Operation Ripper
_Light Resistance the First Day--Seoul Abandoned by Enemy--Second Phase
of the Operation--Changes in 1st MAW Units--General MacArthur Visits
Marine Battalion--1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division--38th Parallel
Recrossed by Marines--Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems_
The new IX corps commander, Major General William H. Hoge, USA, arrived
at Yoju on 4 March 1951. He relieved General Smith the next day and a
color guard turned out to render honors to the Marine commander when he
returned by helicopter to his own Division CP. Upon Smith’s arrival,
General Puller resumed his former duties as ADC.
The jumpoff of the new operation was scheduled for 0800 on 7 March,
so little time remained for last-minute preparations. The basic plan
called for the drive of IX and X Corps toward the 38th Parallel on the
central front. Protection was to be given on the left flank by I Corps
in the area south and east of Seoul. On the right the ROK divisions had
the mission of maintaining lateral security with a limited northward
advance.
It was no secret that General Ridgway had been disappointed in the
numbers of enemy soldiers put out of action during Operation KILLER.
The primary purpose of RIPPER was to inflict as many Communist
casualties as possible, and by means of constant pressure to keep the
enemy off balance in his buildup for a new offensive. A secondary
purpose was to outflank Seoul and the area between that city and the
river Imjin, thus compelling the enemy to choose between default and a
defense on unfavorable terms.[118]
[118] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51.
CCF strategy in the early spring of 1951 was obviously conditioned
by preparations for a third great offensive. The enemy’s emphasis on
caution is shown in a translation of a CCF training directive of this
period:
There must absolutely be no hasty or impatient attitude
toward warfare. Consequently, even though we have a thorough
knowledge of the enemy situation and the terrain, if one day is
disadvantageous for us to engage in combat, it should be done the
next day; if day fighting is disadvantageous, fighting should
be conducted at night, and if engagements in a certain terrain
are not to our advantage, another location should be selected
for combat engagement. When the enemy is concentrated and a weak
point is difficult to find, one must be created (by agitating
or confusing them in some way), or wait until the enemy is
deploying. Engagements must be conducted only when the situation
is entirely to our advantage.[119]
[119] IX Corps _PIR_ #169; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 21.
_Light Resistance the First Day_
United Nations forces held a line extending across the peninsula from
Inchon (Map 8) in the west by way of Hoengsong to the east coast in the
vicinity of Chumunjin. The IX Corps order called for the 1st Marine
Division to maintain lateral contact with the 1st Cavalry Division
on the left and the 2d Infantry Division on the right. Hongchon and
Chunchon, two of the main objectives of Operation RIPPER, lay directly
in the path of the IX Corps advance. Both were important communications
centers which could be utilized to advantage by the enemy for his
forthcoming offensive.
The first phase line in the IX Corps zone was ALBANY. The Marines
did not need a map to locate an objective just beyond Oum Mountain,
a stark 2,900-foot peak about five and a half miles from the line
of departure. Distance in this area was conditioned by terrain, and
it was a natural fortress of wooded hills and swift streams that
confronted the 1st Marine Division. Highways were conspicuous by their
absence, and extensive maintenance would be required to utilize the
Hoengsong-Hongchon road as a MSR. So few and poor were the secondary
roads that it would sometimes prove necessary for vehicles to detour
along the rocky stream beds.[120]
[120] This section, except when otherwise stated, is derived
from the IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_ and the 1stMarDiv _WD_ for
Mar 51.
The last offensive had not developed major or prolonged resistance
at any point. Yet that possibility had to be anticipated by Marine
planners. At least the enemy was an old acquaintance--the 66th CCF
Army,[121] commanded by General Show Shiu Kwai. The 196th Division was
on the left and the 197th on the right, with the 198th in reserve.
These units were believed to comprise about 24,000 men.
[121] A CCF Army, composed of three or four infantry divisions
supported by artillery, is comparable to a U.S. corps.
Wednesday, 7 March, dawned cold and clear, with snow falling in the
afternoon. The Hoengsong-Hongchon road, winding through Kunsamma Pass,
paralleled the boundary between the two Marine assault regiments, the
7th Marines on the left and the 1st Marines on the right. They jumped
off to attack in line abreast, employing all three battalions when
the broken terrain permitted, while the 5th Marines continued its
patrolling activities in the Hoengsong area as Division reserve.
The 11th Marines had to ration its artillery ammunition, owing to
supply shortages. JOC came to the rescue nobly by ordering MAG-33 to
place 11 flights of four planes each at the disposal of DEVASTATE BAKER
on D-minus-one. These aircraft reported at hourly intervals to work
over targets in the area of the next day’s Marine operations. For the
ground forces, it was an embarrassment of riches. They had more air
support than they could use at times, and DEVASTATE BAKER sent the
surplus to hit reserve concentrations and other targets of opportunity
in the enemy’s rear.[122]
[122] Compilation from 1st MAW Sqdns’ _HD_s, 7 and 8 Mar 51.
