CHAPTER LI.

In the last place, I shall present the reader with what Plato says in

the Timæus about the name of the world, and add to it the elucidations

of Proclus; for thus every thing pertaining to the mundane Gods, and

their great recipient the universe will have been amply, and I trust

satisfactorily discussed. Plato therefore says on this subject: “We

shall denominate the universe, _heaven_, or _the world_, or by any

other appellation in which it may especially rejoice.” These names,

says Proclus, were attended with much ambiguity with the ancients. For

some alone called the sublunary region κοσμος _kosmos, the world_,

and the region above it ουρανος _ouranos, heaven_; but others called

_heaven_ a part of _the world_. And some indeed, considered the moon

as the boundary of _heaven_; but others denominated the summits of

generation _heaven_. Thus Homer,

Extended heaven in ether and the clouds

Fell to the lot of Jove.

Hence Plato very properly prior to the whole theory speaks definitively

concerning these names, denominating the universe _heaven_ and

_the world_. And he calls it _heaven_ indeed, as perceiving the

things above, contemplating the intelligible, and participating an

intellectual essence; but _the world_, as always being filled and

adorned by true beings. He likewise denominates it _heaven_ as being

converted to the principles of its existence; but _the world_ as

proceeding from them. For it was generated by true beings, and is

converted to them. As however, of statues which are established

by the telestic (or mystic) art, some things are apparent[201] in

them, but others are inwardly concealed, which are symbolical[202]

of the presence of the Gods, and are known to the mystic framers of

them alone; after the same manner the universe being the statue of

the intelligible world, and perfected by the father, has some things

apparent which are indications of its divinity, but others unapparent,

which are the marks, seals, or impressions of the participation of true

being,[203] which it received from the father who gave it perfection;

in order that through these it may be eternally rooted in real essence.

The appellations also _heaven_ and _the world_ are names significant

of the apparent powers in the universe; the latter indeed, so far as

they proceed from the intelligible, but the former, so far as they are

converted to it.

It is necessary however, to know that the divine name of the abiding

power of the universe, and which is a symbol of the demiurgic seal,

according to which also it subsists in unproceeding union with

real being, is ineffable, and not vocal, and is known to the Gods

themselves. For there are appropriate names in every order of things;

divine indeed, in the Gods; but dianoetic in the subjects of the

discursive power of reason; and doxastic in the objects of opinion. And

this also Plato asserts in the Cratylus, assenting to Homer who places

one kind of names of the same things in the Gods, and another kind in

the opinions of men, as

Gods call it Xanthus, but Scamander men.

And

Chalcis its name with those of heav’nly birth.

But call’d Cymindis by the sons of earth.

And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of

the Gods is of one kind, but that of partial souls of another, so

names in the former are different from those in the latter. Divine

names however, unfold the whole essence of the things named; but

those of men only effect this partially. Plato therefore knowing

that this pre-existed in the world, omits to mention what the divine

and ineffable name of it is which is different from the apparent, and

with great caution speaks of it as a symbol of the divine impression

which the world contains. For the words, “or by any other appellation

in which it may especially rejoice,” are a latent hymn of the mundane

name so far as it is allotted an unspeakable and divine essence, in

order that it may be co-ordinate to that which is signified by him.

Hence also, divine mundane names are delivered by theurgists; some

being called by them ineffable, but others effable; and some of them

being the names of the unapparent powers in the world, but others,

of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Plato

therefore, here delivers both the apparent and the unapparent name of

the world, the former indeed, dyadically, but the latter monadically;

for the words, “or by any other,” are significant of oneness. And

_the ineffable name_ indeed of the universe, is indicative of its

abiding in its father; the name _world_, of its progression; and

_heaven_, of its regression. But through the three, you have the

final cause, on account of which it is full of good, abiding indeed

ineffably, but proceeding perfectly, and returning to _the good_,

as to the pre-existing object of desire.

THE

ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

PROPOSITION I.

All multitude participates in a certain respect of _the one_.

* * * * *

For if it in no respect participates of _the one_, neither will the

whole be one whole, nor each of the many of which the multitude

consists; but there will also be a certain multitude arising from

each of these, and this will be the case to infinity. Each of

these infinites, likewise, will again be infinite multitude. For

participating in no respect of any one, neither according to the whole

of itself, nor according to each of the many which it contains, it will

be in every respect, and according to the whole, infinite. For each of

the many which you may assume, will either be one, or not one, will

either be many or nothing. But if each is nothing, that also which

consists of these will be nothing. And if each is many, each will

consist of infinites infinitely: [and this not in capacity, but in

energy]. These things, however, are impossible. For neither does any

being consist of infinites infinitely assumed; since there is not more

than the infinite; but that which consists of all is more than each.

Nor is it possible for any thing to be composed from nothing. All

multitude, therefore, participates in a certain respect of _the one_.

PROPOSITION II.

Every thing which participates of _the one_, is both one and not

one.

* * * * *

For if it is not _the one_ itself (since it participates of _the one_)

being something else besides _the one_, it suffers, or is passive

to it according to participation, and sustains to become one. If,

therefore, it is nothing besides _the one_, it is one alone, and does

not participate of _the one_, but will be _the one itself_. But if

it is something besides _the one_, which is not _the one_, but its

participant, it is both _not one_, and _one_, not indeed such a one as

the one itself, but _one being_, as participating of _the one_. This,

therefore, is not one, nor is it that which _the one_ is. But it is

one, and at the same time a participant of _the one_. Hence, being

of itself not one, it is both one and not one, being something else

besides _the one_. And so far indeed as it abounds, it is not one, but

so far as it is passive [to the one] it is one. Every thing, therefore,

which participates of _the one_, is both one, and not one.

PROPOSITION III.

Every thing which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of

_the one_, and is one, so far as it suffers the participation of _the

one_.

* * * * *

For if things which are not one become one, they doubtless become so by

a conjunction and communication with each other, and they sustain the

presence of _the one_, not being that which _the one itself_ is. Hence,

they participate of _the one_ so far as they suffer to become one. For,

if they are already one they will not become one; since that which is

does not become that which it is already. But if they become one from

nothing, i.e. from the privation of _the one_, since a certain one

is ingenerated in them, _the one itself_ is prior to them. [And this

ingenerated one must be derived from _the one itself_. Every thing,

therefore, which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of

_the one_, &c.[204]]

PROPOSITION IV.

Every thing which is united is different from _the one itself_.

* * * * *

For if it is united, it will participate in a certain respect of

_the one_, so far as it is said to be united. That, however, which

participates of _the one_, is both one and not one. But _the one

itself_ is not both one and not one. For if this were the case, again

the one which is in it would have both these, and this would take place

to infinity, there being no _one itself_ at which it is possible to

stop; but every thing being one and not one, there will be something

united which is different from _the one_. For if _the one_ is the

same with the united, it will be infinite multitude. And in a similar

manner each of the things of which the united consists will be infinite

multitude. [Every thing, therefore, which is united is different from

_the one itself_.[205]]

PROPOSITION V.

All multitude is posterior to _the one_.

* * * * *

For if multitude is prior to _the one_, _the one_ indeed will

participate of multitude, but multitude which is prior to _the one_

will not participate of _the one_, since that multitude existed prior

to the subsistence of _the one_. For it will not participate of that

which is not; because that which participates of _the one_, is one

and at the same time not one; but _the one_ will not yet subsist,

that which is first being multitude. It is, however, impossible that

there should be a certain multitude, which in no respect whatever

participates of _the one_. Multitude, therefore, is not prior to _the

one_.

But if multitude subsists simultaneously with _the one_, and they

are naturally co-ordinate with each other; for nothing of time will

prevent them being so; neither will _the one_ of itself be many, nor

will multitude be one, as being at one and the same time oppositely

divided by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other.

Hence, multitude of itself will not be one, and each of the things

that are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity,

which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature,

participates of _the one_, and it will not be possible to assume any

thing of it which is not one. For not being one, it will be an infinite

consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence, it entirely

participates of _the one_. If, therefore, _the one_ which is of itself

one, in no respect participates of multitude, multitude will be

entirely posterior to _the one_; participating indeed of _the one_, but

not being participated by _the one_.

