(M385) Much has been made of the knowledge of writing shown by the

Babylonians and Assyrians. The ability to draw up deeds and write letters

seems at first sight to have been widely diffused. In the times of the

First Dynasty of Babylon almost every tablet seems to have a fresh

_tupšar_, or scribe. Many show the handiwork of women scribes.(364) But

most of the persons concerned in these documents were of the priestly

rank. There is no evidence that the shepherds or workpeople could write.

In the Assyrian times the scribe was a professional man. We find _aba_ or

_tupšar_ used as a title. So, too, in later Babylonian times. The

witnesses to a document can only be said to sign their names in so far as

that they impressed their seals. This was done, at any rate, in early

times. In the Assyrian period the only parties who sealed were the owners

of the property transferred to a new owner. The whole of a tablet shows

the same handwriting throughout. Anyone who reads carefully through the

facsimile copies in _Cuneiform Texts_ can readily see this. Different

scribes, especially in early times, wrote differently, but this was still

the case in Assyrian days. Yet no change of hand can be noted anywhere in

one document, save where, as in the forecast tablets, a date or note was

added by a different person, often in Assyrian script, to a text written

in Babylonian. The only safe statement to make is that from the earliest

times a very large number of persons existed, at any rate in the larger

towns, who could write and draw up documents.

(M386) The use of Sumerian terms and phrases in the body of a document

written in Semitic Babylonian might be ascribed to a mere tradition. But

they were no meaningless formulæ. The many variations, including the

substitution of completely different though synonymous words, show that

these Sumerian phrases were sufficiently understood to be intelligently

used. In later times they either disappear altogether, or are used with

little variation. They had become stereotyped and were conventional signs,

doubtless read as Semitic, though written as Sumerian. Our own retention

of Latin words is a close parallel. The First Dynasty of Babylon was

bilingual at any rate in its legal documents, though the letters are all

pure Semitic. The earlier documents show few signs of Semitic origin,

though its influence can be traced as far back as we can go.

(M387) The discovery at Sippara of a school dating from the First Dynasty

of Babylon is very fully worked out by Professor Scheil in _Une Saison de

fouilles à Sippara_, pp. 30-54. Professor Hilprecht gives further details

in _Explorations in Bible Lands_, pp. 522-28 and _passim_.

The methods of learning to write and the lessons in Sumerian are well

described by these authors, and illustrated by numerous extant examples of

practice-tablets. The subjects were very numerous and included arithmetic,

mensuration, history, geography, and literature. As Dr. Pinches has shown

by his edition of some of these practice-tablets,(365) these contain very

valuable fragments of otherwise lost or imperfectly known texts.

(M388) Slaves were often bound as apprentices to learn a trade or

handicraft. A man might adopt a child to teach him his trade, and his duty

to him was sufficiently discharged by doing so.

(M389) We do not yet know in any authoritative way, when or with what

ceremonies children were named. In the case of slaves we have a boy, still

at the breast,(366) or a girl of three months, not named.(367) On the

other hand, a girl still at the breast is named. Hence Meissner concludes,

that at the end of one year, at latest, the child was given a name.(368)

But the usage with respect to slaves is hardly a rule, and, as appears

from the above, they were not consistently named.

(M390) A child seems often to have been put out to nurse. From the

phrase-book we learn that a father might “give a child to a wet-nurse to

be suckled, and give the wet-nurse food and drink, oil for anointing, and

clothing for three years.”(369) That this was not only done with adopted

children is clear from the Code;(370) where we find a severe penalty laid

on a wet-nurse, who substitutes another child for the one intrusted to

her, without the parents’ consent.

(M391) It will hardly do to interpret the phrase-book(371) as meaning that

all children were made to learn writing. But that this was commonly done

is evident from the number, both of men and women, who could act as

scribes.(372)

XV. Adoption

(M392) Adoption primarily means a process by which parents could admit to

the privileges of sonship children born of other parents. There were many

reasons which might impel them to such a course. If they were childless, a

natural desire for an heir might operate. But under the Babylonian law a

man might take a second wife, or a maid, if his wife were childless, to

bear him children. A more operative cause was that children were a source

of profit to their parents while they remained with them. But it seems

that men married early. Hence this alone does not seem sufficient to

account for the great frequency of adoption. Besides, in that case, what

induced a parent to part with his child for adoption? It seems that the

real cause most often was that the adopting parents had lost by marriage

all their own children and were left with no child to look after them.