The two Marine assault regiments met with light resistance on D-Day.
Both took their objectives with little trouble except for scattered
bursts of machine gun fire. Total casualties for the day were seven men
wounded.
It was like old times to have Marine planes supporting Marine ground
forces. MAG-12 aircraft were on the job the next day, when CCF
resistance stiffened without ever becoming serious. Heavy CCF mortar
and small-arms fire was received by 3/1, supported by Company A of the
1st Tank Battalion. Well placed rounds by the 11th Marines silenced the
enemy in this quarter, and both battalions of the 1st Marines reached
their assigned positions by nightfall.
[Illustration: MAP 8
EUSAK plan for Operation Ripper]
The second day’s advances gave added proof that the enemy was up to his
old trick of putting up a limited defense while pulling back before
the Marines could come to grips. Log bunkers were ideal for these CCF
delaying tactics; each was a little fortress that might enable a squad
to stand off a company while larger CCF units withdrew.
The Marine assault troops found that a preliminary treatment of napalm
from MAG-12 aircraft, followed by well-aimed 90mm fire from the tanks,
did much to soften up the bunkers for an infantry attack with hand
grenades.
Company A of the 7th Marines had the hardest fight of all Marine units
on 8 March. Second Lieutenant Clayton O. Bush and the 2d Platoon led
the attack on the company objective, a hill mass to the left of Oum
San. With 300 yards still to be covered, the Marines were pinned
down by well aimed CCF small-arms and mortar fire, including white
phosphorus. A high explosive shell scored a direct hit on the platoon,
killing two men and wounding three. Bush was evacuated, with his right
arm mangled. First Lieutenant Eugenous Hovatter, the company commander,
ordered the 1st Platoon to pass through the 2d and continue the attack
with air and tank support. The flat-trajectory fire of the 90mm rifles
did much to help the company clear the enemy from the hill and the 7th
Marines reached all assigned regimental objectives for the day.[123]
[123] 7thMar _HD_, Mar 51; VMF-323 _HD_, Mar 51; Capt Clayton
O. Bush, ltr of 11 Aug 57.
The Marine advance came to a halt on 9 March to wait for Army units to
catch up on the right. While the 2d Battalion of the 1st Marines took
blocking positions, the 1st and 7th Marines sent out patrols on both
flanks in an effort to regain lateral contact. For the next two days,
1st Marine Division operations were limited to patrolling. A good deal
of activity took place in the rear, however, as Marine service units
moved up to Hoengsong.
_Seoul Abandoned by Enemy_
The advance was resumed on 11 March after the relief of 2/1 by Major
Walter Gall’s Division Reconnaissance Company, reinforced by a platoon
of tanks. Although the enemy withdrew from most of his positions
without putting up much resistance, a patrol of George Company, 3/1,
had a hot fire fight on Hill 549. Opening fire at 50 yards from
camouflaged, log-faced bunkers, the Chinese killed one man and wounded
nine. Marine infantrymen, supported by flat-trajectory 90mm fire,
approached within grenade-throwing range to destroy five bunkers and
kill 16 of the defenders. As the patrol withdrew, it called on the 11th
Marines to finish the job. The cannoneers were credited with several
direct hits.[124]
[124] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 8.
Chinese resistance continued to be light as the two Marine regiments
occupied rather than seized ground on 12 and 13 March. By the 14th all
units were dug in along Phase Line ALBANY.
CCF withdrawals were also reported by other Eighth Army units. On
15 March a patrol from the 1st ROK Division of I Corps found Seoul
abandoned by the enemy. The Chinese Reds had made their choice and UN
forces took over a devastated city with some 200,000 civilians dragging
out a miserable existence in the ruins. Dead power lines dangled over
buildings pounded into rubble, and even such a famous landmark as the
enormous red, brass-studded gates of the American Embassy Compound had
been destroyed.
It was the fourth time that Seoul had changed hands in 9 months of war.
Air reconnaissance having established that the enemy had withdrawn
about 15 miles to entrenched positions in the Uijongbu area, General
Ridgway enlarged the mission of I Corps by directing it to advance on
the left of IX Corps.[125]
[125] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 68–70.
During the first phase of Operation RIPPER, from 7 to 13 March, counted
casualties inflicted on the enemy by X Corps amounted to 6,543 KIA and
216 POW. IX Corps casualties during the same period were reported as
158 KIA, 965 WIA, and 35 MIA--a total of 1,158.[126]
[126] IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 35–37.
