[Illustration]
[Illustration: CCF 5th PHASE OFFENSIVE
1st STEP 22 APRIL
2d STEP 16 MAY
]
U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
1950–1953
VOLUME IV
_The East-Central Front_
by
LYNN MONTROSS
MAJOR HUBARD D. KUOKKA, USMC
and
MAJOR NORMAN W. HICKS, USMC
[Illustration]
Historical Branch, G-3
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C., 1962
Preceding Volumes of
_U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_
Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter”
Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Operation”
Volume III, “The Chosin Reservoir Campaign”
Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 55-60727
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.--Price $2.25 (cloth)
Foreword
Americans everywhere will remember the inspiring conduct of Marines
during Korean operations in 1950. As the fire brigade of the Pusan
Perimeter, the assault troops at Inchon, and the heroic fighters of the
Chosin Reservoir campaign, they established a record in keeping with
the highest traditions of their Corps. No less praiseworthy were the
Marine actions during the protracted land battles of 1951, the second
year of the Korean “police action.”
The 1st Marine Division, supported wherever possible by the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing, helped stem the flood of the Chinese offensive in
April. Then lashing back in vigorous and successful counterattack, the
Marines fought around the Hwachon Reservoir to the mighty fastness of
the Punchbowl. The Punchbowl became familiar terrain to Marines during
the summer of 1951, and the Division suffered its heaviest casualties
of the year fighting in the vicinity of that aptly named circular
depression.
The fighting waxed hot, then cold, as the truce teams negotiated. They
reached no satisfactory agreement, and the fighting again intensified.
Finally, after a year of active campaigning on Korea’s east-central
front, the Marines moved west to occupy positions defending the
approaches to the Korean capital, Seoul.
The year of desperate fighting, uneasy truce, and renewed combat
covered by this volume saw the operational employment of a
Marine-developed technique--assault by helicopter-borne troops. Tactics
were continually being refined to meet the ever changing battle
situation. However, throughout the period, the one constant factor
on which United Nations commanders could rely was the spirit and
professional attitude of Marines, both regular and reserve. This is
their hallmark as fighting men.
[Illustration: (signature)]
DAVID M. SHOUP
_General, U. S. Marine Corps,_
_Commandant of the Marine Corps._
Reviewed and Approved 20 Nov 1961.
Preface
This is the fourth in a series of five volumes dealing with the
operations of United States Marines in Korea during the period 2 August
1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume IV presents in detail the operations of
the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the former while
operating under Eighth Army control and also as part of IX Corps and X
Corps, USA, and the latter while controlled by the Fifth Air Force.
The period covered in this volume begins in the latter part of December
1950, when the Division rested in the Masan “bean patch,” and continues
through the guerrilla hunt, the Punchbowl fighting, and all other
operations during 1951. The account ends when the Marines move to
positions in the west during March 1952.
Marines did not fight this war alone; they were a part of the huge
Eighth United States Army in Korea. But since this is primarily a
Marine history, the actions of the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force are
presented only sufficiently to place Marine operations in their proper
perspective.
Many participants in the fighting during this period have generously
contributed to the book by granting interviews, answering inquiries,
and commenting on first draft manuscripts. Their assistance was
invaluable. Although it was not possible to use all the plethora of
detailed comments and information received, the material will go into
Marine Corps archives for possible use and benefit of future historians.
The manuscript of this volume was prepared during the tenure of
Colonel Charles W. Harrison, Major Gerald Fink, and Colonel William
M. Miller as successive Heads of the Historical Branch. Production
was accomplished under the direction of Colonel Thomas G. Roe. Major
William T. Hickman wrote some of the preliminary drafts and did much
valuable research and map sketching. Dr. K. Jack Bauer and Mrs.
Elizabeth Tierney assisted the authors in research, and Mr. Truman R.
Strobridge assisted in proofreading and preparing the index.
To the Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, as well as Marine officers
and NCOs, who submitted valuable comments and criticisms of preliminary
drafts, thanks are also extended. These suggestions added to the
accuracy and details of the text. Additional assistance was rendered by
personnel of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department
of the Army; the Division of Naval History, Department of the Navy; and
the Historical Division, Department of the Air Force.
The exacting administrative duties involved in processing the volume
from first draft manuscripts through the final printed form were ably
managed by Miss Kay P. Sue. All manuscript typing was done expertly by
Mrs. Miriam R. Smallwood.
The maps contained in this volume were prepared by the Reproduction
Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, and the Historical
Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps. Official Department of Defense
photographs were used.
The Marine Corps mourns the passing of the prime author of this series
and other admirable works of Marine Corps and military history. Lynn
Montross, after a lengthy illness, died on 28 January 1961.
