all things, what ascent will there be for us beyond this also? For we
do not strive in vain, extending ourselves to that which is nothing.
For that which is not even _one_, _is_ not according to the most just
mode of speaking. Whence then do we conceive that there is something
beyond _the one_? For _the many_ require nothing else than _the one_.
And hence _the one_ alone is the cause of the _many_. Hence also _the
one_ is entirely cause, because it is necessary that the cause of
_the many_ should alone be _the one_. For it cannot be nothing; since
nothing is the cause of nothing. Nor can it be _the many_: for so
far as many they are unco-ordinated; and _the many_ will not be one
cause. But if there are many causes, they will not be the causes of
each other, through being unco-ordinated, and through a progression
in a circle, the same things being causes and the things caused. Each
therefore, will be the cause of itself, and thus there will be no cause
of the many. Hence it is necessary that _the one_ should be the cause
of _the many_, and which is also the cause of their co-ordination for
there is a certain conspiring co-ordination, and a union with each
other.
If, therefore, some one thus doubting should say that _the one_ is a
sufficient principle, and should add as the summit that we have not
any conception or suspicion more simple than that of _the one_, and
should therefore ask how we can suspect any thing beyond the last
suspicion and conception we are able to frame;--if some one should
thus speak, we must pardon the doubt. For a speculation of this kind
is it seems inaccessible and immense: at the same time however, from
things more known to us we must extend the ineffable parturitions of
our soul, to the ineffable co-sensation of this sublime truth. For as
that which subsists without is in every respect more honourable than
that which subsists with habitude, and the unco-ordinated than the
co-ordinated, as the theoretic than the political life, and Saturn
for instance than Jupiter, being than forms, and _the one_ than _the
many_ of which _the one_ is the principle; so in short, that which
transcends every thing of this kind is more honourable than all causes
and principles, and is not to be considered as subsisting in any
co-arrangement and habitude; since _the one_ is naturally prior to
_the many_, that which is most simple to things more composite, and
that which is most comprehensive to the things which it comprehends.
So that if you are willing thus to speak, _the first_ is beyond all
such opposition, not only that which is in things co-ordinate, but
even that which takes place from its subsistence as the first. _The
one_ therefore, and the united are posterior to the first: for these
causally contain multitude as numerous[402] as that which is unfolded
from them. _The one_ however, is no less one, if indeed it is not more
so, because separate multitude is posterior to and not in it; and the
united is no less united because it contracted in one things separated
prior to separation. Each of these therefore, is all things, whether
according to co-ordination, or according to their own nature. But all
things cannot be things first, nor the principle. Nor yet one of them
alone, because this one will be at the same time all things, according
to _the one_: but we shall not yet have discovered that which is
beyond all things. To which we may also add, that _the one_ is the
summit of _the many_, as the cause of the things proceeding from it.
We may likewise say that we form a conception of _the one_ according
to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most
comprehensive. But that which is most venerable, must necessarily be
incomprehensible by all conceptions and suspicions; since also in
other things, that which always soars beyond our conceptions is more
honourable than that which is more obvious: so that what flies from
all our suspicions will be most honourable. But if this be the case
it is _nothing_. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than _the
one_, the other posterior to sensibles. If also, we strive in vain in
asserting these things, striving in vain is likewise twofold; the one
falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no respect
whatever has any subsistence. For _this_ also is ineffable, as Plato
says, but according to the worse, but _that_ according to the better.
If too, we search for a certain advantage arising from it, this is the
most necessary advantage of all others, that all things thence proceed
as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For
neither do they proceed as _the one_ produces _the many_, nor as _the
united_ things _separated_, but as the ineffable similarly produces all
things, ineffably. But if in asserting these things concerning it, that
it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we subvert
what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names and words of
our parturitions, daring anxiously to explore it, and which standing
in the vestibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to
the ineffable, but signify the manner in which we are affected about
it, our doubts and disappointment; nor yet this clearly, but through
indications to such as are able to understand these investigations. We
also see that our parturitions suffer these things about _the one_, and
that in a similar manner they are solicitous and subverted. For _the
one_, says Plato, if it _is_, is not _the one_. But if it is not, no
assertion can be adapted to it: so that neither can there be a negation
of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a name simple.
Nor is there any opinion nor science of it; for neither are these
simple. So that _the one_ is in every respect unknown and ineffable.
What then? Shall we investigate something else beyond the ineffable?
Or, perhaps indeed, Plato leads us ineffably through _the one_ as a
medium, to the ineffable beyond _the one_, which is now the subject of
discussion; and this by an ablation of _the one_, in the same manner
as he leads us to _the one_ by an ablation of other things. For, that
he gives to _the one_ a certain position is evident from his Sophista,
where he demonstrates that it subsists prior to being, itself by
itself. But if, having ascended as far as to _the one_, he is silent,
this also is becoming in Plato to be perfectly silent, after the manner
of the ancients concerning things in every respect unspeakable; for
the discourse was indeed most dangerous, in consequence of falling on
idiotical ears. Indeed, when discoursing concerning that which in no
respect has any subsistence, he subverts his assertions, and is fearful
of falling into the sea of dissimilitude, or, rather of unsubsisting
void. But if demonstrations do not accord with _the one_, it is by no
means wonderful; for they are human and divisible, and more composite
than is fit. Indeed, they are not even adapted to being, since they are
formal, or rather, they are neither adapted to forms nor essences. Or,
is it not Plato himself, who in his Epistles[403] evinces that we have
nothing which is significant of form, no type nor name, nor discourse,
nor opinion, nor science? For it is intellect alone which can apprehend
ideas by its projecting energies, which we cannot possess while busily
engaged in discourse. If there fore we even energize intellectually,
since in this case our intellection is characterized by form, we shall
not accord with _the united_ and with being. And if at any time we are
able to project a contracted intelligence, even this is unadapted and
discordant with _the one_. If, also, we energize according to the most
profoundly united intelligence, and through this occultly perceive
_the one itself_, yet even this is expanded only as far as to _the
one_, if there is a knowledge of _the one_; for this we have not yet
determined. At the same time however, let us now apply ourselves to the
discussion of things of such great importance, through indications and
suspicions, being purified with respect to unusual conceptions, and led
through analogies and negations, despising what we possess with respect
to these, and advancing from things more ignoble with us to things more
honorable.
Shall we therefore say, that the nature which we now investigate
as the first, is so perfectly ineffable, that it must not even be
admitted concerning it that it is thus ineffable; but that _the one_ is
ineffable, as flying from all composition of words and names, and all
distinction of that which is known from that which knows, and is to be
apprehended in a manner the most simple and comprehensive, and that it
is not one alone as the characteristic of one, but as _one all things_,
and _one prior to all things_, and not one which is something belonging
to all things? These indeed, are the parturitions of the soul, and are
thus purified with respect to _the simply one_, and that which is truly
the one cause of all things. But, in short, we thus form a conception
of _the one_ which we contain as the summit or flower of our essence,
as being more proximate and allied to us, and more prompt to such a
suspicion of that which nearly leaves all things behind it. But from
some particular thing which is made the subject of hypothesis, the
transition is easy to that which is simply supposed, though we should
in no respect accede to it, but being carried in that which is most
simple in us, should form a suspicion concerning that which is prior to
all things. _The one_ therefore, is thus effable, and thus ineffable,
but that which is beyond it is to be honoured in the most perfect
silence, and prior to this, by the most perfect ignorance[404] which
despises all knowledge.
Let us therefore, now consider, in the second place, how it is said
to be perfectly unknown. For if this be true, how do we assert all
these things concerning it? For we do not elucidate by much discussion
about things of which we are ignorant. But if it is in reality
unco-ordinated with all things, and without habitude to all things, and
is nothing of all things, nor even _the one itself_, these very things
are the nature of it. Besides, with respect to its being unknown, we
either know that it is unknown, or we are ignorant of this. But if the
latter, how do we say that it is perfectly unknown? And if we know
this, in this respect therefore it is known. Or shall we say that
it is known, that the unknown is unknown? We cannot therefore deny
one thing of another, not knowing that which is the subject of the
negation; nor can we say that it is not this or that, when we can in
no respect reach it. How therefore can we deny of that of which we are
perfectly ignorant the things which we know? For this is just as if
some one who was blind from his birth should assert that heat is not in
colour. Or perhaps indeed, he also will justly say, that colour is not
hot. For he knows this by the touch; but he knows nothing of colour,
except that it is not tangible; for he knows that he does not know it.
Such a knowledge indeed, is not a knowledge of colour, but of his own
ignorance. And we also when we say that the first is unknown, do not
announce any thing of it, but we confess the manner in which we are
affected about it. For the non-perception of the blind man is not in
the colour, nor yet his blindness, but in him. The ignorance therefore
of that of which we are ignorant is in us. For the knowledge of that
which is known, is in him that knows, and not in the thing known. But
if knowledge is in that which is known being as it were the splendour
of it, so some one should say ignorance is in that which is unknown,
being as it were the darkness of it, or obscurity, according to which
it is unknown by, and is unapparent to all things,--he who says this is
ignorant, that as blindness is a privation, so likewise all ignorance,
and that as is the invisible, so that of which we are ignorant, and
which is unknown. In other things therefore, the privation of this
or that leaves something else. For that which is incorporeal, though
invisible, yet is intelligible; and that which is not intelligible
by a certain intelligence, leaves at the same time something else.
But if we take away every conception and suspicion, this also we must
say is perfectly unknown by us, about which we close every eye. Nor
must we assert any thing of it, as we do of the intelligible, that
it is not adapted to be seen by the eyes, or as we do of _the one_,
that it is not naturally adapted to be understood by an essential
and abundant intellection: for it imparts nothing by which it can be
apprehended, nothing which can lead to a suspicion of its nature.
For neither do we only say that it is unknown, that being something
else it may naturally possess the unknown, but we do not think fit to
predicate of it either _being_, or _the one_, or _all things_, or _the
principle of all things_, or in short, _any thing_. Neither therefore,
are these things the nature of it, viz. _the nothing, the being beyond
all things, supercausal subsistence, and the unco-ordinated with all
things_; but these are only ablations of things posterior to it. How,
therefore, do we speak concerning it? Shall we say, that knowing these
posterior things, we despise them with respect to the position, if
I may so speak, of that which is in every respect ineffable? For as
that which is beyond some particular knowledge is better than that
which is apprehended by such knowledge, so that which is beyond all
suspicion must necessarily be most venerable; not that it is known
to be so, but possessing the most venerable as in us, and as the
consequence of the manner in which we are affected about it. We also
call this a prodigy, from its being entirely incomprehensible by our
conceptions: for it is through analogy, if that which in a certain
respect is unknown, according to a more excellent subsistence, is
superior to that which is in every respect known. Hence that which is
in every respect unknown according to a more excellent subsistence,
must necessarily be acknowledged to be supreme, though it indeed has
neither the supreme, nor the most excellent, nor the most venerable:
for these things are our confessions about that, which entirely flies
from all our conceptions and suspicions. For by this very assertion,
that we can form no suspicion of it, we acknowledge that it is most
wonderful; since if we should suspect any thing concerning it, we must
also investigate something else prior to this suspicion, and either
proceed to infinity in our search, or stop at that which is perfectly
ineffable. Can we therefore, demonstrate any thing concerning it? And
is that demonstrable which we do not think fit to consider as a thing
whose subsistence we can even suspect? Or, when we assert these things,
do we not indeed demonstrate _concerning_ it, but not _it_? For neither
does it contain the demonstrable, nor any thing else. What then? Do
we not opine concerning it these things which we now assert? But if
there is an opinion of it, it is also the object of opinion. Or shall
we say we opine that it is not these things? For Aristotle also says
that there is true opinion. If therefore, the opinion is true, the
thing likewise is to which opinion being adapted becomes true. For, in
consequence of the thing subsisting, the opinion also is true. Though
indeed, how will that be true which is perfectly unknown? Or shall
we say this is true, that it is not these things, and that it is not
known? Is it therefore truly false, that it is these things, and that
it is known? Or shall we say that these things are to be referred to
privations, and to that which in a certain respect is not, in which
there may be a falling from the hypostasis of form? Just as we call
the absence of light darkness. For, light not existing, neither is
there any darkness. But to that which is never and in no respect being,
nothing among beings can, as Plato says, accede. Neither, therefore,
is it non-being, nor, in short, privation; and even the expression
_never in no respect_ (το μηδαμη μηδαμως) is incapable of signifying
its nature. For this expression is being, and _signification_ is
something belonging to beings. Likewise, though we should opine that
it is not in any respect, yet at the same time, since it thus becomes
the object of opinion, it belongs to beings. Hence, Plato very properly
calls that which never and in no respect is, ineffable and incapable
of being opined, and this according to the worse than the effable and
opinion, in the same manner as we say the supreme is according to that
which is better than these. What then, do we not think, and are we not
persuaded that the supreme thus subsists? Or, as we have often said, do
not these things express the manner in which we are affected about it?
