occult and intelligible; occult indeed, as being conjoined with unity;
but intelligible,[282] as participated by being.
* * * * *
For all the Gods are denominated from the things which are suspended
from them; because from these it is possible to know their different
hypostases, which are [of themselves] unknown. For every thing divine
is of itself ineffable and unknown, as being connascent with the
ineffable one. From the difference, however, of the participants
it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known.
The unities, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are
intelligible; because being, truly so called, is a divine intelligible,
and imparticipable, subsisting prior to intellect. For this would
not be suspended from the first Gods, unless they also possessed a
primary hypostasis, and a power perfective of other Gods; since, as
participants are to each other, so likewise are the hyparxes of the
things that are participated.
PROPOSITION CLXIII.
Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable[283]
intellect, is intellectual.
* * * * *
For as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to
the intelligible unities. Since, therefore, the latter which illuminate
being,[284] are intelligible, hence, the former which illuminate a
divine and imparticipable intellect, are intellectual. Yet they are not
intellectual in such a way, as if they subsisted in intellect, but as
causally existing prior to intellect, and generating intellect.
PROPOSITION CLXIV.
Every multitude of unities which is participated by every
imparticipable soul, is supermundane.
* * * * *
For because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the Gods
also which are participated by it are supermundane, having the same
analogy to the intellectual and intelligible Gods, which soul has
to intellect, and intellect to truly existing being. As, therefore,
every soul is suspended from intellect, and intellect is converted
to the intelligible, thus also the supermundane are suspended from
the intellectual, in the same manner as the intellectual from the
intelligible Gods.
PROPOSITION CLXV.
Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain [sensible
body is mundane.]
* * * * *
For it illuminates the parts of the world, through intellect and soul
as media.[285] For intellect is not present with any mundane body
without soul, nor are deity and soul conjoined without a medium; since
participations are through similars. Intellect itself also according
to its intelligible summit, participates of unity. These unities,
therefore, are mundane, as giving completion to the whole world, and as
deifying visible bodies. For each of these is divine, not on account
of soul; for soul is not primarily a God. Nor on account of intellect;
for intellect is not the same with _the one_. But each of these
visible bodies, is animated indeed on account of soul, and moved of
itself. But it possesses a perpetual sameness of subsistence, and is
moved in the most excellent order, on account of intellect. It is,
however, divine on account of union. And if it possesses a providential
power, it possesses it through this cause.
PROPOSITION CLXVI.
Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if
participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by mundane
souls.
* * * * *
For imparticipable intellect having the first order, is the leader of
every multitude of intellects. But of participable intellects, some
illuminate supermundane and imparticipable soul, but others the mundane
soul. For the mundane multitude is not immediately derived from the
imparticipable; since progressions are through similars. But that which
is separate from the world, is more similar to the imparticipable, than
that which is divided about it. Nor has a supermundane multitude alone
a subsistence, but there are also mundane intellects; since there is
likewise a mundane multitude of Gods, and the world itself is animated,
and at the same time intellectual. The participation also of the
supermundane Gods by mundane souls, is through mundane intellects as
the media.
PROPOSITION CLXVII.
Every intellect intellectually perceives itself. But the first
intellect indeed, perceives itself alone; and in this, intellect
and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent
intellects, perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the
intelligible to each of these,[286] is partly that which it is, and
partly that from which it is derived.
* * * * *
For every intellect, either[287] intellectually perceives itself, or
that which is above, or that which is posterior to itself. But if
indeed it perceives that which is posterior to itself, it will through
intellect be converted to that which is less excellent than itself;
and thus will not know that to which it is converted, as not being in
itself, but external to itself. But it will only know the image of this
thing, as being generated in itself from it. For it knows that which it
possesses, and the manner in which it is affected, but not that which
it does not possess, and by which it is not affected.
But if it perceives that which is above itself, if indeed, this is
accomplished through the knowledge of itself, it will at one and the
same time both know itself and that superior nature. But if it knows
that alone, it will be ignorant of itself, though it is intellect. In
short, by knowing that which is prior to itself, it will know that it
is a cause, and will also know the things of which it is the cause.
For if it is ignorant of these, it will likewise be ignorant of that
which is the cause of them; not knowing that which produces what it
produces, by its very being, and what the things are which it does
produce. Hence, by knowing the things of which it is the cause, it will
also know itself, as deriving its subsistence from thence. By knowing,
therefore, that which is prior to itself, it will likewise entirely
know itself. Hence, if there is a certain intelligible intellect,
this by knowing itself, will also know the intelligible, being
itself intelligible. But each of the intellects posterior to this,
will intellectually perceive the intelligible which is in itself, and
at the same time that which is prior to itself. Hence, in intellect
there is the intelligible, and in the intelligible intellect. But one
intellect is the same with the intelligible; and another is the same
with the intelligible which is in itself, but is not the same with the
intelligible prior to itself. For that which is simply intelligible is
one thing, and the intelligible in that which intellectually perceives
is another.
PROPOSITION CLXVIII.
Every intellect knows in energy that which it intellectually perceives,
and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive, and of
another to perceive that it perceives.
* * * * *
For if it is intellect in energy, and perceives itself as not any
thing different from the object of intellectual perception, it
will know itself, and see itself. But seeing that which perceives
intellectually, and knowing that which sees, it will know that it
is intellect in energy. But knowing this, it will know that it
perceives intellectually, and will not alone know the objects of its
intellection. Hence, it will at once both know the intelligible, and
that it intellectually perceives it, and by intellection it will be
intellectually perceived by itself.
PROPOSITION CLXIX.
Every intellect has its essence, power and energy in eternity.
* * * * *
For if it intellectually perceives itself, and intellect is the same
with the intelligible, intelligence also is the same with intellect
and the intelligible. For being the medium between that which
intellectually perceives, and the object of intellectual perception,
and these being the same, intelligence also will be the same with both.
Moreover, that the essence of intellect is eternal, is evident.[288]
For the whole of it subsists at once. And this being the case,
intelligence also will be eternal, since it is the same with the
essence of intellect. But if intellect is eternal,[289] it will not be
measured by time, neither according to its being, nor its energy. But
these subsisting with invariable sameness, the power also of intellect
will be eternal.
PROPOSITION CLXX.
Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things. But
imparticipable intellect indeed, _simply_ perceives all things.
And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all things
[according to one].
* * * * *
[For if][290] every intellect establishes its essence in eternity, and
together with its essence its energy, it will intellectually perceive
all things at once. For to every thing which is not established in
eternity, the successive objects of its perception subsist according to
parts. For every thing which is successive, is in time; the successive
consisting of prior and posterior, but the whole of it not existing at
once. If therefore all intellects similarly perceive all things,[291]
they will not differ from each other. For if they perceive all things
similarly,[292] they are similarly all things, since they are the
very things which they intellectually perceive. But being similarly
all things, one intellect will not be imparticipable, and another
not. For their essences are the same things as the objects of their
intellection; since the intellection of each is the same with the
being of each, and each is both intellection and essence. It remains
therefore, either that each intellect does not similarly perceive all
things, but one thing, or more than one, but not all things at once;
or that it perceives all things according to one.[293] To assert
however, that each intellect does not perceive all things, is to make
intellect to be ignorant of some particular being. For if it suffers
transition in its energy, and intellectually perceives, not at once,
but according to prior and posterior, at the same time possessing an
immoveable nature, it will be inferior to soul, which understands all
things in being moved, [or in a mutable energy]; because intellect
on this hypothesis, will only understand one thing by its permanent
energy. It will therefore understand all things according to one. For
it either intellectually perceives all things, or one thing, or all
things according to the one of intellection. For in all intellects
indeed, there is always an intellectual perception of all things; yet
so as to bound all things in one of all. Hence there is something
predominant in intellection, and the objects of intellection; since all
things are at once understood as one, through the domination of one,
which characterizes all things with itself.
PROPOSITION CLXXI.
Every intellect is an impartible essence.
* * * * *
For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal, [and immoveable, it
is impartible. For every thing][294] which in any way whatever is
partible, is either partible on account of magnitude, or multitude, or
on account of energies which are borne along with the flux of time. But
intellect is eternal according to all things, and is beyond bodies, and
the multitude which is in it is united. It is, therefore, impartible.
That intellect also is incorporeal, is manifest from its conversion to
itself. For no body is converted to itself. But that it is eternal,
the identity of its energy with its essence evinces. For this has been
before demonstrated. And that the multitude in it is united is evident
from the continuity of intellectual multitude with the divine unities.
For these are the first multitude; but intellects are next to these.
Hence, though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united
multitude. For prior to that which is divided, that which is collected
into profound union, and is nearer to _the one_, subsists.
PROPOSITION CLXXII.
Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of beings perpetual
and immutable according to essence.
* * * * *
For every thing which is produced by an immoveable cause, is immutable
according to essence. But immoveable intellect being all things
eternally, and abiding in eternity, produces by its very being that
which it produces. If however it always is, and is invariably the same,
it always produces, and after the same manner. Hence, it is not the
cause of things which sometimes have existence, and at other times not,
but it is the cause of things which always exist.
PROPOSITION CLXXIII.
Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and
posterior to itself.
* * * * *
For it is those things which are posterior to itself, according
to cause, but those things which are prior to itself, according
to participation. Yet it is still intellect, and is allotted an
intellectual essence. [Hence it defines] all things [according to
its essence];[295] both such as are according to cause, and such
as are according to participation. For every thing participates of
more excellent beings in such a way as it is naturally adapted to
participate, and not according to their subsistence. For otherwise,
they would be similarly participated by all things. Participations
therefore, are according to the peculiarity and power of the
participants. Hence in intellect, the natures prior to it subsist
intellectually. But intellect is likewise intellectually the things
posterior to itself. For it does not consist of its effects, nor does
it contain these, but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is
by its very being the cause of all things. And the very being of it
is intellectual. Hence it contains intellectually the causes of all
things. So that every intellect possesses all things intellectually,
both such as are prior, and such as are posterior to it. As therefore,
every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so likewise it
contains sensibles intellectually.
