or honor that could have dictated Mr Swett's comments on these two
errors. 1. Of the breastwork error, he says--"By describing it as
reaching down to the slough he has represented it as longer than it
was, and has marred and obscured by this mistake one of the principal
features of the battle," &c., &c., p. 5. Indeed! Is this so? Let
both descriptions be examined and it will be seen who, in this, has
"marred and obscured" this battle the most. The Siege says, page
135--"A breastwork beginning a short distance from the redoubt, and
on a line with its eastern side, extended about _one hundred yards_
north to a slough." The distance specified was taken by measure
from Page's Plan--"to a slough" was taken from Mr Swett's History!
The error is mostly corrected by the limitation. Now Mr Swett's
description (History, p. 20, 1823 edition) reads--"A breastwork
ran in a line with it _north down to the slough_." The error here
has no corrective! My breastwork runs only "_about one hundred
yards north_." Mr Swett's breastwork _runs north down splash to the
slough_,--marring and obscuring (_he_ says,) the principal features
of the memorable Bunker Hill battle! But really he is altogether too
severe on his mistake! 2. On the other error Mr Swett writes--"As if
purposely to declare he did not think anything relative to Putnam
deserving of ordinary care or attention, he says--'This report states
Callender was riding down the hill, when there is not a syllable of
the kind,'" p. 13. Now, 1st, the words put upon me between quotation
marks are not mine. This is not what I say. The statement in the
Siege, p. 164, is--"In the report (1775) made to the Massachusetts
provincial congress it is stated that on Bunker Hill he (Putnam)
ordered Capt. Callender, who was riding down the hill, 'to stop and
go back.'" This statement, substituting _going_ for _riding_, is
correct. The exact statement of the report is that "an officer of
the train was drawing his cannon down" Bunker Hill, when General
Putnam met him and ordered him "to stop and go back." "He refused,
until the General threatened him with immediate death, upon which
he returned up the hill again, but soon deserted his post. Another
officer, who had the direction of another cannon, conducted much in
the same manner." And in another place Captains Gridley and Callender
are named as being the officers. Now, by comparing this report with
an article on Callender in the Centinel (1818), it will be seen
that it was Callender "_who was going down the hill_." The sentence
in the Siege is quoted simply to show that Gen. Putnam gave orders
in the battle, and is _concise_, but it was written with "_care
and attention_." I fearlessly appeal to the report to sustain this
remark. Let Mr Swett look at it closely, calmly, and surely he cannot
again write that "there is _not a syllable of the kind there_!"
As though I had manufactured the whole statement! Here, then, an
inexact quotation from the Siege, and a false statement as to fact,
are prefaced by an illiberal, unjust and even wanton remark. Let the
Siege of Boston, I had almost written _everywhere_, answer whether
its author "did not think anything" "deserving of ordinary care and
attention" relative to General Putnam. While Mr Swett is dealing out
such rank injustice, accusing me of "sacrificing" Putnam's character,
of "_racking my fancy_" to discover objections against "his claims,"
and I know not what else, it is peculiarly gratifying to me to be
able to show the impression which the pages of this volume, as far
as they relate to Putnam, made on a candid critic. An article on the
Siege of Boston, in the Philadelphia Bulletin--understood to be from
the pen of WILLIAM B. REED, Esq., the accomplished author of the
Life of President Reed--after, I fear, too favorable a notice of my
labors, reads:--
"For one thing we especially thank Mr Frothingham--his defence
of Putnam from the miserable imputations which anonymous or
irresponsible writers of a late day have sought to cast on his
memory. He does it thoroughly, and shows that at Bunker Hill, as on
all occasions where he had a chance, the old man valiant did his duty
well."
What but partizan feeling could have dictated such gross and
groundless attacks on the integrity of the Siege of Boston as abound
on nearly every page of Mr Swett's pamphlet?
