The CCF January Offensive
_UN Forces Give Ground--Further Eighth Army Withdrawals--Marine
Aircraft in the Battle--1st Marine Division Assigned Mission--
Replacements by Air and Sea--The Move to Japanese Airfields--
Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign--A Tactical Formula for
Victory_
On the last day of 1950 the 1st Marine Division was alerted for two
missions within an hour. At 1425 it was detached from X Corps, after
only four days, and once more assigned to the operational control of
the Eighth Army. The Marines were directed to resume their former
mission of training, reorganizing, and replacing equipment so that
they could be employed either to block enemy penetrations along the
Ulchin-Yongju-Yechon axis (Map 4), or to take over a sector along the
main line of resistance (MLR).
Forty minutes later another EUSAK dispatch alerted the Division to move
to the Pohang-Andong area, where it would be in position to block any
CCF penetration. This warning order came as no surprise, since X Corps
had already contemplated such employment for General Smith’s troops.
In fact, General Craig and Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Edward W.
Snedeker had left Masan that very morning to select assembly areas and
command posts.[25]
[25] EUSAK msgs GX 20332-KG00 and GX 20335-KG00 31 Dec 50;
1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 4.
At a conference of G-3 and G-4 officers held at Masan on New Year’s
Day, it was recommended that the administrative headquarters remain in
its present location when the rest of the Division moved up to Pohang.
Although this headquarters had accompanied the Division CP in the past,
it was believed that gains in mobility would result if the large
number of clerical personnel and their increasing bulk of documents
were left behind.[26] In view of the changing situation at the front,
there was less danger of losing valuable records if the headquarters
continued to function at Masan, maintaining contact with the forward CP
by means of daily courier planes. The plan was approved by the Division
commander and worked out to general satisfaction.
[26] Smith, _Notes_, 1315.
_UN Forces Give Ground_
Decisions were made during the first few days of 1951 in an atmosphere
of suspense and strain as adverse reports came from the firing line.
General Ridgway had assumed correctly, on the basis of prisoner
interrogations, that the main Chinese effort would be channeled
down the historical invasion corridor north of Seoul. He made his
dispositions accordingly, and the Eighth Army order of battle on 31
December 1950 (Map 2) was as follows:
U.S. I Corps--Turkish Brigade, U.S. 25th Division, ROK 1st Division,
from left to right northwest of Seoul. In Corps reserve, British 29th
Brigade.
U.S. IX Corps--ROK 6th Division, U.S. 24th Division, from left to right
north of Seoul. In Corps reserve, British Commonwealth 27th Brigade,
U.S. 1st Cavalry Division.
ROK III Corps--ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions, from left to right on
central front. In Corps reserve, ROK 7th Division.
ROK II Corps--ROK 3d Division, on east-central front.
ROK I Corps--ROK 9th and Capital Divisions, from left to right on
eastern front.
The U.S. X Corps, comprising the newly reorganized U.S. 2d Infantry
Division at Wonju and the 7th Infantry Division in the Chungju area,
had been given a mission of bolstering the ROK-held line in central and
east Korea and blocking enemy penetrations to the rear.
In Eighth Army reserve was the 187th Airborne RCT, with Thailand
Battalion attached, in the Suwon area. Also under EUSAK operational
control in rear areas were the 1st Marine Division (Masan), the 3d
Infantry Division (Kyongju), the Canadian Battalion (Miryang), and the
New Zealand Field Artillery Battalion (Pusan).
[Illustration: EUSAK FRONT LINES 3 Jan. 51
MAP 4]
Altogether, the United Nations forces in Korea numbered 444,336 men
as of January 1951. The cosmopolitan character of the fight against
Communism is indicated by the aid given to the U.S. and ROK forces
by contingents of combat troops from 13 other nations--Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.[27]
[27] Sources for this section are EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51,
4–5, 7, 9, 27, 62–65.
Enemy numbers at this time were estimated at a total of 740,000 men in
Korea and nearby Manchuria. Seven CCF armies, the 37th, 38th, 39th,
40th, 42d, 50th, and 66th were identified among the troops attacking
on New Year’s Eve. The NKPA I and V Corps also participated. Estimated
strength of the assaulting forces was 174,000 Chinese and 60,000 North
Koreans.
Previously identified but not reported in contact with U.S. forces on
31 December were the 24th, 48th, 49th, and 65th CCF armies and the NKPA
1st, 3d, and 15th Divisions.
