In the next place, let us direct our attention to the words, “But
placing soul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the
whole; and besides this, externally surrounded the body of the universe
with soul.” Divinity, says Proclus, at once and eternally produces
all things. For according to his very being, and according to the
eternal intellection of wholes, he generates all things from himself,
supermundane and mundane beings, intellects, souls, natures, bodies,
and matter itself. And indeed, an at-once-collected subsistence in a
greater degree belongs to the demiurgic progeny, than to the solar
illumination; though in this the whole light proceeds simultaneously
with the sun. But it is evident that the sun imitating the father of
the universe through visible fabrication is inferior to eternal and
invisible production. All things, therefore, as we have said, being
produced from the invisible fabrication at once and eternally, at the
same time, the order of the effects is likewise preserved. For all
things proceed collectively together with their own proper order.
For in the producing cause, there was also an eternal intellection,
and order prior to the things that were arranged. Hence, though all
things proceed at once from one cause, yet some have a first, and
others a diminished dignity. For some things proceed in a greater, but
others in a less degree. And some are co-arranged with the demiurgus
according to union, others according to contact, and others according
to participation. For intellect is able to be connascent with intellect
through union; but soul is naturally adapted to be conjoined with
intellect; and bodies participate of it only, just as things in the
profundity of the earth participate of the splendour of the sun. All
these, therefore, subsisting in the world, viz. intellect, soul, and
body, and all these being produced at once, and at the same time, there
being an order in these proceeding from the demiurgus, language at
one time beginning supernally according to progression, ends at the
boundaries of fabrication, but at another time being incited[192] from
things last, according to conversion, recurs to the summits of the
universe, conformably to things themselves. For all things proceed, and
are converted to the cause and principle from which they proceeded; in
so doing exhibiting a certain demiurgic circle.
Plato, however, delivered to us the order of the plenitudes
(πληρωματων)[193] of the world, according to progression, in what he
before said, when the demiurgus placing intellect in soul, and soul
in body fabricated[194] the universe, but in the present passage, he
unfolds to us the order according to conversion. And in the first
place, he assumes two contraries in the universe, adds two media to
these, and unites them through analogy. Afterwards giving completion
to the world, by rendering it a whole of wholes, he surrounds it with
an intellectual [i.e. with a spherical] figure, gives it the power of
participating a divine life, and a motion imitating intellect.[195]
Always, likewise, causing the world to be more perfect by the
additions, he introduces soul into it as her proper place of abode, and
fills all things with life, but different things with a different life.
He also inserts intellect in soul, and through this conjoins her with
her fountain. For the soul of the universe participating of intellect,
is connected with intelligibles themselves. And thus he ends at the
principle from which the mundane intellect, soul and the body of the
world proceed. For giving a three-fold division to the universe, viz.
into intellect, soul, and body, he discusses in the first place the
two latter which are subordinate. For such is the mode according to
conversion. And he terminates indeed the discussion of the body of the
world, having unfolded its essence, its figure, and its motion. But the
theory of soul is connected with this, just as the body itself of the
world is suspended from a divine soul.
With respect, however, to the position of soul in the middle of the
universe, it is differently explained by the different interpreters of
Plato. For some call the centre of the earth the middle, but others
the moon, as being the isthmus of generated and divine natures. Others
again say that the sun is the middle, as being established in the place
of a heart [in the world], others the inerratic sphere, others the
equinoctial, as bounding the breadth of the universe, and others the
zodiac. And some indeed place the governing principle in the centre
of the universe, others in the moon, others in the sun, others in the
equinoctial, and others in the zodiac. And the power of the centre
testifies in favour of the first of these, since it is connective of
every circulation; the motion of the moon, in favour of the second,
since it variously changes generation; the vivific heat of the sun,
in favour of the third; the facility of the motion of the equinoctial
circle, of the fourth; and in favour of the fifth, the circulation of
the stars about the zodiac. Porphyry, however, and Jamblichus, oppose
all these interpretations, and reprobate them as understanding the
middle in a way accompanied with interval, and enclosing in a certain
part the soul of the whole world, which is every where similarly
present, which rules over all things, and leads all things by its own
motions. Of these divine men, however, Porphyry assuming the soul to
be the soul of the universe, interprets the _middle_ according
to the psychical essence; for soul is the middle of intelligibles and
sensibles. This interpretation, however, does not appear to say any
thing as with reference to the words of Plato. But if we assume this,
that the universe derives its completion from intellect, soul and
body, and that it is a psychical and intellectual animal, we shall
find in this system that soul is the middle. This, therefore, Plato
had before asserted; and now he will appear to say nothing else, than
that the soul of the world is extended through the universe, being
allotted a middle order in it. But the philosopher Jamblichus thinks
that by _soul_ we should understand the exempt, supermundane, and
liberated soul, and which has dominion over all things. For according
to him, Plato does not here speak of the mundane soul, but of the
soul which is not participated by body, and which is arranged as a
monad above all mundane souls. For the first soul is of this kind,
and the _middle_ is asserted of this, as being similarly present
to all things, because it does not belong to any body, has no manner
of habitude whatever, similarly animates all things, and is equally
distant from all things. For it is not distant from some things in
a less, and from others in a greater degree, since it is without
habitude; but it is alike distant from all things; though all things
are not after the same manner distant from it. For in its participants
there is the more and the less.