But if _the one_ also participates of multitude, subsisting indeed as

one according to hyparxis, but as not one, according to participation,

_the one_ will be multiplied, just as multitude is united on account of

_the one_. _The one_, therefore, will communicate with multitude, and

multitude with _the one_. But things which coalesce, and communicate

in a certain respect with each other, if indeed they are collected

together by something else, that something else is prior to them. But

if they themselves collect themselves, they are not opposed to each

other. For opposites do not hasten to each other. Hence, if _the one_

and multitude are oppositely divided, and multitude so far as multitude

is not one, and _the one_ so far as one is not multitude, neither will

one of these subsisting in the other be one and at the same time two.

If, also, there is something prior to them which collects them, this

will either be one, or not one. But if it is not one, it will either be

many or nothing. It will not however be many, lest multitude should

be prior to _the one_, nor yet will it be nothing. For how can nothing

congregate? It is, therefore, one alone. For this which is the one

cannot be many, lest there should be a progression to infinity. It is,

therefore, _the one itself_, and all multitude is from _the one itself_.

PROPOSITION VI.

_Concerning Unity._

Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.

* * * * *

For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and

again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident.

But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united, or unities

(εναδες). And if, indeed, it participates of _the one_ it is united;

but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united

consists, it will be unities. For if there is _the one itself_, there

is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is primarily

united. But this consists of unities. For if it consists of things

united, again things united consist of certain things, and this will be

the case to infinity. It is necessary, however, that what is primarily

united should consist of unities. And thus we have discovered what we

proposed at first, [viz. that every multitude consists either of things

united, or of unities.]

PROPOSITION VII.

_Concerning producing causes and things produced._

Every thing productive of another is more excellent than the nature of

the thing produced.

* * * * *

For it is either more excellent, or less excellent, or equal. Hence,

that which is produced from this, will either also itself possess a

power productive of something else, or it will be entirely unprolific.

But if it is unprolific, according to this very thing it will be

inferior to that by which it was produced. And through its inefficacy

it is unequal to its cause which is prolific, and has the power of

producing. But if it also is productive of other things, it either

likewise produces that which is equal to itself, and this in a similar

manner in all things, and all beings will be equal to each other, and

no one thing will be better than another, that which produces, always

giving subsistence in a consequent series to that which is equal to

itself; or it produces that which is unequal to itself, and thus that

which is produced, will no longer be equal to that which produces it.

For it is the province of equal powers to produce equal things. The

progeny of these, however, will be unequal to each other, if that which

produces indeed, is equal to the cause prior to itself, but the thing

posterior to it is unequal to it. Hence, it is not proper that the

thing produced should be equal to its producing cause.

Moreover, neither will that which produces ever be less than that which

is produced by it. For if it imparts essence to the thing produced, it

will also supply it with essential power. But if it is productive of

all the power which that posterior to it possesses, it will also be

able to produce itself such as that posterior nature is. And if this

be the case it will also make itself[206] more powerful. For impotency

cannot hinder, productive power being present, nor a defect of will;

since all things naturally aspire after good. Hence, if it is able to

render another thing more perfect, it will also perfect itself before

it perfects that which is posterior to itself. Hence, that which is

produced, is not equal to, nor more excellent than, its producing

cause. The producing cause, therefore, is in every respect better than

the nature of the thing produced.

PROPOSITION VIII.

_Concerning the first good, which is called_ the good itself.

That which is primarily good, and which is no other than _the good

itself_ is the leader of all things that in any way whatever

participate of good.

* * * * *

For if all beings aspire after good, it is evident that what is

primarily good is beyond beings. For if it is the same with some one

being, either being and _the good_ are the same, and this particular

being will no longer be desirous of good, since it is that to which

it is passive, [i.e. since it is _the good_]. For that which aspires

after any thing is indigent of that after which it aspires, and is

different from it. And [if some one being and _the good_ are the same]

being indeed will participate, and that which is participated in being

will be _the good_. Hence, _the good_ is a certain good inherent in a

certain participant, and after which the participant alone aspires,

but is not that which is simply good, and which all beings desire. For

this is the common object of desire to all beings. But that which is

inherent in a certain thing, pertains to that alone which participates

of it. Hence, that which is primarily good, is nothing else than good.

For whatever else you may add to it, you will diminish by the addition

_the good_, and will make it to be a certain good, instead of that

which is simply good. For that which is added not being _the good_, but

something less than it will by its own essence diminish _the good_.

PROPOSITION IX.

_Concerning that which is sufficient to itself._

Every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence,

or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not

sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended

from another cause.

* * * * *

For if all beings naturally aspire after good, and one thing supplies

well-being from itself,[207] but another is indigent of something

else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the

other separate and apart. By how much the nearer, therefore, the

former is to that which supplies the object of desire [i.e. to _the

good_], by so much the more excellent will it be than that which is

indigent of a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection

of its hyparxis, or its energy. For since that which is sufficient to

itself is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to _the good

itself_ [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished

indeed through participating of _the good_, and because it is not

primarily _the good_. Yet it is in a certain respect allied to it, so

far as it is able to possess good from itself. But to participate, and

to participate through another, are more remote from that which is

primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.

PROPOSITION X.

Every thing which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is

simply good.

* * * * *

For what else is a thing sufficient to itself, than that which from

itself and in itself possesses good? But this is now full of good, and

participates of it, but is not that which is simply good. For that is

better than participation and plenitude, as has been demonstrated.

If, therefore, that which is sufficient to itself, fills itself with

good, that from which it fills itself, will be more excellent than

the self-sufficient, and will be above self-sufficiency. And neither

will that which is simply good be indigent of any thing. For it does

not aspire after any thing else; since by aspiring after it would be

deficient of good. Nor is that which is simply good sufficient to

itself. For thus it would be full of good, and would not be primarily

the good.

PROPOSITION XI.

_Concerning Cause._

All beings proceed from one first cause.

* * * * *

For either there is not any cause of beings, or the causes of all

finite things are in a circle, or the ascent is to infinity, and one

thing is the cause of another, and the pre-subsistence of essence

will in no respect stop. If, however, there is no cause of beings,

there will neither be an order of things second and first, of things

perfecting and perfected, of things adorning and adorned, of things

generating and generated, and of agents and patients, nor will there

be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of

science, and we are then said to know scientifically, when we know the

causes of things.[208]

But if causes revolve in a circle, the same things will be prior and

posterior, more powerful and more imbecil. For every thing which

produces is better than the nature of that which is produced. It makes,

however, no difference to conjoin cause to effect, and to produce from

cause, through many, or through fewer media. For cause will be more

excellent than all the intermediate natures of which it is the cause.

And by how much the more numerous the media, by so much greater is the

causality of the cause.

And if the addition of causes is to infinity, and there is always again

another cause prior to another, there will be no science of any being.

For there is not a knowledge of any thing infinite. But causes being

unknown, neither will there be a science of the things consequent to

the causes. If, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a cause

of beings, and causes are distinct from the things caused, and there

is not an ascent to infinity, there is a first cause of beings, from

which as from a root every thing proceeds; some things indeed being

nearer to, but others more remote from it. For that it is necessary

there should be one principle has been demonstrated;[209] because all

multitude subsists posterior to _the one_.

PROPOSITION XII.

The principle and first cause of all beings is _the good_.

* * * * *

For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been above

demonstrated] it is requisite to call that cause either _the good_,

or that which is more excellent than _the good_. But if it is more

excellent than _the good_, whether is any thing imparted by it to

beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And if indeed nothing

is imparted by it an absurdity will ensue. For we shall no longer

preserve it in the order of cause; since it is every where requisite

that something should be present from cause to things caused,[210] and

especially from the first cause from which all things are suspended,

and on account of which every being exists. But if something is

imparted by it to beings, in the same manner as there is by _the good_,

there will be something better than goodness in beings imparted to

them by the first cause. For being more excellent than, and above _the

good_, it can never bestow on secondary natures any thing subordinate

to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself.[211] But

what can be more excellent than goodness? Since we say that the more

excellent itself is that which participates of a greater good. Hence,

if that which is not good cannot be said to be more excellent than,

it must entirely be secondary to _the good_. If, likewise, all beings

aspire after _the good_, how is it any longer possible that there

should be something prior to this cause? For if they also aspire after

that which is prior to _the good_, how can they especially aspire after

_the good_? But if they do not aspire after it, how is it possible that

things which proceed from it should not desire the cause of all? Hence,

if it is _the good_ from which all beings are suspended, _the good_ is

the principle and first cause of all things.

