In the next place, let us speak concerning the dæmons, who are allotted
the superintendence of mankind. For of these dæmons, which, as we
have said, rank in the middle order, the first and highest are divine
dæmons, and who often appear as Gods, through their transcendent
similitude to the divinities. For, in short, that which is first
in every order preserves the form of the nature prior to itself.
Thus, the first intellect is a God, and the most ancient of souls is
intellectual. Hence, the highest genus of dæmons, as being proximate to
the Gods, is uniform and divine. The next to these in order are those
dæmons who participate of an intellectual peculiarity, and preside
over the ascent and descent of souls, and who unfold into light and
deliver to all things the productions of the Gods. The third are those
who distribute the productions of divine souls to secondary natures,
and complete the bond of those that receive effluxions from thence. The
fourth are those that transmit the efficacious powers of whole natures
to things generated and corrupted, and who inspire partial natures
with life, order, reasons, and the all-various perfect operations
which things mortal are able to effect. The fifth are corporeal, and
bind together the extremes in bodies. For, how can perpetual accord
with corruptible bodies, and efficients with effects, except through
this medium? For it is this ultimate nature which has dominion over
corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The sixth
in order are those that revolve about matter, connect the powers
which descend from celestial to sublunary matter, perpetually guard
this matter, and defend the shadowy representation of forms which it
contains.
Dæmons, therefore, as Diotima also says, being many and all-various,
the highest of them conjoin souls proceeding from their father to
their leading Gods. For every God, as we have said, is the leader in
the first place of dæmons, and in the next of partial souls. For the
demiurgus disseminated these, as Timæus says, into the sun and moon,
and the other instruments of time. These divine dæmons, therefore,
are those which are essentially allotted to souls, and conjoin them
to their proper leaders. And every soul, though it revolves together
with its leading deity, requires a dæmon of this kind. But dæmons of
the second rank preside over the ascensions and descensions of souls;
and from these the souls of the multitude derive their elections.
For the most perfect souls, who are conversant with generation in an
undefiled manner, as they choose a life conformable to their presiding
God, so they live according to a divine dæmon, who conjoined them
to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence, the Egyptian
priest admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine dæmon. To
souls, therefore, who live as those that will shortly return to the
intelligible world whence they came, the supernal is the same with the
dæmon which attends them here. But to imperfect souls the essential is
different from the dæmon that attends them at their birth.
If these things then are rightly asserted, we must not assent to those
who make our rational soul a dæmon. For a dæmon is different from
man, as Diotima says, who places dæmons between Gods and men, and as
Socrates also evinces, when he divides a dæmoniacal oppositely to the
human nature. “For,” says he, “not a human but a dæmoniacal obstacle
detains me.” But man is a soul using the body as an instrument. A
dæmon, therefore, is not the same with the rational soul.
This also is evident from Plato in the Timæus, where he says that
intellect has in us the relation of a dæmon. But this is only true
as far as pertains to analogy. For a dæmon according to essence is
different from a dæmon according to analogy. For in many instances,
that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a dæmon
with respect to that which is inferior, is called a dæmon. Thus Jupiter
in Orpheus calls his father Saturn an illustrious dæmon; and Plato in
the Timæus calls those Gods who proximately preside over, and orderly
distribute the realms of generation, dæmons. “For,” says he, “to speak
concerning other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds the
ability of human nature.” But a dæmon according to analogy is that
which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a God,
or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the Gods.
And the soul that through similitude to the dæmoniacal genus produces
energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and
which suspends the whole of its life from dæmons, is a dæmon κατα
σχεσιν, according to habitude, i.e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it
appears to me, Socrates in the Republic calls those dæmons, who have
lived well, and who in consequence of this are transferred to a better
condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential dæmon
is neither called a dæmon through habitude to secondary natures, nor
through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is
allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain
hyparxis, by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies.
In short, the rational soul is called in the Timæus the dæmon of the
animal; but we investigate the dæmon of man, and not of the animal;
that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument;
and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of
the animal, as Socrates says in the Phædo. For when the animal is no
more, the dæmon which the soul was allotted while connected with the
body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the soul possesses that dæmon
while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgment after
death, this dæmon must be the dæmon of the man, and not of the animal
alone. To which we may add, that beginning from on high, it governs the
whole of our composition.
Nor again, dismissing the rational soul, must it be said that a dæmon
is that which energizes in the soul: as for instance, that in those
who live according to reason, reason is the dæmon; in those that
live according to anger, the irascible part; and in those that live
according to desire, the epithymetic or desiring part. Nor must it
be said that the nature which proximately presides over that which
energizes in our life, is a dæmon: as for instance, that reason is
the dæmon of the irascible, and anger of those that live according to
desire. For, in the first place, to assert that dæmons are parts of
our soul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppose
the division of Socrates in the Republic, who after Gods and dæmons
places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing
in their poems heroes in no respect better than men, but subject to
similar passions. By this accusation, therefore, it is plain that
Socrates was very far from thinking that dæmons, who are of a sublimer
order than heroes, are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the
soul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things essentially
more excellent give completion to such as are subordinate. And in the
second place, from this hypothesis, mutations of lives would also
introduce multiform mutations of dæmons. For the avaricious character
is frequently changed into an ambitious life, this again into a life
which is formed by right opinion, and this last into a scientific life.
The dæmon, therefore, will vary according to these changes; for the
energizing part will be different at different times. If, therefore,
either this energizing part itself is a dæmon, or that part which has
an arrangement prior to it, dæmons will be changed together with the
mutation of human life, and the same person will have many dæmons in
one life; which is of all things the most impossible. For the soul
never changes in one life the government of its dæmon; but it is the
same dæmon which presides over us till we are brought before the judges
of our conduct, as also Socrates asserts in the Phædo.
Again, those who consider a partial intellect, or that intellect which
subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the same with
the dæmon which is assigned to man, appear to me to confound the
intellectual peculiarity with the dæmoniacal essence. For all dæmons
subsist in the extent of souls, and rank as the next in order to divine
souls. But the intellectual order is different from that of soul, and
is neither allotted the same essence, nor power, nor energy.
Further still, this also may be said, that souls enjoy intellect then
only when they convert themselves to it, receive its light, and conjoin
their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the presiding
care of a dæmoniacal nature through the whole of life, and in every
thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the dæmon that
governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we
made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of those
Gods that preside over fate. It is likewise the dæmon that supplies and
measures the illuminations from providence. And as souls indeed, we
are suspended from intellect, but as souls using the body we require
the aid of a dæmon. Hence, Plato in the Phædrus calls intellect the
governor of the soul; but he every where calls a dæmon the inspector
and guardian of mankind. And no one who considers the affair rightly,
will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing
pertaining to us, besides that of a dæmon. For intellect, as we have
said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and
nature is participated by the body, but not by the dianoëtic part.
And further still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but
it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the dæmon alone moves,
governs, and orderly disposes all our affairs. For he gives perfection
to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body,
supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees of fate, and
imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every
thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life. And
thus much concerning our allotted dæmons.