The total strength of the Eighth Army (less the Marines) was 185,229
officers and men in March 1951. Adding the 25,642 of the 1st Marine
Division, the 4,645 of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, plus 11,353 of
the American Air Force and 355 attached from the U.S. Navy, 227,119
Americans were serving in Korea. This does not count 13,475 South
Koreans serving in various U.S. Army divisions.[127]
[127] _Ibid._
The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with an authorized total of 728 officers
and 4,216 enlisted men, had an actual strength of 626 and 4,019
respectively on 31 March 1951. Of an authorized 29 officers and 93
enlisted men from the Navy, 22 and 83 in these categories were on
duty.[128]
[128] FMF Status Sheet, 31 Mar 51.
Troops to the number of 21,184 from the ground forces of other United
Nations were represented as follows:
United Kingdom and Australia 10,136
Turkey 4,383
Philippines 1,277
Thailand 1,050
Canada 858
New Zealand 816
Greece 777
France 749
Belgium-Luxembourg 638
Netherlands 500
----------
[129]21,184
[129] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, Plate 17. Figures do not include
personnel in hospitals or clearing stations. UK and
Australian statistics are not separated in available
records.
The 249,815 officers and men of the ROK Army make a total UN combat
strength of 493,503. There were an additional 671 in three noncombat
units: the Danish hospital ship _Jutlandia_, 186; the 60th Indian
Ambulance Group, 329; and the Swedish Evacuation Hospital Unit,
156.[130]
[130] _Ibid._
Chinese forces in Korea, including confirmed and probable, totaled 16
armies, each comparable to a U.S. corps. Eight others were reported.
Assuming that these CCF units averaged a field strength of 24,000
officers and men, the total would have been 384,000 for the 16 armies.
The reorganized forces of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) were
credited with five armies. Adding these 120,000 men to the 16 Chinese
armies, the enemy had 504,000 troops in Korea plus whatever might
have been the strength of the eight reported armies and the rear area
service elements. In addition, large reserves stood just over the
border in Manchuria.[131]
[131] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 95.
_Second Phase of the Operation_
With scarcely a pause on Phase Line ALBANY, the second phase of
Operation RIPPER began on 14 March with a drive toward Phase Line
BUFFALO (Map 8). Despite the difficulty of maneuver over muddy roads in
mountainous terrain, an Eighth Army directive of that date called for
a pincers movement to be initiated by means of a rapid advance of the
1st Marine Division on the right and the 1st Cavalry Division on the
left. It was hoped that the Chinese forces south of Hongchon might be
trapped and destroyed after the 187th Airborne Regiment cut off escape
by landing north of the town. General Ridgway having urged his corps
commanders to stress maneuver, IX Corps sent this message to division
commanders:
It is desired that more use be made of maneuver within and
between division zones with a view toward trapping and
annihilating the enemy through such maneuver. Movements should be
less stereotyped; it is not desirable that units always advance
toward the enemy abreast. Well planned and successfully executed
maneuver using companies and battalions has previously been
conducted; this should be extended to include regiments. This
Headquarters is studying and will continue to study and order
into execution the maneuver of divisions with the same intent and
purpose.[132]
[132] IX Corps msg IXACT-1053 (122100) in 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51.
Both the 1st Marine Division and 1st Cavalry Division made rapid
progress toward Phase Line BAKER (Map 9), established by IX Corps as an
intermediate control. Unfortunately for the purposes of the envelopment
maneuver, the Chinese withdrew from the Hongchon area before the
pincers could close or the 187th Airborne make an air drop. CCF
resistance was confined to machine gun fire covering hasty retirements.
The 7th Marines on the left occupied its objective without once calling
for air or artillery support, and the 1st Marines was virtually
unopposed. Division casualties for the 14th were six men wounded.
Flash floods and roads churned into hub-deep mud were the greatest
enemies of progress. Serious as the resulting supply problems were,
they might have been worse but for the efforts of the recently
organized Civil Transport Corps formed from members of the ROK National
Guard who lacked the necessary training for military duties. There was
no shortage of willing indigenous labor, for these auxiliaries received
pay as well as rations and clothing. Formed into companies, they worked
with the wooden “A-frames”--so-called because of their shape--used from
time immemorial in Korea as a rack for carrying heavy burdens.
