27. Where then does that which is in our power exist? Since that which

is generated, is connected with the period of the world, and again,

since it is produced from that alone. Where else should we say it

exists, than in our internal elections and impulses? For of these alone

we are the lords; but things which take place external to us, have many

other more powerful beings as their lords. For it is necessary that

what is generated externally should become a part of the universe, that

it may also be generated; and that this should be effected through the

consent and co-operation of the universe, that it may produce every

thing in itself, by one part of itself acting on another, and being

passive from another. On this account, therefore, in the actions of

men, we praise these persons, but we blame those, because through

choice they were lords of their deeds, and we do not say that the

universe, but the agent was the cause of the quality of the actions.

For the quality of a deed is not derived from the universe, but from

the life of the agent. It is, however, co-ordinated to the whole on

account of the whole, and is again such as it is on account of a

part. And that we assert these things with truth, the oracles of the

Gods will manifest to you, since they often ascribe victory to our

choice, and not to the order alone of the mundane periods; as for

instance, when they say: “On beholding yourself, fear.” And again;

“Know thyself.” And, “Believe yourself to be above body, and you are.”

In short, they say, “that our sorrows germinate in us as the voluntary

progeny of the particular life which we lead.”

28. It is not fit, therefore, to refer all events to the order alone of

the universe, as neither is it fit to refer them to our impulse alone.

Nor again is it proper to separate the soul from those beings that

have an absolute elective power,[363] and whose very being consists in

deliberate choice alone, and in declining this thing, but embracing

that; though the soul in those events which take place is not the

mistress of the universe. For it is requisite that every cause should

aspire after that thing alone which it is naturally adapted to obtain.

But that which is in our power, is not only adapted to be active, but

also to be essentially elective. It is also adapted to act electively

in conjunction with other things, and either to err or act rightly on

account of choice. For though the deed may be good, yet if the agent

acts from a bad choice, we say that the action is bad. For that which

is good in the deed, is on account of something else, but that which

is depraved is on account of the choice of him who performs the deed.

Hence, it is evident to all men that we are the lords of actions, so

far as they are eligible.

29. But after this question, you say that all of us are solicitous

about futurity in all things, and even in those things which appear

to be in our power. Speaking summarily, you say well. What then, if

we are all lovers of divination, is there nothing in our power? I,

however, on the contrary say, that if nothing is in our power, but

events are compelled to take place from motion alone, we shall not

be lovers of divination. For what occasion is there for divination

in things which owe their existence to external compulsion, and the

knowledge of which is as of things future or not future. For such

knowledge is superfluous, when events are necessary; since it is

impossible for that which is necessary not to come to pass, though we

should a thousand times consult about, and be prescient of it. If,

therefore, events necessarily happen, we are in vain solicitous about

futurity. We are not, however, in vain solicitous about it, since

this is natural to us; for nothing which is according to nature is in

vain. Hence, it is not proper to consider all things as produced by

compulsion, in consequence of binding them by the circulation of the

heavenly bodies; but we must admit that foreknowledge is in some things

profitable to us, and that we do not live merely for the purpose of

foreknowing events, but that by foreknowing we may contribute or not

contribute something to things future, and may be more prompt in our

energies. We must likewise admit that not divination only, but prayers,

and the whole business of sacred rites contribute something to our

advantage, or we must exile these, pouring oil on their heads, and

crowning them with wool, and we must neither extend our hands upward,

nor grant that we ought to worship those who are able to suspend the

celestial influences. For men when in difficult circumstances will in

vain indulge a hope of being liberated from them by invoking divinity,

and Apollo himself will in vain give responses, unless[364] by

performing certain things it is possible to escape the punishment which

is suspended from the celestial periods, and by not performing them,

the dreaded event will necessarily take place.

30. Indeed, if this were not the case, would it not be perfectly absurd

to make this division, and to allow conformably to the oracles of the

Gods that something must be granted to our choice? But neither must we

proclaim this of divinity [viz. that his oracles are given in vain],

nor must we exterminate from human life, the utility of divination, and

of the sacerdotal office; because you have all history both Barbarian

and Grecian conjointly testifying that through divination, whether

from divine inspiration, or from human art, many have frequently known

what it was requisite to do, and through this knowledge have been

liberated from evils, which would have been otherwise inevitable.

This then I determine as appropriate to the present discussion, that

sometimes[365] this much celebrated divination, and the performance

of sacred rites contribute to a certain thing being effected or

not, and sometimes[366] predominate over those generations which

are introduced from the universe. When, therefore, since all things

are in all, divine and dæmoniacal causes concur in one, and as it

were assert the same thing, then the works of sacrifice are seen

to be inefficacious; for it is impossible for a part to oppose and

effect things contrary to the whole; and foreknowledge, in this case,

neither adds nor takes away any thing from the events which are the

subjects of divination. But when, in consequence of there being many

things of this kind, these effect one thing, and those another; as

for instance, these effect the destruction, but those the safety of

the diseased, through the operations of the celestial bodies upon us,

as is evident from all history, then the performance of some sacred

right, by employing co-operative powers, liberates us from the noxious

defluxions, by those that are beneficial. And the consideration of

the future contributes much to effects. In short, that which is in

our power being co-ordinated with these, or with other causes, as in

calamities, in consequence of receiving a greater increase through its

own motion, exhibits sometimes one, and sometimes another end. And

know that this takes place in things which are externally produced.

Every where, however, the quality of the impulse has a prior existence,

and choice characterizes that which is in our power. This also is

the work of the soul, which abides in it and is not to be referred

to the universe.[367] Conformably, therefore, to these things, as it

appears to me, you say that the universe governs all animals, and that

we and other animals have a diminished life imparted from the air,

and the first circulation. And that the rational part indeed is in

the brain; but that what is called sense is in the organs of sense,

and is conversant with different sensibles, but that the sight, the

hearing, and the other senses, differ only in their subjects, but are

essentially one and without diversity.[368]

31. Hearing you make this arrangement, I was surprized that a lover

of philosophy and intellectual speculations, and why do I say of

intellectual speculations, but who is also skilled in the paths of

erudition and in the inventions of geometry and arithmetic, should

attribute as much to the senses as to our rational and intellectual

essence, though they scarcely come into contact with the objects

of knowledge through debile organs, and should conceive that they

only differ from each other, and from the rational part by a certain

diversity of organs. For we have indeed elsewhere and prior to this

shown that all the senses are inseparable from body, and incapable of

being converted to themselves, but that the rational and intellectual

life is naturally adapted to know itself, and in consequence of this

knowledge to be converted to itself. For every thing gnostic is

according to energy converted to the object of knowledge; and therefore

that which is gnostic of itself is converted to itself. What identity,

therefore, do you see between the intellectual and the sensitive soul,

between that which looks downward, and that which tends upward? And in

short, what identity do you perceive between the soul which is buried

in bodies, and the soul which is unmingled with bodies? Between that

which can never know truth, and that which always extends itself to

real being?

32. But if the appetite which is according to nature is not in vain in

any thing else, neither is it in that which is sometimes allotted the

perception of truth. I omit to say that it is absurd to assert that the

essence of a divine soul flows downward from ether, if it is proper to

call that which is impossible absurd. For the souls which are derived

from ether are allotted a corporeal generation; but the Athenian guest

demonstrates that the rational soul is more ancient than all bodies.

But if by ether you do not mean a body, but an etherial intellect, or

an intellectual soul surrounding ether, neither thus do you appear to

me to have discovered the most true cause of the soul. For there is

another fountain of souls from which etherial souls, the souls of the

sublunary elements, dæmoniacal souls, and ours are derived. And it is

necessary to look to that cause which Plato concealing the truth, as it

appears to me, calls the Crater; in which he represents the demiurgus

mingling the soul of the universe, as Timæus says, not from ether, but

prior to bodies. The Chaldean oracles also celebrate the essential

fountain of every soul, viz. of the empyreal, etherial, and material,

and separate this from the whole vivific goddess; from which also

suspending the whole of Fate, they make two series, the one psychical,

and the other fatal. Deriving the soul, therefore, from one of these

series, they assert that it sometimes becomes subservient to Fate, when

becoming irrational it changes its lord, viz. Fate for Providence.

33. That, as I have said however, you have not asserted any thing

worthy the intellectual energy of Geometry and Arithmetic, in

co-ordinating our soul with the senses, you may learn, by considering

that the first employment of these sciences is to separate the soul

from that energy which subsists in conjunction with the senses, to

withdraw it from them as much as possible, to accustom it to look

within, to see immaterial reasons, and to investigate demonstrations,

the conclusions of which are contrary to the informations of the

senses. For they indeed reject impartibility, but these sciences

require it, and derive their existence from impartibles; since

partibles are the principles of the former, but impartibles of

the latter. And the knowledge of the senses indeed is confined

to particulars; but universals, and those things the nature of

which is always the same, are the objects of the knowledge of the

above-mentioned sciences; which they do not derive from the senses,

for imperfect are not the causes of perfect things; but supernally from

intellect, on which account also they sit in judgment on the senses,

reprehend the grossness of their knowledge, the passivity of their

perceptions, and their indefinite motions.

34. For indeed the knowledge of the senses is truly ludicrous; but the

intention of the mathematical sciences is to liberate us from things

ludicrous, and accustom us instead of pursuing these, to investigate

the knowledge of real being. It belongs to the sensible life therefore,

to be under the dominion of Fate, and to be acted upon differently at

different times, in conjunction with bodies, in which the necessity

from Fate consists. For every form inseparable from matter, is

ingenerated in, and contained by it; since it does not pertain to

it, through being converted to itself to say, that what externally

accedes to it is one thing, and that which is true another. But it

alone says that it announces passion, on which account it belongs to

alter-motive natures, in consequence of not having an energy perfectly

liberated from them. The intellectual life however, is according to

its own nature converted to itself,[369] and cannot endure to follow

the violent passions of sense, but contains in itself criteria of the

fallacious motions externally introduced, and adds indeed what is

deficient to the passive perceptions of sense, and confutes the fallacy

of its information; accomplishing at the same time all this by its own

proper energy. For it is not the province of things which pertain to

sense to form a judgment of sense, but this belongs to intellectual

reasons, which the knowledge of sense is incapable of receiving. The

immaterial therefore and separable life, and which energizes in itself,

must be admitted to be contrary to that of sense; and to this must be

given a choice of inclination, upward and downward, to intellect by

which it was produced, and to sense which it generates; but we must

admit that sense and all corporeal lives are without choice, because

this is also the case with bodies. For the rational soul being a medium

between intellect and sense, tends to both on account of the unstable

inclination of choice; but it becomes according to habitude each of the

extremes, of which it is essentially neither. But the perfection which

it derives from intellect, and the deception which it receives from

sense, manifest its middle nature. And such, as it appears to me, is

the correction[370] of the dogma.

35. With respect to your opinion concerning good which you have

introduced into the midst of your enquiries, viz. that what is

delectable to the several individuals of mankind is good, and that this

exists by position, since different things are considered as legal

by different nations; I should be ashamed indeed, if in writing to a

friend I did not manifestly assert that I conceive this opinion to be

unworthy both of my choice and my years. For it does not appear to me

to be at all wonderful that a young man in consequence of looking to

the opinions of men in many things, should form such an opinion. But I

think he who admits that an aged intellect ought to preside as a judge,

will adopt the decisions of intellectual conceptions, and not those

which the rumour and unbalanced motions of the multitude have spread

abroad. Now therefore, because to the Persians, some things appear to

be delectable, and also certain things which are congruous to these

delectables are considered by them as legal; but to the Greeks other

things appear to be delectable and legal; and to other nations other

things; on this account a different thing is imagined to be good and

delectable by different people. And whoever is allotted a delight which

is naturally good to every one, will possess an end adapted to man;

but whoever errs from this end, though he should be a thousand times

delighted with things which are present to him and appear to be good,

yet he will reap but an imperfect fruit of such delight.