[Illustration: (signature)]
H. W. BUSE, JR.
_Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,_
_Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._
Contents
_Page_
I Interlude at Masan 1
Return to the Bean Patch--1st Marine Division in EUSAK
Reserve--General Ridgway New EUSAK Commander--Ridgway’s
Declaration of Faith--Marine Personnel and Equipment
Shortages--Marine Air Squadrons in Action--The Air Force
System of Control--X Corps Conference at Kyongju
II The CCF January Offensive 21
UN Forces Give Ground--Further Eighth Army
Withdrawals--Marine Aircraft in the Battle--1st Marine
Division Assigned Mission--Replacements by Air and
Sea--The Move to Japanese Airfields--Red China’s “Hate
America” Campaign--A Tactical Formula for Victory
III The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 41
The New Marine Zone of Operations--1st MAW Moves to
Bofu--Marine Rice Paddy Patrols--Operations THUNDERBOLT
and ROUNDUP--Action in the Pohang-Andong Zone--KMC
Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division--10th NKPA Division
Scattered--New Mission for the Marines
IV Operation KILLER 59
The Move to the Chungju Area--Marine Planes in
Action--Planning for the New Operation--The Jump-Off on
21 February--Stiffening of Chinese Resistance--General
Smith in Command of IX Corps--The Advance to Phase Line
ARIZONA--JOC Air Control System Criticised
V Operation RIPPER 79
Light Resistance the First Day--Seoul Abandoned by
Enemy--Second Phase of the Operation--Changes in 1st MAW
Units--General MacArthur Visits Marine Battalion--1st
KMC Returns to Division--38th Parallel Recrossed by
Marines--Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems
VI The CCF Spring Offensive 99
Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive--Hwachon Occupied
by KMC Regiment--CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine
Flank--Marine Air in Support Everywhere--Plugging
the Gap on the Marine Left--Repulse of Communist
Attacks--Withdrawal to the KANSAS Line--Enemy Stopped in
IX Corps Sector--1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps
VII Advance to the Punchbowl 127
Plan to Cut Off Communists--Initial Marine Objectives
Secured--MAG-12 Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong--Fight of
the 5th Marines for Hill 610--1st MAW in Operation
STRANGLE--KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack--1st Marines
Move up to BROWN Line--7th Marines Committed to Attack
VIII The Truce Talks at Kaesong 153
Communists Ask for Truce Talks--Patrol Bases on BADGER
Line--Red Herrings at Kaesong--1st Marine Division in
Reserve--Marine Helicopters Take the Lead--Marine Body
Armor Tested in Korea--MAG-12 Moves to K-18--The Division
Back in Action Again
IX Renewal of the Attack 173
Crossing the Soyang in Flood--Light Resistance at
First--Supply Problems Cause Delay--Resumption of
Division Attack--The Mounting Problem of CAS--First
Helicopter Supply Operation of History--The Fight for
Hill 749--5th Marines Attack Hill 812--The Struggle for
the “Rock”
X The New Warfare of Position 199
Sectors of Major EUSAK Units--Statement by General Van
Fleet--Hill 854 Secured by 3/1--Helicopter Troop Lift to
Hill 884--Helicopter Operation BLACKBIRD--“To Organize,
Construct, and Defend”--Marine Operations of November
1951--The Second Marine Christmas in Korea
XI Winter Operations in East Korea 227
Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve--Marine Raid in
Company Strength--Major General John T. Selden Assumes
Command--Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated--500 Armored
Vests Flown to Korea--Helicopter Operations MULE TRAIN
and CHANGIE-CHANGIE--The Five Days of Operation CLAM-UP
XII The Move to West Korea 247
Truce Talks--Tactical Innovations--The Marines in
Operation MIXMASTER--Operations of Fifteen Months in
Retrospect
Appendixes
A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 263
B Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division 267
C Command and Staff List 269
D Unit Citations 315
Bibliography 319
Index 325
Illustrations
_Photographs_
Sixteen-page sections of photographs following pages 86 and 214.
_Maps and Sketches_
_Page_
1 Korea as a Battlefield 4
2 EUSAK Dispositions, December 1950 9
3 Combat Air Bases 16
4 EUSAK Front Lines, January 1951 23
5 Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 43
6 Operation KILLER 61
7 Area Gained, February-March 1951 77
8 Operation RIPPER Plan 82
9 Operation RIPPER Zone 87
10 CCF Offensive, April 1951 110
11 Actions of 1/1 and 3/1, April 1951 112
12 Night of 16–17 May 1951 124
13 Drive to Yangu, May 1951 129
14 X Corps Routes of Advance, May-June 1951 139
15 1st Marine Division Zone of Action, June-July 1951 140
16 1st MAW Operating Area, May-July 1951 145
17 1st Marine Division Area, September 1951 174
18 X Corps Zone of Action, September 1951 177
19 EUSAK Dispositions, September 1951 200
20 1st Marine Division Situation, September 1951 205
21 HMR-161 Operations 1951 209
22 EUSAK Dispositions, March 1952 252
CHAPTER I
Interlude at Masan
_Return to the Bean Patch--1st Marine Division in_ EUSAK
_Reserve--General Ridgway New_ EUSAK _Commander--Ridgway’s Declaration
of Faith--Marine Personnel and Equipment Shortages--Marine Air
Squadrons in Action--The Air Force System of Control--X Corps
Conference at Kyongju_
A new chapter in Korean operations began for the 1st Marine Division at
1800 on 16 December 1950 with the opening of the CP at Masan. By the
following afternoon all units of the Division had arrived from Hungnam
with the exception of VMO-6 and small groups of such specialists as the
amphibian tractor troops left behind to assist with the redeployment of
remaining X Corps elements to south Korea.
