
from the following sources: Elizabeth L. Tierney,
Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, statistics compiled from
VMO-6 reports of Aug 50 to Jul 51; HMR-161 _HD_, Sep 51;
1stMarDiv type “C” rpt on assault helicopters, 4 Oct 51;
Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (Harper, 1954), based
on Marine records, 151–158.
Thanks to the ability of the helicopter to land “on a dime,” staff
liaison missions and command visits were greatly facilitated. The
helicopter had become the modern general’s steed, and the gap between
staff and line was narrowed by rotary wings.
The importance of wound evacuation missions can hardly be
overestimated. Surgeons stressed the value of time in treating the
shock resulting from severe wounds. The sooner a patient could be made
ready for surgery, the better were his chances of survival. Definitive
care had waited in the past until a casualty was borne on a jolting
stretcher from the firing line to the nearest road to begin a long
ambulance ride. Such a journey might take most of a day, but there were
instances of a helicopter evacuee reaching the operation table only an
hour after being wounded at the front, 15 or 20 miles away.
Captain J. W. McElroy, USNR, commanding the famous hospital ship
_Consolation_, asserted that his experience had “proved conclusively
the superiority of the helicopter method of embarking and evacuating
casualties to and from the ship.”[262] A helicopter loading platform
was installed on the _Consolation_ in July 1951, during an overhaul at
the Long Beach Naval Shipyard in California. Marine helicopter pilots
advised as to landing requirements, and eventually all the hospital
ships had similar platforms.
[262] CO USS _Consolation_ rpt to ComNavFE, 26 Jan 52.
At a conservative estimate, the 1,926 wounded men flown out by VMO-6
helicopters during the squadron’s first year in Korea included several
hundred who might not have survived former methods of evacuation.
_Marine Body Armor Tested in Korea_
Another far-reaching tactical innovation was being launched at this
time as Lieutenant Commander Frederick J. Lewis (MSC) USN, supervised a
joint Army-Navy three-month field test of Marine armored vests made of
lightweight plastics.
A glance at the past reveals that body armor had never quite vanished
from modern warfare. European cavalry lancers wore steel cuirasses
throughout the 19th century. During the American Civil War two
commercial firms in Connecticut manufactured steel breastplates
purchased by thousands of Union soldiers. So irksome were the weight
and rigidity of this protection, however, that infantrymen soon
discarded it.
World War I dated the first widespread adoption of armor in the 20th
century. The idea was suggested when a French general noted that one of
his men had survived a lethal shell fragment by virtue of wearing an
iron mess bowl under his beret. France led the way, and before the end
of 1915 steel helmets were being issued to all armies on the Western
Front.
When the United States entered the war, General John J. Pershing put in
a request for body armor. Some 30 prototypes using steel or aluminum
plates were submitted but rejected. In every instance the weight and
rigidity were such that too high a price in mobility would be paid for
protection.[263]
[263] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived
from the following sources: Rpt of Joint Army-Navy
Mission at HQMC, 9 Nov 51, in G-4 Files; _Instructional
Information, Vest, Armored_, M-1951, G-4 Files, HQMC;
LCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 54; Capt Louis
Kirkpatrick (MC) USN, ltr of 22 Jun 54; Capt D. G.
McGrew, ltr of 2 Jul 54; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, USMC, ltr
of 30 Jun 54.
During the 1930’s new possibilities were opened up by developments in
lightweight plastics. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor interrupted
experiments that were not resumed until 1943. Then a new start was
made with the formation of a joint Army-Navy committee headed by Rear
Admiral Alexander H. Van Kueren and Colonel George F. Doriot.
