THE
COMMAND
IN THE
BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL,
WITH
A REPLY TO "REMARKS ON FROTHINGHAM'S HISTORY
OF THE BATTLE, BY S. SWETT."
BY RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, JR.,
AUTHOR OF A HISTORY OF THE SIEGE OF BOSTON.
BOSTON:
CHARLES C. LITTLE AND JAMES BROWN.
1850.
PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF THE BOSTON POST, NO. 21 WATER STREET.
THE
COMMAND
IN THE
BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL.
The preparation of a History of Charlestown--the occupation of
leisure hours--led to large collections relative to the military
events which occurred in the neighborhood of Boston at the
commencement of the war of the revolution; but as a full account of
them did not appropriately belong to so local a publication, and as
no work had been issued containing a narrative, in much detail, of
these interesting events, it was thought best to prepare the volume
now before the public entitled HISTORY OF THE SIEGE OF BOSTON. The
old subject of the battle of Bunker Hill was so directly in my way
that it could not be avoided; and as an apology for adding another to
the narratives of this event, I determined to construct it, as much
as possible, from contemporary materials.
In a faithful history of the battle, the question of command cannot
properly be avoided. If it is not of the importance which many attach
to it, still it is a curious question, about which there is much
interest. It may be well, in the outset, to state clearly the matter
at issue. The point is, was there a general officer detached to
exercise a general command in the battle? There is great incongruity
in the statements relative to this. It is stated (by Dr Whitney)
that the detachment that fortified Breed's Hill was first put under
the command of Gen. Putnam, that with it he took possession of this
hill, and "ordered the battle from beginning to end;" or as another
(Hon. John Lowell) states it, "General Putnam was detached for the
purpose of fortifying it (Bunker Hill,) and Colonel Prescott was
placed under his orders." On the other hand it is stated, that the
orders to fortify Bunker Hill were given to Colonel Prescott, that
the redoubt was raised by troops under his command, and that at no
time during the whole affair did he act under, or receive an order
from, a general officer. These statements are conflicting and cannot
both be true. It is these rival claims as to Putnam and Prescott that
constitute the delicacy and difficulty of the question.
Whoever investigates this subject must determine the kind of evidence
that will be allowed to influence, mainly, the decision. There are
numerous statements of soldiers who were in the battle, which were
made forty years or more after it took place; after antipathy or
gratitude had biassed them against or for their old commanders;
after what they had heard and had come to believe, had unconsciously
become interwoven with impressions of what they saw; and at a time
of life, too, when exactness as to details of what took place
so long before in such a scene, could not reasonably have been
expected. These relations bear, in some points, the characteristics
of tradition. They mostly harmonize as to the movements of companies
or regiments, but differ, irreconcilably, on points bearing on the
question of command. An argument, or an array of evidence, of equal
authority and of equal positiveness, may be drawn out of this large
reservoir in favor of Putnam, or of Prescott, or that there was
no general commander, or that there was no command at all in the
action. A somewhat laborious study, and critical collation of these
statements forced upon me the conviction, that they ought not to be
relied upon as leading authorities, and that it was idle to expect
to arrive at a satisfactory result by depending on such sources of
information. Hence diligent search was made for contemporary matter.
Much caution and discrimination, however, are necessary in using such
material. The first rumors of events are as apt to be as inaccurate
as reminiscences of those events prepared after years have elapsed.
But these rumors are followed by relations more reliable, and it
is material of this sort that is the most valuable for historical
purposes. It was such material that was selected. There are, however,
but few facts bearing on the question of command in the many
contemporary documents I have examined. Yet what is gleaned from them
is important. Among the documents are letters from Generals Ward and
Putnam, and Col. Prescott. The facts they supply are on some points
conclusive.
Still, in a volume designed to be a simple record of authentic
facts, and in a narrative of the battle prepared without conscious
bias for or against either Putnam or Prescott as the commander, a
labored argument on the question of command seemed neither desirable
nor proper; and in disposing of it, it was thought best to state
concisely, yet fairly, all the evidence of a contemporary nature
relative to both that was known, state the conclusion it seemed
to warrant, and leave the subject with the reader. This course,
right or wrong, it is proper to say, after a remark of Mr Swett in
the pamphlet which has occasioned this publication, was suggested
solely by reflection on the authorities; and the gentlemen to whom
he alludes are hereby exonerated from all responsibility, even for
a suggestion, on this subject. And the "invincible prepossession,"
which seems to puzzle Mr Swett, it will be indeed "useless to
inquire" into because it did not exist. One great reason for
treating the subject in this way was, that the reader, with facts
thus before him, might make up a theory to suit himself. This plan
was, accordingly, carried out. And though Mr Swett is pleased to say
that I labored "throughout a large portion" of the Siege of Boston
to prove a certain "insignificant abstraction," yet, if so, it was
unconscious labor, and to say so is ascribing to the effort far too
much design. The evidence is merely stated and left to speak for
itself. The reader will find it to occupy seven pages.