The 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were separated for
the first time since the Inchon landing. VMF-311, the new Panther jet
squadron, was flying from K-9, an Air Force field near Pusan. Operating
together as an all-Marine carrier group taking part in the Hungnam
redeployment were the three Corsair squadrons: VMF-212 on the CVL
(light carrier) _Bataan_; VMF-214 on the CVE _Sicily_; and VMF-323 on
the CVE _Badoeng Strait_. The two Japan-based night fighter squadrons,
VMF(N)-542 and VMF(N)-513, flying from Itazuke, patrolled the skies
between Japan and Korea.
VMO-6, the observation squadron, consisting of helicopters and OY
fixed-wing planes, was attached to various ships of the Seventh Fleet
for rescue missions when pilots were forced into the sea. A detachment
of Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1) and the
entire Air Defense Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2
(MTACS-2) were also attached to the warships. They assisted in the
control of hundreds of planes that flew over the Hungnam beachhead
daily in support of the final stages of the X Corps evacuation.
The three Marine Corsair squadrons on the _Sicily_, _Badoeng Strait_,
and _Bataan_ represented the entire air strength of Escort Carrier
Task Group (TG) 96.8, commanded by Rear Admiral Richard N. Ruble.
Each squadron came directly under the operational command of the ship
on which it had embarked. Supply, engineering, ordnance, billeting,
and messing were of course provided through naval channels. The only
relationship of the squadrons to their parent organization, MAG-33,
derived from the administration of personnel and the storage of
equipment at Itami.
_Return to the Bean Patch_
Masan, the new Division assembly area, was located about 27 air miles
and 40 road miles west of Pusan on the Bay of Masan, which indents
the southern coast of the peninsula (Map 1). In order to prepare for
the arrival of the Division, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, the
assistant division commander (ADC), had flown from Hungnam with the
advance party on 12 December to make necessary arrangements.
The small seaport, which skirts the bay for about two and a half miles,
was untouched by the war as compared to the ravaged towns of northeast
Korea. It had a protected anchorage, dock facilities, and good rail and
road communications. There was an air strip at Chinhae, a few miles to
the southeast.
Some sort of cycle seemed to have been completed by veterans of the
5th Marines when they found themselves back again in the familiar
surroundings of the Bean Patch on the northern outskirts of Masan.
This large, cultivated field is entitled to capital letters because
of its historical distinction as bivouac area of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade after the battle of the Naktong in August 1950. Barely
four months had passed since that hard fight, but a great deal more
history had been made during the combats of the Inchon-Seoul and Chosin
Reservoir operations.
There was room enough in the Bean Patch for all three infantry
regiments. Headquarters, the 11th Marines, the 1st Signal, 1st Tank,
1st Amtrac, 1st Ordnance, and 1st Motor Transport Battalions were
located on the southern outskirts of town along with the 41 Independent
Commando, Royal Marines. The 1st Combat Service Group, the MP Company,
and the 1st Service, 1st Shore Party, and 1st Engineer Battalions
occupied the dock area of Masan proper. A large building in the center
of town housed the Division hospital, and the 7th Motor Transport
Battalion was assigned to the Changwon area, four miles to the
northeast.[1]
[1] This section is based on 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv)
Historical Diary (_HD_), Dec 50, 1–12; MajGen O. P.
Smith, _Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine
Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War_
(hereafter Smith, _Notes_), 1239–1242; and BrigGen E. A.
Craig, Comments, 4 Jun 57.
Peaceful as the surroundings may have seemed to troops who had just
completed the 13-day running fight of the Chosin Reservoir Breakout,
the Chidi San mountain mass some 50 miles northwest of Masan had been
for many years the hideout of Korean bandits and outlaws. The Japanese
had never been able to clear them out, and the Republic of Korea had
met with no better success. After the outbreak of civil war, they made
some pretense of aiding the Communist cause but were actually preying
upon the ROK army and police for arms, food, clothing, and other loot.
Operating in prowling bands as large as 50 or 60 men, the guerrillas
were well armed with rifles, machine guns, and at times even mortars.
In order to assure the safety both of its own bivouac areas and the
vital port of Masan, Division promptly initiated measures to maintain
surveillance over a broad belt of countryside which described an arc
from Chinju, some 40 miles west of Masan, around to Changwon (Map 1).
The infantry and artillery regiments and the Division Reconnaissance
Company were all assigned subsectors of this security belt. Daily motor
patrols of not less than platoon strength were to be conducted in
each subsector for the purpose of gaining information about the roads
and the guerrillas as well as discouraging their activities.[2] As it
proved, however, no hostile contacts were made by the Marines during
the entire Masan interlude. The guerrillas preferred to restrict their
attention to the local police and civilian population.
[2] CG 1stMarDiv FragO, 1515, 18 Dec 50.
[Illustration: KOREA
AS A BATTLEFIELD]
_1st Marine Division in_ EUSAK _Reserve_
At 2240 on the 18th a dispatch from Major General Edward M. Almond,
USA, commanding general of X Corps, informed the 1st Marine Division
that it had passed to the operational control of the Eighth Army.[3]
[3] CG X Corps msg X 15292, 18 Dec 50; EUSAK msg
GX-35290-KG00, 19 Dec 50.