But we possess in ourselves this opinion, which is therefore empty, as
is the opinion of a vacuum, and the infinite. As therefore, we form a
phantastic and fictitious opinion of these though they are not, as if
they were, just as we opine the sun to be no larger than a sphere whose
diameter is but a foot, though this is far from being the case;--so
if we opine any thing concerning that which never and in no respect
is, or concerning that of which we write these things, the opinion is
our own, and the vain attempt is in us, in apprehending which we think
that we apprehend the supreme. It is, however, nothing pertaining to
us, so much does it transcend our conceptions. How therefore, do we
demonstrate that there is such an ignorance in us concerning it? And
how do we say that it is unknown? We reply in one word, because we
always find that what is above knowledge is more honourable; so that
what is above all knowledge, if it were to be found, would be found
to be most honourable. But it is sufficient to the demonstration that
it cannot be found. We also say that it is above all things; because
if it were any thing known, it would rank among all things; and there
would be something common to it with all things, viz. the being known.
But there is one co-ordination of things in which there is something
common; so that in consequence of this, it will subsist together with
all things. Hence it is necessary that it should be unknown.
In the third place, the unknown is inherent in beings as well as the
known, though they are relatively inherent at the same time. As,
therefore, we say that the same thing is relatively large and small,
so likewise we say, that a thing is known and unknown with reference
to different things. And as the same thing, by participating of the
two forms, the great and the small, is at the same time both great
and small, so that which at the same time participates of the known
and the unknown is both these. Thus, the intelligible is unknown to
sense, but is known to intellect. For the more excellent will not
be privation, the inferior at the same time being form; since every
absence, and a privation of this kind, is either in matter, or in soul;
but all things are present in intellect, and still more in a certain
respect in the intelligible. Unless indeed, we denominate privation
according to a more excellent subsistence, as we say that is not form
which is above form; and that is not being which is superessential; and
that is nothing which is truly unknown, according to a transcendency
which surpasses all things. If, therefore, _the one_ is the last known
of things which are in any respect whatever known or suspected, that
which is beyond _the one_ is primarily and perfectly unknown; which
also is so unknown, that neither has it an unknown nature, nor can we
accede to it as to the unknown, but it is even unknown to us whether
it is unknown. For there is an all-perfect ignorance about it, nor can
we know it, neither as known nor unknown. Hence, we are on all sides
subverted, in consequence of not being able to reach it in any respect,
because it is not even one thing, or rather, it is not that which is
not even one thing. Hence it is that which in no respect whatever has
any subsistence; or it is even beyond this, since this is a negation
of being, and that which is not even one thing is a negation of _the
one_. But that which is not one thing, or in other words, that which is
nothing, is a void, and a falling from all things. We do not however
thus conceive concerning the ineffable. Or shall we say that _nothing_
is twofold, the one being beyond, and the other below, all things?
For _the one_ also is twofold, _this_ being the extreme, as _the one_
of matter, and _that_ the first, as that which is more ancient than
being. So that with respect to _nothing_ also, _this_ will be as
that which is not even the last one, but _that_ as neither being the
first one. In this way therefore, that which is unknown and ineffable
is twofold, _this_, as not even possessing the last suspicion of
subsistence, and _that_, as not even being the first of things. Must we
therefore, consider it as that which is unknown to us? Or this indeed
is nothing paradoxical: for it will be unknown even to much-honoured
intellect, if it be lawful so to speak. For every intellect looks to
the intelligible; and the intelligible is either _form_ or _being_.
But may not divine knowledge know it; and may it not be known to this
superessentially? This knowledge, however, applies itself to _the
one_, but that which we are now investigating is beyond _the one_. In
short, if it also is known, in conjunction with others, it will also be
something belonging to all things; for it will be common to it with
others to be known, and thus far it will be co-ordinated with others.
Further still, if it is known, divine knowledge will comprehend it. It
will therefore define it. Every boundary however, ascends ultimately as
far as to _the one_; but _that_ is beyond _the one_. It is therefore
perfectly incomprehensible and invisible, and consequently is not to
be apprehended by any kind of knowledge. To which we may add, that
knowledge is of things which may be known as beings, or as having a
subsistence, or as participating of _the one_. But this is beyond all
these. Further still, _the one_ also appears to be unknown, if it
is necessary that what is known should be one thing, and that which
knows another, though both should be in the same thing. So that _the
truly one_ will not know itself: for it does not possess a certain
duplicity. There will not therefore be in it that which knows, and
that which is known. Hence, neither will a God, considered according
to _the one itself_ alone, and as being conjoined with _the one_, be
united with that which is simple, according to duplicity. For how can
the double be conjoined with the simple? But if he knows _the one_
by _the one_, that which knows, and also that which is known will be
_one_, and in each the nature of _the one_ will be shown, subsisting
alone, and being _one_. So that he will not be conjoined as different
with that which is different, or as that which is gnostic with that
which is known, since this very thing is one alone; so that neither
will he be conjoined according to knowledge. Much more therefore, is
that which is not even _the one_ unknown. But if _the one_ is the last
thing known, we know nothing of that which is beyond _the one_; so
that the present rhapsody is vain. Or shall we say we know that these
things are unworthy to be asserted, if it be lawful so to speak, of the
first hypothesis [in the Parmenides of Plato,] since, not yet knowing
even intelligible forms, we despise the images which subsist in us of
their eternal and impartible nature; since these images are partible,
and multifariously mutable. Again, being ignorant of the contracted
subsistence of intelligible species and genera, but possessing an image
of this, which is a contraction of the genera and species in us, we
suspect that being itself resembles this contraction, but is at the
same time something more excellent; and this must be especially the
case with that which has an united subsistence. But now we are ignorant
of _the one_, not contracting, but expanding all things to it; and
in us simplicity itself consists, with relation to the all which we
contain, but is very far from coming into contact with the all-perfect
nature of _the one_. For _the one and the simple_ in our nature, are
in the smallest degree that which they are said to be, except that
they are a sign or indication of the nature which is there. Thus also
assuming in intellect every thing which can be in any respect known or
suspected, we think fit to ascribe it as far as to _the one_; if it be
requisite to speak of things unspeakable, and to conceive things which
are inconceivable. At the same time also, we think fit to make that the
subject of hypothesis, which cannot be compared, and is unco-ordinated
with all things, and which is so exempt that neither in reality does
it possess the exempt. For that which is exempt is always exempt from
something, and is not in every respect exempt, as possessing habitude
to that from which it is exempt, and in short, preceding in a certain
co-ordination. If, therefore, we intend to make that which is truly
exempt the subject of hypothesis, we must not even suppose it to be
exempt. For, accurately speaking, its proper name will not be verified
when ascribed to _the exempt_; since in this case it would at the same
time be co-ordinated; so that it is necessary even to deny this of it.
Likewise, negation is a certain sentence, and that which is denied is
a certain thing: but that of which we are now endeavouring to speak
is not any thing. Neither therefore, can it be denied, nor spoken of,
nor be in any way known: so that neither is it possible to deny the
negation; but that which appears to us to be a demonstration of what
we say, is a perfect subversion of language and conception. What end
therefore, will there be of the discourse, except the most profound
silence, and an acknowledgement that we know nothing of that which it
is not lawful, since impossible, to lead into knowledge?”
In another part, near the beginning of the same admirable work, he
remarks that _the one_ in every thing is the more true thing itself.
“Thus for instance, _the one_ of man [or the summit and flower of his
nature,] is the more true man, that of soul is the more true soul, and
that of body the more true body. Thus also _the one_ of the sun, and
_the one_ of the moon, are the more true sun and moon.” After which
he observes as follows: “Neither _the one_, nor _all things_ accords
with the nature of _the one_. For these are opposed to each other, and
distribute our conceptions. For, if we look to the simple and _the
one_, we destroy its immensely great perfection; and if we conceive all
things subsisting together, we abolish _the one_ and _the simple_. But
this is because we are divided, and look to divided peculiarities. At
the same time however, aspiring after the knowledge of it, we connect
all things together, that we may thus be able to apprehend this mighty
nature. But fearing the introduction of all multitudes, or contracting
the peculiar nature of _the one_, and rejoycing in that which is
simple and the first in speaking of the most ancient principle, we
thus introduce _the one itself_ as a symbol of simplicity; since we
likewise introduce _all things_ as a symbol of the comprehension of
all things. But that which is above or prior to both we can neither
conceive nor denominate. And why is it wonderful that we should suffer
these things about it, since the distinct knowledge of it is unical,
which we cannot perceive? Other things too of this kind we suffer
about _being_. For endeavouring to perceive _being_, we dismiss it,
but run round the elements of it, bound and infinity. But if we form
a more true conception of it, that it is an united plenitude of all
things, in this case the conception of _all things_ draws us down to
multitude, and the conception of _the united_ abolishes that of all
things. Neither however is this yet wonderful. For with respect to
forms also, when we wish to survey any one of these, we run round the
elements of it, and, striving to perceive its unity, we obliterate its
elements. At the same time however, every form is one and many; not
indeed partly one, and partly many, but the whole of it is through the
whole a thing of this kind. Not being able, therefore, to apprehend
this collectively, we rejoice in acceding to it with a distribution
of our conceptions. But always adhering in our ascent, like those who
climb clinging with their hands and feet, to things which extend us to
a more impartible nature, we obtain in a certain respect a co-sensation
in the distribution of that which is uniform. We despise therefore
this, with respect to the collected apprehension of it, which we cannot
obtain, unless a certain vestige of collected intelligence in our
nature is agitated. And this is the light of truth, which is suddenly
enkindled, as if from the collision of fire stones. For our greatest
conceptions, when exercised with each other, verge to a uniform and
simple summit as their end, like the extremities of lines in a circle
hastening to the centre. And though even thus they subsist indeed with
distribution, yet a certain vestige of the knowledge of form which we
contain is pre-excited; just as the equal tendency of all the lines
in a circle to terminate in the middle affords a certain obscure
representation of the centre. After the same manner also we ascend to
being, in the first place, by understanding every form which falls
upon us as distributed, not only as impartible, but also as united,
and this by confounding, if it be proper so to speak, the multitude
in each. In the next place, we must collect every thing separated
together, and take away the circumscriptions, just as if making many
streams of water to be one collection of water, except that we must
not understand that which is united from all things, as one collection
of water, but we must conceive that which is prior to all things, as
the form of water prior to divided streams of water. Thus therefore,
we must expand ourselves to _the one_, first collecting and afterwards
dismissing what we have collected, for the super-expanded transcendency
of _the one_. Ascending therefore, shall we meet with it as that which
is known? Or, wishing to meet with it as such shall we arrive at the
unknown? Or may we not say that each of these is true? For we meet
with it afar off as that which is known, and when we are united to it
from afar, passing beyond that in our nature which is gnostic of _the
one_, then are we brought to be one, that is, to be unknown instead of
being gnostic. This contact therefore, as of one with one, is above
knowledge, but the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which
is known. As however, the crooked is known by the straight, so we form
a conjecture of the unknown by the known. And this indeed is a mode
of knowledge. _The one_ therefore, is so far known, that it does not
admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and
imparts a gnostic indication of itself. Unlike other things however,
the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but on the contrary,
less known; knowledge being dissolved by _the one_ into ignorance,
since as we have before observed, where there is knowledge, there also
is separation. But separation approaching to _the one_ is inclosed in
union; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. Thus too, the
analogy of Plato requires. For first we endeavour to see the sun, and
we do indeed see it afar off; but by how much the nearer we approach
to it, by so much the less do we see it; and at length we neither see
other things, nor it, the eye becoming spontaneously dazzled by its
light. Is therefore _the one_ in its proper nature unknown, though
there is something else unknown besides _the one_? _The one_ indeed
wills to be by itself, but with no other; but the unknown beyond _the
one_ is perfectly ineffable, which we acknowledge we neither know, nor
are ignorant of, but which has about itself super-ignorance. Hence by
proximity to this _the one itself_ is darkened: for being very near to
the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it remains as it
were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence. On this account, Plato
in speaking of it finds all his assertions subverted: for it is near
to the subversion of every thing, which takes place about the first.
It differs from it however in this, that it is _one_ simply, and that
according to _the one_ it is also at the same time all things. But
the first is above _the one_ and _all things_, being more simple than
either of these.”
P. 113. _Origen who was a partaker of the same erudition with
Plotinus._ This Origen was not the Christian father of that name,
but was somewhat junior to him.
P. 190. _And Plotinus, exhibiting in a most divinely inspired manner,
the peculiarity of eternity, according to the theology of Plato,
defines it to be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole
of itself, and its own being._ The 7th book of the 3rd Ennead of
Plotinus is concerning Eternity, and the following beautiful extract
from it contains the definition of eternity alluded to by Proclus.