36. But it is, as it seems, true, that one inconvenience being given,

others follow, which you also appear to me to suffer. For placing the

soul under the dominion of Fate, you have co-ordinated her with the

irrational senses, and collecting these into one and the same thing,

you have mingled good with that which is debile. It is necessary

however to eject both the former and this from the soul, that we may

not ignorantly ascribe the same things to men as to brutes, whose life

is without conversion to itself, and is naturally bent to earth, and

whose knowledge is mingled with material passions. These things also

are unfolded by Plato with, as I may say, adamantine arguments. For

says he that which is not good is not [truly] delectable, though all

oxen should assert it to be so. For we are not to adduce the testimony

of oxen, but of the Gods, with whom there is intellect, and the good of

being, which is more divine than intellect itself. These things being

clearly asserted in the Gorgias, the Philebus, and the Republic, I

think it would be superfluous to dwell on them any farther.

37. This however, I will add to what has been said, that the

investigation of good is not to be mingled with the delectable, (for

thus the petulance of delight will cause us to be foolish) but the

all-various diversities of human customs and legal institutions, are to

be referred to the different lives of souls, viz. to the rational, the

irascible and the epithymetic forms of life; for the former germinate

from the latter; since, as it is said, they are not derived from an

oak, nor from a rock. But the many-headed beast persuades these to

establish such things by law as the Persians established; the leonine

soul persuades others to adopt such things as the Thracians adopted;

and in others reason prevails in the adoption of legal and true good.

And the delectable indeed, is common to all these. For the appetible

when present is delectable to every one, but good is not delectable

to all men, but to those in whom reason presides. For the passions do

not see good, but this is alone the province of reason. And to reason

indeed, the delectable and the good are the same; but the fabrication

of things did not give to the blind passions the investigation of

good, but of the delectable; for every species of life when it

energizes without impediment is delighted. Hence there are many legal

institutions, and all-various delectables, and they are different

to different persons; but good is alone with those in whom reason

predominates over the passions. For dominion must not be given to

desire, that we may not be affected in the same manner as asses; nor

to anger, that we may not resemble lions; but it must be given to that

which is the most excellent part of our nature, which we alone are,

or according to which we principally subsist. For the being of every

thing which consists of many things, some better, and others worse, is

according to that which is the best among them. For that which is best

sagaciously conjectures the nature of good.

38. As to what you afterwards write in the way of doubt, you seem

to me to have written it in consequence of hearing Socrates in many

places asserting that he knew nothing, deriding those who say that

they know all things, and farther still contending that when we depart

from hence we shall especially know the truth, and be in possession of

more certain sciences, and also inferring that the mathematical are

not truly sciences. You doubt therefore from all this whether it is

not perhaps impossible to know the truth, and whether we do not only

dream about it. Indeed it is requisite you should at the same time

understand, that if it is not possible for us to know the truth, we do

not more know if there is any thing in our power than if there is not.

For our ignorance of both similarly prevents our adoption of either of

these positions. How therefore, can we use the ignorance of truth in

order to show whether there is any thing which is in our power? Since

with respect to the existence, and non-existence of this, ignorance

possesses the same power, or rather impotency.

39. That we may not however, suffer any thing of this kind, we have

already enumerated all the modes of knowledge; and have shown what

the modes are of which the soul can participate here, and what those

are when she assumes a supreme order. And of these indeed, Socrates

possessing the former, but hoping that he shall obtain the latter on

being liberated from the body, says, “that arriving thither he shall

know the truth.” For other measures and other objects of knowledge

afforded him an opportunity of indulging such a hope. Because it is a

thing usual with the friends of Plato to inquire whether it is possible

for the soul to live not only cathartically, but also theoretically,

while surrounded with this gross bond the body. And I think the

subject has been sufficiently discussed, and has been brought to this

conclusion, that perhaps it is possible to live theoretically even

here, like the coryphæan philosopher in the Theætetus, astronomizing

above the heavens,[371] and investigating on all sides all the nature

of beings, and also like those guardians in the Republic, who ascend

as far as to _the good itself_, through that dialectic, which Plato

calls the defensive inclosure of the mathematical sciences. Again,

however, that it is impossible while here to lead a theoretic life

in perfection, is evident from the causes which are enumerated in

the Phædo, viz. the occupations and molestations of the body, which

do not suffer us to energize theoretically without impediment, and

disturbance. For the life is theoretic, but the energy is called

contemplation, and the contemplation of _the one_.

40. When also Socrates does not permit us to call the mathematical

sciences [truly] sciences, he does not do this as denying that they

have a necessity of demonstrations, but as falling short of the supreme

of sciences. And why should I not say, at falling short of dialectic,

which no longer considers a point, or the monad, as a principle, but

_the good_, and considers the principle of all things. Whence also, as

I conceive, Socrates in the section of a line[372] [in the 6th book of

the Republic] assigns the second part to the mathematical sciences;

but to perfectly immaterial and separate forms, he assigns a part, and

a knowledge prior to these; the former proceeding from hypothesis,

but the latter being unhypothetical. And with Socrates, the author of

the Epinomis likewise accords. For he calls dialectic the bond of the

mathematical sciences, as uniting the principles of all of them.

41. But if Socrates asserted that he knew nothing, and the Pythian

oracle pronounced him to be on this account the wisest of all men,

as he himself informs us, consider the profound meaning both of the

Pythian deity and of Socrates, and how by the assertion of knowing

nothing this is implied, that _the good_ alone possesses an exempt

transcendency,[373] but not he who possesses scientific knowledge; and

this it is to know that he does not know. For the attainment of such

a knowledge as this appears to be the principal business of those who

intend to be wise. For in reality, he is truly wise, who knows that he

is not truly wise, and is not ignorant of this. For to whom does it

belong to know that he does not scientifically know every thing, but to

him who possesses knowledge. For it is indeed necessary that he should

perfectly know that he does not know [every thing]; since he will know

himself not to possess a scientific knowledge [of all things]. Hence no

one will perfectly know that he does not possess scientific knowledge

[in perfection], till he knows that he possesses scientific knowledge.

For then he will at one and the same time know that he knows, and what

the things are which he does not know, and will both know that he knows

and that he does not know, possessing a middle knowledge, and science

alone, which subsists between those natures that know truth wholly,

and those that do not know it at all,[374] of which the former is

intellect, but the latter sense. For sense neither knows real, being,

nor the essence itself of sensibles, of which it is feigned to be the

knowledge; but intellect knows essence itself, and the real truth

itself of being.

42. The soul therefore, being a medium between these, knows the

essences of things as being prior to sense, and does not know them as

being posterior to intellect. He therefore that is wise, will both know

that he knows, and that he does not know. And thus much, my friend,

in answer to the assertion of Socrates, and concerning that which

is real wisdom. Hence, it is not proper to exterminate the reasons

pertaining to science, neither on account of the mathematical sciences

being distinguished from the first science, nor on account of the

hope of obtaining true knowledge after a separation from hence, nor on

account of the answer of the Pythian deity. For it is Plato himself who

exclaims, that if science is destroyed, it will no longer be possible

to make an assertion about any thing, and not even about that which is

contingent. But he shows indeed, what the knowledge is which the soul

may assume while it is united to the body, and what it may obtain when

it is freed from its bonds; and also what that is which is at the same

time knowledge and not science. He likewise shows that there is one

knowledge which is true science, an intellect better than science, and

an intelligence which deifies intellect; and that the soul perceiving

this knowledge, and not being able to obtain it in this life, desires

a departure from body, that she may then be allotted this supernatural

and divine comprehension of beings. But of these things enough.

43. In consequence however of what you have said, you doubt, why good

men are in a worse condition, in consequence of failing to obtain the

end which was the object of their wishes, but bad men are allotted the

things which they desire. You therefore indeed, think that this also

is an argument in favour of the non-existence of any thing which is

in our power. And indeed, if this is an argument of the non-existence

of any thing in our power, that things do not happen to the good

according to their wishes, the success of bad men in gaining the

objects of their desire, will be an argument in proof of the existence

of something which is in our power. It is better however, not to adduce

opposing arguments to what you say, but merely to show you that this

doubt was proposed by some of the ancients not only with a view to the

subversion of that which is in our power, but also with a view to the

investigation whether providence has any existence. And this inquiry

of the ancients has been extended to Plotinus himself, to Iamblichus,

and your namesake [Theodorus Asinæus]. For the unexpected introduction

of fortunate events, shakes in reality our invincible preconceptions

of providence, and the affair requires intellectual inspection, if the

objector being saved from that doubt, ought to commit every thing to

providence.

44. If therefore, we are not the lords of any thing, and have not an

elective life from ourselves, and neither good nor evil is from us,

but these are externally produced, there is no longer any occasion to

doubt of events, as if they happened contrary to desert, since both

good and evil derive their subsistence from an external source. For if

we do not cause ourselves to be such characters as we are, it will not

be requisite that there should be any retribution for our life; nor

in short, is any thing due from those, who are not the causes of the

life which they lead. Hence, if the retribution of fortunate events is

contrary to desert, we ourselves shall be the cause of the lives, the

desert of which it is said we are allotted in the distributions from

the universe; because, of all the things that surround us, we do not

require to have retribution in what we derive from wholes, but in those

things in which we co-operate something. If therefore, there is nothing

in our power, we shall have nothing from ourselves. And if this be the

case, neither should we desire retributions of those things which we

derive from an external source. And this being admitted, neither should

we accuse the distribution of events as contrary to desert.

45. If, therefore, there is nothing in our power, it is not fit to

enquire why good men fail in obtaining the end they desire, contrary to

desert, but bad men obtain this end. But admitting there is something

which is in our power, and that Providence has dominion over all

things, we say, adducing to you persuasion after violence, that what

is in our power does not predominate over, but co-operates with things

external. The rational soul therefore very properly disposes things

that are internal according to its own power, but it cannot do this

with externals, because these require other things in order to their

distribution, which are not inherent in it. I am delighted however with

these doubts of yours, perceiving in you a generous proselyte whom I

frequently desire not to confound those things which are in our power

with those which are not, nor to be so disposed with respect to things

which are not in our power, as if they ought entirely to take place,

in order that we may bear them without difficulty, when they do take

place. Now, however, the doubt happens, from things which are out of,

not conforming themselves to things which are in our power, though we

fancy that they ought, and also from supposing that to be good for

us which is not, and seeking for its accomplishment. But it would be

better for us always to explore the true and real beings that are in

us, and acquire them for ourselves, and to leave things external, and

which are not in our power to the causes of them, as to masters who

know what they do. We should likewise be prepared for those things

which are not, by those things which are in our power. In what manner,

therefore, the doubt pertains to that which is in our power, we have

shown you through such arguments as these. But you ought rather to

refer it, as we have said, to the doubt concerning Providence. And many

things, as I have before observed, have been said on this subject by

the ancients, and they thus solve the doubt.