The conclusion reached is that there was no general commander, other
than Gen. Ward, of the Bunker Hill battle. After quoting the evidence
that bears in favor of Colonel Prescott, the following statement
is made:--"The conclusion warranted by this evidence is, that the
original detachment was placed under the orders of Colonel Prescott,
and that no general officer was authorised to command over him during
the battle." In other words, there is not only no evidence that a
general officer was detached to exercise a general command, but
contemporary authorities bear decidedly against such a conclusion.
Mr Samuel Swett has published a pamphlet entitled--"_Who was the
Commander at Bunker Hill. With Remarks on Frothingham's History of
the Battle, with an Appendix_," in which he labors to overthrow this
conclusion, and to establish the position that General Putnam was
the authorized and general commander. Mr Swett is one of the old
partizan writers on this subject. He began to write at a time (1818)
when there was much excitement relative to the battle. The Analectic
Magazine for February of that year had an account of it; the Port
Folio for March had General Dearborn's extraordinary article,
which opened up the long, bitter, and not yet closed controversy
about General Putnam; Daniel Putnam's able and interesting letter
soon (May) followed, marked by curious anecdote as well as by the
indignant rebuke which filial duty dictated; General Dearborn (June)
issued his "Vindication" with its imposing array of documents;
in July, Hon. John Lowell made his thorough defence of Putnam's
character, in the columns of the Centinel, and Hon. Daniel Webster,
in the North American Review, contributed an invaluable article,
drawing with indelible lines the characteristics of the battle, and
defining, with remarkable accuracy, the positions of Putnam and
Prescott; the subject had got mixed with party politics, and for six
months the press had teemed with articles on one side or the other.
It was, then, at an unfavorable period for healthy investigation,
and after such a surfeit of the subject, that Mr Swett "from his
attention to military subjects," "consented to describe the battle."
He commenced his researches in July, finished them in August, and
early in September was ready to favor the public with his "Historical
and Topographical Sketch of the Battle of Bunker Hill." This account
made up, in great part, from oral or written communications of
actors in the battle, and framed with the theory that General Putnam
was the commander, was regarded as of a partizan character. It was
immediately criticised unfavorably in the Boston Patriot, in a series
of essays which subsequently appeared in pamphlet form, in which
the main object is to show that Putnam was not even in the battle.
Mr Swett has continued his researches, printed two editions of his
history, and several times appeared in defence of it. His statements
relative to the formation of the army and the battle have found
their way into most of the books. It is no injustice to the authors
of subsequent excellent accounts of the battle to remark--for it
is acknowledged--that as to the details they do not go behind Mr
Swett's account. The narrative in the Siege of Boston does. It is
based, as much as possible, on contemporary documents, and, in its
details, will be found to differ in many respects from those of
the same period in Mr Swett's History. A study of the conflicting
evidence relating to this subject, however, ought to excite charity
rather than dogmatism; and it was no purpose in preparing the Siege
of Boston to make of its pages a pillory of error for a respected
pioneer enquirer. Let the language relative to him to be found there,
say whether much was done at the poor business of disparagement,
or whether just credit was withheld. Mr Swett, however, has had
possession of this field so long, that, perhaps, it is not strange he
should regard facts which fearfully disturb old opinions as errors;
or that a conclusion as to the commander which conflicts with a
prepossession which for thirty years has proved invincible, should be
contested. But the spirit, tendency and object of the "_Remarks_" are
too obvious to be misapprehended.
A publication thus by one who has made the Bunker Hill battle his
special study, who has written more on it than any one, and whose
opinions, hence, carry with them a certain authority, seems to
demand a reply. Silence, under such circumstances, might either be
construed into an insult to an older inquirer, or as doing myself
the injustice of admitting the correctness of his strictures.
Besides, those to whom I feel so deeply indebted for criticism as
gratifying as it was unlooked for, on a volume, which gradually and
unexpectedly grew to the form in which it appeared, and who have thus
kindly commended it to the public, have a right to expect, that, when
its integrity is seriously impeached, its author should show his
vindication. Still, I undertake a reply with the greatest repugnance
to controversy.[A] In doing it, and doing it after all, mainly for
the sake of history, what is merely personal will be set aside as
of little account. It is not of so much consequence to the public
how a writer carries his head, whether sometimes under his arm or
always above his shoulders, as it is how he does his work. Besides,
discourteous personal allusions do not strengthen a weak cause, and
are sure to mar a strong one.
[A] Mr Swett, on the publication of the Siege of Boston,
favored me with the following note, which, in another note
written subsequently to the publication of his pamphlet, he
informed me was intended for publication. Under the present
circumstances I hope to be excused for printing it:--
"Richard Frothingham, Jr., Esq.,--
My dear Sir: For your history of the Siege of Boston I am very
much obliged to you. Without time to have read it critically,
I find it a remarkable monument of diligent and successful
research, candor, impartiality and judgment. It is a very
valuable addition to history. The subject of Bunker Hill battle
I thought I had exhausted thirty years ago, but your additional
information is interesting and important. We differ on one
point only I believe worth mentioning, and that important only
as a matter of curiosity, the commander in the battle, which we
may discuss hereafter.
