Operation Killer
_The Move to the Chungju Area--Marine Planes in Action--Planning for
the New Operation--The Jump-Off on 21 February--Stiffening of Chinese
Resistance--General Smith in Command of IX Corps--The Advance to Phase
Line_ ARIZONA_--JOC Air Control System Criticized_
The CCF counterattack which began northeast of Wonju on 11 February
1951 came in reaction to the unremitting pressure exerted during
the previous month by the Eighth Army. Twice beaten during a recent
six-week period and pushed back some 200 miles, EUSAK had shown amazing
powers of recuperation.
“It is hard for me to put into words the magnificent competence, the
fierce, combative, aggressive spirit of that force once it picked
itself off the ground and waded back into the fight,” commented General
Ridgway in retrospect.[79]
[79] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 216.
During Operations THUNDERBOLT and ROUNDUP he had kept a tight rein on
the Eighth Army by insisting on vigorous artillery preparations and
close lateral contacts between units. On 10 February, however, caution
was relaxed as CCF resistance suddenly collapsed west and south of
Seoul, That day the U.S. 24th Infantry Division forged ahead 11,000
yards to occupy the port of Inchon and Kimpo Airfield, both so wrecked
that weeks of repair would be necessary to make them operational. Seoul
was within sight of the U.S. forces on the left bank of the Han when an
aroused enemy struck back on the subzero night of the 11th.
Apparently the CCF drive on the central front had as its objective the
relieving of UN pressure on the Seoul area to the west. The CCF 40th
and 66th Armies and NKPA V Corps struck in the IX Corps sector north
of Hoengsong (Map 6). Two ROK divisions being dislodged by the initial
blows, their retreat made necessary the withdrawal of other IX Corps
units. As a consequence, Hoengsong had to be abandoned on 12 February
to the Communists hammering out a salient northeast of Wonju.[80]
[80] IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51; 1stMarDiv HD, Feb 51; Smith,
_Notes_, 1462–1465.
The UN forces were not bound by any unrealistic concept of holding
ground to the last ditch. General Ridgway deemed it more important
to inflict maximum punishment on the enemy at a minimum cost in
casualties. While fighting on the defensive, he had already made up
his mind to launch an offensive of his own to catch the Chinese off
balance the moment their counterattack ground to a halt. His new
limited objective operation emphasized the destruction of the enemy’s
fighting strength as the major objective rather than the acquisition
of territory. A high attrition rate would preclude the Communists’
capacity to hold and enable EUSAK commander to recover the critical
hill mass north of Wonju. It was for this purpose, he informed Major
General Bryant E. Moore, IX Corps commanding general, that the 1st
Marine Division would be employed.
“The force which holds Wonju,” he said, “has the situation in hand.”[81]
[81] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, Sec I, 52. Comments by Gen O. P.
Smith, USMC (Ret), 13 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser,
14 Feb 58.
_The Move to the Chungju Area_
The 1st Marine Division had instructions to report its order of march
to the Eighth Army, and to keep the Taegu headquarters informed of
progress. Meanwhile, the Marines were to remain under EUSAK operational
control but would pass to IX Corps control at a date and hour to be
announced.
General Puller flew to Chungju with a reconnaissance party on 13
February to look over the road and select CP sites. On the following
morning Major Walter Gall’s Division Reconnaissance Company arrived at
Chungju for patrol duty, and movement by rail and road commenced on the
15th in accordance with Division OpnO 5-51, issued the day before.
[Illustration: MAP 6
1st Mar Div Zone of Action
Operation Killer
Showing Phase I & II Objectives]
The 1st Marines, with the 7th Motor Transport Battalion attached, led
the motor march, and the 5th and 7th Marines followed in that order.
Tracked vehicles were outloaded by rail from Andong and Pohang in a
total of 67 flat cars. Owing to a shortage of cars, Company B and H&S
Company of the 1st Tank Battalion made the move of 120 miles by road.
These tankers claimed the all-time Marine Corps distance record for
armor.[82]
[82] LtCol H. T. Milne, ltr of 3 Dec 57; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb
51.
While the Marine move was in progress, the CCF counterattack went on
full blast along the central front. Driving southeast from the IX Corps
area to the X Corps front, the Chinese cut off and surrounded the 23d
Infantry of the 2d Infantry Division, USA. Colonel Paul Freemen and his
men put up a fight that is one of the classics of the war. Supported by
Marine and Air Force planes, they gave more fire than they received and
held out until rescued by a tank column.[83]
[83] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51; Comments by Gen M. B. Ridgway,
USA (Ret), 4 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, 14 Feb 58.
