The CCF Spring Offensive
_Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive--Hwachon Occupied by KMC
Regiment--CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine Flank--Marine Air in Support
Everywhere--Plugging the Gap on the Marine Left--Repulse of Communist
Attacks--Withdrawal to the_ KANSAS _Line--Enemy Stopped in IX Corps
Sector--1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps_
On 10 April 1951 the 1st Marine Division was poised on Line KANSAS for
a drive to Line QUANTICO. Then a new IX Corps directive put on the
brakes, and for 10 days Marine activities were limited to patrolling
and preparation of defensive works. Boundary adjustments between the
Division and the 6th ROK Division on the left extended the Marine
zone about 2,000 yards to the west; and General O. P. Smith’s CP was
advanced to Sapyong-ni, just south of the 38th Parallel (Map 8).
Out of a blue sky came the announcement on the 11th that General
MacArthur had been recalled by President Truman for failure to give
wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government
and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.
General Ridgway was appointed to the UN command, and he in turn was
relieved on 14 April by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA.
The new Eighth Army commander, youthful in appearance for his 59 years,
was no novice at fighting Communists. In 1949 and 1950 he had been
Director of the Joint Military Aid Group that saved Greece from falling
into the clutches of Communism after Moscow fomented a civil war. Van
Fleet also brought to his new command a World War II reputation as a
vigorous leader with a preference for offensive doctrines.
_Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive_
Chinese prisoners taken during the first three weeks of April 1951 told
all they knew with no apparent reluctance, just as Japanese captives
had given information in World War II. Inconsistent as it may seem that
fanatical Asian soldiers should prove so cooperative, such was the
penalty the enemy paid for insisting on resistance to the last ditch.
Since the possibility of surrender was not considered, CCF prisoners
were taught no code of behavior and answered questions freely and
frankly.
POW interrogations were supplemented by captured documents revealing
that the Chinese prided themselves on a new tactical doctrine known
as “the roving defensive,” put into effect in the spring of 1951. It
meant “not to hold your position to the death, but to defend against
the enemy through movement,” explained a secret CCF directive dated 17
March 1951. “Therefore, the wisdom of the roving defensive is based
on exhausting the enemy without regard for the loss or gain of some
fighting area or the immediate fulfillment of our aims.”[150]
[150] This section is based upon the following documents: IX
Corps _CmdRpt_ 5, Apr 51, Sec 3, Intelligence; 1stMarDiv
_HD_, Apr 51; _PIR_ 171, 179, 180.
It was admitted that the CCF soldier must work harder, “because the
troops will have to construct entrenchments and field works in every
place they move.” But the advantages were that “roving warfare can
conserve our power, deplete the enemy’s strength, and secure for us
more favorable conditions for future victory. Meanwhile, the enemy will
make the mistake once again, and collapse on the Korean battlefield.”
The last sentence evidently refers to the UN advance of late November
1950 that was rolled back by a surprise CCF counteroffensive. Chinese
strategists seem to have concluded that their “roving defensive” had
made possible another such offensive victory in the spring of 1951. At
any rate, prisoners questioned by the 1st Marine Division and other IX
Corps units agreed that the CCF 5th Phase Offensive was scheduled to
begin on 22 April 1951. The IX Corps zone was said to be the target
area for an attempted breakthrough.[151]
[151] EUSAK, IX Corps and 1stMarDiv G-2 _PIR_s, 1–20 Apr 51.
Marine G-2 officers recalled that prisoners gave information on the eve
of the CCF offensive in November 1950 that proved to be astonishingly
accurate in the light of later events. For it was a paradox that
the Chinese Reds, so secretive in other respects, let the man in the
ranks know about high-level strategic plans. In the spring of 1951 it
mattered little, since air reconnaissance had kept the Eighth Army well
informed as to the enemy buildup.
Prisoners were taken in the IX Corps zone from the following major CCF
units during the first three weeks of April:
20th Army (58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions), estimated strength,
24,261;
26th Army (76th, 77th, and 78th Divisions), estimated total
strength, 22,222;
39th Army (115th, 116th, and 117th Divisions), estimated total
strength, 19,538;
40th Army (118th, 119th, and 120th Divisions), estimated total
strength, 25,319.
The 20th and 26th, it may be recalled, were two of the CCF armies
opposing the 1st Marine Division during the Chosin Reservoir breakout.
It was a satisfaction to the Marines that their opponents of December
1950 had evidently needed from three to four months to reorganize and
get back into action.
In CCF reserve on 21 April 1951 were the 42d and 66th Armies, both
located in the Iron Triangle to the enemy’s rear. The former included
the 124th, 125th, and 126th Divisions--the 124th being the unit cut to
pieces from 3 to 7 November 1950 by the 7th Marines in the war’s first
American offensive action against Chinese Red adversaries.
_Hwachon Occupied by KMC Regiment_
At 0700 on the 21st the 1st Marine Division resumed the attack toward
Line QUANTICO with the 7th Marines on the left, the 5th Marines in the
center, the KMC Regiment on the right, and the 1st Marines in reserve.
Negligible resistance awaited the Marines and other IX Corps troops
during advances of 5,000 to 9,000 yards. An ominous quiet hung over the
front as green wood smoke limited visibility to a few hundred yards.
On the Marine left the 6th ROK Division lost touch, opening a gap
of 2,500 yards, according to a message from Corps to the 1st Marine
Division. The ROK commander was ordered by Corps to restore lateral
contact. This incident would be recalled significantly by the Marines
when the CCF blow fell.[152]
[152] 1stMarDiv _HD_ Apr 51, 47–48; CO 7thMar msg to CG
1stMarDiv, 1830 21 Apr 51.
The KMC Regiment had the mission of finishing the fight for control of
the Hwachon Reservoir area. Early in April the 1st Cavalry Division
and the 4th Ranger Company, USA, had been repulsed in attempts to
fight their way across the artificial lake in rubber boats. The enemy
retaliated by opening the penstocks and spillway gates. Considering
that the dam was 275 feet high and the spillway 826 feet long, it is
not surprising that a wall of water 10 feet high roared down the Pukhan
Valley into areas recently occupied by IX Corps units.[153]
[153] Capt D. E. Fowler, “Operations at the Hwachon Dam,
Korea,” _The Military Engineer_, Jan-Feb 1952, 7–8.
Both Army and Marine engineers were on the alert, having been warned by
aerial observers. They cut three floating bridges loose from one bank
or another, so that they could ride out the crest of the flood. Thanks
to this precaution, only temporary damage and interruption of traffic
resulted.[154]
[154] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51.
The 1st Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H.