[Illustration:
USA Photo SC 356353
_Flight From The Foe--A Korean carries his aged father across the
icy Han River in the flight southward to escape the advancing
Communist troops in their drive of January, 1951._
]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158073]
_At the Critical Moment--Above, a Marine tank blasts an enemy
emplacement while a rifleman stands by for the final assault;
below, Marine riflemen hug the ground as they advance under fire
during Operation RIPPER in March, 1951._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 6862]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 8064 USMC Photo A 161016]
_Attack--Above, Marine machine gunner climbs a ridge while a
flamethrower operator burns straw to deny cover to the enemy;
below, a young rifleman hurriedly reloads after emptying a clip
at Chinese Communist soldiers._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159023]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 155354]
_Supporting The Fighting Man--Above, a group of surgeons are at
work in a minor surgery ward; below, a cargador train carries
ammunition and rations to the front-line companies._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 9857]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 8756]
_Moving Out--Above, a Marine rifle company, C/1/1, moves to a
rest area after almost two months of fighting; below, camouflaged
Korean Marines on patrol pause to check the route._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 161982]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 9458 USMC Photo A 9457]
“_Calling_ DEVASTATE BAKER!”--_Above, forward air controllers
with attacking companies use the call sign of supporting air;
below, a dependable Corsair responds to the infantry’s call._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 133540]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 346714]
“_Launch and Attack”--Above, a Panther jet takes off on a close
air support mission; below, the attack is pressed at close range
on a stubborn enemy by a Tigercat (left) and a Corsair (right)._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 130948 USMC Photo A 7283]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158968]
_Supporting The Troops--Above, a tank commander emerges from his
steel shell in order to scan the hills for targets; below, a
rocket battery harasses the enemy near Chunchon in May, 1951._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 155643]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159109]
_Power-Packed Punch--Above, a Marine tank topples Korean trees
while moving into position to support an attack by fire; below, a
rocket battery firing a ripple at night._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 169791]
[Illustration: USMC A 3597]
_Prisoners of War--Above, Marines guarding captured prisoners
awaiting interrogation; and below, after hearing the familiar
order to “saddle up” a Marine awaits the word to move out._
[Illustration: USMC A 159197]
[Illustration: USMC A 9769]
_Random Scenes--Above, the result of what happens when a jeep
runs over an anti-tank mine; and below, a Marine fire direction
control center in operation._
[Illustration: USMC A 155903]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159962]
_Aerial Workhorse--Above, after refueling at a mountainside
fuel dump, a Marine helicopter loads men for evacuation; below,
pre-fab bunkers are unloaded on a Korean hillside._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 168493]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159962]
_Have Chopper, Will Travel--Above, Marine helicopter
demonstrating rescue technique; and below, staff officers board
helicopters in preparation for front line inspection trip._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 168493]
[Illustration: USMC Photo 160193 USMC Photo A 158811]
_Fighting Faces--Above, left, PFC H. W. Hodges pauses to drink
from a “refrigerated” spring; above, right, PFC J. W. Harnsberger
relaxes on the MLR; below, Sgt E. L. Whitlow and Capt W. F.
Whitbeck scan the front for signs of enemy action._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 167904]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 131819]
_Family Reunion--Above, Col W. S. Brown, CO 1st Marines, visits
his son, a Marine corporal; below, left, Capt G. H. Parker
directs an air strike from a tree top observation post; below,
right, PFC K. L. Spriggs receives his Purple Heart._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 132390 USMC Photo A 158743]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158079]
_Necklace of Boots--Above, a South Korean cargador carries a
necklace of boots to a front line company; below, new thermal
boots are issued to combat troops._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 157927]
[Illustration: MAP 9
1st Mar Div Zone of Action
Operation Ripper]
The Civil Transport Corps proved to be a boon for the Eighth Army.
Veteran porters could manage a load of 100 to 125 pounds over ground
too rugged for motor vehicles. Several hundred were attached to each
regiment during Operation RIPPER.
Any lingering hope of rounding up Chinese prisoners in the Hongchon
area was blasted on the 15th when evidence of Chinese withdrawal came
in the form of an enemy radio message intercepted at 1230. “We cannot
fight any longer,” the translation read. “We must move back today. We
will move back at 1400. Enemy troops will enter our positions at 1300
or 1400. Enemy troops approaching fast.”[133]
[133] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv; CO 1stMar, 1300 15 Mar 51.
Hongchon fell without a fight to the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines
on the afternoon of 15 March. Major Webb D. Sawyer, the commanding
officer, sent a motor patrol through the ruins without flushing out any
Chinese, but on the return trip a truck was damaged by a “butterfly
bomb.” This led to the discovery that the Hongchon area was covered
with similar explosives that had been dropped by U.S. planes to slow up
the CCF counterattacks in the middle of February.
Butterfly bombs, so-called because of the whirling vanes that
controlled the drop and armed the 4-pound projectiles, could be set for
air or ground bursts. Usually, however, they were dropped in clusters
to remain on the ground until disturbed. Apparently the enemy had not
troubled to clear them from the Hongchon area, and that three-day task
was begun by Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion while 1/7 seized
the high ground northwest of the town.[134]
[134] LtCol W. D. Sawyer, interv of 30 Aug 57; Field Manual
9-1980, AF 136–137. This was not the first nor the last
time that M-83 fragmentation (butterfly) bombs became a
deadly nuisance to friendly forces.
