From these things, it is evident that being which has a primary

subsistence is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, viz. being, is

present with a greater number of things; since _to be_ is present

with parts, so far as they _are_ parts. But the other, viz.

wholeness, is present with a less number of things. For that which

is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent; but

the cause of a less number is of a subordinate nature, as has been

demonstrated.

PROPOSITION LXXIV.

Every form is a certain whole; for it consists of many things, each of

which gives completion to the form. But not every whole is a form.

* * * * *

For a particular[238] thing is a whole and also an individual, so

far it is an individual, but neither of them is a form. For every

whole consists of parts; but form is that which may be divided into

individual forms. Whole, therefore, is one thing, and form another. And

the one is present with many things, but the other with a few. Hence,

whole is above the forms of beings.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident that whole has a middle order between

being and forms. And hence it follows that being subsists prior to

forms, and that forms are beings, but that not every being is form.

Whence also, in effects, privations are in a certain respect beings,

but are no longer forms, and in consequence of the unical power

of being, they also receive a certain obscure representation of

being.[239]

PROPOSITION LXXV.

Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect.

* * * * *

For if it is in the effect, it either gives completion to it, or is in

a certain respect indigent of it in order to its existence, and thus it

will be more imperfect than the thing caused. For being in the effect,

it is rather a concause than a cause, and is either a part of that

which is generated, or an instrument of the maker. For that which is

a part in the thing generated, is more imperfect than the whole. The

cause also which is in the effect, is an instrument of generation to

the maker, being unable to define of itself the measures of production.

Every cause, therefore, which is properly so denominated, if it is more

perfect than that which proceeds from it, imparts to its effect the

measure of generation, and is exempt from instruments and elements, and

in short, from every thing which is called a concause.

PROPOSITION LXXVI.

Every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, has a

immutable hyparxis. But every thing which is generated from a moveable

cause, has a mutable hyparxis.

* * * * *

For if that which makes is entirely immoveable, it does not produce

from itself that which is secondary through motion, but by its very

being. If, however, this be the case, it has that which proceeds from

it concurrent with its own essence. And if this also be the case, it

will produce as long as it exists. But it exists always, and therefore

it always gives subsistence to that which is posterior to itself.

Hence, this is always generated from thence, and always is, conjoining

with _the ever_ according to energy of the cause, its own ever

according to progression. If, however, the cause is moved, that also

which is generated from it will be essentially mutable. For that which

has its being through motion, changes its being when its moveable

cause[240] is changed. For if, though produced from motion, it should

itself remain immutable, it would be better than its producing cause.

This, however, is impossible. It will not, therefore, be immutable.

Hence, it will be mutable, and will be essentially moved, imitating the

motion of that which gave it subsistence.

PROPOSITION LXXVII.

Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that which is in energy.

And that which is in capacity, proceeds into energy. That also which

is in a certain respect in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is

the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that

which is all things in capacity, proceeds from that which is all things

in energy.

* * * * *

For that which is in capacity is not naturally adapted to produce

itself into energy, because it is imperfect. For if being imperfect

it should become the cause to itself of perfection, and this in

energy, the cause will be more imperfect than that which is produced

by it. Hence, that which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity,

will not be the cause to itself of a subsistence in energy. For on

this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect, it would be the cause of

perfection; since every thing which is in capacity, so far as it is in

capacity, is imperfect, but that which is in energy is perfect. Hence,

if that which was in capacity becomes in energy, it will have its

perfection from something else. And this will either be in capacity;

but thus again the imperfect will be generative of the perfect; or

it will be in energy, and either something else, or this which was

in capacity will be that which becomes in energy. But if something

else which is in energy produces, operating according to its own

peculiarity, it will not by being in capacity make that which is in

another to be in energy; nor will this which is now made be in energy,

unless it becomes this so far as it was in capacity. It remains,

therefore, that from that which is in energy, that which is in capacity

must be changed into energy.

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

Every power is either perfect or imperfect.

* * * * *

For the power which is prolific of energy is perfect. For it makes

other things to be perfect through its own energies. That, however,

which is perfective of other things is in a greater degree perfect, as

being more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of another

that pre-exists in energy, according to which indigence it is something

in capacity, is imperfect. For it is indigent of the perfection which

is in another, in order that by participating of it, it may become

perfect. Hence, such a power as this is of itself imperfect. So that

the power of that which is in energy is perfect, being prolific of

energy. But the power of that which is in capacity is imperfect, and

obtains perfection from the power which is in energy.

PROPOSITION LXXIX.

Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power.[241]

* * * * *

For it is requisite that the thing generated should possess aptitude

and an imperfect power. And that which makes being in energy[242] that

which the thing generated is in capacity, antecedently comprehends a

perfect power. For all energy proceeds from inherent power. For if that

which makes did not possess power, how could it energize, and produce

something else? And if that which is generated did not possess power

according to aptitude, how could it be generated? For that which makes

or acts, makes or acts in that which is able to suffer, but not in any

casual thing, and which is not naturally adapted to suffer from the

agent.

PROPOSITION LXXX.

Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suffer; but every thing

incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is essentially inefficacious,

but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however,

suffers through its communion with body; just as bodies are able to act

through the participation of incorporeals.

* * * * *

For body, so far as body, is alone divisible, and through this becomes

passive, being entirely partible, and this to infinity. But that which

is incorporeal, being simple, is impassive. For neither is that which

is impartible, capable of being divided, nor can that be changed in

quality which is not compounded. Either, therefore, nothing will be

effective, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal nature, since

body, so far as body, does not act, because it is alone liable to be

divided, and to suffer. For every thing which acts has an effective

power; so that body, so far as it is body, will not act, but so far as

it contains in itself a power of acting. Hence, when it acts, it acts

through the participation of power. Moreover, incorporeal natures when

they are inherent in bodies, participate of passions, being divided

together with bodies, and enjoying their partible nature, though

according to their own essence they are impartible.

PROPOSITION LXXXI.

Every thing which is participated in a separable manner, is present

with its participant by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in

it.

* * * * *

For if it is itself present with the participant in a separate manner,

and is not in it, as if it possessed its subsistence in it, a certain

medium between the two is necessary, connecting the one with the other,

and which is more similar to that which is participated, and subsists

in the participant. For if this medium is separable, how can it be

participated by the participant, since the participant neither contains

the medium, nor any thing proceeding from it? A power, therefore,

and illumination proceeding from that which is separable into the

participant conjoins both. Hence, one of these will be that through

which the participation is effected, another will be that which is

participated, and another that which participates.

PROPOSITION LXXXII.

Every thing incorporeal, which is converted to itself, when it is

participated by other things, is participated in a separable manner.

* * * * *

For if in an inseparable manner, the energy of it would not be separate

from its participant, as neither would its essence. If, however,

this were the case, it would not be converted to itself. For being

converted, it will be separate from its participant, each being

different from the other. If, therefore, it is able to be converted

to itself, it will be participated in a separable manner, when it is

participated by other things.

PROPOSITION LXXXIII.

Every thing which has a knowledge of itself, is entirely converted to

itself.

* * * * *

For knowing itself, it is evident that it is converted to itself in

energy. For that which knows and that which is known are one. And the

knowledge of itself is directed to itself as to that which is known.

This knowledge also as pertaining to that which knows is a certain

energy; but it is the knowledge of itself directed to itself, because

it is gnostic of itself. Moreover, that it is converted to itself

essentially, if it is so in energy, has been demonstrated. For every

thing which by energizing is converted to itself, has also an essence

verging to, and subsisting in itself.

PROPOSITION LXXXIV.

Every thing which always is, possesses an infinite power.

* * * * *

For if its hypostasis is never-failing, the power also according to

which it is that which it is, and is able to exist, is infinite. For

the power of existing being finite, it will some time or other fail.

But this failing, the existence also of that which possesses it will

fail, and it will no longer be that which always is. It is necessary,

therefore, that the power of that which always is, and which connects

and contains it essentially, should be infinite.

PROPOSITION LXXXV.

Every thing which is always becoming to be, or rising into existence,

(αει γινομενον) possesses an infinite power of becoming to be.

* * * * *

For if it is always rising into existence, the power of generation in

it is never-failing. For if this power was finite, it would cease in

an infinite time. But the power of becoming to be ceasing, that which

is rising into being according to this power would cease, and thus it

would no longer be always becoming to be.[243] It is, however, supposed

to be always becoming to be. Hence, it possesses an infinite power of

rising into existence.

PROPOSITION LXXXVI.

Every thing which is truly being (οντως ον) is infinite, neither

according to multitude, nor according to magnitude, but according to

power alone.

