Advance to the Punchbowl
_Plan to Cut Off Communists--Initial Marine Objectives Secured--MAG-12
Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong--Fight of the 5th Marines for Hill 610--1st
MAW in Operation_ STRANGLE--_KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack--1st
Marines Moves Up to_ BROWN _Line--7th Marines Committed to Attack_
Only from the air could the effects of the UN counterstroke of May and
June 1951 be fully appreciated. It was more than a CCF withdrawal;
it was a flight of beaten troops under very little control in some
instances. They were scourged with bullets, rockets, and napalm as
planes swooped down upon them like hawks scattering chickens. And where
it had been rare for a single Chinese soldier to surrender voluntarily,
remnants of platoons, companies, and even battalions were now giving up
after throwing down their arms.
There had been nothing like it before, and its like would never
be seen in Korea again. The enemy was on the run! General Van
Fleet, after his retirement, summed up the double-barreled
Chinese spring offensive and the UN counterstroke in these words:
We met the attack and routed the enemy. We had him beaten and could
have destroyed his armies. Those days are the ones most vivid in my
memory--great days when all the Eighth Army, and we thought America
too, were inspired to win. In those days in Korea we reached the
heights.[202]
[202] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret), “The Truth About Korea,”
_Life_, 11 May 53.
Communist casualties from 15 to 31 May were estimated by the Eighth
Army at 105,000. This figure included 17,000 counted dead and the
unprecedented total of some 10,000 prisoners, most of them Chinese Reds
taken during the last week of the month in frantic efforts to escape.
Such results were a vast departure from past occasions when Mao
Tse-tung’s troops had preferred death to surrender.
In all probability, only the mountainous terrain saved them from a
complete debacle. If the Eighth Army had been able to use its armor for
a mechanized pursuit, it might have struck blows from which the enemy
could not recover. As it was, the Communists escaped disaster by virtue
of the fact that a platoon could often stand off a company or even a
battalion by digging in and defending high ground commanding the only
approach. Every hill was a potential Thermopylae in this craggy land of
few roads.
It was the misfortune of the 1st Marine Division to have perhaps the
least lucrative zone of action in all Korea for the peninsula-wide
turkey shoot. A chaos of jagged peaks and dark, narrow valleys, the
terrain alone was enough to limit an advance. Even so, the Marines
inflicted 1,870 counted KIA casualties on the Communists in May and
captured 593, most of them during the last eight days of the month.
General Almond congratulated the Division for its accomplishment of “a
most arduous battle task. You have denied [the enemy] the opportunity
of regrouping his forces and forced him into a hasty retreat; the
destruction of enemy forces and materiel has been tremendous and many
times greater than our own losses.”[203]
[203] CG X Corps msg of 1500, 3 Jun 51; 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51.
_Plan to Cut Off Communists_
The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, released from IX Corps
reserve, arrived in the Hongchon area on 21 May and took a position
between the 1st Marine Division on the left and the 2d Infantry
Division on the right. Two days later X Corps gave the Marines the
mission of securing the important road center of Yanggu at the eastern
end of the Hwachon Reservoir (Map 13). Elements of the 2d Infantry
Division, with the 187th Airborne RCT attached, were meanwhile to drive
northeast to Inje after establishing a bridgehead across the river
Soyang. From Inje the 187th (reinforced) would continue to advance
northeast toward its final objective, Kansong on the coast. After
linking up with I ROK Corps, the Army regiment might be able to pull
the drawstring on a tremendous bag of prisoners--all the CCF forces
south of the Inje-Kansong road. There was, however, a big “if” in the
equation. The Communists were falling back with all haste, and it was
a question whether the bag could be closed in time.
[Illustration: 1st Marine Division Drive To Yanggu
23–31 May
Showing Regimental Routes
MAP 13]
The 1st Marine Division jumped off at 0800 on 23 May with the 1st and
5th Marines abreast, the 1st on the left. Both regiments advanced more
than 5,000 yards against negligible opposition. During the course of
this attack the 1st Marines experimented by calling an air strike
in the hope of detonating an entire mine field. The results were
disappointing. Live mines were blown to new locations, thus changing
the pattern, but few exploded.[204]
[204] 2/1 _HD_, May 51.
The 7th Marines was relieved on the 23d by elements of the 7th Infantry
Division (IX Corps) and moved to the east for employment on the Marine
right flank. The KMC Regiment, relieved by other IX Corps units, went
into Division reserve.[205]
[205] 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51.
The 1st Marines, advancing on the left, reached its objectives, about
two-thirds of the way to the Soyang, by noon on the 26th. The regiment
reverted to Division reserve upon relief by the KMCs. In the right
half of the Division zone, resistance gradually stiffened. On the
24th, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines ran into trouble as
they started their advance toward their initial objective, three hills
about 7,000 yards north of Hangye (Map 12). Both battalions were slowed
by heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. They requested immediate
artillery and air support.
Captain John A. Pearson, commanding Item Company, could observe the
enemy on Hill 1051, holding up the attack with flanking fire. He
directed air and artillery on the crest and on the Communists dug in
along the southeastern slopes. Soon the enemy troops were seen retiring
northward. This eased the pressure on the center, and Captain Samuel S.
Smith’s Dog Company managed to work forward and gain the summit of Hill
883 by 1300. Tanks moved up in support and at midnight Colonel Hayward
reported his portion of the Division objective secured.[206]
[206] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2359 24 May 51.
The 7th Marines, moving forward in the right rear of the 5th, veered
to the left and drove into the center of the Division zone, reaching
the southern bank of the Soyang by nightfall on the 26th. That same day
2/7 overran an enemy ammunition dump and took 27 CCF prisoners, some
of them wounded men who had been left behind. The captured material
included the following items:
100,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition;
12,000 rounds of mortar ammunition;
1,000 rounds of artillery ammunition;
6,000 pounds of explosive charges;
9,000 hand grenades.