With friendly regard and respect,
S. SWETT."
It is difficult to observe method in dealing with this medley of
accusation. Mr Swett's zeal for his hero is so ardent, and his
imagination is so brisk, that he seems to have misapprehended the
simplest language; and hence, quite unintentionally it may be, he
ascribes to me views I do not express, facts I do not state, and
opinions I do not hold. He is merry over mistakes that have not been
committed, and is indignant at charges that have not been made.
Where, for instance, in the Siege of Boston, is it written that the
"great battle of Bunker Hill was fought on our side by a headless
mob?" Where do I say that it is difficult to assign a "motive" for
this conflict? Where is adduced "the most incontrovertible argument
in the world," or is it even stated, that the army at Cambridge
was "itself a mob?" What "mistake of law" is made where it is said
that Warren had not received his commission? What charge is made
against Col. Sargent? Where is it stated or intimated that General
Putnam was "a mere volunteer" in the army at Cambridge? Where is it
said that "he could not possibly" command at Bunker Hill, because
it was an army of allies? Where is the sentence which reads that,
had he been the commander, he would have "boasted of it," or have
"publicly claimed" it? Where is that "large portion" which contains
the attempt to prove that "General Putnam had no right to command
Col. Prescott?" These allusions, and they might be increased, are
to instances where the meaning has been misstated. Mr Swett does
not quote the language he comments on, and I prefer to be judged by
what is written rather than by what he _says_ is written. Besides
all this, and considerable attempts at ridicule, Mr Swett makes the
serious allegations that I have been "grossly regardless of known
facts," and have even "manufactured" history! Though age, among its
privileges, cannot claim exemption from rebuke for such injustice,
yet I deeply regret the occasion which requires controversy with one,
relative to whom I had felt only respect, exchanged only courtesies,
and written only commendation.
Before going to the question of command, it may be well to examine
some of the errors which Mr Swett alleges the HISTORY OF THE SIEGE OF
BOSTON contains.
1. On page 166 it is related that "when General Warren entered
the redoubt Colonel Prescott tendered him the command; but Warren
replied that he had not received his commission, and should serve as
a volunteer." Mr Swett remarks on this as "Frothingham's mistake in
supposing that Warren told Prescott, as a reason for not assuming
the command, that he had not received his commission. This is a
mistake of fact and law; Warren, according to General Heath, said
not one word about his commission, and his want of one did not
diminish his rights of office--a point that has been settled by the
Supreme Court of the United States," p. 7. Mr Swett does not quote
my language, and the reader cannot find any such "mistake of _law_"
as he comments on in the Siege of Boston. This "point," therefore,
need not be discussed. Now for the mistake of _fact_. Mr Swett had
before him, when preparing his pamphlet, President Sparks's MS.
copy of Judge Prescott's memoir of the battle, and knew this was my
authority for the anecdote. But what does he mean? Who would expect,
after such a charge, to find on page 32 of _Mr Swett's own history_,
the following account of what took place when Warren entered the
redoubt:--"Prescott offered him the command; _but he had not yet
received his commission_, and tendered his services to the colonel as
a volunteer!" And Mr Swett says that he got this conversation from
Colonel Putnam and Dr Jeffries. After three editions of his history
has he concluded that he mistook those gentlemen? Does he mean to
ignore his own authorities? If so, the fact must not be given up,
for Judge Prescott states it as from his father, and it harmonizes
with the records relative to Dr Warren's appointment, as will be seen
in another place. Is this the way my narrative is to be pronounced
incorrect and then ridiculed? As Mr Swett makes himself merry at
what he calls my mistakes, he remarks--"He sometimes, like St.
Patrick, carries his head under his arm instead of wearing it on his
shoulders," p. 13. We know it is said that _St. Denis_ carried his
head _in his hands_, and that the Anthropophagi had heads,
"----grow beneath their shoulders,"
but it would seem that _St. Patrick's_ head must have been right when
he did his great work for Ireland. Letting this pass--how was Mr
Swett's head located when it worked out this double "_mistake of fact
and law_?"
2. Mr Swett accuses me of charging Colonel Sargent "with disobeying
Gen. Putnam's order for him to go on to Bunker Hill. This injustice
to the reputations of Putnam and Sargent arises from the most
inconceivable misconstruction of Col. Sargent's letter to us," &c.
&c, p. 11. And after considerable indignant comment--nearly two pages
of it!--Mr Swett returns to the charge, and says: "These are all
the facts the author has for the assertion, that Sargent disobeyed
Putnam's order to go on to Bunker Hill," p. 12. Now _where_ is such
an "assertion" made in the Siege of Boston? The reader _cannot find
it_! Mr Swett refers to a note at page 168, but without quoting it.