* * * * *

For every infinite, is either in discrete, or in continued quantity,

or in power. But that which always is, is infinite, as having an

inextinguishable life, a never-failing hyparxis, and an undiminished

energy. That which is eternally being, however, is neither infinite

on account of magnitude; for that which is truly being is without

magnitude, being self-subsistent; since every thing self-subsistent is

impartible and simple. Nor is it infinite on account of multitude; for

it has in the most eminent degree the form of _the one_, as being

arranged most near, and being most allied to it. But it is infinite

according to power. Hence, it is also impartible and infinite. And by

how much the more it is one and impartible, by so much the more is it

infinite. For the power which is divided, becomes imbecil and finite,

and powers which are entirely divided, are in every respect finite. For

ultimate powers, and which are most remote from _the one_, are in

a certain respect finite, on account of their distribution into parts.

But first powers, on account of their impartibility, are infinite.

For a separation into parts divulses and dissolves the power of every

thing. But impartibility compressing and contracting that which it

contains, renders it never-failing, and undiminished in itself.

Moreover, infinity, according to magnitude, and also according to

multitude, is entirely a privation and falling off from impartibility.

For that which is finite is most near to the impartible, but the

infinite is most remote from it, entirely departing from _the

one_. Hence, that which is infinite according to power, is not

infinite either according to multitude or magnitude, since infinite

power subsists in conjunction with impartibility. But the infinite

either in multitude or magnitude, is most remote from the impartible.

If, therefore, that which is truly being was infinite either in

magnitude or multitude, it would not possess infinite power. It does,

however, possess infinite power; and therefore is not infinite either

according to multitude, or according to magnitude.

PROPOSITION LXXXVII.

Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal.

* * * * *

For the participation of being is present in a certain respect with

generated natures,[244] so far as each of these is not that which in

no respect is. But if that which is generated is not entirely deprived

of being, it is in a certain respect being. The eternal, however, is

in no respect whatever present with generated natures, and especially

not with such of these as do not even participate of the perpetuity

which subsists according to the whole of time. Moreover, every thing

eternal always is. For it participates of eternity, which imparts to

the natures by which it is participated to be always that which they

are. Being, therefore, is participated by a greater number of things

than eternity. And hence being is beyond eternity. For by those natures

by whom eternity is participated, being is also participated. But not

every thing which participates of being, participates also of eternity.

PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

Every thing[245] which is truly being, is either prior to eternity, or

in eternity, or participates of eternity.

* * * * *

For that there is true being prior to eternity has been demonstrated.

But true being is also in eternity. For eternity possesses the _always_

in conjunction with _being_. And that which participates of eternity,

has both the _always_ and _being_, according to participation.

Eternity, however, possesses the _always_ primarily, but _being_

according to participation. But being itself is primarily being.

PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

Every thing which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity.

* * * * *

For if it possesses infinite power, it is evident that it is

infinite, and on this account consists from the infinite. If also it

is impartible, and has the form of _the one_, through this, it

participates of bound. For that which participates of unity is bounded.

Moreover, it is impartible, and therefore possesses infinite power.

Hence every thing which is truly [or primarily] being consists of bound

and infinity.

PROPOSITION XC.

The first bound, and the first infinity subsist by themselves prior to

every thing which consists of bound and the infinite.

* * * * *

For if beings which subsist by themselves, are prior to those which are

_certain_ beings, as being common to all essences, and principal

causes, and not the causes of certain, but in short of all beings, it

is necessary that the first bound, and the first infinity should be

prior to that[246] which consists of both these. For the bound in that

which is mixed [or the first being,] participates of infinity, and

the infinite participates of bound. But of every thing, that which is

the first, is nothing else than that which it is. It is not therefore

proper that the first infinite should have the form of bound, or that

the first bound should have the form of infinity. These therefore

subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed.

PROPOSITION XCI.

Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power

indeed derives its subsistence from infinite power. And infinite power

subsists from the first infinity.

* * * * *

For the powers which have an existence at a certain time, are finite,

falling from the infinity of existing always. But the powers of eternal

beings are infinite, never deserting their own hyparxis.

PROPOSITION XCII.

Every multitude of infinite powers, is suspended from one first

infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things

which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, not being the

power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.

* * * * *

For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power itself.

For it has also bound. But the first power is infinity. For infinite

powers are infinite, through the participation of infinity. Infinity

itself therefore, will be prior to all powers, through which being

also possesses infinite power, and all things participate of infinity.

For infinity is not the first of things [or the ineffable principle of

all] since that is the measure of all things, being _the good_ and _the

one_. Nor is infinity being. For this is infinite, but not infinity.

Hence infinity subsists between that which is first and being, and is

the cause of all infinite powers, and of all the infinity that is in

beings.

PROPOSITION XCIII.

Every infinite which is in [true] beings, is neither infinite to the

natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite to itself.

* * * * *

For that by which each thing is infinite, by this also it exists

uncircumscribed. But every thing which is in [true] beings, is bounded

by itself, and by all the things prior to it. It remains therefore,

that the infinite which is in [true] beings, is infinite to subordinate

natures alone, above which it is so expanded in power, as to be

incomprehensible by all of them. For in whatever manner they may extend

themselves towards this infinite, yet it has something[247] entirely

exempt from them. And though all things enter into it, yet it has

something occult, and incomprehensible by secondary natures. Though

likewise it evolves the powers which it contains, yet it possesses

something on account of its union insurmountable, contracted, and

surpassing the evolution of beings. Since however, it contains and

bounds itself, it will not be infinite to itself, nor much less to the

natures situated above it, since it has a portion of the infinity which

is in them. For the powers of more total natures are more infinite, in

consequence of being more total, and having an arrangement nearer to

the first infinity.

PROPOSITION XCIV.

Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity

is perpetuity.

* * * * *

For there are many infinites which have the infinite not on account

of _the always_, such for instance, as the infinity according

to magnitude, the infinity according to multitude, and the infinity

of matter. And whatever else there may be of the like kind, which is

infinite, either because it cannot be passed over, or through the

indefiniteness of its essence. That perpetuity however is a certain

infinity[248] is evident. For that which never fails is infinite. But

this is that which always has its hypostasis inexhaustible. Infinity

therefore, is prior to perpetuity. For that which gives subsistence to

a greater number of effects, and is more total, is more causal. Hence,

the first infinity is beyond eternity, and infinity itself is prior to

eternity.

PROPOSITION XCV.

Every power which is more single, is more infinite than that which is

multiplied.

* * * * *

For if of powers the first infinity is nearest to _the one_,

that power which is more allied to _the one_, is in a greater

degree infinite than that which recedes from it. For being multiplied

it loses the form of _the one_, in which while it remained, it

possessed a transcendency with respect to other powers, being connected

and contained through its impartibility. For in partible natures

themselves, the powers when congregated, are united,[249] but when

divided, they are increased in number, and become obscured.

PROPOSITION XCVI.

The power which is infinite of every finite body, is incorporeal.

* * * * *

For if it were corporeal, if this body indeed is finite,[250] the

infinite will be contained in the finite. But if the body is infinite,

it will not be power so far as it is body. For if so far as it is body

it is finite, but power is infinite, it will not be power so far as

it is body. Hence, the power which is infinite in a finite body is

incorporeal.

PROPOSITION XCVII.

In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a

leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself; and that

which the cause is primarily, the series is according to diminution.

* * * * *

For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all co-ordinate

natures are co-arranged with reference to it, it is evident that it

imparts to all that the series contains the one idea according to which

they are arranged in that series. For either all things partake of

similitude to this cause without a cause, or that which is the same

in all is derived from it. But the former of these is impossible. For

that which is without a cause is also fortuitous. But the fortuitous

can never take place in things in which there is order, connection,

and an invariable sameness of subsistence. From the cause therefore,

which ranks as a leader, every series receives the peculiarity of the

hypostasis of that cause. But if from it, it is evident that this

is accompanied with a diminution and decrement adapted to secondary

natures. For either the peculiarity exists similarly in the leader,

and the natures that are secondary, and how in this case can the

former be the leader, but the latter be allotted an hypostasis after

the leader? Or it exists dissimilarly. And if this be the case, it is

evident that sameness is derived to the multitude from one thing, but

not vice versa. And the illustrious peculiarity of the series which is

primarily in one thing [or the leader,] is secondarily in the multitude

[suspended from the leading cause].

PROPOSITION XCVIII.

Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no

where.

* * * * *

For by the communication of its own power it is every where. For this

is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted

to participate of it, rules over all secondary beings, and is present

to all things by the prolific progressions of its illuminations.

