The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt
_The New Marine Zone of Operations--1st MAW Moves to Bofu--Marine Rice
Paddy Patrols--Operations_ THUNDERBOLT and ROUNDUP_--Action in the
Pohang-Andong Zone--KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division_--_10th_
NPKA _Division Scattered--New Mission for the Marines_
On 15 January 1951 a reinforced regiment of the U.S. 25th Infantry
Division drove northward from Line D (Map 4) to a point about half
a mile from Suwon in the I Corps sector. VMF-212, flying from the
CVE _Bataan_, supported the movement along with land-based Air Force
planes. No CCF troops were encountered during a two-day thrust
dignified with the name Operation WOLFHOUND. Its only importance lay in
its distinction as the first Eighth Army counterstroke in reply to the
enemy’s January offensive. Other EUSAK advances were soon to follow,
each more ambitious than the last and bearing a more bristling code
name.
General Ridgway proposed by this means to exert continual and
increasing pressure on an enemy paying for victory with extended supply
lines. Meanwhile, he hoped to build up the morale of his own troops
without asking too much of them at first.
In less than seven weeks, from 1 December 1950 to 15 January 1951, the
Eighth Army had been pushed back an average distance of 200 miles.
Never before in the Nation’s history had an American army given up so
much ground and equipment in so short a time, and damage to morale was
inevitable. Yet the commanding general was confident that a cure would
be effected by better combat leadership and discipline. He planned to
emphasize the need for these remedies until he restored the Eighth Army
to tactical health.
_The New Marine Zone of Operations_
Ridgway agreed with Marine generals that the 1st Marine Division had
come out of its 13-day battle in the Chosin Reservoir area with its
fighting spirit undulled. Minor respiratory ills seemed to be the
only consequences felt by the survivors. “A hacking cough,” recalled
a Marine staff officer long afterwards, “was the symbol of the Bean
Patch.”[49]
[49] MajGen F. M. McAlister ltr, 17 Jun 57.
Such ills soon responded to rest and medical care, and it was a
physically fit division that made the move to the new zone of
operations. About one man out of three in the infantry and artillery
battalions was a newcomer to Korea. These replacements were shaping up
nicely, and the new operation promised to be ideal combat training.
The move took nearly a week. While the other troops proceeded by motor,
LSTs 898 and 914 sailed with elements of the Tank, Ordnance, Engineer,
and Service Battalions. The Division CP opened at Sinhung (Map 5),
about 5 miles southeast of Pohang, on 16 January. By the following day
all designated motor and water lifts were completed.
On the 18th the Marines were assigned a three-fold mission by Division
OpnO 3-51: (1) the protection of the Pohang-Kyongju-Andong MSR (main
supply route); (2) the securing of Andong and the two airstrips in the
vicinity; and (3) the prevention of hostile penetrations in force to
the south of the Andong-Yongdok road. The following zones of patrol
responsibility were assigned to Marine units:
_Zone A_--RCT-1: an area about 10 miles east and west of the
Uisong-Andong road, including both Uisong and Andong.
_Zone B_--RCT-5: an area some 15 to 20 miles wide astride the
Kyongju-Yongchon-Uisong road, including Kyongju but excluding Uisong.
_Zone C_--RCT-7: an area 20 to 25 miles wide from east to west and
extending north from the latitude of Pohang to the Andong-Yongdok road.
_Zone D_--11th Marines: a strip seven miles wide along the coast
astride the road from Pohang to a point about 10 miles north of Yongdok.
_Zone E_--1st Tank Battalion: the area bounded by the road from
Pohang to Kyongju and thence to the east coast at a point about 19
miles southeast of Pohang.
[Illustration: MAP 5
1st Mar Div Zone of Action
and
Regimental Boundries
During Pohang Guerrilla Hunt]
Keeping open the 75-mile stretch of MSR from Pohang to Andong was
considered the principal mission of the Division. Strong points were
set up at Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong.
Captured documents indicated that enemy forces in unknown numbers had
already infiltrated through gaps in the eastern sectors of the Eighth
Army’s Line D. Guerrilla activity was reported as far west as Tanyang,
on the MSR of IX Corps, and as far south as Taejon, threatening the
supply line of I Corps. Train ambushes occurred on 13 January in the
Namchang area and to the south of Wonju. Other attacks took place on
the rail line about 60 miles north of Taegu. In expectation of further
attempts, trains were provided with a sandbagged car, pushed ahead of
the engine, to absorb the shock of landmine explosions. Another car was
occupied by guards who had the duty of dealing with direct guerrilla
attacks.[50]
[50] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51.