PROPOSITION CLXXIV.
Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, by
intellection, and its fabrication consists in intellection, and its
intellection or intelligence, in fabrication.
* * * * *
For if intelligible and intellect are the same, the essence also of
every intellect will be the same with the intellection in itself. But
it produces that which it produces by essence, and produces according
to the very being, which it is. By intellection therefore, it will
produce the things which are produced. For in intellect, being and
intellection are both of them one. For intellect is the same with every
being which it contains. If therefore, it makes by its very being, but
its very being is intellection, it makes by intellection. Intelligence
also which is in energy, consists in intellection. But this is the same
with the essence of intellect. And the essence of intellect consists
in producing. For that which produces immoveably, [always possesses]
its very being [in producing. The intelligence of intellect therefore
consists in fabrication or production.[296]]
PROPOSITION CLXXV.
Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are
intellectual, both according to essence, and according to energy.
* * * * *
For it is necessary that it should either be participated by these,
or by other natures, which possess indeed an intellectual essence,
but do not always energize intellectually. It is however impossible
that it should be participated by the latter of these. For the
energy of intellect is immoveable. And hence, the natures by which
it is participated, always participate of intellectual energy, which
always causes the participants of it to be intellectual. For that
which possesses its energy in a certain part of time, is unadapted to
be conjoined with an eternal energy. But that which has perfection
according to the whole of time, is the medium between every eternal
energy, and that which is perfect in a certain time, as well in the
mutations of energy, as in essences. For progressions are never
effected without a medium, but through kindred and similar natures,
both according to hypostases, and the perfections of energies. After
a similar manner therefore, every intellect is primarily participated
by those beings that are able to perceive intellectually, according to
the whole of time, and who always energize intellectually, though their
intellection is in time, and is not eternally in energy.
COROLLARY.
From this therefore, it is evident that it is impossible for the soul
which sometimes perceives intellectually and sometimes does not, to
participate proximately of intellect.
PROPOSITION CLXXVI.
All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time
separate and distinct from the rest.
* * * * *
For if every intellect is impartible, and the multitude which is in it
is united through intellectual impartibility, all things in it will be
in one, impartibles will be united to each other, and all intellectual
forms will pervade through all. But if all intellectual forms subsist
immaterially and incorporeally, they are unconfused with each other
and separate, and each preserving its own purity, remains that which
it is. The peculiar participation however of each participating in
a separate manner, manifests the unconfused nature of intellectual
forms. For unless the forms which are participated were distinguished
separate from each other, the participants of each of them would not
participate in a separate manner, but in the subordinate natures
[i.e. in the participants] there would be, in a much greater degree,
an indistinct confusion, these being according to their order of an
inferior condition. For whence would there be a separation of these, if
the natures which give subsistence to, and perfect them, were without
distinction, and were confused together? But again the impartible
hypostasis, and uniform essence of that which contains forms, evinces
their united nature. For things which have their hyparxis in the
impartible and the uniform, are impartibly in the same thing. For how
can you divide the impartible and _the one_? Hence, they have a
simultaneous subsistence, and are in each other, each wholly pervading
through the whole of each, in a manner unaccompanied with interval.
For that which comprehends them is not extended with interval, nor is
one of them in this thing, but another elsewhere, as in that which has
interval; but every thing is at once in the impartible and in one. So
that all intellectual forms are in each other, and are in each other
unitedly, and at the same time each is distinctly apart from each.
COROLLARY.
But if some one, in addition to these demonstrations, should require
also examples, let him direct his attention to the theorems which exist
in one soul. For all these are in the same essence, which is truly
without magnitude,[297] and are united to each other. For that which is
without magnitude, does not locally contain the things which are in it,
but the natures which it contains are united and separated, impartibly
and without interval. For the soul genuinely produces all things, and
each apart from each, attracting nothing from the rest, which, unless
they were always separated according to habit, would not be separated
by the energy of the soul.
PROPOSITION CLXXVII.
Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one indeed, is
comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms. And
the superior intellects contain in a more total manner, such things
as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior
intellects contain more partially, such things as those that are prior
to them contain more totally.
* * * * *
For the superior intellects employ greater powers, having more the form
of _the one_ than secondary intellects. But the inferior intellects
being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they contain.
For things that are more allied to _the one_, being contracted in
quantity, surpass the natures that are posterior to them. And on the
contrary, things more remote from _the one_, as they are increased
in quantity, are inferior to the natures that are nearer to _the
one_. Hence the superior intellects, being established according to a
greater power, but being less in multitude, produce a greater number
of effects, according to power, through fewer things according to the
quantity of forms. But the intellects posterior to them produce fewer
effects through a greater number of things, according to a defect
of power.[298] If therefore, the former produce a greater number of
effects, through fewer things, the forms in them are more total. And if
the latter produce fewer effects, through a greater number of things,
the forms in them are more partial.
COROLLARY.
Hence it happens that the natures which are generated from superior
intellects according to one form, are produced [in a divided manner
from secondary intellects[299]] according to many ideas. And again,
those natures which are produced by inferior intellects through many
and distinct forms, are produced by superior intellects through fewer,
but more total forms. And that indeed which is a whole and common,
accedes supernally to all its participants. But that which is divided
and peculiar accedes from secondary intellects. Hence secondary
intellects, by the more partial separation of peculiarities, accurately
and subtly distinguish the formations of primary intellects.
PROPOSITION CLXXVIII.
Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures.
* * * * *
For if every intellectual form is eternal and immoveable, it is
essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypostases, but not
of such as are generated and corrupted. So that every thing which
subsists according to an intellectual form is an eternal intellectual
nature. For if all forms produce things posterior to themselves by
their very being, but their essence possesses an invariable sameness of
subsistence, the things produced by them will also be invariably the
same, and will be eternal. Hence, neither the genera which subsist from
a formal cause, according to a certain time, nor corruptible natures
so far as they are corruptible, have a pre-existent intellectual form.
For they would be incorruptible and unbegotten, if they derived their
hypostasis from intellectual forms.
PROPOSITION CLXXIX.
Every intellectual number is bounded.
* * * * *
For if there is another multitude posterior to this, essentially
inferior to it, and thus [more remote from _the one_, but the
intellectual number is nearer to _the one_;[300]] and if that which is
nearer to _the one_, is less according to quantity, but that which is
more remote from it, is more according to quantity;--if this be the
case, the intellectual number also will be less than every multitude
posterior to it. Hence, it is not infinite. The multitude of intellects
therefore, is bounded. For that which is less than a certain thing is
not infinite, because the infinite, so far as infinite, is not less
than any thing.
PROPOSITION CLXXX.
Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of parts, and is
united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But
imparticipable intellect indeed, is simply a whole, as containing all
parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole
as in a part; and thus is all things partially.
* * * * *
For if a partial intellect is all things according to one, but a
subsistence according to one thing is nothing else than a subsistence
partially, the whole is in each of these intellects partially, being
defined according to a certain one particular thing which predominates
in all of them.
PROPOSITION CLXXXI.
Every participated intellect is either divine, as being suspended from
the Gods, or is intellectual only.
* * * * *
For if a divine and imparticipable intellect has a primary subsistence,
the intellect which is allied to this, is not that which differs from
it in both respects, viz. which is neither divine, nor imparticipable.
For things which are dissimilar in both these respects, cannot
be conjoined with each other. It is evident therefore, that the
medium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily
intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either[301] therefore, it is
imparticipable and not divine; or it is participated and divine. But
every thing imparticipable is divine, as being allotted an order in
multitude analogous to _the one_. Hence, there will be a certain
intellect which is divine and at the same time participated. It is
necessary however that there should be [an intellect which does not
participate[302]] of the divine unities, but intellectually perceives
them only. For in each series, such things as are first, and which
are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of things
proximately situated in a superior order. But such as are far distant
from the primary monad, cannot be suspended from the natures that
proximately belong to a higher order. There is therefore both [a
divine intellect,[303]] and an intellect which is intellectual only;
the latter indeed, being established according to an intellectual
peculiarity, which it possesses from its own monad, and from
imparticipable intellect; but the former subsisting according to the
union which it receives from the participated monad.
PROPOSITION CLXXXII.
Every [divine[304]] participated intellect, is participated by divine
souls.
* * * * *
For if participation assimilates the participant to that which is
participated, and renders the former connascent with the latter,
it is evident that the participant of a divine intellect must be a
divine soul, as being suspended from a divine intellect, and that
through intellect as a medium it must participate of the deity which
it contains. For deity conjoins his soul which participates of it with
intellect, and binds that which is divine to that which is divine.
PROPOSITION CLXXXIII.
Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual
alone, is participated by souls which are neither divine, nor
subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.
* * * * *
For neither are divine souls of this kind, nor such as participate
of intellect. For souls participate of the Gods through a divine
intellect, as was before demonstrated. Nor are souls which admit of
mutation, of this kind. For every intellect is participated by natures
which are always intellectual, both according to essence and according
to energy. For this is evident from what has been before shown.
PROPOSITION CLXXXIV.
_Concerning Soul._
Every soul is either divine, or is changed from intellect into a
privation of intellect; or always remains as a medium between these,
but is inferior to divine souls.
* * * * *
For if a divine intellect indeed, is participated by divine souls,
but an intellectual intellect by those souls alone which are neither
divine, nor receive a mutation from intelligence into a privation of
intellect (for there are souls of this kind, which sometimes perceive
intellectually, and sometimes do not);--if this be the case, it
is evident that there are three genera of souls. And the first of
these indeed, are divine. But the second are not divine, yet always
participate of intellect. And the third are those, which are sometimes
changed into an intellectual condition, and sometimes into a privation
of intellect.
PROPOSITION CLXXXV.
All [divine][305] souls, are indeed Gods psychically. But all those
that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual
attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of
mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods.