Our leader, however, [Syrianus] more aptly interprets the words of
Plato. For the soul of the world has indeed that which is supermundane
and exempt from the universe, according to which it is conjoined with
intellect, which Plato in the Phædrus, and Orpheus in his verses
concerning _Ippa_[196] denominate the head or summit of the soul.
It has also another multitude of powers proceeding from this monad,
divided about the world, and appropriately present to all the parts of
the universe. And these subsist in one way indeed about the middle, in
another way about the earth, in another about the sun, and in another
about each of the spheres. Our leader, therefore, says that all these
are comprehended in the present words of Plato, who indicates by them,
that the soul of the world in one way animates the middle, in another
the whole bulk, and that it leaves something else prior to these exempt
from the universe.
That we may not, however, carelessly attend to what is here said by
Plato, but may offer something demonstrative about the psychical
powers, it must be said, that soul by a much greater priority than body
is a vital world, and is both one and number. And by the one indeed, it
is better than every form of habitude; but by the multitude it rules
over the different parts of the universe. For in its guardian powers it
contains the centre; since from thence the whole sphere is governed, to
which also it converges. Farther still, every thing turbulent in the
world is impelled to the middle, and requires a divine guard, which
is able to arrange it, and detain it in its proper boundaries. Hence
also, theologists terminate the progressions of the highest Gods in
that place; and the Pythagoreans call the middle either the tower or
the prison of Jupiter. But in its stable and at the same time vivific
powers, it contains the sphere of the earth. In its perfective and
generative powers, the sphere of water. In its connective and motive
powers it comprehends the air. In its undefiled powers, fire. And in
its intellectual powers, the whole heaven. In these powers, likewise,
it in one way contains the lunar, in another the solar, and in another
the inerratic sphere.
Such therefore, being the animation of the world, or its participation
of soul, Plato, as it is usual with him, beginning according to
conversion from things that are last, first imparts soul to the middle,
afterwards to the universe, and in the third place leaves something
of soul external to the universe. For as he gave subsistence to body
prior to soul, and to parts prior to wholes, thus also he imparts soul
to the world, beginning from things that have an ultimate existence.
When Plato therefore delivered the order of the plenitudes of the world
according to progression, beginning supernally, he placed intellect in
soul, and soul in body. But here where he delivers the order according
to conversion, he first animates the middle, and afterwards the
universe itself. For the river of vivification proceeds as far as to
the centre; as the Chaldean oracles also assert, when speaking about
the middle of the five centres, which from on high passes entirely to
the opposite part, through the centre of the earth. For they say: “And
another fifth middle fiery centre, where a life-bearing fire descends
as far as to the material rivers.” Hence Plato beginning from those
things in which animation ends, recurs to the whole vivification,
and prior to this surveys the exempt power of the soul. We must not
therefore place the ruling part of the soul in the centre; for this is
exempt from the universe; but a certain power of it which guards the
whole order of the world. For nothing else in the universe has so much
the power of entirely subverting the whole of things, as the centre and
the power of the centre, about which the universe with measured motion
harmoniously revolves. Hence it appears to me that Plato divinely
says that the demiurgus placed _soul_ and not _the soul_ in
the middle of the universe. For these differ from each other, because
the latter establishes the whole soul in the centre, but the former a
certain power of it, and a different power in different parts.
The philosopher himself however, shortly after, when speaking of the
animation itself of the world says, “But the soul being extended from
the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and investing it
externally in a circle, gave rise to the divine commencement of an
unceasing and wise life through the whole of time.” For the words “to
be every way extended from the middle,” have the same meaning as “to
be extended from the middle to the very extremities of the universe.”
But in the latter, the soul herself illuminates from herself the
centre of the universe and the whole sphere of it by her powers; while
in the former, the demiurgus is the cause of the animation, himself
introducing the soul into the universe as into her proper place of
abode. For the same thing is effected by both, but demiurgically
indeed and intellectually by the cause, and self-motively by soul.
Now however, the philosopher delivers the bond which proceeds from
fabrication alone. For we particularly refer wholes and such things
as are good to a divine cause; but we consider partial natures, and
such things as are not good, to be unworthy of divine fabrication; and
we suspend them from other proximate causes, though these also, as
it is frequently said, subsist from divinity. Since therefore both a
divine and a partial soul have communication with bodies, the former
indeed subsisting according to boniform will, and not departing from
intelligible progressions is deific; but the latter which takes place
through a defluxion of the wings of the soul, or through audacity,
or flight, is atheistical, though the former is complicated with the
self-motive energy, and the latter with providential care. But in the
one a subsistence according to deity is apparent through the presence
of divinity; and in the other, a subsistence from soul, through the
representation of aberration.