Major General Oliver P. Smith reported in one of his first dispatches
to EUSAK that the Marines had received fresh rations on only three
days since landing in Korea. The Division commander invited attention
to the importance of building up the physical condition of men who
had lost weight during the Chosin Reservoir operation. An information
copy went to Commander Naval Forces, Far East, (ComNavFE), who reacted
promptly by ordering a refrigeration ship to Masan with 50,000 rations
of turkey. The G-4 of EUSAK also responded with fresh rations from time
to time until the Marines, in the words of General Smith, “had turkey
coming out of their ears.”[4]
[4] Smith, _Notes_, 1244–1245.
Games of softball and touch football became popular in the crisp,
invigorating weather as the men rapidly recuperated from fatigue and
nervous tension. A series of shows was put on by troupes of U.S. Army
and Korean entertainers, and the U.S. Navy sent Christmas trees and
decorations.
The first Christmas in Korea was observed with a memorable display of
holiday spirit by men who had cause to be thankful. A choir from the
5th Marines serenaded Division Headquarters with carols on Christmas
Eve, and all the next day the commanding general and ADC held open
house for staff officers and unit commanders.[5]
[5] The remainder of this section is based upon Smith,
_Notes_, 1264–1274.
The United States as a whole rejoiced over the news that the last of
105,000 X Corps troops had embarked from Hungnam on 24 December without
a single life being lost as a result of enemy action. President Truman
spoke for the Nation when he sent this message to General MacArthur:
Wish to express my personal thanks to you, Admiral Joy, General
Almond, and all your brave men for the effective operations at
Hungnam. This saving of our men in this isolated beachhead is the
best Christmas present I have ever had.
Photographers and press correspondents flocked to Masan during the
holiday season for pictures and interviews about various aspects of
the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Among them was Captain John Ford, USNR,
a successful motion picture director who had been recalled to active
duty to make a documentary film depicting the role of the Navy and
Marine Corps in Korea. He used scenes in the Masan area for background
material.
General Smith was informed that a motion picture company intended to
produce a feature film entitled “Retreat, Hell,” based on a remark
attributed to him, “Retreat, Hell, we are just attacking in a different
direction!” When asked if these actually were his words, the Division
commander had a diplomatic answer. He said that he had pointed out to
correspondents at Hagaru that the drive to Hamhung was not a typical
withdrawal or retreat, and thus “the statement attributed to me
described my thinking, that of my staff and unit commanders, and my
situation.”
During the Masan interlude Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, USAR, arrived as
a representative of the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins
University, which had been employed on military research projects by
the Far East Command. Marshall, a well-known military analyst who had
written several books about World War II operations, based his studies
on personal interviews with scores of participants.
The researcher was given a free hand at Masan. Aided by a stenographer,
he interviewed officers and men from privates to commanding general.
The resulting thousands of words went into a classified report
entitled, “CCF in the Attack (Part II), A Study Based on the Operations
of the 1stMarDiv in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni area, 20
November-10 December 1950.”
_General Ridgway New_ EUSAK _Commander_
Shortly after arrival at Masan, General Smith called a conference
of unit commanders and emphasized that their task was to re-equip,
resupply, repair and rehabilitate. Officers and men of replacement
drafts were to be integrated and given unit training as soon as
possible. Both veterans and newcomers were soon training in regimental
areas assigned by Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, the Division G-3, who
arranged for a 200-yard rifle range and a mortar range.
On 23 December came the news that Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker,
the Eighth Army commander, had been killed in a jeep accident. His
successor, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, had commanded
the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps in Europe during the final operations of
World War II. Commencing his flight from Washington on the 24th, he
landed at Tokyo just before midnight on Christmas day.[6]
[6] Gen M. B. Ridgway as told to H. M. Martin, _Soldier, The
Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway_ (New York, 1956), 196–211,
hereafter Ridgway, _Memoirs_.
The new commander’s task was made more difficult by the fact that
the Korean conflict, at the end of its first six months, had become
probably the most unpopular military venture of American history, both
at the front and in the United States. From a mere “police action”
at first, the struggle soon developed into a major effort in which
the national pride suffered humiliations as a consequence of military
unpreparedness. Far from building up the morale of the troops, letters
and newspapers from home too often contributed to the doubts of men who
asked themselves these questions:
“Why are we here? And what are we fighting for?”
Some of the answers were scarcely reassuring. It was insinuated, for
instance, that Americans were fighting “to make South Korean real
estate safe for South Koreans.”
“I must say in all frankness,” commented General Ridgway in his
memoirs, “that the spirit of the Eighth Army as I found it on my
arrival gave me deep concern. There was a definite air of nervousness,
of gloomy foreboding, of uncertainty, a spirit of apprehension as to
what the future held. There was much ‘looking over the shoulder’ as the
soldiers say.”[7]
[7] _Ibid._, 204–205.
These criticisms were not applicable to the 1st Marine Division.