Partridge, was given the mission by Corps of jamming the gates of the
dam at the open position. Compliance would have to wait, of course,
until the KMCs took the dam. Partridge conferred meanwhile with Colonel
Bowser, and it was decided to take no action after the anticipated
capture until a demolitions reconnaissance could be made.[155]
[155] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col J. H.
Partridge, ltr of 17 Mar 58.
As early as 18 April a KMC patrol had crossed the Pukhan into the town
of Hwachon, which was found abandoned except for 11 Chinese soldiers,
who were taken prisoner. Marine engineers installed a floating bridge
on the 21st for the advance of one KMC battalion the next morning. The
other two battalions were to cross the river several miles downstream
by DUKWs.[156]
[156] CO KMC Regt msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2335 22 Apr 51, in KMC
In&Out #1; Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, Mar-Apr 51.
Corps plans for the attack were made in full realization of air
reconnaissance reports for 20 and 21 April indicating that the enemy
offensive buildup was in its final stages. This intelligence was
gleaned in spite of all enemy efforts to frustrate the airmen. CCF
spotters were placed on mountain tops to give the alarm, and relays
of men fired shots to pass on warnings of approaching planes.
Antiaircraft defenses were increased at such vital spots as bridges
and supply areas. The Communists even went so far as to put out
decoys--fake trucks, tanks, and tank cars--to lure UN fighter-bombers
within range of antiaircraft guns.
These efforts resulted in 16 Marine planes being shot down from 1
to 21 April 1951. Nine of the pilots were killed, one was captured,
three were rescued from enemy territory, one walked back to friendly
outposts, and two managed to bail out or crash-land behind the UN
lines.[157]
[157] Compilation of data from 1stMAW sqdn _HD_s, Apr 51;
_PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1051, 1071.
This total was equivalent to two-thirds of the average tactical
squadron. Because of the disruption to the 1st MAW pilot replacement
program, the Commandant arranged for 20 pilots to be flown to Korea to
augment the normal rotation quotas.[158]
[158] _Ibid._
Direct opposition from enemy aircraft was also on the increase. CCF
flights even reached the EUSAK battle line as unidentified light planes
flew over positions or dropped small bombs. Evidently the enemy was
using well camouflaged airfields in North Korea.
An air battle took place on 20 April when two VMF-312 pilots from
the _Bataan_, Captain Philip C. DeLong and First Lieutenant Harold
D. Daigh, encountered four YAK fighters in the heavily defended
Pyongyang-Chinnanpo area. They gave chase and shot down three of the
enemy planes.[159]
[159] 1st MAW _HD_, 20 Apr 51; VMF-312 _HD_, 20 Apr 51.
Marine aircraft were on station when Marine ground forces resumed their
forward movement at 0830 on the morning of 22 April. A CCF prisoner
taken that very afternoon confirmed previous POW statements that the
22d was the opening day of the Fifth Phase Offensive. The front was
quiet, however, as the three Marine infantry regiments advanced almost
at will.
A motorized patrol of Division Reconnaissance Company, led by the
commanding officer, Major Robert L. Autrey, had the initial contact
with the enemy while advancing on the Division left flank. The two
platoons, supported by Marine tanks, found their first indications when
searching a Korean roadside hut. Although the natives denied having
seen any Chinese soldiers. Corporal Paul G. Martin discovered about 50
hidden rice bowls waiting to be washed. Upon being confronted with
this evidence, the terrified Koreans admitted that Chinese soldiers had
reconnoitred the area just before dawn.
Farther up the road, an ammunition dump of hidden mortar shells was
discovered. The enemy had also put up several crude propaganda signs
with such sentiments as YOUR FOLKS LIKE SEE YOU HOME and HALT! FORWARD
MEANS DEATH.
The patrol dismounted and proceeded with caution, guided by an OY
overhead. Although the “choppers” were the favored aircraft of VMO-6,
the OYs also earned the gratitude of the troops on many an occasion
such as this. The pilot gave the alarm just before hidden Communists
opened fire. Thus the Marines of the patrol were enabled to take cover,
and the tanks routed the enemy force with well placed 90mm shells.[160]
[160] Sgt Paul G. Martin, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 2 Jul 56.
The KMCs met no resistance worth mentioning when they secured the town
of Hwachan and the north bank of the Pukhan just west of the reservoir.
Only light and scattered opposition awaited the 5th Marines (Colonel
Richard M. Hayward) and the 7th Marines (Colonel Herman Nickerson, Jr.)
on their way to the occupation of assigned objectives on Line QUANTICO.
_CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine Flank_
For weeks the Communist forces in Korea might have been compared to an
antagonist backtracking to get set for taking aim with a shotgun. There
could be no doubt, on the strength of daily G-2 reports, about both
barrels being loaded. And on the night of 22 April the enemy pulled the
trigger.
The KMCs, after taking their objectives, reported a concentration
of enemy small-arms fire. At 1800 the command of the 1st Marine
Division directed a renewal of the advance at 0700, on the morning of
the 23d. This order was cancelled at 2224 by a message calling for
all Marine units to consolidate and patrol in zone, pending further
instructions.[161]
[161] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th, 7th, 11th Mar, 1st KMC, Tk,
and EngBns, 2224 22 Apr 51 in Div In&Out #21.
One of the reasons for the sudden change was the receipt of a message
by the 1st Marine Division at 2120, informing that the 6th ROK
Division was under heavy attack to the west of the Marines. Meanwhile,
an on-the-spot questioning of a CCF prisoner just taken by the KMCs
convinced the command and staff of the 1st Marine Division that the CCF
5th Phase Offensive was only hours away and gathering momentum. Thanks
to this timely interpretation, all forward Marine units were alerted
two hours before the main blow fell.
It was on the left of the 1st Marine Division that the situation first
became critical. The 6th ROK Division had never quite succeeded in
closing up the gap on its right and restoring contact with the Marines.
But this failure was trivial as compared to the collapse of the entire
ROK division an hour before midnight, leaving a gap wide enough for a
major breakthrough.
The 1st Marine Division took prompt measures to cope with the
emergency. As early as 2130, the 1st Marines, in reserve just north
of Chunchon, were alerted to move one battalion to contain a possible
enemy threat to the Division left flank. A second message an hour later
called for immediate execution. And at midnight the Division Provost
Marshal was directed to stop ROK stragglers and place them under guard.
The Division Reconnaissance Company received orders to aid the military
police.[162]
[162] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar 2130 and 2232 22 Apr 51 in
Div In&Out #12; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51, 6 and 50.
Colonel Francis M. McAlister, commanding the 1st Marines, selected
Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. West’s 1st Battalion to carry out Division
orders. “By midnight we were all on trucks and rolling on the roads
north,” wrote Second Lieutenant Joseph M. Reisler in a letter home.