The tactical problem of the Marines was quite simple--on paper. About
1,600 square miles, most of them standing on end in mountainous
terrain, were included in the new zone of operations. The experience
of World War II had demonstrated how effective guerrilla warfare could
be as an adjunct to large-scale military operations. Officers of the
1st Marine Division had no illusions about their mission, therefore,
when they received unconfirmed reports of NKPA guerrilla infiltrations
behind the EUSAK lines toward Andong.
All uncertainty vanished on 18 January, shortly after the issuing of
OpnO 3-51, when a patrol of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, flushed out
an undetermined number of North Korean troops east of Andong. They took
to their heels so earnestly that the Marines barely managed to catch
three of them after a long chase.
The prisoners identified their unit as the 27th Infantry of the NKPA
10th Infantry Division. The other two regiments, the 25th and 29th,
were also in the general area. All three were supported more in theory
than fact by artillery, mortar, medical, and engineer units organic
to the division. In reality, however, the estimated total of 6,000
troops consisted largely of infantry, A few mortars, according to the
prisoners, were the largest weapons.
Following the Inchon-Seoul operation, the remnants of the badly
mauled NKPA 10th Infantry Division had straggled back across the
38th Parallel to the Hwachon area. There they were reorganized by the
Chinese for guerrilla operations and placed under the command of NKPA
Major General Lee Ban Nam.[51]
[51] 1stMarDiv Periodic Intelligence Report (_PIR_) 87–94,
17–22 Jan 51.
Late in December the rebuilt division, still short of arms and
equipment, departed Hwachon with a mission of infiltrating through the
UN lines to cut communications and harass rear installations of the
Andong-Taegu area. Shots were exchanged with United Nations troops near
Wonju, but General Lee Ban Nam and his troops contrived to slip to the
east through the mountains. Stealthily moving southward, marching by
night and hiding by day, they were soon in a position to heckle the
rear of the X Corps sector. This advantage did not last long. Before
they could strike a blow, the element of surprise was lost along with
the three prisoners taken by the Marines.
As the Marine units moved into their assigned zones, General Ridgway
flew to Pohang to confer with General Smith. Not only did he express
confidence that the Marines would soon have the situation well under
control; he also suggested the possibility of small amphibious landings
along the east coast. The purpose was to block a possible southward
advance of the three CCF armies that had operated in Northeast Korea
during the Chosin Reservoir campaign.[52]
[52] Units of these armies, it may be recalled, were not
identified again in the CCF order of battle before the
middle of March 1951. Until that time, the possibility of
these enemy troops being used for a surprise stroke had
to be taken into consideration.
The east coast littoral was considered the most likely route of
approach. Smith was of the opinion, however, that an amphibious landing
should be made in strength, if at all. And there the matter rested.[53]
[53] Smith, _Notes_, 1339.
_1st MAW Moves to Bofu_
During the operations of the first few days the Marine ground forces
had to depend for air support on FEAF planes sent by JOC. The 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing had its hands full at this time with housekeeping
activities. Work began at Bofu (Map 3) on 20 January as a Seabee
detachment arrived with its graders and bulldozers. They were assisted
by details of Marines from MAG-33.[54]
[54] This section, unless otherwise stated, is based on
the January historical diaries of the following
organizations: 1st MAW; MAG-33; MAG-12; VMF-312; VMF-214;
VMF-323; VMF(N)-513; VMF(N)-542; MWSS-1; FMFPac. Another
source is _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 969.
The job went ahead with typical Seabee efficiency. While specialists
installed plumbing for the galleys and barracks, other crews graded
taxiways, laid pierced steel planking, and poured concrete to patch up
runways, parking ramps, and warmup aprons.
MAG-12 kept busy at the task of moving men and equipment from Itami
and other Japanese fields to Korea. Aircraft of VMR-152, commanded
by Colonel Deane C. Roberts, provided transportation. Since safety
measures precluded the use of the K-1 runway during construction
activity, K-9 substituted temporarily. As fast as the planes unloaded,
passengers and gear were trucked 15 miles through Pusan to K-1.
It was a transition period in more ways than one for the 1st MAW.
Following are the changes of commanders that took place during the last
2 weeks of January:
Colonel Radford C. West, relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Paul J.