“Our men were in high spirits and busily engaged in getting ready to
fight again,” commented Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, ADC. “In
my travels around the various units of the Division, and in talking
to the men, I never even once noticed any air of nervousness or
apprehension.... When General Ridgway visited the Division at Masan he
made a tour of the entire camp area and observed training and general
arrangements. He stated that he was quite satisfied with the 1st
Marine Division and its quick comeback after the Chosin fighting.”[8]
[8] LtGen E. A. Craig, USMC (Retd), ltr of 4 Jun 57. All
letters, typed interviews, and other documentary sources
cited in footnotes are on file in the archives of the
Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps.
General Ridgway learned soon after his arrival that the Eighth Army
staff had prepared a plan for a phased withdrawal to Pusan in case of
necessity. He called immediately for a plan of attack. Prospects of
putting it into effect were not bright at the moment, but at least it
served to announce his intentions.
Rumors were rife at this time that a general withdrawal from Korea,
in virtual acknowledgment of defeat, was contemplated. In a letter of
1957, General Douglas MacArthur wrote an emphatic denial: “I have no
means of knowing whether such action may have been seriously considered
in Washington; but, for my own part, I never contemplated such a
withdrawal and made no plans to that effect.”[9]
[9] Gen Douglas MacArthur, ltr of 6 Jun 57 to MajGen E. W.
Snedeker.
The front hugged the 38th Parallel during the last week of
December as the Eighth Army held a defensive line along the
Munsan-Chunchon-Yangyang axis (Map 2). Three U.S. divisions were
in a combat zone occupied largely by ROK units. The 24th and 25th
Divisions both reduced a third in strength by casualties, remained in
contact with the enemy in west Korea while the 1st Cavalry Division,
also depleted in numbers, occupied blocking positions to the rear.
Personnel and equipment losses suffered by the 2d Division during the
CCF counteroffensive of late November had rendered it noneffective as
a tactical unit until it could be reinforced and re-equipped, and the
3d and 7th Infantry Divisions had just landed in the Pusan-Ulsan area
after the Hungnam redeployment.[10]
[10] EUSAK Command Report (_Cmd Rpt_), Dec 50.
On 27 December 1950 the commanding general began a three-day tour of
Eighth Army units at the front. He talked to hundreds of soldiers
ranging from privates to unit commanders. There was nothing the matter
with the Eighth Army, he assured them, that confidence wouldn’t cure.
“I told them their soldier forbears would turn over in their graves
if they heard some of the stories I had heard about the behavior of
some of our troop leaders in combat. The job of a commander was to be
up where the crisis of action was taking place. In time of battle, I
wanted division commanders to be up with their forward battalions,
and I wanted corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the
hottest action. If they had paper work to do, they could do it at
night. By day their place was up there where the shooting was going on.”
[Illustration: MAP 2
EUSAK DISPOSITIONS 31 DEC 1950]
It could never have been said that this professional soldier, the son
of a Regular Army colonel, had failed to set an example in his own
career. As the commander of an airborne division, he had jumped along
with his men in Normandy.
Seldom seen in Korea without a grenade attached to his harness, Ridgway
insisted that it was not a gesture of showmanship. In mobile warfare a
man might be surprised by the enemy when he least expected it, he said,
and a grenade was useful for blasting one’s way out of a tight spot.
_Ridgway’s Declaration of Faith_
After completing his tour of the combat area, the commanding general
concluded that one thing was still lacking. Soldiers of the Eighth Army
hadn’t as yet been given an adequate answer to the questions, “Why are
we here?” and “What are we fighting for?” In the belief that the men
were entitled to an answer from their commanding general, he sat down
in his room and wrote this declaration of faith:
To me the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that
Korean town or village. Real estate is here, incidental....
The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as
God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall
defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot
their prisoners, enslave their citizens and deride the dignity
of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual
and individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive
with God’s hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead
existence of a Godless world.
If these be true, and to me they are, beyond any possibility
of challenge, then this has long since ceased to be a fight
for freedom for our Korean allies alone and for their national
survival. It has become, and it continues to be, a fight for our
own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent
national existence....[11]
[11] Memorandum from commanding general to all troops of
Eighth Army, 21 Jan 51.
The deep conviction of this declaration could not be doubted. But
Ridgway did not confine himself to moral leadership; he also insisted
on a return to sound tactical principles. Upon learning that some of
the infantry commanders in combat sectors had no knowledge of the
enemy’s strength or whereabouts, he ordered that aggressive patrolling
be resumed at once. He directed further that every unit make a resolute
effort to provide a hot reception for the Red Chinese patrols which had
met too little opposition while prodding every night for soft spots
along the thinly held 135-mile United Nations line.[12]
[12] The source for the remainder of this section is Ridgway,
_Memoirs_, 205–207.
In his talks with officers and men, the new commander told them
that too many weapons and vehicles had fallen into the hands of the
enemy during the withdrawals in west Korea. He made it plain that in
the future any man abandoning equipment without good cause would be
court-martialed.
Not only did Ridgway stress the increased use of firepower; he
requested in one of his first messages to the Pentagon that 10
additional battalions of artillery be sent to Korea. These guns were
to provide the tactical punch when he found an opportunity to take the
offensive.