46. Again, therefore, you inquire what that which is in our power

is. Which it was requisite to investigate in the beginning of the

discussion. And afterwards you doubt concerning it. But inquiring about

it, you define it to be that which is of itself uncircumscribed,[375]

and self-energetic. If, however, this be the case, it is entirely

incorruptible, and most powerful, and alone pertains to the ruler

of all beings, but is not adapted to that which is in our power.

I, therefore, consider this definition to be very remote from that

conception of what is in our power, which the ancients adopting,

attributed this to human souls. But do you also consider the truth of

what I say. For they assumed that which is in our power as indicative

of the energy of choice, making us to be the lords of choice and

aversion, and as indicative of the choice of some good, or the

contrary. For they did not consider choice and will to be the same; but

they asserted that the latter pertains to good alone, but the former

both to good and evil; just as false opinion pertains to that which is

not good. Hence also, they said that election or choice characterizes

the soul, which extends itself both to what is good, and what is not

good, and that this pertains to the middle nature of that being which

is converted to both these. This also common rumour testifies. For

we praise the choice of these, but blame the choice of those. Evil,

however, is not wished for by any one. And evil indeed appears to be

good to those that choose it; for no soul knowing a thing to be evil

would choose, but would avoid it. On account of ignorance, however, the

soul is busily employed about it; for she naturally possesses an acute

love of good, but sometimes is powerless with respect to the attainment

of it.

47. The soul, therefore, essentially possessing an inclination to

both, viz. to good and evil, the ancients called this power of her

elective, on account of which we are naturally adapted to choose one

thing instead of another. And indeed, you may obtain from division such

a definition of this power. Because all power is either rational or

irrational, it is necessary that choice should be in one of these. But

since it is not irrational; for we all say that the irrational power is

without choice, it will be a certain rational power. But every rational

as well as every irrational power, is either gnostic or appetitive.

Choice, however, being election and desire, will be a certain appetite.

But every appetite either alone looks to that which is real good, or to

that which is only apparent good, or to both these. We say, however,

that choice does not look to real good alone; for if it did, it would

never be justly blamed; nor to apparent good alone; for in this case,

it would not frequently be praised. Hence such a power is naturally

adapted to look to both these.

48. Election, therefore, is in short, a rational power, desirous both

of true and apparent good, leading the soul to both, on account of

which she ascends and descends, errs, and acts with rectitude. The

ancients perceiving the energy of this power, called the inclination of

it both to real and apparent good, a twofold path in our nature. Hence

the elective and that which is in our power, will be the same thing.

And according to this power, we differ from divine, and from mortal

natures; for each of these is unreceptive of this twofold inclination;

since the former, indeed, on account of their transcendent excellence

are alone established in true good; but the latter on account of

defect, in apparent good. For intellect indeed characterizes the

former, but sense the latter. And the former is our king, but the

latter our messenger. We, however, being of a middle nature are

established in choice; and are capable of being moved both to true and

apparent good. But wherever we move, we are on all sides comprehended

by wholes, from which we are allotted what is, according to desert. And

if indeed we tend to that which is better, we thus tend as intellect;

but if to that which is subordinate, as sense. That which is in our

power, therefore, is not capable of effecting all things. For that

which can effect all things is a power characterized by unity, and on

this account can effect all things, because it is one and boniform.

But the power which is elective is dyadic, and on this account cannot

accomplish all things; because by its twofold inclinations, it falls

short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would, however,

be itself effective of all things, if it had not an elective impulse;

for then it would be will alone. For a life characterized by will

subsists according to good, which causes that which is in our power to

be most powerful, and is truly deiform, on account of which the soul

also becomes a God, and as Plato says, governs the whole world.

49. Hence that which is in our power, neither pertains to the first,

nor to the last of things, but to the medium between both. You,

however, as it seems, have conceived it to be a power ruling over all

things, leading all things according to its own impulse, and obtaining

every thing which it desires; for you do not define it to be a power

over the objects of desire within the soul, and which cause the

electing soul to be such as it is; but you ascribe to it a power over

things which are not in its power. For things external to the soul are

not in our power; on which account also our life is mingled from things

which are not, and from things which are in our power. And with worthy

men, indeed, there is much of that which is in our power; for they use

all things, modifying even those that are out of our power on account

of virtue, and always adorning the present circumstance. But with the

multitude, there is more of that which is not in our power; for they

follow things external to themselves, not possessing a life within,

which is able to assimilate them to themselves. Hence worthy men,

indeed, are said to be free, and are so on account of the energy both

of that which is in, and of that which is not in their power. But the

multitude are called into servile necessity, in consequence of burying

those things which are in their power, with those that are not, and

possessing all things not in themselves.

50. After all this, you have added the colophon (or summit) of the

doubts, by asking whether divinity knows or does not know events which

are future to us. And if, indeed, he does not know them, you will

say that he does not at all differ from us, who have no knowledge of

futurity. But if he does know them, that which he knows will entirely

and from necessity come to pass. This, however, as it would seem, not

only destroys that which is in our power, but likewise every thing

which is said to be contingent. This also, is usually said by those who

conceive all things to exist by compulsion, and as I may say, has been

asserted a thousand times. But they all reason as follows: if divinity

knows every future event, that which is future will be from necessity.

And they indeed assert it to be false that divinity knows every thing

definitely; but they say that his knowledge is indefinite of things

which indefinitely come to pass, in order that they may save what

is contingent. Others, however, attributing a definite knowledge to

divinity, admit necessity in every thing which comes to pass. These are

the dogmas of the Peripatetic and Stoic sects. But Plato, and whoever

is a friend to Plato, affirm that divinity definitely knows future

events, and that nevertheless[376] some things are produced definitely,

and others indefinitely, according to their respective natures. For

those things which in effects subsist with division and contrarily, are

antecedently comprehended in the Gods according to a more excellent

condition only.

51. I say, for instance, the causes of generated natures, whether they

are incorporeal or corporeal, subsist incorporeally with the Gods; and

in a similar manner their knowledge is incorporeal. And again, the

causes of intellectual, and of non-intellectual beings, subsist with

the Gods both essentially, and according to science. For they also know

things which are not intellectual intellectually. And again, of things

which are produced by them, that are either temporal or without time,

there is with them a cause and a knowledge exempt from time. Hence

because of effects some are definite, but others indefinite, the Gods

antecedently assume the knowledge of both these according to the more

excellent mode, viz. according to the definite. Moreover, the form

of knowledge is not such as the object of knowledge, but such as the

gnostic nature. For knowledge is not in that which is known, but in

that which knows. Hence, it is similar and of the like form to that in

which it is, and not to that in which it is not. If, therefore, that

which is known is indefinite, but that which knows it is definite, the

knowledge is not also indefinite on account of the thing known, but

definite on account of that which knows. For it is possible to know

that which is subordinate after a more excellent mode, and that which

is supreme after an inferior mode.

52. Hence, because the Gods are better than all things, they

antecedently comprehend all things after a more excellent mode. And

beings indeed, they comprehend superessentially;[377] things which are

according to time, as we have already said, prior to time; corporeal

natures, incorporeally; material natures immaterially; definitely,

things indefinite; permanently, things unstable; and ingenerably,

things generable. It does not, therefore, follow that if they know what

will be, the event must happen from necessity; but to the event indeed

we must give an indefinite generation from a definite cause, and to the

Gods a definite foreknowledge of that which is indefinite. For neither

does it follow that because your art[378] employs drums and wheels, and

corporeal materials, these subsisted corporeally in your foreknowledge;

but your imagination comprehended in itself incorporeally and vitally

the productive principle of the future machine; and the astrolabe

was corporeally fashioned from an internal knowledge which is not

corporeal. If this, however, is the case in your art, what ought you

to say of the foreknowledge of the Gods, in which all things subsist

in a manner truly ineffable, and not to be circumscribed by us? Is it

not evident, that this mode of comprehension is different from, and in

no respect allied to the things which are produced by it? Hence the

Gods know divinely, and in a way unaccompanied by time those things

which are in our power, and we energize, as we are naturally adapted.

Whatever we choose also, is foreknown by them, not on account of the

boundary which is in us, but on account of the boundary which is with

them.

* * * * *

Such, my friend, is my answer to your inquiries, independent of which

I am able to show you that there is something in our power, from

praise and blame, from counsel, from exhortation and dehortation, from

judicial affairs, from accusation and defence, from all political

erudition, from legislation, from prayer, from sacerdotal methods,

and from philosophy itself. For you well know that my preceptor

[Syrianus,] used frequently to say, that if that which is in our power

were destroyed, philosophy would be superfluous. For what should it

instruct, when there is nothing which can be instructed, when there is

nothing in us by which we may become better? Reconsidering, therefore,

these things again and again, if you still have any doubts, do not be

averse to write to me. For what subjects can we more aptly discuss than

those, in the disquisition of which no one will accuse us of nugacity?

EXTRACTS

FROM THE

TREATISE OF PROCLUS,

ENTITLED

TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

1. Whether Providence extends to all things, to wholes and parts, and

as far as to the most indivisible natures in the heavens and in the

sublunary regions, in things eternal and things corruptible? This

Proclus affirms, and says that every particular, even of the minutest

things, depends on the beneficent providence of divinity. For nothing

escapes that one whether you speak of the essence of a thing, or its

being known. It is said indeed, and is rightly said, that the whole

circle is centrally in the centre, since the centre is the cause, but

the circle the thing caused, and for the same reason every number is

monadically in unity. But in the one of Providence, all things subsist

after a more exalted mode, since that is more transcendently one than a

centre and the monad.

2. How divinity foreknows and provides for things contingent? Proclus

answers, that divinity, on account of his most perfect nature, knows

in their seeds and causes things indefinite definitely, as he also

knows things distant and corporeal, without distance and incorporeally.

3. Whether Providence is the cause of things definite and indefinite

according to the same, and after the same manner? Proclus answers

that to provide for is nothing else than to benefit; and that hence

every thing participates of that one good according to its own measure

and order, so that Providence retains its unity and liberty even in

things indefinite. In the same chapter also he proves that divinity

provides for things contingent and indefinite, that they may not be as

it were super-adventitious in the universe. For, says he, if the Gods

are willing and able to provide definitely for things indefinite, as

being the authors of them, they will entirely provide for them, and

providing will know the desert of the subjects of their providential

energy. And the Gods indeed, with an exempt transcendency, extend their

providence to all things, but dæmons dividing their superessential

subsistence, receive the guardianship of different herds of animals,

distributing the providence of the Gods, as Plato says, as far as to

the most ultimate division. Hence some of them preside over men, others

over lions, or other animals, and others over plants; and still more

partially, some are the inspective guardians of the eye, others of the

heart, and others of the liver. All things, however, are full of Gods,

some of whom exert their providential energies immediately, but others

through dæmons as media; not that the Gods are incapable of being

present to all things, but that ultimate are of themselves incapable of

participating first natures.

4. How the participations of the Gods are effected, or how the Gods

energize providentially on inferior natures? Proclus answers that the

participations are according to the aptitude of the participants;

viz. they subsist rationally in rational, but intellectually in

intellectual natures, and imaginably and sensibly in those beings that

live according to imagination and sense. And they subsist essentially

and through being alone, in those things which are without life.