PROPOSITION XIII.

Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union

is good; and _the good_ is the same with _the one_.

* * * * *

For if _the good_ is preservative of all beings, (on which account

also it is desirable to all things) but that which is preservative

and connective of the essence of every thing, is _the one_; for all

things are preserved by _the one_, and dispersion removes every

thing from essence;--if this be the case, _the good_ will cause

those things to which it is present, to be one, and will connect and

contain them according to union. And if _the one_ is collective and

connective of beings, it will perfect every thing by its presence.

Hence, therefore, it is good to all things to be united. If, however,

union is of itself good, and good has the power of uniting, the simply

good, and the simply one are the same, uniting and at the same time

benefiting beings. Hence it is that those things which after a manner

fall off from _the good_, are at the same time also deprived of the

participation of _the one_. And those things which become destitute

of _the one_, being filled with separation, are after the same manner

likewise deprived of _the good_. Hence, goodness is union, and union is

goodness, and _the one_ is that which is primarily good.

PROPOSITION XIV.

_Concerning the immoveable and self-motive principle, or cause._

Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if moved, it is either

moved by itself, or by another. And if indeed it is moved by itself,

it is self-motive; but if by another, it is alter-motive. Every thing

therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.

* * * * *

For it is necessary since there are alter-motive natures, that there

should also be that which is immoveable, and that the self-motive

nature should subsist between these. For if every thing alter-motive

is moved in consequence of being moved by another thing, motions will

either be in a circle, or they will proceed to infinity.[212] But

they will neither be in a circle, nor have an infinite progression,

since all beings are bounded by the principle of things and that which

moves is better than that which is moved. Hence there will be something

immoveable which first moves.[213] But if this be the case, it is also

necessary that there should be something which is self-motive. For

if[214] all things should stop, what will that be which is first moved?

It cannot be that which is immoveable;[215] for it is not naturally

adapted to be moved; nor that which is alter-motive; for that is

moved by something else. It remains therefore, that the self-motive

nature is that which is primarily moved. For it is this also which

conjoins alter-motive natures to that which is immoveable, being in

a certain respect a middle, moving and at the same time being moved.

For of these, the immoveable moves only, but the alter-motive is moved

only. Every thing therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or

alter-motive.

COROLLARY.

From these things likewise, it is evident, that of things which are

moved, the self-motive nature is the first; but that of things which

move the immoveable is the first.

PROPOSITION XV.

_Concerning an incorporeal essence, and what the peculiarity of it

is._

Every thing which is converted to itself is incorporeal.

* * * * *

For no body is naturally adapted to revert to itself. For if that

which is converted to any thing is conjoined with that to which it

is converted, it is evident that all the parts of the body which is

converted to itself, will be conjoined with all the parts. For this

it is for a thing to be converted to itself, when both that which is

converted, and that to which it is converted, become one. This however

is impossible in body, and in short, in all partible things. For the

whole of that which is partible is not conjoined with the whole, on

account of the separation of the parts, some of which are situated

differently from others. No body therefore, is naturally adapted to

revert to itself, so as that the whole may be converted to the whole.

Hence if there is any thing which has the power of reverting to itself,

it is incorporeal and impartible.

PROPOSITION XVI.

Every thing which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from

all body.

* * * * *

For if it was inseparable from any body whatever, it would not have a

certain energy separate from body.[216] For thus energy would be more

excellent than essence; since the latter indeed would be indigent of

bodies, but the former would be sufficient to itself, and would not be

in want of bodies: If therefore any thing is essentially inseparable

from body, it is also in a similar manner inseparable according to

energy, or rather it is in a still greater degree inseparable. But

if this be the case, it will not revert to itself. For that which is

converted to itself being something different from body, has an energy

separate from body, and not either through, or together with body,

since the energy, and that to which the energy is directed, are not

at all in want of body. Hence, that which is converted to itself, is

entirely separate from bodies.

PROPOSITION XVII.

Every thing which moves itself primarily, is convertive to itself.

* * * * *

For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself,

that which moves, and that which is moved are at the same time one. For

it either moves in a part but is moved in a part, or the whole moves

and is moved, [or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or[217]] the

contrary. But if one part indeed, is that which moves, and another part

is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since

it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear

indeed to be so, yet are not so essentially.

If however, the whole moves, but the part is moved, or the contrary,

there will be a certain part in both which according to one, moves and

at the same time is moved.[218] And this is that which is primarily

self-motive. If however, one and the same thing moves and is moved,

it will have the energy of moving to itself, being motive of itself.

But it is converted to that towards which it energizes. Every thing

therefore which primarily moves itself, is converted to itself.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

Every thing which imparts existence to others, is itself that primarily

which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with

existence.

* * * * *

For if it gives existence, and makes the communication from its own

essence, that which it gives is subordinate to its own essence [by

the 7th Proposition]. But that which it is, it is in a greater and

more perfect degree; since every thing which gives subsistence to a

certain thing, is better than and not the same with it. For it is

primarily, but the other is secondarily that which it is. For it is

necessary either that each should be the same, and that there should

be one definition of both, or that there should be nothing common and

the same in both, or that the one should subsist primarily, but the

other secondarily. If however indeed, there is the same definition of

both, the one will no longer be cause, but the other effect; nor will

the one subsist essentially, but the other by participation; nor will

the one be the maker, but the other the thing made. But if they have

nothing which is the same, the one will not give subsistence to the

other by its very being, in consequence of communicating nothing to

the existence of the other. Hence, it remains that the one should be

primarily that which it gives, but that the other should be secondarily

that to which existence is given; the former supplying the latter from

its very being.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings,

is present to all the beings that are arranged according to that

nature, and this conformably to one reason, and after the same manner.

* * * * *

For if it is not present to all of them after the same manner, but to

some and not to others, it is evident that it was not primarily in

that nature, but that it is in some things primarily, and in others

secondarily, that sometimes participate of it. For that which at one

time exists, but at another time does not, does not exist primarily,

nor of itself. But it is adventitious, and is imparted from some other

place to the things in which it is thus inherent.

PROPOSITION XX.

The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature

is beyond all souls, and _the one_ is beyond all intellectual

hypostases.

* * * * *

For every body is moveable by something else, but is not naturally

adapted to move itself, but by the presence of soul is moved of itself,

lives on account of soul, and when soul is present, is in a certain

respect self-moveable, but when it is absent is alter-moveable, as

deriving this nature from soul which is allotted a self-moveable

essence. For to whatever nature soul is present, to this it imparts

self-motion. It is however, by a much greater priority that which it

imparts by its very being. Hence, it is beyond bodies, which become

self-moveable by participation as being essentially self-moveable.

Again however, soul which is moved from itself, has an order secondary

to the immoveable nature, which subsists immoveable according to

energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-moveable

essence is the leader; but of all that move, the immoveable is the

leader. If therefore soul being moved from itself, moves other things,

it is necessary that prior to it, there should be that which moves

immoveably. But intellect moves being immoveable, and energizing

always with an invariable sameness of subsistence. For soul on account

of intellect participates of perpetual intellectual energy, just as

body on account of soul possesses the power of moving itself. For if

perpetual intellection was primarily in soul, it would be inherent

in all souls, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence,

perpetual intellection is not primarily in soul. It is necessary

therefore, that prior to it, there should be that which is primarily

intellective. And hence, intellect is prior to souls.