As another possibility which could not be overlooked, the five CCF
armies which had opposed X Corps in northeast Korea might also take
part in the new offensive. Elements of the 20th, 26th, 27th, 30th, and
32d Armies identified in that area early in December, had more than
two weeks in which to reorganize and make their way to the Eighth Army
front. If they got into the fight, it would mean a formidable addition
to the enemy’s forces.
With only five days at his disposal, after arrival in Korea, General
Ridgway’s preparations were limited. His dispositions could not be
blamed, but it was the old story of the chain and its weakest link
as the enemy scored a major breakthrough at the expense of the 1st
ROK Division on the west-central front. Unfortunately, this unit
represented the tactical joint between I Corps and IX Corps. The enemy
widened the gap before dawn and drove on toward Seoul.
Early in the morning the EUSAK commanding general was on the road,
waving his arms in an attempt to stop ROK soldiers streaming rearward
in their vehicles after abandoning crew-served weapons. The short
training period for these troops, their tactical inexperience, and the
language barrier were the dissonant notes tolling the ominous chords of
defeat. The whole front was endangered as the enemy poured through an
ever widening gap, and Ridgway ordered that roadblocks be set up where
MPs could halt the fugitives, rearm them, and send them back to the
front. At his request, President Syngman Rhee appealed to ROK soldiers
over the radio and exhorted them to make a stand. By that time it was
too late to save Seoul, and the commanding general gave orders for its
evacuation.
“The withdrawal was initiated in mid-afternoon on the 3d,” he commented
in retrospect, “I stayed on the bridge site on the north bank until
dark to watch the passage of the most critical loads. These were
the 8-inch howitzers and the British Centurion tanks, both of which
exceeded the safety limits of the bridge under the conditions existing
at the time.”[28]
[28] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 5 Jun 57.
It was a scene of terror and despair that Ridgway never forgot.
Thousands of Korean civilian refugees were making their way over the
thin ice of the river Han, many of them carrying children or old people
on their backs. What impressed the observer most was the uncanny
silence of this mass flight in the freezing winter dusk, broken only
by the sound of a multitude of feet shuffling over the ice--a sound
strangely like a vast whispering. It was as if these derelicts of war
were trying incoherently to confide their misery to someone.
From a strategic viewpoint, the only course left to the Eighth Army was
a continued retirement south of Seoul. “We came back fast,” Ridgway
admitted, “but as a fighting army, not as a running mob. We brought our
dead and wounded with us, and our guns, and our will to fight.”[29]
[29] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 215.
_Further Eighth Army Withdrawals_
EUSAK Fragmentary Operations Plan 20, issued as an order on 4 January,
called for a further withdrawal to Line D (Map 4). In preparation, X
Corps had moved up to the front on the 2d, after assuming operational
control of the U.S. 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions and the ROK 2d, 5th,
and 8th Divisions and occupied a sector between U.S. IX Corps and ROK
III Corps.[30]
[30] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51, 9, 62, 64, 82, 92.
The U.S. 3d Division was attached to I Corps and the 187th Airborne RCT
passed temporarily under operational control of IX Corps.
By 7 January the UN forces had pulled back to a modified Line D
extending from Pyongtaek on the west coast to Samchok on the east and
taking in Yoju and Chechon. General Ridgway sent telegrams to all corps
commanders expressing dissatisfaction with the personnel and material
losses inflicted on the enemy during the withdrawal. “I shall expect,”
each message concluded, “utmost exploitation of every opportunity in
accordance with my basic directive.”
That evening, foreshadowing the offensive operations he was
contemplating, the commanding general ordered a reconnaissance-in-force
by a reinforced infantry regiment north to Osan to search out the
enemy and inflict maximum punishment. No contacts were made, nor did
strong patrols sent out by U.S. IX Corps flush out any sizeable groups
of Chinese. But the Eighth Army had served notice that it intended to
regain the initiative at the first opportunity.
One more blow remained to be absorbed. On the 8th the Communists struck
in the Wonju area with an attack of four divisions. Elements of the
newly reorganized 2d Infantry Division were forced to give up that
important highway and rail center after counterattacks failed. The
enemy now directed his main effort along the Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon
corridor, and North Korean guerrilla forces infiltrated through the gap
between the U.S. X Corps and ROK III Corps.
The salient created by this CCF attack caused Line D to be modified
again so that in the center it dipped sharply downward to Chungju
before curving northeast to Samchok (Map 4).