Hence, Providence being established above all beings, according to

divine union itself, and energizing according to one energy adapted

to _the one_, every thing which accedes to it participates of

it according to its natural adaptation. With respect to the failure

of the oracles he says, that the energy of divinity remaining always

the same, places or men become unadapted to its participation, just

as if a certain statue always remaining the same, a mirror should at

one time exhibit a fulgid image of it, but at another, an obscure or

debile, or indeed no image of it at all. He adds, If, therefore, it

should be said that oracles sometimes participate of the Gods who

are the sources of divination, but at other times fail, becoming

inefficacious, and as it were without spirit, for a certain period, the

causes of this irregularity must be referred to the vapours that are

the instruments of inspiration failing, through an inability of always

being the participants of divine influence. For the oracles are true

which give completion to the phænomena, and angels, dæmons and heroes

are veracious, which the Gods and the perpetually existing allotments

in the universe illuminate, though certain waters and openings of the

earth cannot always participate of them, on account of their unstable

nature. Or if it should be said, that the powers of sacred rites,

sometimes entering into statues, causing them to be vitalized, and

filling them with divine inspiration, fail in certain periods of time,

the failure of these also, I should think it proper to refer to the

recipients, and not to any variation of the energy of the Gods that

inspire them. For neither do we dare to accuse the sun as the cause of

the eclipse of the moon, but the conical shadow of the earth into which

the moon falls.

5. Whence and why evil subsists, since there is Providence? Proclus

answers, that there are two kinds of evils, one in bodies, contrary

to nature; the other in souls, contrary to reason. The kingdom of

Providence, however, says he, is molested by neither of them; but

to the former of these evils, the end is good, and the variety and

perfection of the universe. For every thing which is preternatural

takes place, in order that something which is according to nature may

be effected, but not vice versa. And with respect to the latter of

these evils, between beings more perfect than we are, and brutes, it is

necessary that souls should intervene as a medium, which are endued

with reason, anger and desire, and rejoice in freedom of will.

6. If Providence is, why are good men oppressed with evil, but bad

men triumph? Proclus answers, that notwithstanding this, virtue and

the matter of virtue are not wanting to the good; and also, that this

praise is peculiar to them, that they had rather cultivate naked

Virtue, than Vice with all her abundance. That it is not an evil to

be deprived of the incentives to evil; that some have even earnestly

desired adverse fortune; and that wise men have always borne it with

fortitude. Nor is it expedient that wise men should at one and the same

time abound with every kind of good. For it is necessary that they

should have a certain experience of the evils of the present life, by

which the soul being excited, desires a transition from hence to that

place which is beyond the reach of evil. He adds, that many through

adversity have arrived at greater attainments in virtue; and that in

short, those things only are evil which we ourselves perpetrate, and

not those which we suffer [from an external cause]. That all bad men

are without glory, and without honour, though they should be surrounded

by thousands of flatterers. To the question which he adjoins to

this, why Providence distributes equal to unequal things, according

to arithmetical, and not according to geometrical equality, as when

a whole city perishes, there is a similar destruction of dissimilar

men, viz. of the good and the bad, he answers as follows. In the first

place, indeed, they do not suffer this similitude of punishment so far

as they are dissimilar, but so far as they are similar; in consequence

of voluntarily inhabiting the same city, or entering the same ship, and

fighting together, or mutually suffering any thing else of the same

species; and so according to the energy of that species, they suffer

a certain something which is the same. So far, however, as they are

better and worse, they participate differently of the common calamity;

since the latter perish, bearing it impatiently, but the former

enduring it mildly. And after a separation from the present life, the

place destined to be the habitation of more excellent beings receives

the former, but the abode of subordinate beings receives the latter.

Proclus afterwards adds, that there is a certain order and a period

of common fate, terminating from different principles in the same end,

and a concurrence of progressions, where the less principal parts are

compelled from necessity to be co-passive, And that we are ignorant of

the true equalities of souls.

7. If Providence extends as far as to the lowest beings, whence is the

great inequality in the allotments of brutes, their mutual devorations,

and the like, derived? Proclus answers, that if there is any thing in

them of a self-motive nature, the cause of this must be investigated

from a higher source; but if they are only corporeal, it is of no

consequence if they suffer the same thing as a shadow all-variously

transformed, and are subject to Fate.

8. Why punishments do not immediately follow after crimes, but are

inflicted at length after the commission of them, and this sometimes

is very long after?[379] Proclus answers, that the implanted root of

wickedness (just as the earth bearing thorns, though the germes are

a thousand times cut off, still produces the like) renders the same

energies, in consequence of continuing inflexible by punishment.

Providence, therefore, waits for an appropriate time, not such as may

be pleasing to the vulgar, but such as it knows will contribute to the

health of souls, and instructs many by endurance. For, together with

the Gods, says Plato, Fortune and Time govern all things, whether it

be requisite that some good should be imparted, or that there should

be a purification from something contrary to good. In the next place,

vice is a punishment to itself, and the most grievous injury the soul

can sustain. Precipitate anger also is not a good dispensator of

punishments. Plato once, being about to chastize a slave, was seen

holding his hand in an elevated position for some time, and being

asked why he did so, said that he was punishing his own impetuous

anger. Archytas said to his servants in a field, who had not done

what he had ordered them to do, and expected to be punished for their

negligence, “It is well for you that I am angry.” And Theano said to

one of her servants, “If I were not angry I would chastize you.” Among

the Egyptians there was a law, that a pregnant woman who was judged

worthy of death, should not be put to death till she was delivered.

What wonder, therefore, is it that Providence should for a time

spare those who are deserving of death, but are able to perform not

trifling, but illustrious actions, till they have accomplished them? If

Themistocles had been immediately punished for what he did when he was

a young man, who would have delivered Athens from the Persian evils?

Who also would have explained the Pythian oracle? If Dionysius had

perished in the beginning of his tyranny, who would have freed Sicily,

which was thought to be irremediably lost, from the Chalcedonians? If

the punishment of Periander had not been deferred for a long time,

who would have freed the pleasant island of Leucadia, who would have

liberated Anaxorium from its adversaries?--To which may be added,

that the time of deferred punishment seems long to our feeble vision,

but is nothing to the eye of Providence, just as the place also in

which we live, and carry about these bodies is perfectly small for the

punishment of great offences; but there are many and indescribable

places of punishment in the infernal regions, and excessive torments

for the offenders that are there.--On account of the magnitude of the

punishment likewise, the whole of it is not inflicted at once. Souls

also are naturally adapted to feel remorse, which is the forerunner of

their greatest sufferings. For they say that Apollodorus the tyrant

saw himself in a dream scourged and boiled by certain persons, and his

heart exclaiming from the kettle, I am the cause of these thy torments.

But Ptolemy who was surnamed Thunder, thought in a dream that he was

called to judgment by Seleucus, and that vultures and wolves sat there

as his judges. Such are the preludes to the vicious of impending

punishment.

9. How the crimes of other persons, as for instance of parents or

potentates are punished in children and subjects? For that certain

persons are said to have suffered punishment for the crimes of their

ancestors, both revelations and the mysteries manifest, and certain

liberating Gods are said to purify from them. Proclus answers, that

a nation, or a family, or a city, must be considered as one body, and

that these have kindred powers that preside over them, so that such

crimes are not foreign, on account of this conjunction and similitude.

Why, therefore, should it be any longer paradoxical, that souls when

transferred into other bodies, should suffer punishment for the crimes

which they have committed in former bodies?

10. Since the providence of divinity knows all things and reduces them

to good, how are angels and demons, and if you are also willing, heroes

and souls that govern the world in conjunction with the Gods, said to

exert a providential energy? Proclus answers, that divinity provides

for _all things_ universally and totally, but the other powers

partially, subordinately, and for _certain things_ only.

In order to supply as much as possible the loss of the entire treatise

of Proclus on this subject, the following admirable observations on

Providence, are added, translated from his Commentary On the Parmenides

of Plato; a work, which to the disgrace of Europe, is still only extant

in manuscript.

“The Athenian guest in the Laws clearly evinces that there is a

providence, where his discourse shows that the Gods know, and possess a

power which governs, all things. But Parmenides, at the very beginning

of the discussion concerning Providence, evinces the absurdity of

doubting divine knowledge and dominion. For to assert that the

conclusion of this doubt is still _more dire_ than the former [i.e.

that divinity is not known by us] sufficiently shows that he rejects

the arguments which subvert providence. For it is dire to say that

divinity is not known by us who are rational and intellectual natures,

and who essentially possess something divine; but it is still more

dire to deprive divine natures of knowledge; since the former pertains

to those who do not convert themselves to divinity, but the latter to

those who impede the all-pervading goodness of the Gods. And the former

pertains to those who err respecting our essence, but the latter to

those who convert themselves erroneously about a divine cause. But the

expression _still more dire_ (δεινοτερον) is not used as signifying a

more strenuous doubt, in the same manner as we are accustomed to call

those _dire_ (δεινοι) who vanquish by the power of language, but as a

thing worthy of greater dread and caution to the intelligent. For it

divulses the union of things, and dissociates divinity apart from the

world. It also defines divine power as not pervading to all things, and

circumscribes intellectual knowledge as not all-perfect. It likewise

subverts all the fabrication of the universe, the order imparted to

the world from separate causes, and the goodness which fills all

things from one will, in a manner adapted to the nature of unity. Nor

less dire than any one of these is the confusion of piety. For what

communion is there between Gods and men, if the former are deprived

of the knowledge of our concerns? All supplications, therefore, of

divinity, all sacred institutions, all oaths adducing the Gods as a

witness, and the untaught conceptions implanted in our souls concerning

divinity, will perish. What gift also will be left of the Gods to

men, if they do not previously comprehend in themselves the desert of

the recipients, if they do not possess a knowledge of all that we do,

of all we suffer, and of all that we think, though we do not carry

it into effect? With great propriety, therefore, are such assertions

called dire. For if it is unholy to change any legitimately divine

institutions, how can such an innovation as this be unattended with

dread? But that Plato rejects this hypothesis which makes divinity to

be ignorant of our concerns, is evident from these things, since it is

one of his dogmas, that divinity knows and produces all things. Since,

however, some of those posterior to him have vehemently endeavoured to

subvert such-like assertions, let us speak concerning them as much as

may be sufficient for our present purpose.

Some of those then posterior to Plato, on seeing the unstable

condition of sublunary things, were fearful that they were not under

the direction of Providence and a divine nature; for such events

as are said to take place through fortune, the apparent inequality

respecting lives, and the disordered motion of material natures,

induced them greatly to suspect that they were not under the government

of Providence. Besides, the persuasion that Divinity is not busily

employed in the evolution of all-various reasons, and that he does not

depart from his own blessedness, induced them to frame an hypothesis

so lawless and dire. For they were of opinion that the passion of

our soul and the perturbation which it sustains by descending to

the government of bodies, must happen to divinity, if he converted

himself to the providential inspection of things. Farther still, from

considering that different objects of knowledge are known by different

gnostic powers; as for instance, sensibles by sense, objects of

opinion by opinion, things scientific by science, and intelligibles

by intellect; and, at the same time, neither placing sense, nor

opinion, nor science in divinity, but only an intellect immaterial and

pure;--hence they asserted that divinity had no knowledge of any other

things, than the objects of intellect. [And this was the opinion of the

more early Peripatetics.] For say they, if matter is external to him,

it is necessary that he should be pure from apprehensions which are

converted to matter; but being purified from these, it follows that he

must have no knowledge of material natures. Hence the patrons of this

doctrine deprived him of a knowledge of, and providential exertions

about sensibles; not through any imbecility of nature, but through a

transcendency of gnostic energy; just as those whose eyes are filled

with light, are said to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects, at

the same time that this incapacity is nothing more than transcendency

of vision. They likewise add, that there are many things which it

is beautiful not to know. Thus to the entheastic, (or those who are

divinely inspired) it is beautiful to be ignorant of whatever would

destroy the deific energy; and to the scientific, not to know that

which would defile the indubitable perception of science.

