consent bore children to her master. She was still a slave and if she
rivalled her mistress, or was impertinent to her, she could be put back
again among the slaves; perhaps even branded. But, if she had borne
children, she was not to be sold as a slave. At the death of her master
she was free. Her children by him were free in any case. If her master
were so minded, he might make them full sons by verbal acknowledgment. It
was enough to say, “my sons.” But that he had done so probably had to be
proved by a witness. A family unacknowledged by the father would on his
death have only a mother. In such a family the mother was the obvious
ruler. We must be on our guard against mistaking her position, or that of
the concubine above, for examples of matriarchy. If she was pledged for
debt, she could not be sold, she must be bought back.
(M357) That a slave usually was married to a slave-girl with his master’s
consent and even by his direction is quite the rule. Masters even went so
far as to buy a slave-girl to be wife to a slave. There is no reason to
think that the master did not respect the slave’s matrimonial rights. But
the slave’s wife was not always owned by the slave’s master. Sometimes she
was owned by a different master, or was free. There was no especial
disgrace attaching to becoming the wife of a slave. A free woman might not
only marry a slave, but bring with her a marriage-portion, as if she had
married in her own rank. The man had no ancestral property, he was “a son
of no one.” Hence when he died all the property to be divided consisted of
what the married couple had acquired together, and the wife’s
marriage-portion. To the latter she had full and unquestioned right. The
master was his slave’s heir. So the property which the pair had acquired
during their married life was divided into two equal portions. The master
took one half, the wife the other for herself and her children. The
children were all free. When both father and mother were slaves, so were
the children. There was no property then for the slave-children to
inherit.(306)
(M358) Some further evidence from the contracts is worth noting here.
Documents relating to marriage are not very common and may have owed their
presence in the archives to some peculiarity in their form. Some are
perhaps rather a memorandum that the proper formalities have been complied
with. Thus(307) we read that “A has taken to wife B, the daughter of C,
from C and D his wife, and has paid ten shekels as _terḫatu_ to C, her
father.” The rest is lost. If it only laid down the penalties for
infidelity on either side, this was quite normal.
(M359) Whenever the mother alone appears, as giving her daughter in
marriage, we may suspect that the father was dead, or the mother divorced.
When the mother is a votary, we know that such a person was not entitled
to have a daughter at all, and hence we are not surprised that the
_terḫatu_ offered for the girl is small, five shekels(308) or even one
shekel.(309) So the penalty laid upon the man for divorcing such a wife is
only ten shekels.(310) On the other hand if she was unfaithful she was to
be drowned.(311)
(M360) Very singular are the cases in which a votary marries. We know from
the Code that this sometimes took place; but the votary seems to have been
expected, though married, to keep her vow of virginity. In one case we
read that a woman first devotes her daughter, _ullilši_, then marries her,
and declares at the same time that she is vowed, _ellit_, and that no one
has any claim on her.(312)
(M361) (M362) In some cases a sister had the power to give her sister in
marriage, with the declaration that no one has any claim on her.(313) We
may imagine the sisters orphans, without brothers. The name of their
father is, however, given; and his sons and daughters are mentioned. It
seems to be closely parallel to the case of the marriage of a king’s
daughter(314) where a sister also gives a sister in marriage. Here
Elmeshu, daughter of the king Ammiditana, is given in marriage by Zirtum,
also daughter of king Ammiditana, on the order of her brother,
Shumum-libshi. The bridegroom was Ibku-Anunitum, son of Shamash-limir and
Taram-shullim, his wife. The parents paid for their son only four shekels
as _terḫatu_, which Shumum-libshi and Zirtum received. If the bridegroom
repudiated his bride, he had to pay half a mina. It is not clear what
penalty the bride had to pay if she repudiated her husband. This is dated
in the reign of Ammiditana; but in which year of his reign does not
appear, as the traces of the year-name do not agree with any in the
Chronicle. It must then have fallen somewhere between the seventh and the
twenty-second years. Hence the father of the princess was alive at the
time. Why had he no hand in the marriage? The history of the reign is not
very well known. Perhaps he was away from home. His son and successor,
Ammizaduga, whom we may imagine to have been the eldest son, does not
appear in the case. Perhaps he also was away. But it is remarkable that
the king never does directly take part in any contract. That is probably
due to his sacred character. The young princess was not treated with
overmuch consideration, judging by the smallness of her dowry.