They then adopted a child whose parents would be glad to see him provided

for, to look after them until they died, leaving him the property they had

left after portioning their own children.

(M393) The Code admits all kinds of adoption, but regulates the custom. A

man might adopt an illegitimate son, or the child of a votary or

palace-warder, who had no right to children, or the child of living

parents. In the latter case alone was the parents’ consent necessary. We

have examples of cases of adoption of relatives, of entirely unrelated

persons, of a slave even.(373) We learn from the series _ana ittišu_(374)

that a man might take a young child, put it out to nurse, provide the

nurse with food, oil for anointing, and clothing, for a space of three

years; and then have it taught a trade or profession, such as that of

scribe.(375)

(M394) Adoption was effected by a deed, drawn up and sealed by the

adoptive parents, duly sworn to and witnessed. Such contracts definitely

state the relationship, which was in all respects the same as that of a

son born in matrimony. But it laid down the obligations of the son, while

it stipulated what was the inheritance to which he might expect to

succeed. It brought responsibilities to both parties and fixed them. The

son was bound to do that which a son would naturally have done,

explicitly, to maintain his parents while they lived. The parents were

bound, not only to leave him property, but to treat him as a son. But, as

a rule, all was matter of contract and carefully set down. If such a

contract was not drawn up, although the adoptive parents had brought him

up, the child must return to his father’s house.(376) Only, for an

artisan, it was sufficient to have taught the child his trade.(377)

So far as our examples go, some color might be given to the suggestion

that adoption was always merely for the convenience of old people who

wanted to be taken care of. But we know that children were adopted on

other grounds. That they were children and not always grown-up men and

women is clear from the above. This we may regard as adoption pure and

simple. Other cases are a legal method of making provision for old age, or

for other purposes for which an heir as legal representative was

desirable. In the case of no legal heir, the property went back to the

next of kin.

(M395) That such a process did take place in Babylonia is made clear by

the Code.(378) But few examples are known where a father takes into his

family an additional child. The case, in which the son is not only adopted

by parents who have a family living, but is ranked as their eldest son,

deserves reproducing in full.(379)

Ubar-Shamash, son of Sin-idinnam, from Sin-idinnam, his father,

and Bititum, his mother, have Beltum-abi and Taram-ulmash taken to

sonship, and let him be the son of Beltum-abi and Taram-ulmash.

Ubar-Shamash shall be their eldest son. The day that Beltum-abi,

his father, and Taram-ulmash, his mother, say to Ubar-Shamash,

their son, “You are not our son,” he shall leave house and

furniture. The day that Ubar-Shamash shall say to Beltum-abi, his

father, or Taram-ulmash, his mother, “You are not my father or my

mother,” one shall brand him, put fetters upon him, and sell him.

Both parents of the adopted son were living. That the son is to be

reckoned eldest implies that the adopting parents had other children. This

is made clear in one case where the adoptive parents are expressly said to

have five children.(380) In another case where a child is adopted a

certain person is expressly said to be his brother.(381)

(M396) The existing members of the family had a real interest in the

proceeding. For, as inheriting with them, the addition of another son

could not but affect their prospects. We may wonder what influenced them

to consent. That they did consent is clear from the often-occurring

covenant by which they bound themselves not to object. One explanation may

be that they had grown up and left home and were anxious for the welfare

of their parents, but could not arrange to look after them themselves.

Hence for their parents’ sake they were willing to forego their share, or

submit to a stranger taking precedence of them, or in some cases to give

up all claim to the property in their parents’ possession in return for

being relieved of the responsibility of looking after them. Of course,

when the adopted son was only taken in as one, even the eldest, among

several, he would only have a share at the parents’ death. But it even

seems that the children might of their own motion adopt a brother to be

son to their parents.(382)

(M397) The clause which implies disinheritance in case the parents

repudiate the son, or he repudiates them, could only be enforced by a

law-court.(383) But it was nevertheless most regularly inserted in the

contract. In one case the document merely consists of it,(384) leaving us

to infer that an adopted son was concerned. But this is not absolutely

certain. The son might have been rebellious to his mother, who was

therefore minded to cut him off, and this may be the result of her

bringing her son before the judge. The judge was bound to try and

conciliate the parties.(385) Hence, not infrequently the son was bound

over not to repeat the offence on pain of disinheritance, while the mother

retained her right to disinherit. There was no mention of his being sold

for a slave, or branded, as was usual when a son was adopted and then

repudiated his parents.