This note occurs where, in the text, an attempt is made to give a
definite idea of Gen. Putnam's service throughout the whole affair,
from the laying out of the works on Breed's Hill, to his retreat to
Prospect Hill. One sentence reads--"Some of the officers not under
his immediate command respected his authority, while others refused
to obey him." It is to sustain this remark that reference is made to
the following note:--"Captain Trevett, (Mass.) for instance, applied
to Gen. Putnam for orders; while Colonel Sargent, (N. Hampshire) in a
letter, MS., dated Dec. 20, 1825, writes that Putnam 'sent an officer
to order me on to the hill, but finding I did not attend to his order
he sent a second, who I took no notice of. A third came open-mouthed,
saying,'" &c. This is the note referred to, _and this is all that is
stated_ about Colonel Sargent. Now who but Mr Swett names _Bunker_
Hill? And _what charge_ is made here? Let the reader look at p. 92 of
the Siege of Boston, and say whether there was any disposition to do
injustice to this brave officer. No such charge was ever thought of,
much less made. It is one of Mr Swett's inferences. His indignation
is gratuitous.
But the "_injustice_" I have been guilty of, Mr Swett says "arises
from _the most inconceivable misconstruction_" on my part of Colonel
Sargent's Letter. Now to show fully the height of this "injustice"
and the depth of this stupidity, it may be well to let Colonel
Sargent speak for himself. He was applied to by Mr Swett for
information about the battle; and, in a letter dated Dec. 20, 1825,
gives his story. Mr Swett, in this pamphlet, (Appendix,) quotes
from the conclusion of this letter, but does not quote from the
commencement of it,--doubtless relishing its details about fighting
among the islands in Boston harbor far better than its details about
Putnam and Prescott, and the Bunker Hill battle. It is proper now
that the latter should be printed. I put a few words in italics.
Colonel Sargent writes--
"Had General Ward marched the whole of his troops then in Cambridge
to Charlestown not one of the enemy would have escaped, but instead
of that he only walked Hastings's front yard the whole day. He
ordered Stark and Reed from Medford, and those two regiments did all
that was done that day, of any consequence, although the fatigue
party stood their ground better than could be expected after a hard
night's labor. _In my opinion, Col. Prescott is entitled to the honor
of having the command_ in his calico gown. _I doubt much if General
Putnam was on the ground of battle for the whole day_, and that he
had no regiment that I ever heard of. I made application three times
that day to be permitted to march my regiment to Charlestown, but
General Ward feared my post would be attacked, and for once judged
right, for a large schooner, with from five to six hundred men,
attempted to gain the landing, but the wind against her and the tide
turning, she returned. _About 4, P. M._, General Ward permitted me
to march my regiment with one called his own to Charlestown, but too
late to do any good. _Gen. Putnam, then on Prospect Hill, sent an
officer to order me on to the hill, but finding I did not attend to
his order, he sent a second, who I took no notice of. A third came
open-mouth, saying Gen. Putnam says the devil of hell is in you all,
you will be all cut to pieces._ The words were scarcely uttered when
I was left with Lieut. Col. Ward and my waiter. I had before this
received a scratch from a four pound shot--the same shot took off Lt.
Col. Ward's cartouche box, and knocked down a subaltern behind him.
I returned to headquarters."
This, Mr Swett confesses, is the only document relating to Colonel
Sargent. Now with this as authority, what right has Mr Swett, as he
does in his history, to put Col. Sargent under the immediate command
of Gen. Putnam? What right has he to say, as he does in his pamphlet,
that "Sargent found Putnam" on the top of Prospect Hill? As I read
this authority, Putnam sent successively three officers to Sargent
with an order which Sargent "refused to obey," but instead of joining
Putnam, on Prospect Hill, he went to headquarters. It was a case
where a _New Hampshire_ officer declined to acknowledge the superior
authority of a _Connecticut_ officer; Sargent applied directly to
General Ward for orders, but would not respect the orders of Putnam.
The last point is the fact stated in the Siege of Boston. So much
for the "injustice done to the reputations" of these two officers!
So much for my "most inconceivable misconstruction of Col. Sargent's
letter!!"
But there is more to be said about _Prospect Hill_, and here it is
necessary to carry a bit of war into Africa. Mr Swett in his history
(Notes p. 4) quotes from a letter by Rev. Joseph Thaxter, in which
this hill is mentioned, though in the quotation it appears as "_one
of the neighboring hills_"!! This letter was dated "Edgarton, June
15, 1818," and was addressed to Messrs Monroe & Francis. It will do
no harm to print, for the first time, the whole extract. It reads--
"The writer yesterday saw Thos. Cooke, Esq. In 1775 he was a member
of the Provincial Congress, and one of the signers of the sword in
hand money. He was on the day of the Bunker Hill fight at Cambridge.
He went down to Prospect Hill and saw the whole transaction of the
day. He says that all was confusion, there was no command. That he
saw Gen. Putnam, who did all that man could do to get on the men to
Breed's Hill; that he appeared firm and resolute, thoughtless of
personal danger, and that his praise was in the mouth of every one;
that at that time nor ever after did he ever hear any one speak a
disreputable word against him."
Mr Swett, in his history, besides suppressing the _name_ of the hill,
suppressed also the significant remark, "_all was confusion, there
was no command_." And he suppresses also Mr Thaxter's own opinion in
the same letter, viz:--"As to military discipline and command there
was none." Neither suited his purpose! To fit his theory exactly this
letter of Thaxter's must be _garbled_!