(M363) We have a very singular case in the marriage of two sisters to one
man. This has already been translated and commented upon by Meissner,(315)
Pinches,(316) and Sayce.(317) It is, however, too important to omit here.
There are two tablets concerned with it.(318) The first is the contract
between the husband and his wives. We may render it thus:
Ardi-Shamash took to wife Taram-Saggil and Iltâni, daughters of
Sin-abushu. If Taram-Saggil and Iltâni say to Ardi-Shamash, their
husband, “You are not my husband,” one shall throw them down from
the _AN-ZAG-GAR-KI_; and if Ardi-Shamash shall say to Taram-Saggil
and Iltâni his wives, “You are not my wives,” he shall leave house
and furniture. Further, Iltâni shall obey the orders of
Taram-Saggil, shall carry her chair to the temple of her god. The
provisions of Taram-Saggil shall Iltâni prepare, her well-being
she shall care for, her seal she shall not appropriate (?).
Then follow ten witnesses, but no date.
The second document seems to be drawn up rather from the point of view of
the sisters. We may render it thus:
Iltâni, the sister of Taram-Saggil, Ardi-Shamash, son of
Shamash-ennam, took to wife, from Uttatum, their father. Iltâni
shall prepare the provisions of her sister, shall care for her
well-being, shall carry her chair to the temple of Marduk. The
children which she has borne, or shall bear, shall be their
children. [If Taram-Saggil] shall say to Iltâni, her sister, “you
are not my sister” [the penalty is lost]. [If Iltâni shall say to
Taram-Saggil her sister], “You are not my sister,” one shall brand
her, and sell her. If Ardi-Shamash shall say to his wife, “You are
not my wife,” he shall pay one mina of silver; and if they say to
Ardi-Shamash their husband, “You are not our husband,” one shall
tie them up and throw them into the river.
Here there are eleven witnesses, but again no date.
Meissner deduces from the mention of children that Taram-Saggil was
already married. The exact relation between the sisters is not clear. In
one case they seem to be daughters of Uttatum, in the other of Sin-abushu.
Or it may be that Iltâni alone was daughter of Sin-abushu. If so, perhaps
Uttatum had adopted her. Sayce clearly thinks so. But they might be
daughters of the same mother by different fathers, one of whom is
mentioned in one case, the other in the other. Or they might really be
children of Sin-abushu, if their mother afterwards married Uttatum, who
was thus their step-father. It is clear that Iltâni was to wait on her
sister, and, if she repudiated her, was to be treated as a slave. This is
exactly parallel to the status of the slave-maid, whom a wife or votary in
the Code(319) provided for her husband. Perhaps Taram-Saggil had become a
chronic invalid. A comparison of the two texts is interesting in other
respects. The penalties differ curiously. If Ardi-Shamash repudiates his
wives, in one case, he loses house and furniture; in the other case, he
pays one mina. Was one the penalty for repudiating Taram-Saggil, the other
for repudiating Iltâni? But if they repudiate him, the penalties are
different in the two documents, unless indeed the _AN-ZAG-GAR-KI_ be an
ideogram for the “steep place” from which they were to be thrown into the
water.