_Changes in 1st MAW Units_
Air support for the ground forces continued to be more than adequate in
quantity. Since the agreement between Generals Partridge and Harris, 40
1st MAW sorties a day had been allotted to the 1st Marine Division. The
timing was not all that could have been asked on occasion, but on the
whole the Marine infantry had no complaint.
The 1st MAW had undergone an extensive reshuffling of units on the eve
of Operation RIPPER. VMF(N)-542 was sent back to El Toro, California,
for conversion to F3D jet all weather fighters. The squadron’s F7F-3N’s
and two F-82’s were left with VMF(N)-513. The former commanding officer
of 542, Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson, assumed command of 513.
He relieved Lieutenant Colonel David C. Wolfe, who returned to the
States.
The California-bound cadre of 542 included 45 officers and 145 enlisted
men under Major Albert L. Clark. VMF(N)-513 was now a composite
squadron, attacking from K-1 during the day with its F4U-5N’s and at
night with its F7F-3N’s.
Another change took place when VMF-312 replaced VMF-212 on the CVE
_Bataan_. The former squadron had been preparing for weeks to perform
carrier duty, so that the change was made without a hitch. VMF-212,
after nearly 3 months on the _Bataan_, established itself at K-3 under
a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Claude H. Welch, who
relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wyczawski.
The transportation jam in Korea made necessary the permanent assignment
of a VMR-152 detachment to 1st MAW Headquarters. Transports had
heretofore been sent to the Wing on a temporary basis and returned to
Hawaii when missions were completed.
Mud and inadequate rail facilities doubled the demands on FEAF’S
aerial supply of combat forces. The Wing’s courier service to Marine
air and ground forces scattered over Korea reached the limit of its
capabilities. As a solution General Harris requested a five-plane
VMR-152 detachment on a long-term assignment, and Colonel Deane C.
Roberts took command of this forward echelon at Itami.
It was now possible to handle cargo and troop transport at the cargo
and passenger terminals of all Marine air bases. In one 4-day period,
early in April, approximately 2,000 replacement troops were lifted from
Masan to Hoengsong by the five R5Ds. About a thousand rotated veterans
were flown back on the return trips.[135]
[135] Unless otherwise specified, references to changes in 1st
MAW units are derived from the historical diaries of the
units concerned for February, March, and April 1951.
A further change involved the coordination of the Wing’s air control
organizations. As the enemy’s air power increased, obviously the
problems of UN air defense multiplied. At K-1 the Marine Ground
Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1) and the Air Defense Section of Marine
Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2) were hard pressed to identify
and control the hundreds of aircraft flying daily over Korea.
There was no adequate system of alerting these air defense stations to
the effect that planes were departing or incoming. Many of them failed
to send out their standard identification friend or foe (IFF) signals;
and those that did so were still suspect, since U.S. electronics
equipment on UN planes had fallen into enemy hands. As a consequence
MGCIS-1 was kept busy vectoring air defense fighters to verify that
certain bogeys were friendly transports, B-29s, or enemy bombers.[136]
[136] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1038, 1039. A “bogey” is
an unidentified plane.
In an effort to cope with the situation, General Harris requested that
another Marine ground control intercept squadron, MGCIS-3 be sent to
Korea. He desired that Marine Air Control Group-2 (MACG-2) also be made
available to coordinate the Wing’s air control functions. These units
sailed on 5 March from San Francisco.
Until March 1951 the Air Force’s 606th Aircraft Control and Warning
Squadron had participated in the air surveillance of the Pusan area
from the top of 3,000-foot Chon-San--the encroaching mountain that made
K-9’s traffic pattern so hazardous. This Air Force unit displaced to
Taejon early in March, and the MGCIS-1 commanding officer, Major H. E.
Allen, moved his radio and radar vans to the mountain top to take over
the job.[137]
[137] LtCol H. E. Allen, interv of 26 Feb 59.
_General MacArthur Visits Marine Battalion_
Following the occupation of Hongchon on the 15th, the Marine ground
forces ran into stiffening enemy opposition during the next two days.
The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines were pinned down by intense
CCF mortar and artillery fire when attacking Hill 356 (Map 9). Three
out of six friendly 81mm mortars were knocked out on 15 March in the 3d
Battalion area, and at dusk 2/7 and 3/7 had barely won a foothold on
the hill.[138]
[138] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2130 15 Mar 51.
The 1st Marines also met opposition which indicated that the enemy
planned to make a stand on the high ground east and north of Hongchon.