Five U.S. trucks and jeeps were “released to higher headquarters.” Two
CCF trucks, two mules, and a horse were “integrated into the battalion
transportation system and profitably employed thereafter.”[207]
[207] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2050 26 May 51; Col W. F.
Meyerhoff, ltr of 8 Aug 58.
The 187th Airborne RCT reported on the 24th that its advance was being
held up by increasing enemy resistance.[208] It was already evident
that the CCF flight had frustrated the plan of cutting off decisively
large numbers in the X Corps zone. Air observation established,
however, that hundreds of Chinese Reds had merely escaped from the
frying pan into the fire. By fleeing westward along the south shore of
the Hwachon Reservoir, they stumbled into the IX Corps zone. There the
remnants of whole units surrendered, in some instances without striking
a blow. Along the route they were pitilessly attacked by UN aircraft.
1st MAW units had never before known such good hunting as during the
last week in May 1951.[209]
[208] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 24 May 51, in 5thMar
In&Out #13.
[209] James T. Stewart, _Airpower, The Decisive Force in Korea_
(Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957)
13–15, 84–86; 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pts 4 and 5, Fifth
Air Force Frag orders (hereafter listed as FAF FragOs),
20–31 May; 1st MAW _HD_ May 51, Pt 1, G-3 PORS for 20–31
May; _Ibid._, Pt 2, Staff Jrn G-3, 25 May, 26 May, 27
May, 31 May; EUSAK _Cmd Rept_, May 51, Sec II, Bk 4, Pts
5 and 6, Encls 20–31, PORs, sections entitled G-3 Air.
Despite the “murky instrument weather” of 27 May the all-weather
fighters of VMF(N)-513 reporting the killing of an estimated 425 CCF
soldiers. Two F7F pilots killed or wounded some 200 Chinese Reds in the
I Corps zone. On the following day the 1st MAW claimed a total of 454
KIA casualties inflicted on the enemy.[210]
[210] _Ibid._, VMF(N)-513 HD, 27 May 51.
Estimates of enemy dead by pilots are likely to be over-optimistic,
but there can be no doubt that UN aircraft slaughtered the fleeing
Communists in large numbers. Only poor flying weather saved the enemy
from far worse casualties. So intent were the Chinese on escape that
they violated their usual rule of making troop movements only by night.
When the fog and mist cleared briefly, Marine pilots had glimpses
of CCF units crowding the roads without any attempt at concealment.
Napalm, bombs, and machine guns left heaps of dead and wounded as the
survivors continued their flight, hoping for a return of fog and mist
to protect them.
_Initial Marine Objectives Secured_
As the Marine ground forces advanced, they found fewer and fewer
Chinese Reds opposing them. The explanation was given by a prisoner
from the 12th Division, V Corps, of the North Korean People’s Army
(NKPA). His unit had the mission, he said, of relieving troops in the
Yanggu-Inje area and conducting delaying actions. The purpose was
to allow CCF units to escape a complete disaster and dig in farther
north. The North Koreans, in short, were being sacrificed in rear guard
delaying actions in order that the Chinese Reds might save their own
skins.
U.S. interrogators asked NKPA prisoners why they put up with such
treatment. The answer was that they couldn’t help themselves. The
Chinese had impressed them into service, armed them, and trained them
after the NKPA collapse in the fall of 1950. They were under the thumb
of political commissars holding life and death authority over them.
Any NKPA soldier suspected of trying to shirk his duty or escape was
certain to be shot like a dog. At least the man on the firing line had
a chance to come out alive; the man who defied the system had none.
This attitude accounts to a large extent for the many occasions when
NKPA troops literally resisted to the last man in delaying actions.
Marines in general, judging by their comments, considered the Chinese
Red the better all-around soldier; but they credited the Korean Red
with more tenacity on the defensive.
Because of the stubborn NKPA opposition in East Korea, the Eighth Army
staff and command gave some thought to the possibility of an amphibious
operation in the enemy’s rear by the 1st Marine Division. Plans were
discussed on 28 May for a landing at Tongchon (Map 8). The Marines
were to drive southward along the Tongchon-Kumhwa road to link up
with the IX Corps units attacking toward the northeast along the same
route. After meeting, the two forces would systematically destroy the
pocketed enemy units. It was decided that 6 June would be D-day. And
then, to the great disappointment of Generals Thomas and Almond, the
plan was suddenly cancelled by EUSAK on 29 May after a single day’s
consideration.[211]
[211] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, May 51, 24; Gen G. C. Thomas, USMC
(Ret.), interv of 6 Jun 58; LtGen E. M. Almond, USA
(Ret.), ltr of 22 May 58.
Another scheme for cutting off large enemy forces was abandoned on 28
May when the 187th Airborne got as far as Inje. Most of the CCF units
having escaped, this regiment was given a new mission of securing the
high ground to the north of Inje.
During the last five days of May the 5th and 7th Marines continued to
advance steadily. On the morning of the 31st the 7th faced the task
of breaking through a stubbornly contested pass leading into Yanggu.
With a battalion on each ridge leading into the pass, Colonel Nickerson
found it a slow yet precarious prelude to get the men down. Adding to
their trials were some 500 enemy 76mm and mortar shells received by the
regiment.
General Van Fleet, an onlooker while visiting the 7th Marines OP, shook
his head wonderingly. “How did you ever get the men up those cliffs?”
he asked Colonel Nickerson.
The answer was short and simple. “General,” said the regimental
commander, “they climbed.”
