Having established this general fact that a state of mutual suspicion and
fear prevailed between Germany and the Powers of the Triple Entente, let us
next consider the positions and purposes of the various States involved.
First, let us take Great Britain, of which we ought to know most. Great
Britain is the head of an Empire, and of one, in point of territory and
population, the greatest the world has ever seen. This Empire has been
acquired by trade and settlement, backed or preceded by military force.
And to acquire and hold it, it has been necessary to wage war after war,
not only overseas but on the continent of Europe. It is, however, as we
have already noticed, a fact, and a cardinal fact, that since the fifteenth
century British ambitions have not been directed to extending empire over
the continent of Europe. On the contrary, we have resisted by arms every
attempt made by other Powers in that direction. That is what we have meant
by maintaining the "balance of power." We have acted, no doubt, in our own
interest, or in what we thought to be such; but in doing so we have made
ourselves the champions of those European nations that have been threatened
by the excessive power of their neighbours. British imperialism has thus,
for four centuries, not endangered but guaranteed the independence of the
European States. Further, our Empire is so large that we can hardly extend
it without danger of being unable to administer and protect it. We claim,
therefore, that we have neither the need nor the desire to wage wars of
conquest. But we ought not to be surprised if this attitude is not accepted
without reserve by other nations. For during the last half-century we
have, in fact, waged wars to annex Egypt, the Soudan, the South African
Republics, and Burmah, to say nothing of the succession of minor wars
which have given us Zululand, Rhodesia, Nigeria, and Uganda. Odd as it
does, I believe, genuinely seem to most Englishmen, we are regarded on
the Continent as the most aggressive Power in the world, although our
aggression is not upon Europe. We cannot expect, therefore, that our
professions of peaceableness should be taken very seriously by outsiders.
Nevertheless it is, I believe, true that, at any rate during the last
fifteen-years, those professions have been genuine. Our statesmen, of both
parties, have honestly desired and intended to keep the peace of the world.
And they have been assisted in this by a genuine and increasing desire for
peace in the nation. The Liberal Government in particular has encouraged
projects of arbitration and of disarmament; and Sir Edward Grey is probably
the most pacific Minister that ever held office in a great nation. But our
past inevitably discredits, in this respect, our future. And when we
profess peace it is not unnatural that other nations should suspect a
snare.
Moreover, this desire for peace on our part is conditional upon the
maintenance of the _status quo_ and of our naval supremacy. Our vast
interests in every part of the world make us a factor everywhere to be
reckoned with. East, west, north, and south, no other Power can take a step
without finding us in the path. Those States, therefore, which, unlike
ourselves, are desirous farther to extend their power and influence
beyond the seas, must always reckon with us, particularly if, with that
end in view, by increasing their naval strength they seem to threaten our
supremacy at sea. This attitude of ours is not to be blamed, but it must
always make difficult the maintenance of friendly relations with ambitious
Powers. In the past our difficulties have been mainly with Russia and
France. In recent years they have been with Germany. For Germany, since
1898, for the first time in her history, has been in a position, and has
made the choice, to become a World-Power. For that reason, as well as
to protect her commerce, she has built a navy. And for that reason we,
pursuing our traditional policy of opposing the strongest continental
Power, have drawn away from her and towards Russia and France. We did not,
indeed, enter upon our arrangements with these latter Powers because of
aggressive intentions towards Germany. But the growth of German sea-power
drove us more and more to rely upon the Entente in case it should be
necessary for us to defend ourselves. All this followed inevitably from
the logic of the position, given the European anarchy. I state it for the
sake of exposition, not of criticism, and I do not imagine any reader will
quarrel with my statement.