Moreover, _the one_ is prior to intellect. For intellect though it

is immoveable yet is not _the one_; for it intellectually perceives

itself, and energizes about itself. And of _the one_ indeed, all

beings in whatever way they may exist, participate; but all beings

do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom intellect

is present by participation, necessarily participate of knowledge;

because intellectual knowledge is the principle and first cause of the

gnostic energy. _The one_ therefore, is beyond intellect; and there

is no longer any thing else beyond _the one_. For _the one_ and _the

good_ are the same. But _the good_, as has been demonstrated, is the

principle of all things.

PROPOSITION XXI.

_That intellect is not the first cause._

Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude

co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred

to one monad.

* * * * *

For the monad having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude

allied to itself. Hence one series, and one whole order has a decrement

into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order,

or a series, if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude

is again referred to the one common cause of all co-ordinate natures.

For that in every multitude which is the same, has not its progression

from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that

which subsists from one alone of the many, is not common to all, but

eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since

in every order there is a certain communion, connexion, and sameness,

through which some things are said to be co-ordinate, but others of a

different order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order

from one principle.[219] In each order, therefore, there is one monad

prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connexion to the

natures arranged in it, both to each other, and to the whole.

For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under

the same series: but that which ranks as the cause of the one series,

must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must

be generated by it as co-ordinate, not so that each will be a certain

particular thing, but that each will belong to this order.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are

inherent in the nature of body; that one nature has many natures

co-suspended from it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature

of the universe. It follows also, that the order of souls originates

from one first soul, and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of

souls. That in the intellectual essence also, there is an intellectual

monad; and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one intellect,

and is converted to it. That a multitude of unities likewise originates

from _the one_ which is prior to all things; and that there is an

extension of these unities to _the one_. Hence, after the first

one there are unities; after the first intellect, there are intellects;

after the first soul there are souls; and after total nature, there are

natures.

PROPOSITION XXII.

Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is

one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten.

* * * * *

For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist;

since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two;

or let that which subsists primarily consist of both these. But if

indeed it consists of both, it will again be one, and there will not be

two things that are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not

be first. Nor if both are equally primary, will each have a principal

subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same

with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists

primarily, which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But

each of these being different is, and at the same time is not that

which it is said to be.

If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily

differ so far as they are that which they are said to be; for this

primarily suffers that which is the same; both will not be first, but

that of which both participating, are said to subsist primarily.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that what is primarily being is one

alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two;

that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first

intellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with

every form, such as the primarily beautiful, and the primarily equal.

And in a similar manner in all things. Thus also, with respect to the

form of animal, and the form of man, the first of each is one; for the

demonstration is the same.

PROPOSITION XXIII.

_Concerning the Imparticipable._[220]

Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which

are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to

imparticipable hyparxes.

* * * * *

For that which is imparticipable having the relation of a monad, as

subsisting from itself, and not from another, and being exempt from

participants, generates things which are able to be participated.

For either[221] it remains of itself barren, and possesses nothing

honourable; or it gives something from itself. And that which receives

indeed from it participates, but that which is given subsists in a

participated manner. But every thing which is something belonging to

a certain thing by which it is participated,[222] is secondary to

that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all

things from itself. For that which is in one thing is not in others.

But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it

may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all

things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or it is

prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things being distributed

into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which

is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same

thing, but this of one thing, and that of another, the one being

divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be common

to all, but to one thing. Hence if it is common to things able to

participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is

imparticipable.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is

participated; and that which is participated is inferior to that which

is imparticipable.

* * * * *

For that which participates, being imperfect prior to participation,

but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to

that which is participated, so far as it is perfect by participating.

For so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it

participates, which makes it to be perfect. That however which is

participated since it belongs to a certain thing, and not to all

things, is again allotted an hyparxis subordinate to that which is

something belonging to all things, and not to a certain thing. For

the latter is more allied to the cause of all; but the former is less

allied to it.

The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are

participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in

short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is

participated in the many, is one and at the same time not one; and

every thing which participates is not one, and at the same time one.

PROPOSITION XXV.

_Concerning the Perfect._

Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it

is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all.

* * * * *

For as that on account of its own goodness, unically gives subsistence

to all beings; for _the good_ and _the one_ are the same, so that the

boniform is the same with the unical; thus also those things which

are posterior to the first, on account of their perfection, hasten

to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection is

a certain portion of _the good_, and the perfect, so far as it is

perfect, imitates _the good_. But _the good_ gives subsistence to all

things. So that the perfect likewise, is productive according to nature

of those things which it is able to produce. And that indeed which is

more perfect, by how much the more perfect it is, by so much the more

numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is

more perfect, participates in a greater degree of _the good_. It is,

therefore, nearer to _the good_. But this being the case, it is nearer

to the cause of all. And thus, it is the cause of a greater number of

effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, by how much the more

imperfect it is, by so much the less numerous are the effects of which

it is the cause. For being more remote from that which produces every

thing, it gives subsistence to fewer effects. For to that which gives

subsistence to, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or

fabricates, all things, that nature is more allied which produces a

greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces

a less number of each.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that the nature which is most remote

from the principle of all, is unprolific, and is not the cause of

any thing. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something

posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be most

remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself,

from the principle of all things, but it would be nearer to productive

power, and besides[223] this, would imitate the cause which is

productive of all beings.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in

itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are

successive.

* * * * *

For if it imitates _the one_, but that immoveably gives subsistence to

things posterior to itself, every thing which produces will possess in

a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But _the one_ gives

subsistence to things immoveably. For if through motion, the motion

will be in it, and being moved, it will no longer be _the one_, in

consequence of being changed from _the one_. But if motion subsists

together with it, it will also be from _the one_, and either there will

be a progression to infinity, or _the one_ will produce immoveably;

and every thing which produces will imitate the producing cause of

all things. For every where, from that which is primarily, that which

is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is

productive of certain things originates from that which is productive

of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent

natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves

undiminished, secondary natures are produced from them. For that which

is in any respect diminished, cannot abide such as it is.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

Every producing cause, on account of its perfection, and abundance of

power, is productive of secondary natures.

* * * * *

For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a

defect according to power, it would not be able to preserve its own

order immoveable. For that which imparts existence to another thing

through defect and imbecility, imparts subsistence to it, through its

own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces

remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining, that

which is posterior to it[224] proceeds into existence. Hence, being

full and perfect, it gives subsistence to secondary natures immoveably

and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being

changed into them, nor diminished. For that which is produced, is not a

distribution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither

appropriate to the generating energy, nor to generating causes. Nor

is it a transition. For it does not become the matter of that which

proceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced

is different from it. Hence that which generates is firmly established

undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself; and from itself

imparts secondary hypostases.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

Every producing cause gives subsistence to things similar to itself,

prior to such as are dissimilar.

* * * * *

For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than

that which is produced, they can never be simply the same with each

other, and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but

different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each

other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are

entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and no where

will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence neither

will one of these participate of the other, being entirely different

from it. For that which is participated, gives communion to its

participant, with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover,

it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause,

as from thence possessing its essence.

But if that which is produced, is partly separated from and partly

united to its producing cause, if indeed, it suffers each of these

equally, it will equally participate and not participate. So that after

the same manner, it will both have essence and not have it from the

producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it,

the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which

it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more

deprived of, than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things

which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very

being, have sympathy with them, are naturally suspended from them, and

aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object

of their desire through the cause of their existence,--if this be the

case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree united

to their producing causes, than separated from them. Things, however,

which are more united, are more similar than dissimilar to the natures

to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore,

gives subsistence to things similar to itself prior to such as are

dissimilar.

PROPOSITION XXIX.

Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to

first natures.

* * * * *

For if that which produces, gives subsistence to similars prior to

dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will

give subsistence to the things produced. For similars are rendered

similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If,

therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a [certain] sameness

of that which is generated with that which generates, and exhibits

that which is posterior to the generator such in a secondary degree,

as the generator is primarily, it will have its subsistence through

similitude.

PROPOSITION XXX.