But by an essence unmingled with things in place, and by its exempt

purity, it is no where. For if it is separate, it is established above

all things. In a similar manner also, it is in no one of the natures

inferior to itself. For if it was alone every where, it would not

indeed be prevented from being a cause, and from subsisting in all its

participants. But it would not be prior to all of them in a separate

manner. If also it was no where without being every where, it would

not indeed be prevented from being prior to all things, and from being

nothing pertaining to subordinate natures. But it would not be in all

things, as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects,[251]

by the abundant and unenvying communications of themselves. In order

therefore, that existing as a cause, it may be in all things that are

able to partake of it, and that being separate in itself, it may be

prior to all the natures that are filled by it, it is every where, and

at the same time no where.

And it is not indeed partly every where and partly no where. For thus

it would be divulsed and separate from itself, if one part of it was

every where in all things, but another was no where, and prior to all

things. But the whole of it is every where, and in a similar manner no

where. For the things which are able to participate of it, meet with

the whole of it, and find the whole present with themselves, that at

the same time being wholly exempt from them. For the participant does

not place this separate cause in itself, but participates of it as much

as it is capable of receiving. Nor in the communication of itself does

it become contracted by the multitude of the participations of it; for

it is separate. Nor do its participants participate of it defectively;

for that which imparts is every where.

PROPOSITION XCIX.

Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive

its subsistence from another cause. But it is itself the principle and

cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series

is unbegotten.

* * * * *

For if it is imparticipable in its own proper series, it is allotted

the principality, and does not proceed from other things. For it

would no longer be the first, if it received this peculiarity,

according to which it is imparticipable, from something else.[252]

But if it is inferior to other things, and proceeds from them, it

does not proceed from them so far as it is imparticipable, but so

far as it participates. For of the things from which it originates,

it doubtless participates, and it is not primarily the things of

which it participates. Hence, it is not from a cause so far as it is

imparticipable. For so far as it is from a cause it participates, and

is not imparticipable. But so far as it is imparticipable, it is the

cause of things that are participated, and is not itself a participant

of other things.

PROPOSITION C.

Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause and

principle. But all imparticipables are suspended from the one principle

of all things.

* * * * *

For if each series suffers something which is the same [or a certain

sameness,] there is something in each which is the leader, and the

cause of this sameness. For as all beings are from unity, so every

series is from unity. But again, all imparticipable monads are referred

to _the one_; because all of them are analogous to _the one_. So far

therefore, as they also suffer something which is the same through

an analogy to _the one_, so far a reduction of them to _the one_ is

effected. And so far indeed, as all of them are from _the one_, no

one of these is a principle. But so far as each is imparticipable,

so far each is a principle. Hence, being the principles of certain

things, they are suspended from the principle of all things. For that

is the principle of all things of which all things participate. All

things however alone entirely participate of the first; but of other

things not all, but certain things participate. Hence also that [i.e.

the ineffable] is simply the first, but other things are firsts with

reference to a certain thing, but simply are not firsts.

PROPOSITION CI.

Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things that participate

of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that participate of

life, and imparticipable being of all things that participate of

being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to

intellect.

* * * * *

For because in each series of beings, imparticipables are prior to

things which are participated, it is necessary that intellect should

be prior to intellectuals, that life should be prior to vital natures,

and that being itself should be prior to beings. Because however,

that which is the cause of a greater number of effects, precedes that

which is the cause of a less number, hence, among these, being will

be the first; for it is present with all things to which life and

intellect are present. For every thing that lives and participates of

intelligence necessarily _is_; but not vice versa. For many beings

neither live, nor energize intellectually.[253] But life is the second.

For all things that participate of intellect, participate also of life,

but not vice versa. For many things live indeed, but are left destitute

of knowledge. And intellect is the third. For every thing which is in

any manner whatever gnostic, also lives and is. If therefore being is

the cause of a greater number of effects, but life of a less number,

and intellect of still fewer effects, being is the first, life the

second, and intellect the third.

PROPOSITION CII.

All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consist of bound and the

infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings

are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings

participate of knowledge, through the first intellect.

* * * * *

For if that which is imparticipable in each series imparts its own

peculiarity to all the natures under the same series, it is evident

that the first being also imparts to all things bound, and at the same

time infinity, since it is itself primarily mixed from these. Life also

imparts to all things the motion which it possesses in itself. For

life is the first progression and motion from the stable hypostasis of

being. And intellect imparts knowledge to all things. For the summit

of all knowledge is in intellect. And intellect is the first gnostic

nature.

PROPOSITION CIII.

All things are in all, but appropriately in each.

* * * * *

For in being there is life and intellect; and in life, being and

intellection; and in intellect being and life. But in intellect

indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in

being, all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists

either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to

participation; and in the first, the rest are according to cause; in

the second, the first is according to participation, but the third,

according to cause; and in the third, the natures prior to it are

according to participation;--this being the case, life and intellect

have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since however, each thing

is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause

(for cause pertains to other things, i.e. to effects) nor according

to participation (for a thing derives that elsewhere of which it

participates,)--hence in being there is truly life and intellection,

essential life, and essential intellect. And in life, there is being

indeed according to participation, but intellection according to cause.

Each of these however, subsist there vitally. For the hyparxis is

according to life. And in intellect, life and essence subsist according

to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For

knowledge is the essence and the life of intellect.

PROPOSITION CIV.

Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its

energy eternal.

* * * * *

For if it primarily participates of the perpetuity of eternity, it

does not partially participate of it, but entirely. For either it

participates of it in energy, but not in essence. This however is

impossible; since in this case, energy would be more excellent than

essence. Or it participates of it according to essence, but does not

participate of it according to energy. In this case however, that which

is primarily eternal, and that which primarily participates of time

will be the same. And time indeed, will primarily measure the essence

of certain things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time,

will not measure the essence of any thing, if that which is primarily

eternal, is not essentially contained by eternity. Hence every thing

which is primarily eternal, has both an eternal essence and energy.

PROPOSITION CV.

Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is

immortal.

* * * * *

For if the immortal is that which always participates of life, but

that which always participates of life, participates also of being,

and that which always lives, always is,--hence, every thing immortal

is perpetual. But the immortal is that which is unreceptive of death,

and always lives. And the perpetual is that which is unreceptive of

non-being, and always is. If however, there are many beings more and

less excellent than life, which are unreceptive of death, but exist

always;--if this be the case, not every thing which is perpetual is

immortal. That however, there are many beings not immortal, that exist

always, is evident. For there are certain beings indeed, which are

destitute of life, but which exist always, and are indestructible. For

as being is to life, so is the perpetual to the immortal. For the life

which cannot be taken away is immortal, and the being which cannot be

taken away is perpetual. But being is more comprehensive than life, and

therefore the perpetual is more comprehensive than the immortal.[254]

PROPOSITION CVI.

The medium of every thing which is entirely eternal both in essence and

energy, and of every thing which has its essence in time, is that which

is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time.

* * * * *

For that which has its essence comprehended by time, is entirely

temporal. For by a much greater priority, this will be allotted a

temporal energy. But that which is entirely temporal, is in every

respect dissimilar to that which is entirely eternal. But all

progressions are through similars. Hence there is something between

these. The medium therefore, is either that which is eternal in

essence, but temporal in energy, or vice versa. This latter however, is

impossible. For energy would be more excellent than essence. It remains

therefore, that the medium is the former of these.

PROPOSITION CVII.

Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly temporal, is at one and

the same time being and generation.

* * * * *

For every thing eternal is being, and that which is measured by time

is generation. So that if the same thing participates of time and

eternity, yet not according to the same, it will be both being and

generation.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that generation indeed, having a

temporal essence, is suspended from that which partly partakes of

being, and partly of generation, participating at once of eternity

and time. But this is suspended from that which is in every respect

eternal. And that which is in every respect eternal, is suspended from

being which is prior to the eternal.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

Every thing which is partial in each order, is able to participate in

a twofold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior

order, viz. either through its own wholeness or through that which is

partial in the superior order, and co-ordinate with the thing according

to an analogy to the whole series.

* * * * *

For if conversion is to all things through similitude, that which is

partial in an inferior order, is dissimilar to that which is monadic

and a whole in a superior order. And in short, is as that which is

partial, to a whole, and as one order to another. But a partial nature

is similar to a whole of the same series, through a communion of

peculiarity, and to the proximately superior co-ordinate peculiarity

through an analogous subsistence. It is evident, therefore, that

through these media a conversion from one to the other is effected, as

through similars to that which is similar.[255] For the one is similar

as the partial to that which is partial, but the other as that which

is the appropriate of the same series. But the whole of the superior

series is dissimilar in both these respects.

PROPOSITION CIX.