Fontana as commanding officer of MAG-33;
Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Cole, joined MAG-33 staff as
personnel officer after being relieved of VMF-312 command by
Major Donald P. Frame;
Major Arnold A. Lund of VMF-323, relieved by Major Stanley S.
Nicolay and assigned to General Harris’ staff as assistant
operations officer;
Major William M. Lundin, relieved of VMF-214 command by Major
James A. Feeney, Jr., and transferred to the command of Service
and Maintenance Squadron-33 (SMS-33).
This left only Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczawski of VMF-212
and Lieutenant Colonel Max J. Volcansek, Jr., of VMF(N)-542 still in
command of the tactical squadrons they brought to Korea; and the latter
was to be relieved by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson in February.
The only combat operations of the 1st MAW during the week of
housekeeping from 16 to 23 January were carried out by VMF-212 from the
deck of the _Bataan_.[55] This CVL carrier alternated with the British
light fleet carrier HMS _Theseus_ on the Korean west coast blockade.
Their activities were coordinated by Vice Admiral Andrewes, RN,
commanding the group blockading the Korean west coast.
[55] VMF-212 _HD_, Jan 51; USS _Bataan_ (CVL-29) Action Rpt,
“Operations off the West Coast of Korea, 15 Jan-7 Apr
51;” USS _Bataan WD_, Jan 51; Col R. W. Wyczawski, interv
of 2 Jun 58.
VMF-212 sent out a morning and afternoon reconnaissance flight each
day up the coastline as far as the 39th parallel. On the trip north
the pilots scanned the coastal waters for small enemy shipping which
might indicate reinforcement from Chinese ports on the Yellow Sea. The
return trip along the highways and railroads of the littoral was made
to detect signs of any new enemy activity on land. Four aircraft flew
each of the two coastal sweeps; eight maintained a defensive patrol
over the carrier itself; and any remaining flights were under control
of JOC, with FEAF Mosquitoes providing liaison between fighter-bombers
and ground forces.
To insure sea room beyond the islands and mudbanks of the west coast,
the _Bataan_ had to stay outside the 100-fathom curve. This meant that
the pilots must fly across 65 to 80 miles of open sea in order to reach
the coast. The winter weather varied from unbelievable to unbearable,
and bulky, uncomfortable survival suits were a necessity. They could be
a death trap, however, if a leak developed or if they were not adjusted
tightly at the throat and wrists. Captain Alfred H. Agan, for instance,
was shot down southeast of Inchon and had to choose between landing in
enemy territory and ditching in the sea. He tried for a small island
offshore but crash-landed into the surf. Before a helicopter from the
_Bataan_ could fly 65 miles to the rescue, he died from the shock of
icy water which partially filled his survival suit.
The pilots of VMF-212 reported an increase in enemy antiaircraft fire,
particularly in CCF rear areas. They were amazed to find troops dug in
along the coast as far back as 50 or 60 miles from the battle lines.
These precautions were the enemy’s tribute to Marine capabilities for
amphibious warfare. The fear of another Inchon caused the Chinese to
immobilize thousands of men on both coasts to guard against another
such decisive landing far behind the front.
On the squadron’s third day of sea operations, three planes were hit
by rifle and machine gun fire on reconnaissance missions. One of them,
flown by Captain Russell G. Patterson, Jr., was shot down behind the
enemy lines but a FEAF helicopter rescued the pilot. First Lieutenant
Alfred J. Ward was not so fortunate. His plane was riddled the
following day by enemy fire and he crashed to his death in the midst of
CCF soldiers.
Not until 22 January did the reconditioning of Bofu reach such an
advanced stage that Lieutenant Colonel Fontana could set up his MAG-33
command post. VMF-312 moved in the next day and the first combat
missions were launched to the vicinity of Seoul, 300 miles away. On
the 24th General Harris established his headquarters. A few hours later
VMF-214 and VMF-323 arrived from Itami, where they had put in an idle
week, with no place to go, after their carrier duty. On the 26th, when
they flew their first missions as land-based squadrons, MAG-33 was back
in business and Bofu was a going concern.
No such claim could have been made for MAG-12 and K-1. Although Colonel
Boeker C. Batterton set up his command post on 27 January 1951, two
more weeks were to pass before the K-1 runway was fit for the flights
to tactical aircraft. Meanwhile, the MAG-12 squadrons had to make out
as best they could at K-9.