_Marine Aircraft in the Battle_
The pilots and aircrewmen of the three carrier squadrons and the
land-based jet squadron were the only Marines in a position to take an
active part in the battle. With but one TACP per division, close air
support was out of the question for the ROKs on New Year’s Day.
Control facilities were severely strained when scores of UN fliers
made use of the frequencies which the Mosquitoes employed for tactical
air direction. The voices were all in the English language, but with
more than one person doing the sending, shrill side noises sliced in
to garble the whole into a cacophony of jungle sounds. A Mosquito
trying to coach a fighter-bomber attack at the crossings of the Imjin
might be drowned out by a distant pilot calling up a controller in the
Hwachon Reservoir Area.[31]
[31] USAF Hist Study No. 72, _U. S. Air Force Operations in
the Korean Conflict_, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, (hereafter
cited as AHS-72) pp. 188–196. The term “net” denotes a
network of radio stations, all on a single frequency for
a specific purpose.
As a consequence, there was no coordinated air-ground attack in
direct support of the man in the foxhole. Most of the JOC effort was
directed to the enemy’s rear in an effort to block supporting arms,
reinforcements, and supplies.
The two Marine squadrons attached to Admiral Ruble’s carriers were at
sea, some 80 miles south of Inchon when news of the Chinese offensive
filtered through the tedious communication channels from JOC and EUSAK.
Major Lund, CO of VMF-323, led an eight-plane attack which destroyed
enemy trucks and some 40 huts believed to be occupied by CCF troops in
a village south of the Imjin.
Another Marine air mission of New Year’s Day was the flight commanded
by Major Kenneth L. Reusser for the purpose of wiping out a reported
CCF concentration on the central front. Unfortunately, he could not
get verification that the target consisted of enemy troops. Before
a decision could be made, Reusser heard a Mosquito of the 2d ROK
Division calling urgently for any flier in the area to hit another CCF
concentration (this time verified) in a village to the enemy’s rear of
the Chorwon-Hwachon area. Under the Mosquito’s direction the Corsairs
bombed and napalmed the village, then strafed survivors trying to
escape.
VMF-212, flying with Navy (Task Force) TF-77 on the eastern side of
the peninsula, had a busy New Year’s Day. Two eight-plane interdiction
strikes were flown in the morning against rear area targets along the
coastal highways. The afternoon brought an emergency call from JOC,
and the squadron “scrambled” 14 planes which hit the east flank of an
extensive enemy push south of the Hwachon Reservoir.[32]
[32] The term “scramble” in military aviation parlance refers
to an expeditious takeoff in response to an emergency
call or an alert. With highly trained personnel, it is a
pattern rather than a panic.
More than 300 UN fighter-bombers were sent out under JOC, or MELLOW,
control on the embattled first day of 1951. On the west coast TacRon-3
received more calls for air support than TG-96.8 could fill. Rear
Admiral Lyman A. Thackrey sent a request to Admiral Struble in the
_Missouri_ for additional carrier planes, and within a few hours the
Marines of VMF-212 were detached and on their way to the west coast to
join the other two Corsair squadrons of TG-96.8.
All four Marine fighter-bomber squadrons took part daily in air
operations as the Chinese Reds continued their advance south of Seoul.
VMF-311 was badly handicapped, however, by mechanical difficulties.
Engine or radio trouble accounted for five “aborts” of the 15 sorties
launched on 4 January. The remaining pilots could not make radio
contacts with their assigned Mosquito controller, and had little choice
other than to attack targets of opportunity.
The jets continued in action, but it was realized that they were
not giving the maximum of their capabilities. By mid-January the
squadron had become almost ineffective through no fault of its own.
Technical representatives from the companies that had manufactured
both the engine and plane were flown to K-9 (Map 3), and on the 16th
all jets were grounded. These inspectors did not work on the planes;
they were empowered only to report the nature of the trouble to the
airplane companies concerned. The companies in turn reported to BuAir
in Washington, which sent instructions and if necessary mechanics to
Itami, where major aircraft maintenance was done.
Meanwhile, the fall of Seoul meant that the Air Force was evicted by
enemy action from such major fields as Kimpo and K-16 on an island in
the river Han. The Sabre jets and Mosquitoes had to be pulled back, and
soon the F-51s were no longer secure at Suwon from an advancing enemy.
Admiral Thackrey’s Western Deployment Group completed the evacuation
from Inchon of 70,000 tons of supplies, 2,000 vehicles, and about
5,000 troops.[33] As the Navy closed out activities on the west
coast, TG-96.8 sent out its last combat air missions on 7 January.