As the day wore on, Nickerson called for what his executive officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Davis, described as “a through-the-middle play. A
company of tanks [Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, commanded by Captain
Richard M. Taylor] was launched up the road with infantry on foot
hugging the protective cover of the steep road embankments. As the
tanks drew fire, the infantry could spot the source and ... quickly
cleaned the enemy out. This rapid thrust caused the enemy defenders to
flee as fire was poured into them from our center force as well as the
flank attackers.”[212]
[212] Col R. G. Davis, comments, n.d.; _HD_s for 1stMarDiv,
5thMar and 7thMar for May 51.
By nightfall on the 31st the 7th Marines had control of Yanggu, its
airfield, and the hills surrounding that burnt-out town. The 5th
Marines had reached a point 6,000 yards northeast of Yanggu, astride
the north-south ridgeline between that road center and Inje.
Losses for the 1st Marine Division in May added up to 75 KIA, 8 DOW,
and 731 WIA. The ratio of wounded to killed, it may be noted, is more
than nine-to-one. This proportion, so much more favorable than the
usual ratio, rose to an even more astonishing 15-to-1 in June. Various
explanations have been offered, one of them being the spirit of cool
professionalism of Marines who had learned how to take cover and not
expose themselves to needless risks. But this doesn’t account for the
unusual ratio, and it may perhaps be concluded that the Marines were
simply lucky in this operation.
The comparatively low death rate has also been credited in part to the
alertness with which Marine officers adapted to changing situations.
War is a grim business on the whole, but Colonel Wilburt S. Brown
took an amusing advantage of enemy propaganda accusing Americans
of all manner of crimes against humanity. At the outset he had
requested colored smoke shells for signaling. But upon learning from
POW interrogations that NKPA soldiers were terrified by what they
believed to be frightful new gases, the commanding officer of the 1st
Marines had an added reason for using green, red, and yellow smoke.
Unfortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Adelman, commanding officer
of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, soon had to inform him that the
inadequate supply was exhausted.[213] It was never renewed during
Brown’s command.
[213] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 21 Aug 58.
Major David W. McFarland, commanding officer of VMO-6, also exploited
enemy ignorance. His original purpose in initiating night aerial
observation by OY planes was to improve artillery accuracy. Soon he
noticed that the mere presence of an OY overhead would silence enemy
artillery.
“The aerial observer,” McFarland explained, “was often unable to
determine the location of enemy artillery even though he could see it
firing, because he would be unable to locate map coordinates in the
dark--that is, relating them to the ground. Fortunately, this fact was
unknown to the enemy. From their observation of the OYs in the daytime,
they had found that the safest thing to do whenever an OY was overhead
was to take cover. This they continued to do at night.”[214]
[214] LtCol D. W. McFarland, ltr of 21 Aug 58.
VMO-6 also put into effect an improvement of 1st Marine Division aerial
photographic service at a time when the 1st MAW photo section had
missions all over the Korean front. Lieutenant Colonel Donald S. Bush,
commanding officer of the section, is credited with the innovation of
mounting a K-17 camera on a OY. Only a 6-inch focal length lens could
be installed on one of these small planes. This meant that in order to
get the same picture as a jet the OY must fly at half the altitude. The
pilot would be in more danger but haze problems were reduced.
The experiment was an immediate success. The Division set up a photo
laboratory near the VMO-6 CP for rapid processing and printing. A
helicopter stood by for rapid delivery to the units concerned.[215]
[215] _Ibid._
Not all the variations in tactics were innovations. Lieutenant Colonel
Bernard T. Kelly, commanding officer of 3/7, revived an old device
on 31 May by using indirect automatic weapons fire with good effect.
Four water-cooled heavy machine guns provided long range (2,600 yards)
plunging fires on the reverse slopes of hills in support of his leading
elements during the final attack on Yanggu.[216]
[216] Col B. T. Kelly, interv of 9 Jun 58.
_MAG-12 Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong_
Delay and uncertainty were still the two great stumbling blocks to
adequate air support for the ground forces under the JOC control
system. Marine officers contended that infantry units sometimes
took unnecessary casualties as a consequence. Worse yet, there were
occasions when the expected planes did not arrive at all.
Statistics kept by the 1st MAW and Navy during the spring of 1951
upheld these conclusions. During the Inchon-Seoul operation, the
average delay in receiving air support had been 15 minutes as compared
to 80 minutes in May and June of 1951. Approximately 35 minutes of this
time was required to process the request through JOC. And only 65 to 70
percent of the sorties requested were ever received by Marine ground
forces.[217]
[217] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 523–537.
Generals Shepherd and Harris had discussed the problem during the early
spring of 1951 with General Partridge of the Fifth Air Force. Several
compromises were reached, and for brief periods the 1st Marine Division
received more air support than it could use. Unfortunately, these
periods were at times of the least need. When the chips were down, the
old delays and uncertainties reappeared. General Partridge commented:
The 1st Marine Air Wing was assigned for operational control by
the Fifth Air Force and it was used just as any of the other
units of the Fifth were employed, that is, in support anywhere
along the battle front were it appeared to be most urgently
needed.
In every action such as took place in Korea when the resources
and especially the air resources are far too few, ground
commanders inevitably feel that they are being shortchanged.
They are trying to accomplish their objectives under the most
difficult circumstances and with the minimum number of casualties
and they want all the assistance from the air that they can
get. I am sure I would feel the same in similar circumstances.
However, there was never enough air support to satisfy everyone
and I was most unhappy that this was the case.
From time to time I was called upon to denude one section of the
front of its close air support in order to bolster some other
area where the situation was critical. Sometimes this worked to
the advantage of the Marines as in the case of operations near
the Chosin Reservoir in December 1950, and at other times it
worked to their disadvantage. In retrospect, however, I would
estimate that, day in and day out, the Marine ground units had
more air support than any other division which was engaged.[218]
[218] Gen E. E. Partridge, USAF, ltr of 28 Jun 59.