Wound statistics indicated that the great majority of fatal wounds were
received in a comparatively small area of the body. The following table
shows the regional frequency:
NON-FATAL FATAL
_Percent_ _Percent_
Head 10 Head 20
Chest 10 Chest 50
Abdomen 10 Abdomen 20
Upper Extremity 30 Upper Extremity 5
Lower Extremity 40 Lower Extremity 5
Shell, mortar, or grenade fragments caused 60 percent of the fatal
wounds, the statistics revealed, with the remainder being charged
to rifle or machine gun fire. It was futile to hope for lightweight
protection against high-velocity bullets. But researchers hoped that
plastic body armor could stop enough shell or mortar fragments to
reduce serious wounds to light wounds while preventing light wounds
altogether.
Doron and nylon were the materials approved by the joint Army-Navy
committee. The first, named in honor of Colonel Doriot, consisted of
laminated layers of glass cloth filaments, bonded under heavy pressure
to form a thin, rigid slab. That a 1/8-inch thickness could stop and
partially flatten a submachine gun bullet with a muzzle velocity of
1,150 feet per second was demonstrated by ballistic tests at a range of
eight yards.
The committee recommended 12-ply, laminated, basket-weave nylon for
use where flexibility was required. Both the doron and nylon protected
the wearer by offering enough resistance to absorb the energy of the
missile, which spent itself at the impact. Thus the shock was spread
out over too large a surface for a penetration, although the wearer
could receive a bad bruise. If a penetration did result from a missile
of higher velocity, its effects would be much reduced in severity.
Aircraft pilots and crewmen, who could tolerate more weight than
foot-sloggers, were first to benefit. Flak suits and curtains were
being manufactured in quantity for airmen by 1944, and the Eighth Air
Force claimed a 50 percent reduction in casualties as a result.
The infantry stood most in need of protection. Statistics from 57 U.S.
divisions in the European theater of operations during World War II
indicated that foot soldiers, comprising 68.5 percent of the total
strength, suffered 94.5 percent of the casualties. It was further
established that shell or mortar fragments caused from 61.3 to 80.4
percent of the wounds.
Unfortunately, progress lagged for the ground forces, owing to
conflicting requirements. Several prototype armored vests were
submitted and rejected. The Marine Corps planned to conduct combat
tests in the spring of 1945 by providing the ordinary utility jacket
with sheaths to hold slabs of doron. A battalion of the 2d Marine
Division had been selected to wear the garment on Okinawa, but the
experiment was interrupted by the end of the campaign.
The Navy and Marine Corps renewed their research in 1947 at Camp
Lejeune. There a new ballistics center, established for the development
and evaluation of body armor, was set up by the Naval Medical Field
Research Laboratory (NMFRL). Lieutenant Commander Lewis was placed in
charge of experiments.
Scientific precision seemed more important than haste in time of peace,
and the NMFRL was not ready with an armored vest when Communism
challenged the free world to a showdown in Korea. Five hundred of the
armored utility jackets of the proposed Okinawa test were available,
however, and were air-shipped to the 1st Marine Division during the
Inchon-Seoul operation.
Many of them went astray during the sea lift to Wonsan and subsequent
Chosin Reservoir operation. Only the 50 garments issued to the Division
Reconnaissance Company were worn in combat. And though this unit kept
no records, the doron slabs were credited by Major Walter Gall, the
commanding officer, with saving several lives.
By the summer of 1951, Lieutenant Commander Lewis and his researchers
had designed a new Marine armored vest, weighing about 8½ pounds,
combining curved, overlapping doron plates with flexible pads
of basket-weave nylon. This garment, according to the official
description, was capable of “stopping a .45 caliber USA pistol or
Thompson submachine gun bullet; all the fragments of the U.S. hand
grenade at three feet; 75 percent of the U.S. 81mm mortar at 10 feet;
and full thrust of the American bayonet.”
Only 40 vests were available for field tests in the summer of 1951.