Having thus shown what some of the accusations made against the
History of the Siege of Boston amount to, I might here stop. If
remarks on the Battle of Bunker Hill, to which I apprehended no
intelligent inquirer would object, and a fair citation of the
evidence on both sides, which it would have been grave neglect to
have omitted, be excepted, the whole statement relative to the
question of command is given in a few lines, and seemed to be
such as the authorities quoted necessarily demanded. They will
do it injustice who discover in it, or fancy they discover,
any disposition to make out an exclusive hero, or to fortify an
"invincible prepossession." The question really seems of little
practical account. General Putnam acted throughout with that bravery
that marked his nature,--at the rail fence and on the brow of Bunker
Hill in the heat of the action, and in the rear of these urging
on the reinforcements. Gen. Warren, armed with a musket, fought
in the redoubt, where he remained throughout the action; General
Pomeroy, in the same way, kept at the rail fence; Colonel Prescott
commanded at the original entrenchments. How much would it add to
the fame of either of these patriots, were it made out clear that
either exercised, or was authorized to exercise, a general command?
How much would it increase the gratitude posterity owes to their
memory for their gallant conduct? With such views, even the zeal
and positiveness, and injustice, of Mr Swett shall not make me a
partizan. I have only gone where the evidence carried me.
But the question of the command--a really curious historical
question--had to be met, and I endeavored to account for the
incongruity of the statements relative to it, and to dispose of it,
in a way, which, if free from non-committalism, should also be free
from dogmatism. The candid must judge whether the attempt has been
successful. Mr Swett is not satisfied with the disposition, and
announces his intention as follows:--"It will be our duty to enter
into a thorough investigation of this subject of the command." It
may be well, therefore, to follow him, and see how thorough has been
his investigation, how sound is his reasoning, and how satisfactory
is his conclusion. There is matter bearing on this subject in the
Siege of Boston, never before printed, never before alluded to,
consisting of extracts from original letters from General Ward and
General Putnam; an entire and most important letter from Colonel
Prescott; copious extracts from Judge William Prescott's memoir;
an important document from Rev. Peter Thatcher; Rev. John Martin's
statement; a fine letter from Captain John Chester, a brave and
accomplished officer, who was in the battle; to say nothing of
various other contemporary MS. letters and documents referred to
and quoted. It is rather a question of fact than of argument. The
positive language of contemporaries has, at least, as much to do
with it, as considerations relative to military rank. Now, whoever
professes to thoroughly investigate this subject, and does not cite
these authorities fully and fairly, and consider them candidly, makes
an unfortunate mistake. How does Mr Swett deal with them?
Mr Swett first notices, for he cannot be said to quote them, the
authorities that bear in favor of Colonel Prescott. He does not
allege that they are inaccurately presented in the Siege of Boston,
but complains that they are "left unexplained," and hence that
they may "mislead" readers. Now the intention was to cite these
authorities, relating both to Putnam and Prescott,--_leaving out
the soldiers' statements_--as concisely as possible, and let them
make their own impression. It was no part of my plan to stretch them,
or shorten them, or twist them, or explain them, so as to sustain
a favorite theory. Such work was left for others. Mr Swett has
explained some of this testimony and what is the explanation? Passing
by sundry inferences that are unwarranted, and sundry statements
relative to Prescott, put upon me that I never made, it will be
sufficient to notice his manner of dealing with the two Thatchers',
Ward's and Scammans's testimony. The admirable letter of Colonel
William Prescott is not in this connection, noticed or named by him!
Mr Swett will find it, copied I think correctly from the original,
on pp. 395 and 396 of the Siege of Boston! Neither does he appear to
have _seen_ Rev. Peter Thatcher's important statement. This, also, he
will find, in the same volume, pp. 385 and 386! I commend them to his
attention.
1. Mr Swett comments on the statement of Rev. Peter Thatcher as
follows:--"The report of the committee of safety says--'The commander
of the party gave orders to retreat from the redoubt'; and one of
the writers of the report is supposed to have called Prescott 'the
commander of the provincials.' That is, Prescott commanded the
_party_, the _provincials_, who raised the redoubt, and those of them
who fought there under him, till he gave them orders to retreat."
But, 1, as to the character of this evidence. What _supposition_
is there about this authority? _Supposed_ to have called Prescott
the commander! I print from the original a statement made by Rev.