_Marine Rice Paddy Patrols_
Operations of the first few days demonstrated to 1st Marine Division
ground forces that locating the enemy was more of a problem than
defeating him. Obviously, the NKPA 10th Division had few if any of
the advantages which make for effective guerrilla warfare. Far from
receiving any voluntary support from the inhabitants, the Korean Reds
had their own movements promptly reported to the Marines. Retaliations
on civilians, such as burning mountain villages, were not calculated
to improve relations. Nor did the enemy possess any of the other
requisites for successful operations in an opponent’s rear--a base,
a source of supply, good communications, and a reliable intelligence
system.
If it came to a fight, there could be little doubt about the outcome.
But Marine staff officers must have been reminded of the old recipe for
rabbit pie which begins, “First, catch your rabbit.”
Such a situation called for systematic patrolling in all Marine zones
of action. Secondary roads and mountain trails were covered by “rice
paddy patrols.” Numbering from four men to a squad, these groups ranged
far and wide on foot in an area that was more often vertical than
horizontal. On a single day the 5th Marines alone had 29 of these rice
paddy patrols in action.[56] No better training for replacements could
have been devised. Sometimes the men were on their own for several
days, depending for supplies on helicopter drops. And while casualties
were light, there was just enough danger from sniping and potential
ambushes to keep the replacements on the alert.
[56] 5thMar _WD_, Jan-Feb 51.
Roads fit for vehicles--especially the 75-mile stretch of MSR from
Pohang to Andong--were under the constant surveillance of motorized
patrols, each supported by at least one tank or 105mm howitzer. The
farthest distance was 15 miles between the main Marine strong points at
Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong.[57]
[57] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51.
Close air support was seldom needed against such an elusive enemy as
the Marines faced. General Craig put in a request, however, for an
air squadron to be based at Pohang or Pusan (Map 2). The two Marine
all-weather squadrons, VMF(N)-513 and VMF(N)-542, were General Harris’
first and second choices. They had been flying under Air Force (314th
Air Division) control in the defense of Japan, a mission of dull
routine and waiting for something to break the monotony of patrolling.
The twin-engined F7F-3N Tigercats of VMF(N)-542 were well equipped
with electronics equipment for night interceptor work. VMF(N)-513 flew
F4U-5Ns, the night-fighter modification of the latest Corsair.[58]
[58] The remainder of this section, except when otherwise
noted, is based on 1stMAW _HD_, Jan 51 and VMF(N)-513
_HD_, Jan 51. See Glossary in Appendix A for explanations
of aircraft designations.
General Harris’ plan for VMF(N)-542 to take over the duties of
VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke had the approval of General Partridge. This made
it possible to send the latter squadron to K-9 at Pusan to replace the
VMF-311 jets, which in turn left for Itami to await corrections of
engineering defects.
VMF(N)-513 flew its first combat missions from K-9 on 22 January. These
consisted of routine armed reconnaissance flights and an occasional
deep support mission for the Eighth Army. Not until the 25th did the
squadron respond to a request from Marine ground forces. And out of 49
combat missions (110 sorties) during the remaining 6 days of the month,
only three (10 sorties) were in support of the 1st Marine Division.
For routine operations the Marine ground forces found the support
of VMO-6 sufficient. The nimble little OY observation planes were
ideal for seeking out an enemy who had to be caught before he could
be fought. And the helicopters did their part by dropping supplies,
evacuating casualties, and laying wire.
Meanwhile, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing strengthened its administrative
ties with the 1st Marine Division. Although the two organizations had
no common operational commander other than General MacArthur, they
maintained a close liaison. Harris attached two TBM Avengers to VMO-6
for use as radio relays when ground-to-ground communications failed
in the mountainous Pohang-Andong area. He also set up daily courier
flights, at General Smith’s request, to provide fast administrative
liaison between widely dispersed Marine air and ground units in Korea
and Japan.
_Operations_ THUNDERBOLT _and_ ROUNDUP
On 25 January two corps of the Eighth Army jumped off in Operation
THUNDERBOLT. Advancing side by side, I Corps and IX Corps had orders
to launch limited objective attacks and regain solid contact with the
enemy, who was obviously preparing for a new offensive.
The EUSAK commander moved his CP from Taegu to Chonan (Map 1), the
I Corps headquarters, in order to maintain personal control of the
operation. He requested the Navy to step up offshore patrolling on the
west coast as left-flank protection. Emphasis was also placed on aerial
reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, as well as deep support
directed by the Mosquitoes.