February was also a transition period for Marine fighter squadrons
which had been more or less on the move since the middle of January.
Even before the transfer to Bofu, it had been decided that K-3, four
miles south of Pohang, was to be the ultimate home of MAG-33. While
awaiting completion of this field, VMFs-214, -312, and -323 would find
temporary lodging at K-1, near Pusan, recently assigned to MAG-12.[84]
[84] The balance of this section, unless otherwise specified,
is derived from the _HD_s for Feb 51 of the 1st MAW,
MAG-33, VMF-214, VMF-312, VMF-323, VMF(N)-513, and
VMF-311.
On 6 February, Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, assistant
commanding general of the 1st MAW, radioed General Harris that K-1
would be ready to receive a squadron a day, starting on the 8th. Harris
ordered Squadrons 323, 214, and 312 to make their moves on 8, 9, and 10
February respectively. Transport aircraft were to lift ground crews,
extra pilots, and light equipment directly to K-1. Pilots had orders to
fly combat missions en route.
By the 13th most of the vehicles, heavy equipment, and general supplies
had been loaded on a train for Kobe, there to be transshipped on LSTs
to Pohang. That same day Lieutenant Colonel Fontana set up his MAG-33
command post at K-3 and directed the three fighter squadrons to report
from K-1.
The new field occupied a bench overlooking a wide, sandy beach. Built
originally by the Japanese, the strip had 5,200 feet of concrete
runway. The Air Force had extended it to 5,700 feet with pierced steel
planking. This addition brought the end of the runway to the brink of
a 60-foot drop-off--a hazard in the event of a “hot” landing to the
northwest or too low an approach from the southeast.
Next to arrive at K-3 were the F9F-2Bs of VMF-311. Four weeks of
adjustments at Itami had restored the jets to operative condition. An
advance echelon went ahead to establish squadron living and operating
areas, and the pilots ferried the 19 aircraft. Ground crews and
equipment followed on transport planes.
Plans were made for VMF(N)-513 to move from Itami to K-3 before the end
of the month. The other all-weather squadron, VMF(N)-542, now commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson, completed the transfer from
Itami and Itazuke to K-1.
This field was also the destination of the photo pilots of Headquarters
Squadron, 1st MAW, who flew their F7F-3P and F4U-5P fighters from
Itami. Major Donald S. Bush commanded a unit, formerly a squadron,
which had been one of the first aviation organizations to see action in
Korea. Among its accomplishments were the preliminary beach studies for
the Inchon and Wonsan landings.
With the completion of the moves of February 1951, the 1st MAW was
again based on Korean soil. Fifteen types of Marine aircraft were
being flown. For the heavy hauling, the R4D and R5D transports shifted
troops and supplies. Included among the fighters were F9F Panthers, F4U
Corsairs, and two models of F7F Tigercats--a stripped-down photo plane,
and a radar-armed night fighter. Stinson OY Grasshoppers, TBM Avengers,
and Beechcraft SNBs rounded out the list of conventional planes. Three
types of rotary-wing aircraft were represented: the Sikorsky HO3S-1,
and two models of the Bell HTL.[85]
[85] _Naval Aviation News_, Apr 51, 8.
_Marine Planes in Action_
By 15 February the brief CCF counterstroke had spent its force.
Hoengsong had fallen to Communists who hammered out a salient on a
20-mile front extending as far southward as the outskirts of Wonju (Map
6). But the enemy’s main purpose had failed of accomplishment, for the
grip of the Eighth Army on Inchon and Kimpo Airfield was not shaken.
Nor did the Chinese gain a breathing spell in their preparations for a
third great offensive as a followup to the December and January drives.
More by coincidence than design, the Fifth Air Force launched a new
system of air tactics a few days after the beginning of the CCF
counterstroke. Called “Reconnaissance Plan Fighter,” it was based on
a division of enemy-held Korea into 22 sections. Squadrons were given
the mission of making hourly surveys of the same areas, day after day,
until pilots became so familiar with them that any change hinting at
CCF activity would be noticed at once.[86]
[86] VMF-323 HD, 15 Feb 51.
If these surveys revealed any sign of any enemy concentration, either
of men or supplies, JOC scrambled special bombing strikes against them.
Although Marine fliers could readily see the advantages of covering
the same ground daily, it made for monotony on reconnaissance
missions. Only a highly unusual spectacle would startle a pilot, but
First Lieutenant Weldon R. Mitchell blinked when he saw a camel in
his gunsights.[87] Shaggy little Mongolian horses were no novelty as
ammunition bearers, and after recovering from his first astonishment
the VMF-311 pilot cut loose with .50 caliber machine gun slugs. As he
suspected, the camel’s pack contained ammunition and the animal was all
but vaporized in the explosion.