“Perhaps we ought to conceive of eternity, as a certain one collected
from many; viz. either as one intelligence or one nature, whether
consequent to things in the intelligible world, or existing together
with it, or beheld as situated in the depths of its essence. All these,
I say, reduced into eternity as one, which is also many, and is endued
with a various capacity. Indeed, he who beholds a various capacity,
when he considers it as a subject denominates its essence; but so
far as he perceives life, he denominates its motion; and afterwards
permanency, considered as abiding in a manner entirely the same. He
will likewise behold difference and sameness, so far us they are many,
bound in one. So that he who contracts the difference, subsisting
in things which are many, into one life alone, and contemplates an
unceasing sameness of energy, never passing its intelligence or life,
from one thing into another, but ever abiding in the same manner in
itself far remote from all interval; he I say, who beholds all these,
contemplates eternity, viewing life ever possessing a present whole,
where all things abide together in sameness, without the order of first
and last, and are comprehended in an indivisible bound. Where all
things are collected into one, as into a point, not yet proceeding into
a linear flux, but abiding in sameness, that is, in itself, in an ever
present _now_; because nothing of its nature is past, nothing in it is
future; but what it is, it always is. Hence eternity is not a subject,
but that which beams as it were from its subject, according to the
possession of an ever present identity; promising itself that its ever
abiding nature, will never be changed. For what should happen to this
in future which it is not at present? Since it is a perfect and present
plenitude of all things. Nor can the term was, the appellation of time
past, belong to eternity. For what can that be, which _was_ present
with its nature, and is _past_? It is in like manner independent of
all connection with futurity. And hence eternity is that which neither
_was_ nor _will be_, but alone _is_, which it possesses in a stable
manner; because it is neither changed into a future, nor altered from a
past duration. So that the eternity which we are now investigating, is
life total and full, abiding in its essence about being itself; and is
every where without interval and one.
Hence, eternity is something especially venerable, and a God, as
inherent intelligence affirms. But intelligence likewise dictates,
that eternity is the same with that God whom we denominate being and
life. And it may with the greatest propriety be said, that eternity is
a deity shining and unfolding himself in intelligible light, such as
he is in his essence; in an essence, I say, perfectly unchangeable and
the same, and thus firmly abiding in an unceasing energy of life. Nor
ought any one to wonder that we speak of eternity, as consisting of
many things. For every thing which abides in the intelligible world,
is called many, on account of its infinite power; since infinite
there receives its denomination, because it never falls off from the
consummate intellectual plenitude of its nature. And indeed, it is
particularly called after this manner, because it loses nothing of its
own. And if any one should describe eternity, as life already infinite
because universal, and because it never deserts the integrity of its
nature; (since it cannot be diminished by the past, nor increased by
the future, because it is a perfect whole)----if any one should thus
describe eternity, he will approach very near to its true definition.
For what is afterwards added, that it is a perfect whole, and loses
nothing of its integrity, is only a certain exposition of the
definition which affirms it to be infinite life. But because a nature
of this kind, thus all-beautiful and eternal, abides about _the one
itself_, emanating and in no respect departing from it, but ever
abiding about and in it, and living with it in indissoluble union;
hence it is said by Plato, not rashly, but in a manner truly beautiful
and profound, that _eternity abides in one_. So that he not only
reduces that which eternity contains into one; but the life of being
in like manner reduces itself, about _the one itself_. This then
is what we investigate, and that is eternity, which thus abides. For
that which is the energy of life abiding from itself, and residing
in the depths of unity, without any deception, either in essence or
life, is without all controversy eternity. Since _truly to be_,
is _never not to be_, and to possess no diversity of being. But
when in discoursing on eternity, we use the term _ever_; and
also when we say it is not sometimes being, and sometimes non-being,
we must consider these appellations as adopted only for the purpose
of explanation. For the term ever is not perhaps principally assumed,
but is employed, in order to show an incorruptible and never-failing
nature.”
P. 215. _Let us in the next place speak in common about all the
intelligible triads, &c._ For the further information of the reader
on this most profound subject the intelligible triad, the following
observations are added, being an extract from the Introduction to my
translation of the Parmenides of Plato.
As the first cause then is _the one_, and this is the same with _the
good_, the universality of things must form a whole, the best and
the most profoundly united in all its parts which can possibly be
conceived: for _the first good_ must be the cause of the greatest
good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodness is union, the
best production must be that which is most united. But as there is a
difference in things, and some are more excellent than others, and this
in proportion to their proximity to the first cause, a profound union
can no otherwise take place than by the extremity of a superior order
coalescing through intimate alliance with the summit of the proximately
inferior. Hence the first of bodies, though they are essentially
corporeal, yet κατα σχεσιν, through _habitude_ or _alliance_, are most
vital, or lives. The highest of souls are after this manner intellects,
and the first of beings are gods. For as _being_ is the highest of
things after _the first cause_, its first subsistence must be according
to a superessential characteristic.
Now that which is superessential, considered as participated by
the highest or _true being_, constitutes that which is called
_intelligible_. So that every true being depending on the gods is a
_divine intelligible_. It is _divine_ indeed, as that which is deified;
but it is _intelligible_, as the object of desire to intellect, as
perfective and connective of its nature, and as the plenitude of
_being_ itself. But in the first being life and intellect subsist
according to _cause_: for every thing subsists either according to
_cause_, or according to _hyparxis_, or according to _participation_.
That is, every thing may be considered either as subsisting occultly
in its cause, or openly in its own order (or according to what it is,)
or as participated by something else. The first of these is analogous
to light when viewed subsisting in its fountain the sun; the second to
the light immediately proceeding from the sun; and the third to the
splendour communicated to other natures by this light.
The first procession therefore from the first cause, will be the
intelligible triad, consisting of _being_, _life_, and _intellect_,
which are the three highest things after the first god, and of
which _being_ is prior to _life_, and _life_ to _intellect_. For
whatever partakes of life partakes also of being: but the contrary
is not true, and therefore being is above life; since it is the
characteristic of higher natures to extend their communications
beyond such as are subordinate. But _life_ is prior to _intellect_,
because all intellectual natures are vital, but all vital natures
are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, on account of
its superessential characteristic, all things may be considered as
subsisting according to cause: and consequently number here has not a
proper subsistence, but is involved in unproceeding union, and absorbed
in superessential light. Hence, when it is called a triad, we must
not suppose that any _essential distinction_ takes place, but must
consider this appellation as expressive of its ineffable perfection.
For as it is the nearest of all things to _the one_, its union must be
transcendently profound and ineffably occult.
All the gods indeed considered according to their unities are all in
all, and are at the same time united with the first god like rays to
light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all established in the
first cause (as Proclus beautifully observes) like the roots of trees
in the earth; so that they are all as much as possible superessential,
just as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the same
time being earth itself: for the nature of the earth as being a whole,
or subsisting according to the eternal, is different from the partial
natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its
being wholly of a superessential idiom, must possess an inconceivable
profundity of union, both with itself and its cause, so as to subsist
wholly according to _the united_, το ηνωμενον; and hence it appears to
the eye of pure intellect, as one simple indivisible splendour beaming
from an unknown and inaccessible fire.
He then who is able, by opening the greatest eye of the soul, to
see that perfectly which subsists without distinction, will behold
the simplicity of the intelligible triad subsisting in a manner so
transcendent as to be apprehended only by a superintellectual energy,
and a deific union of the perceiver with this most arcane object of
perception. But since in our present state it is impossible to behold
an object so astonishingly lucid with a perfect and steady vision, we
must be content, as Damascius well observes,[405] with a far distant,
scarcely attainable, and most obscure glimpse; or with difficulty
apprehending a trace of this light, like a sudden coruscation bursting
on our sight. Such then is the pre-eminence of the intelligible order,
to which on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we assign a
triple division, beholding in our phantasy as in a mirror a luminous
triad, beaming from a uniform light; just, says Damascius, as the
uniform colour of the sun appears in a cloud which possesses three
catoptric intervals, through the various coloured nature of the rainbow.
But when we view this order in a distributed way, or as possessing
distinction in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of subsistence
to our imperfect conceptions, it is necessary to give the triad itself
a triple division. For we have said that it consists of _being_,
_life_, and _intellect_. But in _being_ we may view life and intellect,
according to cause; in _life_ being according to participation, and
intellect according to cause; and in _intellect_ both being and life
according to participation; while at the same time in reality the whole
is profoundly one, and contains all things occultly, or according to
cause. But when viewed in this divided manner, each triad is said in
the Chaldaic theology to consist of _father_, _power_, and _intellect_;
_father_ being the same with _hyparxis_, _unity_, _summit_, or _that
which is superessential_; _power_ being a certain pouring forth, or
infinity of _the one_[406] (or the summit); and on this account, says
Damascius, it is present with _father_, as a diffused with an abiding
one, and as pouring itself forth into a true chaos: but _intellect_,
that is _paternal intellect_, subsisting according to a conversion to
the paternal one; a conversion transcending all other conversions, as
being neither gnostic, nor vital, nor essential, but an indistinct
surpassing energy, which is union rather than conversion.
Such then is the intelligible triad, considered according to an
all-perfect distribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our
mental eye. But if we are desirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal
vision, and the fascinating but delusive forms of the phantasy, which,
Calypso-like, detain us in exile from our fathers’ land: after having
through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal
port, and purified ourselves from the baneful rout of the passions,
those domestic foes of the soul; if after all this we are desirous of
gaining a glimpse of the surpassing simplicity and ineffable union of
this occult and astonishing light, we must crowd all our conceptions
together into the most profound indivisibility, and, opening the
greatest eye of the soul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to
approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, silently walking on
the extremities of her shining feet, he will suddenly from his awful
sanctuary rise to our view.
But after such a vision, what can language announce concerning this
transcendent object? That it is perfectly indistinct and void of
number. “And,” as Damascius[407] beautifully observes, “since this is
the case, we should consider whether it is proper to call _this_ which
belongs to it _simplicity_, απλοτης; _something else, multiplicity_
πολλοτης; and _something besides this, universality_ παντοτης. For
that which is intelligible is _one_, _many_, _all_, that we may triply
explain a nature which is one. But how can one nature be _one_ and
_many_? Because _many_ is the infinite power of _the one_. But how
can it be _one_ and _all_? Because _all_ is the every way extended
energy of _the one_. Nor yet is it to be called an energy, as if it
was an extension of power to that which is external; nor power, as an
extension of hyparxis abiding within; but again, it is necessary to
call them three instead of one: for one appellation, as we have often
testified, is by no means sufficient for an explanation of this order.
And are all things then here indistinct? But how can this be easy to
understand? For we have said that there are three principles consequent
to each other; viz. _father_, _power_, and _paternal intellect_. _But
these in reality are neither one, nor three, nor one and at the same
time three._[408] But it is necessary that we should explain these
by names and conceptions of this kind, through our penury in what is
adapted to their nature, or rather through our desire of expressing
something proper on the occasion. For as we denominate this triad
_one_, and _many_, and _all_, and _father_, _power_, and _paternal
intellect_, and again _bound_, _infinite_, and _mixed_--so likewise
we call it a _monad_, and _the indefinite duad_, and _a triad_, and
a paternal nature composed from both these. And as in consequence
of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations, as
incapable of harmonizing with the things themselves, we should likewise
reject the latter on the same account.”
But in order to convince the reader that this doctrine of the
intelligible triad is not a fiction devised by the latter Platonists, I
shall present him with the following translation from Damascius (περι
αρχων) _Concerning Principles_,[409] in which the agreement of all
the ancient theologists concerning this triad is most admirably evinced.
“The theology contained in the Orphic rhapsodies concerning the
intelligible Gods is as follows _Time_ is symbolically placed for
the one principle of the universe; but _æther_ and _chaos_, for
the two posterior to this one: and _being_, simply considered, is
represented under the symbol of an egg. And this is the first triad
of the intelligible Gods. But for the perfection of the second triad,
they establish either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a God, or
a white garment, or a cloud: because from these Phanes leaps forth
into light. For indeed they philosophize variously concerning the
middle triad. But Phanes here represents intellect. But conceiving
him over and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to
Orpheus. But they call the third triad Metis as _intellect_,[410]
Ericapæus as _power_, and Phanes as _father_. But sometimes[411] the
middle triad is considered according to the three-shaped God, while
conceived in the egg: for the middle always represents each of the
extremes; as in this instance, where the egg and the three-shaped God
subsist together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which
is united; but that the three-shaped and really multiform God is the
separating and discriminating cause of that which is intelligible.