Even VMF(N)-542 at Itazuke had orders to conduct long flights to Seoul
and maintain continuous patrols to report any attempt of the enemy to
retire across the frozen Han River. The F7F-3N pilots shot up camp
areas, convoys, and other lucrative targets but found no indications
of large-scale crossings over the ice.[59] So varied were the missions
of the squadron that it came as no surprise to be assigned to naval
gunfire spotting for the USS _St. Paul_ and the other British and
American cruisers shelling Inchon.
[59] VMF(N)-542 _HD_, Jan 51.
All Marine tactical squadrons were in action on 28 January for the
first time since December. Nearly two-thirds of the flights from Bofu
and K-9 were diverted from armed reconnaissance to troop support. A
typical operation was carried out by four VMF-312 planes on their
second day of duty at Bofu. After reporting to MELLOW they were
directed to Mosquito Cobalt, which had received a message that enemy
troops were hiding in a village just north of Suwon, occupied that day
by the U.S. 35th infantry. Under the Mosquito’s direction they bombed,
strafed, and napalmed some 40 buildings containing CCF soldiers.[60]
[60] VMF-312 _HD_, Jan 51.
The fall of Suwon opened the way to Inchon and Seoul as Chinese
resistance stiffened. Eighth Army progress was anything but reckless,
but Ridgway had served notice on the enemy that he held the initiative
and intended to keep it. Operation ROUNDUP followed on the heels of
THUNDERBOLT. Merely a change in name was involved, for the advance
continued at the same prudent pace without any important amendments to
the original mission.
_Action in the Pohang-Andong Zone_
The Marines in the Pohang-Andong zone had their first brush with
the elusive enemy on 22 January. A patrol of the 1st Battalion, 1st
Marines, flushed out a guerrilla force near Mukkye-dong, several miles
southeast of Andong (Map 5). Captain Robert P. Wray’s Charlie Company
deployed for action at sunset and shots were exchanged. The Marines had
no casualties and the enemy could not have suffered many losses before
he disappeared into the winter dusk.
Even at this early date the Korean Reds seemed to have lost confidence
in their guerrilla operations. In a message dated 23 January taken
from a prisoner, the commanding general of the II NKPA Corps directed
General Lee Ban Nam to withdraw if possible. It read as follows:
Get all of your troops out of the enemy encirclement and withdraw
to north of Pyongchang without delay. Liaison team sent with
radio. If you will inform us of your escape route we will assist
by clearing your advance. If you cannot escape, stay in the rear
of enemy as guerrillas.[61]
[61] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 116, Encl 1.
By the 24th an enemy drift southeast from the zones of the 1st and 5th
Marines to 7th Marines territory was apparent. The 1/7 command post and
Company A received scattered mortar fire late that afternoon. Action
picked up the next morning when dawn brought an attack by an estimated
100 guerrillas on the regimental command post. After a brisk 90-minute
fire fight the Korean Reds withdrew to the east, leaving seven dead
behind and taking with them an unknown number of wounded.
Later that morning the 7th Marines teamed up with the National Police
against the Chiso-dong area. Nine bodies were counted as the 3d
battalion seized its objective, but 1/7 was slowed by an entrenched
enemy who offered an unyielding defense. The Marine battalion ground
to a halt just one mile short of Chiso-dong and dug in for the night
as artillery continued to pound the enemy. The air strikes on the 25th
were flown by VMF(N)-513 and VMF-323, both based at K-9, but the pilots
could not contact the FAC and had to make dummy runs over the enemy.
Marine planes and artillery cleared the way on 26 January as 1/7
advanced against scattered opposition. Nearly 400 guerrillas put up a
ragged and futile resistance, but by 1530 Marine firepower prevailed
and Chiso-dong was taken. The 2d Battalion had meanwhile occupied
Hapton-ni, eight miles southeast of Topyong-dong (Map 5). A light enemy
counterattack was repulsed with ease.[62] Altogether, enemy casualties
for the day amounted to 161 KIA or POW.
[62] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, VMF(N)-513, and VMF-323 for
Jan 51.
The VMF-323 flight led by Captain Don H. Fisher and Captain Floyd K.
Fulton’s VMF(N)-513 flight merit recognition as the first successful
instance of Marine air-ground cooperation since the Chosin Reservoir
campaign.