Peter Thatcher in his own handwriting, under his own signature,
relative to his own account of the battle, which is the basis of all
the accounts; and I state that the sheet on which this statement
is written encloses a manuscript copy of this account, with the
interlineations preserved, and that I found this at Worcester. Now
this document--page 385 of the Siege of Boston--is either false, or
it is true. If false, let Mr Swett say so; if true, there can be no
supposition. It is as much _a fact_ that Rev. Peter Thatcher says
that Colonel Prescott was the commander, as it is that the battle
was fought. 2. Let the authority bear as it will, even though it
cut a theory at right angles, there is no such limitation about it
as Mr Swett puts to it. Here it is--that part of it relating to the
command:--"The following account was written by a person who was an
eye witness of the Battle of Bunker Hill. Some of the circumstances
the intervention of the hill prevented him from seeing, for he stood
on the north side of Mystic river. What facts he did not see himself
were communicated from Col. Prescott (who commanded the provincials),
and by other persons, who were personally conversant in the scenes
which this narrative describes." Such is the authority. Where is the
limitation that Mr Swett applies to it? Mr Thatcher is talking about
the _whole_ battle. What right has Mr Swett to restrict his language
to the party who raised the redoubt and fought _there_ under him? If
Prescott's _position_ during the battle is confined to his post, the
original entrenchments, it must be deduced from other circumstances
and authorities, and not from Thatcher's words. If Prescott did not
go to the rail fence, his sagacity saw the necessity of this new
position, and his order occasioned it to be taken. But more of this
is in the sequel.
2. Mr Swett next comments on the letter of General Ward. So important
an authority required an exact quotation, but he introduces it as
follows:--"Gen. Ward, in his letter to President Adams, 30th Oct.,
'75, says that Bunker Hill battle was conducted by a Massachusetts
officer," p. 6. These words are put in quotation marks. But whose
language is it? Not Ward's, for he says, October 30, 1775,--"I think
there has been no one action with the enemy which has not been
conducted by an officer of this colony, except that at Chelsea, which
was conducted by Gen. Putnam:" not mine, for this is an opinion on
these words expressed as follows:--"General Ward's remark is decisive
that a Massachusetts officer conducted the battle." Who, then, is
quoted? There were no such words to quote. They were manufactured by
Mr Swett.
And the comment is of a piece with the coinage. Mr Swett sees the
difficulty--with these words of Ward to take into the account--a
writer who desires to be accurate has to meet, if he ascribes to a
Connecticut officer the command of the battle, but he removes it
in the following curious way:--"Ward was endeavoring to make out a
strong case for the Massachusetts against the southern officers. As
he knew it was physically impossible for Prescott to have conducted
the battle--because he was on foot, and militarily so; because there
were generals and other officers older than Prescott on the field--he
must have intended to designate himself or Warren as the conductor
of the battle. Possibly he intended to claim the honor himself. The
first syllable of the word "conducted" has been altered by the pen:
he began, perhaps, to write the word "commanded," but, recollecting
that he could not claim the command, altered it into "conducted," p.
7. This twisting and syllable business will not answer. General Ward
must be dealt with in a straighter way and with more breadth of view.
It adds force to this remark of General Ward, that it was written at
a time when the circumstances of the battle of Bunker Hill were much
talked of in the American camp. Nobody at this time (October, 1775,)
thought of ascribing much credit to the plan of the enterprise to
Charlestown. At this time it was no glory to have had the general
command, or conduct, or responsibility of the Bunker Hill battle. But
those who really fought this battle stood out then, as they do now,
in envied prominence. An article in the Connecticut Courant, which
does not say that Putnam commanded, had much to say in praise of the
Connecticut officers, but not a word about such officers as Prescott,
Brewer, Gardner, Parker, &c. "This account," General Heath writes
October 23, 1775, "was detested by the brave Putnam." The trials,
also, had for months been going on for the ill behavior of officers.