An intricate maneuver was executed when Lieutenant Colonel Robert
K. McClelland’s 2/1 swung from the right flank, where no enemy was
encountered, to the extreme left. As a preliminary, the battalion
had to circle to the rear, then move by truck up the MSR and through
the zone of the 7th Marines as far as the village of Yangjimal (Map
9). Dismounting, the men made a difficult march across broken country
toward Hill 246. At 1230 on the 15th the column deployed to attack
Hill 428 in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3d
Battalion.
Easy Company (Captain Jack A. Smith) and Item Company (First Lieutenant
Joseph R. Fisher) engaged in a hot fire fight with the enemy. Both
sides relied chiefly on mortars, but the Chinese had the advantage of
firing from camouflaged bunkers. Smith called for an air strike and
four planes from VMF-214 responded immediately. Fox Company (Captain
Goodwin C. Groff) and Dog Company (Captain Welby D. Cronk) were
committed in the attempt to carry Hill 428, but the enemy continued to
resist stubbornly until dusk. McClelland then ordered a withdrawal to
night defensive positions around Hill 246. The two assault battalions
had suffered 7 KIA and 86 WIA casualties. Counted enemy dead were
reported as 93.[139]
[139] 2/1 _HD_ 16 Dec 50 to 30 Apr 51, 21–22; VMF-214 _HD_ Mar
51, 25–26.
Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Kennedy’s 3/5 was attached to the 1st
Marines to protect the right flank as the Marines prepared to resume
the attack on the morning of the 16th. But the enemy had pulled out
from Hill 428 during the night and patrols advanced more than 300 yards
without making contact.
Another hard action awaited the 7th Marines on the 16th, when Major
Sawyer’s 1st Battalion moved up to Line BAKER (Map 9). The Chinese
resisted so hard on Hill 399 that the Marines had to attack bunker
after bunker with grenades.
The following morning was the occasion of a visit to the front by
General MacArthur. Accompanied by Generals Ridgway and O. P. Smith, he
drove in a jeep from Wonju over the mountain pass to Hongchon, where
Marine engineers were still clearing mines. The jeep stalled after
crossing the Hongchon-gang at a ford and a tow was necessary. This
did not deter the commander in chief, who had asked to visit a Marine
battalion in a combat area. He was taken to the CP of Major Sawyer,
whose 1/7 was mopping up on Hill 399 after the hard fight of the day
before.
Five hours of riding over miserable roads had not daunted the
71-year-old veteran of two World Wars. He seemed fresh and rested as he
shook hands with 1/7 officers. “Although we had not passed the word
regarding General MacArthur’s visit,” commented General Smith, “there
were dozens of cameras in evidence.”[140]
[140] Smith, _Chronicle_, 17 Mar 51.
IX Corps orders were received on the 17th for the 1st Marine Division
to attack from Line BAKER to Line BUFFALO (Map 9). The Division plan of
maneuver called for the 5th Marines to pass through and relieve the 7th
Marines while the 1st Marines continued to advance on the right.
Again the enemy chose withdrawal to resistance, and five of the six
Marine battalions reached Line BUFFALO on 20 March after encountering
only sniper fire and a few scattered mortar rounds. Enemy opposition
was reserved for 2/1 on the 19th, when Fox Company was pinned down by
enemy small-arms and mortar fire from a long, narrow ridge running
north and south to the west of Hill 330.
Fortunately for the attackers, a parallel valley enabled a platoon of
tanks from Baker Company, 1st Tank Battalion, to knock out unusually
strong CCF bunkers with direct 90mm fire while Fox Company riflemen
followed along the ridgeline with a grenade attack before the enemy had
time to recover. Thanks to intelligent planning, not a single Marine
was killed or wounded as the battalion dug in for the night on Hill 330.
Adopting the same tactics on the 20th, after artillery preparation
and an air strike by VMF-214 and VMF-323 planes, Easy Company of
2/1 advanced along the ridgeline connecting Hills 330 and 381 while
tanks moved forward on either side providing direct flat-trajectory
90mm fire. By 1315 the Marines had overrun the enemy’s main line of
resistance without a casualty.[141]
[141] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 10; VMF-214 and VMF-323 _HD_, Mar
51.
_1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division_
As the Eighth Army jumped off on 20 March from Line BUFFALO toward
Line CAIRO (Map 9), the 1st KMC Regiment was attached again to the
1st Marine Division. This was the third time that Lieutenant Colonel
Charles W. Harrison had been directed to reorganize and reassemble
a KMC liaison advisory group. The 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William McReynolds, was placed in
direct artillery support. When the advance was resumed, the KMCs
attacked between the 1st Marines on the right and the 5th Marines on
the left.[142]
[142] Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, Mar-Apr 51, 2–3.