[87] _Naval Aviation News_, Apr 51, 8.
Major Bush’s photographic unit had an important part in keeping the
enemy under constant surveillance. The Fifth Air Force directed on
16 February that all photo requests were to be screened by the Fifth
Air Force’s 543d Tactical Support Group at Taegu. Under the tactical
coordination of this Group, the Marine unit was to fill all Navy and
Marine requests. When not on such missions, it would be fitted into the
Fifth Air Force photographic reconnaissance program.[88]
[88] 1st MAW and MAG-12 _HD_s, Feb 51.
Pinpoint photos of suspected troop areas and such terrain features as
defiles, junctions, detours, and bridges were in demand. The fact had
to be faced that the enemy was almost unbelievably clever at camouflage
and concealment. In one instance it was found that the Chinese had
constructed bridge sections which they hid by day and put to use at
night.[89] On another occasion they sank a bridge by means of weights
so that it remained far enough beneath the surface of the water in the
daytime to avoid detection by reconnaissance aircraft.
[89] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg, ltr of 14 Jun 57.
When the photo planes carried out missions as far north as MIG
Alley[90] they flew in pairs. A fighter circled overhead to protect the
photo pilot from an enemy air attack while he paid full attention to
the task of “shooting” the terrain with his camera.
[90] MIG Alley was the name the American airmen gave the area
along the Yalu River where Communist jets were active.
_Planning for the New Operation_
Adaptability to changing circumstances had already become perhaps the
outstanding quality of the revitalized Eighth Army. No better example
could be found than the evolution of Operation KILLER, which completed
the cycle from concept to plan and execution in just three days.
On 18 February 1951, General Ridgway learned that the enemy was
apparently withdrawing. IX Corps and X Corps units had probed forward
that morning without meeting any opposition. Before nightfall the
commanding general decided to launch a limited objectives offensive by
the entire Eighth Army. He called a planning conference for the 19th
and set the 21st as D-Day for the new operation.
The 1st Marine Division found itself detached from X Corps on the
19th and placed under the operational control of General Moore of IX
Corps. This was not the first time in Marine Corps history, of course,
when “soldiers of the sea” have fought alongside U.S. Army units in
conventional land warfare. One of the best-known occasions was in World
War I, when two Marine regiments distinguished themselves in France as
a brigade of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division.
The Marines had been a part of X Corps in 1950, but always under
tactical circumstances which permitted more or less independent
operations with the support of organic aircraft. Now the Division was
to be closely integrated with the other major IX Corps units, the 24th
Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 6th ROK Division, and
the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. Marine calls for air strikes
would continue to be made through JOC, as they had been since the
Hungnam redeployment.
General Ridgway was on hand for the planning conference held on 19
February in General Moore’s CP at Yoju and attended by officers from
IX and X Corps. General Smith, Colonel McAlister, and Colonel Bowser
represented the 1st Marine Division.
The scheme of maneuver called for the Marines to relieve elements of X
Corps and attack in a northeasterly direction from a line of departure
north of Wonju (Map 6) through the Wonju basin. The object was to cut
off enemy forces which had penetrated south and east of Hoengsong, and
to recover control of the roads running eastward by seizing the high
ground just south of the town.[91]
[91] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 1–2, 20.
In the X Corps zone to the east, on the right flank of the Marines,
the 7th Infantry Division was to attack to the north along the
Yongwol-Pyongchang road. On the other Marine flank would be elements of
the 6th ROK Division.
Simultaneous advances were planned for I Corps to the west, where
patrols had found evidence that Seoul was lightly held.
Two U.S. Army units were designated at the 19 February conference to
support the 1st Marine Division--the 74th Truck Company and the 92d
Armored Field Artillery, then en route to the Chungju area.[92] These
cannoneers and their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Leon F.
Lavoie, USA, were well and favorably known to the Marines, having given
effective support during the Chosin Reservoir operations.
[92] _Ibid._
First Marine Division OpnO 6-51, issued on 20 February, directed the
two assault regiments, the 1st and 5th Marines, to jump off at 0800
on the 21st and seize the first objective, the ridgeline about three
and a half miles south of the high ground dominating Hoengsong (Map
6). RCT-1, with Division Recon Company and C/Engineers attached, was
to pass through elements of the 2d Infantry Division in zone while
RCT-5, with A/Engineers attached, passed through elements of the 187th
Airborne Infantry, USA. RCT-7 had been designated the reserve regiment;
but since it could not arrive from the Pohang-Andong area in time, a
battalion of the 5th Marines was assigned this mission.[93]
[93] _Ibid._, 2, 22, and 1stMarDiv OpnO 6-51.