VMF-214 made its final reconnaissance patrols; VMF-212 flew 25 sorties
in support of UN troops in central Korea; and VMF-323 took part in
a series of Air Force raids on enemy troop assembly areas in the
Hoengsong area.[33]
[33] AHS-72, 47, 48; PhibGru-3 _WD_, Jan 51.
Until the last, the carrier Marines alternated their Eighth Army
support missions with routine CAPs, coastal searches, and airfield
bombings. Admiral Thackrey’s Redeployment Group, including TacRon-3,
completed its task in the Inchon area and departed on the 7th. On
that same day HMS _Theseus_, flying the flag of Admiral Andrewes, was
back in west coast waters as the British pilots resumed their coastal
patrols and naval air support on that side of the peninsula. Within a
week VMF-212 and the _Bataan_ returned to fly alternate tours of duty
with the pilots of the _Theseus_. The other two carrier squadrons found
themselves unemployed for the time being. Not only were they out of a
job, they were also homeless, since the United Nations had been forced
to give up airfields at Yonpo, Wonsan, Seoul, Kimpo, and Suwon. Only
K-1, K-2, K-4, K-9, K-10, and two small fields near Taegu remained
(Map 2), and they would scarcely serve the needs of FEAF. Thus it was
that VMF-214 and VMF-323 found a temporary haven at Itami, along with
VMF-311 and most of the administrative and service units of the 1st
MAW. There was nothing to do but wait until a new home could be found
for the fighter-bomber squadrons.
_1st Marine Division Assigned Mission_
The Marine aviators might have found some consolation in the fact that
their comrades of the ground forces were also groping in a fog of
uncertainty. At the most critical period of the CCF thrust in the Wonju
area, General Smith was summoned to Taegu on 8 January for a conference
with General Ridgway. The Eighth Army commander proposed to attach one
of the Marine RCTs to X Corps in the Andong area, about 95 air miles
north of Masan. The remainder of the Division would then move to the
Pohang-Kyongju-Yongchon area, some 60 air miles northeast of Masan (Map
4).
Ridgway asked the Marine general to discuss the prospect with his
staff. He realized, he said, that no commander liked to have his
division split up, and he assured Smith that as soon as the X Corps
zone became stabilized, the RCT would be sent back to him.
They parted with this understanding, but a few hours after his return
by air to Masan the following message was received from Ridgway:
Subsequent your departure, alternate plan occurred to me on which
I would like your views soonest. It follows: 1st Mar Div, under
Army control, move without delay to general area outlined to you
personally today, to take over responsibility at date and hour
to be announced later for protection of MSR between Andong and
Kyongju, both inclusive, and prevent hostile penetration in force
south of Andong-Yongdok road.[34]
[34] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 4; EUSAK msg G-1-628-KGG, 8 Jan
51.
At 1115 on the 9th the plan was made official. An Eighth Army dispatch
ordered the 1st Marine Division to move without delay to the Pohang
area (Map 4), remaining under EUSAK control, with the following
missions:
(a) Prevent enemy penetrations in force south of the Andong-Yongdok
road;
(b) Protect the MSR connecting Pohang, Kyongju, Yongchon, Uihung, and
Uisong.[35]
[35] EUSAK msg GX-1-661-KG00, 9 Jan 51.
Based on these directives. Division OpnO 1-51 was issued at 1600 on the
9th. RCT-1 was directed to move by motor to Yongchon and to protect
the MSR, Yongchon-Uisong inclusive, from positions in the vicinity
of Yongchon and Uihung. The 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions,
plus other Division elements, were ordered to provide the required
trucks.[36]
[36] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 1-51, 9 Jan 51.
General Ridgway arrived at Masan by plane on the morning of 9 January.
He was met by General Smith and driven to Headquarters, where the
Division staff officers and regimental commanders were presented to
him. In a brief talk he reiterated the necessity for reconnaissance
and for regaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. The Marine
officers were told that limited offensive actions by Eighth Army units
would be put into effect soon.[37]
[37] Smith, _Notes_, 1279.
Division OpnO 2-51, issued at 1300 on the 10th, provided for the
completion of the Division movement by road and water from Masan to the
objective area.[38]
[38] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 2-51, 10 Jan 51.
Shortages both of personnel and equipment were much reduced during
the first two weeks of January. Returns to duty of battle and
nonbattle casualties added 945 to the Division strength. Corresponding
improvements had been made in the material readiness of the Division.