The high _esprit de corps_ of the KMCs shines forth from a comment
written in his own English by First Lieutenant Kim Sik Tong: “The KMC
ideal is to complete the mission, regardless of receiving strong enemy
resistance, with endurance and strong united power, and always bearing
in one’s mind the distinction between honor and dishonor.”[143]
[143] 1stKMCRegt _POR_, 24 Mar 51.
The zone of the KMC Regiment was a roadless wilderness, making it
necessary to air-drop ammunition and supplies for the attack on Hill
975. This was the hardest fight of the Division advance to Line CAIRO.
Excellent artillery support was provided for the 2d and 3d Battalions
as they inched their way forward in three days of bitter combat. Not
until the morning of 24 March was the issue decided by maneuver when
the 1st Battalion moved around the left KMC flank into a position
threatening the enemy’s right. Resistance slackened immediately on Hill
975 and the KMCs took their objective without further trouble.
The 1st and 5th Marines were already on Line CAIRO, having met
comparatively light opposition from NKPA troops who had relieved the
66th and 39th CCF Armies. Apparently the enemy was using North Koreans
as expendable delaying elements while massing in the rear for an
offensive that could be expected at any time. A smoke screen, produced
by burning green wood, shrouded the front in an almost constant haze.
Although the objectives of Operation RIPPER had been reached, General
Ridgway planned to continue the UN offensive for the purpose of keeping
the enemy off balance during his offensive preparations. The Eighth
Army had been attacking with few and brief pauses for regrouping even
since 21 February, and the commanding general wished to maintain its
momentum.
An advance of the 1st Marine Division to a new Line CAIRO was ordered
by IX Corps on 26 March. This was simply a northeast extension of the
old line to the boundary between IX and X Corps (Map 9). There was
no need for the 5th Marines to advance, and the 1st Marines and KMC
Regiment moved up to the new line on schedule without opposition.
Eighth Army units had made average gains of about 35 miles during the
last three weeks while driving nearly to the 38th Parallel. On 29
March, General Ridgway published a plan for Operation RUGGED. It was
to be a continuation of the offensive, with Line KANSAS (Map 8) as the
new objective. While other 1st Marine units were being relieved by X
Corps elements, the 7th Marines was to be moved up from reserve near
Hongchon and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division for the attack beyond
Chunchon, evacuated by the retreating enemy.[144]
[144] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 18–19.
On 1 April the Marines were informed of sweeping changes in IX Corps
plans. Instead of being relieved, the 1st Marine Division was to
continue forward with two infantry regiments plus the KMCs. Its new
mission called for a relief of the 1st Cavalry Division (with the 7th
Marines attached) north of Chunchon. This modification gave General
Smith the responsibility for nearly 20 miles of front.[145]
[145] Smith, _Chronicle_, 1 Apr 51.
“I visited this front frequently,” commented Major General A. L.
Bowser, the G-3 of that period, “and it was difficult at times to even
locate an infantry battalion.... Visitors from the States or FMFPac
were shocked at the wide frontages.”[146]
[146] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58.
_38th Parallel Recrossed by Marines_
Further IX Corps instructions on 2 April directed that the 1st Marines
go into Division reserve near Hongchon while the 5th Marines and 1st
KMC Regiment attacked. The deep, swift Soyang-gang, fordable in only a
few places, lay squarely in the path of the 5th Marines. Speculations
as to the method of crossing became rife just as air mattresses were
issued. And though the officers denied any such intent, the troops were
convinced that inflated mattresses would be used.
As it happened, the regimental executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel
Stewart, worked out a plan that did not include any such novelty. A
narrow ford was discovered that would get the 1st and 2d Battalions
across while the 3d rode in DUKWs. Light enemy opposition of a rear
guard nature was encountered but the regiment completed the operation
without casualties. Stewart reported to the regimental CP and learned
that a jeep waited to take him on the initial lap of his homeward
journey. He was the last man to leave Korea of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade, which had landed at Pusan on 2 August 1950.[147]
[147] Col J. L. Stewart, ltr of 25 Oct 57.
After reaching their prescribed objectives, the 5th Marines and KMC
Regiment were relieved on 5 April by elements of the 7th Infantry
Division of X Corps. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines, attached to the 1st
Cavalry Division, advanced northward with the 7th and 8th Cavalry
Regiments. Little opposition developed and on 4 April the Marines were
among the first Eighth Army troops to recross the 38th Parallel.
General Ridgway published another operation plan on 6 April 1951 and
designated new Eighth Army objectives to the northward. The purpose
was to threaten the buildup for the forthcoming CCF offensive that was
taking place behind the enemy lines in the so-called “Iron Triangle.”