While the 7th Marines served eviction notices on the enemy in its area,
action elsewhere was light. Task Force Puller[63] hastened on the
26th to Chongja-dong, seven miles northeast of Uisong, to investigate
a police report that 300 enemy had seized the town. A Marine attack,
following an artillery preparation, was planned for 1500. Captain
Thomas J. Bohannon led Able Company in but discovered that the shells
had fallen on empty huts.[64]
[63] Organized from units of RCT-1 on 25 January when Colonel
Puller was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. On
that date Colonel McAlister assumed command of RCT-1.
[64] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 50, 11.
During the next few days the rice paddy patrols continued to range
over the countryside, searching out the enemy. Combat units were
sent to areas where the G-2 red arrows indicated an NKPA buildup. On
the morning of the 29th, the 5th Marines tried to organize an attack
on a large enemy force reported near Chachon-dong, 12 miles west of
Topyong-dong. Captain Jack R. Jones’ Charlie Company, moving out at
night in small foot patrols to maintain secrecy, scoured the area in an
attempt to pin down the enemy.
Marine intelligence reports had warned of a dawn raid on the town for
the purpose of plundering food from the inhabitants and arms from the
Korean police station. First Lieutenant Richard J. Schening, executive
officer, led a scouting force ahead of the main body to reconnoiter
the area. He urged that a trap be set for the enemy, and the company
commander has left a description of one of the most elaborate ambushes
ever attempted by the Marines during the war:
Well before daylight, a cordon was stealthily braided around
Chachon-dong and we settled down to await the raiders. A later
daylight inspection of the deployment showed that the men had
done a splendid job of locating themselves so as to avoid
detection. They were concealed under porches, beneath the
brambles, and in the heaviest foliage and trees. But no guerrilla
attack materialized, probably due to a “grapevine” warning of our
movement and intent.... During the remaining days in the village
we conducted extensive patrolling in an attempt to catch at least
one guerrilla for our effort. Patrols were kept small to maintain
secrecy. We even dressed Marines in clothing worn by the “locals”
and sent them out in the hills with wood-gathering details.
Larger patrols up to a platoon in size were sent on combat
missions at night, One thing was certain: it was easier to talk
about capturing guerrillas than it was to lay a hand on them.[65]
[65] Maj J. R. Jones ltr, 24 Jun 57.
The elusiveness of the enemy could not always be credited to effective
guerrilla tactics. Often it was due to distaste for combat. As
evidence of low NKPA morale, Major Yu Dung Nam, a battalion commander,
was condemned to death and shot late in January because he planned
to surrender, according to POW testimony. Rations were at a bare
subsistence level and typhus had claimed many victims.[66]
[66] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 105, 5 Feb 51; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 13.
Unrelenting Marine pressure throughout the first week of February
wore the guerrillas down until groups larger than 50 men were
seldom encountered. On the 3d an NKPA second lieutenant surrendered
voluntarily to a RCT-7 patrol and brought three of his men with him.
NKPA morale had sunk so low, he divulged, that all ranks were striving
only for survival. The division commander, Major General Lee Ban Nam,
had apparently become a victim of acute melancholia. He spent nearly
all his time, according to the prisoner, in the solitude of foxholes
dug into the slopes of hills for added protection. There he brooded
constantly over his predicament, but without arriving at any better
solution than alternate hiding and flight.[67]
[67] _Ibid._
Certainly the military situation didn’t offer much to gladden this
Hamlet of the rice paddies, and the Marines continued to give him
fresh causes for pessimism. His footsore remnants eluded RCT-5 only to
stumble into the zone of RCT-1, northeast of Uisong. Neither rest nor
sanctuary awaited them, for the 1st and 2d battalions penetrated into
the mountains near Sangyong to surprise and rout a force estimated at
400 men.[68]
[68] 1stMar _WD_, Feb 51.
_KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division_
Late in January the 1st KMC Regiment got into the fight after being
attached once more to the 1st Marine Division by a EUSAK dispatch of
the 21st. Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Harrison headed a new group
of Division liaison and advisory officers as the four KMC battalions
moved out from Chinhae by LST and truck convoy to the Pohang area.
Division OpnO 4-51 (26 January) assigned the regiment Sector F, astride
the Yongdok-Andong road, which had been carved out of Sectors C and D,
held by the 7th and 11th Marines respectively. The KMCs were ordered to
conduct daily patrolling from positions near Yongdok, Chaegok-tong, and
Chinandong and prevent enemy concentrations in their sector.[69]
[69] References to the 1st KMC Regt in this chapter are based
on Smith, _Notes_, 1450–1458, and Col C. W. Harrison,
_Narrative_, n.d., 1–15. Previous periods of KMC
attachment to the 1stMarDiv are described in Vols I, II,
and III of this series.