Meanwhile, he had the problem of putting up a defense against a
Chinese Communist offensive expected within a week. On his first day
as Eighth Army commander he sent a request to President Syngman Rhee,
of the Republic of Korea, for 30,000 native laborers to dig field
fortifications. The energetic, 71-year-old Korean patriot provided
the first 10,000 at dawn the following morning and the others during
the next two days. Armed with picks and shovels, this army of toilers
created two broad belts of defense, one to the north and one south
of the river Han. The purpose of the first was to stop the enemy if
American firepower could compensate for lack of numbers, and the second
was a final line to be held resolutely.
_Marine Personnel and Equipment Shortages_
Although the Marine ground forces found themselves in the unusual
situation of being 200 miles behind the front, they could be sure that
this respite wouldn’t last. Every effort was being pushed to restore
the Division to combat efficiency by a command and staff acutely
aware of shortages of men and equipment. The effective strength on 29
December 1950 was 1,304 officers and 20,696 men, including 182 attached
U.S. Army troops and 143 Royal Marine Commandos. This total also
included 28 officers and 1,615 men who had arrived in a replacement
draft of 17 December, and 4 officers and 365 men in a draft of three
days later.[13]
[13] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are
Smith, _Notes_, 1280–1292, 1294, 1295, 1303; 1stMarDiv
Periodic Logistics Reports (_PLR_) 2, 11.
Authorized Division strength was 1,438 officers and 24,504 men,
indicating a shortage of 134 officers and 3,808 men. Most of the
deficiencies were in the infantry and artillery units--29 officers and
2,951 men in the three infantry regiments, and 38 officers and 538 men
in the artillery.
Division G-1 had been informed by the FMFPac representative in Japan
that about 5,000 casualties were hospitalized there, and an unknown
number had been evacuated to the United States because of overcrowding
of hospitals in Japan. Such factors made it difficult to predict how
many would return to the Division, but G-1 estimated from 500 to 1,000
in January.
The situation in regard to Division equipment might be summed up by
saying that on 23 December there was a serious shortage of practically
all essential items with the single exception of M-1 rifles. Upon
arrival at Masan, units had been required to submit stock status
reports. These lists were forwarded on 23 December to the Commanding
General, Eighth Army, with a notification that requisitions had been
submitted to the 2d Logistical Command, USA, in Pusan. It was requested
that deliveries of supplies and equipment be speeded up, so that the
Division could soon be restored to its former combat efficiency. A
comparison of the totals of selected items on 23 and 31 December as
listed on the following page shows that considerable progress was made
during those eight days.
The 2d Logistical Command in Pusan, commanded by Brigadier General
Crump Garvin, USA, deserved much of the credit for the week’s
restoration of Marine equipment. Progress passed all expectations,
considering that General Garvin was supplying other Eighth Army units
which had lost equipment during their withdrawal.[14]
[14] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr of 4 Jun 57.
There still existed on 29 December a requirement for clothing and
individual equipment, and the spare parts problem remained acute.
Ironically, the fact that the 1st Marine Division had brought most
of its motor transport out from the Chosin Reservoir was a handicap
at Masan. Eighth Army units which had lost their vehicles were given
priority for receiving new ones. This meant that the Marines must make
the best of war-worn trucks.
_Items of _T/E _Shortages _Shortages
equipment_ allowance_ 23 Dec 50_ 31 Dec 50_
Bags, sleeping 23,000 3,585 0
Machine gun, Browning,
Cal. 30, M1919A4 1,398 338 0
BAR, 30 cal. 904 441 0
Carbine, 30 cal., M2 11,084 2,075 0
Launcher, rocket, 3.5″, M20 396 105 0
Howitzer, 105mm 54 8 0
Howitzer, 155mm 18 9 0
Glasses, field, 7×50 1,740 1,305 1,006
Tank, Med., M4A3, dozer, 105 mm 12 7 7
Tank, med., M-26, 90mm 85 16 12
Truck, 1/4 T., 4×4 641 105 58
Truck, 1½ T., 6×6, cargo 54 3 0
Truck, 2½ T., 6×6, cargo 737 124 33
Radio set, SCR 536 474 211 211
Radio set, SCR 619 137 74 49
Telephone, EE8 1,162 58 58
_Marine Air Squadrons in Action_
While the ground forces trained in the Masan area, the Corsair
squadrons and the jet squadron flew combat missions. Support of the
Hungnam redeployment had top priority until 24 December, when the last
of the 105,000 troops were evacuated by Rear Admiral James H. Doyle’s
Task Force 90. Such totals as 91,000 Korean refugees, 17,500 vehicles,
and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo were also recorded by the U.S.
Navy’s largest operation of the Korean conflict.[15]
[15] ComPhibGruOne Action Rpt, Hungnam, 5–10, 25.
No serious trouble was experienced from enemy action during the two
weeks of the redeployment, although G-2 reports warned that several
Chinese divisions were believed to be in the general area. Air strikes
and naval gunfire shared the credit for this result. Nearly 34,000
shells and 12,800 rockets were fired by the support ships, and UN
planes were on station or carrying out missions every moment that
weather permitted. Marine fighters of VMF-212, VMF-214, and VMF-323,
flying from carriers after the closing of Yonpo Airfield, made a
noteworthy contribution to the success of the Hungnam redeployment.[16]
[16] For a derailed account of the “amphibious operation in
reverse,” see the last chapter of Volume III of this
series.