On these two letters of Sargent and Thaxter, I remark, 1. They serve
to show the character of this sort of authority, and how cautiously
it must be used. 2. Here two manuscripts, so long unpublished,
harmonize on one point. Sargent (1825) says that about 4 P. M. Putnam
was on Prospect Hill: Thaxter's letter (1818) says that Thomas Cooke
went on to Prospect Hill and saw Putnam, who did all man could do to
induce men to go to Breed's Hill. Now Stiles (June 23, 1775) states
that towards night Putnam went away from the action "to fetch across
reinforcements, and before he could return our men began to retreat."
3. Sargent says Prescott was the commander, while Thaxter and Cooke
say there was no command.
3. Here as well as any where, another charge of Mr Swett may be
noticed, because it serves to show how far partizan feeling has
carried him. He has nearly a page of disparaging remark on the
history, because the name of _this same_ Rev. Joseph Thaxter is not
mentioned in it, and especially in connection with the celebration
of the fiftieth Jubilee (1825) of the battle, when he made the
prayer. Mr Swett, after remarking that he "looked in vain to find his
name," says (p. 27) that, "The author has devoted twenty-two pages
to this jubilee and monument, without one syllable to spare for the
patriotism, eloquence, and unction of this most interesting relic of
olden time, or for the mention of any religious service whatsoever
on the occasion;" and again he remarks that, though I "dwell on
Webster's eloquent address," yet there is "_not the slightest
notice_" of any prayer; and _finally_, his pious indignation
culminates in asserting that, "The neglect of all religious services
on the occasion will be considered by all those who give credit
to the author's history as a serious imputation on our national
character"!! Well, our national character _certainly_ ought to be
looked after. But 1. As to the twenty-two pages of matter. The reader
will find in them accounts of the early celebrations of the battle;
of the first monument on Breed's Hill; of the origin and progress of
the Bunker Hill Monument Association, and the only account of much
length there is existing; a history of the building of the monument;
a general view of the two great celebrations of 1825 and 1843, and of
the Ladies' Fair; the cost of the monument, and a minute description
of it! So much for this twenty-two pages about "this jubilee and
monument!" Cannot Mr Swett state a thing right? 2. "A faint outline"
only is presented of the great celebration of 1825; and of this, _the
whole notice_ in the text of the ceremony of laying the corner stone,
and of the oration, _including_ where I "dwell on Webster's eloquent
address to the sovereign people," and even quote his splendid words,
_makes ten lines_! But it is NOT TRUE that, in them, there "is
_not the slightest notice of religious services_;" for the account
concludes, (p. 345)--"_When the exercises here were concluded_,"
&c. One definition of "_exercise_" is "act of divine worship," and
Mr Swett may look into either Webster's or Worcester's dictionary
as authority! Now the "Address" had been mentioned, and "exercises"
after it, _manifestly_, do not refer to wheeling regiments, but
imply, in _addition_ to the address, _the acts of divine worship_
that, in this Christian land, are common on such occasions. Even the
language itself must be perverted to sustain such libel as Mr Swett
has written! And those who wring out of this account "a serious
imputation of our national character," must hate this character
intensely, be most inveterate word-catchers, and twist language from
its obvious import. 3. It might have been better to have stated that
Rev. Joseph Thaxter made the prayer, but no want of respect for the
memory of this venerable veteran occasioned the "neglect." Better
this omission, however, than to have been guilty of garbling and
falsifying the account of the battle the patriot left behind him.
4. The next alleged error relates to the case of Captain Callender.
Mr Swett lets his pen run as follows: "If any thing could be more
wonderful than the author's mistaking one hill for another, when both
have been before his eyes from his birth, it would be his adducing
this case as one of disobedience, or a case of any kind to disprove
that Putnam was the commander," p. 12. This indeed would be wonder
upon wonder--if it were only true. But that I mistook Prospect Hill
for Bunker Hill is one fancy; that this case of Callender is cited to
disprove that Putnam was the commander, is another fancy. _Where_
is it so "adduced?" Really Mr Swett's devotion to his hero leads him
into strange misapprehensions. The reader will _look in vain_ for
such mistakes and citations in the pages of the Siege of Boston.
Once more I ask, what in the name of common sense _does_ Mr Swett
mean? On page 164 of the Siege _this very case_ is "adduced" among
the things that bear _in favor_ of Putnam, and _no where_ is it
cited against his "claims!" _The very report_ made to the provincial
congress, which Mr Swett accuses me of _neglecting_, was thoroughly
studied, (_and Mr Swett knew it_) and is fairly quoted, and in favor
of Putnam! Indeed this report, and the evidence given on the trial of
Colonel Scammans were the main authorities for stating that General
Putnam _gave orders_ to the reinforcements.
But the strictures on pages 12, 13, relative to Callender, were
not enough, and so Mr Swett (p. 22) adverts to this case again,
and says:--"But allow the gentleman, as in regard to Callender, to
manufacture his own case, grossly regardless of all known facts."