Likewise the middle triad subsists according to the egg, as yet united;
but the third[412] according to the God who separates and distributes
the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar
Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus is
as follows. According to them _water_ and _matter_ were the first
productions, from which earth was secretly drawn forth: so that water
and earth are established as the two first principles; the latter of
these having a _dispersed_ subsistence; but the former conglutinating
and connecting the latter. But they are silent concerning the
principle prior to these two, as being ineffable: for as there are no
illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature is from hence
sufficiently evinced. But the third principle posterior to these two,
_water_ and _earth_, and which is generated from them, is _a dragon_,
naturally endued with the heads of a bull and a lion, but in the middle
having the countenance of the God himself. They add likewise that he
has wings on his shoulders, and that he is called _undecaying Time_,
and _Hercules_; that _Necessity_ resides with him, which is the same
as _Nature_, and incorporeal _Adrastia_, which is extended throughout
the universe, whose limits she binds in amicable conjunction. But as
it appears to me, they denominate this third principle as established
according to essence; and assert, besides this, that it subsists as
male and female, for the purpose of exhibiting the generative causes of
all things.
“But I likewise find in the Orphic rhapsodies, that neglecting the two
first principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in
silence, the third principle, posterior to the two, is established
by the theology as the original; because this first of all possesses
something effable and commensurate to human discourse. For in the
former hypothesis, the highly reverenced and undecaying _Time_, the
father of æther and chaos, was the principle: but in this _Time_ is
neglected, and the principle becomes _a dragon_. It likewise calls
triple æther, moist; and Chaos, infinite; and Erebus, cloudy and
dark; delivering this second triad analogous to the first: this being
potential, as that was paternal. Hence the third procession of this
triad is dark Erebus: its paternal and summit æther, not according to
a simple but intellectual subsistence: but its middle infinite chaos,
considered as a progeny or procession, and among these parturient,
because from these the third intelligible triad proceeds. What then
is the third intelligible triad? I answer, the egg; the duad of the
natures of male and female which it contains, and the multitude of
all-various seeds, residing in the middle of this triad: And the
third among these is an incorporeal God, bearing golden wings on his
shoulders; but in his inward parts naturally possessing the heads of
bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, invested with the
all-various forms of wild-beasts. This last then must be considered
as the _intellect_ of the triad; but the middle progeny, which are
_many_ as well as _two_, correspond to _power_, and the egg itself is
_the paternal principle_ of the third triad: but the third God of this
third triad, this theology celebrates as _Protogonus_, and calls him
_Jupiter_, the disposer of all things and of the whole world; and on
this account denominates him _Pan_. And such is the information which
this theology affords us, concerning the genealogy of the intelligible
principles of things.
But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the Theology
of Orpheus, the whole intelligible order is passed over in silence,
as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of verbal
enunciation. Eudemus therefore commences his genealogy from _Night_,
from which also Homer begins: though Eudemus is far from making the
Homeric genealogy consistent and connected, for he asserts that Homer
begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent, that _Night_
is according to Homer the greatest divinity, since she is reverenced
even by Jupiter himself. For the poet says of Jupiter--“that he feared
lest he should act in a manner displeasing to swift _Night_.” So that
Homer begins his genealogy of the Gods from _Night_. But it appears
to me that Hesiod, when he asserts that Chaos was first generated,
signifies by Chaos the incomprehensible and perfectly united nature
of that which is intelligible: but that he produces earth[413] the
first from thence, as a certain principle of the whole procession of
the Gods. Unless perhaps Chaos is the second of the two principles:
but Earth,[414] Tartarus, and Love, form the triple intelligible. So
that _Love_ is to be placed for the third monad of the intelligible
order, considered according to its convertive nature; for it is thus
denominated by Orpheus in his rhapsodies. But _Earth_ for the first,
as being first established in a certain firm and essential station.
But _Tartarus_ for the middle, as in a certain respect exciting
and moving forms into distribution. But Acusilaus appears to me to
establish _Chaos_ for the first principle, as entirely unknown; and
after this, two principles, _Erebus_ as male, and _Night_ as female;
placing the latter for _infinity_, but the former for _bound_. But
from the mixture of these, he says that _Æther_, _Love_, and _Counsel_
are generated, forming three intelligible hypostases. And he places
_Æther_ as the summit; but _Love_ in the middle, according to its
naturally middle subsistence; but _Metis_ or _Counsel_ as the third,
and the same as highly-reverenced intellect. And, according to the
history of Eudemus, from these he produces a great number of other
Gods. But Epimenides establishes _Air_ and _Night_ as the two first
principles; manifestly reverencing in silence the one principle prior
to these two. But from air and night _Tartarus_ is generated, forming
as it appears to me the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature
from the two. And this mixture is called by some an intelligible
medium, because it extends itself to both the summit and the end. But
from the mixture of the extremes with each other, an egg is generated,
which is truly an intelligible animal: and from this again another
progeny proceeds. But according to Pherecydes Syrius, the three first
principles are a _Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature_, _Time_,[415] and
_an Earthly Nature_: one of these subsisting, as I conceive, prior to
the other two. But he asserts that _Time_ generates from the progeny of
itself, _Fire_, _Spirit_, and _Water_: which signify, as it appears to
me, the triple nature of that which is intelligible. But from these,
distributed into five profound recesses, a numerous progeny of Gods
is constituted, which he calls _five-times animated_ (πεντεμψυχος):
and which is perhaps the same as if he had said πεντεκοσμος, or a
_five-fold world_. But we may probably discourse on this subject
at some other opportunity. And thus much may suffice at present
concerning the hypotheses derived from the Grecian fables, which are
both many and various.
But with respect to the theology of the Barbarians, the Babylonians
seem to pass over in silence the one principle of the universe. But
they establish two principles, Tauthe and Apasoon. And they consider
Apasoon as the husband of Tauthe, whom they denominate the mother of
the Gods; from whom an only-begotten son _Mooumis_ was produced: which,
as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world deduced
from two principles.[416] But from these another procession is derived,
_Dache_ and _Dachus_. And likewise a third from these, _Kissare_ and
_Assoorus_. And from these again three deities are produced, _Anus_,
_Illinus_, and _Aus_. But from _Aus_ and _Dache_ a son called Belus is
produced, who they say is the demiurgus of the world. But with respect
to the Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus,
some of them call all the intelligible and united world _Place_,
and some of them _Time_: from which _a good divinity_ and _an evil
dæmon_ are distributed; _Light_ and _Darkness_ subsisting prior to
these, according to the assertions of others. However, both the one
and the other, after an undistributed nature, consider that nature
as having a subsistence which distributes the two-fold co-ordination
of better natures: one of which co-ordinations _Orosmades_ presides
over, and the other _Arimanius_. But the Sidonians, according to the
same historian, place before all things, _Time_, _Desire_, and _cloudy
Darkness_. And they assert that from the mingling of _Desire_ and
_Darkness_ as two principles, _Air_ and _a gentle Wind_ were produced:
_Air_ evincing the summit of the intelligible triad; but _the gentle
Wind_ raised and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of the
intelligible. And again that from both these the bird _Otus_, similar
to a night raven, was produced; representing, as it appears to me,
intelligible intellect. But as we find (without the assistance of
Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Mochus, places _Æther_
and _Air_ as the two first principles, from which the intelligible
god _Oulomus_ was produced; who, as it appears to me, is the summit
of the intelligible order. But from this god (yet proceeding together
with him) they assert that _Chousorus_ was produced, being the first
unfolding procession. And after this _an egg_ succeeds; which I think
must be called intelligible intellect. But the unfolding _Chousorus_ is
intelligible power, because this is the first nature which distributes
an undistributed subsistence: unless perhaps after the two principles
_Æther_ and _Air_, the summit is _One Wind_: but the middle _Two
Winds_, the _south-west_ and the _south_; for in a certain respect they
place these prior to _Oulomus_. But _Oulomus_ himself is intelligible
intellect: and unfolding _Chousorus_[417] the first order after the
intelligible series. But the _egg itself_ is heaven: from the bursting
of which into two parts, the sections are said to have become heaven
and earth. But with respect to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is
related of them by Eudemus: we have, however, by means of some Egyptian
philosophers resident among us, been instructed in the occult truth
of their theological doctrine. According to these philosophers then,
the Egyptians in certain discourses celebrate _an unknown Darkness_
as the one principle of the universe, and this _thrice pronounced
as such_: but for the two principles after the first they place
_Water_ and _Sand_, according to Heraiscus; but according to the more
ancient writer Asclepiades, _Sand_ and _Water_; from which and after
which the first _Kamephis_ is generated. But after this _a second_,
and from this again _a third_; by all which, the whole intelligible
distribution is accomplished. For thus Asclepiades determines. But the
more modern Heraiscus says that the Egyptians, denominating the third
Kamephis from his father and grandfather, assert that he is _the Sun_;
which doubtless signifies in this case intelligible intellect. But a
more accurate knowledge of these affairs must be received from the
above-mentioned authors themselves. It must however be observed, that
with the Egyptians there are many distributions of things according to
union; because they unfold an intelligible nature into characteristics,
or peculiarities of many gods, as may be learned from such as are
desirous of consulting their writings on this subject.”
Thus far Damascius; from which curious and interesting relation
the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the
ancient theologists with each other in celebrating the intelligible
triad, and venerating in silence the ineffable principle of things,
but may likewise see that the Christian trinity is essentially
different from this triad, because according to Plato and the ancient
theologists, the first cause is not a part of any triad, or order of
things. Consonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the
Chaldeans concerning the intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes
Picus, in his _Conclusions according to the opinion of the Chaldean
Theologists_.[418] “The intelligible co-ordination (says he) is not
in the intellectual co-ordination, as Amasis the Egyptian asserts,
but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed
in the abyss of the first unity, and under the obscurity of the first
darkness.” Co-ordinatio intelligibilis non est in intellectuali
co-ordinatione, ut dixit Amasis Ægyptius, sed est super omnem
intellectualem hierarchium, in abysso primæ unitatis, et sub caligine
primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abscondita.
But from this triad it may be demonstrated, that all the processions
of the Gods may be comprehended in six orders, viz. the _intelligible
order_, the _intelligible and at the same time intellectual_,
the _intellectual_, the _supermundane_, the _liberated_, and the
_mundane_.[419] For the _intelligible_, as we have already observed,
must hold the first rank, and must consist of _being_, _life_,
and _intellect_; _i.e._ must _abide_, _proceed_, and _return_; at
the same time that it is characterised, or subsists principally
according to _permanent being_. But in the next place that which is
both _intelligible_ and _intellectual_ succeeds, which must likewise
be triple, but must principally subsist according to _life_, or
_intelligence_. And in the third place the _intellectual_ order must
succeed, which is _triply convertive_. But as in consequence of the
existence of the sensible world, it is necessary that there should be
some demiurgic cause of its existence, this cause can only be found in
_intellect_, and in the last hypostasis of the _intellectual triad_.
For all forms in this hypostasis subsist according to all-various
and perfect divisions; and forms can only fabricate when they
have a perfect intellectual separation from each other. But since
_fabrication_ is nothing more than _procession_, the demiurgus will be
to the posterior orders of Gods what _the one_ is to the orders prior
to the _demiurgus_: and consequently he will be that secondarily which
the first cause of all is primarily. Hence his first production will
be an order of Gods analogous to the _intelligible_ order, and which
is denominated _supermundane_. After this he must produce an order of
Gods similar to the _intelligible_ and _intellectual_ order, and which
are denominated _liberated_ Gods. And in the last place, a procession
correspondent to the _intellectual_ order, and which can be no other
than the mundane Gods. For the demiurgus is chiefly characterised
according to diversity, and is allotted the boundary of all universal
hypostases.
All these orders, as is shown by Proclus in this work, are unfolded by
Plato in the conclusions of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides;
and this in a manner perfectly conformable to the Chaldaic theology. In
proof of this I refer the reader to my collection of Chaldean oracles,
in the Old Monthly Magazine.
P. 348. _It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of
this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all
men._
The following admirable developement by Proclus of the difficulty of
discovering the maker of the universe, is extracted from p. 91, &c. of
his Commentaries on the Timæus of Plato.
“Father and fabricator differ from each other, so far as the former is
the cause of matter,[420] but the latter of the world and order, and
in short, of the formal cause; and so far indeed, as the former is the
supplier of being and union, but the latter of powers and a multiform
essence; and so far as the one stably contains all things in himself,
but the other is the cause of progression and generation: and so far as
the former signifies ineffable and divine providence, but the latter
an abundant communication of productive principles. Porphyry however
says, that father is he who generates the universe from himself, but
fabricator he who receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo
indeed, is said to be the _father_ of Plato, but the builder of a house
is the _maker_ or fabricator of it, as not himself generating the
matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there was no
occasion to call the demiurgus father, because according to Timæus, he
does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore,
rather the fabricator as producing form? For we call all those makers
who produce any thing from a non-existent state into existence. But so
far as the demiurgus produces that which he produces, in conjunction
with life, he is father. For fathers are the causes of animals, and of
certain living beings, and impart seed together with life. And thus
much concerning this particular.