Every[256] partial intellect participates of the unity which is above

intellect and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a

whole, and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with this

partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, participates of the

intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole,

and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body

participates of the soul which is a whole through the wholeness of

nature, and a partial soul.

* * * * *

For every thing partial participates of the monad which is in a

superior order, either through its proper wholeness, or through that

which is partial in that order, and which is co-ordinate to the thing.

PROPOSITION CX.

Of all the things that are arranged in each series, such as are first,

and are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of the

natures which are proximately established in the superior series,

through analogy. But such as are more imperfect and remote from their

proper principle, are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures.

* * * * *

For because such things as are first, are allied to those in a

superior series, being allotted a better and more divine nature in

the order to which they belong, but such things as are more imperfect

proceed further from their principle, and are allotted a secondary and

ministrant, but not a primary and leading progression in the whole

series;--this being the case, the former are necessarily connascently

conjoined to the things in a superior order; but the latter are

unadapted to be conjoined with them. For all things are not of an

equal dignity, though they may belong to the same order. For there is

not one and the same ratio in all. But all things proceed from their

proper monad, as from one, and with reference to one thing. Hence, they

are not allotted the same power. But some things are able to receive

proximately the participations[257] of superior natures; while others

being dissimilar to them by proceeding to a greater distance from their

principles, are deprived of a power of this kind.

PROPOSITION CXI.

Of every intellectual series, some things are divine intellects,

receiving the participations of the Gods; but others are intellects

alone. And of every psychical series, some things are intellectual

souls, suspended from their proper intellects; but others are souls

alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have souls supernally

presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the

presence of souls.

* * * * *

For of each series, not the whole genus is adapted to be suspended

from that which is prior to itself, but that which is more perfect

in it, and sufficient to be connascent with superior natures.

Neither, therefore, is every intellect suspended from deity, but

those intellects only which are supreme and most single. For these

are allied to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of

participable intellect,[258] but such only as are most intellectual.

Nor do all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of the

soul which is participated, but those only that are more perfect, and

possess in a greater degree the form of reason. And this is the mode of

demonstration in all things.

PROPOSITION CXII.

Of every order those things that are first, have the form of the

natures prior to them.

* * * * *

For the highest genera in each order, are conjoined through similitude

to the natures placed above them,[259] and through the connexion and

coherence of the progression of wholes. Hence, such as the superior

natures are primarily, such also is the form which these highest

genera are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of those in the

superior order. They are also such according to the peculiarity of

subsistence as are the natures prior to them.

PROPOSITION CXIII.

Every divine number is unical.

* * * * *

For if a divine number has a precedaneous cause, viz. _the one_,

just as an intellectual number has intellect, and a psychical number

soul, and if multitude is every where analogous to its cause, it is

evident that a divine number is unical, since _the one_ is God. But

this follows, since _the one_ and _the good_ are the same. For _the

good_ and God are the same. For that beyond which there is nothing,

and after which all things aspire, is God. And also that from which

all things proceed, and to which all things tend. But this is good. If

therefore, there is a multitude of Gods, the multitude is unical. But

that there is, is evident. For every principal cause is the leader of

an appropriate multitude which is similar and allied to the cause.

PROPOSITION CXIV.

Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a

God.

* * * * *

For if the number of unities is twofold, as has been before

demonstrated, and some are self-perfect, but others are illuminations

from the self-perfect unities, and if a divine number is allied to and

connatural with _the one_ and _the good_, the Gods are self-perfect

unities. And vice versa, if there is a self-perfect unity it is a God.

For as unity is in the most eminent degree allied to _the one_, and the

self-perfect to _the good_, so likewise according to both these the

self-perfect participates of the divine peculiarity and is a God. But

if a God was a unity, yet not a self-perfect unity, or a self-perfect

hypostasis, yet not a unity, he would be arranged in another order, on

account of the mutation of the peculiarity.[260]

PROPOSITION CXV.

Every God is superessential, supervital, and superintellectual.

* * * * *

For if each is a self-perfect unity, but neither being, life, or

intellect is a unity, but that which is united, it is evident that

every God is beyond each of these. For if these differ from each other,

but all are in all, each of these being all will not be one only.

Farther still, if the first God is superessential, but every God is of

the series of the first, so far as a God, each will be superessential.

But that the first God is superessential,[261] is evident. For essence

is not the same with unity, nor is to exist the same thing as to be

united. If, however, these are not the same, either the first God is

both these, and in this case he will not be one only, but something

else besides _the one_, and will participate of unity, but will not be

_the one itself_; or he is one of these. But if indeed he is essence,

he will be indigent of _the one_. It is, however, impossible that _the

good_, and _the first_ should be indigent. Hence, he is one alone; and

therefore superessential. But if each thing imparts the peculiarity of

that which it is primarily to the whole series [of which it is the

leader], hence, every divine number is superessential; since every

principal cause produces similars prior to dissimilars. If, therefore,

the first God is superessential, all the Gods will be superessential.

For they will be entirely similar [to the first]. Since, however, they

are also essences, they will be produced from the first essence, as the

monads of essences.

PROPOSITION CXVI.

Every deity except _the one_ is participable.

* * * * *

For that _the one_ is imparticipable is evident, since if it were

participated, and on this account pertained to something else, it would

no longer be similarly the cause of all things; both of such as are

prior to beings, and of beings themselves. But that the other unities

are participated, we shall thus demonstrate. For if there is another

imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from _the

one_? For either it subsists after the same manner as that; and how

in this case is the one the second, but the other first? Or it does

not subsist after the same manner. And thus one of these will be _the

one itself_, but the other _one_ and _not one_. This _non-one_ also,

if it is no hypostasis whatever, will be _one_ alone. But if it is a

certain other hypostasis besides _the one_, in this case _the one_

will be participated by the _non-one_. And that will be a self-perfect

one, which conjoins the non-one with _the one_. So that again God will

be this [viz. the one] so far as he is God. But that which is non-one

will subsist in the participation of _the one_. Every unity, therefore,

which subsists after _the one_ is participable, and every God is

participable.

PROPOSITION CXVII.

Every God is the measure of beings.

* * * * *

For if every God is unical, he defines and measures all the multitude

of beings. For all multitudes being in their own nature indefinite, are

bounded through _the one_. But that which is one being [or being

characterized by _the one_] measuring and terminating the natures

with which it is present, leads into bound that which according to its

own power is not bounded. For the one being has the form of _the

one_ by participation.

But that which is uniform, or has the form of the one, recedes from

indefiniteness and infinity. And by how much the more uniform it is,

by so much the less[264] is it indefinite, and without measure. Every

multitude of beings, therefore, is measured by the divine unities.

PROPOSITION CXVIII.

Every thing which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to

their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and

superessential. Hence, all things are contained in them unically and

superessentially.

* * * * *

For if every thing subsists in a three-fold manner, viz. either

according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to

participation, but the first number of all things is the divine number,

nothing will be in the Gods according to participation, but all things

will subsist in them either according to hyparxis, or according to

cause. Such things, however, as they antecedently comprehend, as being

the causes of all things, they antecedently comprehend in a manner

appropriate to their own union. For every thing which is the leader of

secondary natures causally, contains the cause of things subordinate,

in a way naturally adapted to itself. All things, therefore, are in the

Gods unically and superessentially.

PROPOSITION CXIX.

Every God subsists according to superessential goodness, and is good

neither according to participation, nor according to essence, but

superessentially; since habits and essences are allotted a secondary

and manifold order from the Gods.

* * * * *

For if the first God is _the one_ and _the good_, and so far as he is

_the one_, he is also _the good_, and so far as _the good, the one_, if

this be the case, every series of the Gods has the form of _the one_,

and the form of _the good_, according to one peculiarity, and each of

the Gods is not a unity and goodness according to any thing else. But

each so far as he is a unity, so far he is a goodness, and so far as he

is a goodness, so far he is a unity. So far also as the Gods posterior

to the first God proceed from the first, they have the form of _the

good_, and the form of _the one_, since the first is _the one_ and

_the good_. But so far as all of them are Gods, they are unities and

goodnesses. As, therefore, _the one_ of the Gods is superessential, so

likewise is their goodness, since it is nothing else than _the one_.

For each of them is not any thing else than _the good_, but is good

alone; as neither is each any thing else than _the one_, but is one

alone.

PROPOSITION CXX.

Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a providential inspection of

the whole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods.