The objective area was believed to be defended by the 196th Infantry
Division of the 66th CCF Army and unknown elements of the 39th and 40th
CCF Armies. Ahead of the Marines and other IX Corps units lay some
uninviting terrain. Rocky heights and narrow valleys were laced by
swift streams, the largest being the river Som, running from northeast
to southwest through a defile cutting across the western part of the
Division sector. Bordering this twisting stream was the Wonju-Hoengsong
“highway”--a poor dirt road even by Korean standards. Through the right
half of the Division zone an even more primitive road, scarcely fit for
vehicular traffic, wound northeast from Wonju.[94]
[94] _Ibid._, 22–24.
All Eighth Army forces were to be tightly buttoned up and to keep in
close physical contact while maintaining integrity of units. Patrol
observation and reconnaissance were stressed by the EUSAK commanding
general, and even lack of opposition would not justify a unit in
advancing ahead of schedule. Again, as in previous operations, real
estate was to be secondary to the inflicting of maximum personnel and
materiel damage.
On the eve of Operation KILLER, a message from IX Corps emphasized
to all units the necessity for making sure “that no hostile force of
sufficient strength to jeopardize the safety of your forces has been
bypassed. Maintenance of lateral contact between all units is of prime
importance.”[95]
[95] IX Corps msg in 1stMarDiv _In&Out#9_.
Marine ground force and aviation officers alike realized that the
forthcoming offensive would be the first real test of the operational
control of the 1st MAW by the Fifth Air Force and the Eighth Army.
General Smith was uneasy about the outlook. On 13 February 1951, the
day he was alerted for the move to Chungju, he had requested in a
message to EUSAK that the 1st MAW be assigned to the support of his
division. Both Marine ground and air officers, he said, believed that
this change would fit into the JOC overall air control system without
any disruption.[96] But no approval of General Smith’s proposal had
been received before D-Day.
[96] CG 1stMarDiv, msg of 12 Feb 51 to CG EUSAK.
_The Jumpoff on 21 February_
From the outset the transport and supply situation was a G-4 officer’s
nightmare. Heavy traffic broke the back of the MSR before the jumpoff,
so that mud delayed the 5th Marines in reaching the line of departure
(LD).
General Puller, the ADC, telephoned the Division commander for a
decision in the event that all elements of the regiment were unable
to arrive in time. This question was already under discussion between
General Moore and General Smith in the new 1st Marine Division CP, just
opened at Wonju. After later reports of troop arrivals reached him,
Smith decided with few minutes to spare that he would attack with only
the troops able to reach the LD in time--three battalions of the 1st
Marines, a battalion of the 5th Marines, two battalions of the 11th
Marines, and a company of tanks. Moore then confirmed 1000 as H-hour
and notified Puller of the decision.
The last-minute arrival of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, reminded
Smith of the occasion in France, 32 years before, when the 5th Marines
of World War I had to double-time across the wheat fields in order to
attack on schedule at Soissons on 18 July 1918. For at Wonju the lone
battalion scrambled out of trucks on the double and advanced without
taking time for reorganization.[97]
[97] LtGen O. P. Smith, ltr of 28 Jul 53.
Snarled traffic conditions were complicated by the arrival of
high-ranking officers for the jumpoff. General MacArthur visited the
zone of the 187th Airborne RCT, recently attached to X Corps. General
Ridgway and General Moore were on hand when the Marines attacked. The
EUSAK commander, surveying the scene from a snow-covered embankment,
was disturbed to see a Marine corporal stumbling over an untied shoe
lace while carrying a heavy radio.
“I hesitated just a moment,” commented Ridgway, “knowing that what I
wanted to do might be misconstrued as showmanship. Then I slid down
the bank on my tail, landed right at his feet, knelt down and tied his
shoe. Later, when this incident was reported in the States, there were
some who did report it as a theatrical gesture. This was not true. It
was purely an impulse to help a fighting soldier, a man in trouble.”[98]
[98] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 218–219.
The Eighth Army commander was not the only one to see the advantages
of tobogganing in terrain consisting of mud on the sunny slope of
hills and snow on the shady side. When Captain Jack R. Jones’ Charlie
Company of 1/5 reached its first steep decline, the Marine leading the
2d Platoon slipped and fell in the snow, sliding about a hundred feet
down the embankment. The man behind him profited from his example to
make a purposeful slide, as did the rest of First Lieutenant William E.