Although the ROK Army and Eighth Army had the responsibility for
supplying the KMCs, it proved necessary for the 1st Marine Division
to cope with some of the gaps in equipment and rations. Contrary to a
prevalent Western belief, Koreans did not subsist on a diet of rice
alone. They were accustomed to having “side dishes” with their rice,
such as eggs, meat, fish, or vegetables. Colonel Kim Sung Eun, the
regimental commander, had an allotment of money for these purchases,
but the sum was insufficient to meet inflation prices even if there
had been enough food left in a district eaten bare. As a consequence,
the KMCs had to get along on a monotonous and vitamin-poor diet until
the ROK Army belatedly came to the rescue with issues of food for side
dishes.
On 29 January the KMC Regiment opened its CP at Yongdok. Regimental
OpnO 1 of that date divided Sector F into three parts, assigning the
western, central, and eastern subsectors to the 3d, 1st, and 2d
Battalions respectively. The 5th Battalion was attached to the 1st
Marines and assigned to patrolling operations in the Andong area.[70]
[70] What would normally have been the 4th KMC Battalion was
designated the 5th because the Korean word for 4th is the
same as the word for death and is considered unlucky.
The first few days of February saw a brief flurry of activity before
NKPA guerrilla resistance breathed its last gasps. Reports that the
remnants of the NKPA 25th and 27th Regiments were in flight toward the
zone of the 5th Marines led to a concentration for a knockout blow,
but the enemy stole away to the north in the vicinity of Topyong-dong.
There he discovered that he had jumped from the frying pan into the
fire. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines closed in from one
side while the 1st and 3d Battalions of the KMC Regiment blocked roads
in the vicinity of Samgo-ri and Paekcha-dong. Only a wild flight in
small groups saved the guerrillas from annihilation.
The nearest approach to effective NKPA resistance was encountered on 5
February after the 1st and 2d KMC Battalions had established blocking
positions in zone at the request of the 7th Marines, which was driving
the enemy northward. A platoon-size patrol of the 2d KMC Battalion came
up against Korean Reds dug in with 81mm mortars and heavy and light
machine guns a few miles southwest of Yongdok. The KMCs were scattered
with losses of 1 KIA, 8 WIA, and 24 MIA in addition to all arms and
equipment, though the missing men returned later.
It was the single NKPA success of the entire campaign.
An assault was launched the following morning on this enemy stronghold
by a composite KMC battalion, supported by four VMF(N)-513 aircraft
which attacked with rockets and bombs. The largest combat of the
guerrilla hunt appeared to be in the making, but again the enemy
vanished after putting up an ineffectual resistance with small arms and
mortars.[71]
[71] Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 _HD_,
Feb 51.
An unusual air tactic was tested on 4 February in the 7th Marines zone
when an interpreter in an R4D plane hailed the guerrillas by loud
speaker in their own language with a demand that they surrender or
suffer the consequences. Marine fighter-bombers were on station to back
the threat, and about 150 supposed NKPA soldiers came in with uplifted
hands while VMF-323 planes delivered the consequences to the holdouts
in the form of bombs, rockets, and napalm. Unfortunately, it developed
that practically all of the prisoners were terrified civilians seeking
an escape from the slave labor imposed upon them by the guerrillas.[72]
[72] VMF-323 _HD_, Feb 51.
_10th NKPA Division Scattered_
Reports of enemy activity were received daily from Korean civilians
and police, and seldom was a smaller number than “about two thousand”
mentioned. In reality, Marine patrols had difficulty in tracking down
as many as ten of the skulking, half-starved fugitives split up into
small bands hiding in the hills. On 5 February the situation was summed
up by General Smith in reply to a EUSAK request for an estimate of the
time required to complete the Marine mission:
The original 10th NKPA Div forces in the 1st Marine Division area
have been dispersed into many groups, reduced to an effective
strength of 40 per cent, and are no longer capable of a major
effort while dispersed.... It is considered that the situation
in the Division area is sufficiently in hand to permit the
withdrawal of the Division and the assignment of another mission
at any time a new force to be assigned the responsibility for the
area assumes such responsibility and the 1st Marine Division can
be reassembled.[73]
[73] Smith, _Notes_, 1378.
