First, let us remind ourselves in general of the situation that prevailed
in Europe during the ten years preceding the war. It was in that period
that the Entente between France, Russia, and England was formed and
consolidated, over against the existing Triple Alliance between Germany,
Austria, and Italy. Neither of these combinations was in its origin and
purpose aggressive[1].
And, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the relations she entered into
with France and with Russia were directed in each case to the settlement
of long outstanding differences without special reference to the German
Powers. But it is impossible in the European anarchy that any arrangements
should be made between any States which do not arouse suspicion in others.
And the drawing together of the Powers of the Entente did in fact appear
to Germany as a menace. She believed that she was being threatened by an
aggressive combination, just as, on the other hand, she herself seemed to
the Powers of the Entente a danger to be guarded against. This apprehension
on the part of Germany, is sometimes thought to have been mere pretence,
but there is every reason to suppose it to have been genuine. The policy of
the Entente did in fact, on a number of occasions, come into collision with
that of Germany. The arming and counter-arming was continuous. And the very
fact that from the side of the Entente it seemed that Germany was always
the aggressor, should suggest to us that from the other side the opposite
impression would prevail. That, in fact, it did prevail is clear not only
from the constant assertions of German statesmen and of the German Press,
but from contemporary observations made by the representatives of a State
not itself involved in either of the opposing combinations. The dispatches
of the Belgian ambassadors at Berlin, Paris, and London during the years
1905 to 1914[2] show a constant impression that the Entente was a hostile
combination directed against Germany and engineered, in the earlier years,
for that purpose by King Edward VII. This impression of the Belgian
representatives is no proof, it is true, of the real intentions of the
Entente, but it is proof of how they did in fact appear to outsiders. And
it is irrelevant, whether or no it be true, to urge that the Belgians were
indoctrinated with the German view; since precisely the fact that they
could be so indoctrinated would show that the view was on the face of it
plausible. We see, then, in these dispatches the way in which the policy of
the Entente could appear to observers outside it. I give illustrations from
Berlin, Paris, and London.
On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, writes as
follows:--
Call it an alliance, _entente_, or what you will, the grouping of the
Powers arranged by the personal intervention of the King of England
exists, and if it is not a direct and immediate threat of war against
Germany (it would be too much to say that it was that), it constitutes
none the less a diminution of her security. The necessary pacifist
declarations, which, no doubt, will be repeated at Reval, signify very
little, emanating as they do from three Powers which, like Russia and
England, have just carried through successfully, without any motive
except the desire for aggrandizement, and without even a plausible
pretext, wars of conquest in Manchuria and the Transvaal, or which,
like France, is proceeding at this moment to the conquest of Morocco,
in contempt of solemn promises, and without any title except the
cession of British rights, which never existed.
On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador at London,
writes:--
A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow Press, bears to a
great extent the responsibility for the hostile feeling between the two
nations.... It is plain enough that official England is quietly pursuing
a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and that King
Edward has not hesitated to use his personal influence in the service of
this scheme. But it is certainly exceedingly dangerous to poison public
opinion in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible journals.
Again, on July 28, 1911, in the midst of the Morocco crisis, Baron
Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, writes:--
I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of the Emperor William,
in spite of the too frequent exaggeration of some of his gestures. He
will not allow himself to be drawn on farther than he chooses by the
exuberant temperament and clumsy manners of his very intelligent Minister
of Foreign Affairs (Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, in general, less faith in
the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not be sorry to see the
others eat one another up.... As I thought from the beginning, it is in
London that the key to the situation lies. It is there only that it can
become grave. The French will yield on all the points for the sake of
peace. It is not the same with the English, who will not compromise on
certain principles and certain claims.
[Footnote 1: The alliance between Germany and Austria, which dates from
1879, was formed to guarantee the two States against an attack by Russia.
Its terms are:--
"1. If, contrary to what is to be expected and contrary to the sincere
desire of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires
should be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are
bound reciprocally to assist one another with the whole military force
of their Empire, and further not to make peace except conjointly and
by common consent.
"2. If one of the high contracting Powers should be attacked by another
Power, the other high contracting party engages itself, by the present act,
not only not to support the aggressor against its ally, but at least to
observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the other contracting party.
If, however, in the case supposed the attacking Power should be supported
by Russia, whether by active co-operation or by military measures which
should menace the Power attacked, then the obligation of mutual assistance
with all military forces, as stipulated in the preceding article, would
immediately come into force, and the military operations of the high
contracting parties would be in that case conducted jointly until the
conclusion of peace."
Italy acceded to the Alliance in 1882. The engagement is defensive. Each of
the three parties is to come to the assistance of the others if attacked by
a third party.
The treaty of Germany with Austria was supplemented in 1884 by a treaty
with Russia, known as the "Reinsurance Treaty," whereby Germany bound
herself not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. This treaty lapsed
in the year 1890, and the lapse, it is presumed, prepared the way for the
_rapprochement_ between Russia and France.
The text of the treaty of 1894 between France and Russia has never been
published. It is supposed to be a treaty of mutual defence in case of an
aggressive attack. The Power from whom attack is expected is probably
named, as in the treaty between Germany and Austria. It is probably for
that reason that the treaty was not published. The accession of Great
Britain to what then became known as the "Triple Entente" is determined by
the treaty of 1904 with France, whereby France abandoned her opposition to
the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco; and
by the treaty of 1907 with Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated their
relations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. There is no mention in either
case of an attack, or a defence against attack, by any other Power.]
[Footnote 2: These were published by the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,_
and are reprinted under the title "Belgische Aktenstücke," 1905-14 (Ernst
Siegfried Mittler and Sons, Berlin). Their authenticity, as far as I know,
has not been disputed. On the other hand, it is to be assumed that they
have been very carefully "edited" by the German to make a particular
impression. My view of the policy of Germany or of the Entente is in no
sense based upon them. I adduce them as evidence of contemporary feeling
and opinion.]