But others [as the Stoics], ascribe indeed to divinity a knowledge of

sensibles, in order that they may not take away his providence, but

at the same time convert his apprehension to that which is external,

represent him as pervading through the whole of a sensible nature, as

passing into contact with the objects of his government, impelling

every thing, and being locally present with all things; for say they,

he would not otherwise be able to extend a providential energy in

a becoming manner, and impart good to every thing according to its

desert.

Others again affirm that divinity has a knowledge of himself, but

that he has no occasion to understand sensibles in order to provide

for them, since by his very essence he produced all things, and

adorns whatever he has produced, without having any knowledge of his

productions. They add, that this is by no means wonderful, since

nature operates without knowledge, and unattended with phantasy; but

that divinity differs from nature in this, that he has a knowledge of

himself, though not of the things which are fabricated by him. And such

are the assertions of those who were persuaded that divinity is not

separated from mundane natures, and of those who deprived him of the

knowledge of inferior concerns, and of a knowledge operating in union

with providence.

With respect to these philosophers, we say, that they speak truly, and

yet not truly, on this subject. For if providence has a subsistence,

neither can there be any thing disordered, nor can divinity be busily

employed, nor can he know sensibles through passive sense: but these

philosophers in consequence of not knowing the exempt power and

uniform knowledge of divinity, appear to deviate from the truth. For

thus we interrogate them: does not every thing energize in a becoming

manner when it energizes according to its own power and nature? as for

instance, does not nature, in conformity to the order of its essence,

energize physically, intellect intellectually, and soul psychically, or

according to the nature of soul? And when the same thing is generated

by many and different causes, does not each of these produce according

to its own power, and not according to the nature of the thing

produced? Or shall we say, that each produces after the same manner,

and that, for example, the sun and man generate man, according to the

same mode of operation, and not according to the natural ability of

each, viz. the one partially, imperfectly, and with a busy energy, but

the other without anxious attention, by its very essence, and totally?

But to assert this would be absurd; for a divine operates in a manner

very different from a mortal nature.

If therefore, every thing which energizes, energizes according to its

own nature and order, some things divinely and supernaturally, others

naturally, and others in a different manner, it is evident that every

gnostic being knows according to its own nature, and that it does

not follow that because the thing known is one and the same, on this

account, the natures which know, energize in conformity to the essence

of the things known. Thus sense, opinion and our intellect, know that

which is white, but not in the same manner: for sense cannot know what

the essence is of a thing white, nor can opinion obtain a knowledge

of its proper objects in the same manner as intellect; since opinion

knows only _that_ a thing is, but intellect knows the cause of

its existence. _Knowledge therefore subsists according to the nature

of that which knows, and not according to the nature of that which is

known._ What wonder is it then that Divinity should know all things

in such a manner as is accommodated to his nature, viz. divisible

things indivisibly, things multiplied, uniformly, things generated,

according to an eternal intelligence, totally, such things as are

partial; and that with a knowledge of this kind, he should possess a

power productive of all things, or, in other words, that by knowing all

things with simple and united intellections, he should impart to every

thing being, and a progression into being? For the auditory sense knows

audibles in a manner different from the common sense; and prior to,

and different from these, reason knows audibles, together with other

particulars which sense is not able to apprehend. And again, of desire

which tends to one thing, of anger which aspires after another thing,

and of _proairesis_, or deliberate choice, there is one particular

life moving the soul towards all these, which are mutually motive of

each other. It is through this life that we say, I desire, I am angry,

and I deliberately choose this thing or that; for this life verges

to all these powers, and lives in conjunction with them, as being a

power which is impelled to every object of desire. But prior both to

reason and this one life, is _the one_ of the soul, which often

says, I perceive, I reason, I desire, and I deliberate, which follows

all these energies and energizes together with them or we should not

be able to know all these, and to apprehend in what they differ from

each other, unless we contained a certain indivisible nature, which

has a subsistence above the common sense, and which prior to opinion,

desire and will, knows all that these know and desire, according to an

indivisible mode of apprehension.

If this be the case, it is by no means proper to disbelieve in the

indivisible knowledge of divinity, which knows sensibles without

possessing sense, and divisible natures without possessing a divisible

energy, and which without being present to things in place, knows them

prior to all local presence, and imparts to every thing that which

every thing is capable of receiving. The unstable essence therefore, of

apparent natures is not known by him in an unstable, but in a definite

manner; nor does he know that which is subject to all-various mutations

dubiously, but in a manner perpetually the same; for by knowing

himself, he knows every thing of which he is the cause, possessing a

knowledge transcendently more accurate than that which is co-ordinate

to the objects of knowledge; since a causal knowledge of every thing is

superior to every other kind of knowledge. Divinity therefore, knows

without busily attending to the objects of his intellection, because

he abides in himself, and by alone knowing himself, knows all things.

Nor is he indigent of sense, or opinion, or science, in order to know

sensible natures: for it is himself that produces all these, and that

in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himself, comprehends

an united knowledge of them, according to cause, and in one simplicity

of perception. Just as if some one having built a ship, should place

in it men of his own formation, and, in consequence of possessing a

various art, should add a sea to the ship, produce certain winds, and

afterwards launch the ship into the new created main. Let us suppose

too, that he causes these to have an existence by merely conceiving

them to exist, so that by imagining all this to take place, he gives

an external subsistence to his inward phantasms, it is evident that in

this case he will contain the cause of every thing which happens to the

ship through the winds on the sea, and that by contemplating his own

conceptions, without being indigent of outward conversion, he will at

the same time both fabricate and know these external particulars. Thus,

and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of

the universe, possessing the causes of things, both gives subsistence

to, and contemplates, whatever the universe contains without departing

from the speculation of himself. But if with respect to intellect one

kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident that there

is not the same intellectual perfection of all things, but that where

intelligibles have a total and undistributed subsistence, there the

knowledge is more total and indivisible, and where the number of forms

proceeds into multitude and extension, there the knowledge is both one

and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing

the Orphic verses, in which the theologist says:

Αυτη δε Ζηνος και εν ομμασι πατρος ανακτος

Ναιουσ’ αθανατοι τε θεοι, θνητοι τ’ ανθρωποι,

Οσσα τε ην γεγαωσα, και υστερον οσσα εμελλον.

i.e.

There in the sight of Jove, the parent king,

Th’ immortal gods and mortal men reside,

With all that ever was, and shall hereafter be.

For the artificer of the universe is full of intelligibles, and

possesses the causes of all things separated from each other; so

that he generates men, and all other things, according to their

characteristic peculiarities, and not so far as each is divine, in

the same manner as the divinity prior to him, the intelligible father

Phanes.”

The admirable dogma in this most beautiful extract, “that knowledge

subsists according to the nature of that which knows, and not according

to the nature of that which is known,” was originally derived

from Iamblichus, as is evident from the commentary of Ammonius on

Aristotle’s treatise On Interpretation. (See note to p. 162 of my

translation of the Organon.) Boethius in the 5th book of his treatise

De Consolatione, elegantly illustrates this dogma. The passage I allude

to begins with the words: “Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum

sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem.”

The sources however from whence he derived this doctrine, appear to

have been unknown to all his editors and commentators; for they are not

noticed by any of them.

EXTRACTS

FROM THE

TREATISE OF PROCLUS

ON THE

SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL.

In this treatise Proclus inquires, first, Whether there is such a thing

as evil? secondly, If there is, whether it is in intellectual natures?

thirdly, If evil is in sensibles, whether it subsists according to

a principal cause? fourthly, If it does not subsist according to

a principal cause, whether any essence must be assigned to it, or

whether it must be admitted to be perfectly unessential, and without

hypostasis? fifthly, And if this be the case, how does it subsist,

another principle existing, and whence does it originate, and how far

does it proceed? And farther, still, sixthly, how, since Providence

exists, does evil subsist, and whence is it derived? If the father of

the universe not only produced the nature of good, but was also willing

that there should be nothing evil any where, by what contrivance or

art does evil subsist, which the Demiurgus did not wish to subsist?

For it is not lawful to assert that he was willing some things should

subsist, but produced others, since in divine natures _to be willing_,

and _to produce_ are simultaneous and conjoined. Hence evil is not

only a thing contrary to the will of divinity, but is also without

hypostasis, divinity not only not producing it (for this it is not even

lawful to suppose) but not suffering it to subsist. Proclus answers,

that physical evil, viz. the evil which is corruptive of the essence,

power and energy of a thing, is not evil but good, because it subsists

on account of good, and because generation is from corruption, of

which two the world consists, and by which the order of the universe

is adorned. There is not, however, such a thing as unmingled evil, and

evil itself, or an eternal idea, form and essence of evil, but moral

evil is mixed with good, and so far as it is good, it subsists from

divinity, but so far as evil, it is derived from another cause which is

impotent. For evil is nothing else than a greater or less declination,

departure, defect and privation from _the good itself_, and which is

good alone, in the same manner as darkness from the sun. It is the

debility and absence of power in energizing, but is not power. And that

which is evil to partial natures, is not evil to the universe.

2. Evil is not in the Gods, nor in the triple government of the better

genera, viz. it is neither in angels; (for how could we call them

messengers and elucidators of the Gods, if evil of any kind was in

them who are the images of the divinities, and who dwelling in the

vestibules of deity participate of its goodness?) nor in dæmons, nor

in heroes. If divinity produced evil, he either produced it contrary

to his nature, or every thing thence subsisting will be boniform, and

the progeny of the goodness that abides in him. But as it is said, it

is not the property of fire to impart cold, nor of good to produce

evil from itself. Either, therefore, it must be said that evil is not,

if it is necessary to its existence that it should be produced by

divinity, or that it is, and does not originate from deity. Against

those who assert that evil is primarily in dæmons, he observes as

follows: There are certain persons who attribute passions to dæmons,

and say that some of their passions are according to nature as when

they tragically speak of their deaths, and different generations; but

that others are from choice only, as when they denominate certain

dæmons base and evil, who, they also say, defile souls, lead them to

matter, and draw them down from their journey to the heavens to the

subterranean region. It is necessary, however, to ask these persons,

whether are the dæmons, which you say are evil, such to themselves [or

in their own nature,] or not to themselves, but to others? For if they

are evil to themselves, one of two things must follow, either that

they must remain in evil for ever, or that they must be susceptive of

transmutation. And if indeed they are always evil, how can that which

subsists from the Gods be perpetually evil? For it is better not to

be at all, than to be always evil. But if they are transmuted, they

are not essentially evil, but are evil from habitude, in which there

is the better and the worse, and another species of life. Dæmons,

however, are always in the ratio of dæmons, and each of them is always

in its own order. But if they are indeed good to themselves, but evil

to others whom they lead into a worse condition, it is just as if some

one should call teachers depraved, and certain pedagogues, who ranking

as the chastisers of offences, do not suffer the offenders to pursue

a better order in a fluctuating manner, instead of an order which is

adapted to them. Or as if some one should denominate those [officers]

evil, who standing before things of a sacred nature [in temples] keep

the impure from entering into the sanctuary, because they prohibit them

from the participation of the interior rites. Hence, it is not evil to

perform this office, but to be of such an order, and to deserve such a

prohibition.[380] If, therefore, of the dæmons that are in the world,

some lead souls upward, but others keep such in their own manners, as

are not yet able to ascend, we cannot justly call either of them evil,

neither those that separate from nor those that detain souls [in a

corporeal life.] For it is necessary that there should also be those

dæmons who coerce the soul that is defiled with vice, and is unworthy

of a progression into the heavens, in the place which surrounds the

earth. Neither, therefore, in these, does reason appear to discover

evil. For whatever they do, they perform according to their own nature,

and always after the same manner. But this is not evil.

