Let us turn now to France. Since 1870 we find contending there, with
varying fortunes and strength, two opposite currents of sentiment and
policy. One was that of _revanche_ against Germany, inspired by the old
traditions of glory and hegemony, associated with hopes of a monarchist
or imperialistic revolution, and directed, in the first place, to a
recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. The other policy was that of peace abroad
and socialistic transformation at home, inspired by the modern ideals of
justice and fraternity, and supported by the best of the younger generation
of philosophers, poets, and artists, as well as by the bulk of the working
class. Nowhere have these two currents of contemporary aspiration met
and contended as fiercely as in France. The Dreyfus case was the most
striking act in the great drama. But it was not the concluding one. French
militarism, in that affair, was scotched but not killed, and the contest
was never fiercer than in the years immediately preceding the war. The
fighters for peace were the Socialists, under their leader, Jaurès, the one
great man in the public life of Europe. While recognizing the urgent need
for adequate national defence, Jaurès laboured so to organize it that it
could not be mistaken for nor converted into aggression. He laboured, at
the same time, to remove the cause of the danger. In the year 1913, under
Swiss auspices, a meeting of French and German pacifists was arranged at
Berne. To this meeting there proceeded 167 French deputies and 48 senators.
The Baron d'Estournelles de Constant was president of the French bureau,
and Jaurès one of the vice-presidents. The result was disappointing. The
German participation was small and less influential than the French, and
no agreement could be reached on the burning question of Alsace-Lorraine.
But the French Socialists continued, up to the eve of the war, to fight
for peace with an energy, an intelligence, and a determination shown
in no other country. The assassination of Jaurès was a symbol of the
assassination of peace; but the assassin was a Frenchman.
For if, in France, the current for peace ran strong in these latter
years, so did the current for war. French chauvinism had waxed and
waned, but it was never extinguished. After 1870 it centred not only
about Alsace-Lorraine, but also about the colonial expansion which took
from that date a new lease of life in France, as it had done in England
after the loss of the American colonies. Directly encouraged by Bismarck,
France annexed Tunis in 1881. The annexation of Tunis led up at last to
that of Morocco. Other territory had been seized in the Far East, and
France became, next to ourselves, the greatest colonial Power. This policy
could not be pursued without friction, and the principal friction at the
beginning was with ourselves. Once at least, in the Fashoda crisis, the two
countries were on the verge of war, and it was not till the Entente of 1904
that their relations were adjusted on a basis of give-and-take. But by that
time Germany had come into the colonial field, and the Entente with England
meant new friction with Germany, turning upon French designs in Morocco. In
this matter Great Britain supported her ally, and the incident of Agadir
in 1911 showed the solidity of the Entente. This demonstration no doubt
strengthened the hands of the aggressive elements in France, and later
on the influence of M. Delcassé and M. Poincaré was believed in certain
quarters to have given new energy to this direction of French policy. This
tendency to chauvinism was recognized as a menace to peace, and we find
reflections of that feeling in the Belgian dispatches. Thus, for instance,
Baron Guillaume, Belgian minister at Paris, writes on February, 21, 1913,
of M. Poincaré:--
It is under his Ministry that the military and slightly chauvinistic
instincts of the French people have awakened. His hand can be seen in
this modification; it is to be hoped that his political intelligence,
practical and cool, will save him from all exaggeration in this course.
The notable increase of German armaments which supervenes at the moment
of M. Poincaré's entrance at the Elysée will increase the danger of a
too nationalistic orientation of the policy of France.