VMF-212, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczawski, was
assigned the task of gathering the helicopters of VMO-6 from various
ships of the Seventh Fleet and returning them to the operational
control of the 1st Marine Division at Masan. There the OYs of the
observation squadron were waiting after an overland flight, and Major
Vincent J. Gottschalk’s unit was complete.
With the Hungnam redeployment ended, the Navy offered to make its
primary carrier-borne air effort in support of the Eighth Army. There
was no single over-all commander of Navy and Air Force aviation in
Korea (other than General MacArthur himself) and the two services were
working under a system of mutual agreement and coordination.[17]
[17] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report_ (_PacFlt Interim
Rpt_) No. 2, II, 621–758.
The Far East Air Forces (FEAF), under Lieutenant General George E.
Stratemeyer, was the senior Air Force command in the Far East, on the
same level as ComNavFE, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. The largest FEAF
subordinate command was the Fifth Air Force, commanded by Major General
Earle E. Partridge, with headquarters at Taegu, alongside that of the
Eighth Army.
Strictly speaking, land-based Marine air had been under Fifth Air
Force operational control throughout the Chosin Reservoir operation.
Actually a verbal agreement between General Partridge and Major General
Field Harris, commanding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), had given
the Marines a good deal of latitude in making decisions relative to
close air support. This was often the salvation of Marine units during
the breakout, when every minute counted. Later, during the Hungnam
redeployment, control of Marine aircraft became the responsibility of
Admiral Doyle. His control agency was Tactical Air Control Squadron-1
(TacRon-1) in his flagship, the _Mount McKinley_. TacRon-1 kept in
close touch not only with the 3d infantry Division, USA, defending
the shrinking perimeter, but also with the Eighth Army and Fifth Air
Force.[18]
[18] TacRon-1 War Diary (_WD_), Dec 50.
During the last days of 1950 the four Marine air squadrons were kept
busy. VMF-212 on the _Bataan_ was attached to TF-77. The coastline
of east Korea was its hunting grounds for such missions as knocking
out warehouses, bridges, and railway tunnels between the 38th and 39th
parallels.
Along the west coast, VMF-214 on the _Sicily_ and VMF-323 on the
_Badoeng Strait_ were commanded respectively by Major William M. Lundin
and Major Arnold A. Lund. These squadrons were part of Task Group-95.1
under Vice Admiral Sir William G. Andrews, RN. The Marine aviators
found themselves in an organization made up of Royal Commonwealth
naval forces and of French, Thai, and ROK units. TG-95.1 had the
responsibility for patrolling the western coastline to prohibit
enemy movement by water in military junks and by vehicle along the
littoral.[19]
[19] _HD_s and _WDs_ of VMF-323, VMF-214, and VMF-212; _PacFlt
Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1939–1960.
VMF-311, the jet squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Neil R.
MacIntyre, remained the only land-based Marine air unit in Korea. The
Fifth Air Force had made space for it on crowded K-9, seven air miles
northeast of Pusan, when General Harris expressed a desire to keep his
jets in Korea for possible defense against Red air attacks (Map 3).
MacIntyre exercised his prerogative as squadron commander to fly the
unit’s first combat mission on 17 December. He was not, however, the
first Marine aviator to pilot a jet in combat. That distinction went to
Captain Leslie E. Brown on 9 September 1950. Assigned to the Fifth Air
Force’s 8th Fighter-Bomber Squadron as an exchange pilot, he made the
first of several routine flights with an F-80 Shooting Star.
On 20 December, 17 officers and 51 enlisted men arrived at K-9 to boost
VMF-311’s total to 27 officer pilots and 95 enlisted men. Under Fifth
Air Force control, they were employed to attack suspected CCF troop
shelters, entrenchments, and gun positions on the eve of the expected
enemy offensive. Missions of the jet planes averaged 12 a day at the
end of the month.
_The Air Force System of Control_
It was seldom realized in the middle of the twentieth century that for
the first time since the Middle Ages, a single human being represented
in his person a decisive tactical unit. Just as the mailed knight on
his barded charger had ruled the battlefields of the medieval world,
so did the pilot of a modern aircraft have the power to put an enemy
battalion to flight with napalm, or to knock out an enemy stronghold
with a 500-pound bomb.
[Illustration: MAP 3
COMBAT AIR BASES
KOREA-JAPAN]
A great deal depended, of course, on how the lightning of this human
thunderbolt was controlled. The Marine Corps and the Air Force had
different ideas on the subject. At the foundation of the Marine system
was the concept that the needs of the ground forces came first,
and control of air support should be exercised by the troops being
supported. In each Marine infantry battalion a tactical air control
party (TACP) included two aviators--one to be employed as a forward air
controller (FAC) at the front, and the other as an air liaison officer
in the battalion supporting arms center (SAC).[20]
[20] The material in this section is derived from the
following sources: _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II,
463–620; Chief. Army Field Forces Headquarters, Tactical
Air Command, Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground
Operations; and CMC, ltr to Dist List re “Analysis of CAS
Systems,” 19 Aug 52.