But ‘_this universe_’ signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and
the whole spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each.
It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers, which ride as
it were in the corporeal masses. It also comprehends all the mundane
causes[421] and the whole divinity of the world, about which the
number of the mundane Gods proceeds; likewise, the one divinity,
the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the
divine, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is
conjoined with the world. For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate
to itself. All these therefore must be assumed for the _universe_;
since it signifies all these. Perhaps likewise the addition of the
pronoun _this_, is significant of the universe being in a certain
respect sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not
_this_, because it is comprehensive of _all intellectual forms_. But
the term _this_ is adapted to the visible universe which is allotted a
sensible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as Plato says,
to discover the demiurgus of this universe. For since with respect to
discovery, one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are
first,[422] but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature,
according to reminiscence; the discovery from such things as are first
may be said to be difficult, because the invention of the intermediate
powers, pertains to the highest theory. But the discovery from such
things as are secondary, is nearly more difficult than the former. For
if we intend from these to survey the essence of the demiurgus, and
his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld all the
nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the
world, and the unapparent natural powers which it contains, according
to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist.
Prior to these also, we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons,
and natures themselves, both the more total and the more partial,[423]
and again, the immaterial and material, the divine and dæmoniacal, and
the natures of mortal animals. And farther still, the genera which
are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefiled and the
material, such as are wholes, and such as are parts, the rational
and the irrational, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours,
through which every thing between the Gods and the mortal nature are
bound together. We must likewise have beheld the all-various souls,
the different numbers of Gods according to the different parts of
the universe, and the ineffable and effable impressions of the world
through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without
having seen these is impelled to the survey of the demiurgus, is more
imperfect than is requisite to the intellectual perception of the
father. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be conjoined
with that which is all-perfect.
Moreover, it is necessary,[424] that the soul becoming an intellectual
world, and being assimilated as much as possible to the whole
intelligible world, should introduce herself to the maker of the
universe; and from this introduction, should in a certain respect
become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For
uninterrupted energy about any thing, calls forth and resuscitates
our [dormant] ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed
at the door of the father, it is necessary, that we should be united
to him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him,
to associate alone with the alone, and to see him himself, the soul
hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For then
she is present with her father, banquets together with him on the truth
of real being, and in pure splendour is purely initiated in entire and
stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that
which is doxastic; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the
irrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and
composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence
of the intellectual demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according
to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and
a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be
denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to
souls after every evolution of life; or as the true labour of souls.
For after the wandering about generation, after purification, and the
light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in
us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely
establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light
with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more
intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of _the one_ than
this. For this is the paternal port,[425] and the discovery of the
father, viz. an undefiled union with him.
But to _say that when found it is impossible to speak of him to all
men_,[426] perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who had
arcane assertions about divine natures, and did not divulge them to
all men. For as the Elean guest says, the eyes of the multitude are
not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this may be said
which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has
discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to
certain persons such as he has seen him. For the discovery was not made
by the soul speaking, but closing her eyes, and being converted[427]
to the divine light. Nor was it made by her being moved with her own
proper motion, but through being silent with a silence which leads the
way [to union]. For since the essence of other things is not naturally
adapted to be spoken of, either through a name, or through definition,
or through science, but is seen through intellection alone, as Plato
says in his Epistles, in what other way can it be possible to discover
the essence of the demiurgus, than by intellectual energy? And how
when having thus found it, is it possible to tell what is seen, and
explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolution which
is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple
nature. What then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about
the demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of _the one itself_?
To this we reply, we speak indeed _about_ them, but we do not speak _of
each of them itself_. And we are able indeed to speak _scientifically_
of them, but not _intellectually_. For this, as we have before
observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silence of the
soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient to lead
that which is discovered into light?”
The following extracts from the _Manuscript Scholia of_ PROCLUS On the
_Cratylus of Plato_, are added on account of their great importance;
and that the reader may be furnished with all the information on the
recondite theology of Greece, that it was in my power to obtain.
This manuscript is so rare that, if I am not mistaken, no copy of it is
to be found in any of the colleges either of Oxford or Cambridge. My
copy of it is a transcript of that which is now in the possession of
Mr. HEBER of Oxford.
The reader, however, must be careful to remember that the design of
Plato in the Cratylus was to unfold those peculiarities only of the
Gods that are apparent in their names.
That Jupiter is not _said to be_, but _is_ the father of those who
genuinely preserve the proper form of life, such as Hercules and the
Dioscuri; but of those who are never at any time able to convert
themselves to a divine nature, he never _is_, nor _is said to be_
the father. Such therefore as having been partakers of a certain
energy above human nature, have again fallen into _the sea of
dissimilitude_,[428] and for honour among men have embraced error
towards the Gods,--of these Jupiter is _said to be_ the father.
That the paternal cause originates supernally from the intelligible
and occult gods; for there the first fathers of wholes subsist; but it
proceeds through all the intellectual Gods into the demiurgic order.
For Timæus celebrates this order as at the same time _fabricative_ and
_paternal_; since he calls Jupiter the _demiurgus_ and _father_. The
fathers however who are superior to the one fabrication are called
Gods of Gods, but the demiurgus is the father of Gods and men. Farther
still, Jupiter is said to be _peculiarly_ the father of some, as of
Hercules, who immutably preserve a Jovian and ruling life during
their converse with the realms of generation. Jupiter therefore, is
triply father, of Gods, partial souls, and of souls that embrace an
intellectual and Jovian life. The intellectual order of the Gods
therefore, is supernally bounded by the king[429] of the total divine
genera, and who has a paternal transcendency with respect to all the
intellectual Gods. This king according to Orpheus is called by the
blessed immortals that dwell on lofty Olympus Phanes Protogonus. But
this order proceeds through the three Nights, and the celestial orders,
into the Titanic or Saturnian series, where it first separates itself
from the fathers and changes the kingdom of the _Synoches_,[430] for a
distributive government of wholes, and unfolds every demiurgic genus
of the Gods, from all the above-mentioned ruling and royal causes,
but proximately from Saturn the leader of the Titannic orders. Prior
however to other fabricators (δημιουργοι) it unfolds Jupiter, who is
allotted the unical strength of the whole demiurgic series, and who
produces and gives subsistence to all unapparent and apparent natures.
And he is indeed intellectual according to the order in which he
ranks, but he produces the species and the genera of beings into the
order of sensibles. He is likewise filled with the Gods above himself,
but imparts from himself a progression into being to all mundane
natures. Hence Orpheus represents him fabricating every celestial race,
making the sun and moon and the other starry Gods, together with the
sublunary elements, and diversifying the latter with forms which before
had a disordered subsistence. He likewise represents him presiding
over the Gods who are distributed about the whole world, and who are
suspended from him; and in the character of a legislator assigning
distributions of providence in the universe according to desert to all
the mundane Gods.[431] Homer too, following Orpheus, celebrates him
as the common father of Gods and men, as leader and king, and as the
supreme of rulers. He also says that all the multitude of mundane Gods
is collected about him, abides in and is perfected by him. For all the
mundane Gods are converted to Jupiter through Themis,
Ζευς δε θεμιστα κελευσε θεους, αγορην δε καλεσσαι
----ηδ’ αρα παντη
φοιτησασα κελευσε Διος προς δωμα νεεσθαι.
i.e. “But Jupiter orders Themis to call the Gods to council; and she
directing her course every where commands them to go to the house of
Jupiter.”[432] All of them therefore are excited according to the one
will of Jupiter, and become διος ενδον,[433] _within Jupiter_,
as the poet says. Jupiter too again separates them within himself,
according to two co-ordinations, and excites them to providential
energies about secondary natures; he at the same time as Timæus says,
abiding after his accustomed manner;
ως εφατο κρονιδης πολεμον δ’ αλιαστον εγειρεν.[434]
i.e. “Thus spoke Saturnian Jupiter, and excited inevitable war.”
Jupiter however is separate and exempt from all mundane natures; whence
also the most total and leading of the other Gods, though they appear
to have in a certain respect equal authority with Jupiter, through a
progression from the same causes, yet call him father. For both Neptune
and Juno celebrate him by this appellation. And though Juno speaks to
him as one who is of the same order,
και γαρ εγω θεος ειμι· γενος δε μοι ενθεν οθεν σοι,
και με πρεσβυτατην τεκετο κρονος αγκυλομητις,[435]
i.e. “For I also am a divinity, and Saturn, of inflected counsel,
endowed me with the greatest dignity, when he begot me:”
And though Neptune says
τρεις γαρ τ’εκ κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρειη,
Ζευς και εγω, τριτατος δ’Αΐδης ενεροισιν ανασσων,[436]
i.e. “For we are three brothers from Saturn, whom Rhea bore, Jupiter
and I, and the third is Pluto, who governs the infernal realms:”
Yet Jupiter is called father by both these divinities; and this
because he comprehends in himself the one and impartible cause of all
fabrication; is prior to the Saturnian triad;[437] connectedly contains
the three fathers; and comprehends on all sides the vivification of
Juno. Hence, at the same time that this goddess gives animation to the
universe, he also together with other Gods gives subsistence to souls.
Very properly therefore do we say that the demiurgus in the Timæus is
the mighty Jupiter. For he it is who produces mundane intellects and
souls, who adorns all bodies with figures and numbers, and inserts in
them one union, and an indissoluble friendship and bond. For Night
also in Orpheus advises Jupiter to employ things of this kind in the
fabrication of the universe.
αυταρ επην δεσμον κρατερον περι πασι τανυσσης.
i.e. But when your power around the whole has spread
A strong coercive bond.--
The proximate bond indeed of mundane natures, is that which subsists
through analogy; but the more perfect bond is derived from intellect
and soul. Hence Timæus calls the communion of the elements through
analogy, and the indissoluble union from life, a bond. For he says
animals were generated bound with animated bonds. But a more venerable
bond than these subsists from the demiurgic will. “For my will, says
Jupiter in the Timæus, is a greater and more principal bond, &c.”
Firmly adhering therefore to this conception respecting the mighty
Jupiter, viz. that he is the demiurgus and father of the universe, that
he is an all-perfect imparticipable[438] intellect, and that he fills
all things both with other goods, and with life, let us survey how
from names Socrates unfolds the mystic truth concerning this divinity.
Timæus then says that it is difficult to know the essence of the
demiurgus, and Socrates now says that it is not easy to understand his
name, which manifests his power and energy.
That our soul knows partibly the impartible nature of the energy of the
Gods, and that which is characterised by unity in this energy, in a
multiplied manner: and this especially takes place about the demiurgus
who expands intellectual forms, and calls forth intelligible causes,
and evolves them to the fabrication of the universe. For Parmenides
characterises him by sameness and difference. According to Homer two
tubs are placed near him; and the most mystic tradition, and the
oracles of the Gods say that the duad is seated with him. For thus
they speak: “He possesses both; containing intelligibles in intellect,
but introducing sense to the worlds.” These oracles likewise call
him _twice beyond_, and _twice there_ (δις επεκεινα και δις εκει).
And in short they celebrate him through the duad. For the demiurgus
comprehends in himself unitedly every thing _prolific_,[439] and which
gives subsistence to mundane natures. Very properly therefore is his
name two-fold, of which δια manifests _the cause through which_, and
this is paternal goodness; but ζηνα signifies _vivification_, the first
causes of which in the universe the demiurgus unically comprehends. The
former too, is a symbol of the Saturnian and paternal series; but the
latter of the vivific and maternal Rhea. So far likewise as Jupiter
receives the whole of Saturn, he gives subsistence to a triple essence,
the impartible, the partible, and that which subsists between these;
but according to the Rhea which he contains in himself, he scatters as
from a fountain, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal life. But by
his demiurgic powers and energies, he gives a formal subsistence to
these and separates them from forms of a prior order, and from each
other. He is also the ruler and king of all things: and is exempt from
the three demiurgi. For they, as Socrates says in the Gorgias, divide
the kingdom of their father; but Jupiter the demiurgus at once, without
division reigns over the three, and unically governs them.