“Mile after mile, all the roads were covered with remnants of the ROKs
who had fled. Thousands of them [were] straggling along the roads in
confusion.”[163]
[163] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51.
Despite these preparations for trouble on the left flank, the KMCs
on the right and the 5th Marines in the center were first in the
Division to come under attack. During the last minutes of 22 April the
2d KMC Battalion had it hot and heavy on Hill 509. To the left the
1st KMC Battalion, partially encircled, notified the 5th Marines of a
penetration.
The effects were felt immediately by 1/5, with its CP in Hwachon. Hill
313 was the key to the town, being located at the Hwachon end of a long
ridge forming a natural avenue of approach from the northeast. Captain
James T. Cronin’s Baker Company of 1/5 had the responsibility for
protecting the CP and shifting troops to the right flank if necessary.
He sent Second Lieutenant Harvey W. Nolan’s platoon to run a race with
the enemy for the occupation of Hill 313. Attached in excess of T/O for
familiarization was Second Lieutenant Patrick T. McGahn.[164]
[164] Sources for this 1/5 action are 5thMar _HD_, Apr 51;
LtCol John L. Hopkins, interv of 24 Jan 58; Maj J. T.
Cronin, ltr of 30 Jan 58; Capt P. T. McGahn, interv of 27
Jul 56.
About 220 yards from the summit the slope was so steep that the Marines
clawed their way upward on hands and knees. The company commander
posted the attached light machine gun section while Nolan, McGahn,
and Sergeant William Piner organized the assault. The three squads of
riflemen advanced a few yards, only to be pinned down by well directed
CCF machine gun fire. Another rush brought the Marines closer to the
enemy but a stalemate ensued in the darkness. Seven of the platoon were
killed and 17 wounded.
The situation in the 1/5 area was so serious that Fox Company of 2/5
(Lieutenant Colonel Glen E. Martin) sent reinforcements. At dawn,
however, Hill 313 proved to be abandoned by the enemy. A vigorous KMC
counterstroke had swept the Communists from Hill 509, so that the front
was relatively quiet in this area. The courage and determination of the
KMC Regiment were praised by General Smith, who sent this message on
the morning of the 23d to Colonel Kim, the commanding officer:
Congratulate you and your fine officers and men on dash and
spirit in maintaining your positions against strong enemy
attacks. We are proud of the Korean Marines.[165]
[165] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO KMC Regt, 0910 23 Apr 51.
It is taking no credit away from the KMCs and 5th Marines to point out
that they appear to have been hit by enemy holding attacks. The main
CCF effort was directed at the left of the Division line, held by the
7th Marines.
The heaviest fighting took place in the sector of 1/7 on the extreme
left, commanded by Major Webb D. Sawyer. It was obvious that the
enemy planned to widen the penetration made at the expense of the
6th ROK Division. The 358th Regiment of the 120th Division, CCF 40th
Army, hurled nearly 2,000 men at the Marine battalion. Charlie
Company, commanded by Captain Eugene H. Haffey, took the brunt of the
assault.[166]
[166] This account of the 7th Marines’ fight is based on the
following sources: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; BrigGen A.
L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col R. G. Davis, Comments,
n.d.; Col H. Nickerson, comments of 25 Feb 58; Col W. F.
Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26
Feb 58.
The thin battalion line bent under sheer weight of numbers. But it did
not break. It held through three hours of furious fighting, with the
support of Marine and Army artillery, until the 1st Battalion of the
1st Marines came up as reinforcements under the operational control of
the 7th Marines. The newcomers took a position to the left of 1/7, so
that the division flank was no longer completely “in the air.”
This was one of the first examples of the Corps and Division
maneuvering that played such a large part throughout in the blunting of
the CCF offensive. Troops were not left to continue a desperate fight
when a shift of units would ease the pressure.
_Marine Air in Support Everywhere_
At first light on the 23d the FEAF Mosquitoes and fighter-bombers
went into action. The Marines had four two-plane flights of Corsairs
airborne before sun-up. VMF-323 responded to a call from Baker Company,
1/5, only to find that the enemy had abandoned Hill 313. A low-flying
OY of VMO-6, commanded by Major D. W. McFarland, guided the Corsairs
to the withdrawing Chinese, who were worked over thoroughly. VMF-214
planes meanwhile supported 1/7 in that battalion’s desperate fight at
the left of the line.[167]
[167] _HD_s of VMF-323, VMF-214, and VMO-6 for Apr 51.
A pilot’s-eye view showed fighting in progress from one coast to
another, although the enemy was making his main effort in the IX
Corps sector. The U.S. 24th Infantry Division, to the left of the 6th
ROK Division, was having to bend its right flank southward to defend
against the CCF penetration. Toward the rear the 27th Brigade of the
British Commonwealth Division, in IX Corps reserve, was being alerted
to meet the Communists head on and bring the breakthrough to a halt.
Elements of the U.S. 24th and 25th Divisions on the edge of the Iron
Triangle were giving ground slowly. Seoul was obviously an objective
of CCF units that had crossed the Imjin in the moonlight. But
General Ridgway had decided that the city was not to be abandoned.
“Considerable importance was attached to the retention of Seoul,” he
explained at a later date, “as it then had more value psychologically
than its acquisition had conferred when we were still south of the
Han.”[168]
[168] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 29 Jan 58.
Near the junction of X Corps and I ROK Corps the 7th ROK Division had
been hard hit, although the enemy attack in this area was a secondary
effort. Air support helped this unit to hold its own until it could be
reinforced.
Of the 205 Marine aircraft sorties on 23 April, 153 went to support
the fighting front. The 1st Marine Division received 42 of these CAS
strikes; 24 went to the ROK 7th Division; 59 to I Corps to check
the advance on Seoul; and 28 to pound the Communists crossings the
Imjin.[169]
[169] Compilation of data from 1st MAW squadrons for 23 Apr 51.
Only about 66 percent of the landing strip at K-3 (Pohang) could be
used; the remainder was being repaired by the Seabees. In order to give
the Panther jets more room, VMF-212 shifted its squadrons for two days
to K-16 near Seoul. A detachment of VMF-323 planes from K-1 (Pusan)
also made the move. Since K-16 was only 30 miles from the combat area
along the Imjin, the Corsairs were able to launch their attacks and
return for rearming and refueling in an hour or less.[170]
[170] VMF-212, MAG-33, and MAG-12 _HD_s for Apr 51.
_Plugging the Gap on the Marine Left_
At first light on 23 April the entire left flank of the 1st Marine
Division lay exposed to the Chinese who had poured into the gap left by
the disintegration of the 6th ROK Division. IX Corps orders called for
the ROKs to reassemble on the KANSAS line, but most of them straggled
from 10 to 14 miles behind the positions they held prior to the CCF
attack. The 1st Marine Division ordered Reconnaissance Company to stop
ROK stragglers at the river crossing, and several groups were turned
back.