(M364) Marriages are not infrequent which impose conditions upon the
husband and wife with relation to outside parties. Thus a mother gives her
daughter in marriage to a man, on condition that she shall continue to
support her mother as long as she lives. In this case, if the husband put
away his wife, he was to pay one mina of silver; while, if she hated her
husband, she was to be thrown from a pillar, _dimtu_.(320) This pillar may
be the real meaning of the _AN-ZAG-GAR-KI_, which looks very like an
attempt to express _zigguratu_, a tower, in an ideographic way. A very
similar case is where a lady takes a girl to be wife to her son but
stipulates that the wife shall treat her as mistress. If she shall say to
her mother-in-law, “Thou art not my mistress,” she shall be branded and
sold. As long as the mother lives, they two together shall support
her.(321) One may suspect that such maternal power, as is here shown over
the children, arises from their having been adopted by their mother in
order to provide for her in her old age. This was often done. The children
may have been slaves before adoption. In the second case, the mother
leaves her son all she has, or may acquire.
XI. Divorce And Desertion
(M365) Divorce is regulated by the Code. The Sumerian laws seem to regard
the marriage-tie as dissoluble on the part of the man by an act of simple
repudiation, accompanied by a _solatium_, fixed at half a mina. The wife,
however, was punished by death for repudiating her husband.(322) The Code
limits the facility of divorce for the man and renders it possible for the
woman to obtain.
(M366) Divorce of either a wife or concubine involved her being given a
maintenance. The divorced wife had the custody of her children, if any.
They were not disinherited by the divorce. The divorced woman retained the
marriage-portion which she had brought to the home. She had a share with
her children in the divorced husband’s property at his death. If he
married again, the children of both marriages shared equally. She was also
free to marry again, but apparently not until her children had come into
their share of the late husband’s property, therefore not during his
life.(323)
(M367) Divorce was permitted on the ground of childlessness. The husband
gave back to his wife all her marriage-portion. Also he had to give the
bride-price which he had paid to her parents during his courtship, and
which they had returned to him, as a rule, on marriage.(324) If this
bride-price had not been given, then he paid her a fixed sum of money; one
mina, if he was a patrician, a third, if he was only a plebeian.(325) A
slave does not seem to have had the liberty of divorce.
(M368) The wife might take a dislike to her husband and set her face to
leave him and deny him conjugal rights. This was probably equivalent to
desertion. Then a judicial inquiry was required. If his ill treatment or
neglect was made clear and she was blameless, a divorce was granted. She
took her marriage-portion and went back to her family. But as this was of
her own seeking, she received no alimony.(326) It is assumed that it was
an unhappy marriage from the first and that there were no children.
If it were proved that she was a bad wife, she was treated as an
adulteress and drowned.(327) On the other hand, even if she were a bad
wife, the husband might repudiate her simply without paying any price for
divorce. In this case there was no suspicion of her infidelity. Or the
husband might degrade her to the position of a slave.(328) There is no
mention in these cases of a return to her father’s house.
Chronic illness on the part of a wife was not a ground for divorce. The
husband had to maintain her. He might, however, take a second wife.(329)
If she did not care to remain in his house in such conditions, she could
leave him, take her marriage-portion and return to her family.(330)
(M369) We have already seen that the Code regulates the questions arising
out of divorce.(331) The examples at this period are but few. In one case
a man put away his wife and she received her price of divorce. It is
expressly stated that she may marry another man and her former husband
will not complain.(332) This document is, however, little more than an
agreement to abide by the terms of the divorce.
In another case a marriage-contract names the penalty a man shall pay for
divorcing his wife.(333) In all these cases the word for divorce, _ezêbu_,
is literally “to put away.” But a man divorced his wife by the simple
process of saying, “You are not my wife.” He then paid her a fine,
returned her marriage-portion and so on, as laid down in the Code.(334) It
was far harder for a woman to secure a divorce from her husband. She could
do so, however, but only as the result of a lawsuit.(335) As a rule, the
marriage-contracts mention death as her punishment, if she repudiates her
husband. The death by drowning is usually named. This was in accordance
with Law V. of the Sumerian Code.