_What case_ have I manufactured? What "_known facts_" have I been
regardless of? The chief thing that appears to be specified in this
case is this:--"The author's declaration that Callender was tried for
disobedience 27th June, seems to be a poetic license. Ward orders the
court martial at that time, without the slightest intention of such
a charge," p. 13. Why does not Mr Swett quote my language? But 1.
He alludes here, I presume, to a remark (p. 185) of the Siege, when
_the question of command is not alluded to_, but where an account is
given of Callender, and it reads--"Capt. Callender, for disobedience
of orders _and alleged cowardice_ was tried June 27th." And again
I say--"Captain Callender despised the _charge of cowardice_, and
determining to wipe out the _unjust stigma_," &c. Now what sort of
"license" has Mr Swett taken with my "declaration"? Something more
than a poet's license, I fancy! 2. Any one would suppose, from Mr
Swett's words, that Ward's order for a court martial specified what
the charge was. Here it is--June 27, "The general orders that a
general court martial be held this day at the lines, to try Captain
Callender of the train of artillery. Witnesses on both sides to be
duly summoned to attend a court which is to sit at 8 o'clock A. M.,
Col. Little president, Capt. Mosely judge advocate." What light does
this throw on the matter? And _what must be said of the character of
Mr Swett's appeal to it_?
5. Mr Swett, in denying that a portion of the troops refused to obey
General Putnam, writes as follows:--"Now, we say with the utmost
confidence, that, any few cases of cowardice out of the question,
no military despot was ever obeyed with more implicit subjection
than Putnam was throughout the battle, by every one, officers and
men,"--p. 10. This, coming from so thorough an investigator, from a
thirty years' student of the battle, is worth examination; though,
had it come from another, it might be passed over with the simple
remark, that it indicated more dogmatism than knowledge. Mr Swett,
however, confesses that he is leading "a forlorn hope."
Now General Putnam had little or nothing to do with the original
detachment, if the two hundred Connecticut men, after they got to
the rail fence, be excepted. There is no proof that he gave an
order to it throughout the whole affair, but on the contrary, this
is denied in the strongest terms. But his principal service was
rendered in connection with the reinforcements, which arrived at the
scene of action in the afternoon. After the first attack, he rode
to Bunker Hill, and to the rear of it, to urge them forward. But
they hesitated. He used every effort, especially, it is stated, at
Charlestown Neck and on Bunker Hill, to overcome this reluctance.
He ordered, entreated, encouraged and threatened, but all in vain.
"The plea was"--I quote a report made in 1775--"the artillery was
gone, and they stood no chance for their lives in such circumstances,
declaring they had no officers to lead them." They could not be
prevailed upon to go where fighting was, and so large bodies of the
troops remained out of the action. This fact is one of the most
reliable, as well as most discreditable, relative to the battle. In
truth, the state of things on Bunker Hill and in the rear of it,
during the afternoon, was more like positive disobedience, than like
"implicit subjection." However it may have been at Prescott's post
there was no such efficient command in other parts of the field as
is expressed in Mr Swett's language, anything he has written, or may
write, to the contrary notwithstanding. There was confusion when he
leaves the inference that there was order. The evidence on this point
is conclusive--overwhelming.
Thus Captain Chester (1775) states:--"Those that came up as recruits
were most terribly frightened, many of them, and did not march up
with that true courage that their leader ought to have inspired
them with." William Tudor (1775) says--"They were discouraged from
advancing." Rev. John Martin (1775) says--"During the whole or
most of the action Colonel Gerrish, with one thousand men was at
the bottom of Bunker Hill and ought to have come up but did not."
Contemporary authority as decisively connects General Putnam with
the reinforcements. This is not denied. Thus Daniel Putnam, his
son, states that he rode to the rear "to urge on reinforcements;"
and Stiles states that he left the field to urge them on. Mr Swett,
in his history, has no such "implicit subjection." He relates (p.
35) the efforts Putnam made at Charlestown Neck to induce the
reinforcements that reached there to pass across; and although
he "_entreated, encouraged, and threatened_," he could only get
"_some of the troops_" "to venture over." Again, when Gerrish was
on Bunker Hill with part of his regiment, the men disorganized and
dispersed, "Putnam"--_it is Mr Swett_ who writes this--"_ordered
them on to the lines_; he entreated and threatened them, and some
of the most cowardly he knocked down with his sword, _but all in
vain_!" Once more, p. 41, he says--"Putnam rode to the rear and
exhausted every art and effort to bring them on. Capt. Bailey only
reached the lines." The evidence as to the confusion is equally
clear. John Pitts (1775) says--"There never was more confusion and
less command." In Major Gridley's sentence (1775) emphatic allusion
is made to "the great confusion that attended" the transactions.
Captain Chester (1775) says of things on Bunker Hill near the close
of the battle--"When we arrived there was not a company in any kind
of order." But why multiply testimony on this point? Mr Swett himself
says, in his history, p. 50--"Great allowance must be made for those
unable, and those _unwilling to go on; the men went on or off as they
pleased and when they pleased_!"