According to the contracts entered into by the parties, parents could

repudiate adopted sons. This was contrary to the law by which the consent

of the judge was needed for disinheritance. It seems to be an attempt to

contract without the support of the law. The son was then to take a son’s

share and go away.(386)

(M398) The word _aplûtu_, abstract of _aplu_, “son,” and therefore

literally “sonship,” being also used to denote the relation of a daughter

to a parent, came to denote the “share” which a son or daughter received.

If a man adopted a son, he granted him an _aplûtu_, or “sonship,” and this

carried with it a material property. But the father, while still living,

might grant the son his _aplûtu_ and stipulate for maintenance during the

rest of his life. Such a grant begins with _aplûtu ša_ B, where B is the

son. But it by no means follows that B is an adopted son. The question is

only decided for us when the parentage of B is given. If he is said to be

the “son of C,” then we know that A giving him “sonship” must mean that A

adopted him. But if B is merely indicated as the son of A, we cannot tell

whether he was born to A, or only adopted by A.

(M399) So when the property given to B is in his power to dispose of later

as he may choose, this privilege is expressed by the words, “he may give

his sonship to whom he chooses.” The choice is sometimes expressed as

“that which is good to his heart,” or “in his eyes,” or “whom he loves.” A

modified choice is often mentioned, as when it is said that a votary may

leave her “sonship” after her to whom she likes “among her brothers.”

(M400) We have a large number of documents which make reference to the

_aplûtu_ of a certain person, which we can render here by “heritage.”

These are especially common on the part of votaries. As we have seen, they

were not supposed to have children of their own, but possessed the right

to nominate their heir within limits. In return for exercising this right

in favor of a certain person, they usually stipulated that such person

shall maintain them as long as they live and otherwise care for them. Even

outside actual deeds of heritage, we find references to property derived

from votaries subject to certain duties. Such dispositions of property are

closely related to a will or testament, but anticipate the death of the

testator. They are really settlements for the future, which exactly

answers to the title given them by the Babylonian scribes, _ridit

warkati_.

The following example makes these details clear:(387)

The heritage of Eli-eriṣa, votary of Shamash, daughter of

Shamash-ilu. Belisunu, votary of Shamash, daughter of Nakarum, is

the caretaker of her future life. One-third _GAN_ of unreclaimed

land in Karnamkarum, next the field of Issurîa, one _SAR_ house in

Ḥalḫalla, next the house of Nakarum, one-third _SAR_ four _GIN_ in

Gagim, one maid Shala-beltum, price ten shekels of silver, all

this for the future in its entirety, what Eli-eriṣa, votary of

Shamash, daughter of Shamash-ilu, has or shall acquire, she gives

to Belisunu, votary of Shamash, daughter of Nakarum. Every year

Belisunu shall give to Eli-eriṣa three _GUR_ of corn, ten minas of

bronze, and twelve _ḲA_ of oil.

(M401) The _aplûtu_ thus given was in many cases an alienation of property

on which some relative had claims. Even where their consent was not

necessary it was desirable that they should not involve the heir in legal

processes. Hence, such relatives are called up to covenant that they will

raise no objection to the heir’s peaceable succession.(388)

(M402) The obligation to support the adoptive parent is emphasized. The

amount of sustenance varies much. Another list of yearly allowances reads

one shekel of silver, woollen yarn, six _ḲA_ of oil, four _išinni

Shamašh_, ten _ḲA_ of fat, one side, two _GUR_ of corn. Many others could

be instanced, but they make no great addition to our knowledge.