3. Evil in souls is a debility of not always and uniformly adhering

to better natures, and to good. Hence arises their descent to things

subordinate, their oblivion, their malefic inclination to things

conversant with body, and their discord with reason. According to

some, matter is that which is primarily evil, and evil itself, and the

debility of souls arises from their lapse into matter. This Proclus

denies, and says that both body and matter originate from deity, and

that both are the progeny of divinity. He adds, that matter is the

first indefinite, and that essential infinity, in the same manner as a

mixed body, depends on one cause, divinity. That souls sinned before

they were thrust into matter. That there are not two principles [matter

and deity.] And that matter is neither good nor evil, but a thing

necessary, and distant in the last degree from _the good itself_.

4. Of good there is one eternal, definite, universal and producing

cause, viz. God; but of evils the causes are manifold and infinite,

some to souls, and others to bodies. They are also fluctuating,

indefinite, inordinate, and particular, surrounding the nature of souls

and bodies from necessity, and arising from impotency, incommensuration

void of design, anadaptation, debility, and the victory of a

subordinate nature. Good has an hypostasis, but evil a parhypostasis or

a deviation from hypostasis. Good is form, but evil is without form,

and is as it were privation.

5. Evil possesses its power of acting, and its capability from a

contrary good, which becomes debile and inefficacious on account of

the mixture of evil; and evil is allotted its efficacy and energy on

account of the presence of good, for both are in one. Thus in bodies,

that which is preternatural, debilitates that which is according to

nature, the energy, of nature being in this case dormant, and order,

in which good consists, being dissolved. Thus also in souls, evil when

it vanquishes good, uses its power, viz. the power of reason, to its

own purposes, and makes it subservient to desire. Each of these also

imparts something according to its own nature, viz. the one power,

but the other debility; because of itself evil is neither adapted to

act, nor to possess power; for all power is good, and all energy is

an extension of power. And this Plato knowing, says, that injustice

itself is of itself debile and inactive; but through the presence of

justice possesses its power, and is led forth into energy, not abiding

in its own nature. Nor does evil alone consist in a privation of

life, because being which subsists prior to life, gives also to evil

a participation of life. All life, however, is of itself power; but

evil subsisting in a foreign power is contrary to good, employing its

own power for the purpose of opposing good. And the more power indeed

is inherent in it, the greater are the energies and works of evil, and

the less it possesses of power, the less are its energies and works.

In bodies too as soon as the powers of nature cease, the preternatural

energy which is in them ceases also; and hence, all order is entirely

dissolved, that which is preternatural being more abundant. When the

soul, therefore, receives an increase from that which is contrary to

good, according to its base and formless nature, but is diminished

according to virtue and energy, then it becomes at the same time debile

and inefficacious. For the augmentation is not then from power, that

the transition might be to something greater; but it arises from the

presence of the contrary to power, just as if frigidity should use the

power of heat to the accomplishment of its own work, vanquishing and

subjecting its power. The soul, therefore, being deficient through the

absence of good, and possessing more of privation in proportion as

it has more of deficiency, becoming also more debile in its energies

through a diminution of virtue, is indeed more evil, but performs less.

And how indeed could the increase since it is evil be from power,

if the work of all power is to preserve that in which it is, but

evil dissipates every thing of which it is the evil. Hence evil is

of itself inefficacious and impotent. If also, as Plato says, it is

involuntary, it will not be the object of the will. And thus it will be

a privation of the first triad of _the good_, viz. of _will_, _power_,

and _energy_. For good indeed, is the object of the will, and is in

its own nature powerful and efficacious; but evil is unwished for,

is debile and inefficacious. For that is not the object of the will

to any thing which is corruptive of it, nor does power wish for that

which may corrupt it, nor does energy wish not to have its hypostasis

according to power. But evil is desired in consequence of appearing

to be good; and we say that evil seems to be an object of the will,

on account of the mixture of good with it. Power, therefore, and

energy are apparently in evil, [but are not so in reality] because

they are not essentially inherent in it, nor so far as it is evil,

but they extrinsically accede to it, as that to which a parhypostasis

belongs. Hence, as it appears to me, this is what Socrates shows in the

Theætetus to those who are able to understand his meaning, viz. that

evil is neither privation, nor the contrary to good. For privation is

not able to effect any thing, nor does it in short possess any power;

nor does that which is contrary to good of itself possess either power

or energy. But he denominates evil in a certain respect _subcontrary_

to good, because of itself indeed, or essentially, it is privation,

yet because it is not altogether perfect privation, but in a similar

manner with habit changes from capacity, it is from thence constituted

in energizing in the part of contrariety, and is neither perfect

privation, nor contrary, but subcontrary to good.

7. There are these three things which may debilitate, and in which

there is evil, viz. a partial soul; the image of soul in animals; and

body. The evil to body is to have a preternatural subsistence; the evil

to the image of soul is to be in a state of deviation from reason;

and the evil to soul [i.e. to the rational soul,] is to deviate from

intellect. The defect of life according to reason is the malady of

this life; but ignorance and a privation of intellect are baseness,

whether this takes place about the dianoetic or the doxastic power;

and if about the former it is a want of science, but if about the

latter, of art. Baseness, however, and malady, subsist in one way in

cognitions, and in another in impulses. For the irrational appetites

are hostile to the life which consists in action, and the many senses

and precipitate imaginations intervening in the contemplative energy

destroy its purity and immateriality. Hence unbecoming imaginations, or

evil consent and base choice arise, either from an external source and

in various actions, or internally according to anger and desire. That

also which is preternatural is twofold. For in the body, it is either

deformity, as in monsters, or malady, in consequence of the order and

commensuration of the body being dissolved, as in corruption, disease,

and pain.

* * * * *

In many persons meditated evil, and which abides occultly within the

soul, is benefited as being base and unbecoming. But when it subsists

in energy the quality of it becomes apparent. It is manifested,

however, by penitence and the consciousness of the soul. For the

medical art also, in the opening of ulcers, and leading forth

externally the inwardly concealed cause which produced the malady,

exhibits an image of the operations of Providence, which permits base

deeds and passions, in order that the perpetrators of them being

changed from the habit which they have acquired, and which is inflated

with evils, may assume the principle of a better period and life. But

whatever passions are within the soul, are attended with this good,

that they always lead the soul to a proper condition, her improper

choice being accompanied with punishment. Thus also the law which is in

souls leads each to its appropriate state, and to that desert which is

derived from Providence.

9. Evil cannot exist, if it is admitted that it is not contrary to

good, because all things, and even evil itself, are for the sake of

good. Divinity, therefore, is not the cause of evil. For evil, so far

as evil never originates from thence, but from other causes which

as we have said generate not according to power, but on account of

debility. Hence it appears to me that Plato[381] when he places all

things about the king of all, and says that all things are for his

sake, (even things which are not good appearing to be good, and in a

similar manner belonging to beings) calls him the cause of every thing

good, and not at once the cause of all things, for he is not the cause

of evil, but is the cause of every being, and of every thing so far as

it is good. If, therefore, we assert these things rightly, all things

will be from Providence, and evil will have a place among beings. Hence

also the Gods produce evil, but they produce it as good; and they know,

as possessing a unical knowledge of all things, partibles impartibly,

evils according to the form of good, and multitude according to the

form of _the one_. For there is one knowledge of soul, another of

an intellectual nature, and another of the Gods themselves. For the

first of these indeed, is a self-motive, the second, an eternal, and

the third an indivisible and unical knowledge, knowing and producing

all things by _the one_.

* * * * *

For the further information of the reader on this most important

subject, the Subsistence of Evil, the following admirable extract is

added, from the Commentaries of Proclus On the Timæus, (p. 112.) The

Comment is on these words, “Divinity being willing that all things

should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil;”

and is as follows:

“The divine fabrication and intellectual production, proceeds from

things impartible to such as are partible, from the united to the

multiplied, and from things without interval to corporeal masses

that are every way distended with interval. This also the discourse

about it adumbrating, in the first place, _enunciatively_ celebrates

the final cause, afterwards _discursively_, and in the third place,

delivers _in an evolved manner_, the whole orderly distribution and

progression from it. For the words “he was good,” _uniformly_ indeed

comprehend every thing final, and the most divine of causes. But

the words, “In that which is good, envy is never inherent about any

thing; and being without this, he was willing that all things should

be generated as much as possible similar to himself,” effect this

_discursively_.[382] For after the one will of intellect, he introduces

the divided contemplation of it. And in the present words, he delivers

to us the intelligence of divinity now proceeding into all multitude

and interval, _evolving_ every demiurgic providence, and all the

parts of fabrication. Moreover, the third of these is in continuity

with the second, and the second with the first. For since the first

particle was, “he was good,” on this account the second begins from the

good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the father. But the third

beginning from will, delivers the whole of his providential energy. For

if he was good, he was willing to make all things good. But if he was

willing, he made them to be so, and led the universe into order. For

providence indeed, is suspended from will, but will from goodness. And

thus much concerning the order and connexion of the words.

Let us however consider what this will is, in order that we may

understand how it is conjoined with goodness. Superessential union

itself therefore, and which is of itself exempt from beings, is indeed

one, ineffable, and indefinite, having the uncircumscribed, and the

incomprehensible in _the one itself_. If therefore, it be requisite to

survey in this, the above mentioned uniform triad, _goodness_ indeed

has the precedency, but _will_ is the second, and _providence_ is the

third; goodness indeed, producing the perfect, the sufficient, and

the desirable; but will exhibiting exuberant plenitude, the extended,

and the generative; and providence imparting the efficacious, the

perfective, and the undefiled. According to this ineffable and united

hyparxis of the triad, the intelligible also is triply divided into

essence, power, and energy; essence indeed, being firmly established

in it, and being self-perfect; but power having a never-failing and

infinite progression; and energy being allotted perfection, and

essential production. And again, intellect after the same manner is

triply divided, into being, life, and the intellectual. For the first

of these indeed, is the supplier of its existence, the second of its

life, and the third, of its gnostic power. After these also, soul is

divided, into that which is the object of science, into science, and

into that which is scientific. For the first of these is that which is

known, the second is knowledge, and the third is that which derives

its completion from both these. These triads therefore being four, as

goodness is to will, so is essence to power, being to life, and the

object of science to science. And as will is to providence, so is power

to energy, life to intellect, and science to that which is scientific.

For essence, being, and the object of science, have an order analogous

to goodness. For the connective, the stable, the uniform, and the

perfective, pertain to goodness. But power, life, and science, are

analogous to will. For the self-begotten, and that which comprehends

and measures all things, belong to will. And energy, intellect, and

that which is scientific, pertain to providence. For the efficacious,

and that which proceeds through and antecedently comprehends all

things, are the resemblances of divine providence. Since therefore, the

demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable intellect, so far as he

is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and providence; but as

intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy; and as intellect, he

is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he

possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will.