With all due respect to General Partridge, Marine officers felt that
the discussion should not be limited merely to the amount of air
support. It was not so much the amount as the delay and unreliability
under JOC control that constituted the problem as the Marines saw it.
On 24 May, while on one of his periodic tours of the Far East, General
Shepherd brought up the matter of CAS with General Ridgway. He agreed
with the UN commander in chief that it would be improper for a Marine
division to expect the exclusive support of a Marine air wing in Korea.
The main difficulty, he reiterated, lay in the slowness and uncertainty
of getting air support when needed.[219]
[219] _FMFPac Visit_ 21–31 May 51, 5, 6.
At this time an extensive reshuffling of Air Force commanders was in
progress. On 21 May General Partridge relieved Lieutenant General
George E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, who had suffered a heart attack.
Partridge in turn was relieved by Major General Edward J. Timberlake,
who assumed temporary command of Fifth Air Force until Major General
Frank E. Everest arrived to take over a few days later.
The 1st MAW was also undergoing changes in command. General Harris
was relieved on 29 May by his deputy commander, Major General Thomas
J. Cushman. Brigadier General William O. Brice, just arrived from the
States, became the Wing’s new deputy commander.
After several “get acquainted” discussions, the new Air Force and 1st
MAW generals agreed on a plan to cut down delays in air support. It was
a simple solution: the aircraft were merely to be brought nearer to
the Marine ground forces. This was to be managed by moving the MAG-12
forward echelon from K-16 at Seoul to K-46 at Hoengsong (Map 16). The
new field, if such it could be called, was nothing more than a stony
dirt strip. But it was only 40 miles, or a 10- to 15-minute flight,
from the firing line. The first missions from the new field were flown
on 27 May. VMFs-214 and -323 kept an average of 12 Corsairs at K-46
thereafter, rotating them from K-1.[220]
[220] MAG-12 _HD_, May 51, 24, 25 and 27 May; 1st MAW _HD_, May
51, Summary and Chronology for 19, 24, 27 and 28 May 51.
On the surface this seemed to be a practical solution, especially
after a four-plane alert was established at K-46 for use by the 1st
Marine Division when needed. DEVASTATE BAKER was permitted to put in
an alerting call directly to the field. The rub was that JOC must be
called in order to make the original request. Before the planes could
take off, the MAG-12 operations officer at the field was likewise
required to call JOC and confirm the fact that the mission had been
approved.
Communications were poor at first for the 40 miles between the field
and the front. DEVASTATE BAKER got better results by calling 1st MAW
Headquarters at K-1, 140 miles south, and having the Wing call K-46 and
JOC. This meant delays such as General Thomas described in a letter to
General Almond. On 29 May, he said, the 5th and 7th Marines were up
against severe enemy fire in their attack. The TACPS had enemy targets
under observation and were ready to control any aircraft they could
get. The Marines requested 92 sorties and received 55. Of these, 20
were flown by Corsairs or Panther Jets, and 35 by Air Force jets and
Mustangs. And though 55 sorties were considerably less than optimum
air support, practically all arrived from two to four hours late. On
the firing line the enemy’s resistance, concluded General Thomas, was
broken not by air power but by Marine riflemen.[221]
[221] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CG X Corps, 31 May 51.
On other days the new plan made a more encouraging showing. There was,
for instance, the occasion when the OYs discovered an enemy regiment
near the 1st Marine Division right flank. DEVASTATE BAKER called the
1st MAW direct on 31 May for 16 fighters as soon as possible. Wing
called JOC for approval to launch the flight and put in a call to K-46
to alert the planes. In just 48 minutes after the initial call from
DEVASTATE BAKER, 16 pilots had jumped into their flight gear at K-46,
had been briefed, and were airborne on what proved to be a timely
strike with excellent results.[222]
[222] 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pt 2, Assessment Rpt for 31 May 51.
A new tactic of night air support was introduced late in May when
Marine R4D transports were outfitted to operate as flare planes. Not
only did these unarmed aircraft light up targets along the front lines
for the VMF(N)-513 night fighters; they were also on call for use by
the 1st Marine Division. Later, on 12 June, the Navy provided the 1st
MAW with PB4Y-2 Privateers for the nightly illumination missions.[223]
[223] 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pt 1, App II, 2; Chronology, 31
May; MAG-12 _HD_ Jun 51, Chronology and 12 Jun.
_Fight of the 5th Marines for Hill 610_
During the heyday of the battleship, every midshipman dreamed of some
glorious future day when he would be on the bridge, directing the naval
maneuver known as crossing the T. In other words, his ships would be in
line of battle, firing converging broadsides on an enemy approaching
in column. Obviously, the enemy would be at a disadvantage until he
executed a 90° turn under fire to bring his battered ships into line to
deliver broadsides of their own.
It was a mountain warfare variation of crossing the T that the Korean
Reds were using against the Marines. Whenever possible, the enemy
made a stand on a hill flanked by transverse ridgelines. He emplaced
hidden machine guns or mortars on these ridgelines to pour a converging
fire into attackers limited by the terrain to a single approach. It
meant that the Marines had to advance through this crossfire before
they could get in position for the final assault on the enemy’s main
position.
There were two tactical antidotes. One was well directed close air
support. The other was the support of tanks advancing parallel to
enemy-held ridgelines and scorching them with the direct fire of 90mm
rifles and 50 caliber machine guns.
[Illustration: X CORPS ROUTES OF ADVANCE DURING EUSAK OPERATIONS
23 MAY-17 JUNE 51
MAP 14]
[Illustration: 1st MAR DIV ZONE OF ACTION 4 JUNE-17 JULY 51 AND 19 JUN
51 SITUATION ON BROWN LINE
MAP 15]
On 1 June the two regiments in assault, the 5th and 7th Marines, found
the resistance growing stiffer as they slugged their way forward toward
Line KANSAS (Map 15). Within an hour after jumping off, 2/5 was heavily
engaged with an estimated 200 enemy defending Hill 651 tenaciously. At
noon, after ground assaults had failed, a request was put in for air
support. Four VMF-214 planes led by Captain William T. Kopas bombed and
strafed the target. This attack broke the back of NKPA opposition, and
2/5 moved in to seize the objective.[224]
[224] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based on the
following sources: X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Jun 51; _HD_s of
1st MarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, and VMF-214 for Jun
51.