The battle, then, was no obsolete affair. The camp was alive with
talk about it. It is at such a time, that General Ward writes to John
Adams, October 30, 1775--"I think there has been no one action with
the enemy which has not been conducted by an officer of this colony,
except that at Chelsea, which was conducted by General Putnam." The
action at Chelsea took place in the previous May, in which General
Putnam commanded, and led the men with great bravery. Now, General
Ward was thinking over the actions there had been with the enemy, and
thinking also of General Putnam's agency in them. Had there been, as
to the Bunker Hill enterprise, an express agreement between Ward and
Putnam--had Putnam been detached as the general officer to exercise
the command--had he conducted so important a battle--is it probable,
is it possible, that a person of the strict integrity of General
Ward would have written in this way only four months afterwards? Is
not the inference from his words a _necessary_ one, that General
Putnam did not conduct, or command, in the battle of Bunker Hill,
as he conducted or commanded in the battle at Chelsea, but that it
was a Massachusetts officer who performed this duty? It would not be
inconsistent with these words to ascribe the conduct or command of
the battle to Ward, or to Warren, or to Prescott--all _Massachusetts_
officers--but it is utterly inconsistent with them to ascribe it
to General Putnam, a _Connecticut_ officer. This remark has this
significance or it has none.
The way Mr Swett treats this authority deserves notice. He first
garbles it, and then endeavors to evade its force. He tells, with
due gravity, what General Ward began to write, but did not write
and to crown all, tells who he probably intended to name as the
commander, but somehow did not name. Mr Swett says that he meant
to say "That Warren was the conductor or commander of Bunker Hill
battle"!! Now really all this looks like "manufacturing a case." Is
not this modest in one who professes to be so indignantly averse to
such discreditable business? But Mr Swett, on this _fifth_ page of
twisting, surely did not so faithfully reflect as he did on the ninth
page, that, "We were dealing with hard characters. Ward, Warren,
Putnam and Prescott," he there rousingly writes, "are not rag babies,
that an historian may bend and distort according to his fancy. The
whole kingdom of Great Britain could not bend one of them," &c.
Why then does he try to bend Ward's words to suit his theory, or
distort them according to his fancy? This is no way to deal with
authorities. This is trifling with history. Mr Swett must take the
language of Ward as it is, even though unaltered it consigns a
theory, nursed with parental care for more than a generation, to the
tomb of the Capulets.
3. The remark of Colonel Scammans--that "there was no general officer
who commanded at Bunker Hill"--made too as though it were a perfectly
well known fact, is first denied, and then characteristically
explained so as to mean nothing. "The author," Mr Swett says,
"attributes to Colonel Scammans an anonymous note in a newspaper,
written perhaps by the editor." Now if the note were written by the
editor, it was not anonymous! But let this absurdity pass. Let any
one turn to the New England Chronicle of February 29, 1776, read
there a letter requesting the editor "to print the proceedings of the
court martial, _with some remarks upon the depositions then taken_,"
and signed "James Scammans," _Colonel_ Scammans, and then say how
cool it is in Mr Swett to write that "the note was anonymous" or that
it was "written by the editor." The remark, I repeat, was undoubtedly
made by Colonel Scammans, and it is so plain that it speaks for
itself. Besides this, Mr Swett charges me with omitting to mention
here, that "Scammans, during the battle, sent to General Putnam, at
Bunker Hill, to see if he was wanted," and that afterward "General
Putnam came up and ordered the regiment to advance." Now truly this
is not omitted, but it all appears on page 164 of the Siege of Boston
among the things _bearing in favor of General Putnam_! Mr Swett
however plies his ridicule here: but really I do not see the cause
of it, without he designed it to rebuke me for the presumption of
putting corn into his hopper. Up stream or down stream it seems to
be all the same. Mr Swett's zeal for his hero has even a lover's
jealousy. He frankly admits (p. 4,) that I treat General Putnam's
character "with the utmost candor and kindness," but still to his
mind, there is a heathenish heart in it,--for he says, it is done,
"as animals destined for the altar are pampered, to be sacrificed at
last." The renowned Mr Burchell would say _fudge_.
4. Mr Swett's remark on Dr J. Thatcher's statement,--a surgeon in
the army--the first, I think, to make such a statement, is still
worse. He says Thatcher is unequivocal in favor of Putnam's command,
by placing him at the head of all the officers in the following
words: "Generals Putnam, Warren, Pomeroy, and Colonel Prescott were
emphatically the heroes of the day." And Mr Swett writes this,
too, when Dr Thatcher goes on to say that "though _several general
officers were present, Colonel Prescott retained the command during
the action_"!! Comment on this is unnecessary.