* * * * *
For if some souls have divine light supernally shining upon them,
but others are endued with perpetual intelligence, and others again
only sometimes participate of this perfection;--if this be the case,
the first of these will among the multitude of souls be analogous
to the Gods. But the next to these, will always follow the Gods, in
consequence of always energizing according to intellect, and will be
suspended from divine souls, having the same relation to them as that
which is intellectual[306] to that which is divine. And the souls
which sometimes energize intellectually and follow the Gods, neither
participate of intellect after a manner always the same, nor are always
able to be converted [to the intelligible] in conjunction with divine
souls. For that which sometimes only participates of intellect, cannot
by any contrivance whatever be always conjoined with the Gods.
PROPOSITION CLXXXVI.
Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, [and separate from
body].[307]
* * * * *
For if it knows itself, but every thing which knows itself, is
converted to itself, and that which is converted to itself, does not
pertain to body (since every body is without conversion to itself) nor
is inseparable from body, since that which is inseparable from body is
not naturally adapted to revert to itself as it would thus be separated
from body;--if this be the case, every soul is neither a corporeal
essence, nor inseparable from body. Moreover, that the soul knows
itself is evident. For if it knows the natures that are above itself,
and is also naturally adapted to know itself, it will in a much greater
degree know itself from the causes prior to itself.
PROPOSITION CLXXXVII.
Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible.
* * * * *
For every thing which can in any way whatever be dissolved and
destroyed, is either corporeal and a composite, or is allotted its
hypostasis in a subject. And that indeed, which is dissolved, is
corrupted as consisting of many things. But that which is naturally
adapted to be in another thing, vanishes into non-entity when separated
from its subject. Moreover, the soul is incorporeal, and external to
every subject, subsisting in itself, and being converted to itself.
Hence, it is indestructible and incorruptible.
PROPOSITION CLXXXVIII.
Every soul is both life and vital.
* * * * *
For that to which soul accedes necessarily lives. And that which
is deprived of soul, is immediately left destitute of life. Either
therefore it lived through soul, or through something else, and not
through soul. It is however impossible that it should have lived
through something else alone. For every thing which is participated,
either imparts itself, or something pertaining to itself to its
participant. But if it suffers neither of these, it will not be
participated. Soul however, is participated by that to which it is
present. And that which participates of soul is said to be animated.
If therefore that which is participated introduces life to animated
natures, it is either life, or vital alone, or both life and vital. If
however, it is alone vital, but not also life, it will consist of life
and non-life. It will not therefore know itself, nor be converted to
itself. For knowledge is life, and the gnostic power so far as it is
such is vital. If therefore, there is any thing in soul without life,
this will not possess essentially the power of knowing. But if soul is
life alone, it will no longer participate of the intellectual life.
For the participant of life is vital, and is not life alone, i.e. the
first and imparticipable life; but the life which is posterior to this,
is both vital and life. Soul however, is not imparticipable life. And
hence it is at the same time both life and vital.
PROPOSITION CLXXXIX.
Every soul is self-vital.
* * * * *
For if it is converted to itself, but every thing which is converted
to itself is self-subsistent, the soul also is self-subsistent, and
produces itself. But it is likewise life and vital, and its hyparxis
is according to vitality. For it imparts life by its very being to the
natures to which it is present. And if the participant is adapted, it
immediately becomes animated and vital, [soul in effecting this not
reasoning][308] nor acting from deliberate choice, nor vivifying by
cogitation and judgment, but by its very essence, and by that which
it is, supplying the participant with life. Hence the being of soul
is the same as _to live_. If therefore the soul possesses being
from itself, and this is the same as _to live_, and it has life
essentially;--if this be the case, it will impart life to itself, and
will possess it from itself. And this being admitted, soul will be
self-vital.
PROPOSITION CXC.
Every soul is a medium between impartible natures, and the natures
which are divisible about bodies.
* * * * *
For if soul is self-vital and self-subsistent, and has an hyparxis
separate from bodies, it is, in consequence of being more excellent
than, exempt from every thing divisible about body. For the natures
which are divided about bodies, are entirely inseparable from their
subjects, being co-distributed with divisible bulks. They also depart
from themselves, and their own impartibility, and are co-extended
with bodies. And though they subsist in lives, yet these are not the
lives of themselves, but of participants. Though likewise they exist
in essence and in forms, yet they are not the forms of themselves,
but of those things which are fashioned by forms. If therefore, soul
is not these, it is a self-subsistent essence, a self-vital life, and
a knowledge gnostic of itself. Hence, it is entirely separate from
bodies, but is a participant of life. If however, this be the case, it
also participates of essence. But it likewise participates of knowledge
from other causes. It is evident therefore, that it is inferior to
impartible natures, because it is filled [with life externally.][309]
But if with life, it is evident that it is also externally filled
with essence. For imparticipable life and imparticipable essence
are prior to soul.[310] That soul however is not primarily gnostic
is evident.[311] For every soul indeed, so far as soul is life,
but not every soul, so far as it is soul possesses knowledge. For a
certain soul while it remains soul, is ignorant of [real] beings. Soul
therefore, is not primarily gnostic, nor does it possess knowledge from
its very being. Hence, it has an essence secondary to those natures
that are primarily, and by their very being, gnostic. Since however,
the essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, soul does not belong
to natures [entirely] impartible. But it has been demonstrated that
neither does it rank among the natures that are divisible about bodies.
Hence, it is a medium between both.
PROPOSITION CXCI.
Every participable soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy
is accompanied with time.
* * * * *
For either it possesses both eternally, or both temporally; or the
one eternally, but the other temporally. It cannot however, possess
both eternally: for it would be an impartible essence, and the nature
of soul would in no respect differ from an intellectual hypostasis,
viz. a self-motive from an immoveable nature. Nor can it possess both
temporally: for thus it would be generated alone, and would neither
be self-vital, nor self-subsistent. For nothing which is essentially
measured by time is self-subsistent. But soul is self-subsistent.
For that which is converted to itself, according to energy, is also
essentially converted to itself, and proceeds from itself. It remains
therefore, that every soul is partly eternal, and partly participates
of time. Either therefore, it is essentially eternal, [but participates
of time according to energy,[312]] or vice versa. The latter however,
is impossible. Hence, every participable soul, is allotted an eternal
essence, but a temporal energy.
PROPOSITION CXCII.
Every participable soul ranks among the number of [truly existing]
beings, and is the first of generated natures.
* * * * *
For if it is essentially eternal, it is truly being according to its
hyparxis, and always is. For that which participates of eternity,
participates likewise of perpetual existence. But if it is in
time according to energy, it is generated. For every thing which
participates of time, since it is always becoming to be, or rising into
existence, according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at
once that which it is, is wholly generated. But if every soul is in a
certain respect generated according to energy, it will be the first of
generated natures. For that which is in every respect generated, is
more remote from eternal natures.
PROPOSITION CXCIII.
Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.
* * * * *
For if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an
immoveable essence. For that which proceeds from a moveable essence, is
essentially changed in every respect. The cause, therefore, of every
soul is immoveable. But if it proximately subsists from intellect, it
is perfected by, and converted to intellect. And if it participates of
the knowledge which intellect imparts to the natures that are able to
partake of it; (for all knowledge is derived from intellect, and all
things have their progression essentially from that to which they are
naturally converted)--if this be the case, every soul proceeds from
intellect.
PROPOSITION CXCIV.
Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.
* * * * *
For if it proceeds from intellect, and intellect gives subsistence
to soul; and if intellect subsisting immoveably produces all things
by its very being, it will also impart to soul which it fabricates,
the essential reasons [or producing principles] of all things which
it contains. For every thing which produces by its very being,
imparts secondarily to the thing generated by it, that which it is
itself primarily. The soul, therefore, contains secondarily the
representations of intellectual forms.
PROPOSITION CXCV.
Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically,
or after the manner of an exemplar; but intelligibles iconically, or
after the manner of an image.
* * * * *
For subsisting as a medium between impartible natures, and such as
are divisible about body, it produces and gives subsistence to the
latter of these, but pre-establishes in itself the causes from which
it proceeds. Those things, therefore, of which it is the pre-existent
cause, it antecedently comprehends paradigmatically. But it possesses
according to participation, and as the progeny of first natures the
causes of its subsistence. Hence it antecedently comprehends according
to cause all sensible natures, and contains the immaterial productive
principles of things material, the incorporeal principles of things
corporeal, and without interval, the principles of things which possess
interval. But it contains intelligibles and the forms of them after the
manner of an image; so that it receives partibly indeed impartibles,
with multiplication unical natures, and in a self-motive manner, things
immoveable. Hence it is all beings, containing such as are first,
according to participation, but paradigmatically such as are posterior
to its own nature.
PROPOSITION CXCVI.
Every participable soul, primarily uses a perpetual body, which
possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.
* * * * *
For if every soul is essentially eternal, and by its very being
primarily animates some particular body, [it will always animate this
body. For the essence of every soul is immutable]. But if this be the
case, that which is animated by it is always animated, and always
participates of life. That, however, which always lives, by a much
greater priority always exists. But that which always is, is perpetual.
Hence, that which is primarily suspended from every soul, is perpetual.
But indeed every participable soul is primarily participated by a
certain body, since it is participable and not imparticipable, and
animates its participant by its very being. Every participated soul,
therefore, uses a body which is primarily perpetual, and essentially
unbegotten and incorruptible.
PROPOSITION CXCVII.
Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a life essential and
gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise
subsist in it at once, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic; and
all things are in all, and each is separate from the rest.
* * * * *
For if it is the medium between impartible forms, and those which are
divided about bodies, it is neither so impartible as all intellectual
natures, nor so partible as corporeal forms. Since, therefore,
essences, lives and cognitions are divided in corporeal natures, these
subsist in souls impartibly, unitedly, and incorporeally, and all of
them exist at once, through their immateriality and impartibility.
Since, likewise, in intellectual natures, all things subsist according
to union, they are distinguished and divided in souls. All things,
therefore, subsist together in these, and at the same time apart. But
if all impartibles subsist together and in one, they pervade through
each other, and if they are separate, they are again divided without
confusion; so that each subsists by itself, and all are in all. For
in the essence of soul there is both life and knowledge;[313] since
every soul would not know itself, if the essence of it was of itself
deprived of life and knowledge. And in the life of the soul there are
both essence and knowledge. For unessential[314] life, and which is
without knowledge, pertains to material lives, which are neither able
to know themselves, nor are genuine essences. Knowledge, also, which is
unessential and without life, is without subsistence. For all knowledge
belongs to that which is vital, and which is of itself allotted an
essence.