(M403) The obligation might be service; as when a lady adopts a maid to

serve her for life and inherit a certain house.(389) In another case a

lady adopts a son to bring up her daughter and give her to a husband. “If

he vexes his adoptive mother, she will cut him off. He shall not have

claim on any of the goods of his adoptive mother, but shall inherit her

field and garden.”(390) Evidently the mother intended her personal effects

to be her daughter’s and to form her marriage-portion. The obligation did

not always last long. Thus we find that Lautum, who was adopted by a

votary and was herself a votary, two years later was in a position to

adopt as her daughter another votary.(391) She handed on the same

property, indicating that her adoptive mother was dead.

The adoption of a child by a lady of fortune was evidently a good

settlement for the child, and usually the real parents raised no

objection. We even find the father of a girl adopted by a lady, making an

addition to her heritage in the form of a gift to the adopting mother on

her effecting the deed of adoption. He gave them two male and two female

slaves. Here also the girl covenanted to support the adoptive mother.(392)

(M404) Occasionally the adopted child did not carry out his duties. This

was good ground for disinheriting him. But disinheritance was not to be

inflicted without the sanction of the judges.(393) Hence we find that when

a lady had adopted a daughter who failed to give her food and drink, the

judges summoned them to the great temple of Shamash in Sippara, there cut

off the daughter from her heritage, took away the tablet of adoption

granted her, and destroyed it.(394)

(M405) A curious case is where A, the daughter of B and C, endows D to

take care of B and C. As long as D lives A covenants to allow her so much.

When she dies A will herself perform the duties.(395) Here A evidently

expected her parents would not live long, but also D must have been aged,

or infirm, as A contemplates the chance of her parents outliving D. This

is not a case of adoption, but is so similar in purpose to those above as

to deserve a place here.

(M406) Occasionally, however, the adopting parent reserved the usufruct of

the property for life only, fixing by deed the rightful heir.(396) This

was, in effect, a will or testament, since the inheritance did not take

effect until after the death of the testator.

XVI. Rights Of Inheritance

(M407) The division of property among the children invariably followed the

death of the father. We have a very large number of contracts bearing on

this custom. The contract sets forth the particulars of the division and

includes a sworn declaration on the part of the recipients to make no

further claim. There were certain reservations to be made in the case of

minors, for whom a portion had to be set aside to provide for their making

the proper gifts to the parents of their brides on marriage.

(M408) The Code deals at length with the laws of inheritance, which are

best treated under the head of marriage. The actual examples occurring in

the documents of the period serve to illustrate the practical working of

these laws, but hardly add to our knowledge. They are usually occupied

with the division of property among brothers. Sometimes we have some light

on the reservations made in favor of other members of the family. Thus two

brothers divide the property of their “father’s house” and of their

sister, a votary. The sister did not take her property, but the brothers

were trustees for her enjoyment of it during her life, when it reverted to

them in full.(397) The document merely states the amount of one brother’s

share and the other’s agreement to be content with the division. In

another case, where four brothers share the property of their “father’s

house,” no details of their shares are given, but only their agreement to

abide by the division made.(398) In another case the eldest brother allots

to each of two younger brothers a share and takes a woman slave and her

children as his portion. He is said to do this of his “own power,” _ina

emur ḳamanišu_, and to have given them this of his “own graciousness,”

_ina tûbâtišu_. The brothers swear to make no further claim on the

“grant,” _maršîtu_, of their father. Either the property to which they

were legally entitled had already been allotted them, or possibly they had

no legal claim on any. The eldest brother is a high official, a _pa-pa_,

and perhaps had succeeded his father in office. The father’s property

would then be the endowment of his office, a grant from the king, and as

such inalienable from the office to which the eldest son had succeeded.