Kerrigan’s men.[99]
[99] Maj W. E. Kerrigan, ltr of 25 May 57.
This was but one of the unwarlike incidents which enlivened the
jumpoff of Operation KILLER. Seldom if ever have Marines taken part
in an offensive which began so inoffensively, for 21 February was
distinguished for lack of enemy resistance in the Marine zone. Only
a few rounds of scattered rifle fire were encountered until late
afternoon. Then the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, leading the column of
attack, had two long-distance fire fights before digging in for the
night. Three Marines were slightly wounded and the enemy withdrew with
such casualties as he may have suffered.[100]
[100] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 4.
The word “light” could never have been applied to the resistance put
up by the weather and terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart,
commanding 3/5, described it as “a mixture of thawing snow, rain, mud,
and slush.” His men spent the night in foxholes half filled with water.
Every one of them was “wet to the bones, including his clothes, parka,
weapons, and ammo.”[101]
[101] Comment by Col J. L. Stewart, 25 Oct 57.
The 1st Marines led the attacking column of battalions on 22
February, with 1/1 in the lead. More long-distance small-arms fire
was encountered than on the first day, but again there were no close
contacts with a retreating enemy.[102]
[102] 1stMarDiv HD, Feb 51, 4–5.
_Stiffening of Chinese Resistance_
Not until the 23d did either Marine regiment run into determined
opposition. Then the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines,
advancing abreast, had a fight while going up against two hills of a
ridge just south of the first phase objectives.
So far the Marines had found JOC air support satisfactory in quantity.
The statistics show that the Fifth Air Force supported the Eighth Army
during the first phase of Operation KILLER (21–24 February, inclusive)
with an average of 600 sorties a day.[103] There was no room for
complaint until the morning of the 23d, when an air strike the 5th
Marines requested the preceding evening for 0800 failed to materialize
on time. On this occasion the combination of an intense Marine
artillery preparation and light enemy resistance compensated for lack
of air support and the hill was taken with ease.
[103] Statistics are from EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, G-3 Air Rpt.
That afternoon it took a brisk fight to evict an enemy in estimated
battalion strength from log-covered bunkers on the second hill. This
time JOC responded to Marine requests with two effective air strikes.
Sixty Chinese dead were counted, and the Marines reported 1 KIA and 21
WIA.[104]
[104] 2/1 _HD_, 16 Dec 51, 15–16.
On the whole, however, the 5th Marines encountered only slight
resistance. “About all we did was walk--walk--walk!” recalled Captain
Franklin B. Mayer, commanding Easy Company of 2/5. “I don’t think I’ve
ever been so tired or footsore in my life--exception the retreat from
Chosin, but not by much.”[105]
[105] LtCol F. B. Mayer, ltr of 8 May 57.
On the 24th the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines had little
trouble in taking two hills designated as the main Phase 1 objectives.
The 1st Marines on the left sent a tank and infantry patrol into
Hoengsong after artillery preparation and an air strike. Captain Robert
P. Wray, commanding Charlie Company of 1/1 and a platoon of tanks,
entered the ruins of the town only to encounter machine gun and mortar
fire from the hills to the west.[106]
[106] This account of the tank-infantry patrol is based on Maj
R. P. Wray’s ltr of 6 May 57.
When the antennae were shot off two tanks, Wray directed their 90mm
fire by runner and knocked out the enemy positions. After proceeding
further into the town, he was recalled by his battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, because an aerial observer had
reported that Chinese were waiting to ambush the patrol.
An air strike was directed on them while Wray rescued several survivors
of “Massacre Valley,” northwest of Hoengsong, where a U.S. Army truck
convoy had been ambushed during the recent CCF counterattack. The
patrol returned before the ground had completely thawed. Only a few
hours later a jeep passing over the same road was blown up by a land
mine which killed the driver. This was one of the first object lessons
illustrating the danger from enemy mines which were harmless until the
midday sun thawed out the ground.
Chinese artillery fire from the hills north of Hoengsong accounted for
one Marine KIA and four WIA late that afternoon before counter-battery
fire by 2/11 silenced the enemy. This exchange ended the first phase
of Operation KILLER at dusk on 24 February with all preliminary
objectives seized.[107]
[107] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 2, 5–6.
Air support had been rendered, for the most part, by Fifth Air Force
planes. This gave rise to grumbling by Marine ground forces, who felt
that they had been unnecessarily deprived of their own close air
support. The fact was, however, that U.S. Army and British Commonwealth
troops also preferred Marine air and were outspoken about it. As a
disgruntled Marine ground force officer put it, Marine air was “too
good for our own good.”