PROPOSITION CXCVIII.
Every thing which participates of time, and is always moved, is
measured by periods.
* * * * *
For since it is measured by time, the motion of it also participates of
measure and bound, and proceeds according to number. But because it is
always moved, and this always is not[315] eternal, but temporal, it is
necessary that it should use periods. For motion indeed is a mutation
from some things to others. But beings are terminated by multitude
and magnitude. These, however, being bounded, there can neither be a
mutation to infinity according to a right line, nor can that which
is always moved, make its transitions finitely. Hence, that which is
always moved, will proceed from the same to the same, and thus will
proceed periodically.
PROPOSITION CXCIX.
Every mundane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to
its former state.
* * * * *
For if it is measured by time, it energizes transitively, and possesses
a peculiar motion.[316] But every thing which is moved and participates
of time, if it is perpetual, uses periods, periodically revolves, and
is restored from the same things to the same. And every mundane soul
possessing motion, and energizing according to time, will have periods
of motions, and restitutions to its pristine state. For every period of
perpetual natures is _apocatastatic_, or restorative to a former
condition.
PROPOSITION CC.
Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls
indeed is measured by a certain time; but that of the first soul, since
it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time.
* * * * *
For if all motions have prior and posterior, so likewise have periods,
and on this account they participate of time. That also which measures
all the periods of souls is time. But if indeed there were the same
periods of all souls, and they were about the same things, the time of
all would be the same. If, however, the restitutions of different souls
are different, the periodic time also and which restores to a pristine
state, is different in different souls.
That the soul, therefore, which is primarily measured by time, is
measured by the whole of time, is evident. For if time is the measure
of all motion, that which is primarily moved, will entirely participate
of time, and will be measured by the whole of time. For if the whole
of time did not measure its first participant, it would not measure
any thing else, according to the whole of itself. From these things,
however, it is evident that all souls are measured by certain
measures which are more partial than the whole of time. For if these
souls are more partial than the soul which primarily participates of
time, neither can they adapt their periods to the whole of time. The
multitude of their restitutions, however, will be parts of the one
period, and of the one restitution of things to their pristine state,
which is effected by the soul that primarily participates of time. For
a more partial participation pertains to a less power; but a more total
to a greater power. Other souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted
to receive the whole temporal measure according to one life, because
they are allotted an order inferior to that of the soul which is first
measured by time.
PROPOSITION CCI.
All divine souls have triple energies; some indeed as souls; but others
as receiving a divine intellect; and others as suspended from the Gods.
And they provide indeed for the whole of things as Gods; but they know
all things through an intellectual life; and they move bodies through a
self-moved hyparxis.
* * * * *
For because they psychically[317] participate of the natures situated
above them, and are not simply souls, but divine souls, and are
established according to an order, in the psychical extent, analogous
to the Gods, they energize not only psychically, but also divinely,
being allotted a deified summit of their essence, and also because they
have an intellectual hypostasis, through which they are spread under
intellectual essences. Hence, they not only energize divinely, but also
intellectually; the former indeed according to _the one_ which
they contain; but the latter through an energy established according to
intellect. A third energy, likewise, is present with them, according
to their own hyparxis, which is motive indeed of things naturally
alter-motive, but is vivific of such as possess an adventitious life.
For this is the proper employment of every soul; but such energies
as are intellectual and providential, they possess according to
participation.
PROPOSITION CCII.
All souls attending upon, and always following the Gods, are inferior
to divine, but are expanded above partial souls.
* * * * *
For divine souls participating of intellect and deity, on which
account, they are at the same time both intellectual and divine, are
the leaders of other souls, just as the Gods also are the leaders
of all beings. But partial souls are deprived of a suspension from
intellect, in consequence of not being able to participate proximately
of an intellectual essence. For they would not fall from intellectual
energy, if they essentially participated of intellect, as has been
before demonstrated [in Prop. 184]. Hence, the souls which always
follow the Gods are of a middle condition; receiving indeed a perfect
intellect, and through this surpassing partial souls, yet not being
suspended from the divine unities. For the intellect which they
participate is not divine.
PROPOSITION CCIII.
Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed being greater in
power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those
that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls,
both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in
power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.
* * * * *
For divine souls are more allied to _the one_, on account of
their hyparxis being divine; but souls of a middle rank, through
the participation of intellect; and those of the last order, are
essentially dissimilar both to those of the middle, and those of the
first rank. Among perpetual natures, however, those that are nearer
to _the one_, are more single in number, and are more contracted in
multitude, than such as are more remote from it. But such as are more
remote from _the one_, are more multiplied. The powers, therefore, of
superior souls are greater, and have the same ratio to those of souls
in the second rank, which the divine has to the intellectual, and the
intellectual to the psychical peculiarity. Inferior souls also are more
in number. For that which is more remote from _the one_, is a greater,
and that which is nearer to it, is a less multitude.
PROPOSITION CCIV.
Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that always follow the
Gods; and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this
order.
* * * * *
[For if it is a divine soul] it is necessary that it should be allotted
an order [which is the leader or generator[318]] of all things, and
which has a primary rank among souls. For in all beings that which is
divine, is the leader of wholes. It is likewise requisite that every
divine soul should neither alone preside over such souls as perpetually
follow the Gods, nor over those alone that are sometimes their
attendants. For if any divine soul should alone preside over those
that sometimes follow the Gods, how can there be a contact between
these and a divine soul, since they are entirely different from it,
and neither proximately participate of intellect, nor much less of the
Gods. But if it only presides over those that always follow the Gods,
how is it that the series proceeds as far as to these [alone]? For
thus intellectual natures will be the last, and will be unprolific,
and unadapted to perfect and elevate. It is necessary, therefore, that
such souls as follow the Gods, and energize according to intellect, and
which are elevated to intellects more partial than divine intellects,
should be primarily suspended from a divine soul. But it is necessary
that partial souls, and which through those that are divine as media,
participate of intellect and a divine life, should be suspended from
a divine soul in the second place. For through those which always
participate of a more excellent condition, those that sometimes only
participate of it, are perfected. And again, it is necessary that
about every divine soul, there should be a greater number of those
that only sometimes follow, than of those that always attend on the
Gods. For the power of the monad always proceeds into multitude,
according to diminution; being deficient indeed in power, but redundant
in multitude. Since every soul also of those that always follow the
Gods, is the leader of a greater multitude of partial souls, imitating
in this a divine soul; and elevates a greater number of souls to the
primary monad of the whole series. Every divine soul, therefore, is the
leader of many souls that always follow the Gods, but presides over a
still greater number of those that sometimes only receive this order.
PROPOSITION CCV.
Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is
essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle of the
other.
* * * * *
For if the distribution of vehicles to souls is according to nature,
it is necessary that the vehicle of every partial soul should have
the same ratio to the vehicle of the soul which ranks as a whole, as
the essence of the one to the essence of the other. The distribution,
however, is according to nature. For things which primarily participate
are spontaneously conjoined with the natures which they participate.
If, therefore, as a divine soul is to a divine body, so is a partial
soul to a partial body, each soul essentially participating,--if
this be the case, that which was at first asserted is true, that the
vehicles of souls have the same ratio to each other, as the souls
themselves of which they are the vehicles.
PROPOSITION CCVI.
Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and
to ascend from generation to real being.
* * * * *
For if it sometimes follows the Gods, but sometimes falls from an
extension to a divine nature, and participates of intellect and
the privation of intellect, it is evident that it is alternatively
conversant with generation and the Gods. For since it is not for
an infinite time with the Gods, it will not for the whole of the
following time be conversant with bodies. For that which has not a
temporal beginning will never have an end; and that which never has an
end is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that
every partial soul must make periods of ascents from, and of descents
into generation, and that this must be unceasing through an infinite
time. Every partial soul, therefore, is able to descend and ascend
infinitely. And this never ceases to be the case with all of them.
PROPOSITION CCVII.
The vehicle of every partial soul, is fabricated by an immoveable cause.
* * * * *
For if it is perpetually and connascently suspended from the soul that
uses it,[319] being immutable according to essence, it is allotted its
hypostasis from an immoveable cause. For every thing which is generated
from moveable causes, is essentially changed. Moreover, every soul has
a perpetual body, which primarily participates of it. Hence, the cause
of a partial soul, and therefore of its vehicle,[320] is immoveable,
and on this account supermundane.
PROPOSITION CCVIII.
The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially
indivisible and impassive.
* * * * *
For if it proceeds from an immoveable fabrication, and is perpetual,
it will have an immaterial and impassive hypostasis. For such things
as are adapted to suffer essentially, and to be changed, are all
of them material, and in consequence of subsisting differently at
different times, are suspended from moveable causes. Hence, likewise,
they receive an all-various mutation, being moved in conjunction with
their principal causes. Moreover, that this vehicle is indivisible, is
manifest. For every thing which is divided, so far as it is divided,
is corrupted, in consequence of departing from the whole, and from its
continuity. If, therefore, it is essentially immutable and impassive,
it will be indivisible.
PROPOSITION CCIX.
The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of
more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation
of every thing material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous
to the soul that uses it.
* * * * *
For this soul indeed descends irrationally, assuming irrational lives;
but it ascends laying aside all the generation-producing powers, with
which it was invested in its descent, and becoming [pure, returns to
the pristine condition of its nature. For the vehicle[321]] imitates
the lives of the souls that use it, and they being every where moved,
it is moved in conjunction with them. By its circulations likewise
it represents the intellections of some souls; but the falling of
others through their inclination to the realms of generation; and the
purifications of others, through the circumductions which lead to an
immaterial nature. For because it is vivified by the very essence of
souls,[322] and is connascent with them, it is all-variously changed
in conjunction with their energies; follows them every where; becomes
co-passive with them; is restored to its pristine state together
with them when they are purified;[323] and is elevated when they are
elevated, and aspires after its own perfection. For every thing is
perfected when it obtains its proper perfection.