We may regard repudiation of husband and wife, one by the other, and
desertion as leading to divorce; and therefore these may be appropriately
considered next.
(M370) Desertion of a wife by her husband might be involuntary. The Code
deals with the case of a man captured by the enemy. If the wife were left
at home well provided for, she was bound to be true to her absent husband.
If she entered another man’s house, she was condemned to death as an
adulteress.(336) But if she was not provided for, she might enter another
man’s house without blame.(337) There she might bear children. But, if so,
she yet had to go back to her original husband on his return. The children
she had borne in his absence were to be counted to their real father.(338)
That the law provides for such cases points to the existence of frequent
wars, in which fortune was not always on the side of Babylonia.
(M371) But the husband might desert his wife voluntarily. Then, if she was
left unprovided for, the wife might enter another man’s house. The errant
husband, when he returned, could not reclaim his wife.(339)
We have a legal decision in a case(340) where a man had deserted his wife
for twenty years and “left her to her fate, did not love her.” During this
time a daughter, whether real or adoptive we are not told, took care of
her mother. To her the mother left property, among other things, a slave.
The mother being dead, the truant husband returned and claimed the slave
from the daughter. He was nonsuited.
Among the provocations which gave the wife cause for divorce was the
“going out” of the husband, probably a euphemism for adultery on his part.
Belittling his wife was another ground for her complaint. What this means
is not quite clear, but we may regard it as persistent neglect.
XII. Rights Of Widows
(M372) The Code makes clear what was the position of the widow. She had a
right to stay on in her husband’s house until she died,(341) but was not
compelled to do so.(342) If she remained, she was the head of the family.
To her the young sons looked to furnish them with means to court a wife,
and the daughters for a marriage-portion. She acted in these matters with
the consent and assistance of her grown-up children. But she might elect
to leave the home and remarry.
(M373) As long as she remained in her husband’s home she enjoyed to the
full whatever she had brought there as a marriage-portion, whatever her
husband had settled upon her, and also received a share from her husband’s
goods at his death. The widow’s share was the same as a child’s. But she
had no power to alienate any of these possessions. The Code expressly
declares that they were her children’s after her.(343) The children had no
power to turn her out. If they desired her to leave, the matter came
before the law-courts, and her private wishes were consulted. If she
wished to remain, she might do so, and the judge bound over the children
to allow her to do so.(344)
(M374) A very clear example of the permanence of the Code regulations on
this subject meets us in the fifth year of Cambyses.(345) Ummu-tâbat,
daughter of Nabû-bêl-usur, wife of Shamash-uballiṭ, son of Bêl-ebarra, a
Shamash priest, who was dead, whose sons were Shamash-eṭir, Nidittum, and
Ardi-Ḥar, swore to Bêl-uballiṭ, priest of Sippara, saying, “I will not
remarry, I will live with my sons, I will bring up my sons to manhood,
until they are numbered with the people.” On the day that Ummu-ṭâbat
remarries, according to her bond, the property [of her late husband] which
is in the possession of Bêl-uballiṭ, the priest of Sippara, [she shall
forfeit]. The tablet is defective here, but on the edge of the tablet we
see that the care of her sons was given her. To remarry is expressed here
by the words, “going into the _bît zikari_.”
(M375) A widow could remarry at her discretion. She no longer had to be
given in marriage. She was free to marry the man of her choice.(346) She
might take with her her marriage-portion to her new home, but she had to
leave behind any settlement which her former husband had given her, or any
share of his goods that had come to her at his death. Her family were not
called upon to find any fresh marriage-portion for her. But she was not
completely mistress of even her marriage-settlement. If she had children
of the former marriage, they and any children of her second marriage
shared her marriage-portion equally. Only she had the enjoyment of it for
life.(347) If there were no children of the second marriage, those of the
first took all she left.(348)
(M376) We have assumed that when her husband died her children were old
enough to care for themselves. If they were not, she had no power to enter
upon a second marriage and desert her first family. She was not free to
marry at all without consent of the law-court.(349) But there is no
evidence that this could be withheld, if proper conditions were observed.