Now with such evidence--and this is but a tithe of what may be
adduced--is it not surprising that such a claim of efficient command
should be set up at this late day, with nothing but bare assertion to
support it? If it were so, if there were this implicit subjection,
this ready obedience, the enemies of General Putnam might ask with
force, what they have asked in weakness--'Why, if he was so obeyed,
were not the troops at the lines? Could he not have _led_ them up?'
To affirm that he was _obeyed implicitly_, by officers and men,
and then to be obliged to admit that _those he commanded_ were not
in battle raging _a stone's throw off_, is to place the brave old
general in an awkward position, a position he never filled in his
life time. Mr Swett's zeal here lacks discretion.
6. Another mistake seems to astonish Mr Swett "by its magnitude,
nay its sublimity." He says--"According to him, the great battle
of Bunker Hill was fought, on our side, by a headless mob; and, to
prove this, he adduces the most incontrovertible argument in the
world, were it true, that the army at Cambridge, which had been for
two months collecting and organizing under the able and experienced
Gen. Ward, assisted by a host of accomplished veteran officers, was
itself a mob,"--p. 3. No quotation is made to sustain these remarks,
and _none can be made_. Nothing to warrant it can be found in the
book, and it is enough to stamp it as glaring misrepresentation. I
hold no such opinion. I adduce no such argument. It may be cruel to
annihilate so much "magnitude" and "sublimity," but I must state that
they have no better basis than Mr Swett's imagination.
In opposition to this "mob" theory, Mr Swett goes to the other
extreme, and affirms, p. 18--"That the army at Cambridge was
regularly organized and consolidated under Ward, Warren, Putnam,
and other officers in regular gradation, without any distinction
in regard to the colonies whence the troops came." And this is
repeated on p. 21, and again on p. 29. In fact this constitutes the
foundation of one of Mr Swett's "incontrovertible" proofs that Putnam
was the commander. It is strange that Mr Swett should venture upon
such assertions flatly in the face of the most positive evidence. He
makes no attempt to disprove the facts, first brought together in
the Siege of Boston, (pp. 98 to 104) relative to the action of the
colonies, and which were drawn entirely from contemporary MSS. and
authorities. It is not necessary to repeat them here. They show that
each of the four colonies commissioned its troops, supplied them
with provisions, directed their disposition, and that it was not
until after the battle of Bunker Hill that the Committee of War of
Connecticut ordered Generals Spencer and Putnam, while their troops
were in Massachusetts, to obey General Ward as commander-in-chief, in
order that there might be "a due subordination;" and also advised the
colonies of Rhode Island and New Hampshire to do the same respecting
their troops. That the army (June 17, 1775) was regularly organized
and consolidated is not true.
The evidence in relation to the want of organization in the
Massachusetts army is ample. This army certainly cannot be said to
have been settled under officers in "_regular gradation_." I have
a report made to the provincial congress of Massachusetts, dated
June 15, 1775, by a committee appointed "to consider the claims and
pretensions of the colonels," which goes with much particularity
into many cases, and recommends several to be commissioned, which
was not done, however, until after the battle. _On the 21st of
June_ an important committee was raised "to inquire into the reason
of the present want of discipline in the Massachusetts army, and
to report to this congress what _is the proper way to put said
army into a proper regulation_;" and on the next day, the congress
ordered the committee of safety to present lists of persons worthy
to be commissioned, "_that so our army may be organized as soon as
possible_." The army regularly organized and consolidated! I beg Mr
Swett will make himself acquainted with the facts, from authentic
sources, before he writes again.
The old soldiers gave Mr Swett, when he prepared his history,
better information than he writes in his last pamphlet. On page 11
(edition of 1826) he says:--"They (the troops) were strangers to
discipline and almost _to subordination_. Though nominally organized
into regiments, these were deficient in numbers, many of them only
skeletons, _and their respective ranks not ascertained_. Some of
the troops were yet serving as minute men, and the officers in a
number of regiments _were not yet commissioned_." Again, p. 14: The
Americans "were unable to appreciate the necessity of discipline
or to understand THE UNORGANIZED STATE OF THE ARMY IN EVERY
DEPARTMENT!!" But in 1850 the same writer has it that this same
army was "_regularly organized and consolidated_," and in "_regular
gradation_." It really seems only necessary to adduce Mr Swett's
facts to correct Mr Swett's imagination.
The reminiscences of the veterans go so far in this direction as to
border even on injustice to the army, if they do not make it a mob.
Thus, Gen. Dearborn states that "nothing like discipline had entered
into the army," and Mr Thaxter, whom Mr Swett likes as an authority,
writes severely on this point. He says:--"As to military discipline
and command (in the battle) there was none; both officers and men
acted as volunteers, each one doing that which he thought right."
* * "At that time our army was little better than a mob, without
discipline, and with little command till General Washington came,
and Gates, and gave it some regularity." It would be quite easy to
increase quotations of this character. But this will answer. It
conveys a very incorrect idea of the army to say that it was a mob,
but it is as incorrect to say that it was regularly organized and
consolidated.