It is not very surprising that Mr Swett, after such a sham review
of the authorities bearing in favor of Colonel Prescott, should
venture to write that "in the whole of them there is not a shadow of
an excuse" for my conclusion, one half of which he actually quotes,
but the other half he characteristically suppresses! Is it then
possible that such authorities, the whole of them, do not supply even
"_a shadow_ of an excuse" for stating that "the original detachment
was placed under the orders of Colonel Prescott, and that no general
officer was authorized to command over him during the battle?" What!
When, according to General Ward, a Massachusetts officer must have
conducted the battle; when, according to Judge Tudor, there _was no
authorised general officer on the field_; when Col. Scammans says
no general officer commanded; when Martin, Gordon, Thatcher, and
Prescott himself state explicitly that the original detachment was
put under Col. Prescott's orders; when James Thatcher states that,
though several general officers were present, Prescott retained
the command during the action; when Peter Thatcher states that he
commanded; when John Pitts states that no one but Prescott appeared
to have any command; and when Judge Prescott states that he had
orders in writing, and that no officer exercised or claimed any
authority over him during the battle! When a writer confesses that
evidences of this sort "come like shadows, so depart," all that need
be said is, that the difficulty is not with them, it is not that they
lack character, directness, or substance, but it is in the writer's
mind, it is what metaphysicians term _subjective_--perhaps it is a
"_prepossession_" that is "_invincible_"--and it therefore cannot be
reached and removed.
In direct conflict with this conclusion, however, is the statement
made first by Rev. Mr Whitney in 1790, as from conversations with
General Putnam--"That the detachment was put under the command of
General Putnam; with it he took possession of the hill, and ordered
the battle from beginning to end;" or as Hon. John Lowell (1818)
states it:--"If General Putnam is to be believed, he first proposed
the taking possession of Bunker Hill, and was detached for the
purpose of fortifying it, and Col. Prescott was placed under his
orders;" or as Mr Swett (1818) states it--"General Putnam having
the general superintendence of the expedition," accompanied the
detachment; or (in 1850) he went to Breed's Hill, p. 23, "under the
express agreement with General Ward that he was to do so, and to
have the direction and superintendence of the whole expedition."
The proof to sustain this consists, 1. Notices in diaries, letters,
or newspapers, giving the earliest rumors of the action, as Stiles'
Boyle's, S. Ward's, Jackson's, Clarke. None of these are dated later
than June 1775. Or, 2. Matter commencing with Whitney's declaration,
May, 1790, and supported in 1818, and afterwards, by the statements
of the soldiers and others; as, Putnam, Grosvenor, Dexter, Bancroft,
Cleaveland, Allen, Trevett, Dearborn, Thaxter, Keyes, Smith, and
Low. The character of this sort of evidence has been sufficiently
dwelt upon. It is granted that a specious argument may be framed out
of it, either in favor of Prescott or of Putnam, and still a more
specious one, I am sure, in favor of the position that there was no
command in the action. A re-reading of this matter has only served
to strengthen a conviction of its unsatisfactory nature, and that
contemporary testimony, of a proper character, ought to determine
the question. As to proof of this sort, it will only be remarked,
that I have not met with _a single statement_, in manuscript or in
print, to the effect that General Putnam commanded in the battle of
Bunker Hill, _between the dates of June, 1775 and May, 1790_. Mr
Swett does not produce any such statement. On the contrary, every
contemporary allusion to his conduct in the battle, I could find, has
been faithfully quoted. But the same allusions to Colonel Prescott,
which also might be supported by soldiers' statements, are of the
most positive character, and they state that the orders to occupy
Bunker Hill were given to him, and that no general officer interfered
with his command. In accounting for this conflict of testimony, in
page 166 of the Siege of Boston, I remark--"Without intending to
question the honor or the veracity of any one, it is more reasonable
to conclude that the facts communicated by the general (Putnam) have
not been stated exactly, and with the proper discriminations, than it
is to conclude that so many independent contemporary authorities are
incorrect in stating that the first detachment was placed under the
orders of Colonel Prescott."