During the first phase of Operation KILLER most of the sorties by 1st
MAW planes were in support of U.S. Army units. On 23 February the
Marines flew 101 of the Fifth Air Force total of some 800 sorties for
the day.[108] The experience of VMF-312 was fairly typical of the other
Marine fighter-bomber squadrons. In the morning VMF-312 took part in
a 16-plane strike behind the CCF lines. That afternoon two special
flights of four planes each were scrambled in support of 2d and 7th
Infantry Division units of X Corps. The following morning Major Daniel
H. Davis, executive officer of the squadron, scrambled with four
planes and reported to a FAC attached to the Canadian and Australian
battalions of the British Commonwealth Division. These troops were
engaged near Chipyong-ni in the hottest fight of the first phase of
Operation KILLER. After the FAC marked the CCF strongholds with white
phosphorus, the Corsairs came snarling in with napalm, rocket, and
strafing runs just ahead of the infantry. The enemy was driven out of
positions defended by 20mm antipersonnel fire, but Major Davis paid
with his life on his eighth run when he lost a wing and crashed to his
death.
[108] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sec III, Bk 4, Pt 5, 23 and 24 Feb; 1st
MAW _HD_, 22–24 Feb 51.
_General Smith in Command of IX Corps_
On 24 February 1951 came the news that General Moore had suddenly died
as the indirect result of a helicopter accident. The aircraft had
plunged into the Han River, after hitting a telephone wire, and the IX
Corps commander was rescued unhurt only to die of a heart attack half
an hour afterwards.
Commander of the 8th Infantry Division in European operations of
World War II, General Moore later became Superintendent of the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point. As his successor, pending a permanent
appointment, General Ridgway named General Smith to the command of IX
Corps. When announcing this decision, the Eighth Army commander said,
“General Smith is to be taken into their hearts in IX Corps, and, by
definite action, made to feel that he belongs there.”[109]
[109] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, Sec 2, 23.
Marines with an interest in Corps history could recall only two similar
occasions when Marines commanded major U.S. Army units. Major General
John A. Lejeune had headed the 2d Infantry Division in World War I, and
Major General Roy S. Geiger led the U.S. Tenth Army to victory during
the closing days of the Okinawa operation after a Japanese shell killed
Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., USA.
On 24 February, with General Puller taking command of the 1st Marine
Division, General Smith flew to Yoju by helicopter to begin his new
duties. His military competence and complete lack of ostentation made
him cordially accepted at the IX Corps CP. The following day General
Ridgway arrived for a conference. Wishing to change the boundary
between IX and X Corps, so as to orient the former more to the north,
he directed the Marine general to reach an agreement with X Corps. He
also asked for a recommendation as to future operations of the Marines,
and General Smith replied that he knew of no better employment for
his division than to continue attacking along the Hoengsong-Hongchon
axis.[110]
[110] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Chronicle of the Operations of
the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months
of the Korean War_, 1950–1951 (MS), (hereafter, Smith,
_Chronicle_), 24–25 Feb 51.
The change in boundaries, as decided at a conference of corps
commanders, meant that in the zone of the 1st Marine Division the 5th
Marines on the right would be pinched out by the 3d ROK Division of X
Corps. On the left, the zone was to be extended by bringing the 7th
Marines into line to the left of the 1st Marines while the 5th Marines
dropped back into reserve.[111]
[111] 5th and 7th Marines _HD_s, Feb 51.
Logistics became the better part of valor on 25 February as Ridgway
called a halt in the fighting until enough ammunition, fuel, and other
supplies could be brought up for a resumption of the attack toward the
final objective, Phase Line ARIZONA (Map 6). Napoleon’s famous remark
that mud should be recognized as a separate element was apt as violent
rains turned all roads into swamps. Operations might have come to a
standstill except for air drops. On the 25th the Combat Air Command
flew 480.7 tons of freight and 1,004 passengers, followed by 604.9
tons and 1,193 passengers the following day.[112] Corps and Division
engineers strove meanwhile with indigenous labor to repair the roads.
[112] FEAF _Operations History_, Vol II, 300–306; Comment by
Col J. H. Partridge, 10 Dec 57.
By a prodigious effort, enough progress in logistics was made so that
the EUSAK commanding general could issue orders on 25 February for
the second phase of Operation KILLER to commence on 1 March. He made
it known that he was not satisfied with results so far. The assigned
physical objectives had been taken, but the enemy’s withdrawals had
saved him from the full extent of the personnel and material losses
Ridgway had hoped to inflict. He called on his staff officers,
therefore, for plans aiming at a new operation “having the primary
intent of destroying as many enemy and as much equipment as possible
and, by continued pressure, allowing the enemy no time to mount a
counteroffensive.”[113] A secondary mission was that of outflanking
Seoul and the area between Seoul and the Imjin River, “so that this
territory may be taken either by attack from the east or by enemy
default.”