The first husband’s property was inventoried and consent for the second
marriage being granted, she and her new husband were bound by deed to
preserve the whole estate of the late husband for his children. With that
proviso, the newly married pair entered into full use of the deceased’s
property and were bound to educate the children until grown up. They had
no inducement to neglect them, as in any case none of the deceased’s
property could ever be theirs. If the children died, it would all revert
to the family of the deceased. The newly married pair had no further
interest in it than the enjoyment of it until the children could manage
for themselves. They could not alienate any of it. The sale of even a
utensil was not possible.(350)
XIII. Obligations And Rights Of Children
(M377) It is customary to say that the father had absolute power over his
children, but it is better to state only what is known with certainty
regarding the extent of his power. The father could treat his child, or
even his wife, equally with a slave, as a chattel to be pledged for his
debts.(351) We may therefore conclude that he could sell his child. An
actual example cannot be cited from early times, but they are very common
later.
The son was not capable of entering into an independent contract with an
outside person.(352) We may assume that this means simply while yet living
in his father’s house. The father had rights over what his son earned. A
man could also hire out his child and take the wages.(353)
(M378) The father had the right to prefer one son above the rest. He could
endow him with house, field, and garden. But this must be done in his
lifetime and by written deed. This gift did not in any way affect the
son’s claim to inherit equally with his brethren on the father’s death,
when he took a full share over and above what he had by gift.(354)
(M379) The father had full power to dispose of his daughters in marriage.
But he was expected to furnish them with a marriage-portion. This was not
obligatory, being probably a matter of negotiation with the parents of the
bridegroom. In later times the obligation evidently became irksome and
oppressive, and Law E was passed to relieve the strain. A father was bound
to do his best to fulfil his promise to dower his daughter, but no more. A
father could not hinder his daughter from becoming a votary.(355) If he
approved her choice, he might give her a portion, as if for marriage,(356)
but he was not compelled to do so. A father could give his daughter to be
a concubine.(357)
The father’s consent was also needed to his son’s marriage.(358) He had to
provide the youth with a bride-price, and secure a wife for him.(359)
(M380) It is not easy to determine when children ceased to be under the
paternal power. Betrothed daughters remained in their father’s house; so
did married sons sometimes. Whether the birth of a child, making the young
man himself a father, freed him as head of a family, or whether it was
entering a house of his own, we cannot yet say.
(M381) The Sumerian laws are very severe upon a child’s repudiation of a
father. That degraded him to the status of a slave. He might also be
branded. Obviously he was disinherited. The repudiation is expressed in
the words, “You are not my father,” but it may be intended to cover all
unfilial conduct. The Code is more explicit. If a son struck his father,
his hands were cut off.(360)
(M382) The Sumerian laws preserved the father’s rights to disinherit the
son by a simple repudiation, saying, “You are not my son.” The son then
had to leave house and enclosure. The Code limits this power. It insists
on legal process and good reason alleged. Also it was not allowed for a
first offence on the son’s part.(361)
(M383) The mother was in much the same position of authority as the
father. A son who repudiated his mother was branded and expelled from
house and city. He was not, however, sold as a slave. The Sumerian laws
also reserved to the mother the right to repudiate her son, and he must
quit house and property. The Code gives no such power to mothers. Indeed,
we find examples of a son disputing with a mother.(362) Mothers took up
the father’s place toward the children on the death of the father as
regards marriage-portions, bride-price, and other family affairs. But they
usually acted in concert with the elder children.
(M384) The repudiation of adoptive parents was a very grievous sin,
especially on the part of those who were children of parents who were
forbidden to have children. Something worse than illegitimacy was their
lot. The penalties of having the eye torn out, or the tongue cut out,(363)
show the abhorrence felt for their ingratitude.
XIV. The Education And Early Life Of Children