Early on the morning of the 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins’ 1/5
moved out to secure the southwest end of the long ridge line that
stretched northeast from Yanggu (Map 15) and afforded a natural avenue
of approach to Taeam-san and the KANSAS line on the southern rim of
the Punchbowl. The Marine advance got under way at 0915. After two
four-plane strikes by VMF-214 and a “preparation” by 1/11 and the 1st
Rocket Battery, the battalion attacked across a valley with Baker
Company (First Lieutenant William E. Kerrigan) on the right and Charlie
Company (First Lieutenant Robert E. Warner) on the left to seize the
terminal point on the ridge leading to Hill 610 (Map 15). Able Company
(Captain John L. Kelly) followed Charlie as Company C (Captain Richard
M. Taylor) of the 1st Tank Battalion moved into supporting position.
Converging fire from transverse ridges had the Marine riflemen pinned
down until the tankers moved along the valley road running parallel.
Direct 90mm fire into NKPA log bunkers enabled C/1/5 to advance to the
forward slope of Hill 610. The enemy fought back with machine guns and
grenades while directing long-range rifle fire against 2/5, attacking
along a parallel ridge across the valley.
By 1945 the last bunker on Hill 610 had been overrun. Meanwhile, 2/5
had pushed ahead some 5,000 yards to the northeast.
The capture of Hill 610 will never have its glorious page in history.
It was all in the day’s work for Marines who could expect a succession
of such nameless battles as they clawed their way forward. That night
the weary men of 1/5 were not astonished to receive a counterattack
in the darkness. It was all part of the job, too. After driving off
the unseen enemy, the new tenants of Hill 610 snatched a few hours of
sleep. They were on their feet again at dawn, ready to go up against
the next key terrain feature in a rocky area that seemed to be composed
entirely of Hill 610s.
The next knob along the ridge happened to be Hill 680, about 1,000
yards to the northeast. VMF-214 planes from K-46 napalmed and strafed
the enemy, and Able Company led the 1/5 attack. During the air strike
the Koreans had taken to cover in their holes on the reverse.
They were back in previously selected forward slope firing positions by
the time the Marines came in sight. Close-in artillery support enabled
the attackers to get within grenade range and seize the last NKPA
bunker by 1400. Able Company pushed on.
Midway from Hill 680 to the next knob, Hill 692, the advance was
stopped by enemy small-arms and mortar fire. An air strike was
requested on the bunkers holding up the assault, but fog closed in and
the planes were delayed more than two hours.
At 1600, after Able Company had renewed the assault without air
support, four VMF-214 Corsairs started a target run controlled by a
liaison plane from VMO-6. The foremost Marines, almost at the summit
by this time, had to beat a hasty retreat to escape the napalm and
500-pound bombs being dumped on Hill 692. Fortunately, there were no
friendly casualties. Some were caused indirectly, however, when hostile
mortar fire caught Marines withdrawing along a connecting saddle to the
comparatively safe reverse slope of Hill 680. When the danger passed,
Able Company returned to the attack on 692 and routed the remaining
defenders.[225]
[225] 5thMar _UnitReport_ (_URpt_), Jun 51, 35.
The 1st Marine Division made it a policy thereafter that only the
forward air controllers on the ground were to direct close air support
along the front. Control of air strikes farther behind the enemy lines
was reserved for the OYs.
_1st MAW in Operation_ STRANGLE
Sightings of enemy vehicles during the month of May totaled
54,561--seven times those of January. This increase prompted General
Van Fleet to ask the Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet to initiate a
program of cutting off all possible enemy road traffic between the
latitudes 38° 15´ N and 39° 15´ N.
Earlier in 1951 the interdiction program had been aimed chiefly at the
enemy’s rail lines and bridges. The Communists had countered by using
more trucks. The new program, known as Operation STRANGLE, was to be
concentrated against vital road networks. Flight leaders were briefed
to search out critical spots where truck and ox cart traffic could be
stopped. Roads skirting hills were to be blocked by landslides caused
by well placed bombs. Where cliffside roads followed the coast, as they
so often did in East Korea, naval gunfire started avalanches of dirt
and rocks which sometimes reached a depth of 20 feet. Roads running
through a narrow ravine or rice paddy could often be cut by a deep bomb
crater.[226]
[226] Descriptions of Operation STRANGLE are based on _Pac
Flt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chapter 10, 10-45 to 10-47; and
on 1st MAW _HD_s, May to Jul 51, G-3 PORs, G-3 Journal
entries, Assessment Rpts.
The 1st MAW was given the assignment of stopping traffic on three roads
in East Korea--from Wonsan to Pyonggang, from Kojo to Kumhwa, and along
a lateral route linking the two (Map 16). Since Kumhwa and Pyonggang
were two of the three Iron Triangle towns, these roads were of more
than ordinary importance.
The Communists reacted to the new UN pressure by increasing their
flak traps. UN pilots were lured with such bait as mysterious lights,
tempting displays of supposed fuel drums, or damaged UN aircraft that
called for investigation. The cost of the UN in planes and pilots
showed an increase during the first two months of Operation STRANGLE.
From 20 May to the middle of July, 20 Marine planes were shot down.
Six of the pilots returned safely; two were killed and 12 listed as
missing.[227]
[227] 1st MAW _HD_s May-Jul 51, Summaries; MAG-12 and MAG-33
_HD_s May-Jul 51, Summaries.