Early in January a large resupply shipment arrived from Kobe, and
a Navy cargo ship brought supplies and equipment which had been
left behind at Inchon in October. Thus the situation was generally
satisfactory except for nearly 1,900 gaps in the ranks that remained to
be filled.[39]
[39] Smith, _Notes_, 1285–1286, 1307–1308.
_Replacements by Air and Sea_
Facilities for air transport across the Pacific were limited, since
the Army was also moving replacements to the Far East. A piecemeal
process of shuttling Marines in plane-load increments could not be
completed before 30 January. Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd,
Jr., commanding FMFPac, took a dim view of this delay. It would be
better for the Division, he maintained, to receive even a part of its
replacements before it went back into action. As a compromise, he
proposed a combined air-sea lift which met the approval of Rear Admiral
Arthur H. Radford, commanding Pacific Fleet.
Three replacement drafts were already on the way, with the 3d in Japan
and the 4th and 5th at Camp Pendleton. General Shepherd scraped the
bottom of the manpower barrel so closely that he dug up an additional
700 men from Marine security detachments in Japan, the Philippines, and
other Pacific Ocean bases.
Seven trainloads of Marines from Camp Lejeune arrived at San Francisco
on 10 January to join those from Camp Pendleton. On the same day
230 of these replacements were flown to Hawaii by the Military Air
Transportation Service (MATS), by the R5D’s of Marine VMR-352 and of
Navy VR-5, and by the “Mars” flying boats of Navy VR-9. The next day
799 Marines sailed on the fast transport USNS _General W. O. Darby_.
The remainder were transported at the rate of one plane load a day
by MATS and at the rate of three or four plane loads a day by the
Navy and Marine transport planes of Fleet Logistics Air Wing, Pacific
(FLogAirWingPac).[40]
[40] Material relative to Marine replacements has been derived
from FMFPac _HD_, Dec 50 and Jan 51.
Five days later, on the 16th, the airlift had cleared the last Marine
out of Treasure Island. On 21 January, 1,000 men of the special draft
were already with the 1st Division at Pohang and the 799 on board
_General Darby_ were due to dock at Pusan.
It had been a fast job of coordination by the Navy, Army, Air Force,
and virtually all major units of the Marine Corps. Much of the special
airlift was flown by the R5Ds of VMR-352 and of VMR-152. The former,
commanded by Colonel William B. Steiner, had been flying the El
Toro-Tokyo flights since October, but most of its effort had been in
shuttling between the mainland and Hawaii. VMR-152 had concentrated on
the Hawaii-Japan leg of the long trip. During the Chosin campaign,
the squadron commander, Colonel Deane C. Roberts, had maintained his
headquarters and 10 planes at Itami to support the shuttle to Korea.
He had barely returned to Hawaii from that job when his squadron was
alerted not only for the special lift of Marine replacements but also
for a return to the Far East.[41]
[41] The balance of this section is derived from the Dec 50
and Jan 51 historical diaries of VMF-352, VMR-152, 1st
MAW, and FMFPac.
Hawaii had been the bottleneck in this special troop lift. Land and
seaplanes were discharging their human cargo at Barbers Point, Hickam
Air Force Base, and Keehi Lagoon. From there FLogAirWingPac had to
space the planes over the long stretches of sea at approximately
four-hour intervals. The guiding factor was other air traffic over
the same route and the servicing, messing, and rescue capabilities of
Guam and other points along the way, such as tiny Johnston Island. The
latter was barely big enough for its single 6,100-foot runway.
VMR-152 and the Navy’s VR-21 were assigned the mission of flying
the long Hawaii-Japan portion of the big lift. Itami became another
collection center for the airborne replacements and five of the VMR-152
planes were retained there to shuttle the troops the last 300 miles to
K-3, near Pohang (Map 2). On 21 January the troop lift reached virtual
completion, but Admiral Radford authorized the 1st MAW to retain a
couple of R5D’s at Itami a little longer. Thus the Marines were able
to avoid highway and rail traffic jams in Korea by flying men and
materials from troop and supply centers in Japan to K-1, K-3, or K-9.
Looking back at the troop lift from a historical distance, the observer
is most impressed by its demonstration of teamwork on a gigantic scale.
The Marine Corps had functioned as a single great unit, even though a
continent and an ocean separated the vanguard in Korea from the rear
echelons in North Carolina.