He is therefore the cause of the paternal triad, and of all
fabrication; but he connectedly contains the three demiurgi. And he
is _a king_ indeed, as being co-ordinated with the fathers; but _a
ruler_, as being proximately established above the demiurgic triad, and
comprehending the uniform cause of it. Plato therefore by considering
his name in two ways evinces that images receive partibly the unical
causes of paradigms, and that this is adapted to him who establishes
the intellectual duad in himself. For he gives subsistence to twofold
orders, the celestial, and the supercelestial; whence also the
theologist Orpheus says, that his sceptre consists of four and twenty
measures; as ruling over a twofold twelve.[440]
That the soul of the world gives life to alter-motive natures; for to
these it becomes the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in
the Phædrus and Laws. But the demiurgus simply imparts to all things
life divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about
bodies. No one however should think that the Gods in their generations
of secondary natures are diminished; or that they sustain a division of
their proper essence in giving subsistence to things subordinate; or
that they expose their progeny to the view, externally to themselves,
in the same manner as the causes of mortal offspring. Nor in short,
must we suppose that they generate with motion or mutation, but that
abiding in themselves, they produce by their very essence posterior
natures, comprehend on all sides their progeny, and supernally perfect
the productions and energies of their offspring. Nor again when it is
said that Gods are the sons of more total Gods, must it be supposed
that they are disjoined from more ancient causes, and are cut off
from a union with them; or that they receive the peculiarity of their
hyparxis through motion, and an indefiniteness converting itself to
bound. For there is nothing irrational and without measure, in the
natures superior to us. But we must conceive that their progressions
are effected through similitude; and that there is one communion of
essence, and an indivisible continuity of powers and energies, between
the sons of Gods and their fathers; all those Gods that rank in the
second order, being established in such as are more ancient; and the
more ancient imparting much of perfection, vigour, and efficacious
production to the subordinate. And after this manner we must understand
that Jupiter is said to be the son of Saturn. For Jupiter being the
demiurgic intellect proceeds from another intellect, superior and more
uniform, which increases indeed its proper intellections, but converts
the multitude of them to union; and multiplies its intellectual powers,
but elevates their all-various evolutions to impartible sameness.
Jupiter therefore proximately establishing a communion with this
divinity, and being filled from him with total intellectual good,
is very properly said to be the son of Saturn, both in hymns and in
invocations, as unfolding into light that which is occult, expanding
that which is contracted, and dividing that which is impartible in
the Saturnian monad; and as emitting a second more partial kingdom,
instead of that which is more total, a demiurgic instead of a paternal
dominion, and an empire which proceeds every where instead of that
which stably abides in itself.
Why does Socrates apprehend the name of king Saturn to be υβριστικον
_insolent_, and looking to what does he assert this? We reply that
according to the poets _satiety_ (κορος) is the cause of _insolence_;
for they thus denominate immoderation and repletion; and they say
that _Satiety_ brought forth _Insolence_. (υβριν φασιν τικτει κορος).
He therefore who looks without attention to the name of Saturn, will
consider it as signifying _insolence_. For to him who suddenly hears
it, it manifests satiety and repletion. Why therefore, since a name
of this kind is expressive of insolence, do we not pass it over in
silence, as not being auspicious and adapted to the Gods? May we not
say that the royal series[441] of the Gods, beginning from Phanes and
ending in Bacchus, and producing the same sceptre supernally as far
as to the last kingdom, Saturn being allotted the fourth royal order;
appears according to the fabulous pretext, differently from the other
kings, to have received the sceptre insolently from Heaven, and to have
given it to Jupiter? For Night receives the sceptre from Phanes; Heaven
derives from Night, the dominion over wholes; and Bacchus who is the
last king of the Gods receives the kingdom from Jupiter. For the father
(Jupiter) establishes him in the royal throne, puts into his hand the
sceptre, and makes him the king of all the mundane Gods. “Hear me ye
Gods, I place over you a king.”
κλυτε θεοι τον δ’υμμιν βασιλεα τιθημι,
says Jupiter to the junior Gods. But Saturn alone perfectly deprives
Heaven of the kingdom, and concedes dominion to Jupiter, cutting
and being cut off as the fable says. Plato therefore seeing this
succession, which in Saturn is called by theologists _insolent_
(υβριστικη) thought it worth while to mention the appearance of
insolence in the name; that from this he might evince the name is
adapted to the God, and that it bears an image of the insolence which
is ascribed to him in fables. At the same time he teaches us to refer
mythical devices to the truth concerning the Gods, and the apparent
absurdity which they contain, to scientific conceptions.
That _the great_ when ascribed to the Gods, must not be considered as
belonging to interval, but as subsisting intellectually, and according
to the power of cause, but not according to partible transcendency.
But why does Plato now call Saturn διανοια the dianoetic part of the
soul? May we not say, that it is because he looks to the multitude of
intellectual conceptions in him, the orders of intelligibles, and the
evolution of forms which he contains; since also in the Timæus, he
represents the demiurgic intellect as reasoning, and making the world,
dianoetically energising: and this in consequence of looking to his
partible and divided intellections, according to which he fabricates
not only wholes but parts. When Saturn, however, is called intellect,
Jupiter has the order of the dianoetic part: and when again, Saturn is
called the dianoetic part, we must say that he is so called according
to analogy with reference to a certain other intellect of a higher
order. Whether therefore you are willing to speak of intelligible and
occult intellect, or of that which unfolds into light (εκφαντορικος
νους) or of that which connectedly contains (συνεκτικος νους) or of
that which imparts perfection,[442] (τελεσιουργος νους) Saturn will be
as the dianoetic part to all these. For he produces united intellection
into multitude, and fills himself wholly with excited intelligibles.
Whence also, he is said to be the leader of the Titannic race, and the
source of all-various separation and diversifying power. And perhaps
Plato here primarily delivers twofold interpretations of the name of
the Titans, which Jamblichus and Amelius afterwards adopted. For the
one interprets this name from the Titans extending their powers to all
things; but the other from _something insectile_ (παρα το τι ατομον)
because the division and separation of wholes into parts receives its
beginning from the Titans. Socrates therefore now indicates both these
interpretations, by asserting of the king of the Titans that he is a
_certain great dianoetic power_. For the term _great_ is as symbol
of power pervading to all things; but the term _a certain_, of power
proceeding to the most partial natures.
That the name Saturn is now triply analysed; of which the first
asserting this God to be the plenitude of intellectual good, and to
be the satiety of a divine intellect, from its conveying an image
of the satiety and repletion which are reprobated by the many, is
ejected as insolent. The second also which exhibits the imperfect
and the puerile, is in like manner rejected. But the third, which
celebrates this God as full of purity, and as the leader of undefiled
intelligence, and an undeviating life, is approved. For king Saturn
is intellect, and the supplier of all intellectual life; but he is
an intellect exempt from co-ordination with sensibles, immaterial
and separate, and converted to himself. He likewise converts his
progeny and after producing them into light again embosoms and firmly
establishes them in himself. For the demiurgus of the universe,
though he is a divine intellect, yet he orderly arranges sensibles,
and provides for subordinate natures. But the mighty Saturn is
essentialized in separate intellections, and which transcend wholes.
“For the fire which is beyond the first, says the Chaldean Oracle,
does not incline its power downwards.” But the demiurgus is suspended
and proceeds from Saturn, being himself an intellect subsisting about
an immaterial intellect, energizing about it as the intelligible,
and producing that which is occult in it, into the apparent. For the
maker of the world is an intellect of intellect. And it appears to me,
that as Saturn is the summit of those Gods, that are properly called
intellectual, he is intellect, as with reference to the intelligible
genus of Gods. For all the intellectual adhere to the intelligible
genus of Gods, and are conjoined with them through intellections.
“Ye who understand the supermundane paternal profundity,” says the
hymn to them. But Saturn is intelligible, with reference to all the
intellectual Gods. _Purity_ therefore indicates this impartible
and imparticipable transcendency of Saturn. For the not coming into
contact with matter, the impartible, and an exemption from habitude,
are signified by purity. Such indeed is the transcendency of this
God with respect to all co-ordination with things subordinate, and
such his undefiled union with the intelligible, that he does not
require a Curetic guard, like Rhea, Jupiter, and Proserpine. For all
these, through their progressions into secondary natures, require the
immutable defence of the Curetes. But Saturn being firmly established
in himself, and hastily withdrawing himself from all subordinate
natures is established above the guardianship of the Curetes. He
contains however, the cause of these uniformly in himself. For this
purity, and the undefiled which he possesses, give subsistence to all
the progressions of the Curetes. Hence in the Oracles, he is said to
comprehend the first fountain of the Amilicti, and to ride on all the
others. “The intellect of the father riding on attenuated rulers, they
become refulgent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire.”
Νους πατρος αραιοις εποχουμενος ιθυντηρσιν
Ακναμπτου αστραπτουσιν αμειλικτου πυρος ολκοις.
He is therefore _pure intellect_, as giving subsistence to the
undefiled order, and as being the leader of the whole intellectual
series.
Αυτου γαρ εκθρωσκουσιν αμειλικτοι τε κεραυνοι,
Και πρηστηροδοχοι κολποι παμφεγγεος αλκης.
Πατρογενους Εκατης, και υπεζωκος πυρος ανθος,
Ηδε κραταιον πνευμα πολων πυριων επεκεινα.
i.e. “From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the
prester-capacious bosoms of the all-splendid strength of the
father-begotten Hecate, together with the environed flower of fire, and
the strong spirit which is beyond the fiery poles.”
For he convolves all the hebdomad of the fountains,[443] and gives
subsistence to it, from his unical and intelligible summit. For he is,
as the Oracles says, αμιστυλλευτος uncut into fragments, uniform, and
undistributed, and connectedly contains all the fountains, converting
and uniting all of them to himself, and being separate from all things
with immaculate purity. Hence he is κορονους, as an immaterial and pure
intellect, and as establishing himself in the paternal silence. He is
also celebrated as the father of fathers. Saturn therefore is a father,
and intelligible, as with reference to the intellectual Gods.
That every intellect either abides, and is then intelligible, as being
better than motion; or it is moved, and is then intellectual; or it is
both, and is then intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. The
first of these is Phanes; the second which is alone moved is Saturn;
and the third which is both moved and permanent is Heaven.
That Saturn from his impartible, unical, paternal, and beneficent
subsistence in the intellectual orders has been considered by some as
the same with the one cause of all things. He is however only analogous
to this cause, just as Orpheus calls the first cause _Time_ (χρονος)
nearly homonymously with Saturn. (κρονος) But the Oracles of the Gods
characterise this deity by the epithet of _the once_; (τῳ απαξ) calling
him _once beyond_ (απαξ επεκεινα). For _the once_ is allied to _the
one_.
That _Heaven_ the father of Saturn, is an intellect understanding
himself indeed, but united to the first intelligibles; in which he is
also firmly established; and connectedly contains all the intellectual
orders, by abiding in intelligible union. This God too is _connective_,
just as Saturn is of a _separating_ idiom; and on this account he
is _father_. For connecting precede separating causes; and the
intelligible and at the same time intellectual such as are intellectual
only. Whence also _Heaven_ being the _Synocheys_ (συνοχευς) of wholes,
according to one union gives subsistence to the Titannic series,
and prior to this, to other orders of the Gods; some of which abide
only in him, which he retains in himself, but others both abide and
proceed, which he is said to have concealed, after they were unfolded
into light. And after all these he gives subsistence to those divine
orders, which proceed into the universe, and are separated from their
father. For he produces twofold monads, and triads, and hebdomads equal
in number to the monads. These things however will be investigated
more fully elsewhere. But this deity is denominated according to the
similitude of the apparent Heaven. For each of them compresses and
connects all the multitude which it contains, and causes the sympathy
and connection of the whole world to be one. For connection is second
to unifying power, and proceeds from it. In the Phædrus therefore Plato
delivers to us the production of all secondary natures by Heaven, and
shows us how this divinity leads upwards and convolves all things to
the intelligible. He likewise teaches us what its summit is, what the
profundity of its whole order, and what the boundary of the whole of
its progression. Here therefore investigating the truth of things from
names, he declares its energy with respect to things more elevated and
simple, and which are arranged nearer to _the one_. He also clearly
appears here to consider the order of Heaven, as intelligible and at
the same time intellectual. For if it sees things on high, it energizes
intellectually, and there is prior to it the intelligible genus of
Gods, to which looking it is intellectual; just as it is intelligible
to the natures which proceed from it. What then are the things on high
which it beholds? Is it not evident that they are, the supercelestial
place, an essence without colour, without figure, and without the
touch, and all the intelligible extent? An extent comprehending as
Plato would say intelligible animals, the one cause of all eternal
natures, and the occult principles of these; but as the followers of
Orpheus would say, bounded by æther upwards, and by Phanes downwards.
For all between these two gives completion to the intelligible order.
But Plato now calls this both singularly and plurally; since all things
are there united, and at the same time each is separated peculiarly;
and this according to the highest union and separation.
With respect to the term μετεωρολογοι, i.e. _those who discourse on
sublime affairs_, we must now consider it in a manner adapted to
those who chuse an anagogic life, who live intellectually, and who
do not gravitate to earth, but sublimely tend to a theoretic life.