Consequent to this, it remains to enquire how the demiurgus wished all

things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it

may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would

be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods

and undefiled essences. If however, he not only fabricated these, but

also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was

not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that

better natures should exist, but also fabricated such as are worse.

If he had been willing therefore, that all things should be good, he

would have stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply however,

that if the progression of things was only as far as to the Gods, all

things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last

order, the good would be destroyed; since being able and willing to

generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of an arrangement

as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our

opponents therefore say, if all things are good, the progression is as

far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends

only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine

nature is unprolific how is it good? But it will be unprolific, if it

is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than

that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing,

that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be

the Gods therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the

Gods, let there be a progression[383] as far as to matter itself; and

let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of

things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last

of beings, nor any vacuum. For what vacuum can there be, when things

characterized by _itself_[384] have the first subsistence, those

that rank as the second proceed from these, those of the third order,

proceed from these and others, those in the fourth rank, are generated

from things characterized by the term _another_, and those in the

fifth rank being _others_ only; and on each side of these those

natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar?[385] Such therefore,

being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable

natures being first established, self-motive natures having the second,

and alter-motive natures the third rank, all of which are the last of

things. For all beings derive their completion from the above-mentioned

orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued

in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting

from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the

well-ordered progression of all beings from _the one_.

Let therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation

of beings be extended as far as to nothing; but whether is there

nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain

respect, and that there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in

souls? For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely;

but others have been induced to deny a providence, in consequence of

believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are good.

For if indeed divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he

be good? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to

benefit every thing, just as it is of that which is essentially hot, to

give heat. But it is not lawful for _the good_ to effect any thing

else than what is good. And if divinity was not[386] willing there

should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist

contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the

doubt.

We must say however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato according to

our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respect to things

subsists in a different manner from that of ours. And again, that the

habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their

habitude with reference to us. For wholes have a relation to parts

different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore

nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. For

he uses these also to a good purpose. But again, to partial natures

there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by

it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe

and to wholes is not evil, but good. For so far as it is a being, and

so far as it participates of a certain order, it is good. For this

thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute of

all good, you will make it to be beyond even that which in no respect

whatever is. For as _the good itself_ is prior to being, so evil

itself is posterior to the nothingness of non-entity. For that which is

most distant from the good is evil, and not that which has no kind of

subsistence.[387] If therefore, that which in no respect whatever is,

has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is

much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself.

If however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil

is complicated with good, you give it a place among beings, and you

make it good to other things. And indeed, how is it possible it should

not, if it ranks among beings? For that which participates of being,

participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity,

participates likewise of good. Hence evil if it is, participates

of good; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not

entirely deprived of order, and indefinite. Who therefore made it to be

such? Who imparted to it measure and order, and bound? It is evident

that it is the demiurgus, who rendered all things similar to himself.

For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits

all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil

according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For power is

twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that

is so abundantly seen;[388] but the other being that of recipients,

which participate of the goodness of the demiurgus according to the

measure of their order [in the scale of beings]. In consequence

therefore of the demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing

evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause

of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away

the fabrication of the world, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and

confound the nature of things first and last.

That we assert these things however, conformably to the opinion of

Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the Politicus,

he clearly says, “that the world obtained from[389] its maker all

beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice and

evil, as are produced within the heavens.” For because there is

generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a

subsistence. And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls

with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that

which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance

of subsistence. At the same time however, all these particulars become

beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the universe. But in

the Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says

that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated; through

which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from

divinity. For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate,

nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil. And

he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted,

and such as are indefinite. For it is not in evils as in things that

are good, viz. that _the one_, and what is primarily good, precede

multitude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil. The

words _others_ therefore and _certain_, evince that the causes of evil

are partial and indefinite. But in the Theætetus he says “that it is

neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for them to be in the

Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal nature,

and this place of our abode.” If therefore, evil revolves necessarily

in the mortal place, it will not be according to Plato, that which in

no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all

beings. So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes,

and is benefited through the boniform providence of the demiurgus,

because there is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in

a certain respect accomplished conformably to justice and divinity.

For we may make the following division: Of all that the world contains,

some things are wholes, but others parts. And of parts, some eternally

preserve their own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial

dæmons, but others are not always able to preserve their proper good.

And of these, some are alter-motive, but others self-motive. And of

self-motive natures, some have evil established in their choice; but

in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes therefore,

they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts

with good. Such things however, as are parts, and yet preserve their

own good, possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are

parts, and alter-motive, deriving their subsistence from other things,

are suspended from the providence of them, and are transmuted in a

becoming manner, as is the case with such bodies as are generated and

corrupted. For if it is necessary that there should be generation, it

is also necessary that there should be corruption. For generation

subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation. But if

there is corruption, it is necessary that the preternatural should be

secretly introduced. As therefore, that which is corrupted, is indeed

corrupted with reference to itself, but is not destroyed with reference

to the universe; for it is either air or water, or something else into

which it is changed; thus also that which is preternatural, is indeed

with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the universe

has an orderly arrangement. For, if though it should be destroyed

and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of

the universe, how is it possible that when having a preternatural

subsistence which is of itself nothing when deprived of all order,

it can destroy the whole arrangement of things? But again, partial

natures which are self-motive indeed, and whose energy is directed to

externals, cause that which is effected by their energy to be evil to

themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is good, and conformable

to divinity. For since impulses and actions are from choice, actions

follow elections according to justice, when he who chuses not only

deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that also which

follows from his conduct. And simply indeed, the action is not good,

but to him who chuses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain

way, it is introduced according to justice; and is good to this

individual and this particular life. For of goods, some are good to all

things, others to such as differ according to species, and others to

individuals, so far as they are individuals. For hellebore is not good

to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies, but it

is good to one who is diseased in a particular manner, and is salutary

from a certain principle. Whether therefore, the action is intemperate

or unjust, to those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is

conformable to justice, but simply it is not good, nor to those by whom

it is done, but is to them the greatest evil. And so far as it proceeds

from them and is directed to them, it is evil; but so far as it

proceeds from the universe to them, it is not evil. And so far as their

energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming

actually depraved; but so far as they suffer from the universe, they

undergo the punishment of their choice; (just as it is said, that those

who deliberate about betraying a suppliant, subvert divinity); or they

suffer the punishment of their will.

Let us however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such

partial natures as energize self-motively, and who stop their depravity

as far as to their choice. For they suffer the punishment of their

cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of

mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly,

and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise they punish the

contrary. But it may be said, how can choice itself have that which is

conformable to justice and divinity? May we not reply, because it is

necessary there should be an essence of this kind and a power of an

ambiguous nature, and which verges to different lives. If therefore

that which has dominion over choice is from divinity, choice also is

from divinity, and if this be the case, it is good. For the electing

soul alone, is transferred to another and another order. For all

choice either elevates the soul, or draws it downward [to an inferior

condition of being]. And if indeed the choice is from a depraved[390]

soul, it is evil; but if it transfers that which chuses to its proper

order, it is according to justice and good. For the choice itself

introduces punishment to the electing soul. Or rather, the choice

becomes punishment in him who chooses, causing the soul to apostatize

from good. For as a beneficent choice becomes truly the reward of

itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is

the peculiarity of self-motive powers. Hence there is no evil, which

is not also in a certain respect good; but all things participate of

providence.

If however, certain persons should ask on what account an

evil-producing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not

rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these it must be

said, that the progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum

is left among them. Whether therefore, is it necessary that there

should not be every self-motive life? But we shall thus take away many

natures that are divine. Or shall we say it is necessary there should

be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should

be self-motive parts? But how is it possible they should be wholes,

if deprived of their proper parts?[391] And how will the continuity of

beings be preserved, if wholes and self-motive natures have a prior

existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely

destroy the intermediate natures, viz. such as are self-motive indeed,

but at the same time partial? And which through the partial form become

connected with habitude, but through the self-motive power, are at a

certain time liberated from habitude. It is necessary therefore, that

there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the

bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary[392] to

each other. Evil however, is not on this account natural to the soul;

since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated

body has an essential tendency to disease; for it is essentially

corruptible; and yet disease is not according to nature. Hence disease

is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this

particular body, but is good to the wholeness of bodies. For it is

necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed

into another thing. As therefore, to the nature which is in us, it is

good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation

of the animal; thus also to every nature it is good for a part to be

corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always

prior to parts. For if parts were generated from wholes, and the

things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed,

in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For a continued

ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must

necessarily fail. But wholes not existing, either generation will be

stopped, or mutation to partial natures will be derived from other

things. Hence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the

whole life of the world.

Farther still therefore, resuming the enquiry after another manner

from the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there

should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he

was willing indeed, considered as imparting being to all things. For

every thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from

the demiurgic cause. But he was not willing, considered as producing

all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good. And if you

are willing to argue physically, evil is produced _essentially_

indeed from a partial soul, but _accidentally_ from divinity, so

far as it is evil, if it is admitted that divinity gave subsistence

to the soul. Evil also so far as it is essentially good, originates

from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. For so far as it

subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the

Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him

who suffers it, and resembles the opening of ulcers. And he who is

incapable[393] of being healed without a certain action, is incited

to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from

her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and

repenting of her own evils, may begin to be purified. For base and

unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those

that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, fill those that

perform them with repentance. And when indeed, they are the subjects

of meditation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased; but when

they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility,

but liberate the soul from the most disgraceful parturition. And some

indeed, exhibit this punishment according to the whole of their life;

but others according to partial energies. For he who does any thing

irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the

object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in

his imagination.

In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures; for the whole

intellectual genus is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole

bodies; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and

always subsisting according to nature. It remains therefore, that it

must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither is it

in the essences of these; for all their essences are derived from

divinity; nor in their powers; for these subsist according to nature.

Hence it remains, that it must be in their energies. But with respect

to souls, it is neither in such as are rational; for all these aspire

after good; nor in such as are irrational; for these energize according

to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry[394] of these

with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in form;

for it wishes to rule over matter; nor in matter; for it aspires after

the supervening ornaments of form. But it consists in the privation

of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident,

that every thing evil exists according to a _parhypostasis_, or

_resemblance of subsistence_, and that at the same time it is

coloured by good; so that all things are good through the will of

divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it

was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have

a shadowy subsistence, since it is necessary to the perfection of the

whole of things. And from what has been said, it is evident, that the

will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to

him, and there is not any being which is not vanquished by a portion

of good. Nor are the words, “_as much as possible_,” written

superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that

power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an

abundance of good.”

THE END.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

VOL. I. P. 1. _Becoming unapparent to many._ It is a remarkable

historical fact, as I have observed in my History of the Restoration

of the Platonic Theology, that the philosophy of Plato was in a manner

lost for many centuries after the death of its great master. For its

depths were not penetrated prior to Plotinus, who lived about two

hundred and fifty years after the birth of Christ.

P. 2. _Jamblichus and Theodorus._ Both these philosophers were the

disciples of Porphyry. For an account of the former, of whom the

Emperor Julian says, that he was posterior indeed in time to Plato,

but not in genius, see my History of the Restoration of the Platonic

Theology, annexed to my translation of Proclus on Euclid.