_The Move to Japanese Airfields_
The seven remaining UN airfields in Korea were of course not enough
to accommodate the 25 FEAF and Marine tactical squadrons. Logistics
and lack of space proved to be knotty problems. Thirty tank cars of
gasoline a day were needed for normal flight operations of K-2 alone.
Yet it took these cars eight days to make the 120-mile Pusan-Taegu
round trip, such was the strain put on the railway system by the CCF
offensive.
FEAF had standby plans to evacuate Korea entirely in an emergency. Some
of the secondary airfields of the Itazuke complex in Japan had been
reevaluated for this purpose. Originally built by the Japanese for
World War II, they were obsolescent by 1951 and because of weather,
neglect, and misuse badly deteriorated.[42]
[42] This section is based on the 1st MAW and MAG-33 _HD_s
of Jan 51; Fifth Air Force History (hereafter to be
designated FAF), Dec 50 and Jan 51; AHS-72, 35–37; EUSAK
_Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51, Sec II, 12, 63, 64–65; _PacFlt Interim
Rpt_ No. 2, II, 969, 1062; Mobile Construction Battalion
Two (hereafter MCB-2) Report of Activities for Jan 51;
Col T. J. Noon, interv of 5 Jun 58.
The most promising of these secondary airfields were Tsuika, Ozuki, and
Bofu (Map 3), ranging from 30 to 65 miles east of Itazuke and facing
one another around Japan’s Inland Sea. Nearest to Itazuke and on the
same island of Kyushu was Tsuika. Across the narrow Shimonoseki Strait,
on the shore line of Honshu, were Ozuki and Bofu.
General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, informed General MacArthur
that it was necessary to start air operations from Ozuki and Bofu as
soon as possible. A good deal of work had already been done on Tsuika,
even to moving a major Japanese highway in order to lengthen the runway
to 7,000 feet. The Air Force general wanted to repair Ozuki for his
F-51 squadrons, and Bofu was to be reserved for the 1st MAW.
This decision meant a revision of plans for the Marines. MAG-12 had
recently been lifting a hundred men a day to K-1 (Pusan west) with a
view to making it into a major base. These preparations came to an
abrupt halt, pending the final decision on Bofu.
A Marine survey of that World War II airfield showed it to be in
serious disrepair. The Air Force had already rejected it as a base for
night-harassing B-26s. Although the runway was only 7 feet above sea
level, a 720-foot hill complicated the traffic pattern. Nevertheless,
Bofu was considered suitable for the time being, and the Air Force
assured the 1st MAW that its use would be but temporary.
FEAF proposed that the Marines start flying out of Bofu immediately,
operating under field conditions. There were, however, essential
repairs to be made. The 5,300-foot runway remained in fair condition,
but much of the taxiway was not surfaced and couldn’t stand heavy use
by the Corsairs, Three of the four hangars needed extensive repairs,
as did the barracks and mess hall. Fuel would have to be stored in
drums.
The Wing had the capability for minor construction but lacked the
equipment, men, and fiscal authority to handle major work on the
runways and taxiways. The Air Force offered to furnish the labor
and materials, provided that the Navy pay for them. The Navy in its
turn was too limited in funds to restore an Air Force field for only
temporary use by Marines.
Finally, a compromise solved the problem. The Navy agreed to have
the engineering work done by a detachment of its Mobile Construction
Battalion 2 (Seabees) and furnish the concrete for patching the runways
and rebuilding the warm-up aprons. The Air Force was to provide the
pierced steel planking for the runways.
On 15 January MAG-33 sent an advance detachment of 125 officers and men
to Bofu to do some of the preliminary work, and on the following day
the Seabees initiated the heavy construction. The restoration of K-1
was meanwhile resumed by MAG-12.
Until these two fields were made ready, VMF-212 on the _Bataan_ would
be the only Marine squadron in combat.
_Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign_
The middle of January was also a transition period for the 1st Marine
Division. In accordance with Division Orders 1-51 and 2-51, the
movement from Masan commenced at 0545 on 10 January when the first
serial of RCT-1 departed by motor for the Pohang-Andong area. LSTs
898 and 914 sailed the next day with elements of the Tank, Ordnance,
Engineer, and Service Battalions. The new Division CP opened at
Sinhung, about five miles southeast of Pohang, at 1600 on 16 January;
and by the 17th all designated motor and water lifts were completed.
Thus the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were poised
to begin new operations which will be described in the following
chapter.[43]
[43] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51.