For that which is called Earth there, maternally gives subsistence to
such things as Heaven, which is co-ordinate to that Earth, produces
paternally. And he who energizes there, may be properly called
μετεωρολογος, or, _one who discourses about things on high_. Heaven
therefore, being of a _connective_ nature, is expanded above the
Saturnian orders, and all the intellectual series; and produces from
himself all the Titannic race; and prior to this, the perfective and
defensive orders: and in short is the leader of every good to the
intellectual Gods. Plato therefore, having celebrated Saturn, for his
intelligence which is without habitude to mundane natures, and for
his life which is converted to his own exalted place of survey, now
celebrates Heaven for another more perfect energy. For to be conjoined
to more elevated natures is a greater good than to be converted
to oneself. Let no one however think, that on this account the
above-mentioned energies are distributed in the Gods; as for instance,
that there is providence alone, in Jupiter, a conversion alone to
himself, in Saturn, and an elevation alone to the intelligible, in
Heaven. For Jupiter no otherwise provides for mundane natures than
by looking to the intelligible; since as Plato says in the Timæus,
intellect understanding ideas in animal itself, thought it requisite
that as many and such as it there perceived should be contained in the
universe; but as Orpheus[444] says with a divinely inspired mouth,
“Jupiter swallows his progenitor Phanes, embosoms all his powers,
and becomes all things intellectually which Phanes is intelligibly.”
Saturn also imparts to Jupiter the principles of fabrication, and of
providential attention to sensibles, and understanding himself, he
becomes united to first intelligibles, and is filled with the goods
which are thence derived. Hence also the theologist (Orpheus) says
“that he was nursed by Night.”[445] If therefore the intelligible
is nutriment, Saturn is replete not only with the intelligibles
co-ordinated with him, but also with the highest and occult
intellections. Heaven himself also fills all secondary natures with
his proper goods, but guards all things by his own most vigorous
powers; and the father supernally committed to him the connecting and
guarding the causes of eternal animal. But he intellectually perceives
himself, and is converted to the intelligibles which he contains; and
this his intelligence, Plato in the Phædrus calls _circulation_. For
as that which is moved in a circle is moved about its own centre, so
Heaven energizes about its own intelligible, according to intellectual
circulation. But all the Gods subsisting in all, and each possessing
all energies, one transcends more in this, and another in a different
energy, and each is particularly characterised according to that in
which it transcends. Thus Jupiter is characterised by providence,
and hence his name is now thus analysed; but Saturn by a conversion
to himself, whence also he is _inflected counsel_ αγκυλομητις; and
Heaven by habitude to things more excellent; from which also he
receives his appellation. For his giving subsistence to a pure and
the Saturnian intellect, represents his energy to the other part. But
as there are many powers in Heaven, such as the connective, guardian,
and convertive, you will find that this name is appropriately adapted
to all these. For the connective is signified through bounding the
intellectual Gods; since the connective bounds the multitude which
he contains. The power which guards wholes subsists through the
termination and security of an intellectual essence. And the convertive
power subsists through converting seeing, and intellectually-energizing
natures, to things on high. But all these are adapted to Heaven. For
there is no fear that the Gods will be dissipated, and that on this
account they require connective causes; or that they will sustain
mutation, and that on this account they stand in need of the saving aid
of guardian causes; but now Socrates at once manifests all the powers
of Heaven, through convertive energy. For this is to behold things
on high, to be converted to them, and through this to be connected
and defended. And it appears to me that Heaven possesses this idiom
according to analogy to the intelligible eternity and the intelligible
wholeness. For Timæus particularly characterizes eternity by this,
viz. by abiding in the one prior to it, and by being established in
the summit of intelligibles; and Socrates says that Heaven surveys
things on high, viz. the supercelestial place, and such things as are
comprehended in the god-nourished silence of the fathers. (και οσα τῃ
θεοθρεμμονι σιγῃ περιειληπται των πατερων). As therefore Parmenides
signifies each of these orders through _wholeness_, the one through
intelligible, and the other through intellectual wholeness; in like
manner both Timæus and Socrates characterise them by a conversion to
more excellent natures. But the conversion as well as the wholeness
is different. For that of eternity is intelligible, on which account
Timæus does not say that it looks to its intelligible, but only that
it stably abides. But the conversion of Heaven is intellectual, and on
this account Socrates says that it sees things on high, and through
this converts, guards, and connects all things posterior to itself.
Whence also in the Phædrus, it is said by the circulation of itself,
to lead all things to the supercelestial place, and the summit of the
first intelligibles.
That there being three fathers and kings of which Socrates here
makes mention, Saturn alone appears to have received the government
from his father, and to have transmitted it to Jupiter, by violence.
Mythologists therefore celebrate the sections of Heaven and Saturn.
But the cause of this is, that Heaven is of the connective, Saturn
of the Titannic, and Jupiter of the demiurgic order. Again, the
Titannic genus rejoices in separations and differences, progressions
and multiplications of powers. Saturn therefore, as a dividing God,
separates his kingdom from that of Heaven; but as a pure intellect he
is exempt from a fabricative energy proceeding into matter. Hence also
the demiurgic genus is again separated from him. Section therefore
is on both sides of him. For so far as he is a Titan, he is cut off
from the connective causes, but so far as he does not give himself to
material fabrication, he is cut off from the demiurgus Jupiter.
That with respect to the supercelestial place to which Heaven extends
his intellectual life, some characterise it by ineffable symbols; but
others after giving it a name celebrate it as unknown, neither being
able to speak of its form, or figure. And proceeding somewhat higher
than this, they have been able to manifest the boundary[446] of the
intelligible Gods by name alone. But the natures which are beyond this,
they signify through analogy alone, these natures being ineffable and
incomprehensible. Since that God who closes the paternal order, is
said by the wise to be the only deity among the intelligible Gods,
that is denominated: and theurgy ascends as far as to this order.
Since therefore the natures prior to Heaven, are allotted such a
transcendency of uniform subsistence, that some of them are said to
be effable, and at the same time ineffable, known, and at the same
time unknown, through their alliance to _the one_, Socrates very
properly restrains the discourse about them, in consequence of names
not being able to represent their hyparxes; and in short, because
it requires a certain wonderful employment, to separate the effable
and ineffable, of their hyparxis or power. He accuses therefore his
memory, not as disbelieving in the fables, which assert that there are
certain more ancient causes beyond Heaven, nor as not thinking it worth
while to mention them. For in the Phædrus he himself celebrates the
supercelestial place. But he says this, because the first of beings
cannot become known by the exercise of memory and through phantasy, or
opinion, or the dianoetic part. For we are alone naturally adapted to
be conjoined to them, with the flower of intellect and the hyparxis
of our essence; and through these we receive the sensation of their
unknown nature. Socrates therefore says, that what in them is exempt,
both from our gnostic and recollective life, is the cause of our
inability to give them a name; for they are not naturally adapted to be
known through names. Theologists likewise would not remotely signify
them, and through the analogy of things apparent to them, if they could
be named, and apprehended by knowledge.
That Homer[447] does not ascend beyond the Saturnian order, but
evincing that Saturn is the proximate cause of the demiurgus, he
calls Jupiter, who is the demiurgus, the son of Saturn. He also calls
the divinities co-ordinate with him Juno, Neptune, and Mars; and he
denominates Jupiter, the father of men and Gods. But he does not
introduce Saturn, as either energizing, or saying any thing, but as
truly αγκυλομητις in consequence of being converted to himself.
That Orpheus greatly availed himself of the licence of fables, and
manifests every thing prior to Heaven by names, as far as to the
first cause. He also denominates the ineffable, who transcends the
intelligible unities, _Time_; whether because _Time_ pre-subsists as
the cause of all generation, or because, as delivering the generation
of true beings, he thus denominates the ineffable, that he may indicate
the order of true beings, and the transcendency of the more total to
the more partial; that a subsistence according to Time may be the same
with a subsistence according to cause; in the same manner as generation
with an arranged progression. But Hesiod venerates many of the divine
natures in silence, and does not in short name the first. For that what
is posterior to the first proceeds from something else, is evident from
the verse,
“Chaos of all things was the first produced.”
For it is perfectly impossible that it could be produced without a
cause; but he does not say what that is which gave subsistence to
Chaos. He is silent indeed with respect to both the fathers[448] of
intelligibles, the exempt, and the co-ordinate; for they are perfectly
ineffable. And with respect to the two co-ordinations, the natures
which are co-ordinate with the one, he passes by in silence, but those
alone which are co-ordinate with the indefinite duad, he unfolds
through genealogy. And on this account Plato now thinks Hesiod deserves
to be mentioned, for passing by the natures prior to Heaven, as being
ineffable. For this also is indicated concerning them by the Oracles,
which likewise add “they possess mystic silence,” σιγ’ εχε μυστα. And
Socrates himself in the Phædrus, calls the intellectual perception of
them μυησις and εποπτεια, _in which nearly the whole business is
ineffable and unknown_.
That Saturn in conjunction with Rhea produced Vesta and Juno who are
co-ordinate to the demiurgic causes. For Vesta imparts from herself
to the Gods an uninclining permanency, and seat in themselves,
and an indissoluble essence. But Juno imparts progression, and a
multiplication into things secondary. She is also the vivifying
fountain of wholes, and the mother of prolific powers; and on this
account she is said to have proceeded together with Jupiter the
demiurgus; and through this communion she generates maternally, such
things as Jupiter generates paternally. But Vesta abides in herself,
possessing an undefiled virginity, and being the cause of sameness to
all things. Each of these divinities however together with her own
proper perfection, possesses according to participation the power of
the other. Hence some say that Vesta is denominated from essence (απο
της εστιας) looking to her proper hyparxis. But others looking to her
vivific and motive power which she derives from Juno say that she
is thus denominated ως ωσεως ουσαν αιτιαν _as being the cause of
impulsion_. For all divine natures are in all, and particularly such
as are co-ordinate with each other, participate of, and subsist in each
other. Each therefore of the demiurgic and vivific orders, participates
the form by which it is characterised, from Vesta. The orbs of the
planets likewise possess the sameness of their revolutions from her;
and the poles and centres are always allotted from her their rest.
That Vesta does not manifest essence, but the abiding and firm
establishment of essence in itself; and hence this goddess proceeds
into light after the mighty Saturn. For the divinities prior to
Saturn have not a subsistence in themselves and in another,[449] but
this originates from Saturn. And a subsistence in _self_ is the
peculiarity of Vesta, but in _another_ of Juno.
That the theology of Hesiod from the monad Rhea produces according
to things which are more excellent in the co-ordination, Vesta, but
according to those which are subordinate Juno; and according to those
which subsist between, Ceres. But according to Orpheus, Ceres is in
a certain respect the same with the whole of vivification, and in a
certain respect is not the same. For on high she is Rhea, but below in
conjunction with Jupiter, she is Ceres: for here the things begotten
are similar to the begetters, and are nearly the same.
That we ought to receive with caution what is now said concerning
effluxions and motions. For Socrates does not descend to the material
flowing of Heraclitus; for this is false,[450] and unworthy the
dianoetic conceptions of Plato. But since it is lawful to interpret
things divine analogously, through appropriate images, Socrates very
properly assimilates fontal and Saturnian deities to streams; in so
doing jesting and at the same time acting seriously, because good is
always derived as it were in streams from on high, to things below.
Hence, according to the image of rivers, after the fontal deities,
who eternally devolve streams of good, the deities who subsist as
principles are celebrated. For after the _fountain_ of a river the
place where it _begins_ to flow is surveyed.
That those divinities who are peculiarly denominated total intellectual
gods, of whom the great Saturn is the father, are properly called
fontal. For “from him leap forth the implacable thunders,” says the
oracle concerning Saturn. But concerning the vivific fountain Rhea
from which all life, divine, intellectual, psychical and mundane is
generated, the Chaldean oracles thus speak.
Ρειη τοι νοερων μακαρων πηγη τε ροη τε.
Παντων γαρ πρωτη δυναμεις κολποισιν αφραστοις
Δεξαμενη, γενεην επι παν προχεει τροχαουσαν.
i.e. “Rhea[451] is the fountain and river of the blessed intellectual
Gods. For first receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable
bosoms, she pours running generation into every thing.”
For this divinity gives subsistence to the infinite diffusion of all
life, and to all never-failing powers. She likewise moves all things
according to the measures of divine motions, and converts them to
herself; establishing all things in herself, as being co-ordinate to
Saturn. Rhea therefore is so called from causing a perpetual influx of
good, and through being the cause of divine _facility_, since the
life of the gods is attended with _ease_ (θεοι ρεια ζωντες).