The three slaves may have thus been all the private property of the father

which was available for division. But the context seems to suggest that

what the brothers received was a concession from the eldest brother on

which they had no claim. He may in consideration of his succeeding to his

father’s appointment have made this concession to his brothers as a

consolation.(399) In another case a mother gives certain sums to her three

sons. She had still left two sons and two daughters, and the first three

agree to make no claim on all that she and these four children have or

shall acquire.(400) It is noteworthy that one of the three receives ten

shekels as the _terḫatu_ of the wife he shall marry. He was evidently not

of marriageable age, or, at any rate, still unmarried. In such a case the

Code directed that on partition of the father’s property, a special sum

should be laid aside for this necessary present to the bride’s

father.(401) So we find two brothers giving a sister a share consisting of

one-third _SAR_ of a house, next her brother’s, one maid, a bed and a

chair, with the promise that on the day that she marries and enters her

husband’s house she shall receive further two-thirds _GAN_ of land and

slaves.(402) The list of property is often given, especially where

brothers give shares to their sisters. Sometimes the relationship is less

close. Thus a man shares with two sons of his father’s brother, _i.e._,

with two cousins, ten _SAR_ of unreclaimed land, taking three and a half

_SAR_ as his share.(403) Sometimes the property included the mother’s

marriage-portion. Thus three brothers divide their property and two of

them, as her sons, share their mother’s marriage-portion:(404)

(M409)

One _SAR_ of built land and granary, next the house of Ubarrîa and

next that of Bushum-Sin, two exits to the street, the property of

Urra-nâṣir, which he divided with Sin-ikisham and Ibni-Shamash.

From mouth (?) to gold the share is complete. Brother shall not

dispute with brother. By Shamash, Malkat, Marduk, and Sin-mubaliṭ

they swore. Nine witnesses. Thirteenth year of Sin-mubaliṭ.(405)

The property which fell to Urra-nâṣir was a house occupying one _SAR_ of

land. The text means not that the three men, Urra-nâṣir, Sin-ikisham, and

Ibni-Shamash, divided the house among them, but that at the division this

house was the share of the first named. What the two, Sin-ikisham and

Ibni-Shamash, had as their share we are not here told. But the three

agreed not to call in question the division of property, which probably

came to them from their father or mother. Fortunately we know in this case

what the others got. Thus we find:

One _SAR_ of built land, (and) granary, next the house of

Ibni-Shamash and next the street, its exit to the street, the

property of Sin-ikisham, which he divided with Ibni-Shamash and

Urra-nâṣir. From mouth (?) to gold the share is complete. Brother

shall not dispute with brother. By Shamash, Malkat, and

Sin-mubaliṭ they swore. Nine witnesses. Thirteenth year of

Sin-mubaliṭ.(406)

And again:

One _SAR_ of built land, (and) granary, next the house of

Sin-ikisham and next the house of Ishtar-Ummasha, two exits to the

street, the property of Ibni-Shamash, which he divided with

Sin-ikisham and Urra-nâṣir. From mouth (?) to gold the share [is

complete]. Brother shall not dispute with brother. By Shamash,

Malkat, Marduk, and Sin-mubaliṭ they swore. Nine witnesses.

Thirteenth year of Sin-mubaliṭ.(407)

Thus we see that each brother, if they were brothers, obtained exactly the

same share, one _SAR_ of land on which a house was built. Two of them,

Sin-ikisham and Ibni-Shamash, were next door to each other. Ibni-Shamash

had the street on the other side of him, in fact, occupied a corner house.

The third brother, Urra-nâṣir, had a house in another part of the town. We

therefore must understand the word “divided” in the sense “obtained on

division.” In the second and third case the word rendered share is

literally “all.” But the first text shows that “all is complete” means

“the share is complete.” The meaning of the expression, “from mouth (?) to

gold,” is still obscure. It is not certain that _bi-e_ really means

“mouth.” But as Meissner has shown,(408) it exchanges with the ideogram

for “mouth.” He therefore suggests that the whole phrase means “from the

first verbal discussion of the division to its consummation by payment the

partition of the property is now at an end.” That seems probable enough,

but we may yet find a different explanation. If this be correct, it is of

interest to note that while silver seems to have been the usual money,

this phrase seems to assume that gold would be used in payment. A curious

parallel is the fact that while in later times we always find the order

gold and silver, in Sumerian texts it is silver and gold. We must not

press this too far, but it really looks as if in early times silver was

more valued, or at any rate, less in use than gold.

It will be noted that the second text omits Marduk from the oath, while

the others name him. The third text omits _gamru_, “is complete.” The nine

witnesses and the date are the same for all three. In the first and last

the names of the witnesses only are given, but in the second the name of

the father is added to several of them.

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