By 15 January relative quiet prevailed along the entire front; the
Chinese Reds had shot their bolt. In terms of territorial gains (Map
4) the Communists could claim a victory, for they had inflicted heavy
losses both in troop casualties and equipment on the UN forces. Yet
the CCF January offensive could not compare with the November-December
attacks either in moral or material damage done to the Eighth Army.
This time the UN divisions had withdrawn for the most part in good
order after the rout of ROK units at the outset. Nor were Ridgway’s
troops always driven from their positions by enemy action. Whenever he
had an option between sacrificing men or Korean real estate, it was the
latter he chose. And by his insistence on good combat discipline, he
made the enemy pay an exorbitant price.
Nevertheless, the blunt fact remains that the United Nations forces
had been beaten in spite of an overwhelming superiority in aircraft,
artillery, armor, and transport as well as command of the sea.
Stateside Americans can scarcely be blamed for asking themselves why
their well-equipped divisions had been defeated twice within six weeks
by an Asiatic peasant army using semiguerrilla tactics and depending
largely on small arms, mortars, and light artillery.
The answer cannot be given in simplified terms. Although the Chinese
Reds were represented by a peasant army, it was also a first-rate army
when judged by its own tactical and strategic standards. Military
poverty might be blamed for some of its deficiencies in arms and
equipment, but its semiguerrilla tactics were based on a mobility which
could not be burdened with heavy weapons and transport. The Chinese
coolie in the padded cotton uniform could do one thing better than any
other soldier on earth; he could infiltrate around an enemy position
in the darkness with unbelievable stealth. Only Americans who have
had such an experience can realize what a shock it is to be surprised
at midnight with the grenades and submachine gun slugs of gnomelike
attackers who seemed to rise out of the very earth.
Press correspondents were fond of referring to “the human sea tactics
of the Asiatic hordes.” Nothing could be further from the truth. In
reality the Chinese seldom attacked in units larger than a regiment.
Even these efforts were usually reduced to a seemingly endless
succession of platoon infiltrations. It was not mass but deception and
surprise which made the Chinese Red formidable.
They also had an advantage over Western soldiers in their ability to
withstand hunger and cold while making long night marches. After all,
the rigors of a winter campaign in Korea were not much worse than the
hardships the Chinese peasant had endured all his life. Usually he was
a veteran of at least five years’ combat experience, for China had
known little but war since the Japanese invasion of 1935. Many of Mao
Tse-tung’s troops, in fact, were former Nationalists who had fought for
Chiang Kai-shek.
The Chinese Reds held another advantage in Korean terrain well suited
to their tactical system. This factor has been ably summarized by U.S.
Military Academy historians:
The mountains are high, and the deep gorges between them are a
bar to traffic even when the streams are dry or frozen. Roads are
few, and those that do exist are not suited for heavy traffic.
Transportation then becomes a problem for the pack mule and the
human back rather than the self-propelled vehicle. Telephone
wires are difficult to lay and, with guerrillas on every hand,
are doubly hard to maintain. Even radio is limited by such
terrain, with a considerable reduction in range. In all, most
observers have agreed that American forces have seldom fought in
terrain to which modern means of war are less adaptable.[44]
[44] U.S. Military Academy, _Operations in Korea_, 28–29.
The fanaticism and political indoctrination of the CCF soldier must
also be taken into account. His introduction to Communism began when
he was persuaded that China’s small farms would be taken away from the
hated landlords and divided among the people. This is the first stage
of every Communist upheaval. Next comes a reign of terror calculated
to liquidate the entire class of landlords and small shopkeepers.
Communist China, almost literally wading in blood, had reached this
second phase in 1951, the “year of violence.” Mass trials were held in
which the People’s Tribunals, keyed up to a frenzy of fury, sentenced
group after group of “Capitalist oppressors” to death without bothering
about the evidence. The executions were public spectacles. An estimated
million and a half of them took place in 1951 alone as loudspeakers on
street corners blared out first-hand descriptions.
Drives were organized for everything in Red China. So rapidly did
they multiply that humorless Communist leaders saw no absurdity in
announcing a new drive to reduce the number of drives. And when the
Youth League tried too zealously to please, a drive was launched “to
Correct the Undesirable Habit of Filing False Reports.”[45] Under these
circumstances it is understandable that great emphasis was placed
on Red China’s “Hate America” drive early in 1951. The illiterate
masses were made to believe that Americans practiced all manner of
bestialities, including even cannibalism. This was the indoctrination
of the CCF soldier in Korea, and political commissars with a captain’s
authority were attached to each company to see that no backsliding
occurred. In case of doubt, it was a simple matter to compel the
suspected political deviate to kneel at the roadside and await a bullet
from behind.