The reasons for the ROK collapse are variously given. Weak command
and low morale have been blamed for the debacle, yet the shattered
division did not lack for defenders. No less an authority than General
Van Fleet declared himself “... reluctant to criticize the 6th ROK
Division too severely. I do not believe they deliberately threw away
their equipment--I am inclined to believe such equipment was abandoned
due to the terrain, lack of roads and weight. Our check at the time
indicated that the Korean soldiers held on to their hand weapons. It is
interesting to know that General Chang who commanded 6th ROK Division
at the time ... is today [March 1958] Vice Chief of Staff of the Korean
Army.”[171]
[171] Gen J. S. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58.
As a first step toward setting up a defense in two directions, the 1st
Marine Division received orders from IX Corps to fall back to Line
PENDLETON (Map 10). This was one of the Eighth Army lines assigned to
such profusion that they resembled cracks in a pane of glass. PENDLETON
ran generally southwest to northeast through the 7th Marines sector,
then turned eastward just north of the town of Hwachon.
By occupying this line, the 7th Marines could bend its left to the
south in order to refuse that flank. Still farther to the south, the
1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines were to take positions facing
west. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division would face west as much
as north. On the center and right the KMCs and 5th Marines would find
it necessary to withdraw only about 1,000 yards to take up their new
positions.[172]
[172] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar for Apr 51; MajGen
O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23–24 Apr 51; MajGen E. W.
Snedeker, ltr of 12 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26
Feb 58; Col H. Nickerson, ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col W. F.
Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Maj R. P. Wray, ltr of 27
Apr 58; LtCol J. F. Coffey and Maj N. B. Mills, interv of
4 Apr 58.
It was up to 1/1 to make the first move toward plugging the gap. At
0130 on the 23d Captain John Coffey’s Baker Company led the way. Moving
north in the darkness along the Pukhan and then west along a tributary,
the long column of vehicles made its first stop about 1,000 yards from
the assigned position. Here the 92d Armored Field Battalion, USA, was
stationed in support of the 6th ROK Division and elements of the 1st
Marine Division. The commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Leon F.
Lavoie, was an old acquaintance of 1/1, having supported that battalion
during the final days of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. Lavoie was
held in high esteem by the Marines, who found it characteristic of him
that in this fluid situation his cannoneers were formed into a tight
defensive perimeter, ready to fight as infantry if need be.
[Illustration: MAP 10
CCF Offensive Starting 22 April
And Subsequent Marine Withdrawals]
Another Army artillery unit, the 987th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion, had been roughly used by the Chinese who routed the ROK
division. Losses in guns and equipment had resulted, and Coffey moved
with his company about 1,500 yards to the west to assist in extricating
from the mud all the 105s that could be saved. Resistance was
encountered in the form of machine gun fire from Chinese who had set up
a road block.[173]
[173] Sources for operations of the two Army artillery
battalions are: Gen W. M. Hoge, USA (Ret.), ltr of 3 Feb
58; LtCol Leon F. Lavoie, USA, ltr of 5 Feb 58; LtCol Roy
A. Tucker, USA, ltr of 30 Nov 57; LtCol John F. Coffey,
USMC, ltr of 9 Feb 58; Capt Russell A. Gugeler, USA,
_Combat Actions in Korea_ (Washington, 1954), 162–173.
Upon returning to 1/1, Coffey found it occupying what was in effect an
outpost to the southwest of the 7th Marines. Baker Company was assigned
to the left of Captain Robert P. Wray’s Charlie Company, holding the
curve of a horseshoe-shaped ridge, with Captain Thomas J. Bohannon’s
Able Company on the right. In support, along the comparatively level
ground to the immediate rear, was Weapons Company (Major William L.
Bates).
With 1/1 facing in three directions to block a CCF attack, 1/7 managed
to disengage and withdraw through 3/7, which occupied a position on
Line PENDLETON. VMO-6 helicopters and troops of 2/7 helped to evacuate
the 1/7 casualties incurred during the night’s hard fighting.
During the early morning hours of the 23d the Marines of 3/1 had
boarded trucks to the village of Todun-ni (Map 11) on the west bank of
the Pukhan. Their assigned position was Hill 902, a 3,000-foot height
dominating the surrounding terrain. The Chinese also were interested in
this piece of real estate, since it overlooked the river crossing of
the 1st Marine Division. Pressure to beat the Communists to the crest
mounted as NCOs urged the men to their utmost efforts over steep uphill
trails.
[Illustration: MAP 11
Action of 1/1 at Horseshoe Ridge, 3/1 on 902, and Subsequent
Withdrawals, 23–25 April]
The Marines won the race. Once in position, however, it was evident
to Lieutenant Colonel Banning that three ridge lines leading up to
the hill mass would have to be defended. This necessity imposed a
triangular formation, and he placed Captain Horace L. Johnson’s George
Company at the apex, with First Lieutenant William J. Allert’s How
Company on the left, and First Lieutenant William Swanson’s Item
Company on the right. The heavy machine guns of Major Edwin A. Simmons’
Weapons Company were distributed among the rifle companies and the
81mm mortars placed only 10 to 20 yards behind the front lines.[174]
[174] 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar _HD_s, Apr 51; LtCol E. A.
Simmons, interv of 12 Jun 57.
The KMCs and 5th Marines completed their withdrawal without
interference. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division on the afternoon
of 23 April might have been compared to a fishhook with the shank in
the north and the barb curling around to the west and south. The three
Marine battalions plugging the gap were not tied in physically. Major
Maurice E. Roach’s 3/7 was separated by an interval of 1,000 yards from
1/1, and the other two Marine battalions were 5,500 yards apart (Map
11). But at least the 1st Marine Division had formed a new front under
fire and awaited the night’s attacks with confidence.
_Repulse of Communist Attacks_
Bugle calls and green flares at about 2000 announced the presence of
the Chinese to the west of 1/1 on Horseshoe Ridge.
“They came on in wave after wave, hundreds of them,” wrote Lieutenant
Reisler, whose platoon held an outpost in advance of Charlie Company.
“They were singing, humming and chanting, ‘Awake, Marine....’ In the
first rush they knocked out both our machine guns and wounded about 10
men, putting a big hole in our lines. We held for about 15 minutes,
under mortar fire, machine gun fire, and those grenades--hundreds of
grenades. There was nothing to do but withdraw to a better position,
which I did. We pulled back about 50 yds. and set up a new line. All
this was in the pitch-black night with Chinese cymbals crashing, horns
blowing, and their god-awful yells.”[175]
[175] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51.