That Ocean is the cause to all the Gods of acute and vigorous energy,
and bounds the separations of the first, middle, and last orders;
converting himself to himself, and to his proper principles, through
swiftness of intellect, but moving all things from himself, to energies
accommodated to their natures; perfecting their powers, and causing
them to have a never-failing subsistence. But Tethys imparts permanency
to the natures which are moved by Ocean, and stability to the beings
which are excited by him to the generation of secondary natures. She is
also the source of purity of essence to those beings who perpetually
desire to produce all things; as sustaining every thing in the divine
essences which as it were _leaps forth and percolates_. For each
of first causes, though it imparts to secondary natures a participation
of good, yet at the same time retains with itself that which is
undefiled, unmingled and pure from participation. Thus for instance,
intellect is filled with life, being, and intelligence, with which also
it fills soul; but establishing in itself that which in each of these
is genuine and exempt, it also illuminates from itself to beings of
a subordinate rank, inferior measures of these goods. And vigour of
energy indeed, is present with more ancient natures, through Ocean;
but the leaping forth and percolating through Tethys. For every thing
which is imparted from superior to subordinate natures, whether it be
essence, life, or intelligence, is _percolated_. And such of these
as are primary, are established in themselves; but such as are more
imperfect, are transferred to things of a subject order. Just as with
respect to streams of water, such of them as are nearer their source
are purer, but the more remote are more turbid. Both Ocean and Tethys
therefore, are fontal Gods, according to their first subsistence.
Hence Socrates now calls them the fathers of streams. But they also
proceed into other orders of Gods, exhibiting the same powers among
the Gods who rank as principles or rulers, among those of a liberated,
and those of a celestial characteristic; and appropriately in each of
these. Timæus, however, celebrates their sublunary orders, calling them
fathers of Saturn and Rhea, but the progeny of Heaven and Earth. But
their last processions are their divisible allotments about the earth;
both those which are apparent on its surface, and those which under the
earth, separate the kingdom of Hades, from the dominion of Neptune.
That Saturn is conjoined both to Rhea and Jupiter, but to the
former as father to prolific power, but to the latter, as father to
intelligible[452] intellect.
That Ocean is said to have married Tethys, and Jupiter Juno, and
the like, as establishing a communion with her, conformably to the
generation of subordinate natures. For an according co-arrangement of
the Gods, and a connascent co-operation in their productions, is called
by theologists _marriage_.
That Tethys is denominated from leaping forth and _straining_ or
_cleansing_, being as it were _Diatethys_, and by taking away the first
two syllables _Tethys_.[453]
That Saturn is the monad of the Titannic order of the Gods, but Jupiter
of the demiurgic. This last divinity however is twofold, the one exempt
and co-ordinated with Saturn, being a fontal God, and in short ranking
with the intellectual fathers, and convolving the extremity of them;
but the other being connumerated with the sons of Saturn, and allotted
a Saturnian summit and dominion in this triad; concerning which also
the Homeric Neptune says,
τρεις γαρ τ’ εκ Κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρειη.[454]
As brother Gods we three from Saturn came,
And Rhea bore us.
And the first Jupiter indeed, as being the demiurgus of wholes, is the
king of things first, middle, and last, concerning whom Socrates also
had just said, that he is the ruler and king of all things; and life
and salvation are imparted to all things through him.
But the ruling Jupiter, who ranks as a principle, and who is
co-ordinate with the three sons of Saturn governs the third part of the
whole of things, according to that of Homer,
τριχθα δε παντα δεδασται----[455]
A triple distribution all things own.
He is also the summit of the three, has the same name with the fontal
Jupiter, is united to him, and is monadically called Jupiter. But the
second is called dyadically, marine Jupiter, and Neptune. And the third
is triadically denominated, terrestrial Jupiter, Pluto, and Hades.
The first of these also preserves, fabricates, and vivifies summits,
but the second, things of a second rank, and the third those of a
third order. Hence this last is said to have ravished Proserpine, that
together with her he might animate the extremities of the universe.
That the Titannic order dividing itself from the connecting order of
Heaven, but having also something in itself abiding, and connascent
with that order, Saturn is the leader of the separation, and on
this account he both arms others against his father, and receives
the scythe[456] from his mother, through which he divides his own
kingdom from that of Heaven. But Ocean is co-ordinated with those that
abide[457] in the manners of the father, and guards the middle of the
two orders; so far as a Titan being connumerated with the Gods that
subsist with Saturn; but so far as rejoicing in a co-ordination with
Heaven conjoining himself with the Synoches. For it is fit that he who
bounds the first and second orders, should be arranged in the middle
of the natures that are bounded. But every where this god is allotted
a power of this kind, and separates the genera of the Gods, the
Titannic from the connecting (των συνοχικων) and the vivific from the
demiurgic. Whence also ancient rumor calls Ocean the God who separates
the apparent part of Heaven from the unapparent; and on this account
poets say, that the sun and the other stars rise from the ocean. What
is now said therefore by Plato comprehends all the Titannic order
through these two conjunctions; this order abiding and at the same time
proceeding. And through the Saturnian order indeed, it comprehends
every thing separated from the fathers; but through that of Ocean,
every thing conjoined with the connecting Gods. Or if you had rather
so speak, through the Saturnian order, he comprehends every maternal
cause, but through the other, every thing subservient to the paternal
cause. For the female is the cause of progression and separation, but
the male of union and stable permanency.
That of the demiurgic triad[458] which divides the whole world, and
distributes the indivisible, one and whole fabrication of the first
Jupiter, the summit, and which has the relation of father is Jupiter,
who through union with the whole demiurgic intellect having the same
appellation with it, is for this reason not mentioned here by Plato.
But Neptune is allotted the middle and that which binds together both
the extremes; being filled indeed from the essence of Jupiter, but
filling Pluto. For of the whole of this triad, Jupiter indeed is the
father, but Neptune the power, and Pluto the intellect. And all indeed
are in all; but each receives a different character of subsistence.
Thus Jupiter subsists according to _being_; but Neptune according to
_power_, and Pluto according to _intellect_. And though all these
divinities are the causes of the life of all things, yet one is so
_essentially_, another _vitally_, and another _intellectually_. Whence
also the theologist Orpheus says, that the extremes fabricate in
conjunction with Proserpine things first and last; the middle being
co-arranged with generative cause from his own allotment, without
Proserpine. Hence _violence_ is said to have been offered to Proserpine
by Jupiter; but she is said to have been _ravished_ by Pluto. (διο
και φασι την κορην υπο μεν τον διος βιαζεσθαι, υπο δε του πλοντωνος
αρπαζεσθαι.) But the middle is said to be the cause of motion to all
things. Hence also, he is called _earth-shaker_, as being the origin
of motion. And among those who are allotted the kingdom of Saturn, the
middle allotment, and the agile sea (η ευκινηγος θαλaσσa) are assigned
to him. According to every division therefore, the summits are Jovian,
the middles belong to Neptune, and the extremes to Pluto. And if you
look to the centres, such as the east, that of mid-heaven and the west;
if also you divide the whole world, as for instance into the inerratic,
planetary and sublunary spheres;--or again, if you divide that which is
generated into the fiery, terrestrial, and that which subsists between;
or the earth into its summits, middle, and hollow, and subterranean
parts, this triad every where distributes the first, middle and last
differences of things fabricated in demiurgic boundaries.
That the name Neptune is now triply analysed. For Neptune is the
trident-bearer, and the Tritons, and Amphitrite are the familiars of
this God. And the first analyzation of his name is from the allotment
over which he presides, and from souls coming into generation, in whom
the circle of sameness is fettered; since the sea is analogous to
generation. But the second is from communion with the first.
αλλα Ζευς προτερος γεονει, και πλειονα ηδει.[459]
But Jove was born the first, and more he knew. For a Jupiter of this
kind, is the proximate intelligible of Neptune. But the third analysis
of his name is from his energy in externals. For he is motive of
nature, and vivific of things last. He is also the guardian of the
earth, and excites it to generations.
That Neptune is an intellectual demiurgic God, who receives souls
descending into generation; but Hades is an intellectual demiurgic
God, who frees souls from generation. For as our whole period
receives a triple division, into a life prior to generation, which
is Jovian, into a life in generation which is Neptunian, and into
a life posterior to generation which is Plutonian; Pluto, who is
characterised by intellect, very properly converts ends to beginnings,
effecting a circle without a beginning, and without an end, not only
in souls, but also in every fabrication of bodies, and in short, of
all periods;--which circle also, he perpetually convolves. Thus for
instance, he converts the ends to the beginnings of the souls of
the stars, and the convolutions of souls about generation, and the
like. And hence Jupiter is the guardian of the life of souls prior to
generation.
That some badly analyze the name of Pluto into wealth from the earth,
through fruits and metals; but Hades into the invisible, dark and
dreadful. These Socrates now reprobates, bringing the two names to
the same signification; referring the name of Pluto, as intellect,
to the wealth of prudence, but that of Hades to an intellect
knowing all things. For this God is a sophist, who purifying souls
after death, frees them from generation. For Hades is not, as some
improperly explain it, evil: for neither is death evil; though Hades
to some appears to be attended with perturbations (εμπαθως); but it
is invisible and better than the apparent; such as is every thing
intelligible. Intellect therefore, in every triad of beings, convolves
itself to being, and the paternal cause, imitating in its energy the
circle.
That men who are lovers of body, badly refer to themselves the passions
of the animated nature, and on this account consider death to be
dreadful, as being the cause of corruption. The truth however is, that
it is much better for man to die, and live in Hades a life according to
nature, since a life in conjunction with body is contrary to nature,
and is an impediment to intellectual energy. Hence it is necessary to
divest ourselves of the fleshly garments with which we are clothed,
as Ulysses did of his ragged vestments, and no longer like a wretched
mendicant together with the indigence of body, put on our rags. For as
the Chaldean Oracle says, “Things divine cannot be obtained by those
whose intellectual eye is directed to body; but those only can arrive
at the possession of them, who stript of their garments hasten to the
summit.”
That Neptune when compared with Jupiter is said to know _many_ things;
but Hades compared with souls to whom he imparts knowledge is said to
know _all_ things; though Neptune is more total than Hades.
That as it is necessary to analyse Pluto, not only into the obvious
wealth from the earth, but also into the wealth of wisdom, so likewise
Ceres must be analysed not only into corporeal nutriment; but beginning
from the Gods themselves it is requisite to conceive her to be the
supplier of aliment, first to the Gods themselves, afterwards to the
natures posterior to the Gods; and in the last place, that the series
of this beneficent energy extends as far as to corporeal nutriment. For
the characteristic of love shines forth first of all in the Gods: and
this is the case with the medicinal and prophetic powers of Apollo, and
with those of every other divinity. But nutriment, when considered with
reference to the Gods, is the communication of intellectual plenitude
from more exalted natures to those of an inferior rank. Gods therefore,
are nourished, when they view with the eye of intellect Gods prior to
themselves; and when they are perfected and view intelligible beauties,
such as justice itself, temperance itself, and the like, as it is said
in the Phædrus.
That from sportive conceptions about the Gods, it is possible for those
to energize entheastically, or according to a divinely inspired energy,
who apply themselves to things in a more intellectual manner. Thus
for instance, according to the material conceptions of the multitude,
Venus derives her origin from foam; and foam corresponds to seed.
Hence according to them the pleasure arising from this in coition is
Venus. Who however, is so stupid, as not to survey primary and eternal
natures, prior to such as are last and corruptible? I will therefore
unfold the divine conception respecting Venus.
They say then that the first Venus was produced from twofold
causes, the one as that _through which_,[460] co-operating with her
progression, as calling forth the prolific power of the father, and
imparting it to the intellectual orders; but Heaven as the maker
and cause unfolding the goddess into light, from his own generative
abundance. For whence could that which congregates different genera,
according to one desire of beauty, receive its subsistence except
from the _synochical_ power of Heaven? From the foam therefore of his
own prolific parts thrown into the sea, Heaven produced this goddess,
as Orpheus says. But the second Venus, Jupiter produces from his
own generative powers, in conjunction with Dione; and this goddess
likewise proceeds from foam, after the same manner with the more
ancient Venus, as Orpheus evinces. These goddesses therefore differ
from each other, according to the causes of their production, their
orders and their powers. For she that proceeds from the genitals of
Heaven is supermundane, leads upwards to intelligible beauty, is the
supplier of an unpolluted life, and separates from generation. But
the Venus that proceeds from Dione governs all the co-ordinations
in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each other, and
perfects their generative progressions, through a kindred conjunction.
These divinities too, are united with each other through a similitude
of subsistence: for they both proceed from generative powers; one
from that of the connectedly-containing power of Heaven, and the
other from Jupiter the demiurgus. But the sea signifies an expanded
and circumscribed life; its profundity, the universally-extended
progression of such a life; and its foam, the greatest purity of
nature, that which is full of prolific light and power, and that which
swims upon all life, and is as it were its highest flower.
That according to Orpheus Ceres is the same with Rhea. For he says
that subsisting on high in unproceeding union with Saturn, she is
_Rhea_, but that by emitting and generating Jupiter, she is _Ceres_.
For thus he speaks,
Ρειην το πριν εουσαν, επει διος επλετο μητηρ
Γεγονε δημητηρ.[461]