Lewis rotated them among as many wearers as possible in the three
regiments selected for the test, the 5th Marines and the 23d and 38th
regiments of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. There was, as he saw it,
a psychological question to be answered--would body armor win the
acceptance of troops in combat? The hackneyed phrase “bullet-proof
vest,” for instance, put the wearer in a class with the buyer of a
gold brick. Nylon was associated in the minds of the men with alluring
feminine attire rather than protection from shell fragments. Finally,
there could be no denying that undesired weight had been added, that
doron plates hampered movement to some extent, and that nylon pads were
uncomfortably warm for summer wear.
Despite these drawbacks, Lewis found that troop acceptance was all
that could be asked. The locale of the tests was the Inje area and the
approaches to the KANSAS Line in June and early July. “By keeping these
few vests almost constantly in use,” the Medical Service Corps officer
commented, “the maximum amount of troop wear was obtained. Included
in the wide sampling were company aid men, riflemen, BAR men, mortar
(60mm) men, radio (backpack type) men--each carrying his basic weapon,
ammunition load and a one-meal ration.”
When Lewis returned to Camp Lejeune, he reported “that body armor,
protection of some type for the vital anatomic areas, is almost
unanimously _desired by all combat troops_, particularly the combat
veteran of several actual fire fights with the enemy.”[264]
[264] Quotations are from _Instructional Information, Vest
Armored_, M-1951. The italicized words were in the
original.
Infantry body armor had at last made the transition from a dream
to a reality. The M-1951 was put into production by a Philadelphia
sportswear firm. And it was estimated that by the spring of 1952 nearly
all Marines would be protected by the vest in combat.
Saving of American lives, of course, was a primary consideration. But
there was a tactical as well as humanitarian advantage to be gained.
For if body armor could reduce fatal and serious wounds by as much as
50 percent, as NMFRL researchers hoped, it would mean that a large
percentage of the enemy’s best antipersonnel weapons had in effect been
silenced.
_MAG-12 Moves to K-18_
There was no respite for 1st MAW while the 1st Marine Division remained
in reserve. Operation STRANGLE was at its height, and interdiction
flights called for nearly all the resources of Marine aviation during
the summer of 1951.
Close air support missions were made secondary. This principle was
upheld by Air Force Major General Otto P. Weyland:
I might suggest that all of us should keep in mind the
limitations of air forces as well as their capabilities.
Continuous CAS along a static front requires dispersed and
sustained fire power against pinpoint targets. With conventional
weapons there is no opportunity to exploit the characteristic
mobility and fire power of air forces against worthwhile
concentrations. In a static situation close support is an
expensive substitute for artillery fire. It pays its greatest
dividends when the enemy’s sustaining capability has been
crippled and his logistics cut to a minimum while his forces
are immobilized by interdiction and armed reconnaissance. Then
decisive results can be obtained as the close-support effort is
massed in coordination with determined ground action.[265]
[265] Quoted in James T. Stewart, _Air Power, The Decisive
Force in Korea_ (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand Company,
1957), 22–23.
Marine aviation officers, of course, would have challenged some of
these opinions. But General Weyland insisted that in the summer and
fall of 1951 “it would have been sheer folly not to have concentrated
the bulk of our air effort against interdiction targets in the enemy
rear areas. Otherwise, the available firepower would have been expended
inefficiently against relatively invulnerable targets along the front,
while the enemy was left to build up his resources to launch and
sustain a general offensive.”[266]
[266] _Ibid._
The UN interdiction program was costly to the Communists. Yet it
remained a stubborn fact that the enemy had not only maintained but
actually increased his flow of supplies in spite of bombings that might
have knocked a Western army out of the war. That was because CCF and
NKPA troops could operate with a minimum of 50 short tons per day per
division--an average of about 10 pounds per man. It was about one-fifth
of the supply requirements for an equal number of U.S. troops.
Try as they might, the UN air forces could not prevent the arrival of
the 2,900 tons of rations, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies needed
every day by the 58 Communist divisions at the front.
The enemy during this period was increasing his own air potential. On
17 June the Fifth Air Force warned that the Communists had stepped up
their number of planes from an estimated 900 in mid-May to 1,050 in
mid-June. Their Korean airfields were being kept under repair in spite
of persistent UN air attacks.