For four hours the attacks on Horseshoe Ridge were continuous,
particularly along the curve held by Wray’s company. He was reinforced
during the night by squads sent from Coffey’s and Bohannon’s companies.
Wray realized that the integrity of the battalion position depended on
holding the curve of the ridge, but his main problem was bringing up
enough ammunition. Men evacuating casualties to the rear returned with
supplies, but the amount was all too limited until Corporal Leo Marquez
appointed himself a one-man committee. His energy equalled his courage
as he carried grenades and small-arms ammunition all night to the men
on the firing line. Marquez emerged unhurt in spite of bullet holes
through his cartridge belt, helmet, and a heel of his shoe.
About midnight it was the turn of 3/1. These Marines had dug in as best
they could, but the position was too rocky to permit much excavation.
Ammunition for the mortars had to be hand-carried from a point halfway
up the hill.
Several hours of harrassing mortar fire preceded the CCF effort. George
Company, at the apex of the ridge, was almost overwhelmed by the
first Communist waves of assault. The courage of individual Marines
shone forth in the ensuing struggle. Technical Sergeant Harold E.
Wilson, second in command of the center platoon, suffered four painful
wounds but remained in the fight, encouraging his men and guiding
reinforcements from How Company as they arrived.[176]
[176] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51.
Steady artillery support was provided by Colonel McAlister, who
rounded up a jury-rigged liaison party and three forward observer
teams composed mainly of officers from the 987th AFA Battalion. They
registered 11th Marines and 987th Battalion defensive fires which had
a large part in stopping the CCF attack as it lapped around George
Company and hit How and Item on the other two ridges.
Colonel McAlister and Colonel Nickerson paid a visit to the CP of
1/1, which remained under the operational control of the 7th Marines
until morning. The two regimental commanders arranged for artillery
and tank support to cover the gap between 1/1 and 3/7.[177] The enemy,
however, seemed to be wary about infiltrating between the three
battalion outposts. This reluctance owed in large part to the deadly
flat-trajectory fire of the 90mm rifles of Companies A and B of the 1st
Tank Battalion, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Holly F.
Evans, had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne that day.
[177] Col H. Nickerson Jr., ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col R. E. West,
comments, n.d.
Attacks on 3/1 and 3/7 also continued throughout the night. At daybreak
the close air support of Marine aircraft prevented further Communist
efforts, though dug-in enemy groups remained within machine gun range.
Identification of Chinese bodies at daybreak indicated that the 359th
and 360th Regiments, 120th Division, 40th CCF Army, had been employed.
_Withdrawal to the Kansas Line_
Now came the problem for the three Marine battalions of letting loose
of the tiger’s tail. Corps orders were received on the morning of
24 April for all units of the Division to pull back to Line KANSAS.
This was in accordance with General Ridgway’s policy, continued by
General Van Fleet, of attaching more importance to destruction of enemy
personnel than the holding of military real estate.
Some of the most seriously wounded men of 1/1 required immediate
evacuation, in spite of the obvious risks. A VMO-6 helicopter piloted
by First Lieutenant Robert E. Matthewson attempted a landing at the
base of Horseshoe Ridge. As he hovered over the panel markings, CCF
small-arms fire mangled the tail rotor. The machine plunged to earth so
badly damaged that it had to be destroyed. Matthewson emerged unhurt
and waved off a helicopter flown by Captain H. G. McRay. Then the
stranded pilot asked for a rifle and gave a good account of himself as
an infantryman.[178]
[178] VMO-6 _HD_ for Apr 51.
While First Lieutenant Norman W. Hicks’ second platoon fought as the
rear guard, First Lieutenant Niel B. Mills’ first platoon of Charlie
Company led the attack down the hill, carrying the wounded behind. In
an attempt to rout the Chinese from a flanking hill, Mills was wounded
in the neck by a bullet that severed an artery. Corpsman E. N. Smith
gripped the end of the artery between his fingers until a hemostat
could be applied, thus saving the lieutenant’s life. Just before losing
consciousness. Mills looked at his watch. It was 1000 and 1/1 had
weathered the storm.[179]
[179] LtCol R. P. Wray and Maj N. W. Hicks, interv of 16 Dec 59.
The 3d Battalion of the 7th Marines, which had beaten off probing
attacks all night, coordinated its movements with those of the two
Marine battalions as they slowly withdrew toward the Pukhan. Despite
Marine air attacks, the Communists not only followed but infiltrated in
sufficient numbers to threaten the perimeter of Lavoie’s cannoneers.
The training this Army officer had given his men in infantry tactics
now paid off as the perimeter held firm while mowing down the
attackers with point blank 105mm shells at a range of 1,000 yards. The
Marines of Captain Bohannon’s company soon got into the fight, and
the 92d repaid the courtesy by supporting 1/1 and 3/7 during their
withdrawal. Counted CCF dead numbered 179 at a cost to the 92d of 4 KIA
and 11 WIA casualties.[180]
[180] Capt R. A. Gugeler, USA, _Combat Actions in Korea_,
170–172.
As the morning haze lifted, the OYs of VMO-6 spotted for both Army and
Marine artillery, DEVASTATE BAKER fed close support to the forward
air controllers as fast as it could get planes from K-16 at Seoul,
only a 15-minute flight away. Not only 49 Corsairs but also 40 of the
Navy ADs and Air Force F-51s and jets aided the Marine ground forces
in their withdrawal to Line KANSAS. To speed the fighter-bombers to
their targets, some of the Marine pilots were designated tactical air
coordinators, airborne (TACA). Their familiarity with the terrain was
an asset as they led incoming pilots to ground force units most in need
of support.[181]
[181] Summary of data from 1st MAW _HD_s for 24 Apr 51.
It was a confusing day in the air. The mutual radio frequencies
to which planes and ground controllers were pretuned proved to be
inadequate. The consequence was all too often the blocking out of key
information at a frustrating moment. Haze and smoke made for limited
vision. The planes needed a two-mile circle for their attacks, yet the
battalions were at times less than 1,000 yards apart. DEVASTATE BAKER
had to deal with this congested and dangerous situation as best it
could.
In addition to its strong support of Marine ground forces, the 1st MAW
sent 10 sorties to the ROKs in east Korea and 57 to I Corps in its
battle along the Imjin. By this time the Gloucestershire Battalion of
the 29th British Brigade was isolated seven miles behind enemy lines
and receiving all supplies by air-drop. The outlook grew so desperate
that officers ordered their men to break up and make their way back to
the UN lines if they could. Only 40 ever succeeded.
In the former 6th ROK Division sector units of the 27th Brigade of the
British Commonwealth Division had done a magnificent job of stopping
the breakthrough. The 2d Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry and the 3d Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment
distinguished themselves in this fight, which won a Distinguished Unit
Citation for the division.[182]
[182] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr51, Sec 1, 98, 100, 101; Brig C. N.