Every thing which is produced from a certain thing without a medium,

abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

* * * * *

For if every progression is effected, while primary natures remain

permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being

constituted prior to dissimilars,--if this be the case, that which is

produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For

that which entirely proceeds, will have nothing which is the same with

the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it, and will

not have any thing common with and united to it. Hence it will abide

in its cause, in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If,

however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ

from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something

different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and

apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides,

it will proceed from the cause, in order that while it abides, it may

be separated from it. So far therefore, as that which is produced has

something which is the same with the producing[225] cause, it abides

in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being,

however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and

different. Hence, it abides, and at the same time proceeds, and it is

neither of these without the other.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is

converted to that from which it proceeds.

* * * * *

For if it should proceed indeed, but should not return to the cause

of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For every

thing which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover,

every thing aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it

is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, aspires after

its cause. For well-being is derived to every thing from that through

which its existence is derived. But appetite is first directed to that

through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which

appetite is first directed.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things

converted to that to which they are converted.

* * * * *

For every thing which is converted, hastens to be conjoined with its

cause,[226] and aspires after communion and colligation with it. But

similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates

and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain

communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through

similitude,--if this be the case, all conversion will be effected

through similitude.

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it,

has a circular energy.

* * * * *

For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the end

to the beginning, and the motion is one and continued; one motion being

from that which abides, but the other being directed to the abiding

cause. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes;

greater and less circles being continually formed of conversions, some

of which are to the natures [immediately] placed above the things that

are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on as far

as to the principle of all things. For all things proceed from this

principle, and are converted to it.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

Every thing which is converted according to nature, makes its

conversion to that, from which also it had the progression of its

proper hypostasis.

* * * * *

For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential

desire of that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the

whole being of it is suspended from that to which it makes an essential

conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a

natural sympathy with, as being allied to the essence of it. If this,

however, be the case, either the being of both is the same, or the

one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a

certain other one. But if the being of both is the same, how is the one

naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one,

it will be according to nature for both to be converted to that one. It

remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other.

But if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the

conversion is according to nature.

COROLLARY.

From these things, therefore, it is evident that intellect is the

object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect,

and that the whole world though it is perpetual possesses its essence

from intellect. For it is not prevented from proceeding from intellect

because it is perpetual. For neither because it is always arranged is

it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially

perpetual, and is always converted, and indissoluble according to order.

PROPOSITION XXXV.

Every thing caused, abides in, proceeds from, and returns, or is

converted to, its cause.

* * * * *

For if it alone abided, it would in no respect differ from its cause,

being without separation and distinction from it. For progression

is accompanied with separation. But if it alone proceeded, it would

be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause, having no

communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can

that which has not its essence from the cause, be essentially converted

to that which is foreign to its nature? But if it should abide and

proceed, but should not be converted, how will there be a natural

desire to every thing of well-being, and of good, and an excitation to

its generating cause? And if it should proceed and be converted, but

should not abide, how being separated from its cause will it hasten to

be conjoined with it? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure;

since if it had been conjoined, it would entirely have abided in it.

But if it should abide and be converted, but should not proceed, how

can that which is not[227] separated be able to revert to its cause?

For every thing which is converted resembles that which is resolved

into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary

however, either that it should abide alone, or be converted alone, or

alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound to each other, or

that the medium should be conjoined with each of the extremes, or that

all should be conjoined. Hence it remains that every thing must abide

in its cause, proceed from, and be converted to it.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

Of all things which are multiplied according to progression, the first

are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to

them, and after the same manner successively.

* * * * *

For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there

are diminutions of things secondary with respect to such as are first,

it follows that first natures in proceeding, are more conjoined

with their causes, being [as it were,] germinations from them. But

second natures are more remote from their causes, and in a similar

manner such as are successive. Things however, which are nearer and

more allied to their causes, are more perfect. For causes are more

perfect than things caused. But things which are more remote are more

imperfect, being dissimilar to their causes.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.

Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more

imperfect than the second, and the second than those that follow; but

the last are the most perfect.

* * * * *

For if conversions are effected in a circle, and conversion is directed

to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from

that which is most perfect, hence conversion is directed to the most

perfect. And if conversion first begins from that in which progression

terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect,

conversion will begin from the most imperfect. Hence in things which

subsist according to conversion, such as are most imperfect are the

first, but such as are most perfect, the last.

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

Every thing which proceeds from certain numerous causes, is converted

through as many causes as those are through which it proceeds, and

all conversion is through the same things as those through which

progression is effected.

* * * * *

For since each of these takes place through similitude, that indeed

which has a transition immediately from a certain thing, is also

immediately converted to it. For the similitude here is without a

medium. But that which requires a medium in proceeding, requires also

a medium according to conversion. For it is necessary that each should

be effected with reference to the same thing. Hence the conversion will

be first to the medium, and afterwards to that which is better than

the medium. Through such things therefore as being is derived to each

thing, through so many well-being also is derived, and vice versa.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or also

gnostically.

* * * * *

For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life together

with being, or it likewise receives from thence a gnostic power. So far

therefore as it alone _is_, it makes an essential conversion, but

so far as it lives, a vital, and so far as it likewise knows, a gnostic

conversion. For in such a way as it proceeded from its cause, such also

is the mode of its conversion to it, and the measures of its conversion

are defined by the measures according to progression. Desire therefore

is to some things according to being alone, this desire being an

aptitude to the participation of causes; but to others it is according

to life, being a motion to more excellent natures; and to others, it is

according to knowledge, being a co-sensation of the goodness of causes.

PROPOSITION XL.

Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from

themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsistent essence, are the

leaders.

* * * * *

For if every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to

essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is

suspended from another cause; but that which produces itself, since it

produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to

essence; but that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient

to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to _the good_; but

things more allied and similar to their causes, subsist from cause

prior to such as are dissimilar;--this being the case, things which

are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient

than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For

either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or _the good_ is a thing

of this kind, or the first things that subsist from _the good_. But

if there is nothing self-subsistent, there will not in reality be in

any thing self-sufficiency. Nor will it be in _the good_, since that

being _the one_ is better than self-sufficiency. It is also _the good

itself_, and not that which possesses _the good_. But if _the good_ was

self-subsistent, in consequence of itself producing itself, it will

not be _the one_. For that which proceeds from _the one_ is not _the

one_. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so

that _the one_, would at the same time be one and not one. Hence, it is

necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the first.

And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed

from another cause. For it has a more principal subsistence than these,

and is more allied to _the good_, as has been demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XLI.

Every thing which is in another is alone produced by another; but every

thing which is in itself is self-subsistent.

* * * * *

For that which is in another thing and is indigent of a subject, can

never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally adapted to

generate itself, does not require another seat, because it is contained

by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that

which abides, and is able to be established in itself, is productive

of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective of

itself. And thus it is in itself, as the thing caused in its cause.

For it is not in itself, as in place, or as in a subject. For place is

different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject

is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same

with that in which it is inherent; for it is self-subsistent. And it

is in such a manner in itself, as that which is from a cause is in the

cause.

PROPOSITION XLII.

Every thing self-subsistent is convertive to itself.

* * * * *

For if it proceeds from itself, it will also make a conversion to

itself. For to that from which progression is derived, to that a

conversion co-ordinate to the progression is directed. For if it alone

proceeded from itself, but having proceeded was not converted to

itself, it would never aspire after its proper good, and that which

it is able to impart to itself. Every cause however is able to impart

to that which proceeds from it,[228] together with the essence which

it gives, well-being conjoined with this essence. Hence that which

is self-subsistent will impart this to itself. This therefore is the

proper good to that which is self-subsistent. And hence this will not

be the object of desire to that which is not[229] converted to itself.

But not desiring this, it will not obtain it, and not obtaining it,

it will be imperfect, and not sufficient to itself. If, however,

self-sufficiency and perfection pertain to any thing, they must pertain

to that which is self-subsistent. Hence it will obtain its proper good,

and will be converted to itself.

PROPOSITION XLIII.

Every thing which is convertive to itself is self-subsistent.

* * * * *

For if it is converted to itself according to nature, it is perfect in

the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For to

every thing, essential progression is from that to which conversion

according to nature is directed. If therefore, it imparts well-being to

itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will

be the lord of its own hypostasis. Hence, that which is able to revert

to itself is self-subsistent.