In June enemy light planes made night raids along the UN front lines
and even into the Seoul area. VMF(N)-513 pilots, flying the nightly
combat patrol over Seoul, had several fleeting contacts with these
black-painted raiders. The Marines were unable to close in for the
kill, since the opposing planes were nonmetal and difficult to track
by radar. Soon, however, the VMF(N)-513 pilots had better hunting. On
30 June Captain Edwin B. Long and his radar operator, CWO Robert C.
Buckingham, shot down a black, two-place PO-2 biplane. And on 13 July
Captain Donald L. Fenton destroyed another.[267]
[267] MAG-12 HD, Jun 51, Summary and Chronology, 30 Jun; MAG-12
_HD_, Jul 51, Chronology, 13 Jul.
Despite the Air Force emphasis on interdiction, better close air
support remained a major objective of the 1st MAW. One of the
requirements was a shorter flying distance from air base to combat
area. K-46, the MAG-12 field near Hoengsong, had qualified with respect
to reduced flying time. Maintenance problems caused by the dusty, rocky
runway of this primitive strip led to its abandonment. On 14 July
the squadrons pulled back temporarily to K-1, and on the 26th MAG-12
withdrew its maintenance crews.
The Group’s new field was K-18, a 4,400-foot strip on the east coast
near Kangnung and just south of the 38th Parallel. Situated only 40
miles behind the 1st Marine Division and on the seacoast, the new field
seemed to be ideally located. The runway, reinforced with pierced steel
planking, extended inland from a beach where water-borne supplies could
be delivered, as at K-3.[268]
[268] “Rpt of Visit to Far East by CG, FMFPac, and his staff
during the period 27 August to 12 September 1951,” 17
_ff._
_The Division Back in Action Again_
Political causes had a good deal to do with the renewal of activity for
the 1st Marine Division late in August 1951. Apparently the Communist
armed forces had been given enough time to recuperate from their hard
knocks in May and June. At any rate, the Red delegates walked out on
the truce talks after falsely charging on 22 August that UN planes
had violated the neutrality of the Kaesong area by dropping napalm
bombs. Although the Reds were unable to show any credible evidence, the
negotiations came to an abrupt end for the time being.[269]
[269] Berger, _The Korean Knot_, _op. cit._ 144–145.
On the 26th all Marine units received a Division warning that offensive
operations were to be initiated in the immediate future. The effective
strength, of the Division (including the KMCs) had been reported as
1,386 officers and 24,044 enlisted men on 1 August 1951. Attached to
the Division at that time were 165 interpreters and 4,184 Korean CTC
cargadores.
On the 26th the regiments were disposed as follows: the 1st Marines
near Chogutan; the 5th Marines near Inje; the 7th Marines near Yanggu;
and the 1st KMC Regiment at Hangye. Service units and the Division
CP were located along the Hongchon-Hangye road in the vicinity of
Tundong-ni.
The 11th Marines (-), with the 196th FA Battalion, USA, attached,
constituted the 11th Marine Regiment Group, an element of X Corps
artillery. Throughout the training period 2/11 remained under the
control of the 1st Marine Division and 3/11 was attached to the 2d
Infantry Division.
The 5th Marines, 7th Marines, and KMCs were alerted to be prepared
to move up to the combat areas south and west of the Punchbowl on 27
August. The 1st Marines was to remain in Division reserve, and the 11th
Marines reverted to parent control.[270]
[270] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug 51, 3–5.
It was only about a five hour motor march from Tundong-ni to the
forward assembly area under normal road and weather conditions. But
recent rains had turned roads into bogs and fordable streams into
torrents. Bridges were weakened by the raging current in the Soyang,
and landslides blocked the road in many places.
The 1st Marine Division was back in action again. But it would have to
fight its first battles against the rain and the mud.