* * * * *

For all other things which are posterior to the Gods, energize

providentially through the participation of them. But providence

is connascent with the Gods. For if to impart good to the subjects

of providential energy, is the prerogative of the providential

peculiarity, but all the Gods are goodnesses, either they do not impart

themselves to anything, and thus nothing will be good in secondary

natures. And whence will that be derived which subsists according

to participation, except from those natures that primarily possess

peculiarities? Or if they do impart themselves, they impart good, and

in consequence of this providentially attend to all things. Providence,

therefore, subsists primarily in the Gods. For where is the energy

which is prior to intellect, except in superessential natures? But

providence (προνοια), as the name signifies, is an energy prior to

intellect (ενεργεια εστι προ νου). The Gods, therefore, from being

Gods, and from being goodnesses, provide for all things, and fill all

things with the goodness which is prior to intellect.

PROPOSITION CXXI.

Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses

a power which is unsubdued and at once incomprehensible by all

secondary natures.

* * * * *

For if it providentially attends to the whole of things, there is in

it a power which has dominion over the subjects of its providential

energy; through which being unsubdued and uncircumscribed by all

things, divine natures fill all things with, and subject all things to

themselves. For every thing of a ruling nature, which is the cause of

other things, and has dominion over them, rules through abundance of

power, and predominates according to nature.

The first power, therefore, is in the Gods, not indeed having dominion

over some things, but not over others, but equally comprehending in

itself according to cause the powers of all beings, this power neither

being essential, nor much less unessential; but being connascent

with the hyparxis of the Gods, and superessential. Moreover, the

boundaries of all knowledge, presubsist uniformly in the Gods. For

through divine knowledge, which is exempt from the whole of things,

all other knowledge has a subsistence; this knowledge neither being

intellectual, nor much less, being a certain knowledge posterior to

intellect, but being established according to the divine peculiarity

above intellect. Whether, therefore, there is a divine knowledge, this

knowledge is occult and uniform [or has the form of _the one_].

Or whether there is a power uncircumscribed by all things, this power

is in a similar manner comprehensive of all things. Or whether there

is a divine goodness, this goodness defines the hyparxis of the Gods.

For if all things are in the Gods, knowledge, power, and goodness are

also in them. But their hyparxis is characterized by that which is most

excellent, and their hypostasis also is according to that which is

best. But this is goodness.

PROPOSITION CXXII.

Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from

the subjects of its providential care, providence neither relaxing

the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a

separate union abolishing providence.

* * * * *

For divine beings abiding in their unical nature, and in their own

hyparxis, fill all things with the power of themselves. And every

thing which is able to participate of them, enjoys the good which

it is capable of receiving, according to the measures of its proper

hypostasis; divine natures, in the mean time, illuminating beings

with good, by their very essence, or rather prior to essence. For

that which is divine being nothing else than goodness, it supplies

all things with an unenvying abundance of good, by its very being,

not making a distribution according to a reasoning process; but other

things receiving indeed according to their desert, and divine natures

according to their hyparxis. Neither, therefore, in providing for other

things, do they receive a habitude, or alliance with the subjects of

their providential care. For they benefit all things by being that

which they are. But every thing which makes by its very essence, makes

without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For habitude is

an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor being

separate, do they withdraw their providential care. For thus they

would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hyparxis, the

peculiarity of which is goodness. For it is the province of goodness

to extend itself to every thing which is able to participate of it.

And the greatest of all things is not that which is boniform, but that

which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this

beneficent nature, or the Gods will possess it prior to beings. For it

is not possible that a greater good should be present with the natures

that are good by participation, but a less good with those that are

primarily good.

PROPOSITION CXXIII.

Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of its superessential

union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is

comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, _that which is

first_, is alone perfectly unknown, as being imparticipable.

* * * * *

For all knowledge which subsists through reasoning and language,

pertains to beings, and in beings possesses the apprehension of

truth. For it comes into contact with conceptions, and subsists in

intellections. But the Gods are beyond all beings. Neither, therefore,

is that which is divine doxastic, or the object of opinion, nor is it

dianoëtic, nor intelligible. For every being is either sensible, and

on this account doxastic, or truly existing being, and on this account

intelligible, or it is between these, subsisting as _being_ and

at the same time _generation_, and on this account is dianoëtic.

If, therefore, the Gods are superessential, and subsist prior to

beings, there is neither any opinion of them, nor science and dianoia,

nor intellection. But the nature of their peculiarities is known by

the beings that are suspended from them. And this by a necessary

consequence. For the differences of participants are co-divided

conformably to the peculiarities of the participated natures. And

neither does every thing participate of every thing; for there is no

co-ordination of things perfectly dissimilar. Nor does any casual thing

participate of that which is casual. But that which is kindred is

conjoined to that which is kindred, and proceeds from that to which it

is allied.

PROPOSITION CXXIV.

Every God knows partible natures impartibly, temporal natures, without

time, things which are not necessary, necessarily, mutable natures,

immutably; and in short, all things in a manner more excellent than the

order of the things known.

* * * * *

For if every thing which is with the Gods, is with them according

to their peculiarity, it is evident that the knowledge in the Gods

of things inferior, will not subsist according to the nature of the

inferior things, but according to the exempt transcendency of the

Gods. Hence, their knowledge of multiplied and passive natures, will

be uniform and impassive. If, therefore, the object of knowledge is

partible, divine knowledge will be impartible. If the objects that are

known are mutable, the knowledge of the Gods will be immutable; if they

are contingent, they will be known by the Gods necessarily; and if they

are indefinite, definitely. For that which is divine, does not receive

knowledge from subordinate beings, in order that thus the knowledge may

be such as is the nature of the thing known. But subordinate beings

become indefinite about the definite nature of the Gods, are changed

about their immutability, receive passively that which is impassive

in them, and temporally that which in them is without time. For it is

possible for subordinate to be surpassed by more excellent natures; but

it is not lawful for the Gods to receive any thing from beings inferior

to themselves.

PROPOSITION CXXV.

Every God, from that order from which he began to unfold himself

into light, proceeds through all secondary natures, always indeed

multiplying and dividing the communications of himself, but preserving

the peculiarity of his own hypostasis.

* * * * *

For progressions being effected through diminution, first natures are

every where after a manner multiplied into the decrements of secondary

natures. But these proceeding according to a similitude to their

producing causes receive their orderly distribution, so that the whole

of that which proceeds is after a manner the same with, and different

from, that which abides; through its diminution indeed, appearing to

be different, but through continuity with its cause, not departing

from sameness with it. But such as that which abides is among first,

such is that which proceeds, among secondary natures; and thus an

indissoluble communion of the series is preserved. Each of the Gods,

therefore, is unfolded into light appropriately, in the orders in which

he makes his evolution. But he proceeds from thence, as far as to the

last of things, through the generative power of first natures. He is

always, however, multiplied according to a progression from unity into

multitude. But he preserves sameness in the progression, through the

similitude of the things that proceed to the leader and primary cause

of each series.

PROPOSITION CXXVI.

Every God who is nearer to _the one_ is more total, but the God who is

more remote from it is more partial.

* * * * *

For the God, who is the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer

to that which produces all things; but he who is the cause of a less

number is more remote from it. And he indeed, who is the cause of a

greater number of effects, is more total; but he who is the cause of

a less number, is more partial. And each indeed, is a unity; but the

one is greater, and the other less in power. The more partial Gods

also are generated from the more total; the latter not being divided,

for they are unities; nor changed in quality, for they are immoveable;

nor multiplied by habitude, for they are unmingled. But they generate

secondary progressions from themselves, which are the decrements of the

natures prior to them, through abundance of power.

PROPOSITION CXXVII.

Every thing divine, is especially primarily simple, and on this account

most sufficient to itself.

* * * * *

For that it is indeed simple, is evident from its union; since every

thing divine is most unical. But a thing of this kind is transcendently

simple. That it is also most sufficient to itself, may be learnt by

considering that a composite nature is indigent, if not of other things

to which it is external, yet of those things of which it is composed.

But that which is most simple and unical, and which establishes itself

in _the good_, is most sufficient to itself. Such, however, is every

thing divine. Neither, therefore, is it indigent of other things,

existing as goodness itself, nor of things requisite to composition,

because it is unical.

PROPOSITION CXXVIII.

Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is

participated without a medium; but when participated by natures

more remote from himself, the participation is through a less or

greater[265] number of media.

* * * * *

For the former through their alliance being uniform, are immediately

able to participate of the divine unities; but the latter through their

diminution, and extension into multitude, require other things which

are more united, in order that they may participate of the unities

themselves, and not of things united. For united multitude subsists

between unity itself and divided multitude; being indeed able[266]

to coalesce with unity, but allied in a certain respect to divided

multitude, through the representation of multitude.

PROPOSITION CXXIX.

