In the next place Timæus, or rather Plato adds, “And causing circle to
revolve in a circle, he established heaven (i.e. the world) one, only,
solitary nature;” on which Proclus observes as follows: The philosopher
Porphyry well interprets the meaning of circle revolving in a circle.
For it is possible, says he, for that which is not a circle to be moved
in a circle, as a stone when whirled round; and also for a circle to
be moved not in a circle, as a wheel when rolled along. But it is the
peculiarity of the world, that being circular it is moved in a circle,
through harmoniously revolving about the centre. In a still greater
degree however, the divine Jamblichus well interprets the meaning of
these words. For he says that the circle is twofold, the one being
psychical, but the other corporeal, and that the latter is moved in
the former. For this is conformable to what has been before said, and
accords with what is afterwards asserted. For Plato himself shortly
after moves the corporeal nature according to the psychical circle, and
renders the twofold circulations analogous to the periods in the soul.
Moreover, to comprehend the whole blessedness of the world in three
appellations, is most appropriate to that which subsists according to
a triple cause, viz. the final, the paradigmatic, and the demiurgic.
For of the appellations themselves, the first of them, viz. _one_,
is assumed from the final cause; for _the one_ is the same with _the
good_. But the second, viz. _only_, is assumed from the paradigmatic
cause. For the _only-begotten_ and _onlyness_ (μονωσις) were, prior
to the universe, in all-perfect animal. And the third, viz. the
_solitary_, is assumed from the demiurgic cause. For the ability of
using itself, and through itself governing the world, proceeds from
the demiurgic goodness. The world therefore is _one_, so far as it is
united, and is converted to _the one_. But it is _only_, so far as it
participates of the intelligible, and comprehends all things in itself.
And it is _solitary_, so far as it is similar to its father, and is
able to save itself. From the three however, it appears that it is a
God. For _the one_, the _perfect_, and the _self-sufficient_, are the
elements of deity. Hence, the world receiving these, is also itself a
God; being _one_ indeed, according to hyparxis; but _alone_, according
to a perfection which derives its completion from all sensible natures;
and _solitary_, through being sufficient to itself. For those that
lead a solitary life, being converted to themselves, have the hopes
of salvation in themselves. And that this is the meaning of the term
_solitary_, will be evident from the following words of Plato: “Able
through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external,
and sufficiently known and friendly to itself.” For in these words,
he clearly manifests what the solitariness is which he ascribes to
the world, and that he denominates that being solitary, who looks to
himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper
measure. For those that live in solitary places, are the saviours of
themselves, so far as respects human causes. The universe therefore is
likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and
preserving itself, not through a diminution, but from an exuberance
of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says,
through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who
possesses virtue is able to associate with, and love himself with a
parental affection. But the vicious man looking to his inward baseness,
is indignant with himself and with his own essence, is astonished with
externals, and pursues an association with others, in consequence
of his inability to behold himself. On the contrary, the worthy man
perceiving himself beautiful rejoices and is delighted, and producing
in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association
with himself. For we are naturally domesticated to the beautiful,
but hastily withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world
possesses virtue adapted to itself, in its intellectual and psychical
essence, and in the perfection of its animal nature, looking to itself,
it loves itself, and is present with, and sufficient to itself.
It is proper therefore to assert these things to those who place
intelligibles external to intellect. For how can that which tends to
other things, and as being deficient is indigent of externals, be
blessed? Hence, if the world is through virtue converted to itself,
must not intellect do this in a much greater degree? Intellect
therefore intellectually perceives itself. And this is among the number
of things immediately known. This also deserves to be remarked, that
Plato when he gives animation to the world, directly imparts virtue to
it. For the participation of soul is immediately accompanied with the
fulness of virtue, in the being which subsists according to nature;
since the one cause of the virtues,[197] is also co-arranged with
the fountain of souls,[198] and the progression of this fountain is
conjoined with the progression of soul. For with respect to virtue,
one indeed is unical, primary and all-perfect; but another subsists
in the ruling supermundane Gods; another in the liberated Gods; and
another is mundane, through which the whole world possesses undefiled
intelligence, an undeviating life, an energy converted to itself,
and a purity unmingled with the animals which it contains. From this
virtue therefore, the world becomes known and friendly to itself. For
knowledge precedes familiarity.
Since the universe also is intellectual, an animal, and a God, so far
indeed, as it is intellectual, it becomes known to itself; but so far
as it is a God, it is friendly to itself. For union is more perfect
than knowledge. If therefore, the universe is known to itself, it is
intellectual; for that which is primarily known to itself is intellect.
And if it is friendly to itself, it is united. But that which is
united is deified; for _the one_ which is in intellect is a God.
Again therefore, you have virtue, a knowledge of, and a friendship
with itself, in the world; the first of these proceeding into it from
soul; the second from intellect; and the third from deity. Hence Plato
very properly adds, that on account of these things, the world was
generated by the demiurgus a blessed God; for the presence of soul,
the participation of intellect, and the reception of union, render the
universe a God. And the blessed God which he now mentions is the God
“who at a certain time would exist,” animated, endued with intellect,
and united. Union however is present with it according to the bond of
analogy; but much more from the one soul and the one intellect which it
participates. For through these, greater bonds, and a more excellent
union proceeded into the universe. And still beyond these unions,
divine friendship, and the supply of good, contain and connect the
whole world. For the bond which proceeds from intellect and soul is
strong, as Orpheus also says; but the union of the golden chain [i.e.
of the deific series] is still greater, and is the cause of greater
good to all things.
Moreover, felicity must likewise be assumed in a way adapted to the
universe. For since it is suspended from the paternal intellect and the
whole fabrication of things, and since it lives conformably to these
causes, it is consequently happy (ευδαιμων)[199] from them. For the
demiurgus also is denominated a dæmon by Plato in the Politicus, and a
great dæmon by Orpheus when he says,
One the great dæmon and the lord of all.[200]
He therefore who lives according to the will of the father, and
preserves the intellectual nature which was imparted to him from thence
immutable is happy, and blessed. The first, and the all-perfect form
of felicity likewise, is that of the world. The second is that of the
mundane Gods, whom Plato in the Phædrus calls happy Gods, following the
mighty Jupiter. The third is that of the genera superior to us [viz.
the felicity of angels, dæmons and heroes]. For there is one virtue of
angels, another of dæmons, and another of the heroic genera: and the
form of felicity is triple being different according to each genus.
The fourth form of felicity is that which subsists in the undefiled
souls, who make blameless descents [into the realms of generation,]
and exert an inflexible and untamed life. The fifth is that of partial
souls [such as ours]; and this is multiform. For the soul which is an
attendant on the moon, is not similarly happy with the soul that is
suspended from the solar order; but as the form of life is different,
so likewise perfection is defined by different measures. And the last
form of felicity is that which is seen in irrational animals. For
every thing which obtains a perfection adapted to it according to
nature, is happy. For through its proper perfection, it is conjoined
to its proper dæmon, and partakes of his providential care. The forms
of felicity therefore, being so many, the first and highest must be
placed in the world, and which also is now mentioned by Plato. We must
not however wonder that he immediately calls the world a God, from its
participation of soul. For every thing is deified through that which is
proximately prior to it; the corporeal world indeed through soul; but
soul through intellect, as the Athenian guest also says; and intellect
through _the one_. Hence, intellect is divine, but not a God.
_The one_ however is no longer a God through any thing else, but
is primarily a God; just as intellect is primarily gnostic, as soul is
primarily self-motive, and as body is primarily in place.