P. 5. _Being likewise a partaker of the dialectic of Plato._

The dialectic of Plato is very different from the dialectic which

is conversant with opinion, and is accurately investigated in the

Topics of Aristotle. For the business of this first of sciences, is

to employ definitions, divisions, analyzations, and demonstrations,

as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the

progression of beings from the first principle of things, and their

continual conversion to it, as the ultimate object of desire. “But

there are three energies, says Proclus (in MS. Comment. in Parmenid.

lib. 1.) of this most scientific method, the first of which is adapted

to youth, and is useful for the purpose of rousing their intellect,

which is, as it were, in a dormant state. For it is a true exercise of

the soul in the speculation of things, leading forth thro’ opposite

positions the essential impression of ideas which it contains, and

considering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to

truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing

worthy of belief; and lastly, stimulating the all-various conceptions

of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests

from its former investigations, as becoming most familiar with the

speculation of beings, and beholds truth itself firmly established on

a pure and holy foundation. And this energy, according to Socrates,

by a progression through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible

nature, till it arrives at that which is first; and this by analyzing,

defining, demonstrating and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards,

till, having entirely investigated the nature of intelligibles, it

raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being

perfectly established in this nature, as in her paternal port, no

longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as she has now

arrived at the end of her search. And you may say that what is

delivered in the Phædrus and Sophista is the employment of this energy,

giving a twofold division to some, and a fourfold to other operations

of the dialectic art. Hence it is assigned to such as philosophize

purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the

intellect of their soul in pure intellection. But the third energy

purifies from twofold ignorance, when its reasons are employed upon

men full of opinion; and this is spoken of in the Sophista.” So that

the dialectic energy is triple, either subsisting through opposite

arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood. See

admirable specimens of this master science in the notes to my Plato,

Vol. 3.

P. 13. _Devised wanderings, sections, battles, lacerations, rapes and

adulteries of the Gods._ See the fables in which these things are

asserted of the Gods admirably unfolded by Proclus in the Introduction

to the 2nd. and 3rd. books of the Republic of Plato, in Vol. 1. of my

Plato.

P. 90. _And thus much concerning divine names._ In addition to what is

here said, Proclus admirably remarks on this subject as follows, in his

MS. Scholia On the Cratylus of Plato.

Since, however, the present discourse is about divine names, it is

necessary to speak a little concerning them. And in the first place,

let us speak concerning the names which are occultly established in the

Gods themselves; since some of the ancients said that these originated

from the more excellent genera,[395] but that the Gods are established

beyond a signification of this kind; but others admitted that names are

in the Gods themselves, and in those Gods that are allotted the highest

order.

The Gods, therefore, possess an hyparxis uniform and ineffable, a

power generative of wholes, and an intellect perfect and full of

conceptions; and they give subsistence to all things according to

this triad. Hence it is necessary that the participations of those

divinities who are of a more elevated order, and who are arranged

nearer to _the good_, should proceed triadically through all things to

which they give subsistence. It is also necessary that among these,

those participations should be more ineffable, which are defined

according to the _hyparxes_ of the first Gods; but that those should

be more apparent, and more divided, which are illuminated according to

the _intellect_ of exempt causes; and that those participations which

are between these, should be such as are the effluxions of _prolific

powers_. For the fathers of wholes giving subsistence to all things,

have disseminated in all things vestiges, and impressions of their own

triadic hypostasis; since nature also inserts in bodies an exciting

principle (εναυσμα) derived from her proper idiom through which she

moves bodies, and governs them as by a rudder. And the demiurgus has

established in the universe an image of his own monadic transcendency,

through which he governs the world, holding a rudder, as Plato says,

like a pilot. It is proper to think therefore, that these rudders

and this helm of the universe, in which the demiurgus being seated

orderly disposes the world, are nothing else than a symbol of the whole

fabrication of things, to us indeed difficult of comprehension, but

to the Gods themselves known and manifest. And why is it requisite to

speak concerning these things, since of the ineffable cause of all,

who is beyond intelligibles, there is an impression in every being,

and even as far as to the last of things, through which all things are

suspended from him, some more remotely, and others more near, according

to the clearness and obscurity of the impression which they contain.

This it is which moves all things to the desire of good, and imparts

to beings this inextinguishable love. And this impression is indeed

unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of

knowledge. It is also more excellent than life; for it is present with

things inanimate: and has not an intellectual power; since it lies

in things destitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the

demiurgic monad, and the father himself who is exempt from all things,

have disseminated in things posterior, impressions of their respective

peculiarities, and through these convert all things to themselves, in

like manner all the Gods impart to their progeny, symbols of their

cause, and through these establish all things in themselves, The

impressions, therefore, of the hyparxis of the higher order of Gods,

which are disseminated in secondary natures are ineffable and unknown,

and their efficacious and motive energy surpasses all intelligence. And

of this kind are the characters of light, through which the Gods unfold

themselves to their progeny; these characters subsisting unically in

the Gods themselves, but shining forth to the view in the genera more

excellent than man, and presenting themselves to us divisibly, and

accompanied with form. Hence the Gods[396] exhort “To understand the

fore-running form of light.” For subsisting on high without form, it

becomes invested with form through its progression; and there being

established occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through

motion, from the Gods themselves; possessing indeed an efficacious

energy, through a divine cause, but becoming figured, through the

essence by which it is received.

Again, the impressions which are illuminated from powers, are in

a certain respect media between things ineffable and effable, and

pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not possible for the

primary gifts of the Gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent

genera (i.e. angels, dæmons and heroes) previously participating the

illuminations which thence proceed. But these illuminations subsisting

appropriately in each of their participants, and co-ordinately in all

things, unfold the powers that give them subsistence. Of this kind

are the symbols of the Gods, which are indeed uniform in the more

elevated orders, but multiform in those that are subordinate; and which

the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations

(αδιαρθρωτων εκφωνησεων).

The impressions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from

intellectual essences to all peculiarities, and proceed as far as to

us, are divine names, through which the Gods are invoked, and by which

they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the Gods themselves,

and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of

the Gods as is apparent. For through these we are able to signify

something to each other, and to converse with ourselves about the Gods.

Different nations however, participate differently of these, as for

instance the Egyptians according to their native tongue, receiving

names of this kind from the Gods; but the Chaldeans and Indians in a

different manner, according to their proper tongue; and in a similar

manner the Greeks according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity

therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the

Chaldeans, we must nevertheless admit that each of these names is the

progeny of the Gods, and that it signifies the same essence. But if

some names are more and others less efficacious, it is not wonderful;

since of things which are known to us, such as are dæmoniacal and

angelic are more efficacious; and in short of things denominated the

names of such as are nearer are more perfect than the names of those

that are more remote.

Not every genus of the Gods however, can be denominated. For Parmenides

evinces that the God who is beyond all things is ineffable. “For,

says he, he can neither be denominated, nor spoken of.” And of the

intelligible Gods the first genera, which are conjoined with _the

one itself_, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and

ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot

be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requisite that

the progression of intelligibles, should be terminated in this order;

in which there is the first effable,[397] and that which is called

by proper names. For the first forms are there, and the intellectual

nature of intelligibles there shines forth to the view. But all the

natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by

intelligence.[398] Hence the whole of the telestic art energizing

theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says,

that this is first called by a name by the other Gods: for the light

proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual

orders. But he thus speaks,

μητιν σπερμα φεροντα θεων, κλυτον οντε φανητα,

πρωτογονον μακαρες καλεον κατα μακρον Ολυμπον.

i.e., “Metis bearing the seed of the Gods, whom the Gods about lofty

Olympus call the illustrious Phanes Protogonus.” In the Gods however

nomination is united with intellectual conception, and both are present

with them through the participation of the light which the mighty

Phanes emits to all things. But in our soul these two are divided from

each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and name another:

and the one has the order of an image, but the other of a paradigm. In

the middle genera there is indeed a separation, but there is also a

union of the intellective and onomastic energy. The transportive name

(διαπορθμιον ονομα) of _Iynxes_[399] (ιγγυων) which is said to sustain

all the fountains, appears to me to signify a thing of this kind. Such

also is the appellation _teletarchic_ (το τελεταρχικον) which some

one of the Gods[400] says, “leaps into the worlds, through the rapid

reproof of the father.” κοσμοις ενθρωσκειν κραιπνην δια πατρος ενιπην.

For all these things are occultly with the Gods, but are unfolded

according to second and third progressions, and to men that are allied

to the Gods.

There is therefore a certain abiding name in the Gods, through which

the subordinate invoke the superior, as Orpheus says of Phanes, or

through which the superior denominate the subordinate, as Jupiter in

Plato gives names to the unapparent periods of souls.[401] For fathers

define the energies of their offspring, and the offspring know their

producing causes through the intellectual impressions which they bear.

Such then are the first names which are unfolded from the Gods and

which through the middle genera end in the rational essence.

There are however other names of a second and third rank; and these

are such as partial souls have produced, at one time energizing

enthusiastically about the Gods, and at another time energizing

according to science; either conjoining their own intelligence with

divine light, and thence deriving perfection; or committing the

fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artists, such as

geometricians, physicians and rhetoricians give names to the things

the peculiarities of which they understand. Thus too poets inspired by

Phœbus (των ποιητων οι φοιβοληπτοι) ascribe many names to the Gods,

and to human names give a division opposite to these; receiving the

former from enthusiastic energy and the latter from sense and opinion;

concerning which Socrates now says Homer indicates, referring some

names to the Gods and others to men.

P. 138. _So that language when conversant with that which is ineffable,

being subverted about itself, has no cessation and opposes itself._

Damascius likewise, in a wonderfully sublime manner speaks of the

immense principle of the universe, conformably to what is now said

by Proclus, in his excellent MS treatise περι αρχων, or “concerning

principles;” and the following is an epitome of what he says on this

subject.

“Our soul prophesies that the principle which is beyond all things that

can in any respect be conceived, is unco-ordinated with all things.

Neither therefore, must it be called principle, nor cause, nor that

which is first, nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no

means therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor in short,

is it to be celebrated, nor recalled into memory. For whatever we

conceive or consider, is either something belonging to all things, or

is all things, though analyzing we should ascend to that which is most

simple, and which is the most comprehensive of all things, being as it

were, the ultimate circumference, not of beings, but of non-beings.

For of beings, that which has an united subsistence, and is perfectly

without separation, is the extremity, since every being is mingled

from elements which are either bound and infinity, or the progeny of

these. But _the one_ is simply the last boundary of _the many_. For

we cannot conceive any thing more simple than that which is perfectly

one; which if we denominate the principle and cause, the first, and

the most simple, these and all other things are there only according

to _the one_. But we not being able to contract our conceptions into

profound union, are divided about it, and predicate of _the one_ the

distributed multitude which is in ourselves; unless we despise these

appellations also, because _the many_ cannot be adapted to _the one_.

Hence it can neither be known nor named; for, if it could, it would in

this respect be _many_. Or, these things also will be contained in it,

according to _the one_. For the nature of _the one_ is all-receptive,

or rather all-producing, and there is not any thing whatever which

_the one_ is not. Hence all things are as it were evolved from it. It

is therefore, properly cause, and the first, the end and the last, the

defensive enclosure of all things, and the one nature of all things;

not that nature which is in things, and which proceeds from _the one_,

but that which is prior to them, which is the most impartible summit of

all things whatever, and the greatest comprehension of all things which

in any respect are said to have a being.