The demands of Operation STRANGLE added to the emphasis on interdiction
and armed reconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force. Statistics compiled
by the 1st Marine Division for 1-17 June 1951 show that 984 close air
support sorties had been requested and 642 received--about 65 percent.
The ratio of Marine planes to other UN aircraft reporting to the
Division was about four to one.[228]
[228] Summarization from DivAirO memo of 26 Jun 51 to CG
1stMarDiv.
The statistics of the 1st MAW indicate that out of a total of 1,875
combat sorties flown from 1 to 15 June 1951, about a third were close
air support--651 day CAS and 19 night CAS. Of this number, 377 sorties
went to the 1st Marine Division, which received more than half. Next
in line were the 7th Infantry Division (41 sorties), the 3d Infantry
Division (31 sorties), and the 25th Infantry Division (28 sorties).[229]
[229] 1st MAW _HD_, Jun 51. Pt 1, Chronology, 15 Jun.
The effect of Operation STRANGLE on the enemy must be left largely
to conjecture. There can be no doubt that it added enormously to the
Communists’ logistical problem. It is equally certain that they solved
these problems to such an extent that their combat units were never
at a decisive handicap for lack of ammunition and other supplies.
Operation STRANGLE, in short, merely added to the evidence that
interdictory air alone was not enough to knock a determined adversary
out of the war, as enthusiasts had predicted at the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea.
_KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack_
On the night of 1–2 June, Colonel Nickerson was notified that the 7th
Marines would be relieved next day by the 1st Marines, which would
pass through and continue the attack. The 1st Marines moved into
assembly areas at 0630. Lieutenant Colonel Homer E. Hire, commanding
officer of 3/1, went forward at 0800 with his command group to make
a reconnaissance of the area. As his staff paused for a conference
in a supposedly enfiladed location, a Communist mortar barrage hit
the group by complete surprise. The artillery Liaison officer was
killed instantly. His assistant, two forward observers, four company
commanders, the S-3 and 32 enlisted men were wounded. So hard hit was
the battalion that its attack had to be postponed until the following
day.[230]
[230] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1915 2 Jun 51.
The first Division objective was designated X-RAY. 2/1 had the mission
of taking the high point, Hill 516 (Map 15). Across the valley 3/1
advanced up a parallel ridge. Planes from VMF-214 and VMF-323 cleared
the way for the securing of this battalion’s objective at 1900.
Aircraft from these same squadrons also aided 2/1 in over-running the
last opposition on Hill 516, where 80 NKPA dead were counted.[231]
[231] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1830 3 Jun 51; _HD_s of
VMF-214 and VMF-323, Jun 51.
[Illustration: MAP 16
1st MARINE AIR WING
OPERATING AREA
23 MAY-15 JULY 1951
UNIT LOCATIONS ON 1 JULY]
The KMC regiment, in reserve only two days, was ordered to relieve
the 5th Marines on 4 June. This would permit Colonel Hayward to shift
over to the right flank, thus extending the 1st Marine Division zone
5,000 yards to the east with a north-south boundary of the Soyang river
valley (Map 15). The purpose of this maneuver was to free 2d Infantry
Division troops for a mission of mopping up in the X Corps rear area.
Three Marine regiments were now in line, the 1st on the left, the
KMCs in the center, the 5th on the right, and the 7th in reserve. A
reshuffling of units also took place in the 1st MAW when VMF-312 ended
its tour of duty on the CVL _Bataan_. The replacement involved a change
of carriers when VMF-323 was alerted for west coast duty on the CVE
_Sicily_ a week later.[232]
[232] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; 1stMarDiv
_Special Action Report_ (_SAR_), Jun 51.
Ahead of the KMCs stretched the most difficult of the regimental zones
of action--the main mountain range extending northeast from Yanggu
to Hill 1316, known to the Koreans as Taeam-san. Along these ridges
the Chinese had placed North Korean troops with orders to “hold until
death.”[233]
[233] The account of the KMC attack is based upon these
sources: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jun 51; “KMC Operations in
Korea, Jun 51,” n.d., by Col C. W. Harrison, then KMC
senior adviser.
From the air, the ground in front of the KMCs resembled a monstrous
prehistoric lizard, rearing up on its hind legs. The 1st Battalion was
to ascend the tail and the 2d the hind legs. The two would meet at the
rump, Hill 1122 (Map 15). From this position the backbone ran northeast
to the shoulders, Hill 1218. Still farther northeast, along the neck,
was the key terrain feature--Taeam-san, the head of the imagined
reptile.
The 1st and 2d Battalions ran immediately into the opposition of an
estimated NKPA regiment. In an effort to outflank the enemy, the 3d
Battalion swung over to the east and attacked up the ridge forming
the forelegs. Seizure of the shoulders (Hill 1218) would render enemy
positions along the back, rump, hind legs, and tail untenable. Major
General Choe Am Lin, commanding the 12th NKPA Division, was quick to
recognize the tactical worth of this height and exact a stiff price for
it.
That the KMCs could expect little mercy from their fellow countrymen
was demonstrated when the bodies of ten men reported missing were
found. All had been shot in the back of the head.
For five days the fight raged with unabated fury. The terrain limited
the advance to a narrow front, so that the attack resembled the thrust
of a spear rather than a blow from a battering ram. When the KMCs did
gain a brief foothold, the enemy launched a counterattack.