PROPOSITION CCX.
Every connascent vehicle of the soul, always possesses both the same
figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be greater and less, and of a
dissimilar figure, through the additions and ablations of other bodies.
* * * * *
For if it derives its essence from an immoveable cause, it is evident
that both its figure and its magnitude are defined by this cause, and
each is immutable and invariable. Moreover, at different times it
appears to be different, as likewise greater and less. Hence, through
other bodies added from the material elements, and again taken away, it
exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form.
PROPOSITION CCXI.
Every partial soul descending into generation descends wholly; nor does
one part of it remain on high, and another part descend.
* * * * *
For if something pertaining to the soul remained on high in the
intelligible world, it will always perceive intellectually, without
transition or transitively. But if without transition, it will
be intellect, and not a part of the soul, and this partial soul
will proximately[324] participate of intellect. This, however, is
impossible. But if it perceives intellectually with transition, from
that which always [and from that which sometimes[325]] energizes
intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, also is
impossible. For these always differ, as has been demonstrated. To which
may be added, the absurdity resulting from supposing that the summit
of the soul is always perfect, and yet does not rule over the other
powers, and cause them to be perfect. Every partial soul, therefore,
wholly descends.
ON
PROVIDENCE AND FATE,
AND THAT
_WHICH IS IN OUR POWER_.
TO
THEODORUS, THE MECHANIST.
1. I am of opinion, my friend Theodorus, that the conceptions of your
mind are mature, and adapted to a man who loves the contemplation of
beings; and I am gratified that you have thought fit to write to us
on these subjects, though there are many among you that are able to
investigate and doubt with you about such like problems. But it is
requisite, as it seems, that we also should adduce[326] what appears
to us to be the truth on the subjects which you have proposed for our
discussion, and what we conceive to accord with things themselves,
and with the opinions of the most celebrated of the philosophers
prior to us; and that we should not in vain hear the inquiries of a
man eminently skilled in mechanics, who was formerly known to us,
as I conceive, and as you have asserted. You inquire however, about
things which have been a thousand times investigated, and which in my
opinion will never have any rest, because the soul is excited to the
discussion of them, much light having been already thrown on them by
the elaborate writings of Plotinus and Iamblichus, and prior to these
by the divine Plato; and if it be not too much to say, such particulars
respecting them have been proclaimed by the divinely-inspired mouth
of theologists, as Plato alone has unfolded by demonstrations. And
why is it requisite to adduce to you Plato, and men who were divinely
wise, since they have been most luminously developed[327] by the Gods
themselves, who transcendently know what pertains to themselves,
and what they have produced, and have not been delivered by them in
enigmas, as by theologists. It is requisite therefore, that we also
writing conformably to them, should as I have said adduce to you what
appears to us to be the truth respecting the subjects of your inquiry.
2. You deserve indulgence if looking to the all-various tragic and
comic, and other connexions of human affairs, you have conceived that
there is only one fabricator and maker of such colligations in the
universe, and have called this Fate; or rather you have denominated
it the series and consequent generation of things; have thought that
such a dramatic scene is alone directed by some inevitable necessity;
and have celebrated this as providence, and asserted that it alone
possesses freedom of will, and is the lord of all things. But you have
conceived that the freedom of will of the human soul is only a name,
and is truly nothing, since she has an arrangement in the world, is
subservient to the energies of other things, and is a part of the
mundane fabric. Or rather, that I may use your own words, the human
soul is a machine, since there is an irrefragable cause which moves all
things that the world comprehends in itself. But the universe being as
it were one machine, the whole spheres are complicated in each other
analogously to certain drums, but the partial animals and souls that
are moved by them, and in short, all things, depend on one mover. And
perhaps in consequence of honouring your art, you have conceived that
the maker of the universe is a certain mechanic, and that you are an
imitator of the best of causes. These things however we have written,
mingling the jocose with the serious.
3. Betaking ourselves therefore to the contest, we say, that the
difference of these three things ought especially to be considered
by you, if you intend to arrive at the gate of the subjects of
investigation. And of these, the first indeed is, that Providence and
Fate do not differ in the way in which you conceive they do, viz. that
the one is a connected consequence, but the other is necessity, the
cause of this consequence. For both indeed are the causes of the world,
and of whatever is produced in the world, but Providence subsists prior
to Fate; and all that is produced according to Fate, is by a much
greater priority produced by Providence, but the contrary is not true;
for in short,[328] the natures which are governed by Providence are
more divine than those which are governed by Fate. The second thing
is this, that the soul which is separable from the body, and which
descends into this mortal abode from the Gods, is different from the
soul which is in bodies, and which subsists in, and is inseparable from
its subjects; and that the latter essentially depends on Fate, but the
former on Providence. The third particular is, that the science and
truth which are inherent in souls conversant with generation, though
they may lead an immaculate life, are different from the science and
truth in souls that have fled from this abode, and are established in
that place whence they first fell, and descended into the realms of
mortality. Of these three particulars therefore, as we have said, if
you can discover sufficient solutions, you will obtain a satisfactory
answer to your inquiries. For Providence indeed, differing in the
above mentioned manner from Fate, it will be evident that many things
escape Fate, but that nothing escapes Providence; that Providence
supernally governs Fate, produces it, and has limited its empire[329]
by alter-motive natures, viz. by things which are allotted their first
subsistence in beings that are moved by something else. But again,
having shown that the soul which is separable from bodies, is different
from that which is planted in bodies, it will be manifest to you which
of these two possesses freedom of will, and that which is in our power;
which is subservient to necessity, and is under the dominion of Fate;
and where the complication of these is to be found, on account of which
the one dulls the freedom of the will through a subordinate life, but
the other participates of a certain image of election, in consequence
of its greater proximity to a more excellent nature.[330] And science
appearing to you to be twofold, it will be evident after what manner
both Plato and Socrates, and to these also may be added the great
Parmenides, assert, that the soul while here is capable of knowing
truth, when it is purified from material darkness, and the passions
introduced into it by the body, and its commixture with corporeal
natures, but that it is allotted science in a greater degree, and in a
mote genuine mode, when it exists beyond bodies, and generation, and
bitter matter.
4. These three problems therefore, being necessary and having been
well discussed[331] by the ancients, partly by Iamblichus, in his
copious and elaborate treatises On Providence and Fate, and partly
by all the lovers of Plato, who proclaim that the soul is twofold,
by Plotinus likewise in many places, and also by Porphyry, who make
a distinction between contemplation, and contemplative virtue, and
in short, by all who are able to understand Plato,--this being the
case, it is necessary that beginning from the first thing proposed, we
should discover the difference between Providence and Fate. “But in
every thing, says Plato, it is requisite to know the one principle
of that which is the subject of speculation, or we must err in every
thing.” It is necessary however, as the dæmoniacal Aristotle teaches,
after inquiring _if a thing is_, to investigate in the next place _what
it is_. If therefore, you inquired whether Providence is, or is not,
and in a similar manner concerning Fate, it would be requisite in the
first place to show you _that_ each of them is,[332] and if you still
doubted, I should be unwilling after this to answer your doubts, but
since you acknowledge that both of them have a subsistence, and that
all things are comprehended in their dominion, it evidently remains,
I conceive, that I should demonstrate to you _what_ each of them is;
for from this it will be evident what it is in which they differ.
And this being known, many of your doubts, as we have said, will be
solved. But again, because to the discovery of _what a thing is_, the
dividing method is said to contribute, which Socrates in the Philebus
celebrates as the gift of the Gods to men, and because what are called
our common conceptions contribute to the discovery of principles, from
which conceptions it is possible, as Aristotle writes, to investigate
many things that are demonstrable,--hence it is requisite that we
also employing both these, should unfold Providence and Fate; so far
as pertains to what we say they are, using common conceptions, but so
far as pertains to other things, employing distinctly the divisions of
beings, from which, as it appears to me, we can alone discover what
the definitions are of Providence and Fate. But these being known will
enkindle a clear light in the subjects of investigation, and will
perhaps free us from the doubts by which we are at present detained.
5. The common conceptions therefore of all men, and which possess
indubitable evidence, assert, that Providence is indeed the cause of
good to those beings for which it provides, and that Fate is also a
cause, but the cause of a certain connexion and consequence to those
things that are generated. For that all of us have these irrefragable
conceptions about Providence and Fate, is evident from our asserting
that men who are the procurers of good to others, have _well_ provided
for the subjects of their beneficence; and again, we denominate that
which is evolved through many causes complicated with each other and
unknown to us, no otherwise than _Fate_. Our life also is full of these
names, because names testify the truth of these conceptions. For the
word Providence (προνοια) indicates[333] that energy which is prior to
intellect, and which it is necessary to attribute to _the good_ alone;
for this alone is more divine than intellect, because much-honoured
intellect desires good, together with all things and prior to all
things. But the word Fate (ειμαρμενη) indicates _that which connects
all things that are naturally adapted to have such a connexion_.
Moreover, that the thing which is provided for is not the imparting,
nor that which is connected, Fate, nor that which proceeds into this,
connexion, but that which connects, you may assume from this, that all
of us conceive Providence and Fate to be certain productive powers.
But every where effective causes are distinct from their effects: and
these three things differ from each other, viz. that which makes,
that which is made, and the energy of making.[334] Just as in what
pertains to Providence and Fate there are, that which provides, that
which is provided for, and the effective energy which proceeds from the
providing cause into that which is provided for: and again, there are,
that which connects, that which is connected, and the effective energy
proceeding from the connecting cause into the thing connected. And it
is evident that according to each of these triads, that which makes is
not such as that which is made, but if the latter is various, it is
necessary that the former should be simple, and that if the participant
of good is the thing made, the maker should be imparticipable. For
every where that which makes is allotted a part more divine than that
which is made. When we say therefore, that Providence is the cause of
good, we must also say that it is the fountain of good, which does not
require to be benefited by other things. And admitting Fate to be the
cause of connexion, we must not say that it is itself connected by
other things. Such therefore, being the common conceptions which we
antecedently assume of these two, it remains in the next place that we
should consider what it is in which each of them excels [and by which
each is characterized]: and first, in what the characteristic of Fate
consists.