Patrolling continued as usual in all Marine regimental zones during the
second week in February. Some units, such as the 11th Marines and the
Division Reconnaissance Company, had made few enemy contacts throughout
the operation. But at least the cannoneers had found good pheasant
hunting and enjoyed a change in the bill of fare.
It was just as well that the tactical situation seldom made it
necessary to call for air support at this stage, since the 1st MAW
was once again in the throes of moves which will be described in the
following chapter. Bofu had been only a temporary base for MAG-33
squadrons which were making another transfer to K-9 while MAG-12
completed its shift to K-1.
VMO-6 took care of the reduced air requirements of the Division
adequately. Another helicopter “first” was scored when First Lieutenant
John L. Scott received credit for the first night casualty evacuation
by a HTL (Bell), which then had no instruments for night flying. For
a harrowing moment, however, it would be hard to beat the experience
of Captain Clarence W. Parkins and Corpsman R. E. Krisky. While they
were flying a casualty to the hospital ship _Consolation_, the patient
became wildly delirious. It took the combined efforts of pilot and
corpsman to subdue him and make a safe landing.[74]
[74] VMO-6 _HD_, Feb 51.
Any excitement would have been welcomed by the troops in general. For
the area was as tranquil as if the guerrillas had never troubled its
snowbound heights. Recently arrived Marines might have been pardoned
for concluding that the NKPA 10th Division and its gloomy commander
were but creatures of the imagination--phantoms to be compared to the
crew of the _Flying Dutchman_, that legendary ship condemned to sail on
endlessly until the Day of Judgment. The NKPA 10th Division also seemed
doomed to perpetual flight as its ghostly survivors made their way from
crag to crag of the remote ridgelines.
Thanks to the rice paddy patrols, the replacements were ready for
combat and the Division was organizing a rotation draft for return to
the States. Five officers and 600 men had already been selected on a
basis of combat time, wounds received, and length of service. Major
General Edward A. Craig, who commanded the first Marines to land in
Korea, was given a farewell dinner and congratulated on his second
star. Two new brigadier generals were named, with Lewis B. “Chesty”
Puller relieving Craig as ADC and Gregon A. Williams accompanying him
on the voyage back to the States. Captain Eugene R. “Bud” Hering, (MC)
USN, was also returning with the gratitude of all Marines for his care
of casualties in the “frozen Chosin” campaign.[75]
[75] Smith, _Notes_, 1369.
All Marine missions in the guerrilla hunt had been successfully
accomplished, so that the Division could be relieved at any time by the
2d ROK Division. There were 120 counted enemy dead and 184 prisoners.
Only estimates are available for the wounded, but there is no doubt
that the total NKPA casualties were crippling. At any rate, the NKPA
10th Division was destroyed as a fighting force without accomplishing
any of its objectives. Marine casualties from 18 January to 15
February were 19 KIA, 7 DOW, 10 MIA, 148 WIA, and 1,751 of a nonbattle
classification, largely frostbite cases soon restored to duty.[76]
[76] 1stMarDiv Periodic Operations Report (_POR_) 18 Jan-15
Feb 51, 71–159.
_New Mission for the Marines_
On 11 February, General Smith flew to Taegu to discuss the next Marine
mission with General Ridgway. The EUSAK commander spoke favorably of
employing the 1st Marine Division to relieve the 24th Infantry Division
in the critical Han River corridor, where recent UN advances had been
made. He also recognized the advantages of committing the Marines
to the east coast, so that they could be held in readiness for an
amphibious operation. A third possibility was the Yoju corridor of the
IX Corps zone (Map 1). As “the most powerful division in Korea,” said
Ridgway, “the Marines would be astride what he considered the logical
route for an expected enemy counterthrust.”[77]
[77] Smith, _Notes_, 1441–1445.
No decision was reached that day. At midnight the CCF attack
materialized; and the central front was the area of decision, as
Ridgway had predicted.
Naturally, the next mission for the Marines had to be reconsidered in
the light of this development. On 12 February EUSAK warning orders
alerted the 1st Marine Division to be prepared to move to Chungju, in
the rear area of the IX Corps front where the heaviest CCF attacks were
taking place. The Division was further directed to make an immediate
reconnaissance of the Chungju area while the 1st KMC Regiment prepared
for a move to Samchok on the east coast and attachment to the ROK
Capitol Division. The following day brought orders from the Eighth
Army to initiate these movements on 15 February 1951.[78] Thus the
Pohang-Andong guerrilla hunt came to an end with the Marines on their
way to new employment in the battle line of the Eighth Army.
[78] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51.