Every divine body is divine through a deified soul. But every soul

is divine through a divine intellect. And every intellect is divine

through the participation of a divine unity. And unity indeed is of

itself a God; intellect is most divine; soul is divine; but body is

deiform. For if every number of the Gods is above intellect, but

participations are effected through kindred and similar natures, the

impartible essence will primarily participate of the superessential

unities. But the nature which comes into contact with generation will

participate of them secondarily. And generation in the third place.

Each of these likewise participates of them through the proximately

superior natures. And the peculiarity of the Gods indeed proceeds, as

far as to the last of things, in its participants; but through media

allied to itself. For unity indeed imparts the transcendent power

of itself to the first intellect, among divine natures, and causes

this intellect to be like itself according to unical multitude. But

through intellect it is also present with soul, conjoining soul with

intellect and co-inflaming it [with divine fire], when this intellect

is participable. And through the echo[267] of soul, imparting also to

body its own peculiarity, if it is a body which participates something

of soul. And thus body becomes not only animated and intellectual,

but also divine. For it receives life indeed and motion from soul;

but indissoluble permanency from intellect; and divine union from

participated unity.[268] For each of these imparts its own hyparxis to

the subsequent natures.

PROPOSITION CXXX.

In every divine order, such things as are first, are in a greater

degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged under them, than

these latter are from things subsequent. And secondary natures in a

greater degree adhere to their proximate superiors, than following

natures to these.

* * * * *

For by how much more unical and total any thing is, by so much the

more is it allotted a greater transcendency with respect to subsequent

natures. And by how much the more diminished it is according to power,

by so much the more is it connascent with the natures posterior to

itself. And more elevated natures indeed are more united with their

more principal causes; but inferior natures are less united with

them. For it is the province of a greater power to be more exempt

from subordinate, and to be more united to better natures. As on the

contrary, it is the province of a diminution of power, to recede

in a greater degree from more excellent, and to be co-passive with

subordinate natures. And this happens to secondary, but not to first

natures, in every order of things.

PROPOSITION CXXXI.

Every God begins his own energy from himself.

* * * * *

For he first exhibits the peculiarity of his presence with secondary

natures, in himself; because he imparts himself to other things also

according to his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is deficiency

adapted to the Gods, nor fulness alone. For every thing deficient is

imperfect, and not being itself perfect, it is impossible it should

make another thing to be perfect. But that which is full is alone

sufficient to itself, and is not yet prepared to communicate. It is

necessary, therefore, that the nature which fills other things, and

which extends to other things the communications of itself should be

super-plenary or exuberantly full. Hence, if a divine nature fills all

things from itself with the good which it contains in itself, it is

exuberantly full. And if this be the case, establishing first in itself

the peculiarity which it imparts to others, it will extend to them the

communications of super-plenary goodness.

PROPOSITION CXXXII.

All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by a medium.

* * * * *

For all the progressions of beings are effected through similars;

and much more will the orders of the Gods possess an indissoluble

continuity, as subsisting uniformly, and being defined according to

_the one_, which is the principal cause of their existence. The

decrements, therefore, are produced unitedly, and alone according to

the similitude in beings of secondary to first natures. And this,

because the hyparxis of the Gods much more consists in union than the

subsistence of beings. All the divine genera, therefore, are bound

together by appropriate media; and first natures do not proceed into

progressions perfectly different without a medium, but through the

genera common to each, from which they proceed, and of which they are

immediately the causes. For these congregate the extremes into one

union, being spread under some things connascently, but proximately

exempt from others. And they preserve the well-ordered generation of

divine natures.

PROPOSITION CXXXIII.

Every God is a beneficent unity or an unific (ενοποιος) goodness; and

each, so far as a God, possesses this hyparxis. The first God, however,

is simply good, and simply one. But each posterior to the first, is a

certain goodness, and a certain unity.

* * * * *

For the divine peculiarity distinguishes the unities and goodnesses of

the Gods, so that each according to a certain peculiarity of goodness,

such as that of perfecting, or connectedly-containing, or defending,

benefits all things. For each of these is a certain good, but not every

good. But the first God pre-establishes a unical cause. Hence, that is

_the good_, as giving subsistence to all goodness. For all the

hyparxes of the Gods, are not together equal to _the one_; so

great a transcendency is the first God allotted with respect to the

multitude of the Gods.

PROPOSITION CXXXIV.

Every divine intellect, intellectually perceives indeed, as intellect,

but energizes providentially as a God.

* * * * *

For it is the illustrious prerogative of intellect to know beings, and

to have its perfection in intellections. But it is the province of a

God to energize providentially, and to fill all things with good. This

communication, however, and replenishing with good, is accomplished

through the union of the replenishing natures with the causes prior to

themselves; which intellect, also imitating, passes into sameness with

intelligibles. A divine intellect, therefore, so far as it energizes

providentially, is a God; providence being established in an energy

prior to intellect. Hence, as a God it imparts itself to all things;

but as intellect it is not present with all things. For a divine nature

extends to things into which the intellectual peculiarity does not

proceed. For beings which are without intellect desire to energize

providentially, and to participate of a certain good. But this is

because all things indeed do not aspire after intellect, not even all

such as are able to participate of it. All things, however, aspire

after good, and hasten to obtain it.

PROPOSITION CXXXV.

Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or

without a medium; and every deified nature is extended to one divine

unity. As many also as are the participated unities, so many are the

participating genera of beings.

* * * * *

For neither two or more unities are participated by one being. For

since the peculiarities in the unities are different, must not that

which is connascent with each be different also, since contact is

effected through similitude? Nor is one unity participated in a divided

manner by many beings. For many beings are unadapted to be conjoined

with unity, and as _beings_ they are unconjoined with the unity which

is prior to beings, and as _many_, they are separated from unity. It

is necessary, however, that the thing which participates should be

partly similar to that which is participated, and partly different and

dissimilar. Since, therefore, that which participates is something

belonging to beings, but unity is superessential, and according to

this they are dissimilar; it is necessary that the participant should

be one, in order that according to this, it may be similar to _the

one_ which is participated, though of these, the latter is one in such

a manner as to be unity, but the former, so as to be passive to _the

one_, and to be united through the participation of unity.

PROPOSITION CXXXVI.

Every God who is more total, and arranged nearer to the first, is

participated by a more total genus of beings. But the God who is more

partial, and more remote from the first, is participated by a more

partial genus of beings. And as being is to being, so is one divine

unity to another.

* * * * *

For if unities are as many in number as beings, and vice versa, and

one unity is participated by one being, it is evident that the order

of beings proceeds according to the order of the unities, being

assimilated to the order prior to beings. And more total beings indeed

are connascent with more total unities; but more partial beings

with more partial unities. For if this were not the case, again

similars would be conjoined with dissimilars, and there would not

be a distribution according to desert. These things, however, are

impossible. Since from thence the one, and an appropriate measure are

luminously imparted to all things, and from these proceed. Much more,

therefore, will there be an order of participation in these, similars

being suspended as much as possible from similars.

PROPOSITION CXXXVII.

Every unity in conjunction with _the one_ gives subsistence to the

being which participates of it.

* * * * *

For _the one_, as it gives subsistence to all things, so likewise it

is the cause of the participated unities, and of beings suspended

from these unities. But the unity belonging to every being produces

the peculiarity which shines forth in that particular being. And _the

one_ indeed is the cause of existence simply; but unity is the cause

of alliance, because it is connascent with _the one_. Hence, unity is

that which of itself defines the being which participates of it, and

essentially exhibits in itself a superessential peculiarity. For every

where, from that which is primary that which is secondary is that which

it is. If, therefore, there is a certain superessential peculiarity

of deity, this also belongs to the being which participates of it

superessentially.

PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.

Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity,

the first and highest is _being itself_.

* * * * *

For if being is beyond intellect and life, as has been demonstrated,

and if it is also after _the one_ the cause of the greatest number

of effects, being will be the highest deified nature. For it is more

single than life and intellect, and is on this account entirely more

venerable. But there is not any thing else prior to it except _the

one_. For prior to unical multitude what else can there be except

_the one_? But being is unical multitude as consisting of bound

and infinity. And in short, the superessential one[269] is prior

to essence. Since also in the illuminations which are imparted to

secondary natures, _the one_ alone extends beyond being. But being

is immediately posterior to _the one_. For that which is being in

capacity, but is not yet being, is nevertheless according to its own

nature one. And that which follows the being that is in capacity is

now being in energy. Hence, in the principles of things, non-being is

immediately beyond being, as something more excellent, and no other

than _the one itself_.

PROPOSITION CXXXIX.

All things which participate of the divine unities, originate indeed

from being, but end in a corporeal nature.