6. From these conceptions therefore, we infer that Fate is the cause
of things that are connected. But let us consider what the things are
that are connected. Of beings therefore, some have their essence in
eternity, but others in time. By beings however, whose essence is in
eternity, I mean those whose energy[335] together with their essence
is eternal: but by beings whose essence is in time, I mean those
whose essence _is_ not, but is always in generation, or rising into
existence, though it should be in generation for an infinite time. And
the natures that subsist between these, are such as have their essence
indeed permanent, and better than generation, but their energy measured
by time. For it is necessary that every progression from things first
to last should be effected through media. Since therefore, there are
beings which are eternal both in essence and energy, it is necessary
that there should be a middle extent, and that it should either have
an eternal essence, but an energy indigent of time, or the contrary.
The contrary however is impossible, that we may not confess that we
place energies prior to essences. Hence it remains that the medium must
be that which has an eternal essence, but a temporal energy. We say
therefore, that we have exhibited to you these three orders of beings,
the intellectual, the psychical,[336] and the corporeal. But I call
the intellectual that which exists and is intellective through all
eternity; the corporeal, that which is always rising into existence,
or becoming to be, either in an infinite time, or in a part of time;
and the psychical, that which is eternal indeed in essence, but which
employs temporal energies. Where then, must the things which are
connected be arranged? Consider assuming from the Gods the meaning
of the term ειρεσθαι _to be connected_, as implying nothing else than
this, that the natures which are differently produced according to
time, are conjoined with, and not separated from each other. And if
existing at one and the same time they are distant from each other
according to place, yet they have a certain co-ordination with each
other. Hence being separated either by places or times, they are in a
certain respect collected into unity, and into one sympathy, through
connexion. And in short,[337] the things which are connected, cannot
suffer this from themselves, but require something else which may
impart to them connexion. If therefore the natures which are arranged
under Fate, are such as are connected with each other, according to
our common conception of Fate; but the things which are connected are
partible, being distant either in places or times, and are naturally
adapted to be connected by something else, on account of the opinion
of connexion which prevails among all men; and these are moved by
something else, and are corporeal; for of the natures which are beyond
bodies, some [i.e. intellects] are better both than place and time, but
others [viz. souls] though they energize according to time, appear to
be pure from place;--if this be the case, it is evident that the things
which are governed and connected by Fate, are moved by something else,
and are entirely corporeal.
7. If however this is demonstrated, it is evident that admitting Fate
to be the cause of connexion, we must also admit that it presides
over alter-motive and corporeal natures. But assuming this, we will
ask ourselves what that is which is said to be the cause of bodies,
which is proximate to them, and by which things alter-motive are
inspired[338] and contained, and accomplish whatever they are able
to effect. And if you are willing, looking in the first place to our
bodies, let us consider what it is that moves and nourishes, and always
reweaves, and binds them together? Is not this that which is innate in
bodies, which also in other animals exhibits a similar energy,[339]
which extends as far as to things that are rooted in the earth, and
possesses a twofold energy, _this_ indeed renovating bodies that
they may not by discerption entirely vanish, but _that_ preserving
the several individuals in a condition conformable to nature? For it
is not the same thing to add what is deficient, and to preserve the
power of things that are held together. If therefore, not only in us,
and other animals and plants, but in this universe also[340] much prior
to bodies, there is one nature of the world, which is connective and
motive of the subsistence of bodies, as it is also in us, or why do
we call all bodies the progeny of nature, it is indeed necessary that
nature should be the cause of things that are connected, and that in
this what is called Fate should be investigated. And on this account
perhaps the dæmoniacal Aristotle also is accustomed to call those
augmentations or generations which are effected beside the accustomed
time, _deviations from Fate_. And the divine Plato says, “that the
world considered by itself, without the intellectual Gods, is convolved
as being corporeal by Fate, and innate desire.” The oracles of the Gods
also accord with these and bear witness to our demonstrations when they
say: “Look not upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal.” And thus we
have discovered what Fate is, and how it is the nature of this world,
and a certain incorporeal essence. For it presides over and is the life
of bodies, and this essentially, since it internally moves bodies,
and not externally, moves all things according to time, and connects
the motions of all things that are distant both in times and places;
according to which also, mortal are adapted to the participation of
eternal natures, are convolved together with them, and these are
mutually co-passive. For the nature which is in us, binds and connects
all the parts of our body, and their operations on each other: and
this also is a certain Fate of our body. As in our body likewise, some
parts are more, but others are less principal, and the latter follow
the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less principal
follow the motions of the more principal parts, viz. the sublunary
generations follow the periods of the celestial orbs, and the circle
of the former is an image of the circle of the latter. And these things
which have been divulged by all the ancients, I am unwilling to prolong.
8. It is not therefore, difficult for you to see what Providence
is. For if you assert that the fountain of good is primarily the
divine cause itself, you will speak rightly. For whence, except from
divinity, is good imparted to all things? So that as Plato says, “no
other cause of good than God, is to be admitted.” In the next place,
Providence being established above both intelligibles and sensibles,
is superior to Fate. And those things which are under Fate, are also
under Providence, possessing indeed, their connexion from Fate, but
their participation of good from Providence, so that the connexion may
have a good end, and that Providence may contain the end of Fate in
itself. But again, with respect to things that are under Providence,
all of them are not likewise indigent of Fate, but intellectual natures
are exempt from it. For the empire of Fate is entirely in corporeal
natures;[341] since to be connected introduces time, and corporeal
motion. To these things also, as it appears to me, Plato looking,
says that a subsistence of this kind, is mingled from intellect and
necessity, intellect ruling[342] over the necessity of bodies. And in
this place, he calls the motive cause necessity, which he elsewhere
denominates Fate, conceiving that bodies act by compulsion. And this
rightly. For every body is compelled both to do whatever it does, and
to suffer whatever it suffers, to heat, or to be heated, to impart
or to receive cold. But choice is not in bodies, because you may say
that their peculiarity is the necessary and an existence unaccompanied
with choice. For if this were not the case, what could there be that
is better than bodies? For the body which is moved in a circle, and
which is of an illustrious nature, is thus moved from necessity, in
the same manner as fire is from necessity moved to the circumference,
but earth to the middle [of the universe]. Plato therefore asserts
that necessity presides over the generations of bodies, and on this
account, over their corruptions also; but he exalts intellect, and
determines that it rules over necessity. If therefore Providence is
above intellect, it is evident that it rules over intellect, and those
things which are under this necessity; and that necessity alone rules
over those things which are under its dominion. Hence, every thing
indeed which has an intellectual subsistence, continues to exist under
Providence alone, but every thing which has a corporeal subsistence,
endures under necessity.
9. You must understand therefore, that there are two genera of things,
the one intellectual, but the other sensible, and also that there are
two kingdoms of these, the kingdom of Providence indeed above, which
reigns over both intellectuals and sensibles, and the kingdom of Fate
beneath, which has dominion over sensibles alone. And Providence
differs from Fate, in the same way in which a God differs from that
which is divine indeed, but by participation and not primarily. For in
other things also, as you may see, one thing has a primary subsistence,
and another is according to participation. Thus for instance, there is
light in the sun,[343] and light in the air, but the former subsists
primarily, and the latter subsists on account of the former. And life
is primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body, and subsists
on account of the life of the soul. Thus also, Providence indeed,
is essentially deity, but Fate is something divine, and not deity,
for it depends on Providence, and is as it were its image. For if as
Providence is to intellectual, so is Fate to sensible beings; since
the former reigns over intellectuals, but the latter over sensibles;
then alternately, as geometricians say, as Providence is to Fate, so
are intellectuals to sensibles. But intellectuals are primarily beings,
and sensibles derive their subsistence from them. Hence Providence
is primarily that which it is, and from this the order of Fate is
suspended. But of these things enough.
10. If you are willing, however, we will betake ourselves to the second
discussion, viz. the consideration of the soul which is separable, and
of that which is inseparable from bodies. But assume this also from
the philosophy of Aristotle. For he says, that every soul which has an
energy not at all indigent of body, is likewise allotted an essence
beyond and separable from body. And this necessarily. For if we should
arrange energy as existing independent of body, but essence inseparable
from body, energy would be better than essence, since it would not
be at all indigent of a subordinate essence, that being rooted in
it, it might have a subsistence according to nature. This however is
impossible. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul which has an
energy separable from body, should also be itself separable. Consider
then, my friend, what soul it is in us, which we acknowledge is not at
all indigent of body, in the energies of itself according to nature?
Is it sense? But every sensitive power uses corporeal instruments,
and together with them energizes about its proper sensibles; viz. it
uses the eyes, the ears, and all the other senses, being at the same
time moved and co-passive with them. What then shall we say of anger
and desire? But do you not see that these frequently co-operate with
the corporeal parts, with the heart and the liver, and that these
also are not pure from body? For how is it possible that things which
energize with sense, should not also be indigent of body, since sense
is always moved through body? But with respect to the orectic powers,
that these energize with sense, is I conceive known to all of us. For
what deprived of sense, can either be angry, or desire? Plotinus also
rightly asserting, that all the passions are either senses, or are not
without sense. If, therefore, that which is angry is so in conjunction
with sense, possessing at the same time a sense of sorrow, and that
which desires possesses a sense of delight; but that which energizes
with sense energizes with body, for sense subsists with body;--if
this be the case, it is necessary that every thing which is angry and
desires, should energize with body. Hence, these species of life, being
all of them irrational, have that energy which is according to nature
in conjunction with body.
11. Looking now, however, to the rational nature itself, consider the
life of it which is seated in the inferior lives, and corrects either
what is deficient in them according to knowledge, as when from above
it evinces that sense is deceived about its own objects of knowledge.