PROPOSITION XLIV.

Every thing which is convertive to itself according to energy, is also

converted to itself essentially.

* * * * *

For if it is capable of being converted to itself in energy, but is

without conversion in its essence, it will be more excellent according

to energy than according to essence, the former being convertive,

but the latter without conversion. For that which depends on itself,

is better than that which alone depends on another. And that which

has a power of preserving itself, is more perfect than that which is

alone preserved by another. If therefore, it is convertive to itself

according to the energy proceeding from essence,[230] it will also

be allotted a convertive essence, so that it will not alone energize

towards itself, but will depend on itself, and will be contained,

connected, and perfected by itself.

PROPOSITION XLV.

Every thing self-subsistent is unbegotten.

* * * * *

For if it is generated, because generated indeed, it will be imperfect

of itself, and will be indigent of perfection from another. Because,

however, it produces itself, it is perfect and sufficient to itself.

For every thing generated is perfected by another which imparts

generation to it not yet[231] existing. For generation is a path from

the imperfect to its contrary the perfect. But if any thing produces

itself, it is always perfect, being always present with the essence

of itself, or rather being inherent in that which is perfective of

essence.

PROPOSITION XLVI.

Every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible.

* * * * *

For if it should be corrupted, it would desert itself, and would be

without itself. This however is impossible. For being one thing, it is

at the same time cause and the thing caused. But every thing which is

corrupted, departing from the cause of itself is corrupted. For so far

as it adheres to that which contains, connects and preserves it, it is

connected and preserved. But that which is self-subsistent never leaves

its cause, because it does not desert itself; for it is the cause of

itself. Every thing therefore self-subsistent is incorruptible.

PROPOSITION XLVII.

Every thing self-subsistent, is impartible and simple.

* * * * *

For if it is partible, being self-subsistent, it will constitute itself

partible,[232] and the whole will be converted to itself, and all

will be in all itself. This however is impossible. Hence that which

is self-subsistent is impartible. But it is also simple. For if a

composite, one thing in it will be less, but another more excellent,

and the more will be derived from the less excellent, and the less

from the more excellent, if the whole proceeds from itself. Farther

still, it would not be sufficient to itself, being indigent of the

elements of itself of which it consists. Every thing therefore, which

is self-subsistent, is simple.

PROPOSITION XLVIII.

_Concerning the perpetual, in order to demonstrate that the world is

perpetual._

Every thing which is not perpetual, is either a composite, or subsists

in another.

* * * * *

For either it is dissoluble into those things of which it consists, and

is entirely composed from the things into which it is dissolved, or

it is indigent of a subject, and leaving the subject it departs into

non-entity. But if it is simple in itself, it will be indissoluble, and

incapable of being dissipated.

PROPOSITION XLIX.

Every thing self-subsistent is perpetual.

* * * * *

For there are two modes according to which it is necessary a thing

should not be perpetual; the one arising from composition, and the

other from a subsistence in something else [as in a subject]. That

which is self-subsistent however, is neither a composite, but simple,

nor in another, but in itself. Hence it is perpetual.

PROPOSITION L.

Every thing which is measured by time, either according to essence, or

according to energy, is generation, so far as it is measured by time.

* * * * *

For if it is measured by time, it will be adapted to it to be, or to

energize in time; and the _was_ and the _will be_, which differ from

each other, pertain to it. For if the _was_ and the _will be_ were the

same according to number, it would suffer nothing by time proceeding,

and always having one part prior, and another posterior. If therefore

the _was_ and the _will be_ are different, that which is measured by

time is becoming to be [or rising into existence], and never _is_,[233]

but proceeds together with time, by which it is measured, existing in

a tendency to being.

It likewise does not stop in the same state of being, but is always

receiving another and another _to be_, just as _the now_ in time is

always another and another, through the progression of time. Hence

it is not a simultaneous whole; for it subsists in a dispersion of

temporal extension, and is co-extended with time. This however is

to possess being in non-being. For that which is becoming to be is

not that which is become. Such a kind of being therefore as this is

generation.

PROPOSITION LI.

Every thing self-subsistent, is essentially exempt from the natures

which are measured by time.

* * * * *

For if that which is self-subsistent is unbegotten, it will not

according to existence be measured by time. For generation is

conversant with the nature which is measured by time. Hence nothing

self-subsistent has its being in time.

PROPOSITION LII.

Every thing eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And whether

it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once

present, nor will it have _this_ thing pertaining to itself now

subsisting, but _that_ afterwards which as yet is not; but as

much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution,

and without extension. Or whether it has its energy as well as its

essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding

in the same measure of perfection, and as it were, fixed immoveably and

without transition according to one and the same boundary.

* * * * *

For if the eternal, as the name denotes, is perpetual being, but to be

sometimes,[234] and to subsist in becoming to be, are different from

perpetual being, it is not proper that it should have one thing prior

and another posterior. For if it had, it would be generation, and not

being. But where there is neither prior nor posterior, nor was and

will be, but alone _to be_, and this a whole, there every thing

subsists at once that which it is. The same thing also takes place with

respect to the energy of that which is eternal.

COROLLARY.

From this it is evident that eternity is the cause to wholes of

their existence as wholes, since every thing which is eternal either

according to essence, or according to energy, has the whole of its

essence or energy present with itself.

PROPOSITION LIII.

_Concerning Eternity and Eternal Natures._

Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior

to every thing which subsists according to time.

* * * * *

For if every where the natures which are participated are prior to

their participants, and imparticipables are prior to participated

natures, it is evident that the eternal is one thing, the eternity

which is in the eternal, another, and eternity itself, another. And

the first of these indeed subsists as a participant, the second as a

thing participated, and the third as an imparticipable. That also which

is in time is one thing; for it is a participant. The time which is

in this is another thing; for it is participated. And the time prior

to this is another thing; for it is imparticipable. Every where also,

that which is imparticipable is in all things the same. But that which

is participated is in those things only by which it is participated.

For there are many eternal, and many temporal natures in all of which

eternity subsists according to participation. The time also which is

in temporal natures subsists in a distributed manner; but the time

which they participate is indivisible. And there is one time prior to

both these. Eternity itself likewise is an eternity of eternities, and

time itself is a time of times; and they give subsistence, the one to

participated eternity, but the other to participated time.

PROPOSITION LIV.

Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the

measure of things in time; and these are the only two measures of life

and motion in beings.

* * * * *

For every thing which measures, either measures according to a part,

or it measures the whole at once when it is adapted to that which is

measured. That which measures, therefore, according to the whole is

eternity; but that which measures according to parts is time. Hence,

there are only two measures, the one of things eternal, but the other

of things in time.

PROPOSITION LV.

Every thing which subsists according to time, either subsists through

the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a part of time.

* * * * *

For if all progressions are through similitude, and things more

similar to first natures subsist in union with them prior to such

as are dissimilar, but it is impossible for things which are

generated in a part of time to be conjoined with eternal natures,

(for as being generated they differ from first natures which are

self-subsistent,[235] and as existing once, they are separated from

things which always exist, but the media between these, are such things

as are partly similar and partly dissimilar to them)--this being the

case, the medium between things which are once generated, and those

that exist always, is either that which is always becoming to be, or

that which is once, or that which is not truly being. It is however

impossible it should be that which once only truly is. And that which

is once not truly being is the same with that which is becoming to be.

Hence the medium is not that which is once only. It remains, therefore,

that the medium between both is that which is always becoming to be,

being conjoined indeed with the worse of the two through becoming to

be, but through subsisting always, imitating an eternal nature.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident that perpetuity is twofold, the one

indeed being eternal, but the other subsisting according to time.

The one also being a stable, but the other a flowing perpetuity. And

the one indeed having its being collected, and the whole subsisting

at once, but the other diffused, and expanded according to temporal

extension. And the one being a whole of itself, but the other

consisting of parts, each of which is separate, according to prior and

posterior.

PROPOSITION LVI.

Every thing which is produced by secondary natures, is produced in a

greater degree by prior and more causal natures, by whom such as are

secondary were also produced.