* * * * *

For being is the first of participants, but body the last; for we say

that there are divine bodies. For the highest of all the genera of

bodies, souls and intellects, are attributed to the Gods, that in every

order, things analogous to the Gods may connect and preserve secondary

natures, and that each number may be a whole, containing all things

in itself, according to the whole which is in a part, and possessing

prior to other things the divine peculiarity. The divine genus,

therefore, subsists corporeally, psychically, and intellectually. And

it is evident that all these are divine according to participation.

For that which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. Hence, the

participants of the divine unities originate indeed from being, but end

in a corporeal nature.

PROPOSITION CXL.

All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and

proceeding through appropriate media, extend as far as to the last of

things, and to places about the earth.

* * * * *

For neither does any thing intercept these powers, and exclude them

from being present with all things. For they are not in want of

places and intervals, on account of their unrestrained transcendency

with respect to all things, and a presence every where unmingled.

Nor is that which is adapted to participate of them, prohibited from

participation. But as soon as any thing is prepared for participation,

they also are present, neither then approaching, nor prior to this

being absent, but always possessing an invariable sameness of

subsistence. If, therefore, any terrene nature is adapted to the

participation of these divine powers, they are present with it, and

fill all things with themselves. And indeed they are in a greater

degree present with superior natures. But they are present with those

of a middle nature, according to the order which they possess. And

with such natures as are last, they are present in an ultimate degree.

From on high, therefore, they extend themselves as far as to the last

of things. Hence also, in last natures there are representations of

such as are first, and _all things sympathize with all_;[270]

secondary indeed, pre-existing in first natures, but first natures

presenting themselves to the view in such as are second. For every

thing subsists in a three-fold manner, either according to cause, or

according to hyparxis, or according to participation.

PROPOSITION CXLI.

Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one indeed being exempt from

the natures for which it provides, but the other being co-arranged with

them.

* * * * *

For some divine essences indeed, according to hyparxis, and the

peculiarity of their order, are entirely expanded above the illuminated

natures. But others being of the same order, provide for things

subordinate that are of the same co-ordination; these also imitating

the providential energy of the exempt Gods, and desiring to fill

secondary natures with the good which they are able to impart.

PROPOSITION CXLII.

The Gods are present with all things after the same manner, but all

things are not after the same manner present with the Gods. But every

thing participates of their presence according to its own order and

power. And this is accomplished by some things uniformly, but by others

manifoldly; by some things eternally, but by others according to time;

and by some things incorporeally, but by others corporeally.

* * * * *

For it is necessary that the different participation of the same

things, should become different, either from the participant, or from

that which is participated. But every thing divine always possesses

the same order, and is without habitude to, and unmingled with all

things. It remains therefore, that the mutation must subsist from the

participants, and that in these that which is not invariably the same

must be found, and that at different times they are differently present

with the Gods. Hence, the Gods being present with all things with

invariable sameness, all things are not after the same manner present

with them. But other things are present with them as far as they are

able, and according to the manner in which they are present they enjoy

their illuminations. For the participation is according to the measure

of the presence of the divinities.

PROPOSITION CXLIII.

All inferior natures fail before the presence of the Gods, though that

which participates of them may be adapted to participation. Every thing

foreign indeed from divine light becomes far removed from it. But all

things are illuminated at once by the Gods.

* * * * *

For divine natures are always more comprehensive and more powerful

than the things which proceed from them. But the inaptitude of the

participants, becomes the cause of the privation[271] of divine

illumination. For this inaptitude obscures it by its own imbecility.

And this being obscured, something else appears to receive dominion,

not according to its own power, but according to the imbecility of

the participant, which seems to rise against the divine form of the

illumination.

PROPOSITION CXLIV.

All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their

progressions, as the orders of the Gods.

* * * * *

For the Gods produce beings in conjunction with themselves, nor is any

thing able to subsist, and to receive measure and order external to the

Gods, [or beyond their influence.] For all things are perfected through

their power, and are arranged and measured by the Gods. Prior therefore

to the last genera in beings, the Gods pre-exist, who also adorn these

genera, and impart to them life, formation and perfection, and convert

them to _the good_. In a similar manner also, the Gods are prior

to the middle and first genera of beings. And all things are bound and

rooted in the Gods, and through this cause are preserved. But when any

thing apostatizes from, and becomes destitute of the Gods, it entirely

departs into non-entity and vanishes, in consequence of being perfectly

deprived of those natures by which it was contained.

PROPOSITION CXLV.

The peculiarity of every divine order pervades through all secondary

natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate genera of beings.

* * * * *

For if beings proceed as far as the orders of the Gods extend, in every

genus of beings, there is a supernally-illuminated peculiarity of the

divine powers. For every thing receives from its proximate appropriate

cause, the peculiarity according to which that cause is allotted its

subsistence. I say for instance, if there is a certain cathartic or

purifying deity, there is also a purification in souls, in animals, in

plants, and in stones. And in a similar manner, if there is a guardian,

a convertive, a perfective, and a vivific power. And a stone indeed

participates of the divine cathartic power in a corporeal manner only.

But a plant participates it still more clearly according to life. An

animal possesses this form according to impulse; the rational soul

rationally; intellect, intellectually; and the Gods superessentially

and unically. The whole series also has the same power from one divine

cause. And there is the same mode of reasoning with respect to the

peculiarities of the other divine powers. For all things are suspended

from the Gods. And different natures are illuminated by different

Gods; every divine series extending as far as to the last of things.

And some things indeed are suspended from the Gods immediately, but

others through a greater or less number of media. But _all things are

full[272] of Gods_. And whatever any thing naturally possesses, it

derives from the Gods.

PROPOSITION CXLVI.

The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their

principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end,

through conversion to their principles.

* * * * *

For if every thing that has proceeded, is converted to the proper

principle from which it proceeded, much more will total orders

having proceeded from their summit be again converted to it. But

the conversion of the end to the beginning, renders the whole order

one, definite, and converging to itself, and exhibiting through the

convergency, that which has the form of _the one_ in the multitude.

PROPOSITION CXLVII.

The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the

natures [proximately] situated above them.

* * * * *

For if it is necessary that there should be an uninterrupted connection

of the divine progression, and that each order should be bound together

by appropriate media, it is necessary that the summits of secondary

should be conjoined with the terminations of first orders. But this

contact is through similitude. Hence there will be a similitude of the

principles of an inferior, to the ends of a [proximately] superior

order.

PROPOSITION CXLVIII.

Every divine order is united to itself in a three-fold manner, from the

summit which is in it, from its middle, and from its end.

* * * * *

For the summit possessing a power which is most single, transmits union

to all the series, and unites the whole of it supernally abiding in

itself. But the middle extending to both the extremes, binds together

the whole order about itself; transmitting indeed, the gifts of primary

divine natures, but extending the powers of such as are last, and

inserting communion in all of them, and a conjunction with each other.

For thus the whole order becomes one, from natures that replenish

and those that are filled, converging to the middle as to a certain

centre. And the end again returning to the beginning, and recalling

the proceeding powers, imparts similitude and convergency to the whole

order. And thus the whole order is one through the unific power of

primary natures, through the connexion existing in the middle, and

through the conversion of the end to the principle of the progressions.

PROPOSITION CXLIX.

Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded according to number.

* * * * *

For if this multitude is most near to _the one_ it will not be

infinite. For the infinite is not connascent with, but foreign from

_the one_. Indeed, if multitude is of itself, or in its own nature,

separated from _the one_, it is evident that infinite multitude is

perfectly destitute of it. Hence it is powerless, and inefficacious.

The multitude of the Gods therefore, is not infinite. Hence it has the

form of _the one_ and is finite, and is more finite than every other

multitude. For it is nearer to _the one_ than all other multitude. If

therefore the principle of things was multitude, it would be necessary

that what is nearer to the principle should be a greater multitude than

what is more remote from it. For that which is nearer to any thing is

more similar to it. Since however, that which is first is _the one_,

the multitude which is conjoined with it, is a less multitude than that

which is more remote from it. But the infinite is not a less, but is

the greatest possible multitude.

PROPOSITION CL.

Every thing which proceeds in the divine orders, is not naturally

adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor in

short, are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the

natures prior to themselves, but the latter have certain powers exempt

from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings

posterior to themselves.