I mean for instance, when it shows that sense is deceived in asserting
that the sun is but a foot in diameter, or when sense with its usual
deception asserts of such things any thing of a similar nature: or when
reason disciplines anger,[344] which is immoderate in its motions, when
it is agitated with fury. Hence Ulysses in Homer exclaims “endure, my
heart,” and represses the impulse of anger barking like a dog: or when
the rational nature represses the wantonness of desire, and frustrates
its endeavours to detain the soul by the delights that germinate
from the body, the petulance of these delights being ameliorated by
the corporeal temperaments. For in all such energies the rational
soul evidently represses all the irrational motions both gnostic and
orectic, and liberates itself from them, as from things foreign to its
nature. It is necessary, however, to investigate the nature of every
thing, not from the perverted use of it, but from its natural energies.
Hence, if reason, when it is moved in us as reason, restrains the
shadowy impression of the delights of desire, punishes the precipitate
motion of anger, and reproves sense as full of deception, asserting
that we neither hear nor see any thing accurately,[345] and if it
asserts these things looking to its internal reasons, none of which
it knows through body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident
that according to this energy it elongates itself from the senses,
contrary to the decision of which it is separated from those sorrows
and delights.
12. After this, however, I see another and a better energy of our
rational soul, the inferior powers being now at rest, and exhibiting
no tumult, as in many things they are accustomed to do, according to
which energy she is converted to herself, sees her own essence and the
powers[346] she contains, the harmonic ratios of which she consists,
and the many lives of which she is the completion, and re-discovers
herself to be a rational world, the image indeed of the natures prior
to herself, and from which she has departed, but the paradigm of the
natures posterior to herself, and over which she presides. To this
energy of the soul, my friend, arithmetic, and geometry, the mother of
your art, are said to contribute much,[347] which indeed elongate the
soul from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms
of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal
comprehension of forms, extending as it were, the lustrations to
the future mystics that are anterior to the most sacred mysteries.
For consider from intellectual energies after what manner the
above-mentioned sciences are allotted the purifying power of which we
have been speaking. For if they assume the soul replete with images,
and knowing nothing subtile, and unattended with material garrulity,
and if they cause reasons to shine forth which possess an irrefragable
necessity of demonstration, and forms full of all certainty and
immateriality, and by no means calling to their assistance the
grossness which is in sensibles, do they not evidently purify our
intellectual life from those things that fill us with folly, and which
are unadapted to the divine circumscription of beings?
13. After both these energies of the rational soul, let us survey her
now running back to her highest intelligence, through which she sees
her sister souls in the world, which are allotted the heavens and the
whole of generation according to the will of the father, and of which
she being a part, desires the contemplation of them. But she sees above
all souls, intellectual essences and orders. For above every soul a
deiform intellect resides, which imparts to the soul an intellectual
habit. She also sees prior to these, the monads of the Gods themselves
which are above intellect, and from which the intellectual multitudes
receive their unions. For it is necessary that unific causes should
be placed above things united, in the same manner as vivifying causes
are above things vivified, causes that impart intellect are above
things intellectualized, and in a similar manner imparticipable
hypostases are above all participants. For according to all these
elevating intellections, I conceive it is evident to those that are
not perfectly blind, how the rational soul leaving sense and bodies
behind, is led upward by intellectual surveys about the inflected and
truly mystic intuitions of the supermundane Gods. Or whence, and from
what kind of energies have the progeny of the Gods unfolded to us the
occult dispensations of divinity? And after what manner are souls
said to energize enthusiastically, and assuming a mania better than
temperance[348] to be conjoined to the Gods themselves? I speak of the
Sibyl who soon after she was born uttered admirable things, and told
those who were present at the time who she was, and from what order she
came into this terrestrial abode, and I allude to any other soul who in
a similar manner was of a divine destiny.[349]
14. In short, we must say that the rational and intellectual soul in
whatever way it may energize, is beyond body and sense; and therefore
it is necessary that it should have an essence separable from both
these. This however though of itself now evident, I will again manifest
from hence, that when it energizes according to nature, it is superior
to the influence of Fate, but that when it falls into sense, and
becomes irrational and corporeal, it follows the natures that are
beneath it, and living with them as with intoxicated neighbours, is
held in subjection by a cause that has dominion over things that are
different from the rational essence.[350] For again, it is necessary
that there should be a certain genus of beings of this kind, which
according to essence indeed is above Fate, but according to habitude
is sometimes arranged under it. For if indeed the beings which are
wholly eternal are placed above the laws of Fate, but there are beings
which according to the whole of their life, are arranged under the
periods of Fate, it will also be necessary that there should be an
intermediate nature between these two, which sometimes indeed is above
the productions of Fate, and sometimes is under its dominion. For the
progression of beings much more than the situation of bodies, leaves
no vacuum; but there are every where media between the extremes, which
also bind the extremes to each other. And not only Plato, but likewise
the oracles of the Gods have revealed these things to us. For in the
first place indeed, they order those divine men who were thought worthy
to be the auditors of those mystic discourses, “_not to look upon
nature, because the name of it is fatal_.” And again, they order
them “_not to co-augment Fate_.” Every where also, they exhort
them to turn from the life which is according to Fate, and to avoid
“_becoming corporeal with the fatal herds_;” by all which they
withdraw us from the senses and material desires; for through these we
become corporeal, and are then acted upon from necessity by Fate. For
similitude every where copulates[351] beings to each other; but that
which is assimilated enjoys the same polity as that to which it is
assimilated, whatever it may be, and consequently is under the dominion
of the ruler of that polity. For nothing is without a ruler and a
principality in the universe, whether you speak of wholes, or of parts.
But different things have different rulers, because these live in one
way, and those in another. Afterwards, the oracles teaching concerning
our most divine life, and that immaculate polity, which we enjoy when
liberated from every polity of Fate, say, “_The souls that become
venerable by understanding the works of the father will escape the
fatal wing[352] of Destiny_.”
15. The soul, therefore, embracing this life, and such a life as this,
will not rank among those souls that are led by Fate. But if it wishes
to conform itself to body, aspires after what are called corporeal
goods, and pursues honours, power and riches, it suffers the same thing
as a philosopher who is chained, and in this condition enters a ship.
For he becomes subservient to the winds that move the ship, [and cannot
help himself] if some one of the sailors should trample on him, or some
fettered slave should insult him. Bidding farewell, therefore, to the
things to which we are bound, we should direct our attention to the
strength of virtue, and consider Fate not as effecting any thing in us,
but in the things which surround us. For with respect, my friend, to
all external circumstances that may befal us, enemies may demolish the
walls of our city, and reduce its buildings to ashes, they may deprive
us of our possessions, and leave us in a state of indigence; but all
these being mortal and external, are in consequence of this in the
power of other beings, and not in ours. But with respect to the things
which are in our power, there is no one so potent as to be able to take
away any one of them, even though he should possess all human power.
For if we are temperate, we shall still continue to be so, though these
calamities may befal us, and if we are contemplators of true beings,
neither shall we be plundered of this habit; but all these dreadful
events taking place, we shall still persevere in celebrating the rulers
of all things, and in investigating the causes of effects.
16. By no means, therefore, must we reprobate the necessity of the
soul from its ultimate energies, but looking to its first energies,
we should admire its unconquerable power. And if we are thus wise,
nothing will disturb us pertaining to the passions of the inferior
parts of the soul; but when the body is disturbed, and we say that
we sustain something of a dreadful nature, it is not we who thus
speak, but it is the language of desire;[353] for the delights of the
body, and therefore its sorrows pertain to this part. When also being
robbed of our wealth, or not obtaining riches, we are grieved, this
passion belongs to that power of the soul which is a lover of wealth.
And again, when being reproached, and falling from power, we are
indignant, this is not the passion of the superior soul, but of that
which dwells downward, about the heart. For this pertains to the part
which is a lover of honour. But the reason which is in us, being in all
such particulars deceived, follows and is at the same time disturbed
with the subordinate powers of the soul, being a blind intellect, and
not having that eye[354] yet purified, by which it is able to perceive
itself, and the natures prior and posterior to itself. When, however,
it becomes purified from those things with which it was invested when
it fell, it will then know what that is which is in its power, how it
is neither in corporeal natures; for these are posterior to reason;
nor in those beings in whom there is the liberty of divine will; for
they are prior to reason; but that it consists in living according to
virtue. For this alone is free and unservile, and adapted to liberty,
and is truly the power of the soul, and confers power on its possessor.
For it is the province of all power to contain and preserve that which
possesses it.
17. But he who directs his attention to vice, looks at the debility
of the soul, though she should possess all other power. For the power
of instruments is one thing, and the power of those beings that ought
to use the instruments another. Hence, every soul, so far as it
participates of virtue, and so far as it is [a rational soul], is free;
but so far as it is vicious and debilitated, and is not [rational],
it is subservient to other things,[355] and not to Fate only, but to
every thing, in short, that is either willing to give that which is
appetible, or is able to take it away. For he who possesses virtue
is subservient to those beings who are alone sufficient to impart to
and co-augment with him that which is desirable; but these are the
Gods, with whom there is true virtue, and from whom that which is in
our power is derived. Plato also somewhere says, that this voluntary
servitude is the greatest liberty. For by being subservient to those
who possess all the power of all things, we become assimilated to
them, so that, as he says, we govern the whole world; i.e. when we are
perfect and winged, and reign on high. This, therefore, pertains to
the most divine of our souls, just as it pertains to the last of them,
to be as it were bound in prison, and to live an involuntary, instead
of a voluntary free life. But to the souls that have an intermediate
subsistence between these, it belongs, so far as they are liberated
from passions and the body, to ascend above necessity to a life which
has dominion over generation.