* * * * *

For if that which is secondary has the whole of its essence from that

which is prior to it, its power of producing is also derived from

thence; for powers in producing causes are essentially productive,

and give completion to the essence of them. But if it is allotted the

power of producing from a superior cause, it will possess from that

its existence as the cause of things of which it is the cause, and

its power of giving subsistence to other things will be measured from

thence. If, however, this be the case, the things proceeding from it

are effects through that which is prior to it. For the one perfects a

cause, and the other the thing caused. But if this be the case, the

thing caused is from thence rendered such as it is.

Moreover, that it is also in a greater degree perfected from thence

is evident. For if that which is first gives to that which is second

the cause of producing, it will primarily possess this cause; and on

this account that which is secondary generates, receiving from thence

a secondary generative power. If, however, the one becomes productive

through participation, but the other in a way superior to participation

and primarily, that will be in a greater degree a cause, which imparts

generative power to another thing proximate to its own nature.

PROPOSITION LVII.

Every cause both energizes prior to the thing caused, and gives

subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it.

* * * * *

For so far as it is cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than

that which is posterior to it, and in consequence of this is the cause

of a greater number of effects. For it is the province of a greater

power to produce more, of an equal power to produce equal, and of a

less power to produce a less number of effects. And the power which

is able to effect greater things among similars, is also capable of

effecting such as are less. But that which is able to effect such as

are less, is not necessarily capable of producing such as are greater.

If, therefore, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more

numerous effects.

Moreover, such effects as the thing caused is able to produce, the

cause is in a greater degree able to produce. For every thing which is

produced by secondary natures, is in a greater degree produced by such

as are prior and more causal. The cause, therefore, gives subsistence

together with the thing caused to such effects as the thing caused is

naturally adapted to produce. But if likewise it produces prior to

it, it is indeed evident that it energizes prior to the thing caused,

according to the energy which is productive of it. Every cause,

therefore, energizes prior to the thing caused, and together with it,

and posterior to it, gives subsistence to other things.

COROLLARY.

Hence, it is evident, that of such things as soul is the cause,

intellect also is the cause; but that soul is not also the cause

of such things as intellect is the cause. But intellect energizes

prior to soul. And such things as soul imparts to secondary natures,

intellect also imparts in a greater degree. Likewise, when soul no

longer energizes, intellect imparts by illumination the gifts of

itself to those things to which soul does not impart herself. For that

which is inanimate, so far as it participates of form, participates of

intellect, and the production of intellect. Moreover, of such things as

intellect is the cause, _the good_ also is the cause; but not vice

versa. For the privations of forms subsist from _the good_; since

all things are from thence. But intellect being form, does not give

subsistence to privation.

PROPOSITION LVIII.

Every thing which is produced by many, is more compounded than that

which is produced by fewer causes.

* * * * *

For if every cause imparts something to that which proceeds from

it, more numerous causes will impart a greater number of gifts, but

less numerous causes a less number. Hence, of participants some will

consist of a greater number of things, but others, of a less number,

of which each participates, some indeed through a progression from a

greater number of causes, but others from a less. Those, however, which

proceed from a greater number of causes are more compounded, but those

from a less number of the same causes, are more simple. Every thing,

therefore, which is produced by a greater number of causes, is more

compounded, but that which is produced by a less number is more simple.

For the more compounded participates of those things of which the more

simple participates, but the contrary to this is not true.

PROPOSITION LIX.

Every thing which is essentially simple, is either better or worse than

composite natures.

* * * * *

For if such beings as are the extremes of things are produced by fewer

and more simple causes, but such as are in the middle, from a greater

number of causes, the latter indeed will be composites, but of the

former, some are more simple according to that which is better, but

others according to that which is worse. That the extremes, however,

are produced by fewer causes is evident, because such natures as are

higher begin to produce prior to such as are subordinate, and extend

beyond them, to things to which subordinate natures do not proceed

through a diminution of power. For on this account also, the last of

things, [i.e. matter] is most simple, as well as the first of things,

because it proceeds from the first alone. With respect to simplicity,

however, one kind subsists according to that which is better than all

composition, but another according to that which is worse. And there is

the same reasoning in all things.

PROPOSITION LX.

Every thing which is the cause of a greater number of effects, is

better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number,

and which produces the parts of those things to the wholes of which the

other gives subsistence.

* * * * *

For if the one is the cause of a less, but the other of a greater

number of effects, but the former are parts of the latter, that which

gives subsistence to a greater number of effects, will produce all that

the other produces; but not vice versa. Hence the former of these two

is more powerful and more comprehensive. For as that which proceeds is

to that which proceeds, so is one productive power to another, when

assumed with reference to each other. For that which is able to effect

a greater number of things, possesses a greater and more total power.

But this is nearer to the cause of all things. That however, which is

nearer to this cause, is in a greater degree good, just as the cause

of all is _the good_ itself. Hence, that which is the cause of

a greater number of effects, is essentially more excellent than that

which produces a less number.

PROPOSITION LXI.

Every power which is impartible is greater, but when divided is less.

* * * * *

For if it is divided it proceeds into multitude. And if this be the

case, it becomes more remote from _the one_. But in consequence of

this it is able to effect a less number of things, through departing

from _the one_, and the unity which contains it, and will be

imperfect, since the good of every thing consists in union.

PROPOSITION LXII.

Every multitude which is nearer to _the one_, is less in quantity

than things more remote from it, but is greater in power.

* * * * *

For that which is nearer to is more similar to _the one_. But _the

one_ gives subsistence to all things, without having any multitude in

itself. Hence that which is more similar to it, being the cause of a

greater number of effects, since _the one_ is the cause of all things,

has more the form of unity, and is more impartible, because that is

_one_. As therefore, that which is less multiplied, is more allied to

_the one_, so likewise as being allied to the cause of all things, it

is productive of a greater number of effects. Hence it is more powerful.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that there are more corporeal natures

than souls; more souls than intellectual natures; and more intellects

than divine unities. And there is the same reasoning in all things.

PROPOSITION LXIII.

Every thing which is imparticipable gives subsistence to two-fold

orders of participated natures, one indeed in things which sometimes

participate, but the other in things which always and connascently

participate.

* * * * *

For that which is always participated, is more similar to the

imparticipable than that which is sometimes participated. Hence,

before the imparticipable establishes that which is sometimes, it

will establish that which is always participable; and which by being

participated differs from that which is posterior to it, but by _the

always_ is more allied and more similar to the imparticipable. Nor

are there alone things which are sometimes participated; for prior to

these are the natures which are always participated, through which

these also are bound to imparticipables according to a certain well

ordered progression. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes

participated. For these possessing an inextinguishable power, since

they are always, are prolific of other things which are sometimes

participated, and as far as to these the diminution proceeds.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident that of the unions proceeding from _the

one_, and which illuminate beings, some are always, but others

sometimes participated. Intellectual participations, likewise, are in

a similar manner two-fold, as also are the animations of souls, and

the participations of other forms. For beauty, similitude, permanency,

and sameness, being imparticipable, are participated by natures which

always participate, and secondarily by those that sometimes participate

according to the same order.

PROPOSITION LXIV.

Every monad which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a two-fold

number; one indeed of self-perfect hypostases, but the other of

illuminations which possess their hypostasis in other things.

* * * * *

For if progression is according to diminution, through things

appropriate to producing causes, perfect natures will proceed from the

all-perfect, and through these as media, imperfect natures will proceed

in a well-ordered progression, so that some indeed will be self-perfect

hypostases, but others will be imperfect. And these latter will become

the forms of participants. For being imperfect, they will be indigent

of subjects in their very nature. But the self-perfect hypostases will

produce things which participate of themselves. For being perfect,

they will indeed fill these from themselves, and establish them in

themselves. But they will require nothing of inferior natures to their

own subsistence. Self-perfect hypostases, therefore, through their

separation into multitude, are indeed diminished with respect to their

principal monad; but through their self-perfect hyparxis, they are

in a certain respect assimilated to it. But imperfect hypostases, in

consequence of subsisting in other things, are remote from that which

subsists from itself, and through their imperfection are separated from

that which perfects all things. Progressions, however, are through

similars, as far as to natures which are entirely dissimilar. Every

monad, therefore, which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a

two-fold number.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that of the unities, some are

self-perfect proceeding from _the one_, but others are illuminations

of unions. And with respect to intellects, that some of them are

self-perfect essences, but others belong to animated natures, being

only the images of souls. And thus, neither is every union a God, but

this is true of a self-perfect unity alone, nor is every intellectual

peculiarity an intellect, but an essential peculiarity alone [is

entitled to this appellation], nor is every illumination of soul a

soul, but there are also images of souls.