At 2000 on 10 June, after six days of relatively unsuccessful fighting,
the KMCs decided to gamble on a night attack. This had heretofore
been the enemy’s prerogative, and the Korean Reds were caught unaware
in a devastating surprise. Most of the NKPA troops were attending to
housekeeping duties at 0200 when all three KMC battalions fell upon
them like an avalanche. Hill 1122, the rump of the lizard, was seized;
and under pressure the enemy withdrew from the shoulders. This made the
fall of Taeam-san inevitable, and only mopping-up operations remained
for KMCs who had suffered more than 500 casualties. General Thomas sent
the regiment this message on 12 June:
Congratulations to the KMC on a difficult job well done. Your
seizure of objectives on the KANSAS Line from a determined enemy
was a magnificent dash of courage and endurance. Your courageous
and aggressive actions justify our pride in the Korean Marines.
Logistical support of the three regiments in the attack presented a
problem to the Division supply echelons. The KMCs in the center and
the 1st Marines on the left could be supplied over a narrow, winding
mountain road that scaled a high pass before dropping down into an
east-west valley giving relatively easy access to the center and left.
The 5th Marines had to receive its supplies over another mountain road
leading north of Inje, then west into the regimental zone.[234]
[234] The KMC’s drew fuel and ammunition from the 1st Marine
Division and rations from the ROK Army. Other classes of
supplies were obtained generally on a catch-as-catch-can
basis with some aid from KMC Headquarters in Pusan.
Both of the Division supply routes needed a good deal of engineering
work before trucks could move over them freely. Landslides were
frequent and many trucks skidded off the slippery trail while rounding
the hairpin turns.
The 1st Marines moved northward on north-south ridges, and the KMCs in
the center had spurs leading to their objectives. It was the misfortune
of the 5th Marines to have a topographical washboard effect ahead. The
axis of advance was south to north, but the ground on the way to the
final objectives on the KANSAS Line consisted of five sharply defined
ridgelines running northwest to southeast. Instead of attacking along
the ridgelines Colonel Hayward’s men had to climb some 1,200 feet, then
descend 1,200 feet, five separate times while covering an advance of
8,000 yards (Map 15).
Artillery fired for more than two hours on the morning of 6 June to
soften defenses on the next regimental objective, Hill 729. An air
strike was attempted but fog with low-hanging clouds forced the flight
leader to abort the mission. At 1300 the assault battalions moved
across the LD against small-arms and machine gun fire. The fog lifted
sufficiently at 1400 to allow four F9Fs from VMF-311 to deliver an
effective attack. And by 2100 both 2/5 and 3/5 were consolidating their
positions on the first of the five ridges.
This assault is typical of the fighting as the 5th Marines took the
remaining four ridges, one by one, in a slugging assault on an enemy
defending every commanding height. The advance resolved itself into
a pattern as the Korean Reds probed the Marine lines at night and
continued their tough resistance by day. For 10 days the regiment
plugged ahead, step by step, with the support of artillery, air,
mortars, and 75 mm recoilless rifles.[235]
[235] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv and 1stMar, Jun 51.
_1st Marines Moves Up to_ BROWN _Line_
On the left flank, the 1st Marines devoted several days to
consolidating its position and sending out reconnaissance patrols
in preparation for an attack on the ridge just north of the Hwachon
Reservoir. From this height the Communists could look down the throats
of Colonel Brown’s troops.
From 6 to 8 June, Lieutenant Colonel Hire’s 3d Battalion led the attack
against moderate but gathering resistance. A gain of 1,500 yards was
made on the right flank by 2/1, commanded by Major Clarence J. Mabry
after the evacuation of Lieutenant Colonel McClellan, wounded on the
5th. On the left, Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. West’s 1/1 held fast as
the 5th ROK Regiment, 7th ROK Division, X Corps, passed through on its
way to a new zone of action to the west.
Early on the 9th, as 2/1 was preparing to launch its attack, an intense
artillery and mortar barrage fell upon the lines, followed by the
assault of an estimated NKPA company, The Korean Reds were beaten off
with heavy losses. And though the enemy fire continued, 2/1 jumped off
on schedule, fighting for every inch of ground. Colonel Brown committed
1/1 on the left. It was an all-day fight for both battalions. After
taking one ridge in the morning, it was used as the springboard for
an assault on the second objective. The weapons of the regimental
Anti-Tank Company built up a base of fire that enabled this ridge to be
secured by 1600.
The 5th ROK Regiment took its objectives by the morning of the 10th.
The 1st Marines provided additional fire support by diverting all its
antitank guns and tank rifles to the aid of the ROKs.
The pressure, which had been building up for several days, reached
a new high on 10 June. Late that morning Colonel Brown met General
Almond and the Division G-3, Colonel Richard G. Weede, at a conference.
By 1100 the entire 2d Battalion of the 1st Marines was committed. On
the left, Lieutenant Colonel West had to hold up the 1st Battalion
until 1330, when the ROKs completed the occupation of the high ground
dominating the route of advance.
For several hours it appeared that the Marines had met their match
this time. A tenacious enemy defended log bunkers expertly, refusing
to give ground until evicted by grenade and bayonet attacks. At every
opportunity the Communists counterattacked. So effective was their
resistance that at dusk the two Marine battalions were still short of
their objectives in spite of casualties draining the strength of both
units.
Colonel Joseph L. Winecoff, commanding officer of the 11th Marines,
remained on the telephone for hours with Colonel Brown. He gave all
possible artillery support, not only of his own regiment but also
nearby Corps units. By nightfall, with the attacking battalions
still held up, the atmosphere was tense in the regimental forward
CP. Lieutenant Colonel Adelman, commanding the supporting artillery
battalion, 2/11, helped to coordinate air strikes and artillery with
Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, executive officer of the 1st
Marines, and the air liaison officers.
“Everything I had ever hoped to see in years of teaching such
coordination of fires seemed to come true that night,” commented
Colonel Brown at a later date. “I stayed in my regular CP until I was
sure all I could do through Winecoff was done, and then went forward to
see the finale. It was a glorious spectacle, that last bayonet assault.
In the last analysis 2/1 had to take its objective with the bayonet and
hand grenades, crawling up the side of a mountain to get at the enemy.