In an emergency both could quickly be assigned to companies or even
platoons to “talk” air strikes down on the enemy. The normal chain of
command was bypassed in favor of direct radio from the TACP to the
cognizant air control agency that had the authority to cross-check the
request for possible conflict with other operations and to channel
fighter-bombers to the attack.
Intermediate commands kept themselves informed of the over-all air
picture and controlled the employment of aviation by their own
subordinates as they listened in on these requests. They indicated
approval by remaining silent, and disapproval by transmitting a
countermand.
The hub of the Air Force system was the Tactical Air Control Center
(TACC) of the Fifth Air Force-EUSAK Joint Operations Center (JOC),
known by the code name MELLOW. An aviator coming on duty called up
MELLOW and received his instructions from JOC.
FACs were assigned to U.S. Army and British units down to corps,
division, and regimental levels, and to ROK corps and divisions.
Further assignment to smaller front line units was possible but
entailed a good deal of time and advance planning. And even the most
urgent requests had to be channeled through division and regimental
levels to JOC for approval.
If a Marine FAC wasn’t able to control an air strike visually because
of terrain conditions, he called for a “tactical air coordinator,
airborne” (TACA) to locate the target from the air and direct
planes to the attack. The Fifth Air Force also used special airborne
coordinators. Known as “Mosquitoes,” they flew low-winged, two-seater
North American training planes, designated T-6s by the Air Force and
SNJs by the Navy.
This plan was capable under favorable circumstances of providing the
Fifth Air Force-EUSAK tactical air control system with a mobile and
flexible means of directing air power at the front. Its chief weakness,
according to Marine doctrine, lay in the separation of air power from
ground force control. The Air Force claimed the advantage of projecting
tactical air power deep into enemy territory; but as the Marines saw
it, this was deep or interdictory support, and not to be compared to
genuine close air support.
_X Corps Conference at Kyongju_
The command and staff of the 1st Marine Division could only speculate
during this interim period as to what the near future might hold for
them. Rumors had been circulated, during the first week at Masan, that
the Division would be employed as rearguard to cover an Eighth Army
withdrawal from Korea, with Pusan serving as the port of debarkation.
And while plans cannot be made on a basis of rumor, General Smith and
Colonel Bowser went so far as to discuss the possibility seriously. At
last, on 24 December, a more definite prospect loomed when the EUSAK
staff requested the Division to furnish logistical data for a move by
rail and truck to Wonju, some 130 miles north of Masan.
It was not known whether an actual move was contemplated or the
intention was merely to have available a plan for future use if the
occasion warranted. General Smith sent the data but added a strong
recommendation to the effect that any commitment of the Division be
postponed until it was re-equipped and strengthened by replacements.[21]
[21] 1stMarDiv _HD_ Dec 50, 12–13; Smith, _Notes_, 1258–1259.
At this time the Marine general received a copy of a map prepared
by the Eighth Army staff which showed the phase lines of a 200-mile
withdrawal from the combat zone to the Pusan port of debarkation. No
enlightenment as to the employment of the Division was forthcoming
until 27 December 1950, however, when a EUSAK dispatch directed that
the Marines be detached from Eighth Army reserve and reassigned to the
operational control of X Corps.[22]
[22] EUSAK msg GX-20179-K600, 27 Dec 50.
A message of the 28th requested General Smith to attend a conference at
the X Corps CP at Kyongju (about 60 air miles northeast of Masan) on
the 30th. He was directed to bring several members of his staff with
him and to assign a liaison officer to X Corps.[23]
[23] CG X Corps msg X 16070, 28 Dec 50.
Two VMO-6 helicopters flew him to Kyongju along with his G-3, Colonel
Bowser, and his aide, Captain Martin J. Sexton. Tossed by high winds,
they landed just in time to meet General Ridgway, who gave a talk
emphasizing the necessity for reconnaissance and maintaining contact
with the enemy.
The new plan for X Corps employment, as modified after discussion with
the Eighth Army commander, called for the recently reorganized 2d
Infantry Division to be placed under operational control of General
Almond. It was to move out at once to the Wonju front, followed by the
3d and 7th Infantry Divisions. The 1st Marine Division was to stage to
Pohangdong (Map 3) on the east coast, some 65 miles north of Pusan,
with a view to being eventually employed on this same front.[24]
[24] This account of the Kyongju conference is derived from
Smith, _Notes_, 1269–1271.
“Certainly no one could accuse General Almond, the X Corps commander,
of defeatism,” was a tribute paid by General Smith. On the contrary,
the Marine general had sometimes differed with him on the grounds
that he was aggressive to the point of giving too little weight to
logistical considerations and time and space factors.
It was realized at the conference that administrative decisions
must depend to a large extent on the outcome of the impending enemy
offensive. G-2 officers of the Eighth Army, forewarned by prisoner
interrogations, were not surprised when the blow fell shortly before
midnight on the last night of the year.
In spite of Air Force bombings of roads and suspected supply dumps,
the Chinese Reds had been able to mount a great new offensive only
three weeks after the old one ended. Attacking in the bitter cold of
New Year’s Eve, they made penetrations during the first few hours in
ROK-held sectors of the central and eastern fronts. By daybreak it
became evident that Seoul was a major objective, with the UN situation
deteriorating rapidly.