This strategic area, one of the few pieces of comparatively level real
estate in central Korea, was bounded by Kumhwa, Chorwon, and Pyongyang
(Map 14). A broad valley containing a network of good roads, it had
been utilized by the Chinese for the massing of supplies and troops.
Experience had proved that interdictory bombing could not prevent
the enemy from nourishing an offensive, even though the FEAF had
complete control of the air over roads and rail lines of a mountainous
peninsula. The Chinese, though hampered in their efforts, had been
able to bring up large quantities of supplies under cover of darkness.
General Ridgway determined, therefore, to launch his ground forces at
objectives threatening the Iron Triangle, thus forcing the enemy to
fight.
On 8 April, in preparation for the new effort, the 1st Marine Division
was directed by IX Corps to relieve the 1st Cavalry Division on Line
KANSAS and prepare to attack toward Line QUANTICO (Map 8).
_Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems_
By this time, after three months of various sorts of operational
difficulties, VMF-311 was riding a wave of efficiency. The distance
from the operating base to the combat area emphasized the superior
speed of the F9Fs. The Panther jets could get into action in half the
time required by the Corsairs. The jets were more stable in rocket,
bombing, and strafing runs. They were faster on armed reconnaissance
and often were pouring it into the enemy before he could disperse.
These advantages offset the high fuel consumption of the F9Fs and made
them ideal planes for close air support.
On the morning of 8 April an opportunity arose for the Marine jets to
help the 7th Marines. It started when 3/7 patrols encountered 120mm
mortars, small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades employed by an
enemy force dug in on a ridge looming over the road near the west end
of the Hwachon reservoir. The battalion forward air controller radioed
DEVASTATE BAKER at Hongchon for air support.[148]
[148] The following description is from: 7th Mar HD, 8 Apr 51,
5; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, Bk III, Vol 2, PORs #574
and 575 of 8 Apr; Shepherd Memo, 27 Apr 51, encl (7)
“Excerpt from Maj Hewitt rept;” 1stMAW _HD_, Apr 51, App
VII, “Staff Journal G-3 Section,” 9 Apr.
At the time Major Roy R. Hewitt, an air officer on General Shepherd’s
FMFPac staff, was visiting the Air Support Section of Marine Tactical
Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2). His blow-by-blow report of events is
as follows:
a. At 0900 a request for an air support strike on an enemy mortar
position was received from the 7th Marines. It took the Air
Support Section until 0945 to get through to JOC and then it had
to be shunted through K-1 in order to get the request in.
b. The G-3 1st Marine Air Wing had arranged with JOC to have four
(4) F9F ‘scramble alert’ for use by the 1st Marine Division.
The F9Fs were requested, and JOC authorized their use, but when
Marine Aircraft Group-33 was contacted they informed the Air
Support Section that JOC had already scrambled the aircraft and
sent them to another target.
c. Air Support Section again contacted JOC, and JOC said aircraft
would be on station in one (1) hour. At the end of one (1) hour
JOC was again contacted concerning aircraft. This time JOC said
they would have two (2) flights on station within one (1) hour.
At the end of the second one (1) hour period no aircraft were
received.
d. Again the Air Support Section contacted JOC and was informed
that any air support for the 7th Marines would have to be
requested through the 1st Cavalry Division to which the 7th
Marines were attached. [In fact, JOC notified DEVASTATE BAKER
that any such requests from the 1st Marine Division would not be
honored until the Division went back into action.][149]
[149] 1st MAW G-3 Staff Journal, 9 Apr, _op. cit._
During all this time ten Marine planes--six from VMF-311 and four from
VMF-214--had reported in and out of the area. They had been sent by
MELLOW to work under the control of Mosquito STRATEGY, the tactical air
controller (airborne) (TACA) of the 1st Cavalry Division. The flights
also supported the 6th ROK Division patrols on the Marines’ left, hit
troops in a small settlement 3 miles to the Marines’ front, and aided
the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments which were encountering resistance on
the commanding ground to the right. None of the flights supported the
Marines.
Meanwhile, the 3/7 Marines employed artillery and tanks on the enemy
positions, and late in the day a Mosquito brought in a flight of four
Air Force F-80s. Major Hewitt’s report continued:
e. At the end of six (6) hours air support was finally received
by the 7th Marines. It was brought in by a Mosquito who would not
relinquish control of the aircraft to the Forward Air Controller
who could see the target much better than the Mosquito.
f. After having the fighters make a couple of passes the Mosquito
took the fighters and went to another target without having
completely destroyed the position.
This was the beginning of a deterioration in air support for Marine
ground forces that can be charged in large measure to the JOC system
of control. Major Hewitt’s report was read with great interest by
high-ranking Navy and Marine Corps officers. By now they were devoting
a lot of thought to the breakup of the Marine air-ground team.