18. For again, if intellect and deity are prior to soul, but passions
and bodies are posterior to it; and if to these it belongs to act from
compulsion, but to intellect and deity, to act in a manner better than
all necessity, and which is alone free, it is necessary that the soul
betaking itself either to the former or to the latter, should either
enter under the necessity of subordinate, or exert the liberty of
more excellent natures; and that it should be subservient either to a
supernal dominion, or to a dominion inferior to itself.[356] But if it
is subservient, it must either rule in conjunction with the powers that
rule over it, or be alone subservient in conjunction with subservient
natures. Here, therefore, the soul ascending and resuming its power,
which is virtue, will consider nothing as dreadful whatever it may be,
that takes place about and external to the body. For the passions of
instruments do not pass to those that use them; but in whatever manner
they may subsist, it is possible for the soul to energize according to
virtue; strenuously indeed, if the body should happen to be languid,
but moderately when it is sane. And when poverty is present, it may
energize sublimely, but in affluence magnificently; but every where
from occurring circumstances, it may extol virtue that uses them;
and being ameliorated by its inward strength may vanquish external
calamities. For you must not suppose that you mechanists alone, are to
be permitted to say, that you can move a given weight with a given
power; for this you are well known to assert; but it is much more
possible for those who live according to virtue, truly to adorn a power
given from every circumstance by another power. And he who does this is
generous and free; but the bad man is the slave of all things though he
should rule over all things. For he resembles those who are punished in
Egypt, by laughing vizards that surround them. Over these also, who are
not able to govern themselves, necessity prevails. For being elongated
from the Gods, the universe uses them as brutes.
19. When, therefore, you wish to see that which is in our power, look
at the soul living according to nature. But the soul which is not
debile lives according to nature. For there is nothing debile in that
which is conformable to nature. The soul, however, is not debile, which
is not replete with vice, [the evil of the soul]; for in all things
evil is debile. And if you consider the soul in this point of view, you
will see what the nature is of that which is in our power. For you will
see that it uses all circumstances rightly, and either prohibits them
from taking place, or providentially attends to calamitous events when
they occur. It also permits Fate to act upon those things which are
posterior to Fate, and of which it is the lord; but is co-ordinated to
the natures prior to itself, and from which being more excellent than
itself, it is not divulsed. And thus much for the second particular
which we proposed to discuss.
20. In the third place, we will show what, and of what kind the modes
of knowledge are; for if we suffer these to remain indistinct, we
shall ignorantly err both about things themselves, and the doctrines
of the divine Plato. Let us then direct our attention to that mode of
knowledge divulged by Aristotle, and also Plato, which without the
assignation of cause alone knows the truth of the οτι; or _that a
thing is_;[357] because to souls beginning to be purified, these
philosophers attribute opinion as the first mode of knowledge, and as
adapted to those who are instructed in practical affairs,[358] without
engaging in the contemplation of beings. For erudition is a purgation
of the immoderation of the passions, reason in this case being
co-passive indeed, but moderately, and casting off all the rope of the
passions.
21. Such then being this mode of knowledge, another mode of an
elevating nature is delivered to us from the same Gymnasium. But this
knowledge is said to proceed from principles indeed as hypotheses, to
know causes, and to form necessary conclusions in all its reasonings.
And such is the knowledge obtained through arithmetic and geometry,
which syllogize, conclude from things necessary, and are alone placed
above doxastic knowledge. Because, however these sciences abiding in
their principles, do not ascend to the causes of these, on this account
they show themselves to fall short of the most perfect knowledge.
For as Aristotle says, “it is not the business of a geometrician to
discourse with him who subverts the principles of his science.” Hence,
in these sciences, that which is deduced from principles acknowledged
by them will be manifest; but that which pertains to the principles
themselves is obscure and unknown.
22. In the third place, ascending higher, conceive me to speak of
that knowledge of the human soul which ascends as far as to _the
one_, and to that which is unhypothetical, through all forms or
ideas, as I may say, dividing some, but analyzing others, and producing
many things from one, and one thing from many. Socrates, in the
Republic, defines this knowledge to be the defensive inclosure of the
mathematical sciences, and the guest in the Epinomis asserts it to
be the bond of them. For from this, geometry, and each of the other
sciences, assume the theory concerning their principles, adapting[359]
to themselves many principles, and which are divided or separated from
the one principle of all things. For what _the one_ is in all
beings, that a point is in geometry, the monad in arithmetic, and
in every thing, that which is most simple; from which principles the
several sciences producing those things which are under them, frame
their demonstrations. Each of these, however, is said to be, and is, a
certain principle. For the principle of all beings is simply principle,
and the highest ascent of the sciences, is as far as to this.
23. There still remains for you to understand a fourth mode of our
knowledge, which is more simple than the preceding, because it does
not employ methods, or analyses, or compositions, or definitions,
or demonstrations; but those who are able to energize according to
it, celebrate it as contemplating beings by simple, and as it were
self-visive projections; and they add, that they venerate it as
intellect, and not as science. Or have you not heard that Aristotle
in his demonstrative treatises says, that the intellect which is in
us is our most excellent part, and is that by which we know terms or
boundaries; and that Plato in the Timæus asserts that intellect and
science are the knowledges of the soul about beings? For science indeed
appears to pertain to the soul, so far as the soul is knowledge; but
intellect pertains to it so far as the soul is the image of true and
real intellect. For intellect perceiving intellectuals, or rather being
one with them, Plato says, that it understands them by projecting
energies, by intuition and contact, understanding itself, and beholding
intelligibles in itself, on which account it intellectually sees what
it is, and knows that it is at one and the same time both the perceiver
and the thing perceived. The soul, therefore, imitating this as much as
she is able, becomes herself intellect, running above science, leaving
the many methods with which she was before adorned, elevating her eye
to beings alone, and understanding them by contact in the same manner
as intellect; from which she differs in this, that she comes into
contact with different intelligibles at different times, but intellect
passes into contact with all things at once.
24. After all these modes of knowledge, I wish you (who have believed
in Aristotle when he leads the soul upward as far as to intellectual
energy, but insinuates nothing beyond this), to assume a fifth
intelligence; in so doing, following Plato, and prior to Plato
theologists, who are accustomed to celebrate a knowledge which is
above intellect, and have divulged this as a truly divine mania. But
they say that this is obtained by exciting the profundity of the soul,
which is no longer intellectual, and adapting it to union with _the
one_. For all things are known by the similar, that which is sensible
by sense, that which is the object of science by science, that which
is intelligible by intellect, and that which is one by that which is
charactertized by unity. For the soul indeed being intellective knows
herself, and knows whatever she understands, by contact, as we have
before observed. But being superintelligent, she is ignorant both of
herself and of the objects of knowledge, and being near to _the one_,
she loves quiet, having shut up her knowledge, becoming mute, and being
silent with internal silence. For how can she be adjacent to the most
ineffable of all things, except by laying asleep the garrulous matter
that is in her? Hence, she must become one that she may see _the one_,
or rather that she may not see _the one_. For seeing, she will see
that which is intellectual, and not that which is above intellect, and
will intellectually perceive a certain one, and not _the one itself_.
He, my friend, who energizes according to this most divine energy
of the soul, trusting solely to himself, viz. to the flower of his
intellect, causing himself to be at rest not from external, but from
internal motions, and becoming a God as far as it is possible for the
soul to be so, will understand how the Gods alone ineffably know all
things, according to _the one_ of themselves. But as long as we are
rolled about things beneath, it will appear to us to be incredible that
divinity knows all things impartibly and supereternally; eternal beings
indeed, having a real existence, but things which are in generation,
or becoming to be, subsisting temporally, neither time nor eternity
subsisting in _the one_. So many indeed are the species of knowledge
with us, by looking to which it is possible to solve all the doubts
concerning the truth which the soul may know,[360] and concerning that
which it is not possible for her to know, in the present life.
25. Because, however, we have made three discussions which we said
were necessary to a distinct survey of the objects of inquiry, let
us now pass to the doubts, and give to each of them an appropriate
solution. In the first place, therefore, you consider this as a
sufficient argument that what is in our power is frivolous, and is the
work alone of the celestial bodies, viz. that we men assert ourselves
to be the causes of those events which are attended with prosperity;
but in things in which we are unfortunate, we transfer the cause to
necessity, instead of ascribing them to choice. And thus doubting, you
think you obtain this as a common conception concerning Fate, that it
has a more principal power in practical affairs than our impulses.
Indeed, I myself do not see men otherwise affected than as ascribing to
themselves the cause of their success, but to others the cause of their
errors. But in this we differ, that you indeed admit the opinion of the
many as sufficient to form a judgment of things; while I conceive them
to reason in this way through a certain immoderate love of themselves.
Among wise men, however, to whom it belongs to look both to whole and
parts, and not to neglect the order which they possess with reference
to them, divinity is considered as the principal cause of all events
from which good is derived to all things; but the next causes to this
are, the period of the world, and time, in which events are co-adapted
and co-ordinated to wholes, nothing being superfluously adventitious
in the polity of wholes; and in the third place, they consider
themselves as causes in those things in which they are allotted a
deliberate choice, and in which by their impulses they co-operate to
the completion of things.
26. When, however, any thing happens contrary to their choice, then
they deservedly ascribe the event to wholes alone, and the efficiency
of wholes, as the conquering cause. For it is every where necessary
that partial natures should energize in conjunction with wholes, but
wholes without partial natures. And after this manner intellectual men
divide events, but not as you have divided them. Hear, likewise, Plato
in the Laws exclaiming that divinity indeed governs all things; but
that after divinity, Fortune and Time rule over all human affairs; and
that our art follows as the third after these. For during a tempest,
the pilot’s art contributes something, and in disease the medical
art, and in short, in practical affairs, the political art.[361] If,
therefore, our affairs are prosperous, Fate, Time, and Divinity, must
be considered as the causes that they are so. Hence, there will be
three causes of events, Divinity indeed causing that which comes to
pass to be good; but Time and Fate causing it to be arranged in one
concord with every thing. And in short, another cause is human. For
every human work is a part of the universe, but the contrary is not
true, because it is necessary that other animals also, since they are
parts of the universe, should not only[362] act, but also suffer. For
every part, indeed, of this mundane fabric and drama has for its end
good; since no part of it is left inordinate, but is so woven with
other parts, as to contribute to the well-being of the universe. The
contrary, however, is not true, that every thing which is allotted good
is co-ordinated with the mundane polity. For there is a supermundane
life, and the life of the Gods, and of souls that transcend Fate, and
follow Providence alone.