* * * * *

For if the peculiarities of the Gods differ from each other, those of

the subordinate pre-exist in the superior divinities; but those of

the superior being more total, are not in the subordinate. But more

excellent natures impart indeed some things to their progeny, but

antecedently assume others in themselves, in an exempt manner. For it

has been demonstrated that those Gods who are nearer to _the one_

are more total; and those more remote from it more partial. But if the

more total have powers comprehensive of the more partial, those that

have a secondary and more partial order, will not comprehend the power

of the more total Gods. In the superior therefore, there is something

incomprehensible and uncircumscribed by the inferior orders. For

each of the divine orders is truly infinite.[273] Nor is that which

is infinite, as has been demonstrated,[274] infinite to itself, nor

much less to things above itself, but to all the natures posterior

to itself. But infinite in these last is incapacity. The infinite

however, is incomprehensible by those natures to which it is infinite.

Subordinate natures therefore, do not participate of all the powers

which more excellent natures antecedently comprehend in themselves.

For the latter are incomprehensible by the former. Hence things of a

secondary nature, from their more partial subsistence, will neither

possess all the powers of more excellent beings, nor will they possess

the powers which they do contain after the same manner as superior

natures, on account of that infinity through which the latter transcend

the former.

PROPOSITION CLI.

Every thing paternal in the Gods is of a primary nature, and is

pre-established in the rank of _the good_, according to all the

divine orders.

* * * * *

For it produces the hyparxes of secondary natures, and total powers

and essences, according to one ineffable transcendency. Hence also it

is denominated paternal, in consequence of exhibiting the united and

boniform power of _the one_, and the cause which gives subsistence

to secondary natures. And according to each order of the Gods, the

paternal genus ranks as the leader, producing all things from itself,

and adorning them, as being arranged analogous to _the good_. And of

divine fathers, some are more total, but others are more partial, just

as the orders themselves of the Gods, differ by the more total, and the

more partial, according to the reason of cause. As many therefore, as

are the progressions of the Gods, so many also are the differences of

fathers. For if there is that which is analogous to _the good_ in every

order, it is necessary that there should be the paternal in all the

orders, and that each order should proceed from the paternal union.

PROPOSITION CLII.

Every thing which is generative in the Gods, proceeds according to

the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through

all things, and transcendently exhibiting the never-failing in the

progressions of secondary natures.

* * * * *

For to multiply things which proceed, and to produce things into

progeny, from the occult comprehension in causes, of what else is it

the prerogative, than of the infinite power of the Gods, through which

all divine natures are filled with prolific good? For every thing which

is full produces other things from itself according to a super-plenary

power. The domination of power therefore is the peculiarity of

generative deity, which multiplies the powers of the things generated,

and renders them prolific, and excites them to generate and give

subsistence to other things. For if every thing imparts the appropriate

peculiarity which it possesses primarily to other things, every thing

which is prolific will impart progression, and will adumbrate the

infinity which is the primary leader of wholes, from which every

generative power proceeds, and which in an exempt manner pours forth

the ever-flowing progressions of divine natures.

PROPOSITION CLIII.

[Every thing which is perfect in the Gods,[275]] is the cause of divine

perfection.

* * * * *

For as the hypostases of beings are of one kind, but those of

superessential natures of another, so likewise with respect to

perfections, those of the Gods themselves according to hyparxis, are

different from those of beings, which are secondary and posterior to

them. And the former indeed, are self-perfect and primary, because

_the good_ subsists primarily in them; but the latter possess

perfection according to participation. Hence the perfection of the Gods

is one thing, and that of deified natures is another. The perfection

however, which is primarily in the Gods, is not only the cause of

perfection to deified natures, but also to the Gods themselves. For

if every thing so far as it is perfect, is converted to its proper

principle, that which is the cause of all divine conversion, is the

perfective genus of the Gods.

PROPOSITION CLIV.

Every thing which is of a guardian nature in the Gods, preserves every

thing in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt[276] from secondary,

and established[277] in primary natures.

* * * * *

For if a guard immutably preserves the measure of the order of every

thing, and connectedly contains all the natures that are guarded

in their appropriate perfection, it will impart to all things a

transcendency exempt from subordinate beings, and will firmly establish

each thing unmingled, in itself, existing as the cause of undefiled

purity to the natures that are guarded, and fixing them in superior

beings. For every thing is perfect which adheres to primary natures,

but is in itself alone, and is expanded above things subordinate.

PROPOSITION CLV.

Every thing vivific in the Gods is [a generative cause, but every

generative cause is not vivific.[278]]

* * * * *

For a generative is more total than a vivific cause, and is nearer to

the principle of all things. For generation manifests a cause which

produces beings into multitude. But vivification represents to us

the deity who is the supplier of all life. If therefore the former

multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter gives subsistence

to the progressions of life,--if this be the case, as being is to life,

so is the generative order to the vivific series. The former therefore,

will be more total, and the cause of a greater number of effects, and

will on this account be nearer to the principle of all things.

PROPOSITION CLVI.

Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guardian order. But on

the contrary, not every thing of a guardian order is the same with the

purifying genus.

* * * * *

For purity imparts to all the Gods the unmingled with things inferior,

and the undefiled in the providence of secondary natures. But a

guardian power also effects this, and contains all things in itself,

and firmly inserts them in superior natures. The guardian therefore is

more total than the purifying genus. For in short, the peculiarity of

the guardian power, is to preserve the order of every thing the same

with reference to itself, and to the natures prior and posterior to

itself. But the peculiarity of purity is to keep more excellent natures

exempt from such as are subordinate. These powers however primarily

subsist in the Gods. For it is necessary that there should be one cause

preceding that which is in all things, and in short, it is requisite

that there should be uniform measures of all good, and that these

should be comprehended by the Gods according to cause. For there is no

good in secondary natures which does not pre-exist in the Gods. [Hence

in the divinities purity is likewise a primary good, guardianship, and

every thing of this kind.[279]]

PROPOSITION CLVII.

Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and

gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every thing which

is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to composite

natures, and precedes their order, and division according to number,

and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal cause, in the

more partial genera of things.

* * * * *

For each of these belongs to the order of bound; since hyparxis also,

number and form, have all of them the nature of bound. Hence, in this

respect they are co-ordinate with each other. But the demiurgic or

fabricative cause indeed, produces fabrication into multitude. And

the uniform, or that which has the form of _the one_ supplies

the progressions of beings. And the former indeed, is the artificer

of form, but the latter produces essence. So far therefore, as these

differ from each other, viz. form and being, so far also does the

paternal differ from the demiurgic cause. But form is a _certain_

being.[280] Hence the paternal cause is more total and causal, and is

beyond the demiurgic genus, in the same manner as being is beyond form.

PROPOSITION CLVIII.

Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from a purifying cause,

and from the convertive genera.

* * * * *

For it is evident that this cause also has necessarily a primary

subsistence in the Gods; since all the causes of total good pre-exist

in the divinities. But it subsists prior to the purifying cause. For

the one liberates from things of a subordinate nature, but the other

conjoins with more excellent natures. The elevating however, has a

more partial order than the convertive cause. For every thing which

converts, [is converted either to itself, or to that which is more

excellent than itself.[281]] But the energy of the elevating cause

is characterized by a conversion to that which is more excellent, as

leading that which is converted to a superior and more divine cause.

PROPOSITION CLIX.

Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, bound and

infinity. But one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, and

another from infinity.

* * * * *

For every order proceeds from both these, because the communications

of first causes pervade through all secondary natures. But in some

things bound predominates in the mixture [of bound and infinity,] and

in others infinity. And thus the genus which has the form of bound has

its completion, in which the prerogatives of bound have dominion. This

too is the case with the genus which has the form of the infinite, and

in which the properties of infinity predominate.

PROPOSITION CLX.

_Concerning Intellect._

Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of _the one_,

and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from itself, and

produces other intellects.

* * * * *

For if it is a God it is filled with divine unities, and is uniform.

But if this be the case, it is also perfect, being full of divine

goodness. And if this be admitted, it is likewise primarily intellect,

as being united to the Gods. But being primarily intellect, it also

gives an hypostasis to other intellects. For all secondary natures

obtain their hyparxis from such as have a primary subsistence.

PROPOSITION CLXI.

Every thing which is truly being, and is suspended from the Gods, is

divine and imparticipable.

* * * * *

For since that which is truly being, is the first of the natures

that participate of the divine union, it likewise fills intellect

from itself. For intellect is being, as replete with being, and is

therefore a divine intelligible. And so far indeed as it is deified

it is divine, but as filling intellect, and being participated by

it, it is intelligible. Intellect also is being, on account of that

which is primarily being. But that which is primarily being itself is

separate from intellect; because intellect is posterior to being. But

imparticipables subsist prior to things which are participated. Hence

being which subsists by itself and is imparticipable, is prior to

the being which is conjoined with intellect. For it is intelligible,

not as co-arranged with intellect, but as perfecting intellect in an

exempt manner, because it imparts being to it, and fills it with truly

existing essence.

PROPOSITION CLXII.