Barclay, _The First Commonwealth Division_ (Aldershot,
1954), 69–70.
_Enemy Stopped in IX Corps Sector_
Spring had come at last to war-ravaged Korea and the hills were a
misty green in the sunshine. Looking down from an aircraft on the warm
afternoon of 24 April 1951 the Marine sector resembled a human anthill.
Columns of weary men toiled and strained in every direction. Chaotic
as the scene may have seemed, however, everything had a purpose. The
1st Marine Division was in full control of all troop movements, despite
enemy pressure of the last two nights.
The 5th Marines and KMCs had no opposition as they continued their
withdrawal. Marine air reduced to a minimum the harassing efforts of
the Chinese following the 1st Marines. As front-line units disengaged
and fell back, the length of the main line of resistance was contracted
enough for the 7th Marines to be assigned a reserve role. The 1st and
2d Battalions were given the responsibility for the defense of Chunchon
as well as the crossing sites over the Pukhan and Soyang Rivers. Major
Roach had reached the outskirts of Chunchon when 3/7 was ordered back
across the Chunchon, to be attached to the 1st Marines on the left
flank.[183]
[183] 7thMar _HD_, Apr 51.
Throughout the night of 24–25 April the enemy probed the Marine lines,
seeking in vain a weak spot where a penetration could be made. It
was already evident that the breakthrough in this area had given the
Communists only a short-lived advantage. By the third night they were
definitely stopped. Only minor patrol actions resulted except for two
attacks in company strength on 2/1 at 0050 and 0150. Both were repulsed
with total CCF losses of 25 counted dead.
Contrary to the usual rule, the Marines saw more action during the
daylight hours. A company-size patrol from 1/1 became heavily engaged
at 1350 and three Company A tanks moved up in support. The fight lasted
until 1645, when the enemy broke off action and the tanks evacuated 18
wounded Marines.
Early in the afternoon a 3/1 patrol had advanced only 200 yards along
a ridgeline when it was compelled to withdraw after running into
concentrated mortar and machine gun fire. Sporadic mortar rounds
continued until a direct hit was scored on the battalion CP, wounding
Colonel McAlister, Lieutenant Colonel Banning, Major Reginald R. Myers,
the executive officer, and Major Joseph D. Trompeter, the S-3. Banning
and Myers were evacuated and Trompeter assumed command of 3/1.
Losses of 18 KIA and 82 WIA for 24–25 April brought the casualties of
the 1st Marines to nearly 300 during the past 48 hours.[184]
[184] 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51.
A simple ceremony was held at the 1st Marine Division CP on the
afternoon of the 24th for the relief of General Smith by Major General
Gerald C. Thomas. The new commanding general, a native of Missouri, was
educated at Illinois Wesleyan University and enlisted in the Marine
Corps in May 1917 at the age of 23. Awarded the Silver Star for bravery
at Belleau Wood and Soissons, he was commissioned just before the
Meuse-Argonne offensive, in which he was wounded.
During the next two decades, Thomas chased bandits in Haiti, guarded
the U.S. mails, protected American interests in China, and served as
naval observer in Egypt when Rommel knocked at the gates of Alexandria
in 1941. As operations officer and later chief of staff of the 1st
Marine Division, he participated in the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942.
The next year he became chief of staff of I Marine Amphibious Corps in
the Bougainville operation. Returning to Marine Headquarters in 1944 as
Director of Plans and Policies, he was named commanding general of the
Marines in China three years later.
General Smith had won an enduring place in the hearts of all Marines
for his magnificent leadership as well as resourceful generalship
during the Inchon-Seoul and Chosin Reservoir campaigns. Speaking of the
Marines of April 1951, he paid them this tribute in retrospect:
The unit commanders and staff of the Division deserve great
credit for the manner in which they planned and conducted
the operations which resulted in blunting the Chinese
counteroffensive in our area. In my opinion, it was the most
professional job performed by the Division while it was under my
command.[185]
[185] Gen O. P. Smith USMC (Ret.), ltr of 11 Feb 58.
The night of 25–26 April passed in comparative quiet for the Marines.
A few CCF probing attacks and occasional mortar rounds were the extent
of the enemy’s activity. All Marine units had now reached the modified
Line KANSAS, but General Van Fleet desired further withdrawals because
the enemy had cut a lateral road.
IX Corps also directed that the 1st Marine Division be prepared on
the 26th to move back to Chunchon, where it would defend along the
south bank of the Soyang until service units could move out their
large supply dumps. The Division was to tie in on the right with the
lower extension of the Hwachon Reservoir, and contact was made in that
quarter with the French battalion of the 2d Infantry Division, X Corps.
On the Marine left flank the 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division
had relieved elements of the British Commonwealth Division.
Marine regimental officers met with Colonel Bowser, G-3, to plan
the continued withdrawal. It was decided that four infantry
battalions--1/1, 2/1, 3/5, and 3/7--were to take positions on the west
bank of the Pukhan to protect the Mojin bridge and ferry sites while
the other units crossed. The execution of the plan went smoothly,
without enemy interference. After all other Marine troops were on the
east side, 3/7 disengaged last of all and forded the chest-deep stream
as a prelude to hiking to Chunchon.[186]
[186] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
2040 27 Apr 51.
The enemy was kept at a discreet distance throughout the night by
continuous artillery fires supplemented by ripples from Captain Eugene
A. Bushe’s Battery C, 1st 4.5´´ Rocket Battalion. An acute shortage
of trucks made it necessary for most of the troops to hike. Then came
the task of organizing the new Division defenses on a line running
northeast and southwest through the northern outskirts of Chunchon (Map
10). Planning continued meanwhile for further withdrawals to positions
astride the Hongchon-Chunchon MSR.[187]
[187] CO IX Corps _IXACT 1370_; 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51; 5thMar
_HD_, Apr 51; 7thMar _HD_, Apr 51. A “ripple” normally
consists of 144 rounds fired simultaneously by six
launchers.
It was apparent by this time that the enemy had been badly mauled on
the IX Corps front. The Communists were now making a supreme effort to
smash through in the I Corps area and capture Seoul. It was believed
that they had set themselves the goal of taking the city by May Day,
the world-wide Communist holiday.
In this aspiration they were destined to be disappointed. They tried to
work around the Eighth Army’s left flank by crossing the river Han to
the Kimpo Peninsula, but air strikes and the threat of naval gunfire
frustrated them. Another flanking attempt 35 miles to the southeast
met repulse, and before the end of the month it was evident that the
Chinese Reds would not celebrate May Day in Seoul.