[45] Richard L. Walker, _China Under Communism_ (New Haven,
1955), 119, 307.
_A Tactical Formula for Victory_
It might well be inquired where Red China raised the funds, for even
wars waged with human cannon fodder do not come cheaply. Much of the
money was donated by new farm owners as “voluntary” contributions
exceeding by far the rent and taxes of pre-Communist years. The slave
labor of millions of Chinese sent to concentration camps also helped
to foot the bill. In the long run, however, the Communist lords found
perhaps their most effective means in the extortion of ransom from
Chinese living outside the country on pain of torturing or killing
relatives dwelling within its borders. Enormous sums were collected in
spite of the efforts of foreign governments to put an end to this form
of secret terrorism.[46]
[46] _Ibid._, 13.
Altogether, the army of Red China may be appraised as a formidable
instrument on terrain suited to its tactics. Several of America’s
foremost military thinkers were convinced, nevertheless, that Eighth
Army reverses of the first few months in Korea were the penalty paid
for a national preoccupation with airborne atomic weapons at the
expense of preparations for limited wars.
It was only natural that the American public and its political and
military leaders in Washington should have been much concerned about
a weapon with the capability of wiping out a medium-size city in
a minute.[47] Their anxiety was heightened by President Truman’s
announcement on 23 September 1949 that Soviet Russia had exploded an
atomic bomb. A great many Americans, probably a majority, sincerely
believed that it was hardly worthwhile to prepare for an old-fashioned
limited war when the Armageddon of the future would be fought to an
awesome finish with thermonuclear weapons. National policy was shaped
by this line of reasoning; and though we had every opportunity to
study Chinese tactics prior to 1950, few if any preparations were made
to cope with them. The outbreak of Korean hostilities found the four
U.S. skeleton divisions in Japan woefully unready, both morally and
materially.
[47] The day had not yet dawned when the hydrogen bomb would
have a much greater potentiality for frightfulness.
At a later date three high-placed U.S. Army generals, Matthew B.
Ridgway, James M. Gavin, and Maxwell D. Taylor, would retire because
they could not reconcile their views with a national policy which
they interpreted as placing all our strategic eggs in the basket of
intercontinental bombers and guided missiles. Afterwards, as advocates
of preparedness for limited as well as atomic warfare, they published
books presenting their side of the case.[48]
[48] Gen M. B. Ridgway, _Memoirs_ (New York, 1956); Gen J. M.
Gavin, _War and Peace in the Space Age_ (New York, 1958);
Gen M. D. Taylor, _The Uncertain Trumpet_ (New York,
1959).
On 15 January 1951 these developments were still in the future, of
course. But even at the time it had already been made evident that
the armed forces of Red China were not an exception to the age-old
rule that there is no such thing as an invincible army. When they came
up against well trained and led U.S. Army outfits in both of their
offensives, they always had a fight on their hands and frequently a
repulse.
The Marines had proved beyond doubt in their Chosin Reservoir campaign
that the Chinese Reds could be beaten by ground and air firepower
engendered by sound training, discipline, and combat leadership. Five
Chinese armies, of three or four divisions each, were identified in
northeast Korea during the November-December operations. Three of
them were directly or indirectly opposed to the 1st Marine Division,
with a U.S. Army battalion and smaller Army units attached. Yet the
beleaguered American forces seized the initiative and fought their way
for 13 days and 35 miles through enveloping CCF units which had cut the
mountain MSR in five places.
Throughout the CCF January offensive, EUSAK G-2 officers anxiously
sought every scrap of evidence as to the whereabouts of the five CCF
armies identified in northeast Korea as late as 10 December. Even if
reduced by casualties, they would have been a formidable and perhaps
even decisive reinforcement to the seven CCF armies engaged. But they
did not appear. Nor were they encountered again until the middle of
March 1951, when similarly numbered units filled with replacements
reached the front.
The full story may never be known, since the Chinese Reds are not fond
of acknowledging their disasters. But it is a likely conjecture that
the fatal combination of Marine firepower and General Winter created
terrible havoc among Communists who had been so certain of an immediate
victory that they were neither armed, clothed, nor supplied for a
13-day campaign in subzero weather.