[113] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, Sec 1, 53.
The name of the new drive was to be Operation RIPPER, and it was to
jump off as soon as possible after the finish of KILLER.
_The Advance to Phase Line_ ARIZONA
From newly won positions in the high ground south of Hoengsong, the
Marines could look across the soggy plain to their Phase II objectives,
the hills to the north of the battered town. Hoengsong occupied a
valley at the confluence of two rain-swollen streams. Thus a triangular
area of low, flat ground lay between the ruins and the hills which
must be taken in the final phase of Operation KILLER. The 1st and 7th
Marines were the combat units, with the 5th Marines in reserve. (The
KMC Regiment, it may be recalled, had been temporarily detached for
service with the ROK army.)
Before the 1st and 7th Marines could launch their combined attack, the
latter had to fight its way up to the point of junction after relieving
elements of the 6th ROK Division.[114] The scheme of maneuver then
called for Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3/1 to sideslip into
the zone of Major Maurice E. Roach’s 3/7, in order to be in position
for the advance across the Hoengsong plain. This meant a crossing of
the river Som for 3/1 and a combined assault with 3/7 on the high
ground along the west bank.
[114] Except when otherwise noted, this section is derived
from the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 2–5; 7thMar _HD_, Mar
51, 2–6; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_ No. 4, Mar 51, 31–32; EUSAK
_Cmd Rpt_, Sec 1, Mar 51, 53–59; LtCol Edwin H. Simmons
narrative, n.d.; Comment by Col Wilbur F. Meyerhoff.
The problem of crossing the river, 200 feet wide and chest-deep at the
most likely site, was turned over to Banning with the explanation that
the engineer company supporting the regiment could not be diverted from
road repairs. To meet this emergency Major Edwin H. Simmons, commanding
Weapons Company of 3/1, produced a field manual with instructions for
building a “Swiss bent bridge.”[115] His Antitank Assault Platoon
was given the task under the command of energetic Technical Sergeant
Carmelo J. Randazzo, a veteran on his third enlistment.
[115] FM 70-10, _Mountain Operations_, 41–46.
There was no lack of trees for timbers, and rolls of telephone wire
were sworn to be beyond salvaging by the battalion communications
officer. The A-shaped bents, or trusses, were lashed together with wire
and enthusiasm, then carried out into the ice-cold water to be attached
to spars and stringers.
It was a great triumph for “war by the book.” Before dark on 28
February two spans, one 120 feet long and another half that length,
were linked by a sandbar in midstream. The improvised bridge stood up
well next morning when the battalion crossed to the west bank. There
3/1 echeloned itself behind 3/7, which gained the first 1,000 yards
under cover of a vigorous artillery preparation and belated air strikes.
On the left, Major James I. Glendinning’s 2d Battalion of the 7th
Marines ran into increasingly stubborn opposition from CCF mortar and
small-arms fire. Before noon the attacks of both battalions of the 7th
Marines were brought almost to a halt in difficult terrain which the
Communists had booby-trapped. Neither artillery nor air strikes had a
decisive effect against an enemy sheltered by log-covered bunkers. So
many delays were encountered that it was decided in mid-afternoon to
postpone the advance until the following morning, 2 March.
Artillery and air strikes supported 2/7, 3/7, and 3/1 as they attacked
at 0800 west of the river. Meanwhile, 1/7 patrolled on the division
left flank while maintaining contact with the 6th ROK Division.
Apparently the enemy put up a hard fight only when he could not
withdraw in time to avoid one. Resistance was light on the west bank,
and east of the river Lieutenant Colonel Allen Sutter’s 2/1, supported
by tanks, had little trouble. His battalion linked up with 3/1 in the
afternoon and dug in after taking its assigned objective, Hill 208,
with casualties of three men wounded.
The only determined opposition of 2 March took place during the
afternoon in the zone of 2/7, There the attackers could only inch
forward over rocky terrain which the enemy defended, ridge by ridge,
in spite of air strikes and 1,600 artillery rounds fired by the 11th
Marines.
At daybreak on the 3d the men of the 1st and 7th Marines could look to
the north and see their final objectives. Five hills lay along Phase
Line ARIZONA from west to east--Hills 536 and 333 in the zone of the
7th Marines, and Hills 321, 335, and 201 in the zone of the 1st Marines.