7. Mr Swett, p. 16, writes--"We are delighted to discover, at last,
something amusing in one of the author's mistakes. He says Putnam had
the command of a regiment, because he was complimented with the empty
title of colonel of a particular regiment," &c. &c. And then follows
nearly a page of matter in which "signing humble servant" in letters,
"the king of Prussia," "the virgin Mary," "wolves heads," figure,
along with surmises about my "hallucination," and my ideas about
"the odd notion" of "perdition," and of "the head of the wolf Putnam
slew." Here, as usual all through the pamphlet, if I am quoted at
all, it is with gross injustice. But what _is_ all this for? What is
the _offence_? I am _really_ at a loss to know what _it is_. On page
100, the action of Connecticut is stated, and that the regiments of
Spencer and Putnam, and part of Parson's, were ordered to Cambridge.
Will _this_ be contested? On p. 168, it is stated that Putnam "was
in _command of the Connecticut troops_ stationed at Cambridge," and
in another place are specified, the regiments and parts of regiments
that were here. Will _this_ be disputed? Again, I state, p. 168--"No
service was more brilliant than that of _the Connecticut troops_
whom he (Putnam) _was authorized to command_." Again, p. 188--"_The
Connecticut forces at Cambridge were under the command of General
Putnam_." Is there any thing wrong _here_? What _is_ there then so
_amusing_? What has drawn forth nearly a page of _such_ attempt at
ridicule? Is it that I name the _undoubted fact_ from the records of
the Connecticut assembly, that General Putnam _had a regiment_? Has
Mr Swett forgotten how he _commences his own account of the battle_?
His first paragraph, p. 18, reads--"The same order issued for one
hundred and twenty _of Gen. Putnam's regiment_, and Capt. Gridley's
company of artillery with two field pieces;" a statement, by the
way, nearly all wrong: for "the same order" for Prescott's, Frye's,
and Bridge's regiments to parade (see Fenno's MS. Orderly Book,) 1,
did _not_ embrace the Connecticut men; 2, nor Gridley's company; 3,
there were _two hundred men_; and 4, they were _not_ all taken from
"Putnam's regiment"--four errors in less than three lines! But to
return. Once more I ask, what is the _mistake_ I have committed about
Gen. Putnam's regiment? What is there so _amusing_? Where is the
point of the ridicule?
Mr Swett throughout his pages has much matter rather personal, which
may pass for what it is worth. He supposes how I would write on
"_chemistry_" and "_astronomy_;" he compares me to a character Colman
has in his "_Broad Grins_," and to a clergyman "fulminating" against
the "_flaunting top-knots our foremothers wore_;" and he accuses
me of mooting questions "_on a par with that of free agency or the
origin of evil_." It is not, however, necessary even to specify
other such matter. He makes President Adams, Sen., and Judge Tudor,
after failing "_so egregiously_" on a certain question, jump into a
"_quickset hedge_," and ascribes to me a power of _following_ them
with my "_eyes shut_." I feel honored in being put in such society,
and as yet suffer no inconvenience from the place we occupy. But
one remark I protest against. On p. 10 he says we are writing on a
subject technical, and "concerning which _both of us confess_ we know
_little or nothing_." Here I claim at least the privilege of the
dying. Positively, Mr Swett has no authority to act as my confessor.
And how a person, who, in 1818, stated that "from _his attention to
military subjects_," he consented to describe the battle, and who
since, has had a thirty years' study of it, can in 1850 "_confess_"
that professionally, he knows "_little or nothing_" about it, seems
"_most inconceivable_."
The errors that have been examined appear to be the most material
which Mr Swett has specified, though he names others, and even grows
desponding over their number. He remarks, p. 10--"We have made the
supposition of the author's fundamental error being solitary; but
errors, like misfortunes, never come alone. The lost traveller who
wanders from the right road enters a boundless field of aberration,
and at every step plunges deeper into a chaos of mistakes." The
right road in this case is probably the beaten path of Mr Swett's
history, and every step from it is aberration and a plunge deeper
into "chaos." The reader can judge of the nature of some of these
mistakes. Others are of like character. It is however, entirely
inadmissible that facts resting on contemporary documents are to be
proved errors by the recollection of aged people. Is it not a waste
of words to refute charges based on this sort of proof? I have aimed
to give a faithful relation of facts, and on this score fear no
investigation and ask no quarter. But more of this in another place.
But in spite of this endeavor to state things exactly, it would be
strange indeed if the "_Siege of Boston_" did not contain errors,
for what book is without them? As yet none of much importance have
been pointed out, though I should thank any one who will inform me
of such as there are and should be glad to correct them. Two may be
here acknowledged: one on page 135 where "_to_ a slough," should
read "_towards_ a slough." I regret to have met with no particular
contemporary description of the entrenchments, _and hence quoted Mr
Swett's words_, and this error was copied from his History! (This
quotation is acknowledged on p. 135 of Siege of Boston as from p. 20
of his History.) Another error is on page 164, where "_riding_ down
the hill" should read "_going_ down the hill," an error inadvertantly
made in copying for the press. _Long before_ Mr Swett printed his
pamphlet he _knew how these errors occurred_, and also knew _they
were acknowledged and corrected_ for a subsequent edition of the
Siege of Boston. What more could be done?