It was bloody work, the hardest fighting I have ever seen.”[236]
[236] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 8 Jun 58. Other
sources for this section are the _HD_s of 1stMarDiv,
1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, and VMF-214.
This was no small tribute, coming from a veteran officer whose combat
service included three major wars, not to mention Nicaragua and
China. It was nearly midnight before Mabry’s battalion took its final
objective. Casualties for the day’s attack were 14 KIA and 114 WIA
exclusive of slightly wounded, who were neither counted nor evacuated.
West’s battalion, which seized Hill 802, overlooking the Soyang River,
had won its all-day fight at a cost of 9 KIA and 97 WIA.
Unfailing support had been given throughout the daylight hours by
aircraft of VMF-214. VMF(N)-513 took over on the night shift, and
planes came screeching in as late as 2200 to attack moonlit targets a
hundred yards ahead of the leading infantry elements.
The 1st Marines had outfought and outgamed a tough enemy. Never again,
after the 10th, was the NKPA resistance quite as determined. The 3d
Battalion led the other two during the next few days. There was plenty
of fighting for all three, but the result was never again in doubt.
By the late afternoon of 14 June the regiment was in position on the
BROWN Line. This was the unofficial name for an extension of the KANSAS
Line some 3,000 yards north. It had been requested by Colonel Brown
when he realized that positions along the KANSAS Line were completely
dominated by the next ridge to the north.
The change made necessary a continued advance by the KMCs on the right
to tie in with the 1st Marines. The so-called BROWN Line was then
officially designated the modified KANSAS Line.
_7th Marines Committed to the Attack_
For several days General Thomas had been concerned over the heavy
casualties suffered by his command. In order to give greater impetus
to the Division effort, he decided to commit the reserve infantry
regiment, the 7th Marines (minus one battalion held back as Division
reserve) to complete the occupation of the modified KANSAS Line.
On 8 June, Colonel Nickerson’s regiment (minus 3/7) moved into an
assembly area between the 1st Marines and the KMCs, ready to attack in
the morning. Ahead stretched a narrow but difficult zone of advance up
the valley of the So-chon River (Map 15). Tank-infantry patrols went
forward to select favorable positions for the jumpoff, and engineers
worked throughout the daylight hours to clear the valley roads of
mines. Despite their best efforts, 10 Marine tanks were lost to mines
during the first week.[237]
[237] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the
_HD_s of the 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, 1/7, 2/7, and 3/7 for Jun
51.
As the two battalions advanced on the morning of the 9th they came
under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. Nevertheless, they secured
Hill 420 and dug in before nightfall.
On the 10th Rooney’s 1/7 advanced along the ridgeline to support
the attack of Meyerhoff’s 2/7 up the valley floor. The maneuver was
carried out successfully in spite of NKPA automatic weapons and mortar
opposition. Contact was established with KMC forward units at dusk.
Sixteen POWs were taken by the 7th Marines and 85 North Korean dead
were counted on the objectives.
The two battalions continued the attack throughout the next week. The
3d Battalion of the 7th Marines remained General Thomas’ sole Division
reserve until he committed it on the afternoon of 18 June.
The newcomers got into the fight just in time for the enemy’s all-out
effort to defend the steep east-west ridge marking the BROWN Line.
The nature of the terrain made maneuver impossible--a frontal assault
was the only answer. Defending the ridge was the 1st Battalion, 41st
Regiment, 12th NKPA Division. Waiting on the reverse slope, the enemy
launched a counterattack when the Marines neared the crest. George
Company, commanded by First Lieutenant William C. Airheart, met five
successive repulses at the hands of superior numbers. Item Company
(First Lieutenant Frank A. Winfrey) also took part in the fifth
assault, and both companies held their ground near the summit when the
fighting ended at dusk. They expected to resume the attack at dawn,
but the enemy had silently withdrawn during the night. All three 7th
Marines battalions occupied their designated positions on the BROWN
Line without further interference.
By early afternoon on the 20th, the Division was in complete control of
the modified KANSAS Line and construction of defenses began in earnest.
The next day the 1st Marines and KMCs extended their right and left
flanks respectively and pinched out the 7th Marines, which dropped back
into reserve.
Thus ended two months of continual hard fighting for the 1st Marine
Division, beginning on 22 April with the great CCF offensive. Few and
far between were the interludes of rest for troops which saw both
defensive and offensive action. After stopping the enemy’s two drives,
they launched a month-long counterstroke that had the enemy hardpressed
at times for survival. Only the ruthless sacrifice of NKPA troops in
defensive operations enabled the Chinese Reds to recover from the blows
dealt them in late May and early June.
The cost in Marine casualties had been high. Throughout the entire
month the 1st Marines alone suffered 67 KIA and 1,044 WIA, most of them
being reported during the first 2 weeks. This was a higher total than
the regiment incurred during the Chosin Reservoir operation. Reflecting
on the caliber of these men, their regimental commander had this to say:
They were war-wise when I got command; I contributed nothing to
their training because they were in battle when I joined them and
I left them when they came out of the lines for a rest. They used
cover, maneuvered beautifully, used their own and supporting arms
intelligently, were patient and not foolhardy; but when it came
to the point where they had to rely on themselves with bayonet,
hand grenade and sheer guts, they could and did do that too. I
have long ago given up telling people what I saw them do on many
occasions. Nobody believes me, nor would I believe anyone else
telling the same story of other troops.[238]
[238] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr to Maj W. T.
Hickman, 22 Apr 57.
Colonel Brown, of course, paid this tribute to the troops of his
regiment. But it is safe to say that any commanding officer of the 1st
Marine Division would have felt that these sentiments applied equally
to his own men. All the combat Marines of the 60-day battle had shown
themselves to be worthy heirs of the traditions of Belleau Wood,
Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and the Chosin Reservoir.