The last two positions were in the path of 2/1, which seized them after
several brisk fire fights. Casualties of three KIA and 28 WIA were
incurred while inflicting losses of 70 counted CCF dead. The terrain
gave 3/1 more trouble than the enemy in taking Hill 321, where the CCF
troops had already begun their withdrawal.
It was in the zone of the 7th Marines that Communist resistance was
hottest. The 1st battalion was summoned to cover the regimental left
flank and aid in the attack of 2/7 on Hill 536 while 3/7 continued its
struggle for Hill 333. Both battalions had their hardest fight of the
entire operation that afternoon. They lost most of the 14 KIA and 104
WIA which the Division reported for 3 March, and the enemy still held
the topographical crests.
The 1st Marines had reached the mopping-up stage on 4 March, while the
7th Marines prepared to go up against an expected last-ditch stand
of the enemy on Hills 536 and 333. The parkas of the assault troops
were powdered with snow as the men moved out to the attack at 0800,
following an intensive artillery preparation. There was something
ominous about the silence in the objective area, but no trap had been
set for the attackers. The Communists actually had pulled out under
cover of darkness, leaving behind only enough outpost troops for
delaying operations.
Operation KILLER ended at nightfall on the 4th for the Marines, though
mopping up continued throughout the following day. Total Marine
casualties for the 8 days of fighting were 395--48 KIA, 2 MIA, and 345
WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 274 counted dead and 48 prisoners. It is
certain, however, that the actual KIA and WIA figures were much higher,
since the withdrawing Communists buried their dead and took their
wounded with them.
Any evaluation of this limited objective operation must credit it
with achieving its main purpose--keeping the Communists off balance
while they were striving desperately to make ready for another great
offensive (Map 7). This explains why the enemy as a whole put up a
half-hearted resistance. He preferred to withdraw whenever possible and
fight another day.
JOC _Air Control System Criticized_
Operation KILLER was the first real test of the JOC system as far
as the Marines were concerned, and both the flying and ground-force
Marines felt that it had shown grave shortcomings. Air support on
1 March proved so disappointing that General Puller, as temporary
commander of the 1st Marine Division, reported the situation to General
Shepherd, commanding FMFPac. His letter is quoted in part as follows:
We are having very little success in obtaining Marine air for
CAS [close air support] missions and practically no success in
having Marine air on station for CAS missions.... Most of our
CAS missions in the current operation have been Air Force or
Navy Carrier planes. They do a good job and we are glad to have
them, but our Marine air, with whom we have trained and operated,
can do a better job. We have attempted to insure that Marine
air would support us, and to cut down the delays in receiving
such support, as evidenced by the attached dispatches. We have
received no decision relative to our requests. Apparently, the
answer is no by default.[116]
[116] Shepherd Papers, 27 Apr 51, Encl. 4. This is a file of
documents in the Marine archives relating to problems of
JOC control in the spring of 1951.
[Illustration: MAP 7]
General Puller’s report was obviously written for the record, since
General Shepherd was present at the 1st Marine Division CP at the time.
He witnessed personally the Marine attacks of 2 and 3 March and the air
support they received. On the 3d, the day of heaviest fighting in the
entire operation, there could be no complaint that few Marine aircraft
supported Marine ground forces. The Corsairs flew 26 CAS sorties that
day and cleared the way more than once for the 2d and 3d Battalions
of the 7th Marines. The trouble was that air support as administered
by JOC was so often late in arriving, even when requested the evening
before. More than once the infantry had to go ahead with only artillery
support. Such delays threw the whole plan of attack out of gear, for
air and artillery had to be closely coordinated to be at their best.
General Shepherd had a series of talks with General Harris. Both then
conferred with General Partridge, commander of the Fifth Air Force.
They requested that he authorize the 1st MAW to keep two planes on
station over the 1st Marine Division whenever it was engaged. General
Partridge did not concur. He maintained that Marine aircraft should be
available to him if needed elsewhere in an emergency. He did consent,
however, to permit 1st MAW armed reconnaissance sorties to check in
with DEVASTATE BAKER for any CAS requests.[117]
[117] Shepherd Papers, Encl 2, a ltr from Gen Shepherd to
CMC, dtd 9 Mar 51. DEVASTATE BAKER was the call sign of
Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), which
coordinated the assignment of aircraft to tactical air
control parties (TACPS).
This conference did much to clear up the situation. On 5 March no less
than 48 Marine sorties reported to DEVASTATE BAKER, though there was
little need for them in mopping-up operations. And during the next two
weeks an average of 40 sorties a day was maintained.