Generally speaking, the Eighth Army had kept its major units intact
and inflicted frightful losses on the enemy while trading shell-pocked
ground for Chinese lives. The night of 27–28 April saw little activity
on the IX Corps front, adding to the evidence that the enemy had shot
his bolt. The next day the 1st Marine Division, along with other
Eighth Army forces, continued the withdrawal to the general defensive
line designated NO NAME Line (Map 10). Further withdrawals were not
contemplated, asserted the IX Corps commander, who sent this message to
General Thomas:
It is the intention of CG Eighth Army to hold firmly on general
defense line as outlined in my Operation Plan 17 and my message
9639, and from this line to inflict maximum personnel casualties
by an active defense utilizing artillery and sharp armored
counterattacks. Withdrawal south of this line will be initiated
only on personal direction of Corps commander.[188]
[188] CG IX Corps msg to CG 1stMarDiv with plans for
withdrawal, 28 Apr 51.
FEAF placed the emphasis on armed reconnaissance or interdiction
flights for Marine aircraft during the last few days of April. 1st MAW
pilots reported the killing or wounding of 312 enemy troops on the
29th and 30th, and the destruction of 212 trucks, 6 locomotives, and
80 box cars. On the other side of the ledger, the Wing lost a plane a
day during the first eight days of the CCF offensive. Of the fliers
shot down, five were killed, one was wounded seriously but rescued by
helicopter, and two returned safely from enemy-held territory.[189]
[189] 1st MAW _HD_, Apr51, Pt #1, Chronology 22–30 Apr and App
VI, PORs #46 (23 Apr) and 54 (1 May).
The shortage of vehicles slowed the withdrawal of Marine ground forces,
but by the 30th the 5th Marines, KMC Regiment, and 7th Marines were
deployed from left to right on NO NAME Line. The 1st Marines went into
reserve near Hongchon. On the Division left was the reorganized 6th ROK
Division, and on the right the 2d Infantry Division of X Corps.[190]
[190] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; 5thMar HD, Apr 51; 7thMar _HD_,
Apr 51.
Nobody was in a better position to evaluate Marine maneuvers of the
past week than Colonel Bowser, the G-3, and he had the highest praise.
“Whereas the Chosin withdrawal was more spectacular than the April
‘retrograde,’” he commented seven years later, “the latter was executed
so smoothly and efficiently that a complex and difficult operation was
made to look easy. The entire Division executed everything asked of it
with the calm assurance of veterans.”[191]
[191] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58.
_1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps_
UN estimates of enemy casualties ranged from 70,000 to 100,000. The
Fifth Phase Offensive was an unmitigated defeat for the Communists so
far, but EUSAK G-2 officers warned that this was only the first round.
Seventeen fresh CCF divisions were available for the second.
General Van Fleet called a conference of corps commanders on 30 April
to discuss defensive plans. In the reshuffling of units the 1st Marine
Division was placed for the third time in eight months under the
operational control of X Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Edward
M. Almond. The Marines were to occupy the western sector of X Corps
after its boundary with IX Corps had been shifted about 12 miles to the
west.[192]
[192] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, 115–118.
Van Fleet put into effect a reshuffling of units all the way across the
peninsula in preparation for the expected renewal of the CCF offensive.
Thus on 1 May the UN line was as follows from left to right:
_US I Corps_--1 ROK Division, 1st Cavalry Division and 25th
Infantry Division in line; the 3d Infantry Division and British
29th Brigade in reserve;
_US IX Corps_--British 27th Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, 5th
and 6th ROK Divisions and 7th Infantry Division in line; the
187th Airborne RCT in reserve;
_US X Corps_--1st Marine Division, 2d Infantry Division, 5th and
7th ROK Divisions;
_ROK III Corps_--9th and 3d Divisions;
_ROK I Corps_--Capitol Division and ROK 11th Division.
“I don’t want to lose a company--certainly not a battalion,” Van Fleet
told the corps commanders. “Keep units intact. Small units must be kept
within supporting distance.... Give every consideration to the use of
armor and infantry teams for a limited objective counterthrust. For
greater distances, have ready and use when appropriate, regiments of
infantry protected by artillery and tanks.”[193]
[193] _Ibid._
From the foxhole to the command post a confident new offensive spirit
animated an Eight Army which only four months previously had been
recuperating from two major reverses within two months. The Eighth
Army, in short, had been welded by fire into one of the finest military
instruments of American military history; and the foreign units
attached to it proved on the battlefield that they were picked troops.
With the Hwachon dam now in enemy hands, the Communists had the
capability of closing the gates, thus lowering the water level in the
Pukhan and Han rivers to fording depth. As a countermeasure, EUSAK
asked the Navy to blast the dam. It was a difficult assignment, but
Douglas AD Skyraiders from the _Princeton_ successfully torpedoed the
flood gates on 1 May.[194]
[194] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 766.
An atmosphere of watchful waiting prevailed during the next two weeks
as the Marines on NO NAME Line improved their defensive positions and
patrolled to maintain contact with the enemy. Eighth Army evolved at
this time the “patrol base” concept to deal with an enemy retiring
beyond artillery range. These bases were part of a screen, called
the outpost line of resistance (OPLR), established in front of the
MLR. Their mission was to maintain contact with the enemy by means of
patrols, give warning of an impending attack, and delay its progress as
much as possible.
When it came to artillery ammunition, the 11th Marines found that it
had progressed from a famine to a feast. Where shells had recently
been rationed because of transport difficulties, the Eighth Army
now directed the cannoneers along NO NAME Line to expend a unit
of fire a day. The 11th Marines protested, since the infantry was
seldom in contact with the enemy. One artillery battalion submitted
a tongue-in-cheek report to the effect that the required amount
of ammunition had been fired “in target areas cleared of friendly
patrols.”[195] The requirement was kept in force, however, until the
demands of the renewed CCF offensive resulted in another ammunition
shortage for the 11th Marines.
[195] Col Merritt Adelman, ltr of 10 Feb 58.
Marine tanks were directed by Division to use their 90mm rifles to
supplement 11th Marine howitzers in carrying out Corps fire plans. The
tankers protested that their tubes had nearly reached the end of a
normal life expectancy, with no replacements in sight. This plaint did
not fall upon deaf ears at Corps Headquarters and two Army units, the
96th AFA Battalion and 17th FA Battalion, were assigned to fire the
deep missions.[196]
[196] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 4 May 51; CG 1stMarDiv msg
to CG X Corps, 9 May 51; X Corps msg X9613, 10 May 51.
Eighth Army staff officers concluded that the enemy would launch
his next effort in the center. Intelligence, according to General
Van Fleet, “had noted for some 2 weeks prior to the May attack
that the Chinese Communists were shifting their units to the
east.” Nevertheless, the blow fell “much farther east than [was]
expected.”[197]
[197] Gen J. A. Van Fleet USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58.