PROPOSITION LXV.

Every thing which has any subsistence whatever, either subsists

according to cause, so as to have the form of a principle, or according

to hyparxis, or according to participation, after the manner of an

image.

* * * * *

For either that which is produced is seen in that which produces, as

pre-existing in cause, because every cause antecedently comprehends in

itself the thing caused, being that primarily which the thing caused is

secondarily. Or that which produces is seen in that which is produced.

For the latter participating of the former, exhibits in itself

secondarily that which the producing cause is primarily. Or each thing

is beheld in its own order, and is neither seen in the cause nor in the

effect. For the cause subsists more excellently than that which exists

[out of the cause]. But that which is in the effect is less excellent

than that which exists out of the cause [but is not in any thing else].

It is, however, necessary there should be that which after this manner

_is_. But every thing subsists according to hyparxis in its own

order.

PROPOSITION LXVI.

All beings with reference to each other, are either wholes, or parts,

or the same, or different.

* * * * *

For either some of then comprehend, but the rest are comprehended, or

they neither comprehend, nor are comprehended. And they either suffer

something which is the same, as participating of one thing, or they are

separated from each other. But if they comprehend, they will be wholes,

and if they are comprehended, parts. If also many things participate

of one thing, they are the same according to this one. But if they are

alone many things, so far as they are many they will be different from

each other.

PROPOSITION LXVII.

Every wholeness (ολοτης) is either prior to parts, or consists of

parts, or is in a part.

* * * * *

For the form of each thing is either surveyed in its cause, and we

call that which subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts. Or it

is seen in the parts which participate of it; and this in a two-fold

respect. For it is either seen in all the parts together, and this is

a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent diminishes

the whole. Or it is seen in each of the parts, so that the part also

becomes according to participation a whole; which makes the part to

be a whole partially. The whole, therefore, which is according to

hyparxis consists of parts. But the whole which is prior to parts is

according to cause. And the whole which is in a part is according to

participation. For this also according to an ultimate diminution is a

whole, so far as it imitates the whole which consists of parts, when

it is not any casual part, but is capable of being assimilated to the

whole, of which the parts also are wholes.

PROPOSITION LXVIII.

Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists

of parts.

* * * * *

For if it is a part, it is a part of a certain whole. And it is either

a part of the whole which it contains, according to which it is said

to be a whole in a part. But thus it will be a part of itself, the

part will be equal to the whole, and each will be the same. Or it is a

part of a certain other whole. And if of some other, it is either the

only part of that, and thus again, it will in no respect differ from

the whole, being one part of one thing. Or it is a part in conjunction

with another part. For of every whole the parts are more than one, and

that will be a whole from many parts, of which it consists. And thus

the whole which is in a part, is a part of the whole which consists of

parts.

PROPOSITION LXIX.

Every whole which consists of parts, participates of the wholeness

which is prior to parts.

* * * * *

For if it consists of parts, the whole is passive [i.e. the whole

participates of another whole]. For the parts becoming one, are passive

to a whole on account of their union, and the whole subsists in parts

which are not wholes. But the imparticipable subsists prior to every

thing which is participated. The imparticipable wholeness, therefore,

subsists prior to that which is participated. Hence, there is a certain

form of wholeness, prior to the whole which consists of parts, which

is not passive to a whole, but is wholeness itself, and from which the

wholeness consisting of parts is derived. For the whole indeed, which

consists of parts, subsists in many places, and in many things, in

various ways. It is, however, necessary that there should be a monad

essentially of all totalities. For neither is each of these wholes

genuine, since it is indigent of parts that are not wholes, of which

it consists. Nor is the whole which is in a certain thing capable of

being the cause of wholeness to all other things. Hence, that which is

the cause to all wholes of their being wholes, is prior to parts. For

if this also consisted of parts, it would be a certain whole, and not

simply whole. And again, this would be from another whole, and so on,

to infinity; or it will subsist on account of that which is primarily a

whole, and which is not a whole from parts, but is a wholeness.

PROPOSITION LXX.

Every thing which is more total among principal causes, illuminates

participants, prior to partial natures, and when these fail, still

continues to impart its illuminations.

* * * * *

For it begins its energy upon secondary natures prior to that which is

posterior to it, and is present in conjunction with the presence of it.

When likewise that which is posterior to it no longer energizes, it is

still present, and that which is more causal continues to energize.

And this not only in different subjects, but likewise in each of the

natures that sometimes participate. Thus it is necessary, for instance,

that being should be first generated, afterwards animal, and afterwards

man. And man, indeed, is not, if the rational power is absent, but

there is still animal, breathing and sentient. And again, life failing,

being remains. For though a thing does not live, yet it has existence.

And there is a similar reasoning in all things.

The cause, however, of this is, that the more causal nature being more

efficacious, energizes on the thing caused[236] prior [to that which

is less causal]. For the thing caused participates first of that which

is more powerful. And that which is secondary again energizing, that

which is more powerful energizes with it. Because every thing which

the secondary nature produces, that which is more causal produces

likewise in conjunction with it. When the former also fails, the

latter is still present. For the communication of the more powerful

cause, operating in a greater degree, leaves that which participates

it, posterior to the energy of the less powerful cause. For through

the communication of the secondary nature, it corroborates its own

illumination.

PROPOSITION LXXI.

All things which among principal causes possess a more total and higher

order in their effects, according to the illuminations proceeding

from them, become in a certain respect subjects to the communications

of more partial causes. And the illuminations indeed, from higher

causes, receive the progressions from secondary causes; but the latter

are established in the former. And thus some participations precede

others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from

on high, to the same subject, more total causes having a prior energy,

but such as are more partial, supplying their participants with their

communications, posterior to the energies of more total causes.

* * * * *

For if more causal natures energize prior to such as are secondary on

account of exuberance of power, and are present with those that have

a more imperfect aptitude, and illuminate them also; but things more

subordinate, and which are second in order, are supplied from such as

are more causal,--it is evident that the illuminations of superior

natures antecedently comprehend that which participates of both these,

and give stability to the communications of things subordinate. But

these illuminations of superior causes, employ the resemblances

of subordinate natures as foundations, and operate on that which

participates of them, the superior causes themselves having a prior

energy.

PROPOSITION LXXII.

All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject,

proceed from more perfect and total causes.

* * * * *

For the causes of a greater number of effects, are more powerful and

total, and are nearer to _the one_ than the causes of fewer

effects. But the natures which give subsistence to such things as are

antecedently the subjects of others, are among causes the sources of a

greater number of effects.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from

_the one_, is of itself destitute of form. And why body, though it

participates of being, is of itself without the participation of soul.

For matter being the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of

all. But body being the subject of animation, derives its subsistence

from that which is more total than soul, and participates after a

certain manner of being.

PROPOSITION LXXIII.

Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of

being, but not every being is a whole.[237]

* * * * *

For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior, but

the other posterior. If, however, a part, so far as it is a part, is

being (for a whole is from parts which have a being), yet it is not

of itself also a whole. Being, therefore, and whole are not the same.

For if this were the case, a part would be a non-entity. But if a part

was a non-entity, the whole would have no existence. For every whole

is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them [and therefore

causally containing them in itself], or as subsisting in them. But the

part not existing, neither is it possible for the whole to exist. If,

however, whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a

whole. Again, therefore, there will not be a part. This, however, is

impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part,

the part also being a part, will be the part of the whole. It remains,

therefore, that every whole indeed is being, but that not every being

is a whole.

COROLLARY.