Although the east offered the best prospects of surprise, a rugged
terrain of few roads imposed grave logistical handicaps on the
enemy. Moreover, UN warships dominated the entire eastern littoral.
Despite these disadvantages, an estimated 125,000 Chinese attacked
on the morning of 16 May 1951 in the area of the III and I ROK Corps
between the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and the coast. Six CCF divisions
spearheaded an advance on a 20-mile front that broke through the lines
of the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions. Pouring into this gap, the Communists
made a maximum penetration of 30 miles that endangered the right flank
of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division.
General Van Fleet took immediate steps to stabilize the front. In one
of the war’s most remarkable maneuvers he sent units of the 3d Infantry
Division, then in reserve southeast of Seoul, on a 70-mile all-night
ride in trucks to the threatened area.[198]
[198] Unless otherwise specified, accounts of the CCF offensive
of 16 May 51 are based on the following sources: EUSAK
_Cmd Rpt_, May 51, 12–18; 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51; CO
7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2015 17 May 51.
The 1st Marine Division was not directly in the path of the enemy
advance. During the early morning hours of 17 May, however, an enemy
column made a thrust that apparently was intended as an end-run attack
on the left flank of the 2d Infantry Division. Avoiding initially the
Chunchon-Hongchon highway, Chinese in estimated regimental strength
slipped behind the patrol base set up by a KMC company just west of the
MSR (Map 12).
For several days Colonel Nickerson and his executive officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis, had been apprehensive over the
security of this road on which the 7th Marines depended for logistical
support. On the afternoon of the 17th they pulled back Lieutenant
Colonel Bernard T. Kelly’s 3/7 (less Company G) to establish a blocking
position, generally rectangular in shape, at the vital Morae-Kogae pass
on the Chunchon road. This move was not completed until sunset and
George Company did not rejoin the battalion until midnight, so that the
enemy probably had no intelligence of the new position. The main road
ran along a shelf on one shoulder of the pass, but the Chinese avoided
it and came by a trail from the northwest (Map 12).
The surprise was mutual. A platoon of D/Tanks, a Weapons Company
platoon, and an Item Company platoon, defending the northern end of
the perimeter, opened up with everything they had. A desperate fire
fight ensued as the enemy replied with a variety of weapons--mortars,
recoilless rifles, satchel charges, grenades, and machine guns.
[Illustration: MAP 12
SITUATION ON THE NIGHT OF 16–17 MAY 1951]
Two CCF soldiers were killed after disabling a Marine tank by a grenade
explosion in the engine compartment. A satchel charge knocked out
another tank, and the enemy made an unsuccessful attempt to kill a
third by rolling up a drum of gasoline and igniting it.
Captain Victor Stoyanow’s Item Company, at the critical point of the
thinly stretched 3/7 perimeter, was hard-pressed. The enemy made a
slight penetration into one platoon position but was repulsed by a
counterattack that Stoyanow led. Marine infantry and tanks were well
supported by artillery that sealed off the Chinese column from the
rear. The action ended at daybreak with the routed enemy seeking only
escape as Marine artillery and mortars continued to find lucrative
targets. Air did not come on station until about 1030, when it added
to the slaughter. Scattered enemy groups finally found a refuge in the
hills, leaving behind 82 prisoners and 112 counted dead. Captures of
enemy equipment included mortars, recoilless rifles, and Russian 76mm
guns and machine guns. Friendly losses were 7 KIA and 19 WIA.[199]
[199] This account of 3/7’s action is derived from 1stMarDiv,
7thMar, 1stTkBn, and 3/7 _HD_s, May 51; Col B. T. Kelly,
interv of 28 Dec 57.
1st MAW squadrons were kept busy furnishing close air support to the
2d Infantry Division and the two ROK divisions hit by the enemy’s May
offensive. Because of the patrolling in the Marine sector, the OYs
of VMO-6 took over much of the task of controlling air strikes. They
flew cover for the infantry-tank patrols, and in the distant areas
controlled almost as many air strikes as they did artillery missions.
From the 1st to the 23d of May, VMO-6 observers controlled 54 air
strikes involving 189 UN planes--159 Navy and Marine F4Us, F9Fs, and
ADs, and 30 Air Force F-80s, F-84s, and F-51s. About 40 percent of the
aircraft controlled by the OYs were non-Marine planes.[200]
[200] VMO-6 _HD_, May 51.
On the 18th the 1st Marine Division, carrying out X Corps orders, began
a maneuver designed to aid the U.S. 2d Infantry Division on the east
by narrowing its front. The 7th Marines pulled back to NO NAME Line to
relieve the 1st Marines, which side-slipped to the east to take over
an area held by the 9th Infantry. The 5th Marines then swung around
from the Division left flank to the extreme right and relieved another
Army regiment, the 38th Infantry. This permitted the 2d Infantry
Division to face east and repulse attacks from that direction.
By noon on 19 May the enemy’s renewed Fifth Phase Offensive had lost
most of its momentum as CCF supplies dwindled to a trickle along a
tenuous line of communications. That same day, when Colonel Wilburt S.
Brown took over the command of the 1st Marines from Colonel McAlister,
all four Marine regiments were in line--from left to right, the KMCs,
the 7th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 5th Marines. A new NO NAME
Line ran more in a east-west direction than the old one with its
northeast to southwest slant. Thus in the east of the Marine sector
the line was moved back some 4,000 yards while remaining virtually
unchanged in the west.
Enough enemy pressure was still being felt by the 2d Infantry Division
so that General Van Fleet ordered a limited offensive by IX Corps to
divert some of the CCF strength. While the rest of the 1st Marine
Division stood fast, the KMC Regiment advanced with IX Corps elements.
At the other end of the line the Marines had the second of their two
fights during the CCF offensive. Major Morse L. Holliday’s 3/5 became
engaged at 0445 on the 20th with elements of the 44th CCF Division.
Chinese in regimental strength were apparently on the way to occupy the
positions of the Marine battalion, unaware of its presence.
This mistake cost them dearly when 3/5 opened up with every weapon at
its disposal while requesting the support of Marine air, rockets, and
artillery. The slaughter lasted until 0930, when the last of the routed
Chinese escaped into the hills. Fifteen were taken prisoner and 152
dead were counted in front of the Marine positions.[201]
[201] 5thMar _HD_, May 51.
From 20 May onward, it grew more apparent every hour that the second
installment of the CCF Fifth Phase Offensive had failed even more
conclusively than the first. The enemy had only a narrow penetration
on a secondary front to show for ruinous casualties. Worse yet, from
the Chinese viewpoint, the UN forces were in a position to retaliate
before the attackers recovered their tactical balance. The Eighth Army
had come through with relatively light losses, and it was now about to
seize the initiative.